State of Karnataka v. Union of India & Another
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 8 November 1977
- Judge
- Justice M. Hameedullah Beg
- Neutral citation
- 1977 INSC 214
- Reported in
- [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1
- Result
- Dismissed
- Acts & sections
- Article 131 Constitution, Article 300 Constitution, Article 163 Constitution, Article 356 Constitution
- Subject
- Civil
Full judgment
STATE OF KARNATAKA
v. UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER November 8, 1977
[M. H. BEG, C.J., Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWALIA, P. N. SHINGHAL, JASWANT SINGH AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]
Constitution of India 1950-Art. 131-Scope of-Commission of Inquiry
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appointed by the Central Government under the
Cornmissions of lr_iquiry 4ct,
1952 to inquire into allegations of corruption, favouritism and nepotlsm agaifl!t the Chief Minister of a State-Suit filed by the State under Art. 131-If main· tainable-Central Government, if could constitute a Commission of Inquiry against sitting Chief Mini.ster and Ministers of the State Government-Action of Central Government, if destructive of federal structure of the Constitution and distribution of powers betweell the Cen1re and the States-.ff subverts the principle of collective responsibility under which Ministers are responsible only
to the State Legislature-If violates privileges of the menibers of the Assembly under Art. 194(3). Co1n1nissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 validity of-Section 3-Scope of-If s. 3 ultra vires Part XI of the Constitution-Inquiry-Purpose and scope of"Defintte matter of public importance" meaning of.
Article 131 of the Constitution of India provides that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in any dispute :- (a) between the Government of !ndia and one or more States; or (b) between Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other; or ( c) between two or more States if and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. A memorandum alleging corruption, favouritism and nepotism against the Chief Minister of the State of Kamat.aka was submitted to the Union Homo Minister by certain opposition members of the State Assembly. The Chief Minister repelled the allegations as frivolous and· pclitica.Ily motivated. By a notification dated May 18, 1977 .the State Government appointed under s. 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, a one man commission presided over by a retired Judge of the Karnataka High Court for inquiring into the allegations specified in the nOtification. By notifica· tion dated May 23, 1977, the Government of India appointed under s. 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, a one man commission presided over by a retired judge of the Supreme Court to enquire into the charges made agaimt the Chief Minister excluding "any matter covered by the notification of the Government of Karnataka". Thereupon, the State Qiovemment filed in this Court a suit under Art. 131 of the Constitution. On the pleadings of the parties, three issues were framed by this Court. These \Vere : (1) Is the suit maintainable·? (2) Is the impugned notification ultra vires the powers of the Central Government under s. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 ? (3) Even if the notification falls within sec. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act is the section itself unconstitutional ? It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that : (I) the Central Govern· ment has no jurisdiction or authority to constitute the Commission of Inciuiry in the purported exercise of its powers under the Act; (2) the action of the Central Government in appointing the Commission against the Ministers of the State Government is destrnctive of the federal strncture of the Constitution and the scheme of distribution of powers between the Centre and the States; (3) under the Cabinet system of government the Council of Ministers is responsible to the Legislature for all its actions and the inquiry ordered by the Central Government against the State Ministers, while they are in office would subvert the principle of collective responsibility of Ministers to the Legislature; (4) by virtue of Art 194(3) it is the privilege of the Assembly (and not of
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any other body) to appoint a Committee for inquiring into the conduct of ·,,any of its members; (S) interpretation of s. 3 of the 1952 Act in such a way as to empower the Central Government to appoint a Co~ion for inquiring into matters relating to any of the entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution would make s. 3 itself ultra vires thet provisions of Part XI of the Constitution; and (6) r:.ince on the basis of the report the Central Government cannot take any action against the Ministers of the State Government such . a - Comm~~>ion cannot serve any . useful purpose. ·
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On the other hand, the 4.efendant (Central Government) raised preli:mi- nary objections as to the maintainability of the suit -on the ground that the appointment of such a Commission does not affect any legal right of the State; and-(2) also that the Central Government is competent to constitute a Com. mission to inquire into a. definite matter of public importance, -(3) that, furthermore, its notification does not cover any of the matters mentioned in the State Government's notification, nam'!ly, the conduct of Afinisters of the State Government.:· I
, (Per majority_ Beg, C.J. Chandrachud, Bhagwati_ and K.ailasam, JJ) (Untwalia, Shinghal and Jaswant Singh, JJ dissenting) The suit is maintainable. BEG, C. 1.
l(a) The sUte concerned~ ~1 hich challenges the validity of the ·action of.th~ Central Government against one or moie of its ~Iinisters in respect of acts involving exercise of its governmental powers, \\'Ould have sufficient interest to maintain a suit under Art. 131 because it involves claims to what appertains to the State os a "State." [94 CD] (b) The case involves consideration of the exercise of govemffiental powers \\'hich vest in the: Government of the State and its Ministers :is such l-'is-a·vis those of the Central Government and its 1\finisters. It also raises questions relating to the meaning and the ambit and the applicability of the particular provisions of the Constitution whose. operations are of vital inten:st to every State. Interpretations given to those provisions mu'it necessarily be of great concern to ~he Union as well. [91 C·D] ( c) The Union of India, acting through the Central Government. could be said to represent the v. hole of the people of India. The individual States, act· ing through their Governments and Ministers, could be said to represent the people of each individual State and their intere'its. When differences arise between the representatives of the State and those of the whole people of India, on questions of interpretation of the Constitution, \\'hich must affect the welfare of the whole people, and, particularly that of the people of the State concerned, it is too technical an argument to be accepted that a suit does not lie under · · Article 131 of the Constitution. [91 E·FJ (d) Article 131 can be invoked "\Vhenever a State and other States or the Union differ on a question of interpretation of the Constitution so that a. decision of it will affect the scope or ex,.erci.se of governmental powers which are attributes of a State. It makes no difference to the maintainability of the action if the pov:ers of the State which are executive, legislative, and judicial are exercised through particular individuals.. [92 F·Gl . (e) The distinction between the State and its Government is, 3.t the most.--one - between the whole and an inseparable part of the whole. It would be immaterial as regards claims on behalf of either the State or its Government whether the two are distinct juristic ·entities. Assuming that these are ·distinctly separate entities, the claim of the- Government wOUld be that of the ·'State.
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'· (f) The fact thai th~ s·tate aCts tbrou&h its Mini~ters ~r officials ~ot affoct the maintainability. of a c;uit under Art. 131 of the Constitution. ;.-\rticle 166(3)_ provides for allocation of the business of the Government an1ong the ~Ii('isters for "the more convenient transaction of the business". This implies that the State cannot act merely through its Govcmtnent as a "\vhole but also
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KARNATAKA V. UNION
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tbrouih its intfoidual Ministers as provi:lcd by the rules. Articles 166(3) and 154(1), far from establishing any antithesis between the official capacity of a Minister and the State for which he acts, only show that, as a Minisfer, he "is an agent or a limb of the Government of the State and, therefore, he can be treated as an officer for purposes of Art. 154,(1). The result is that a Minister's official acts cannot be distinguished from those of the State on whose behalf he acts. There is nothing in Art. 131 of the Constitution it.elf, to debar the State, which must always necessarily act through its officers or agents or Ministers, from suing the Central Government not only to protect one of its dfficers, agents or Ministers from being proceeded against, by the Central Government, but to prefer its own claim to exclusive power to deal with him and this is what the plaintiff has done by means of the suit. [92 H; 93 DJ
State of Raiasthan v. Union of India A.l.R. 1977 S.C. 1361, King Emperor
v. Sibnath Benerii & Ors, 72 LA. 241 and Sanieevi Naidu etc. etc. v. State of
Madras & Anr. [1970] 3 S.C.R. 505 referred to.
The Governor-General in Council v. The Province of Madras, [1943] FCR p. 1, United Provinces v. Governor·General in Council, AIR 1939 PC 58, Attorney~General for Victoria- at the Relation of Dale and Ors. v. The Commonwalth & Ors., 71 C.L.R. 237 and Attorney-General for Victoria (At the relation of the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers) v. The Commonwealth 1933-1934 (2) C.L.R. 533 held inapplicable. The Central Government's notification is valid.
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[94 G)
2(a) A perusal of the tv. 0 notifications sho\VS that while the State notifica1
tion is meant to set up the commission which has to enquire whether the veil worn by certain transactions is correct in fo1m and covers it fully, the Central Government notification j5 clearly meant to enable the Commission appointed ·by it to tear down the veil of appareilt legality and regularity which may be worn by some transactions. It cannot be said that the two notifications would be covering "the same matter" as contemplated by proviso (b) to s. 3(1) of the Act. If the State notification is meant only to superficially scratch the -surface of the allegations made whereas the Central Government notification is meant to probe into the crux or the heart of what may or may not have gone wrong with the body politic in the State, this Court could not be too technical or astute in finding reasons to hold that the subject-matter of the two inquiries is substantially the same. [36 G-H] (b) Since the two notifications authorise inquiries into matters \Vhich are substantially different in nature and object, the inquiry of the Central Commission cannot be said to be barred by reason of the State Government notification under proviso (b) to s. 3 (!) of the Act even if, in order to deal with a substantially different subject-matter, central areas of fact or rules governing If the objectives are different the the transactions may be common. examination of common areas of fact and Jaw for different purposes will be permissible. [39 Bl 3(a) The obvious intention behind the 1952 Act is to enable the machinery · of democratic Government to function more efficiently and effectively. It could hardly be construed as an Act n1eant to 1hv;'art democratic methods of Government. [44 El
(b) In· all democratic countries when allegations and rumours circulate causing crisis of confidence in the integrity of public life or about other matters of public importance, it is essential that public confidence should be restored and this can be done only by thoroughly investigating and probing the rumours and allegations. Such an inquiry might reveal either that the evil exists or that· ·there is no force in the rumours. In either case- confidence is restored. [40 H]
(c) In England; the Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 was passed ·to displace the procedure of Select Parliamentary Committees which tilt then w~r~ use? "tp investigat~ .aJleged ytrong doing in high places". Such a method ·of 111vc~t1gullon by a political Tnbun::i1 \vas found to be wholly unsatisfa1ctory fuecause such hod1es could never be free from party political influences. When
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reports of these committees came to be debated in the House of Commons. the House was divided on party-lines and by a majority exonerated the minis~ ters from all blame. Therefore, investigation by a political tribunal on matters causing grave public disquiet had been discredited and the 1921 Act was passed for setting up some permanent investigating machinery. Even in the United States, where the system of Congressional Committees is still in vogue, ad hoc tribunals (such as the Warren Commission) are appointed to avoid a matter being referred to Congressional Committees. This clearly, shows that. in democratic countries, not only does modem practice but statute can provide for inquiries of the kind which are to be conducted under the 1952 Act. The proceedings of the Commission can only result in a report which is to be laid before the Legislature concerned under s. 3.i( 4) of the Act. The Act contains no provision for giving effect to the1 findings of the Commission or for enforcing any order which can be made by the C0mmission. t41 C-H; 44 EJ 4. The question whether a State Government or its Chief !\-1inister is or is not carrying out the trust which the constitutional po\ver places in the hands of a State Government and its head for the purposes of determining whether any exercise of extraordinary powers under Art. 356 is called for or not. is a matter which lay within the powers of the Central Government. What is contemplated by Art. 356 when it speaks of the "satisfaction" of the President fron1 a report of the Governor "or otherwise" whether a particular situation has arisen in which the Government of the State can be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution is a matter which would be of public importance. If the President deems it necessary to give the State Government or i~ Chief Minister an opportunity of being beard before an impartial Commission of Inquiry constit'uted under the Act, it could not be said that such a mode of exercise of power under Art. 356 is not fully covered by what i3 necessarily implied in the provisions of the Constitution, that is. the power to on.l~~r an inquiry for the. purposes of the satisfaction jCquired by Art. 356. [48 F-Hl 5(a) Provisions of either Art. 75(2) or Art. 164(2) cannot operate as bars against the institution of inquiries by Commissions set up under the Act. To infer such bars would be to misunderstand the object as well as the mode and s):lhere of operation of these articles as also the purposes, scope, and function of Commissions to be set up under the Act. [53 HJ (b) The Council of Ministers, though theoretically <1ppointcd by the Gvvernor. is curlectively responsible to the Legblntivc Assembly of the State. But ihis col!ecti>.·e responsibility doe'i ~ot abrid,!!c or truncate the power of the Central Government to appoint a Commission under s. J of tho Act. Coltectivc responsibility has a scope and mode of operation which are very different from those of an inquiry under s. 3 of the Act even thou,gh the same or similar matters may some times give rise to both. Matters investigated under s. 3 of the Act may have no bearing on any collective responsibility. The sphere of inquiry under s. 3 is very different from that in which collective resoonsibility functions. While the obiect of collective responsibility is to make the whole body of Ministers collectively or vicariously responsible for acts of others even if an individual minister may not personally be responsible. the inquiry under s. 3 has been ordered by the Central Government to determine who is actuallv responsible for certain actions and what \vi11 be the motive behind them. [50 F] (c) Inasmuch ns the Council of Ministers is able to stay in office only so· long as- it continues the support and confidence of a majority of the Members of the Legislature. the whole Council of Ministers is politica11y responsible forthe decisions and policies of each of the 1-finisters and of his department. S0 far as the Ministry's nnswerability to the Legislative Assembly is concerned, the \Vhole Ministry has to be treated as one entity. The purpose of Art. 164(2). \\·hich embodies this principle, is not to find out facts or to establish the actu<il responsibility of a Chief Minister or anv other Minister or Ministers for particular decisions or governmental acts. The principle of individual as well as collective miilisterial /responsibility can work most efficiently only when cases requiring proper sifting an~ evaluati~n of evidence and ~is~ussion ~f q_u~_qons involved have ta-ken place 1n proceedings before a Con1n11ss1on appointed unaer s. 3 of lhe Act. [51 F-G]
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KARNATAKA V. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
6(a) The only sanction for the enforcement of collective responsibility is the pressure of public opinion. In England, the principle operates as a matter of convention backed by political judgment, but for us, this principle is stated in our Constitution itself [Arts. 75(2) and 164(2)]. Nevertheless, here also it depends upon convention and public opinion, particularly as reflected in Parliament or in State Legislatures, for its effectiveness. The principle, of
coti.:.;.tive re,•.pcnsibility also exists &eparately J.1~d independently from the IP.gal liability of a Minister holding anr office in the Union or a State Govern-
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ment. [52 HJ (b) An investigation by a Commission of inquiry should facilitate or help the formation of sound public opinion. A Minister's_ individual actions, however, do not bring into operation the principle of collective responsibility where his colleagues in the Government cannot reasonably be held guilty of dereliction or breach of any duty. [53 C-D] Constitutional Law-Wade & Phillips 8th Edn. p. 87. Constitutional and Administrative Law Prof. S. A. dt1 Smith, pp. 170-179 referred to.
7. A Commission of Inquiry has an orbit of action of its own within which it can move so as not to conflict with or impede other forms of action or modes of redress. A Commission of Inquiry is meant to explore and discover real facts. It is neither a substitute for action in a court of law nor can its report or findings relieve courts of their duty. The appointment of a Commission is generally a confession of want of sufficient evidence to take the matter to a court combined with an attempt to satisfy the public need and d~re to discover what had really gone wrong and how and where, if
po6Sible. [53 G-H] 8. There is no force in the contention that Ministers answerable to the Legislature are governed by a separate law which exempted them from liabilities under the ordinary law. Articles 194 and 105' which deal with powe~. privileges and immunities of each House as well as its Members, do not apply to legislative powers of Parliament or of the State Legislatures. The "powers" meant to be indicated in these Articles are powers which depend upon or are necessary for the conduct of business Of each House. [57 B-C]
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9(a) The Constitution could not mention and exhaust every conceivable topic of legislation and it is precisely to meet such a situation that Art. 248' read with Entry 97 was inserted. Therefore. Art 248 read with Entry 97 of List I will fully cover s. 3 of the Act even if Entry 94 c>f List I does not. The term 'constitutional law' can be neither clearly nor exhciustively defined. A. Constitution could be expected to contain only the basic frame-work.r It is not a part of its nature to exhaustively deal with all ma.tters. It is well accepted that nJt all ccnstitutional law need - b.~ written. Ther~ can be no clear-cut distinction between what could or should and what could not or should not be comprehended within the bcxly of rule~ called _constitutional law. In practice, what is embodied even in a written constitution depends sometimes on the peculiar notions of a people. It reflects their views about what should be consideff!d so basic or fundamental as to find a place in the constitutional document. To expect the content of the Constitution to be so all-embracing as to deal with every ccri.ceivable topic of legislation exhaustively so as to leave no roon1 for doubt is to expect the humanly impracticable, if not the impossible. The most that could be expected from the human foresight of Constitution-maki;rs is that they should provide for the residual power of legislation which could cover topics on which Parliament or State legislatures could legis-late even though the legislation may not be easily assignable to any specific entry. Such a provision our Constitution-makers did wake. [61 H; 59 G-H; 61 B-C; D-El
(b) The term 'inquires' as used in Entry 94 of List 1 and Entry 45 of List III, without any limitations, is wide enough to _embrace every kind of inquiry, whether a criminal offence by any one is disclosed or not by facts alleged. Entry 45 in List Ill must include inquires to- cover allegations against all persons which bring them within the sphere of Entry I of List III relatin~ to criminal law. Alt that "inquires" covered by Entry 45 require is that they
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must be ..for the purpose -of any of the mati:ers specified in List II or· List lll". The language used " ...... any of the matters specified.• .. " is broad enough to cover anything reasonably related to any of the enumerated items even if done by holders of ministerial offices in the States. Other subjects will be foun<;t in List II. Even assuming that neither Entry 94 -List I nor Entry 45 of list III v.:ouid cover inquires against 11inisters in the States,: relatin~ to act'\ connected \Vith the exercise of ministerial powers: Art. 248, read with Entry 97 of List 1~- n:usl necessarily cover an inquiry against r.Hnisters on matters of public importance, whether the allegations ·include violations of criminal law or not. A contrary view would have the whoHy unacceptable consequence of placing ~finisters in State Governments practically above the law. [63 C·E] . t_ __
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(c)'Since the powei-s- confefr~d by-s. 3 upon the Central and State Govern· ments. including the PQ'o\'er to institute inquiries of the kind set up under each of the two Notifications. are covered by the express constitutional pro••isions. no question of any exclusion, either by necessary implication or by any principle supposed to form a part· of or to flow from the ·basic structure of the Constitution, can arise here. Nor is it possible to so read down and interpret s. 3 of the Act as to exclude from its purview inquiries of the. kind instituted under the two notifications; To do so would' be to give an incentive to possible misuse and perversion of governmental machinery -and powers for objects not \\'arranted by law. Such powers carry constitutional obligations with them. They are to be exercised like the powers ·and obligations of tlustees who must not deviate from the purposes of their trusts. \Vhether a ~linhtcr has or h<ls not abused his powers and privileges could be bcSt detf'rmined by fair and honest people anyv..here only after a just and impartial inquiry hn.s taken place into co:r;nplaints ·made against him so that jts results are before them. {64 A-CJ (d) There is no room for applying the rule Exprc.~sio Ur.ius Est Excfr1jio to exclude "''hat falls within an expressly provided legislative entry. Before the principle can be applied at rill, the Court- must find an exoress n1ode of doing something that is provided in a statute which, by· its necessary implication, could exclude doing of that very thing and not something else in some other way. Far from this being the case here, the constitution-makers intendt:d to cover the making of provisions by. Parliament for inquiries for various object5 which 1nay be matters of public importance V.'ithout any indications of any other limits except that they must relate to subjects found in the I.ist.- [64 }11 Alt~rius
Coll1uhoun v. Brooks, [1888] Q.B.D. 52 @ 65 referred to.
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(e)" The proposition that what is not specifically mentioned in the Consti· tutlon must be deemed to be deliberately excluded from its purview so that nothing short of a constitutional amendment could authorise legislation upon it, is really to invent a "Ca.sus Omissus·~ so as to apply the rule that. \\"here there is such a gap in the law, the Court cannot fill it. The rule, however. is equally clear that the Court cannot so interpret a statute as to produce a ca.sus omissus _where there is really none. If the Constitution itself provides for legislation to fill what is sought to be construed as a lacuna, legislation seeking to it!.o this cannot be held to be void because it performs its .intended function by an exercise of an expressly conferred legislative power. l,n declaring the purpose of the provisions· so made and the authority for making it~ Courts_ do not supply an omission or fill up .a gap at all. It is Parliament ~hich can do so and has~ done it. [65 A-BJ
The Mer;~y Docks and HarbOur Board v. V. Hfnderson Brothers, [1888] 13 A.C. 595 @ 602 T'ferred to. ·
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lO(a) "fhe \\'ritten Co~titution by its very nature as the embodiment ·of the fundamental law of the land makes it imperative for Courts to determine th;.; meanings of_ its parts. in _keeping, with its broad. and h~si.; ~ur~,·s :tnd objectives. It nlust be ·read: as a v..·holei and construed in keeping w1th _1ts declaTed objects and __its f~hctio~~. Although .the Courts. actiriJ?. in exerc~e ~of judicial pov.'cr, may supplem\~nt those parts where-the'Jetter of.the Constttut10:1 is silent or may leave room-: fo~ it'i development by either ordinary legislation _
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KARNATAKA l'. UNION
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'or judicial intcrprcta'tion, they cannot nullify, defeat, or d~t~rt the reasonably clear meaning of any part of the Constitu~ion in order to give expression to some theories of their own about the broad or basic scheme of the Constitution. This must be done with reference to the express provisions of the Consti:tution. The dubiousness of expressions used may be cured by Courts by making their n1canings clear and definite,'. if necessary, in the Hght of the broad and basic purposes set before themsel.ves by th-: Constitution-makers. The power of judicial interpretation cannot· extend to Jaying down what is in direct conflict with, express provisions of the. Constitution. Nor can express provisions be curtailed by importing limits based on a_ mere theory of limitations on legis· lative powers:~ [66 C-GJ · (b) In the matter of interpretation of the Constitution~ in a Jong line of decisions, this Court has held that where two constructions are possible, the Court should- adopt that __ which will implement and discard that which .will stultify the apparent intention~ of the Constitution-makers, that the Court should adopt a construction which harmonizes rather than one which produces a conflict between its provisions, the construction which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and eschew the other which will lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well-established provisions of existing law nugatory, that the plenitude of power to legislate, indicated by a legislative entry, has to be given as wide and liberal an interpretatiOn as is reasonably possible. If a subject does not fall within a specificaily demarcated field found in List Il or List III, it would fall in List I, apparently because of the amplitude of the residuary field indicated by Entry 97~ List I. Legislative entries only denote fields of operation of legislative power which is actually conferred -by one of the articles of the Constitution. This Court has also rejected argument -that the wide range given to Entry 97 of List I, read with ArL 248 of the Constitution, would destroy the federal structure of Our Republic. On an application of_ a similar test. the powers. given to the Central Government by s. 3 of the Act, cOuld not be held to be invalid on the ground that the federal structure of the State is jeopardized_. [68 C; E: 69 C; 70 B & DJ · · - -
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A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 & 119 to 120. State of Bi/lar v. Kame'shwar Singh. (1952] SCR 889 & 980.81, I. C. Go/aknath v. State of Puniab [1967] 2 SCR 762 @ 791, K. K. Kochuni "· State of E Madras & Kera/a, [1960] 3 SCR 887 & 905, Mohd. Hanif v. State of Ei/1ar, [1959] SCR 629 @ 648, State of M.P. v. Ranojirao Shinde. [1963] 3 SCR 489, Prem--Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 885 @ 911 Deradasan v. Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680 @ 695, Kes-;ananda BT.arati v. State of Kerala, [1973] 4 SCC 225 @ 426, (=1973 Suppl. SCR !), Sakal Papers (P) Ltd: v. Union of lndia, [1962] 3 SCR 842, lagannat/i B~klh Singh v. State of U.P., [1963] 1 SCR 2,0 @ 228-229 and Union of lndie1 v. R. S. Dhillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33 referred to. ~ (c) Whenever the doctrine of basic structure -- bas been expounded or F applied it is only as a doctrine of interpretation of the Constitution as it actualJy exists and not of a Constitution which could exist only subjectively in the minds of different individuals as mere theories about what the Constitution is. The doctrine did not add to the contents of the Constitution. It did not, in theory, deduct anything from what was there. lt only purported to bring out ~ exrlain the meaning of what was already there. It \\'as~ ·in fact, used .by all • the Judges for this purpose with differing results simply because .their assessments or inferences as to what was part of the basic structure in the Coru.titution differed. This is the correct interpretation of the doctrine of the basic structure of the Constitution. It should only_ be applied if it is clear, beyond the region of doubt, that what is put forward as a restriction upon otherwise clear and plenary legislative power is -there as a Constitutional imperative. [ 86 G-HJ · (d) If thfa is the correct view about the basic structure, as a mode of interprctin6 the Constitution only, the so called federalism as a fetter on legislative poV.'er must fin~ ~xpression in some expi:ess provision to be recognised by Court~. A .ma1onty of Judges who decided the Keshvanand Bharati's case H have not treated "federalism" as part of the basic structure of the Constitution and none of them ba.s discussed the extent of the "federal" part of this struc~ tu:-e. It h r.ot enough to point out Art. 1 of the Constituiion to emphasise that
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our R<!public is a "Union" of States. The word "Union" was used in the the peculiar character of our federal Republic revealed by its express provisions. One . has to find from other express provisions what this "Union" n1cans or what is th;! extent or nature of "federalism" implied by it. The Cons.titution itself does not use the word "federation" at all. It is not possible to ~1scover any such. fetter which could, by a necessary implication, preYent PaTliament from enacting s. 3 of the Act. [87 B~D]
Per Chandrachud, l.
contex~ of
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The preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit ought to be rejected. The proceeding brought by the State of Karna.taka is maintainable under Art. 131 of the Constitution. [100 C~
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(a) The jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Art. 131 of the Constitution should not b~ tested on the anvil of rules which are applied under the Code of Civil Procedure for determining whether a suit is maintainable. A constitutional provision which confers exclusive jurisdiction on this Court to entertain disputes of a certain nature in th'! exercise of its original jurisdiction, cannot be equated with a provision conferring a right on a civil court to entertain a common suit so as to apply to an original proceeding under Art. 131 the canons of a suit which is ordinarily triable under s. 15 of the C.P.C. by a court of the lowest grade competent to try it. The Constitution docs not describe a proceeding under Art. 131 as a suit but uses words nnd phrases commonly employed for determining the jurisdiction of a court of first instance to entertain and try a suit. It does not Speak of a cause of action; instead it employs the word "dispute". Above all, Art. 131 is a self-contained code on matters falling within its purview. By the very terms of the Article, the sole conditiOn required to be satisfied for invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court is that the dispute l1ctween the parties, referred to in clauses (a) to (c) must involve a question on which the existence or ex1ent of a legal right depends. [97 E-H] (b) The quintessence of Art. 131 is that there has to be a dispute between the parties regarding a question on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. A challenge by the State Government to the authority of the Central Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry clearly involves a question on which the existence or extent of the legal right of the Central Government to appoint the Commission of Inquiry depends and that is enough to sustain the proceeding brought by the State under Art. 131 of the Constitution. Tlie Constitution has purposefully conferred on this Court a jurisdiction \vhich is untrammelled by considerations which fetter the jurisdiction of a court of first instance which entertains and tries suits of a civil nature. The very nature of the dispute arising under Art. 131 is different both in form and substance from the nature of claims which require adjudication in ordinary suits. [98 B-DJ (c) Part XI of the Constitution is devoted specially to the delineation of 1elations between the Union and the States. The object of Art. 131 is to provide a high powered machinery for ensuring that the Central Government and the State Governments act within the respective spheres of their authority and do not trespass upon each other's constitutional functions or powers. Therefore a challenge to the constitutional capacity of the defendant to act in an int~nded n1anner is enough to attract the application of Art. 131 particularly when the plaintiff claims that right exclusively for itself. [98 F-GJ (d) A proc~edi.ng under ,Art. 13,1.stan~s ii! s~arp contra~t with an ordinary civil suit. While in an ordinary c1v1l suit re1ectton of a nght asserted by the defendant cannot correspondingly and of its own force establish the right claimed by the. plaintiff, proceedings under Art. 131 are adjudicatory of the limits of constitutional power vested in the Central or the State Governments. Jn a civil suit the plaintiff has to succeed on the strength of his own title; the competition in a proc_eeding und~r Art~ '131 ,is. bet~een t'"'.o or D!Ore G~vern ments. There is no third ~ltema~1vc a~ 1n :i. civil Sl}tt wherein the nght cla1iped by the plaintiff may reside neither 1n htm nor tn the defendant but 1n a stranger. A demarcation and definili0n of constitutional power between the
- ,..
•
KARNATAKA v. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
rival claimants and restricted to t!zeni and tfiem alone is \Vhat a proceeding under Art. 13 J necessarily involves. [98 H & 99 A-C]
I
'
(e) There is no force in the defendant's contention that if a State Govern· inent challenges the constitutional rights! .of the Central Government to t~k~ a particular course of action, Art. 131 will not be attracted. The contention -0f the State Government is not only that the Central Government has no power to appoint the Inquiry Commission for enquiring into the conduct of State Ministers but that such right is exclusively vested in the State Government. There is, therefore, not only a denial of. the right. claimed. by t!'e Central Government but an assertion that the nght exclusively resides 1n the State Government. [99 D-E]
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India A.I.R. 1977 S.C.J. 361 referred to, (f) A writ under Art. 226 is hardly a substitute for a proceeding under Art. 131. A dispute between one or more States or bet\veen the Government Qf India and a State on the one hand and another State or other States on the other, cannot properly be decided by a High Court under Art. 226. Moreover disputes of the nature described in Art. 131 being usually of an urgent natu~e should be decided by this Court to obviate dilatoriness of a possible appeal. Tue original proceeding is decided once and for all by this Court.
C
[100 A-BJ
2. The notification issued by the Central Government is within the scope of
s. 3 (!) of the Act. The objection of the State Government that it offends
against cl. (b) of th' proviso to s. 3(1) of the Act is factually unfounded and theoretically unsound. [114 F; 10 I HJ
(a) It is wrong to contend that the Central Government has appointed the Comn1ission of Inquiry for the purpose of inquiring into the same matter into which the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the State Government is directed to inquire. [IOI El (b) Considering the terms of the notifications issued by the State Government and the Central Government and the matters into which the respective Commissions are directed to inquire, it is obvious that the obiect and purpose of the two inqciries is basically different The primary object of the Stare Government in appointing the commission is to ascertain whether imorooer or excessive payments were made, undue favours were shown, irregularities or fraud had occurred in the conduct of official business etc; and secondly to find out as to who are "the· persons responsible for the lanses, if any, regarding the aforesaid and to what extent". On the other hand, the Commission appointed bv the Central Government is specifically directed to inquire 11whether lhe Chief Minister practised favouritism and nepctism" in regard to various matters mentioned in the notification. [IOO G; IOI D-E]
( c) Moreover, it is hardly ever possible that the State Government will appoint a Commission to inquire into actci of corruption, favouritism and nepotism on the part of its Chief Minister. [IOI G] 3(a) On a plain reading of s. 3(1) of the Act, it is impossible to hold that the section cannot be construed as authorising the Central Government to appoint a Commission of lnquirv for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of a sitting Minister of a State Government. [l 02 BJ (b) Section 3 ( 1) cannot be S?iven a restricted meaning. There is no justificaHon for readin_g down the provisions of the section to limit the. power of the Central Government to appointing a Commission of Inquiry for inquiring into the con.duct of persons in relation to matters concerning the affairs of the Union Government only. The section empowers the Central Government to appoint a Commission: for making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance. It is inarguable that the conduct of Ministers of State Governments in the purported discharge of their official functions is not a definite ma1ter of public importance .. Further, it cannot bo said that the Central Go\'trnment does not even possess the power to collect facts in regard to
SUP.REME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 2 S.C.R.
allegations of corruption made by a section of the State Legislature sitting l\linisters of the Sta.te Governn1ent. [102 E~F]
against
(c) The argument thats. 3(1) will offend against the principle of collective responsibility unless it is construed narrowly is without substance. Whatever may be the findings of the Commission of Inquiry, the Council of Ministers Vvhether at the Centre or in the States, continues to be collectively answerable or accountable to the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly. Neither the appointment of the Commission nor even the rejection by thc:t Commission of all or any of the allegations referred to it for its inquiry would make the Council of Ministers any the less answerable to those bodies. The object of Articles 75(3) and 164(21 of the Constitution is to provide that for every decision taken by the Cabinet each one of th~ Ministers is responsible to the Legislature concerned. It is difficult to accept that for acts of co1ruption, nepotism or favouritis1n which are alleged by members against an individual Minister, the entire Council of Ministers can be held collectively responsible to the Legislature. If an individual Minister uses his office as an occasion or pretence for committing acts of corruption, he would be personally answerable for his unlawful acts and no question of collective responsibilit~ of the Council of Ministers can nrise in such a case. [105 C; 103 F-H]
(d) The essence of collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers is that the Cabinet is responsible to the Legislature for every action taken in any of the ministries. In other words the principle of collective responsibility governs only those acts which a Minister performs or can reasonably be said to have performed in the la\vful discharge of his oflicial functions. l104. B]
'
-- .
A. Sanjeel'i l\1aidu etc. v. Stale of Atadra.1 & Anr., [1970] 3 SCR 505, 512
·~·: ·~:.:i
referred to.
VJ'<
(e) In lhe llb:-:u1ce of a specific provision in the c·onsr~uiion t!J~1t ;lie conduct of a member of the Legislature shall be inquired into by the Legislature only,
,lS
It is impossible to hold that the appointment o~ a Commisslon of Inquiry under
English precedents relating to the privileges of the House of Commons which are relevant under Art. 194(3) do not support th~ State's contention. [105 0]
'';"
the Act constitutes interference with the privHeges of the Legislature.
(f) The po\ver conferred by Parliament on the Central (Jovernment to appoint a Commission of Inquiry under s. 3 ( 1) of the Act for the purpose of finding facts in regard to allegations of corruption, favouritism and nepotism against a sitting Chief Minister or Ministers cannot be held to constitute inter~ ference with the executive functions of the State Government or that it confer~ on the Central Government the power to control the functions of the State executive. [109 F-G] (g) i\n examination of the provisions and scheme of the Act shows that a Commission appointed under the Act is purely ·.a fact finding body \Vith no power to pronounce a binding or a definitive judgment. The larger interest of the community requires that sensitive matters of public importance should be enquired into by a high-po\V·ercd Commission whose findings can command the confidence of the people. If, on receipt of the report, the Central Government decides to take any action. the validity thereof may have to be decided in the light of the con~titutional provisions. But, until that stage arrives, it is difficult to hold that the Central Government is exercising any control or supervisory jurisdiction over the executive functions of the State. [108 B-C]
(h) The impugned Act cannot b~ held to suffer from ;.vant of legislative competence in the Parliament to enact it. Entry 94 of List I, Entry 45 of List fl! and failing these, Entry 97 of l.ist I must sustain the Act. [112 Bl
II
(i) In Shri Ra1n Krishna Dalniia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tcndo!kar and other.:1 this Court held that Parliament had the legislative competence to pas.;; the law under Enny 94 of Lis~ I and Entry 45 of List m of tho Seventh Schedule. The word "Inquiries" occurring in the two Entries must be held to cover the po\ver to pa&s an Act providing for appointment of CommiS!ions of Inquiry. Since
r
' "F'
KARNATAKA v. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
I1
the power to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of sitting M1n1sters of State Governments does not offend against the principle of collective responsibility or against the privileges of the Legislative Assembly, and, ~ince it does not also confer on the Central Government the power of control
over the State executive, the provision must be held to be a valid exercise of
the legislative competence of the Parliament.
[111 B·C]
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others, [1959]
SCR 279, 293 approved. M. V. Rajwade v. Dr. S. M. Hassan & Ors., AIR 1954 Nag. 71 Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, [1955] SCR 955, 975 referred to.
•
·'
and
(j) Entry 97 is in the nature of a residuary entry and the words "any other matter" which appear therein, mean "any matter other than those enumerated in List I". If entry 94, List I does not cover the Act, inquiries of the nature contemplated by the Act wilJ fall within the description "any other matter" occurring in entry 97 of List I. If entry 45 of List III and the vvhole of the State List are to be kept out of consideration, the Act will relate to "a matter not enumerated in List IT or List III." [111 G] (k) The contention that by empowering the Central Government to appoint a Commission for inquiring into the· conduct of the sitting Ministers of the State Government, Parliament }las legislated, on the Centre-State relationship \.\hich is a constitutional subject, is without any force. The Act merely empowers the Central Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for col . . lccting facts with a view to informing its own mind and the report of the Commission is not binding on any one. If a law is within the legislative competence of the legislature, it cannot b~ invalidated on the supposed ground that it has added something to, or has supplemented, a constitutional provision so long as the addition or supplementation is not inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution. [113 A; 112 F-G; 114 C-D]
~·
\
(1) Not only that the pith and substance of the Act is "inquiries" but it does not even incidentally encroach or trespass upon the constitutional field occupied by Part XI. If it does not touch the subject matter of Centre-State relationship, there is no question of its impinging upon a subject dealt with by the Constitution. Even assuming that legislation on the question of CentreState relationship is impliedly barred, the impugned Act does not fall within the vice of that rule and cannot, therefore. be pronounced as unconsti-
tutional. [113 Hl
Per I!hagwati, J. concurring The suit filed under Art. 131 of the Constitution by the State of Karnataka against the Union of India iS maintainable. (122 BJ
1. The State would have locus to challenge unconstitutional exercise of power by the Central Government which encroaches upon State:s exclusive sphere in relation to the conduct of its Council of Ministers. By reason of proviso (a) to s. 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, it could challenge the impugned action of th.e Central Government because it prevents the . State from exercising its power to direct inquiry into matters specified in the notification, issued by the Central Governn1ent. [121 HJ 2. (a) The claim of the State that its Legislature and Gov~rnment alone have power to investigate and control misuse of governmental power by the Chief Minister and other Ministers of the State and that Central Government has no power to enquire into the same or to set up a Commission of Inquiry for that purpos~. clearly raises a 1ispute as to ~he extent of the power of the State and the. existence of a supenor or co-ordinate power in the Central Government to tnq?ire into. the conduct of the Chief Minister and other Ministers of the State in the discharge of their governmental functions. Such a dispute con~
cerns the content of the respective powers of the State and the Union of India
and the inter se relationship between the two entities and the State is vitally tcteres!ed in it.. The. State i~ very much concerned whether the conduct of its Council of Ministers 1n the discharge of governmental functions can be enquired
2-1042SCil77
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
into only by itself through its own agency or can be subjected to scrutiny by the Union of India. The State would have locus to say that the Union has no right to encroach upon its exclusive power to investigate into misuse of governmental power by its Council of Ministers. Apart from the Council of Ministers, the State can also competently make a claim that the Council of Ministers, acting on its behalf, is immune from subjection to the power af the Central Government to enquire into their conduct as Ministers. This immunity claimed in respect of the Council of Ministers can be ascribed to the State and the State can raise a dispute touching upon the existence of this immunity. [121 B-E]
Attorney-General for Victoria v. The Commonwealth, 71 C.L.R. 237 and Attorney-General for Victoria v. The Commonwealth, 52 C.L.R. 533 referred to.
(b) The two limitations in regard to a dispute which can be brought before the Supreme Court under Art. 131 are: parties and subject matter. The object of the Article is that since in a federal or quasi-federal structure disputes_ may arise between the Government of India and one or more States or between two or more States, a forum should be provided for the resolution of such disputes and that forum should be the highest court in the land. Article 131 is attracted only when the parties to the dispute are the Government of ludia or one or more States arrayed on either side. The limitation as to sub.. ject matter is contained in the words "if and in so far as the dispute involves any question whether of law or fact on which the existence or e:Xtent of legal right depends" which indicates that the dispute must be one affecting the existence or extent of a legal right and not a dispute on the political plane not involving a legal aspect. [115 G-H] State of Rajastlian v. Union of India, A.l.R. 1977 S.C. 1361 referred to. (c) There are two fallacies in the argument based on the distinction bet\Veen State and State Government : one in dra"'·ing a rather rigid, \vater-tight distinction between State and State Government and the other in assuming that it is only where the legal right of the plaintiff is infringed that the suit can be maintained under Art. 131. [117 B-D]
II
(d) Although theoretically a distinction exists between State and State Government (and this finds recognition ins. 3(58) and s. 3(60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897) constitutional authorities have pointed out that the distinction is analogous to that between a given human individual as a moral and intellectual person and bis material physical body. By the term 'State' is understood the political person or entity which possesses the law-making right and by the term 'Government' is understood the agency through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and ·executed. The Government thus acts as the machinery of the State and those who operate this machiner}' act as the agents of the State. Again, the State itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible and immutable and the Gove1nment is its agent. Jf the State Government is the agent through which the State expresses its will, the State cannot be said to be unconcerned when any right or capacity or lack of it is attributed to the State Government. It would be \\'holly unrealistic to suggest that since the State Gove1 nment is distinct from the State, any action or capacity or Jack of it in the State Government \\'Ollid not affect the State and the State would not be interested in it. To do this would be to ignore the integral relationship between the State and the State Government. Any action \Vhich affects the State Government or the Ministers in their capacity as ministers would raise a matter in which the State would be concerned. [117 D-H] (e) When any right or capacity or lack of it is attributed to any institution or person acting on behalf of the State, it raises a matter in which the State is involved or concerned. The State would, in the circumstances. be affected or at any rate, interested if the Chief Minister and other Ministers in their caPacity as such that is in the matter of discharge of their official functions,,. are sub1ected to unconstitutional exercise of power by the Central Government. If the Central Government were to issue a direction to the Chief Minister and other Ministers to exercise the executive power of the State in a particular 1!1-an.ner, the State would. be clearly a!fected. if . such Oireclion is unconstttut1onal and would be entitled to compl!!.1n against it. If
KARNATAKA V. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
the Central Government proceeds without aily constitutional authority to enquire how the executive power of the State is exercised by the Chief Minister and other Ministers and whether it is exercised in a proper manner, the State would clearly have a locus to challenge the unconstitutional action of the Central Government. [ll8 B-GJ ' (f) It is not a sine qua non of the applicability of Art 13 l that there should be infringement of some legal right of the plaintiff before it can institute a suit under the Article. What the Article requires is that the dispute must be one which involves a question "on which the existence or. extent of legal right depends". The legal right may be that of the plaintiff or of the defendant. In other words, what isi necessary is_ that the existence or extent of the legal right must be in issue in the dispute between the parties. [118' HJ
•
I
(g) Article 131 does not lay down any particular mode of proceeding for exercise of the original jurisdic-tion conferred by it. Although the Supreme Court Rules contemplate that the original jurisdiction of the Court under this Article shall be invoked by means of a suit that is not the requirement of the Article. While interpreting the Article one is perhaps unconsciously influenced to import the notion of cause of action which is germane in a suit and read this Article as limited only to cases whe.re some legal right of the plaintiff is infringed and consequently it has a cause of action against the defendant. But there-is no reference to a suit or cause of action in Art. 131. That Article confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court with reference to the character of the dispute which may be brought before it for adjudication. The requirement of cause of action, which is so necessary in a suit, cannot be imported 1'hile construing the scope and ambit of Art 131. [115 E & 119 B-CJ
C
(h) The only requirement necessary for attracting the applicability of Art. 13 I is that the dispute must be one involving any question "on which the existence or extent of a legal right" depends irrespective of whether the legal right is -claimed by one party or the other and it is not necessarv that some , legal right of the plaintiff should be infringed before a suit can be brought under that Article. [119 E-FJ
T
.\
(i) The word "right" is used in Art. 131 in a generic sense _and not accordinJ? to its strict meaning. A right in its narrow sen~ con<;titutes the correlative of duty but in its generic sense includes not only right stricto .rensu but ''any advantage or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of Jaw.'' The word "right" has four different meanings: (i) Right stricto sensu: (ii) liberty; (iii) power; and (iv) immunity. In its strict sense 'right' is defined as interest which the law protects by imposing corresponding duty nn otlu~rs. "Liberty" is exemption from the right of another and its correlative is "no ril!ht"; "power" is ability to change the legal relations of another and its correlative is liability. "Immunity" is exemntion from the legal p-Ower of another and its correlative is disability. [119 H & 120 Al
(j) The word 'right' is used in Art 131 in the generic sense, lf the State claims to be entitled to legislate exclusively on a particular matter on the ground that it falls within List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and the TJnlon of Tndia qu stions this right of the State, the dispute would be one relating, not to any right of th~ State in the strict sense of the term. but to the 'liberty' of the State to legi"'late on such matters and it would come directly within the terms of Art. 131. ETen a di,.pute relating to the vower of the Union of India to abolish the legiMatitve assembly of a. State· or tu dissolve it would fall \vithin the scope and 3rnbit of Article 131. [120 C-D]
State of Rilia•than v, Union of lndi•. AJ,R, 1977 S,C, 1361, ArtomeyGeneral for Victoria v. The Co1nmonweal1h. it C.L.R. ·237 and AttorfleYGeneral for Victoria V, The Commonwealth, 5! CLR 533 referred to, · Untwa!ia, Shinghal aod Jaswant Sineh, JL (Dissenting) The suit is not maintainable, [126 DJ
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
. . (a) The S_tate by itself is an ideal person, a legal entity, unchangeable, 1nvIS1ble and immutable. The Government is the agency through which the will of the State is forn1ulated, exprcs5ed and executed. [123 El (b) In relation to the existence of a dispute between the Union of India on the one hand and one or more States on the other, the expression used ~n Art. 13_1 for the former is Government of India signifying that the dispute may be with the Government of India but the other party to the dispute must be the State oilly and not any limb of the State, n<lmely, the executive, the legislature or the judiciary. Article 300 of the Constitution which states that the Government of I n<l.ia may sue or be sued by the name of Union of India and the (Tovernment of a State may sue or be sued by the name of the State is only an enabling provision. /\.n ;nroad upon the right of the Government n1ay, in certain circu1nstances, be an inroad upon the legal right of the State, and if there is any invasion on the legal right of a State the agency through which action will be commenced, may be the Government of the State. Article 300 n1crely nrescrihes the n1ode of describing a party to the suit. But the real ans\ver to the maintainability of the suit is to be found from Art. 131 itself. [123 F-0] (c) Article 131 does not specifically state whose legal riµht the question involved in the dispute must relate to and in \Vhat respect. To say that for the application of the Article it is sufficient that the plaintiff questions the. legal or can5titutional right asserted by the defendant may not be correct. Ordinarily and generally in any suit the competition is between the legal right of the plaintiff and the defendant. But primarily the plaintiff has to establish If the defend.'lnt establishes his legal his legal right to succf'ed in the suit. right, the suit fails. If either party -fails to establish the legal right, yet the suit fails because the p1antiff cannot succeed unless he establishes his legal right The expres'.'=ion "the exi~tcnce or extent of a legal right' 11sed in Art. 131 is meant to bring about this result. It was neither necessary nor advisable to state further in the Article that the dispute must involve any question on which the legal right of the plaintiff must depend. [124 B; E-Fl
(d) It is \\'ell-established that a Minister is an officer subordinate to the Governor. The enquiry set up in this case is not against the State or the State Government, but against the Chief Minister and other Ministers to whom it is open to move the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and the High Court \Vould then have referred the auestion of vires of the Act to the Supreme Court under Art. 131A. But, that in no way entitles the State to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supre1ne Court under Art. 131. [125 A.-B1 State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India, A.LR. 1977 S.C. 1361, King En1peror v. Sibnath Banerji & Ors., 72 Indian Appeals, 241 and A. Sanjeevi Naidu etc. etc. v. State of Madras and Anr., [1970] 3 S.C.R. 505 referred to.
(e) There is no force in the contention that it is only the State Government and not the Central Government which has the right to order an enquiry under s. 3. There may be competition between the power of one authority. (Central Government) and another (State Government), but unless the power exercised by one authority brings about a dispute impinging upon the legal right of G the other party, the latter cannot come under Art. 131 and say that merely because it was within its power to do so, its legal right is affected by the illegal , exercise of the pov.•er by the other party. The exercise of power must directly or by necessarv imnlication affect the legal ri~ht of the other party. Suppose for example. if Parliament passes a law under Entry 8 (intoxicating liquors) in List II and in pursuance of that law, makes an order against a resident in a State, the order is bad as having been issued under an invalid law made by Parliament. The State Government. in such a case, cannot file a suit under Art. 131 merely because the order had been made against its resident under a H law which encroached upon the legislative field of the State. In the instant case, the c0nc~rned ministers can challenge the impugned notification but the notification can in no way be said to hav~ affected or restrained the State Government from gi\'1ng effect to its notification. [125 B; D·G]
-
KARNATAKA V. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
I5
(f) Moreover, if a restricted meaning were not to be given to the scope of the suit which can be filed under Art. 131 very anomalous results may follow. Any action taken by the Central Govefnment under the Act or otherwise q.gainst any citizen residing in or an officer of a State, could be challenged by institution of a suit under Art. 131 by the State on the ground that the action of the Central Government is ultra vires and without any legal right. A Minister, being an officer of the State, the order affecting him cannot confer a right of suit on the State under Art. 131. [126 B-CJ
(Concurring with the majority)
I
•
2(a) There is no justification for reading down the provisions of the Act nor are the provisions constitutionally invalid on any account. [137 CJ (b). The Indian Constitution is not. federal in character, but has been characterised as quasi-federal in nature. Even though the executive and legislative functions of the Centre and States have been defined and distributed, there runs through it all a thread or rein in the hands of the Centre in both the fields. Apart from the exclusive legislative power of the Centre and the States, both have concurrent powers of legislation in regard to the entries of List III. The residuary power lies with the Parliament (Art. 248, Entry 97 of List I). Parliament has a predominant hand in respect of matters in the concurrent list (Art. 254). In certain circumstances. Parliament has power to legislate on matters in the State List (Articles 249, 250, 252 and 253). Article 256 provides, inter alia, that the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose. There are also other important features which demonstrate the weak federal structure and the controlling hand of the Centre over the States. . The Governor is appointed by the President and holds office at his pleasure. He reports to the Centre from time to time about the administration of the State. Entry 45 in List III empowers the Parliament to legislate on the subject of inquiries. for the purpose of any of the matters specified ill List II. Parliament has power to admit ,into the Union, or establish, new States (Art. 2) and can make a law for the formation of new States and alteration of areas and boundaries if existing States (Art. 3). [128 A-D; 129 C.E] State of West: Bengal v. Union of India [1964] 1 S.C.R. 371 referred to.
'
(c) The law made under Entry 45 of List III can cover an inquiry in matters like corruption, nepotism or mal-administration in any executive action of the State Government. Such an enquiry neither interferes with the legislative power of the State nor With its . executive action. An inquiry under the Act by a Commission appointed thereunder, which is a fact finding body, is for the purpose of finding the facts. It cannot be said that a Comrnission appointed by the Central Government under the Act cannot be appointed for fiil.ding facts in relation to the allegations made against a Minister of a State. [131 B-CJ (d) In an enquiry set up under the Act, there is no prosecution, no framing of a formal charge, no accused before the Commission of Inquiry and there is no exercise of any supervisory or disciplinary jurisdiction by the Central Government against the State Government nor is there any usurpation of any executive function of the State. The Centre is concerned with and interested only in knowing and ascertaining facts as regards the allegations made against a Chief Minister, Minister or any other officer o.f the· State Government. [132 A-B; CJ
(3) It may be true to say that the. Ministers of the State Government are not under the disciplinary control of the Central Government. But it would be incongruous and anomalous to say that it is only the State Government which is competent to appoint a Commission of Inquiry against itself or its Ministers. It is not likely that the Ministers, while remaining in office, would set up Commissions of Inquiry for enquiring in:o their alleged _misdeeds even if it is assumed that thi'i is possible, it does not lead to the conclusion that their power i~ exclusive and excludes the power of the Central ·Government under the Act. There is nothing in the Constitution to indicate that the power of the State Legislature or the State Government is exclusive. It may be co-extensive
f '
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
and such a situation is postulated and provided fo11 in the proviso to s. 3 ( 1) of the Act. There is nothing in the Act or the. Constittuion which excludes the power of the Central Government to set up a Commission of Inquiry for find~ ing facts in regard to the nlJeged n1al-administration of the State. After ascertaining the facts, further action may follow in accordance with. the provisions of the Constitution or the law. The Act does not provide for any kind of disciplinary action against a Minister. [132 F-H]
( 4) The doctrine of collective responsibility does not grant immunity to the State Ministers from being subjected to the provisions of the Commissions of lnquiry Act. In truth, it is little more than a political practice which is commonplace and inevitable. All that it means is that Cabinet decisions bind all Cabinet Ministers even if they argued in the opposite direction in the Cabinet, and that the team must not be weakened by some of its members making clear in public that they disapprove of the Government'~ policy. It only means that the Council of Ministers will have to stand or fall together, every member be·· ing responsible for, the· action of any other. [134 EJ
"Representative and
Responsible
Governn1ent'' by A. H. Birch.
"Government and Law·• by T.C. Hertley and J. A. C. Griffith. State of Ja111n1u and Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghula1n Moha1nrnad, [1966] Suppl S.C.R. 401 referred to.
(5) The power granted to Parliament under Entry 45 of List Ill is clear and explicit for passing a law for inqajries in regard to any of the matters in List II. That being so, the power cannot be curtailed by the doctrine of implied prohibition. The doctrine of implied prohibition was definitely rejected ·hY Courts in England and Australia end by an overwhelming majority of this Court in Kt.l'a1 anda Bharati's case. The only way in which the Court could determine whether the prescribed limits of legislative power had been exceeded or not is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which ttffirmatively the legislative power was created and by \11hich negatively they are restricted. [136 E]
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Rai Narain, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 347, Webb v. Outrim [1907] A.C. 81 The Amalgamated Society of Engineers and The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited and Others, 28 Commonwealth Law Reports, 129. The State of Victoria and The Co1umonwealth of Au.~tralia, 122 Commonwealth Law Reports, 353 and His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kera/a; [1973] Suppl. S.C.R. 1 referred to. -
( 6) There is no, substance in the argument that a commission appointed by the Central Government to inquire into the same matter for which a commission had already been set up by the State Government is violative of s. 3(1) (b) of the Act. The notification of the State Government has not, in terms, appointed any com.mission for inquiring into the· matters of alleged corruption, nepotism, favouritism and mal-administration of the Chief Minister or any other Minister of the Government. The items referred to for inquiry by the State Commission were "irregularities committed or excess payments made in certain matters relating to contracts, grant of loan, allotment of sites, purchase of furniture, disposal of foodgrains, etc." In none of those clauses, is it mentioned as ~o the person responsible for the alleged irregularities or mal-adn1inistration. There is no reference to any alleged misconduct, corruption or maladministration of the Chief Minister or any other Minister. In contrast, the terms of reference in the notification issued by the Centre is to enquire into the specific matters enumerated in Annexure I, one of which is covered by the _ notification of the State Government. In regard to specific matters in Annexture JJ, there may be some common matters which are the subject-matter of enquiry by the State Government, but in regard to matters in Annexure II, the notification in clear terms excludes any matter covered by the notification of the State Government. The Commission appointed by the Central Government, therefore, wouk1 he competent to exclude such matters from the yiurvie\v of its enquiry. [137 E-F] '
.
KARNATAKA v. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
-Per Kailasam., J. (concurring)
1 (a) The suit is maintainable. When the exercise of the executive functions of the State through its officers is interfered with by the Central Government, it cannot be said that the legal right of the State is not affected. [168 G;
167 Al
(b) The executive _powers of the State will be exercised by the Governor with the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and other Ministers. The power is exercised either directly or indirectly through officers subordinate to the Governor in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. According to the impugned notification the Commission of Inquiry was appointed for the purpose of making an inquiry into a definite matter of public importance, namely, charges of- corruptioil, nepotism, favouritism and misuse of governmental power levelled against the Chief Minister and certain other Ministers -of the State. Therefore, the scope of the inquiry would inevitably involve the -functioning of the executive of the State. The dispute in the instant case ,relates to the -functioning of the State in exercise of the powers conferred under th~ Constitution and so the State's legal rights are affected. [166 D-Fl
,--""f;
..
~
•
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 1361 referred to. ·(c) The .Government of India Act, 1858, provided only absolute imperial control without any popular participation in the administration. The Government of India Act 1919, for the first time introduced dyarchy in the Provinces. Under this Act the Provinces were delegates of the Centre and the Central legislature retained the po\ver to legislate on any subject for the whole of India. The Government of India .Act, 1935 changed the unitary nature of the Gov'<'rnment under the 1919 Act into a federal structure and made the Provinces ..as units. The 1935 Act divided legislative powers between the.centre and the provinces; the Federal list comprising of subjects over which the federal legis~ lature had exclusive powers of legislation, the Provincia1 List comprising of -subjects over which the Provincial legislatures had exclusive jurisdiction and the Concurrent List comprising of subjects over which both the Federal and Provincial legislatures had power to make laws. Und~r the Constitution the States, in several respects, are subordinate to the Central Government in that the formation of the federation was not as a result of any treaty between the States and the Federation. There are various features of the Constitution which make it strictly not federal. It has variously been described as quasifederal or federal in structure or federal system with a strong central bias. In the- scheme of distribution of powers between the Union and the States, there is a strong tilt in favour of the Union. For the purpose of settling disputes between the Centre and the States a machinery is also provided for in the Constitution itself. (140 C; 141 C; 142)
C
(d) In determining what the respective powers of the Centre and the States are, one has to look into the Constitution. Since the States are not the dele· gates of the Central Government and the source of power both for the Union as well as the States being the Constitution itself, the Central Government cannot exercise any power over the States which is not provided for in the Consti· ~tution. There is no overriding power \Vith the Union Government. (143 B] · Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. The State of Assam & Ors. [1961] 1 SCR 809, Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan [1963] 1 SCR 491. State of West Bengal v. Union of India [1964) 1 SCR 371 and Ke.mvanand Bharti [1973) Supp. S.C.R. 1 referred to.
(e) Under Article 254(1) when a law made by the State Legislature is in conflict with any provision of law made by Parliament or to any -orovision of any existing law with respect to one of the matterS eiiumerated in the Concurrent List, then the law made by Parliament shall prevail and the State
,Jaw shall be void to the extent of repugnancy. [149 CJ
(f) Before declaring a law as repugnant an attempt should be made to see whether the conflict could be avoided by construction. [149 CJ
(g) Article 248(1) and Entry 97 in List I of the Seventh Schedule make :it clear that the residuary power is with Parlian1ent and when a matter sought
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
to be legislated is not included in List II or List III Parliament has power tom.ake laws with respect to that matter or tax. But the function of the Lists is not to confer powers on thr legislature; they only den1arcate the legislative field. Since there is no provision in the Constitution conferring on the Union the power to supervise the governmental functions of the State reference to the Lists will not solve the problem raised in this case. [149 C-D] The Governor General in Council v. The Raleigh lnves1rnent Co. [1944] F.C.R. 229, 261 and Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon [1972] 2 SCR 33 referred to. (h) The well accepted basic principles of construction of the Constitution as laid down by decided cases are that when a questicn arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, the only way in which it can be done is by looking into the terms of the instrument by which affirmatively the legislative powers were created and by which negatively they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited, it is not for any Court of justice to inquire further or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions. If the text is explicit the text is conclusive. When the text is ambiguous, recourse must be had to the context and scheme of the Act. Yet another well-accepted <)id to construction is that the history which lies tehind an enactment is admissible because to find out the meaning of the law, recourse may legitimately be had to the prior state of the law, the evil sought to be remedied and the process by .'hich the la\".r was e'volYed. [150 H; 151 A] ' ·
'
\1
(i) The golden rule of interpretation that in construing words in a Constitution conferring legislative po"•er, the most liberal construction should be put upon the words, admits of certain exceptions. If it is found necess~ry to prevent conflict between t\vo exclusive jurisdictions a restricted meaning may be given to the words. Further, in interpreting the words of a statute the main object is to ascertain the intention expressed by the words used, that is, to ascertain "the intention of them that made it." [154 F-GJ
R. v. Burah [18781 3 A.C. 889 and Attorney-General for the Prorince o/ Ontario and Others. v. Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada and Another [1912} A.C. 571 at 573, The Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide Stean1s/dp Company Ltd. & Ors. 28 C.L.R. 129, Webb \', Outrin1 [1907) A.C. 81. The State of Victoria v. The Common-Wealth of Australic, 122 C.L.R. 353, LiyanRe v. R. [1967] A.C. 259 and The State of West Bcn1::al v. Aliripendra Nath Bagcld [1966] 1 SCR 771 referred to. (j) Articles 256 and 257 list the obligations of the States and the Union and control of the Union over the States in certain cases. Article 257(A) (introducted by 42nd Amendment of the Constitution) empQwers the Clovernment of lndia tn deploy any armed forces of the Union or anv o'.her force for dealing with any grave situation of la\v and order in any State. Except in cases referred to in these Articles, the Constitution does not provide for the Union Government to give any directions to the State Government. As there is no specific article in the Constitution enabling the Union Government to cau:'e an inquiry into the goven1menta1 functions of the State the power cannot be assumed by- ordinary legislation but resort must be had to a constitl1tional amendment. [152 C-D; F; HJ (k) Tue Constitution being the fL1ndamental law, no la\v passed under mere legislative, power can effect any change in the Constitution unless there is an express power to that effect given in he Constitution itself. There are a number of articles \Vhich expressly proYide for amendment of the Constitution bv law. Rut \Yhere no power is conferred on the Parlian1cnt to 1nake laws. it' cannot add to the CC?nstitution by ordinary law mak[ng process. fl 53 B-C]
I. C. Golak Nath & Ors. referred to.
v.
State of Punjab & Aw-. [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762
(1) Entry 45 in List III (Enquiries ........ for the purposes of any of the matters 'specified in List JI or List III) shguld not be given a wide meaning as
•
• KARNATAKA V. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
cotJferring on the Union and the State Government powers to enact a provisio.n to embark on an inquiry as to the misuse of the governmental powers by the other. [155 C-D]
River Wear Co1nmissioners v. A damson [1877] 2 A.C. 743, R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla .v. The Union of lndia [1957] SCR 930 and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1955] 2 SCR 603 referred to.
(m) The power conferred under Entry 45 List III cannot be construed in such a manner as to lead to the conclusion that if a law enacted by Parliament empowers the Union Government to conduct an inquiry into the misuse of governmental functions by a Minister of State Government, the State·will have the power to legislate. empowering it to enquire into the misuse of governmental tJowers by a Union Minister relating to matters in List III. Such an interpretation would Dot be conducive to the harmonious functioning of the Union and the States. [155 D-E] (n) The decisions on which the Union Government relied fQr the propositior. that the words "definite matter of public importance" would embrace an . inq·1iry into the misuse of governmental functions of the State, do not support that contention. In M. V. Rajwade v. Dr. S. M. Hassan and Others the commission appointed was o_nly a fact-finding body meant to instruct the mind of the Government and the scope of the inquiry fell within s. 3 as it related to a definite matter _of public imnortance and not an inquiry into the misuse of govern1nental functions of a Chief Minister or a State Minister. In Shri Ram Kri~·hna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar and others, it was held that the act and conduct of individuals may assume such dangerous proportions as may well affect the public well-being and thus become & de.finite n1atter of public importance. But neither decision concludes the point arising in this case, namely, whether the words "definite matter of public importance" should be construed as to include the right to inquire into the abuse of governmental fun:tions by a State Government. Again in State of lammu & Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulanz Mohammad which is an authority for the proposition that inquiry into the acts of a person who had ceased to be a Chief Minister may continue to be a matter of public importance it \Vas held that the ·inquiry into t·he past acts which have affected. the public well-heing \You1d be matters of ·::iublic importance and it was irrelevant if the person who committed those act~ was still in power. to be able to repeat them. [158 A-H] Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Others [1959] SClt 279, Suite of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, [1966] Supp. SCR 401 and M. V. Rajwade v. Dr. S. M. Hassan & Others l.L.R. [1954] Nag. 1 held inapplicable. (Dissenting) 2. The impugned notification impinges on the right of the State to function in its limited sphere and is beyond the powers of the Central Government under s. 3 of the Act. [168 G] ·
(a) If s. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. 1952 is construed as enabliniz the appointrnent of a Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of a CWef Minister in office, it wou1d result in empowering the Central Government which is a delegate of the Parliament to exercise the powers which would never have been contemplated by the Parliament. The result of such a construction would amount to inviting the State Government to appoint Commissions of Inquiry into the conduct of Central Ministers regarding matters in List II and List ITT. [161 HJ (b) Section 3 ( 1) read with the proviso makes it clear that the intention of 1he Act is to enable the appropriate Governments that is, the Central or the Sta1 e Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance. The Central Government can appoint a Commission to make an inquiry into any matter rela1:.able to any .of the Entries enumerated in List I, List 11 or List III of the Sev·:nth Schedule of the Constitution while the State Government can appoint a Commfasion to inquire into any matter relatable to any of the EntrieS enumerated in List IT and List IIl of the Constitution. As both the Central Govern-
B-
C
!}
K
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ment and the State Government have power to appoint a Commission of Inquiry relating to Entries in List II and List III there Inight arise occasions when there may be overlapping. In order to avoid such a contingency pro-
visos (a) and (b) to s. 3(1) enact that when the
[1978) 2 S.C.R
Central
Government bas
appointed a Cornmission of Inquiry, the State Government shall not appoint another Commission of Inquiry into the same matter without the ap}!lroval of the Central Government so long as the Commission appointed by the Central Governn1ent is functioning and the Central Governn1cnt shall not appoint another Commission to inquire into the same matter as long as the Commission appointed by the State Government is functioning. These provisions are for the purpose of avoiding any conflict by the two Governments appointing two separate commissions to inquire into the same, matter. [163 D-E]
( c) In the instant case the Court is not called upon to go into the tv·.rO notifications and determine which item in the notification of the Central Government is not covered by the State Government's notification. [168 G]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Original Suit No. 8 of 1977. L. N. Sinha, R. N. Byra Reddy, Adv. Genl., S. C. Agarwal, Vinoo Bhagat and Narayan Nettar, for the Plaintiff.
S. N. Kacker, Solicitor General, Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi. Solicitor General, R. N. Sachthey, E. C. Agarwala and Girish Chandra, for Defendant No. 1. The following Judgments were delivered by :
BEG, C.J.-"India, that is Bharat, shall be nnion of States". The very first mandate of the first article of our Constitution to which we :E owe allegiance thus prohibits, by necessary implication, according to , the plaintiff in the original suit now before us wider Article 131 of the Constitution of India, any constitutionally unjustifiable trespass by the Union Government upon the domain of the powers of the States. The State of Karnataka, has, therefore, sued for a declaration that a notification dated 23-5-1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'The Central Notification') constituting a Commission of Inquiry in purported exercise of its powers under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), is illegal and ultravires. This declaration is sought on one of two alternative grounds : firstly, that the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, does not "authorise the Central Government to constitute a Commission of Inquiry in regard to matters falling exclusively within the sphere of the State's legislative and executive power", and, secondly, that if the provisions ·G of the Act do cover the Central Government Notification, they are ultra-vires for contravention of "the terms of the Constitution as well as the federal structure implicit and accepted as an inviolable. basic feature of the Constitution". Consequentially, the plaintlff seekS a perpetual injunction to restrain the respondents, the Union of India and Shri A. N. Grover, the one-man Commission of Inquiry into "charges of corruption, nepotism, favouritism and misuse of GovernH mental power against the Chief Minister and other Ministers of the State of Karnataka", from acting under the Central Government's notification.
KARNATAKA V. UNION (Beg,
{
•
i
C.J.)
The plaintiff State's case is : that, the Congress Party was returned by tl1e electors by a majority at an election held in the State in 1972; that the majority pcuty in tho legillature alected Shri Devraj Un as its leader who then formed his Government as required by Article 163 of the Constitution; that, the Government thus installed, by what must be deemed to be the will and decision of the State Legislature, continues to enjoy the confidence of the legislature and is in office; tbiil, in tl1e recent Lok Sabha elections, the Congress party headed by Shri Devraj Urs achieved a resounding success by having won 26 out of 2g seats so that the Janata party, which is in power at the Centre, must be deemed to have been rejected by the electorate, but it is in<lirec:ly, through the appointment of a Central Commission of Inquiry trying to discredit the Congress Party and its leaders in the State of Karnataka, and, thereby, interfering with the democratic machinery of contrnl and supervision of the .Government of the State provided by the Constitution itself. On 26th April, 1977, the Union Home Minister sent a letter to the Chief Minister of the State communicating the allegations contained in a Memorandum submitted by certain members of the opposition party in th~ Kamataka State I..cgi'1aturo and asked him t.o make hie ron1r ments. The Chief Minister gave :qeply dated 13th May, 1977 a copy of which was attached to the plaint. The Chief Minister, in his reply, complains that "slanderous propaganda has been unleashed without any verification of the truth or otherwise of the allegations or past history of most of the charges". He points out that broadcasts and press reports had given him an intimation of the allegations sent to him even before they were received by him with the Home Ministor'' letter. The Chief Mini~!tc said : "It is reasonable to presume that the object of this campaign of slander is mainly to tarnish the image of the Congress party, my colleagues and myself in an effort to gain, if possible, power for your party in the State immediately after your party was totally rejected by the electorate of the State in the recent Lok Sabha elections". The insinuation was that the whole object of manipulated chartes against the Chief Minister was to vilify him and his Government and to bring · hin_i down in the estimation of the public so as to destroy the support which the Congress party had from the people of the State. It was thus a charge of malice in fact. The Chief Minister also admitted, in his letter to the !Jnion Home said to be embodied in onr Constitution and described them as "the ':?mt!r-«~e ~ 11ft:tional unity and national integrity". He asserted : the constitution 1s the source of all power for the various organs of the Centre and the State and all actions and exercise of all power under any •)f the statutes either by the Centre or by the State must conform t? and be subo~dinaied to the scheme of distribution of powers, legislative and executive, under the Federal Scheme of the Constitution". The Chief Minister also admitted in his letter to the Union Home Minister, that the Constitution "in certain exceptional circumstances pro..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
vides for the Centre making inroads into the exclusive domain of the· State Legislature or the State executive". But, he denied that the exceptional circumstances, expressly provided for in the ConstitutiQ.11, for interference by the Centre, existed in the instant case. Evidently, the Chief Minister meant that there was no room for invoking the emergency provisions under Article 356 of the Constitution which provides for the assumption by the President of India of any of the functions of the Government and by the Union Parliament of the functions of the State Legislature, provided "the President is satisfied on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or :itherwise that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot.be carried on in terms of the Constitution". The Chief Minister also invokes the aid of the principles of 0emocracy which, according to him, permeate the whole scheme of the Constitution, so that Chief Ministers and other State Ministers can be called to account only by the State Legislature to which they are responsible. He asserted that "the Cabinet system of Government is a basic feature of the Indian Constitution". This implies, according to him, that all control over ministerial actions vests in the State Le~islatures only and not in the Union Government, subject, of course, to exceptions expressly provided. With regard to the actions of the State Government, he complained that the assumption of inquisitorial or supervisory functions by the Union Government at the instance of "an extra constitutional agency, however high, would destroy the basic character of the Cabinet system of Government and would rob the legislature of the State and its people, of the constitutionally guaranteed right of having a Government of their choice subject to their control". He claimed that the State had exclusive right to investigate charoes relating to l]latters falling "within exclusive domain of the State under the Co119titution", He warned against the dangers to national interest by undue interference with the federal scheme contemplated by the Cor.stitutiori. The Chief Minister, after_ having emphatically asserted what he conceived to be the object of the proceedings against him and his constitutional rights, very properly offered to place all the material having a bearing upon the 36 charges out of which he admitted that 23 related to him. He offered to clear himself of these charges. He pointed out that 4 of the charges related to his colleagues and had been discussed in the legislature. He also said that 3 charges had already been enquired into by the former Prime Minister. He said that he did not want these to be reopened. He cited the speech of Shri Om Mehta. a former Minister of State, in the Lok Sabha, on 5th May 197G, where it was stated that some memoranda had been sent, containing allegations of corrnption and misuse of power made against the Chief Minister and other ministers of Karnataka by some members of the Legislative Assembly, as long ago as 1973. According to that statement, there were 99 allegations out of which 16 concerned the Chief Minister personally. Shri Mehta was said to have declared that the allegations against the Chief Minister were found to lack substance after the settled procedure·
.'
\
-,...
KARNATAKA v. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
. of inviting comments from the Chief Minister had been obser~ed: . The . Chief Minister then dealt at considerable length witn the md1v1dual
~barges.
I
Jn the plaint before us, it was poirlted out that charges of the nature now referred to the one man Comm1ss10n by the Central Govcrnme_nt had been made over since 1972 elections both on the !loor of the Legislature and elsewhere. It also said that they had been explained and answered on the floor of the Legislature repeatedly. The Chief Minister complained that the same allegations had been repeated after a new Government had assumed office at the Centre. It was also asserted in the plaint that, in order to allay any suspicion in the minds of the public in the State, and, in view of the continued agitation for a judicial probe, and, in accordance with the highest and best traditions of Government, the State Government, by a nohl:irnl!on, dated I.8th May, 1977, appointed a Commission of Inquiry under Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. A copy of the notification of the State Government was attached to the complaint. It was alleged that a copy of it had also been sent to the Home Minister on 18th May, 1977.
One of the submissions by the plaintiff is that the State Government notification dated 18th May, 1977, appointing its own Commission to inquire into all the matters and irregularities, to which additions could be made and of which further particulars could be provided, covers all that could be enquired into by the Grover Commission under the notification dated 23rd May, 1977, which specifically excludes matters covered by the Karnataka Government's notification dated 18th May, 1977. Reliance is placed on proviso (b) to Section 3 (!) of the Act which prohibits the Central G.overnment from appointing another Commission "to inqnire into the same matter for so long as Commission appointed by the State Government is functioning, unless the Central Government is of opinion that the scope of the inquiry should be extended to two or more States".
.F
The written statement filed on behalf of the Union of India raises 2 preliminary objections as follows b>fore replying seriatim to the para:graphs· in the plaint. The preliminary objections are : "l. The suit by the State of Karnataka is not maintainable inasmuch as the impugned notification S.O. No. 365 fE) dated 23rd May 1977 ~onstituting the <=:ommission of _Inquiry does not affect the plamtiff-State. By impugned notification a Commission of Inquiry under section 3 of the Commissions of Inq':1iry A~t, 1?5~, has been constituted for the purpose of mak_u_ig an mqm~y mto the charges of corrnption, nepotism, fav?unll~ll'. and misuse Governm~n!al power against the _ Chief M1mster and certam other M1111sters of the State of Karnat~ka SI?e~ified in the no~ification. The inquiry is against the Chief Mm1ster and certam other Ministers as individuals and not against the State of Karnataka. The inquiry is rather
o!
SUPREME COURT REPOr.TS
. [1978] 2 S~C.R.
in the interest o~ State that such curruption, nepotism, favouritism should not exist in the State. The State of Karnataka is not directly interested. in the inquiry proposed to be held against the Chief Minister aud certain other Ministers of the State. The individuals occupying the office of Chief Minister . and Ministers are distinct from the Sta~ itself.
.A
.B
·- · -2:-Article 131 of the Constitution of India gives original jurisdiction to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in any dispute between the Government of India aad one or more States etc., ____ if the dispute involves any question of law or fact or which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. There being no dispute between the Government of India and the State, C ._ the suit is n()t maintainable. There is no legal right of the plaintiff-State to file the present suit.'' .· / /
-·
The Union of India denied that the matters now to be enquired into by the Grover Commission constituted a resuscitation o( previous charges and allegations which had been disposed of. Halafides in the institution of the Commission of Inquiry is denied. The validity of all provisions of the Act is staunchly defended. The Inquiry ordered by the Central Government is, its asserted, quite competent and not covered by the State Government notification. It is denied that the federal scheme or democratic principles embodied in the Constitution are affected by the institution of a Commission of Inquiry of the kind set up. It is submitted that the Central Government Commission of Inquiry was ordered to enable an appropriate and completely impartial fact finding process to take place so that either the Central Government or any other authority or even members of the public may, i11 accordance with democratic principles, act in a manner which i; constituticnally proper and fully justified. In any case, the conduct of the Chief Minister of a State with regard to affairs of State and the mann~r in which he used his official position were, according to Union Government, matters of public importance into which the Central Government was quite competent to order impartial fact finding inquiries in public interest. ·
\.._
On the above set of pleadings, the followi".ig issues were framed by this Court :
"1. I& the suit miinbinable? 2. Is the impugned notification ultra· vires lhe powers of the Central Government under section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act ? '
3. If Section 3. of the Commission of Inquiry Act authorises the Central Government to issue the impu%fied notification, is the Section itself unconstitutional '!"
•
An important preliminary question· to be decided, for the reasons already indicated, concerns the nature of the two inqairies, one by the State Government and another instituted by the Central Government. If the two notifications cover substantially "th<: same matter", it may
.~.
KARNATAKA V. UNION
• i
(Beg, C.J.)
not be necessary to deal with other questions at all. The parties have very fully argued their cases on this question even through no >cparate or specific issue has been framed on it. Both the parties have raised this issue specifically in their pleadings. They have argued on the assumption that a decision on it is implied in the trial of other issues in the case. We will, therefore, take it up first separately as a preliminary question which we should decide before taking up other matters in issue. A determination of this question has an important bearing on matters argued for purposes of deciding each of !he three issues framed above. Even if the question was not directly or indirectly involved in the decision of each of the three issues framed above, a decision on it seems necessary for clearing the ground for a correct approach to the whole case. It is certainly not a question we could abstain from deciding simply because no specific issue was framed separately on it at the outset. Although, in view of the fact that the question has been put in issue and so understood and very fully argued by the parties, a separate and specific issue need not be framed upon it, yet, because of the crucial importance of it, we formulate it now separately and specifically as follows : Do both the State and the Central Government inquiries relate to the 'same matter' within the meaning of proviso (b) to Section 3 (1) of the Act so as to bar an iuquiry by the Central or Union Government so long as the State Commission is functioning ? The State Government's notification dated 18-5-1977, reads as under:-
"Government of Kamataka" Karnataka Government Secretariat Vidhana Sondha Bangalore, May 19, 1977
NOTIFICATION WHEREAS allegations have been made on the floor of the Houses of the State Legislature and elsewhere that irregularities have been committed/excess payments made ~n certain matters relating to contr;cts, grai:ts ol land, allotment of sites, purchase of furniture, disposal o' foodgrams, etc. :
r
WHEREAS the State Government is of the opinion that it is neces-
sar~ to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the said alle-
gations :
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NOW, THEREf'.ORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by subsect10n ( 1) of Sect.ton 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 (Central Act 60 of 1952) the Government of Karnataka hereby apPl~int Justice Shri Mir Iqbal. ~ussain, Retired Judge of the Karnataka H1g~ C~urt .to be the C?mnussio~ of Inquiry for the purpose of making ·an mqm!y mto the said allegat1ons, particularly specified below and to subnut a report thereon to the State Government within a period of four months from the date of this Notification : -
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1978] 2 S.C.R.
I. Whether improper or excessive payment was made to M/s. Ninnala Engineering Construction Company in 1espect of tho contracts awarded to them by the Government of Karnataka and the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board for lift irrigation or water supply scheme ? II. Whether any improper or excessive payment was made to M/s. Balaji Engineer'.ng and Construction Works Ltd., in respect of the contracts awarded to them for( 1) the construction of the right bank earth dam of Hemavatbi Project from chainage No. 7890' to 851 O'.
the
(2) the construction of the right bank irrigation sluice of the Hemavathi Dam; ( 3) the construction of the left bank irrigation sluice of the Hemavathy Dam; ( 4) the construction of the masonry dam of the Hemavathy Project from Chainage No. 4400' to 5740' including the overflow section and the protective works;
( 5) the construction of the spillway dam of the Hemavathy Project; ( 6) the construction of the Project?
masonry dam
of the
Harangi
Ill. Whether any improper or excessive payment was made or undue favour shown to M/s. Nechipadam Construction Company in respect of the contract awarded to them for the construction of the Hemavathy right Bank Earth Dam from chainage 2025m. to 2405m. and chainage 1750m. to 2025m? IV. Whether any improper or excessive payment was made or undue favour shown to M/s. Shankaranarayan Construction Company in respect of the contracts awarded to them for-
( 1) the construction of the combined Board Administrative Division Building; (2) the construction of the right bank earthen portion of the Hidkal Dam in tbe two reaches from 10,000 to 11,000 and 11,100 to 14,700?
V. Whether any improper or excessive payment was made or undue favour shown to M/s. EICIL in respect of the contracts awarded to them for( 1) the construction of the head race tunnel from the Born-
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manhalli pick up dam to the surge point; (2) the construction of the surge tank and the pressure shaft ?
VI. Whether any undue favour was shown to M/s. Ghansham Commercial Co. Ltd., in the sale of 25.,000 tonnes of bajra at the rate of Rs. 73.50, per quintal in 1972?
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KARNATAKA v. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
VII. Whether any undue favour was shown to ~/s. Kris!Jna Flour Mills in respect of the lease of the land next to its prem1Ses, measuring 200'X200' for a period of 30 years?
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VIII. Whether any improper or excessive payment was made or any undue favour was shown to M/s. Shah Construction Company in the settlement of their claims for the contract awarded to them for the construction of the Almatti Dam.? IX. Whether any undue favour was shown to M/s. Poornima Electronics in the placing of orders on them for supply of electronic equipments like Intercome etc. ? X. Whether there was any disappropriation or fraud in the dealings of the State Co-operative Marketing Federation during the period 1971-72 and 1972-73?
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XI. Whether any undue favour has been shown by the Government or the KSTRC in leading out the building in the KSRTC bus stand at Mysore for a Canteen at Mysore? XII. Whether any undue favour was shown by Government or the KSTRC in leasing out resting rooms in the KSRTC in Mysore to Shri Prem Kumar ?
XIII. Whether the funds of the Agro Industries Corporation were wrongly diverted to the Gadag Co-operative Textile Mills, Hulkoti, Gadag, Dharwar district ?
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XIV. Whether undue favour was shown to M/s. Navrasa Fertilizers in purchasing fertilisers and whether payment was made even with out receipt of the stock ? XV. Whether site ou J.C. Road was leased to Shri M. B. Lal and N. V. Venkatappa contrary to the interests of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation?
XVI. Whether the grant of land in S. No. 15 of Bommenahalli Village, Nelamangala Taluk, Bangalore District was made contrary to rules ? XVII. Whether sites in Rajmahal Vilas and Palace Orchard--;; layouts were irregularly allotted ?
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XVIII. Whether the purchase of one thousand tonnes of paddy from Tamil Nadu by Shri Atheeq Ahmed, Proprietor of the Mandya Rice Mills, Mandya at the instance of the State Government and the subsequent disposal thereof were adverse to the interests of the State ? XIX. Whether the contract for the preparation of models and designs for the re-modelling of the K. R. Market, Bangalore was irregularly awarded to Mis. Karekar and Sundaram? 3-1042 SCl/77
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
XX. Whether the conversion of land owned by Shri C. M. Dinshaw and family in Narasipura Village, Bangalore North Taluk (known as 'Dinshaw Estate') as non-agricultural land was not in accordance with the rules ? XXL Whether any irregularities or improprieties have been committed in the administration of the Karnataka Film Development Corporation since 1971 ? XXIL Whether the cement or steel allotted for the construction of the Government Harijan Hostel building in Bangalore City was diverted to other purposes ?
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XXIII. Whether orders for the purchase of furniture for the Health Department for the years 1972-73, 1973-74 were placed at exorbitant rates with firms who were neither furniture dealers nor approved PWD contractors/suppliers ? XXIV. Whether essentiality certificates for stainless steel were issued to bogus firms or fictitious persons during the period !st March 1974 to 30·th June 1974 ?
XXV. Whether the purchase of Fargo and Bedford Chassis by the KSRTC in August 1972 was against the Corporation's interests ? XXVL Whether the appointments of agents, sub-agents and dealers during the years 1967-77 by the Visvesvarnya Iron and Steel Ltd., Bhadravathi for the distribution of Steel and cement were adverse to· the Company's interests? XXVII. Whether the appointments of agents, sub-agents and dealers for the years 1967-77 by the Mysore Paper Mills Ltd., Bhadravathi for the distribntion of paper were adverse to the Company's interests ?
XXVIII. Whether improper or excessive payment was made to Shri M. S. Ramaiah, contractor, in respect of the contract awarded to him for the construction of the Talakalele dam and its appurtenant works, which form part of the Sharavathi Valley Project. XXIX. Whether there were any defects in the construction of Talakalele Dam owing to bad design, use of sub-standard materials caused by negligence or wilful commission of the contractor or any individual? XXX. Whether unjust or excessive payment was made to M/s. Tarapore & Co., in respect of the contract awarded to them for the rock fill work both up and down stream, in the Lingannamakki earthen dam ?
XXXI. Whether there was any irregularity or impropriety in the grant of 3000 acres of land in Periyapatna Taluk to M/s. Oriental Aromatics ?
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KARNATAKA V. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
XXXII. Whether any favour was shown to Shri Bhooma Reddy in the matter of award of the right to retail vend of liquors in the year 1968 ?
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XXXIII. Who are the persons responsible for the lapses, if any regarding the aforesaid and to what extent? By order and in the name of the Governor of Karnataka. Sd./- G. V. K. RAO, Chief Secretary to the Government To
The Compilor, Karnataka Gazette, for publication of this Noti-fication in a Gazette Extraordinary and supply of 200 copies.
Copy to: All Secretaries to Government, The Registrar, High Court of letter." The Central Government Notification follows:-
Karnataka with a covering dt. 23-5-1977
reads
as
"THE GAZETTE OF INDIA EXTRAORDINARY
PART II-SECTION 3-SUB-SECTION (ii) MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL & A.R. NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 23rd May, 1977 S.C.365(E)-Whereas the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into a definite matter of public importance, namely, charges of corruption, nepotism, favouritism or misuse of Government power against the Chief Minister and certain other Ministers of the State of Karnataka, hereinafter specified; Now, therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by secti,on 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (60 of 1952), the Central Government hereby appoints a Commission of Inquiry consisting of a single member, namely, Shri A. N. Grover, retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
2. The terms of reference of the Commission shall be as follows:(a) to inquire into the following allegations, namely : (i) such of the allegations contained in the memorandum
dated 11th April, 1977, received from some Members of the Karnataka State Legislature and addressed to the Prime Minister as are specified in Annexure I; (ii) such of the allegations contained in the memoranda
aforesaid as are specified in Annexure II, but excluding any matter covered by the notification of the Government of Karnataka in the Chief Secretariat No. DPAR 7 GAM 77, dated the 18th May, 1977;
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(b) to inquire into any irregularity, impropriety or contravention of law other than those specified in the said notification of the Government of the State of Karnataka, on the part of any person in relation to any matter referred to in the allegations aforesaid; (c) to inquire into any other matter which arises from, or is connected with or incidental· to, any act, omission or transaction referred to in the allegations aforesaid; Explanation-In the Armexures to this notification, "Chief Minister" means Shri Dev:raj Urs, the Chief Minister of the State of Karnataka.
3. The headquarters of the Commission will be nt New Delhi. 4. The Commission will complete its inquiries and report to the Central Government on or before the !st day of December. 1977. 5. And whereas the Central Government is of opinion having regard to the nature of the inquiry to· be made by the Commission and other circumstances of the case, that all the provisions of subsection (2), sub-section (3), sub-section (4) and sub-section (5). of section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (60 of 1952) should be made applicable to the Commission, the Central Government hereby directs, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (I) of the said section 5, that all the provisions of the said sub-section (2), (3), (4) a'.nd (5) of that section shall apply to the Commission. ANNEXURE I 1. Whether the Chief Minister practised favouritism and nepotism by appointicg his own brother, Shri D Kamparaj Urs, as a Director of the Karnataka State film Industries Development Corporation in place of Shri R. J. Rebello, Chief Secretary to the Government, in 1974, and later as Director-in-charge with the powers to exercise all the powers of the Managing Director.
2. Whether the Chief Minister had directed auction of excise shops out of turn in five districts on the eve of the recent Lok Sabha
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KARNATAKA V. UNION
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(Beg, C.J.)
Elections in the month of February, 1977, with corrupt motives although the auctions were due in the month of May, 1977, and whether this was done with the object 0f collecting funds for the Elections. 3. Whether the Chief Minister had released Rs. 50.60 lakhs to buy "Understanding Science" from I.B.H. over-ruling the decision of the Sub-Committee constituted for the purpose under the Chairmanship of the Chief Minister and also over-ruling the orders of the con.cerned Minister.
4. Whelher the Chief Minister was guilty of shielding corrupt, officers, in particular, two, officers of the Public Works Department, namely, Shri Sesbagiri Rao, Assistant Engineer, and Shri Shivanna, a Clerk, against whom prosecution orders were passed by tlte Government on the basis of the recommendations of the Vigilance Commission. Whether the Chief Minister on his own revised the order and withdrew the prosecution for any consideration.
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5. Whether Shri Hanumantha Reddy, Superintending Engineer, was promoted as Chief Engineer by the Chief Minister against the recommendation of the Vigilance Commission that he should be and demoted and certain amounts should be recovered from him whether the Chief Minister also over-ruled the orders of the concerned Minister and whether such action of the Chief Minister was for anv
consideration.
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6. Whether the following payments were made to M/s. Shankarauarayana Construction Co. : ~-
(i) an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 6.37 lakhs in Malaprabha Project; ' (ii) excess payment to the tune of Rs. 12.00 lakhs in Ghataprabha Project with an intention to favour the contractors. 7. Whether any misappropriation of funds and fabrication of accounts of the Social Welfare Department was made with the connivance of the then Minister Shri N. Rachaih to the extent of Rs. 30.00 Jakh3 and whether any fraud was practised in connection with the said matter.
8. Whether appointment was made of fictitious persons as dealers
in sandal soap by Mysore Sales International under the orders of the
Chief Minister and the Minister for Industry and payment was made of hugs amounts by way of commission. 9. Whether gross misuse of powers and position was made by Shri H, ilI. Channa Bassappa, formerly Minister-in-charge of Public Works Department and Electricity (now Minister of Health) in converting the residential site which he got allotted to him by the Trust Board into a commercial site and starting a company with his family members as directors.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 2 S.C.R.
10. Whether any favouritism was shown or whether there was. any corruption in the purchase of new tyres and in body building contract for the new chassis by Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation under the undue influence of the Chief Minister and the Minister for Transport Shri Aziz Sail. 11. Whether there was any nepotism and favouritism and misuse of power by the Chief Minister and the Minister of Transport in the matter of nationalisation of contract carriages and wil1ully benefiting certain parties with whom the Chief Minister's second son-in-law was a partner. 12. Whether any favouritism was shown in the nomination of Shri K. V. Rao as a member of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Board against the provisions of the Act.
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13. Whether an undue favour was shown to M/s. Balaji Engineering Construction Company by accepting the tender for construction of houses under Housing and Urban Development Corporation's Low Income Group Scheme in Dumlur Lay-out by the Bangalore Development Authority, which is under the administrative control of the Chief Minister. 14. Whether allotment of 20 acres of land was made to the three sons of the Finance Minister, Shri M. V. Ghc•rpade, in contravention of land grant rules and the provisions of the Land Reforms Act and the Land Revenue Acts.
15. Whether any misuse of power was committed, or any corruption committed by Shri D. K. Naikar, Minister for Municipal Admi-nistration, with regard to the grant of land to Boroka Textile Milles in Hubli-Dharwar Corporation Area. ANNEXURE II
Whether the Chief Minister or any other Minister of the State of Karnataka was guilty of corruption, nepotism, favouritism or misuse of governmental power in connection with all or any of the following matters, namely : ( 1) Grant of 20 acres of Government
land, reserved for grazing of cattle in Hommanahalli, Nelamangala taluk, Bangalore District, to the son-in-law of the Chief Minister, Shri M. D. Nataraj, in violation of the provisions of the Land Revenue Code and disregarding the claims of local Scheduled Caste applicants;
(2) Allotment of 4 large valuable house sites in the most posh locality of Bangalore, Raj Mahal Vilas Extension, to Shri Devaraj Urs and his family members in supersession of the rightful claims of other applicants;· (3) Undue favours shown to Messrs Nirmala Engineering Construction Company, by releasing Government funds.
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KARNATAKA v. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
in spite of the fact that the concerned Minister has taken a decision to prosecute the firm on the basis of the recommendations of the Vigilance Commissions.
(4) Excess payment of Rs. 98.88 lakhs to Messrs Balaji Engineering Company, in Hemavathi Project, in contravention of the terms of the contract with a view to favouring the contractor;
i
(5) Under favour shown to Messrs Nechipadam Construction Compny in Hemavathi Project, by accepting the highest tender with an intent to benefit the contractors and involving excess payment to the extent of Rs. 3.5 lakhs; (6) Excess payment of Rs. 1 crore to Messrs TICIL Contractors, in Kali Hyde! Project, for the benefit of the contractors;
(7) Whether about 5,000 tons of rice, purchased by the Government of Karnataka from the Tamil Nadu Government on government-to-government basis, was allowed to be marketed by a private party, Shri H. R. Athu Ahmed, without the knowledge of the Food Department instead of the Mysore State Co-operative Marketing Federation as was earlier agreed, with the sole intent of benefiting the private party;
(8) Undue favonr shown to a fictitious cooperative society in regard to conversion of 270 acres of agricnltural land called Dinshaw Estate intq non-agricultural purpose in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Land Reforms Act and the Land Revenue Act;
(9) Whether undue favour was shown to one Ghanshyam in the sale of 2500 •tons of Bajra at the rate of Rs. 73.50 p. per quintal without calling for tenders and allowing Shri Ghanshyam to sell the Bajra in the State of Maharashtra at the rate of Rs. 125.00 per quintal during the time of drought in Karnataka. (10) Whether undue favour was shown or concession was made to M/s. Karakar and Sundaram, Architects, in regard to the preparation of designs for remodelling the K. R. Market in supersession of the order of the concerned Minister.
( 11) Whether undue favour was shown, or concession was made to M/s. Shah Construction Co., Contractors, in Upper Krishna Project at Alamatti.
(12) Whether undue favour was shown to M/s. Krishna flour Mills in granting valuable land in Bangalore City, which land was meant for children's park, at a nominal rent by over-ruling the orders of the concerned Minister.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
(13) Whether there was any misappropriation of funds of the Karnataka State Film Industries Development Corporation to the tune of Rs. 10.00 lakhs, when the Chief Minister himself was the Chairman of that Corporation and whether the business of the Corporation, its members, creditors or any other person or otherwise for a fraudulent or nnlawful purpose. (14) Whether any undue favour was. shown to M/s. Poornima Electronics, Bangalore, in the purchase of electronic equipment (intercom) by superseding the recommendation of the Head of the Department and orders of the concerned Minister. (15) Whether any misappropriation of the funds of the Karnataka State Co-operative Marketing Federation to the extent of several crorcs of rupees was made by Shri H. S. Srikantiah, Minister of State for Home, when he was the ~resident of that Federation and whether the business of the Federation was conducted with intent to defraud that Federation, its members, creditors, or any other person or otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose. ( 16) Whether any undue favour was shown by Shri Satya Pal by the Minister of Transport Shri Mohamed Ali, by accepting the once rejected tender of Shri Satya Pal in leasing out its building for canteen in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Bus Stand, Mysore, and whether any undue favour was shown by the same Minister to Shri Satya Pal's son Shri Prem Kumar, in leasing out its retiring rooms of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation in Mysore. (17) Whether any undue favour was shown to four firms, namely, All India Agencies, Vidyut Engineering Co., Trishul Enterprises and Mysore Woods, in purchasing furniture valued at Rs. 29.00 Lakhs in 1973-74 under I.P. Project by the Minister for Health, Shri H. Siddaveerappa. (18) Whether any undue favour was shown by the Minister of State for Small-scale Industries, Shri Koulajgi in 1974, in the issue of Essentiality Certificate to parties many of which are fictitious and bogus. (19) Whether undue favour was shown by the Chief Minister and the Minister of Transport, Shri Aziz Sait in 1973-74, to M/s. Fargo in buying 150 chassis against the advice of the Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation.
(20) Whether any undue favour was shown by the Minister of Industries, Shri S. M. ·Krishna, in allotting of paper, cement and steel of the State-owned Industries to Nontraditional dealers/agents including his kith and kin.
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KARNATAKA v. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
(21) Whether an excess payment of Rs. 3~.00 lakhs was _made
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to M/s. Shankaranarayana Construction Company m regard to the construction of combined Board Administrative Building Complex at Bangalore over and above the contract rates. (22) Whether any excess payment was made to M/s. Bal~ji
Enginering Company to the tune of Rs. 80.00 lakhs m Harangi Project with an intent to favour the contractor.
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(23) Whether Shri K. H. Patil, the then Minister for Agricul-
ture and Forest, was guilty of any misuse of pow~r or undue favouritism in relation to Hukkeri Textile Mills or Gadage Co-operative Textile Mills, or both.
(24) Whether any undue favour was shown or any corruption committed by Shri Chikke Cowda, the then Minister for Animal Husbandry and Agriculture in relation to the payment of a sum of Rs. 3.00 lakhs to M/s. Navarasa Fertilizers. (25) Whether there was any misuse of power and corruption committed by Shri D. K. Maikar, Minister for Municipal
Administration in connection with the allotment of land on J.C. Road to Shri M. B. Lal and Shri M. V. Venkatappa. (No. 375/16/77-AVD-III) R. K. TRIVEDI Secretary
The first thing that strikes one, on a bare reading of the two notifications is that, whereas the State Notification seems scrupulously to avoid any mention of any particular act or part of any individual whatsoever, the whole object of the Central Government notification seems to be to inquire into the correctness of the allegations made against the Chief Minister of the State principally and into allegations against other specified individuals incidentally. The objects and subject matter of the Central Government notification become clearer by looking at Annexures 1 and 2 of it giving particulars of transactions to be investigated. The first five items of Annexure 1 and separate transactions in each of which the Chief Minister of the State is himself G alleged to have played the principal role in such a way as to indicate · his exclusive responsibility. In other transactions, such as in items 10, 11 and 13, the Chief Minister is shown as having participated with others. And, in the remaining transactions mentioned, the allegations do not place the responsibility on any particular individual, but they seem designed to elicit the truth of allegations of favouritism, nepotism, and misuse of power against whoever may be responsible. Annexure 2 of the Central Government notification begins by a statement which shows that its object is to determine whether the Chief Minister or .<1ny other Minister of the Government of the State of Karnataka,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
indulged in nepotism, favouritism, or misuse of Governmental powers in a number of transactions which are listed as items 1 to 25 there. On the other hand, the State Government notification, without mentioning the persons who might be responsible for any excessive or improper payments, or favouritism, or misappropriation, or irregularity, mentions certain contracts in favour of various companies, or parties under 32 heads. It then states, as a separate item of inquiry, the question as to who were the persons responsible in the lapses, if any, mentioned earlier. In other words, apart from their parts in certain lapses the responsibility of the Chief Minister or any other Minister of the Government of Karnataka could not be inquired into by the Commission appointed under the State notification. And, all that the State notification seems to empower its Commision to enquire into, with regard to transactions mentioned there is whether there was any excessive payment or irregularity involved. Hence, it speaks of responsibility for "lapses" as though one could assume that there was no, dishonest motive. The emphasis, in the State notification, is on the question of observance or non-observance of rules coupled with the question whether certain payments were proper. And, the question of affixation of responsibility is confined to "lapses" in the course of these transactions only. Even 11 a transaction has been made completely in accordance with the rules, it may, nevertheless, be an act of favouritism tainted with corruption or dishonesty. Less deserving parties could be deliberately preferred over more deserving parties in much transactions. It is not difficult to make out compliance with the rules or to show on paper that Inthe most deserving party has received the benefit of a contract. deed, even the post deserving party may receive a contract or a benefit under a decision taken by a Government or its Ministers who may have received an illegal gratification for it without anything what so ever appearing on the records of the Government about the bribe received by the Minister concerned. Hence, in add1t10n to the fact that the items mentioned in the two notifications mostly do not tally with each other, it appears to us that the objects of the State notification do not go beyond investigation into the illegality or irregularity of any transaction and "responsibility" only of persons concerned to point: oul what they were. If one may so put it, the Stale notification is meant to set up a Commission which has to inquire whether the veil worn by certain transactions is correct in form and covers it fully, but the Central Government notification is cleady meant to enable the Commission appoiiltcd to tear down even the veil of apparent legality and regularity wl1ich may be worn by some transactions. It authorises the Grover if Commission to inquire into and discover the reality or substance, any, behind certain (mostly other) transactions. The object of the Central Government notification seems clearly not only to affix responsibilty for transactions mentioned there on individuals who may be really guilty even if a few of them could be said to have been mentioned in both notifications. Wc do not think that such notifications would justly or fairly be spoken of as covering "the same matter", as contemplated by proviso (b) to Section 3 ( 1) of the Act, because the
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KARNATAKA v. UNION
,. s.
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(Beg, C.J.)
State Commission is there to examine the appearance or the surface whereas the Central Commission is expected to delve deeper into what could only lie behind or below it. It is certainly a matter for concern to a State if some irregularity or illegality has been committed in a particular transaction by its Government or a Minister. But, it would obviously be more helpful to determine why it has been committed. And, it should be still more important for it to find out who, however highly placed, is really responsible for the commission of that irregularity and whether any dishonesty or corruption has operated at the highest levels in the State even if the form is proper and regular. If the State notification shows no concern for what seem to us to be the much more important objects of the Central Government notification, one could perhaps guess that the indifference of the State towards the more serious matters is not without some object or significance. Nevertheless, we do not propose to pass any judgment on the motives of the State Government or the fact that the most important or significant features of what has been alleged against the Chief Minister and members of his Government have been left out by the State Government notification even if the object of that notification was quite bonafide and proper so far as it went. We think, however, that the State notification does not go far enough. But, the Central Government notification does proceed further. It squarely levels charges against persons who, according to the allegations made, may have acted in a manner which makes them not only theoretically responsible but actually guilty of corruption.
For the success of the policies of any State or Government in it, in any part of the country over which its authonty runs, it should be shown to be capable of carrying out the constitutional mandates contained in Part IV of the Directive Principles of State Policy so as to make the basic human rights guaranteed by our Constitution a reality and not a mirage. That, for the masses of our people, is the basic be purpose of the who·le Constitution which cannot be allowed to If the basic rights of the people are not to be stultified frustrated. anJ to appear chimerical, those in charge of the affairs of the State, at the highest levels, must be above suspicion. This is only possible if their own bonafides and utterly unquestionable integrity are assured and apparent in the context of the high purposes of our Constitution and the dire needs of our poverty striken masses. We cannot view We think that the interests of the allegations of corruption lightly. States and of the Union are not anti-thetical when there are charges of corruption and misuse of power against those in authoritv anywhere. To serve the common interests of the whole people, on whose behalf our Constitution speaks, the States and the Union cannot stand apart. It is as They must stand to~ethcr united in purpose and action. important that unjustified and malicious attacks and charges against individuals in high places should be unmasked and the reality beliind them exposed for what it is worth, as it is that justified complaints must find adequate means of redress so that the interests of the dumb millions of our country men are duly safeguarded against unscrupulousness wl1erever found. If, as we find in this case, the State notification is meant only to superficially scratch the surface of the allegations made,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978) 2 S.C.R.
whereas the Central Government notification is meant to probe into the crux or the heart of what may or may not have gone wrong with the body politic in the State of Karnataka, we could not be too technical or astute in finding reasons to hold that the subje~t matter of the two enquiries is substantially the same. Obviously, this could not really be so. A bare reading of the two notifications, set 1out in full above, shows that. In the circumstances of this case, it may be more graceful for the Chief Minister of the State of Karnataka to waive his technical objections, as he seems to do in undertaking to place all the material before whichever commission may be found to have jurisdiction to inquire into the allegations made against him. He could take the opportunity to honourably face and repel the charges which, according to him, have been repeatedly but unjustifiably and maliciously made He could thus be able against him over a sufficiently long period. to establish that he is serving the interests of his State, its inhabitants, and, indeed, of the country as a whole, if his assertions are correct.
The plaintiff has not suggested anywhere that the Grover Co!llinission is not presided ever by an individual of unquestionable integrity and independence who has been a Judge of this Court. Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, appearing for the plaintiff, has, very frankly and properly, conceded that he cannot successfully press want of bonafides on the part of the Central Government in issuing its notification. This means that the question whether the Commission is either unnecessary, except as a weapon of political warfare, as well as any doubts about whether it could be or was to be misused in this case, must be dismissed as unsustainable. The State Government must itself be deemed to admit that circumstances necessitated the appointment of a Commission, by appointing its own, to inquire into analogous matters which deserved investigation due to their public importance. We find that the Central Government notification itself excludes from its purview those charges which may be fairly said to fall within the scope of the Commission set up by the State Government. We are not concerned with matters which may be subsequently added so as to We think expand the scope of inquiry by the State Commission. that the provisions of proviso (b) to Section 3 ( 1) of the Act will prevent the State Government from adding such matters as are already covered by the Central Government notification. We, however, leave it to the Grover Commission itself to determine, whenever it is faced with such an objection, whether a particular matter is already being properly enquired into by the State Commission. In view of what we have observed above, it would perhaps be proper for the Government of Karnataka itself to withdraw its own notification if it thinks that certain members of the State Government will be unduly embarrassed by having to face inquiries by two Commissions on matters which may have some connections or even some common areas. Indeed, to get to the heart of a transection, its surrounding or superficial shell, which is all that the State Commission
KARNATAKA V. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
,
)
can inquire into with regard to some transactions, may have to be pierced, or, to some degree, traversed before the core of these transactions can be reached .. As we hold that the two notifications authorise inquiries into matters which are substantially different in nature and object, the enquiry by the Grover Commission cannot be said to be barred by reason of the State Government notification under proviso (b) to Section 3 (1) of the Act, even if, in order to deal with the substantially different subject matter, in view of the divergence in objects certain areas of fact or rules governing transaction may be common. If the objectives arc different the examination of common areas of fact and law for different purposes will still be permissible. Without doubting the motives of the State Government in appointing its own Commission perhaps we may observe that, in a case involving charges of the kind made against the Chief Minister and other Ministers of the State, it would be better if the State's own Commision did not even remotely appear to have been set up merely in anticipation of a thorough investigation by an outside Central authority which would, presumably, appear more impartial and objective, or, to impede or embarrass the proceedings of the Central Government Commission. Such doubts as could arise on these grounds will be dispelled by the withdrawal of the State notification. Although the prompt action ,-01 the State Government may seem quite commendable and bonafidc, in appointing its own Commission in the context and circumstances disclosed above, its continued existence may not give exactly that impression after what we have held above on an analysis of the apparrent objects of the two Commissions judged by the contents of the two notifications. In any case, the subject matter, not being substantially same, the Central Government Commission could proceed with its investigations if other objections, which we now proceed to examine, are not really fatal to the validity of the Central Government's notification. Those other objections to the validity of the Central Government's notification may be summarised as follows : Firstly, it is submitted that express provisions of the Constitution relating to the federal structure, distribution of executive and legislative powers between the State and the Union, joint responsibility of a State's Council of Ministers, conditions under which they can hold office or may be dismissed, the State Legislature's exclusive control over their actions and conduct of affairs of the State Government, are infringed by it, so that, if all this could be done, under the clock of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Act, by the Central Government, this provision: of the Act is, pro tanto, invalid. Secondly, and following logically and naturally from the set of propositions, as their necessary consequence, the notification constitutes violations by the Central Government of what must be held to be parts of the basic features or the basic structure of the Constitution which do not permit the destruction of eitlier federalism or democracy by issuing executive fiats ..Thirdly, carryin~ the logic of the last mentioned set of submissions a step further, it is urged that, as the basic features of the Constitution have been held by this Court to be outside the procedure for amendment
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•
contained in Article 368 of the Constitution, it must, a fortiori, be held to be outside the legislative competence of Parliament as contemplated by Articles 245-255 in Part XI of the Constitution read with provisions of the Legislative Lists in Schedule 7. Fourthly, it is suggested, in the alternative, that, in any case, a necessary implication of the express provisions of _the Constitution is that a control by the Union Government over the day-to-day working of the Governments in the States by the adoption of the legislative procedure found in Part XI of the Constitution must have a result which can only be achieved by a Co!lstitutional amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution. Fifthly, it is submitted that even if interference with the day to day working of the Governmental machinery in the States is not barred by the basic structure of the Constitution, yet, the situations in which such the interference is warranted having been specifically laid down in emergency provisions contained in Articles 352-360 found in Part XVI!! of the Constitution, any other mode of interference with the operations of State Governments, not expressly prvvided by the Constitution itself, must be deemed to be outside the ordinary legislative competence of Parliament. Sixthly, the plaintiff's counsel submitted that, in any event, the provisions of the Act must be so construed or interpreted, by reading them down if necessary, as to preclude interference by the Union Government with the operations of the State Government or the conduct of its Ministers keeping in view all the submissions mentioned above.
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It is true that learned counsel for the plaintiff kept reverting to what he really meant to put forward as the basic or inviolable features of the Constitution, yet, he felt reluctant to unequivocally commit himE self to the view that the Act contained provisions which constituted a violation of the basic structure of the Constitution which has been held to inelude both Democracy and Federalism. Apparently, this somewhat shifting position arose from a realisation that the Act ma31 have very little, if anything at all, to do with provisions meant to ensure Democratic Government, and that our Constitution has, despite what.ever federalism may be found in its structure, so strongly unitary featuF res also in it that. when the totality of these provisions is examined, it becomes difficult to assert confidently how much federalism such a Constitution contains, whether those parts of it which seem to override the federal elements of our Constitution are not more basic or si!',nificant than what is described as its federalism, and whether possible actions under the Act, intended to authorise investigation, pr~smnably with a view to finding remedies. into whatever dishonesty or corruption may be discovered in the conduct of governmental affairs by Ministers, are not really meant to safeguard or help rather than to destory or hinder democratic government. It is interesting to note what Sir Gyril Salmon, Lord Justice A ppca 1, said in a lecture on Tribunals of Inquiry".
"In all countries, certainly in those which enjoy freedom of speech and a free Press, moments occur when allegations and rumours circulate causing a nation-wide crisis of confidence in the integrity of public life or about other matters
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of ~
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KARNATAKA V. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
of vital public importance. .No doubt this rarely happens, but when it does it is essential that public confidence should be restored, for without it no democracy can long survive. This confidence can be effectively restored only by thoroughly investigating and probing the rumours and allegations so as to search out and establish the truth. The truth may show that the evil exists, thus enabling it to be rooted out, or that there is no foundation in the rumours and allegations by which the public has been disturbed. In either case,
l
confidence is restored".
In the lecture mentioned above, it was pointed out that the Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, was passed in England to displace the procedure by which Sekct Parliamentary Committees were used "to investigate alleged wrongdoing in high places". About the Select Committee procedure he said : "Such a method of investigation by a political tribunal was wholly unsatisfactory. Being a progressive people it took us only little more than about 300 years to do anything about it. In the United States of America, however, which is still more progressive than we are, they still use virtually the same method. Congressional Committees of investigation, like our Parliamentary committees, consist of members representing the relative strength of the majority and minority parties. Clearly snch bodies can never be free from party political influences. This is a very real defect in any tribunal investigating allegations of public misconduct-particularly as the subject matter of the inquiry often has highly charged political overtones." He observed : "Thfl history of such investigations in England by Parliamentary committees is, to say the least, unfortunate. Let me give you but one example. Early in the present century there occurred what became known as the Marconi Scandal. In 1912 the Post Master General in a Liberal ·Government accepted a tender by the English Marconi Company for the construction of State-owned wireless telegraph stations throughout the Empir9. There followed widespread rumours that the Government bad corruptly favoured the Marconi Company and that certain prominent members of the Government had improperly profited by the transaction. The Select Parliamentary Committee appointed to investigate these rnmours represented the respective strengths of the Liberal and Conservative Parties. The majority report of the Liberal members of the Committee exonerated the members of the Government concerned whereas a minority report by the Conservative members of the Committee found that these members of the Government bad been guilty of gross impropriety. When the reports came to be debated in the House of Commons, the House divided on strictly party lines and by a majority exonerated the Ministers from all blame. This is the last instance of a matter of this kind being investigated by a Select Committee of Parliament''. In other words, "it was because in England investigation by a political tribunal of matters causing grave public disquiet had been: discredited that the Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, was passed, with a view to setting up some permanent investigating machinery to be available for use when re{juircd''. Furthermore, he pointed put that even in America ad hoc
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tribunals are not infrequently appointed to avoid a matter being referred to a Congressional Committee, as, for example, the Warren Commission to investigate the murder of President Kennedy.
It is thus clear that in democratic countries not only modern practice but statute can provide for Inquiries of the kind which are meant to be conducted under our Act of 1952. The Preamble of B our Act shows that it was meant to "provide for appointment of the Commissions of Inquiry and for vesting such Commissions with certain powers". Section 1, sub-section (2) of the Act indicates that it extends to the whole of India; but, a proviso to it puts certain limitations to which its operation is subjected so far as the State of Jammu & Kashmir is concerned inasmuch as, for this State, Inquiries set up must relate to matters appertaining to such entries in List II or c List ill of the Seventh Schedule as may be applicable to the State. There is nothing in the Act to show any such limitations with regard to any other State.
Section 2 of the Act provides : "2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,D
(a) "appropriate Government" means(i) the Central Government, in relation to a Commission appointed by it to make an inquiry into any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List I or List II or List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution; and
(ii) The State Government, in relation to a Commission appointed by it to make an inquiry into any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List II or List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution :
Provided that in relation to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, these clauses shall have effect subject to the modification that-
(a) in sub-clause (i) thereof, for the words and figures "List I or List II or List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution" the words and figures "List I or List HI in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir" shall be substitufed;
(b) in sub-clause (ii) thereof, for the words and figures "List II or List Ill in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution", the words and figures "List ill in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir" shall be substituted; (b) "Commission" means a Commission of Inquiry appointed under section 3;
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KARNATAKA v. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
(c) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this Act." ,._
Section 3 of the Act reads·as foUows :
/,-
"3. (1) The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall, if a resolution in this behalf is pa5sed by the House of the People, or, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notificatiou, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly : Provided that where any such Commission appointed to inquire into any matter-
has been
(a) by the Central Government, no State Government shall, except with the approval of the Central Government, appoint another Commission to inquire into the same fuatter for so long as the Commission appointed by the Central Government is functioning; (b) by a State Government, the Central Government shall not appoint another Commission to inquire into the same matter for so long as the Commission appointed by the State Government is functioning, unless the Central Government is of opinion that the scope of the inquiry should be extended to two or moi;e States. (2) The Commission may consist of one or more members appointed by the appropriate Government, and where the Commission consists of more than one member, one of them may be appointed as the Chairman thereof. (3) The appropriate Government may, at a1fy stage of an inquiry by the Commission fill any vacancy which ntay have arisen in the office of a member of the Commission (whether consisting of one or more than one member) . (4) The appropriate Government shall cause< to be laid before the House of the People or, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State, the report, if any, of the Commission on the inquiry made by the Commission under sub-section ( 1 ) together with a memorandum of the action taken thereon, within a period of six months ci the submission of the report by the Commission to the appropriate Government". 4-l 042 SCI/77
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After the two sections, set out above, which disclose the apparently very wide and undefined sc.ope of inquiries to be conducted under the Act, the only limit being that they must relate to matters of "definite public importance", follow sections conferring upon Commissions under the Act powers of a civil court for the purpose of eliciting evidence, both oral and documentary, and power to punish those guilty of its contempts. Section 6 of the Act, however, makes it _ clear that statements made by a person in the course of his evidence before the Commission "will not subject him to or be used against him in any civil or criminal proceeding except in a prosecution for giving false evidence by making such statements". But, this protection is not extended to statements made in reply to questions not required by the Commission to be answered,. or, those made on matters which are not relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The Act, however, contains no provisions for giving any effect to the findings of the Commission or for enforcing any order which conld be made by the Commission against any person as a result of an inquiry. In fact, the only orders a Commission under the Act is empowered to make against anybody are those relating to adduction of evidence, whether oral or documentary, and those which may be required to protect the Commission against "acts calculated to bring the Commission or any member thereof into disrepute". The proceedings of a Commission could only result in a Report which is to be laid before the Legislature concerned under the provisioos of s. 3 ( 4) of the Act. Hence, the obvious intention behind the Act is to enable the machinery of demoq~tic government to function mcire efficiently and effectively. It could hardly be construed as an Act meant to thwart democratic methods of government. Even in countries with undiluted unitary systems of Govt. there is devolution of powers of local self-Government for restricted purposes. In our country, there is, at the top, a Central or the Union Government responsible to Parliament, and there are, below, it State Governments, responsible to the State Legislatures, each functioning within the sphere of its own powers which are divided into two categories; the exclusive and the concurrent. Within the exclusive sphere of the powers of the State legislature is local Government. And, in all States there is a system of local Government in both Urban and Rural areas, functioning under State enactments. Thus, we can speak of a three tier system of Government in our country in which the Central or the Union Govt. comes at the apex with certain subjects wh;ch are exclusively left to the States concerned ordinarily or in normal times. But, even problems which arise within the territories of States may fall within the sphere of overriding Central power in emergencies. And. if a subject is considered important enough to be regarded as the cooeern of the whole nation, the Constitution makers have themselves placed it either in the exclusively Central Legislative List I or in the concurrent Legislative List III of items mentioned in Schedule VII. Our Parliament consists of the President and the two Houses of Perliament. The House of the People is not meant to represent the States as independent units of a federation (Article 79). It has to
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KARNATAKA V. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
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.have a sirength of members not exceeding 525 in ·number chosen by .direct election by the people from various territorial constituencies in the States and not more than twenty representatives oi people living in the Union territories (Article 81J. There the people of India living in the States and of the Union territories are directly represented so that their interests and rights could be presumed to be well looked after and protected by their direct representatives. The Council of States has 12 members in it nominated by the President for their special knowledge or experience in matters. of art, science, or social service, and not more than 23 8 representatives of the States and elected by members of the legislative assembly of each State in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote and from the Union territories in the manner prescribed by law made by the Parliament (Article 80). The repre:: sentation of the Legislative bodies o[ the States and oi the Union territories is certainly a recognition ol tho federal prine;ple. But, this does not mean that the Central Government is precluded from all interference in matters concerning individual States. For deter@inbg the extent of that interference and the circumstances in which it is possible we have to turn to other provisions of our Constitution.
Article 245 ( 1) of our Constitution gives the territorial operations of the laws made by Parliament and the State legislatures. Article 246(1) enacts that items in List I of the Seventh Schedule fall exclusively within the domain of Parliament and those in List II come exclusively )Vithin the legislative power of the State legislatures, but those in List III are to be concurrent. Article 248, however, vests Parliament with exclusive power to legislate with respect to matters not enumerated in either the concurrent or State list. This is what is spoken of generally as the "residuary power". In addition, Parliament has over-riding powers of legislating even · for matters in the -State list for limited durations if th•c Council of States by resolution supported by not less than two thirds of its members declared that it is necessary to do so in national interest or during the continuance of a proclamation of emergency (Articles 249 and 250). Inconsistency between laws made by the Parliament and a State legislature on an item found in a concurrent list, is to be resolved in favour of the law made by Parliament (Article 254). And, far-reaching. powers, contained in Articles 352-360 in Part XVIII of the Constitution, enable the President to suspend not only the enforcement of fundamental rights of citizens, and their operation as fetters on legislative powers but also the functions of the State legislature which can be assumed by Parliament and of State Governments which can be taken over by the President. It is true that the emergency powers are so drastic that they can be abused. We have not, however, got before· us a case of the exercise of emergency powers or of abuse of powers. We are only considering here the extents of what are put forward as federal and democratic features of Govt. which may or may not be capable of suspension. As the Constitution stands at present, the exercise of the emergency powers, whose validity is not questioned before us by any party in this case, can completely remove even the semblance of a federal structure in our ·constitution for the duration of an emerg~ncy.
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A look at Chapter II of Part XI on administrative relations between the Union and the States, shows us provisions for directions which can be given to the State Governmen!S eve!} in normal times by the Central Govt. described in Articles 256-257, as "the Govt. of India." Article 256 enacts : "256. The executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the Jaws made by Parliament and any existing Jaws which apply in that State, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose". Article 257 (1) may also be quoted to illustrate the extent of Executive powers of the State and Unio11 Govt. : "257(1) The executive power of every State shall be so exercised as not to ·impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the g~ving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose". The extent of the normal executive powers of the Union are indicated as follows by Article 73 (1) of the Constitution :
"73 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend(a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament haspower to make laws; and (b) to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India · by virtue of any treaty or agreement;
Provided that the executive power referred to in subclause (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in this Constitution or in any Jaw made by Parliament, extend in any State to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has also power to make Jaws". And, the exte.nt and limitations of the executive power of a State given in Article 162 as follows :
"162. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution the executive· power of a. State shall extend to the matters 'with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws: Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a. State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executlve power of the State shall be subject to, and linlited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof".
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KARNATAKA V. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
The wide scope of executive powers of the Union Government was considered by this Court not Jong ago in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India('), where; after examining the relevant Constitutional provisions, one of us observed in the context of what was sought to be =trued as a "direction" to the State Government, given by the Home Minister in the Union· Government, to dissolve a State Assembly : j
'
·"I may point out that there are various aspects of relations between the Union and the States governed by different provisions of the Constitution. I may here refer to tho~e which relate to giving of 'directions' by the Union Government to the State Governments because Art. 365 provides : '365. Where any State has failed to comply with or to give effect to any directions given in the exercise of the executive power of the Union under any of the provisions of this Constitution, it shall be lawful for the ·President to hold that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution' Articles 256 and 257 mention a wide range of subjects on which the Union Government may give executive directions to Sl<'lte Governments. Article 73(1) (a) of the Constitution tells us tha~ the Executive power of the Union extends to all matters on which 'Parliament has power to make laws'. Article 248 of the Constitution vests exclusively in the Parliament residuary powers of making laws on any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent or State Lists. Article 256 of the Constitution covers cases where the President may want to give directions in exercise of the executive power of the Union to a State Government in relation to a matter covered by an existing law made by Parliament which applies to that State. But, Art. 257(1) impo6es a wider obligation upon a State to exercise :!ts powers in such a way as not to impede the exercise of executh·c power of the Union which, as would appear from Art. 73 of the Constitution, read with Art.- 248 may cover even a subject on which there is no existing law but on which some legislation by Parliament is possible. It could, therefore, be argued that although, the. Constitution itself does not lay down specifically when the power of dissohition should be exercised by th.e Governor on the advice of a Council of Ministers in the Sl<'lte, yet if a direction oil that matter was properly given by the Union Government to a State Government, there is a duty to carry it out. The time for the dissolution of a State Assembly is not covered by (1) A.I.R. 1977 S.C. p. 1361, 1383-M.
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any specific provision of the Constitution or any law made on the subject. It is possible, however, for the Union Government, in exercise of its· residuary executive power
to
consider it a fit subject for the issue of an appropriate direction when it considers that the political situation in the country· is such that a fresh electio11 is necessary in the interest of political stability or to establish !he confidence of the people in the Govt. of a State". (p. 1383-84). \,
In that case, after considering the extent of federalism m ,Constitution it was also observed (p. 1383) :
onr
"If thrn our Constitution creates a Central Government which is 'amphibian' in the sense that it can move either on the federal or unitary plane, according tc the needs of the situation and circumstances of a case, the question which we are driven back to consider is whether an assessment of the 'situation' in which the Union Government should move either on the federal or unitary plane arc matters for the Union Government itself or for this Court to consider and determine. Each organ of the Republic is expected to know the limits of ifs own powers. The judiciary comes m generally only when any question ~f ultra vires action is involved, because questions relating to vires appertain to
its domain".
ln the first quotation given above, what was spoken of as a "residuary executive power" of the Ce11tral Government, analogous to the "residuary" legislative powers of Parliament, was relied upon in support of the alleged "direction" from the Centre. In the case before us it could certainly be urged that a consideration of the question whether a State Govt. or its Chief Minister is or is not carrying out the trust which Constitutional power places in the ha!1ds of a State Government and its head, so as to· determine whether anv exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 356 of the· Constitution is called for or not. is certainly a matter which lay within the powers of ,the Central Government. Article 356 speaks of the' "satisfaction" of the President fron1 n. report of the Governor "or other\visc'' whether a particular situation has arisen in \Vhich the Govt of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provision~ of the Ccnstitution. Such a matter would certainly be a matter of public importance. ]f the President dccn1s it necessary to give the Slate Govt. or its Chief Minister an opportunity of being heard before an impartial Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Act. it could ccrta'nly not be said that such a mode of exercise of power under Article 356 is net fully covered by what is necessarily implied hy this article of the Cons1itution. Indeed, such a procedure wo~ld be a very fair and reasonable one. And, in judging the validity of provisions even hypothetical situations to which they could apply could be taken into account and not merely those present in the case before the Court. We do not think that an examination of the CJ:press provisions of the Constitution advances the case of the plaintiff.
KARNATAKA v. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
I
On the other hand, the central Government can place relian.ce on, interalia, provisions of Article 356 of the Constitution for powers which could be held to be necessarily implied in the provisions of the Constitution-that is to say, a power to order .an inquiry for the purposes of the satisfaction required by article 356. And the machinery provided by the Act could, it seems to us, be utilised to decide whether action nuder article 356 is really called for. Reliance was, however, placed strongly on provisions of the Constitution setting up what, in the words of Dr. Ambedkar, one of the prime architects of our Constitution, is "a Dual Polity" by which, as was explained in the case of State of Rajasthan (supra), he meant a Republic "both unitary as well as federal" according to the needs of the time and circumstances. This "Dual Polity" of ours is a product of historical accidents, or, at any rate, of circumstances other than thOse which result in genuine federations in whieh the desire for a separate identity and governmental independence of the federating units is so strong that nothing more than a union with a strictly demarcated field of Central Government's powers is possible. A confoderal polity carries tl:ie attenuation of Central authority to the extent of confining combinecl or concerted action to the more strictly limited field of collaboration only to matters such as foreign affairs and defence so that it sets up a mechanism of cooperative action in limited areas which can nardly be spoken of as ·a Government. A: genuine federation is a combination of political units which adhere rather tenaciously to the exclusion· of the Central authority from stricttv deCiarcated spheres of State action, but there is a Central or Federal "Government". The extent of Federalism set up depends upon the extent of demarcafon in the executive, legislative and judicial spheres. In a truly Federal Constitution this demarcation is carried out in a very carefully comprehensive and detailed manner. The limits are clearly specified. We will thus have to examine our Constition to determine how much of it is found here. No doubt, throughout the long course of our history, our successive rulers 1iad been trying to build up, a unity of India by establishing their imperial sway politically and administratively over the whole country, but, it was really the British who succeeded in givin~ reality to such an objective. And, even they preserved a duality of systems of Government. There was a British India under the Governor General 'presiding over the destinies of the various provinces under Governors as Imperial sub-agents, but all acting on behalf of an Emperor whose; governments ruled from Westminster and Whitehall. And, there were other parts of the country, ruled by Indian Princes owing allegiance to a foreign Emperor to whose authority they paid homage by acknowledging his sovereignty or the paramountcy exercised through his Viceroy. These two parts were sought to be knitted toge~her into a federal polity by the Government of India Act of 1935. Federal princlples, including a Federal Court, were embodied in it so as to bring together and co-ordinate two different types of palitical systems and sets of authorities. But, after the Constitution
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of our Republic, came the gradual disappearance of Princely States and a unification of India in a single polity with duality of agencies of Government only for the purposes of their more effective and efficient operations under a Central direction. It was, more or less, an application of the principle of division of labour under at least Central supervision. In other words the duality or duplication of organs of government on the Central and State levels did not reflect a truly federal demarcation of powers based on any separatist sentiments which could threaten the sovereignty and integrity of the Indian Republic to which members! of our Constituent Assembly seemed ardently devoted, particularly after an unfortunate division of the country with certain obviously disastrous results. However, we may examine t:he express provisions of our Constitution relating to the organs of Government in the States which, no doubt, give the appearance of full-fledged separate States for Certain purposes. Each State has its own Governor exercising the executive power of that State. But, all Governors, although· undertaking tC> devote themselves to the service and well-being of the people of their respective States, owe an undivided allegiance to "the· Constitution and the law". Each of them is appointed by the President and holds office dnring the pleasure of the President to whom he sends his reports with a view to any proposed action under Article 356 of the Constitution. The Governor's authority, under the Warrant of his appointment, is traceable to the President to whom he is to submit: his resignation if he resigns. Article 163 speaks of the Council of Ministers "with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion." Now, the Council of Ministers, theoretically appointed by the Governor, is certainly "collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State" (see: Article 164(2). But, this "collective responsibility" does not, as has been erroneously attempted to be argued before us, abridge or truncate the power of the Central Government to appoint a Commission under s. 3 of the Act. In fact, this "collective responsibility" has a scope and mode of operation which are very different from those of an inquiry under s. 3 of the Act even though the same or similar matters may, sometimes, give rise to both: "Collective Responsibility" is basically political in origin and mode of operation. It may arise even in cases which may not call for any inquiry under Section 3 of the Act. And, matters investigated under Section 3 of the Act may have no bearing on any "collective responsibility". The object of collective responsibility is to make the whole body of persons holding Ministerial office collectively, or, if one may so put it, "vicariously" responsible for such acts of the others as arc referable to their collective volition so that, even if an individual may not be personally responsible for it, yet, he will be deemed to share
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KARNATAKA V. UNION (Beg; C.J.)
'.
1he re;ponsibility 'with thos~ who may have actnally commit.led some wroag. On the. other hand, in the case, before ns, the enqmry un'.ler Section 3 of the Act by the Grover Commision has been ordered by the Central Government so as to determine who is actually responsible ior certain actions and what could be the motive behind them. The sphere of this enquiry is very different frorn that.in which ."~i:IIective respOnsibility" functions. Explaining ''collective respons1b1lity", as understood in England, two writers on Constituticnal matters (see : "Some Problems of the Constitution" by Geoffery Marshall and Graeme C. Moodie) say: (at p. 71) . "If responsibility is taken in the formal constitutional sense, there would seem, granted collective governmental responsibility; to be no clear distinction to be drawn between. Ministers inside and those. outside the Cabinet. . To be responsible in ·this sense simply is to share the consequences · of responsibility-namely to be subject to the rnle that·no member of the Government may properly remain a member anq dissociate. himself from its policies (except on occasions when the Government permits a free vote in the House)", · .
They add: ' "The substance of the Government's collective responsibility could be defined as its duty to submit its policy to and defend its policy before the Honse of Commons, and to · resign if defeated on an issue of confidence". Each Minister can be and is separately responsible for his own ·decisions· and .acts and omissions also. But, inasmuch as the Council of Ministers is able to stay in office only so !Ong as it commands the support and confidence of a majority of Members cf the Legislature of the State, the whole Council of Ministers· must be held to be politically responsible for the decisions and policies of each of tl1e Ministers and of his department which could be presumed to have the support of the whole Ministry. Hence, the whole Ministry will, at least on issues involving matters of policy, have to be treated· as ··one entity so far as its answerability to the Legislative Assembly representing the "electors is concerned. This is the meaning of. the principle underlying article 164(2) of the Constitution. The purpose of this provisiol\ i.s not to find out facts or to establish the actual responsibility ef a Chief Minister or any other Minister or Ministers for particular decisions or-· Governmental acts.. That can be more suitably done, when wrongful a'-ts or decisions are complained of, by means of inquiries under the Act. As already indicated above, the procedure of. Parliamentary Committees to inquire into every . legally or ethically wrong act was found to be unsatisfactory and unsound. The principle of individual as well as collective ministerial responsibility can work most efficiently only when cases requiring proper sifting and evaluation of evidence and discussion of questions involved have taken place, where this is required, in proceedings before a Commission appointed under."s.· 3 of the Act.
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Text-books writers on Constitutional Law have indicated how collective ministerial responsibility to Parliament, which has essentially a political purpose and effects, developed later than individual responsibility of Ministers to Parliament which was also political in origin and operation. It is true that an individual Minister could, in England, where the principle of individual and collective responsibility of 'Ministers was evolved, be responsible either for wrongful acts done by him without the authority of the whole cabinet or of the monarch to support them, or under orders of the King who could, in the eye of law, do no wrong. But, apart from an impeachment, which has become obsolete, or punishment for contempts of a House, which constitute only a limited kind of offences, the Parliament does not punish the offender. For establishing his legal liability recourse to ordinary courts of law is indi_>pensable. Responsibility to Parliament only means that the Minister may be compelled by convention to resign. Out of this liability arose the principle of collective responsibility. Thus, in Wade and Phillips on "Constitutional Law", 8th Edn., p. 87, we find; "Just as it became recognised that a single Minister could not retain office against the will of Parliament, so later it became clear that all Ministers must stand or fall together in Parliament, if the Government was to be carried on as a unity rather than by a number of advisers of the Sovereign acting separately". This development of collective responsil)ility was thus described in 1878 by Lord Salisbury: "For all that passes in Cabinet every member of it who does not resign is absolutely and irretrievably responsible and has no right afterwards to say that he agreed in one case to a compromise, while in another he was persuaded by his colleagues .... It is only on the principle that absolute responsibility is undertaken by every member of the Cabinet, who, after a decision is arrived at; remains member of it, that the joint responsibility of Ministers to Parliament can be upheld and one of the most essential princi11les of parliamentary responsibility established." The whole question of respm1sib.ility is related to the continuance of a Minister or a Government in office. A Minister's cwn acts or omissions or those of others in the Department in his charge, for which he may fee]· morally responsible, or, for which others may hold him morally responsible, may compel him to resign. By an extension of this logic, applied to individual Ministers at first, emerged the principle of "collective responsibility" which we find enacted in Articles 75 (2) and 164 (2) of our Constitution. The only sanction for its enforcement is the pressure of public opinion cxpress·ed pa1ticularly in terms of withdrawal of political support by members of Parliament or the State Legislature as the case may be_ As Prof. S. A. de Smith points out in his Constitutional and Administrative Law, 1971. at p. 170 to 179, the principle operates in a nebulous moral-cum-political sphere, sometimes forcing an individual Minister to resign, as in the case of Mr. Profumo, and, on
KARNATAKA V. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
J
other occasions, involving the fate of the whole Ministry, depending npon the extent to which the Cabinet as a whole could. be, in the circnmstances of a parllcnlar case, deemed to be responsible for a particular decision or action or inaction. In England, the principle operates as a matter of convention backed by political jndgment, as reflected in Parliament whereas, for us, the principle is stated in onr Constitution itself, but it, nevertheless, depends upon convention and upon public opinion, particularly as reflected in Parliament or in t~e State Legislature, ~s the case may be, for its effectiveness. The principle thus exists separately and independently from the legal liability of a Minister, holding an office in the Union or a State Government.
An investigation by a Commission· of Inquiry should facilitate or help the formation of sound public opinion. That was the object of the Commission of Inquiry presided over by Lord Denning on the Profnmo allair. The fact that the Minister concerned was considered individually responsible to the House for a wrong statement made to it did not prevent an inquiry by a Commission into matters on which he had made the statement. His individual actions, however, did not bring into operation the principle of collective responbility beca~sc his colleagues in the Government could not reasonably be held guilty of dereliction or b(each of any duty.
A Conll1lisson of Inquiry could not properly be meant, as is sometimes suspected, to merely white-wash ministerial or departmen-' tal acti011, rather than to explore and discover, if possible, real facts. It is also not meant to serve al5 a mode of prosecution and much less of persecution. Proceedings before it cannot serve as substitutes for, proceedings which should take place before a Court of law inves. tcd with powers of adjudication as well as of awarding punishments or affording reliefs. Its report or findings cannot relieve Courts which may have to detennine for themselves matters dealt with by a Commission. Indeed, the legal relevance or evidentiary value of a Commission's report or findings on issues which a Court may have t0 decide for itself, is very questionable. The appoinllnent of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate a matter which should, in the ordinary course, have gone to a Court of law is generally a confession of want of sufficient evidence-as in the case of the appointment of the Warren Commission in the U.S.A. to inquire into facts concerning the murder of the· late President Kennedy-to take it to Court combined with an attempt to satisfy the public need and desire to discover what had really gone wrong and how and where if possible. A Commission of Inquiry has, therefore, a function of its own to fulfil. Tt has an orbit of action of its own within which it can move so as not to conflict with or imnede other forms of action or modes of redress. Its report or findings are not immune from.criticism if they are either not fair and impartial or arc unsatisfactory for other reasons as ·was said to the case with the Warren Commission's report.
be
Provisions of either Article 75(2) or Article 164(2) could not operate as bars against the institution of inquiries by Commissions
ff
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scl up under the Act. To infer such bars as tbeir necessary consequences would be to misunderstand the object as well as the mode and sphere of operation of the principles found in both articles 75 (2) and I 64(2) of the Constitution and also the purpose, scope, and function of Commissions of Inquiry set up under the Act.
In a somewhat desperate alteJ11.Pt to fin~ some constitutional prohibition against the inquiries on which the Grover Commission has embarked, learned Counsel for the plaintiff relied on Article 194(3) of the Constitution. The particular clause (3) of Article 194 has to be read in the context of other clauses of Article 194 as well as the remaining provisions of the Constitution as indicated by Article 194(1). We may here set out the whole of Article 194 which reads as follows : "I 94· (1). Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of the Legislature, there shall be freedom of speech in the Legislature of every State. (2) No member of the Legislature of a State shall be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paR§r. votes or proceedings. ( 3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a State, and of the Members and the committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution. ( 4) The provisions of clauses (I), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, a House of the Legislature of a State or any committee thereof as they ~pply in relation to members of that Legislature". Article J 94 reproduces the terms of article 105 with this evident difference that, whereas article 194, is applicable to Houses of a State Legislature, article 105 applies to the two Houses of Parliament. Each of these two articles subjects "the powers, privileges and immunities" of each House as well as all its Members and its Committees not only to the laws made by the appropriate legislature but also to all the other provisions of the Constitution. It is, clear, from these articles. that they do not apply to legislative po,wers of Parliament or of the
KARNATAKA v. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
State Legislatures which are specifically dealt with by articles 245 to' 255 of the Constitution. Articles 105 and! 194, far from dealing with the legislative powers of Honses of Parliament or of State Legisla!uf".8 respectively, are confined in scope to such powers o~ each House as 1t may exercise separately functioning as a House. It also covers immunities and privileges of each House as a House as well as of its members. The correct principle of ~interpretation to apply is "noscitur a sociis", or, in other words, the word "powers" gets its meaning a~<l co]our !lot only from its context but also from the other words used m association
A.
\Vith.jt,
It is evident, from the Chapter in which article 194 occurs as well as the heading and its marginal note that the "powers" meant to be indicated here are not independent. They are powers which depend upon and arc necessary for the conduct of the business of each House. They cannot also be expanded into those of the House of Commons in England for all purposes. For example, it could not, be contended that each House of a State Legislature has the same share of legislative power as the House of Commons has, as a constituent part of a completely sovereign legislature. Under our law it is the Constitution which i~ sovereign or supreme. The Parliament as well as each Legislature of a State in India enjoys only such legislative powers as the Constitution confers upon it. Similarly, each House of Parliament or State Legislature has such share in Legislagve power as is assigned to it by the Constitution itself. The powers conferred on a House of a State Legislature are distinct from the legislative powers of either Parliament or of a State legislature for whicb, as a!reasJy ob&,rvcd, there are separate provisions in our Constitution. We need not travel beyond the words of article 194 itself, read with other provisions of the Constitution, to clearly reach such a conclusion.
There is, if We may say so, considerable confusion still in the ' minds of some people as to the seope of the undefined "powers, privileges and immunities" of a House of a State Legislature so much so that it-has sometimes been imagined that a House of a State legislature has some judicial or quasi-judicial powers also, quite apart from its recognised powers of punishment for its contempts or the power of investigations it may carry out by the appointment of its own committees. Arguments of the kind which have been sometimes advanced in this country could not have been advanced ii it was clearly understood that, even in England, where the Constitution is largely conventio~al, the .exerci~e of judicial powers directly by Houses of the legislature, mc!udmg powers such as those of impeachment, are practically obsolete. Whatever remained of the power enj~yed on~e by the High Cou;t of Par~ament, when the King could hunself sit, as a part of Parliament, with the Houses of Parliament to administer justice is now concentrated in the House oti Lords exer~ cised through a Committee of Law Lords. ' Every power of the House of Parliament in England is subject to an act of Parliament. The Act \vith which we are concerned is an
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Act of our Parliament. We have to satisfy ourselves by reference to our Constitution and not the British Constitution that the provisions of the Act before us are within the legislative competence of Parliament. Bnt, ii we could ignore the provisions of our Constitution relating to distribution of legislative powers, which is what the arguments based on Article 194(3) seem to imply, we would be left with no yard-stick for determining the legislative competence of our Parliament. It would be absurd to take that view simply because that is the position in England. Nobody could, in England, question the validity of an Act of Parliament on the ground that it is in ~xcess of the power vested in a sovereign Parliament to legislate. If we could apply that principle here the Act before us would be a sufficient answer to all argument against its validity. If that principle does not apply in our country because of the provisions of our Constitution, which constitute courts judges of constitutionality of even Acts of Parliament, we have to test the provisions of the Act on the anvil of ex9ress provisions of our own Constitution and not on the erroneously supposed powers of a House of Commons in England which could never ignore or invalidate the provisions of any Act made by the Parliament there although it could play a decisive role in its repeal if it so desired. '
A source of confusion about the "powers'' and "privileges" of the House of Commons even in England was sought to be removed long ago by Sir Erskine May when he pointed out in his "Parliamentary Procedure and Practice", in 1844, that Coke's dictum and Blackstone's views, according to which the ordinary law courts could not judge matters relating to "Lex Parliamenti", on the ground that "the High Court of Parliament hath no hi?,her", were out of date even in 17th Century England. He said about such views : "The views belonged to a time when the distinction between the judicial and legislative functions of Parliament was undrawn or only boginning to be drawn and when the separation of the Lords from the Commons was much less co111plete than it was in the seventeenth century. Views about the High Court of Parliament and its powers which were becoming antiquated in the time of Coke, continued to be repeated far into the eighteenth century, although after the Restoratiorr Principles began to be laid down. which were more in accord with. the facts of the modern Constitution. But much confusion remained which was not dismissed by the use of the phrase "privileges of Parliament".
Sir Erskine May wont on to indicate the three notions resulting from this "confusion of thought" in the course of English Constitutional history. He wrote :
"Three notions arise from this co.nfusion of thought : ( 1) That the courts, being inferior to the High Court of Parliament, cannot call in question, the decision of either House on a matter of privilege.
KARNATAKA V. uNION (Beg, C.J.)
(2) That the lex ct conseutudo parliamenti is a separate law, and, therefore, unknown to the Courts.
(3) That a Resolution of either House declaratory of privil<Jge is a judicial precedent binding on the courts."
J
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Now, what learned counsel for the plaintiff seemed to suggest was that Ministers, answerable ·to a Legislature were governed by a separate law which exempted them from liabilities under the ordinary law. This Wllll never the la.w in England. And, it is not so here. Our Constitution leaves no scope for such arguments, based on a confusion concerning the "powers" and "privileges" of the House of Commons mentioned in articles 105(3) and 194(3). Our Constitution vests only legislative power in ·Parliament as well as in the State Legislatures.! A House of Parliament or State Legisiatur~ cannot try anyone or any case directly, as a Court of Justice can, but it can proceed quasi-judicially in cases of contempts of its authority and take up motions concerning its "privileges" and "imn1unities" because, in doing so, it only seeks removal of obstructions. to the due performance of its legislative functions. But, if any question of jurisdiction arises as to wheth,er a matter falls here <ir not, it has to be decided by the ordinary courts in appropriate proceedings. For example, the jurisdiction to try a criminal offence, such as murder, committed even within a House vests in ordinary crinlinal courts and not in a House of Parliament or in a State legislature. ' In Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain('), this Court held that a House of Parliament cannot, in exercise of any supposed "powers" under article 105, decide election disputes for which special authorities have been constituted under the Representation of People Act, 1961, enacted in compliance with article 329. Similarly, appropriate provisions for· appointments of suitable persons, invested with power to determine, in accordance with a procedure which is fair and just and regular and efficient, for ascertainment of facts on matters of public importance, is provided by the Act. If such provisions ·are covered by specific provisions relating to legislath:e competence of Parliament and one of the items in Central List I or the concurrent List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, we need not go to other provisions which would, strictly speaking, not be relevant unless th~y could be relied upon to clearly carve out some exception operating against such legislative competence. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has relied also upon the provisions of Chapter II, Part XI, containing Articles 256 to 263 of the Constitution. Here, we find Articles 256 and 257 (I) of the Constitution which vve have already examined above to bring out the extent of Government of India's power to give necessary directions tn everv State. The term "State" used there could not possibly be held to apply merely to a geographical entity or territory. Article l, sub-article (2) and Article 3 of our Constitution make a distinction between "the State" and its territory. Article 300, in the context of legal proceedings, makes the Government of a: State tlie legal representative of the (1) [19761 2 S.C.R. 347.
./
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State. A direction can only be given to a legal entity and not to a geographical or a territorial entity. Hence, "directions" to the "State", as these terms are used in Articles 256 and 257, must necessarily mean directions to States as legal entities which must have legal representatives. There need be no difficulty in treating State Governments as repre-.;entatives of their respective individual States. Can we, with such a constitntion as ours, say that the Union Government must take no II interest, and, consequently, no action whatsoever which savours of interference with governmental functions of a State Goverrnnent? In the dissolution of State Assemblies case we have already stated the views of this Court on such a subject at some length indicating there the kind of federation we have in this country with what has been characterised as "a strong unitary bias", or, at any rate, with powers given to the Union Goverrnnent of SUJ>crvision and even supersession, c in certain circumstances, of State Governments temporarily to restore normalcy or to inject honesty, integrity, and effidency into State administrations where these essentials of good government may be wanting.
Neither Chapter IL part Xl of the Constitution, dealing with the administrative relations between the Union and the States, nor any other part of the Constitution could be held to imply a prohibition against the •exercise of any legislative power of Parliament. Indeed, a glance through Chapter II in part XI shows that, apart from article& 256 and 257(1 ), it deals only with some special matters, such as maintenance of national highways, water ways, and railways, constructions to be undei;taken for objects of national or military importance, delegation of certain powers, some arbitrations, recognition throughout the territory of India of certain public acts and judicial proceedings E of the Union and of every State, determination of disputes relating to waters, and certain other matters involving co-ordination between the States. It could not be said to exhaust all matters which may involve the interests of particular States as well as of the Union. There is nothing in any of the provisions here or elsewhere in our Constitntion which could, by a necessary implication, be said to impose conditi.ons on the exercise of legislative powers distributed by Chapter I of Part II XI of the Constitution read with the three lists in the Seventh Schedule. Such a question must, therefore, be determined exclusively by the provisions of Chapter I of Part XI which refer us to the l~gislative lists in the Seventh Schedule. We cannot forget that. we are really, concerned here with legislative powers and not with administrative relations or directions. It is true that those powers cannot be so exercised as to displace or amend the Constitution. But, unless they have that G effect, provisions meant to supplement and facilitate due discharge of Constitutional powers cannot be deemed to be in excess of ordinary legislative power. Entry 94 in List I of exclusively Central subjects of legislation reads as follows :
"94. Inquiries, surveys and statistics for the purpose of any of the matters in this list". It is true that matters affecting relations between the Union Government and the State Government are not found mentioned specifically
,
....
XAllNATAKA V. UNION (Beg, C.l.)
.anywhere in the Union List. It was, therefore, urged that "inquiries" mentioned here, even if they extend beyond surveys and statistics, must, .nevertheless, be confined to "matters in this list". It was submitted. that such "inquiries" could not embrace the conduct of Ministers exercising governmental powers as such conduct does not fall under any item in the list but should, properly speaking, have found a place in the Chapter on "administrative relations". It was suggested that the Union Government was really trying to exercise a kind of unwarranted <lisciplinary authority and control ov>"r the conduct of Ministers in the States in the performance of governmental functions by setting up a Commission of Inquiry-a subject, it is submitted, that could properly be dealt with only as a part of "Constitutional law" and should have found a mention explicitly in some part of our Constitution so as to fo unmistakably identifiable there as such control exercisable through the means adopted for it.
We do not think that the term "Constitutional Jaw" can be either clearly or exhaustively defined although its natnre can be roughly indicatr'...d in the way in which text-book writers have attempted to do it. For example, Professors E.C.S. Wade and Godfrey Phillips (See : Constitutional Law, 8th Ed. page 4) say : · "There is no hard and fast definition of constitutioual law. In the generally accepted use of the term it means the rules which regulate the structure of the principal organs of government and their relationship to each other, and determine their principal functions." fn other words, it could be expected to contain only the basic framework. It is not part of its nature to exhaustively deal with all governmental matters.
AB there is no written Constitution in Britain, the authors quoted above said "the Constitution has no separate existence sinoo it is the ordinary law of the land". They added : "There is a common body of law which forms the constitution, partly statutory, partly common law, and partly conventions". It is not possible in England to equato all that passes as "constitutional law" with rules enforceable through Courts of law because conventions, which cannot be so enforced, are also, apparently, treated as parts of it since they also contain rules of conduct. Thus, not all "constitutional law" need be written or be even · "Jaw" in the commonly accepted sense of this term. In any case, there can be no clear-cut distinction between what conld or should and what could not or should not be comprehended within the body of rules called "constitutional law". In practice, it will be found that what is embodied even in a written constitution depends sometimes on the peculiar notions for the time being of people who make it. It reflects their views about what should be considered so basic or fundamental as to find a place in the Constitutional document. For example, one of the provisions of the Swiss Constitution of 1893 prohibits "sticking of animals for butchers" meat unless thev have previously been stunned". According to normal notions of "Constitutional law", such a subject should not have found a. place in it. Others think that a 5-1042SCI/77
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[1978] 2 S.C.R.
A constitution should contain nothing more than the barest possible out-
lines of the structure of the Government of a country. The r~st, whether "constitutional law" or not, could be done by the exercise oi ordinary legislativ>~ powers.
Prof. K. C. Wheare, in his "modern Constitutions", wrote a Chapter on "What a constitution should contain", where he observes : "A glance at the Constitutions of different countries shows at ono~ that people differ very much in what they think it necessary for a Constitution to contain. The Norwegians were able to say all that they wanted to say in about twentyfive pages; the Indians occupy about two hundred and fifty pages in their Constitution of 1950. A principal· line of division is found between those who regard a Constitution as primarily and almost exclusively a legal document in which, therefore, there is a place for rules of law but for practically nothing else, and those who think of a Constitution as a sort of manifesto, a confession of faith, a statement of ideals, a 'charter of the land', as Mr. Podsnap calkd it". He opined that "the one essential characteristic of the ideal or the best form of constitution is that it should be the shorb~st possible". And, Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States said in 1819 in McCulloch v. Maryland(') : "A Constitution to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, wonld partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be und~rstood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." It is true that our Constitution-makers did not try to conform to the standards indicated above. This was due largely to the historical background and the manner of our Constitution making. We did not start with a ckan slate. We accepted as our starting point the scheme embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, enacted by the British Parliament, evidently in an attempt to provide quite a comprehensive and foolproof set of legal rules for the governance of our country. On it, were engrafted a set of provisions containing principles, sometimes conflicting, culled from the Constitutions of various countries, including Japan, and results of judicial wisdom and experience ~atliered from all comers of the earth, so that we Jiave a Constitution which, as Mr. Granville Austin suggests in his book on "The Indian Constitution : The cornerstone of a Nation", resembles. a coat of various colours. (I) 4, L.Bd. 579.
KARNATAKA V. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
Qui: Conititution may be lengthy and considerably more comprehensive and elaborate than Constitutions of other countries. Nevertheless, to expect its contents to· be so all embracing as to necessarily specify and deal with every conceivable topic of legislation on all constitutional matters exhaustively, with sufficient particulars, so as to leave no room for doubt as to what could be meant by it. ..... as though a topic of legislation had to be stated, with tNcessary parti· culars, like a charge to an accused person .... is to expect the humanly impracticable if not the impossible. And, to build an argument founded on the suppo&~d reasonableness of such an expectation and some loosely drafted comprehensive definition of either "Constitutional law" or a "Constitution", to convince us that what is not so specified and identifiable as a subject of legislation, given in the Constitution must be necessarily prohibited at least as a topic of ordinary legislation, although it may become permissible by an amendment of the Constitulion, by an addition to it, appears very unrealistic to us. At any rate, our Constitution does not inhibit the growth or clevelopmcnt of supplementary constitutional law through channels other than Article 368.
-!
Excessive particularity is not consistent, as already indicated above, with the generally accepted notions of a basic or what may be characterised as the "structural" law of the State delineating its broad basic features only. The inoot that could be expected from the human foresight of Constitution makers is that they should provide for that residual power of legislation which could cover topics on which, consistently with the constitutional framework, Parliament or State legislatures could depending on the constitutional pattern, legislate ,even though the legislation may not be easily assignable to any specific entry. Such a provision our Constitution makers did make.
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J!l
Item 97 corresponds to the residuary legislative powers of Parliament under Article 248. It reads as follows : "97. Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List ID including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists."
\
It gives effect to Article 248. No do~bt, resort to Article 248, read with item 97 of List I, could not overcome any specific constitutional bar against legislation on investigation of conduct of Ministers of any State Government in the discharge of their duties had there been one. There is certainly no such express and specific bar in our Constitution. And, it is difficnlt to see how one can arise by some necessary implication of provisions dealing with entirely different topics. There is no indication anywhere in our Constitution that, while enacting the provisions from which we are asked to infer a bar against or limitation upon legislation on such a topic as inquiries, that our Constitution-makers had any such bar or limitation even remotely in their minds. There seems no legal or rational nexus between such a supposed bar or limitation and the subjects dealt with in the articles relied upon. As already indicated above, the Constitution makers cannot always mention and exhaust every conceivable topic. We think that it is in order to meet precisely such a situation that article· 248 read \\ith Entry 97 was inserted. Hence, we think that article 248 read
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IVith Entry 97 of List I will fully cover Section 3 of the Act even if .
i~em 94 of Llst I does not
\
A)ternatively, Entry 45 of the Concurrent List III of the Seventh Schedule was relied upon on behalf of the Union.. This item reads as follows :
"45. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters specified in List II or List ID'". To fall under item 45 of List III the topic of inquiry must relate to one of the specified items in List II or Lisf III. If neit.her items 94 and 97 of List I nor item 45 of List III which refers to inquiries relating to topics in List II as well, could cover Section 3 of the Act, it would necessarily follow that such an enactment, assuming that Section 3 was meant to cover an inquiry against a State Minister's conduct in the exercise of powers enjoyed by him by virtue of his office was not contemplated at all by our Constitution makers. If such an argument was correct, Section 3 would, on the assumption made, fall entirely outside the legislative competence of both Parliament and State Legislatures because there would be no legislative power conferred upon >any Legislature to deal with snch subject as it could not be covered by any entry in any list. Indeed, if we have correctly understood tlie argument of learned Counsel for the plaintiff in the form it finally took, this is precisely what is submitted to us for acceptance. It was contended that this W'aS so because the conduct of governmental affairs by State Governments and their Ministers is subject exclusively to the control by State Legislature and those of the Union Government by Parliament alone by reason of the Constitutional provisions we have already examined and explained. To accept such contentions of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff is to place Ministers, both in the States and in the Union Governments, completely outside the scope of legal answerability on the ground that they were only politically responsible to and controllable by appropriate legislatures even when they, in the course of purported exercise of official powers, act dishonestly and corruptly and even commit criminal offences. This would mean that even if a Minister receives bribes, as we genuinely hope that none in the whole country does, he could not be made answerable in ordinary courts or be subjected to criminal proceedings. If no inquiry under any law into his conduct was possible simply because the act complained of was done by a Minister in purported exercise of a power vested in him by virtne of his ministerial office, he would be placed in a privileged position above the ordinary processes of law applicable to other citizens. Mere holding of Ministerial office would confer immunity from any inquirv. He would thus become a legally irresponsible despot above the ordinllfY law. . The determine whether there is a prima facie case for a criminal offence facts have to be necessanly investigated or inqu;red into. But, of every type of inquiry and investigation except one by the House of the Legislature of which he is a member is barred, the very first step
•.
KARNATAKA v. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
) '
towards a prosecution for any serious crime would be shut out in No question of any further legal proceedings would arise under any enactment. Such a consequence of the constitutional provisions relied upon by learned counsel for the plaintiff could not, in our opinion, be possible within the contemplation of our Constitution makers. Indeed, such a view would clearly violate the express and very salutary provisions of Artiole 14.
limine.
We prefer to infer and hold that the term 'inquiries', as used in item 94 of List I and Item 45 of List III, without any .!imitations upon their nature or specification of their character or objects, is wide enough to embrace every kind of inquiry, whether a criminal offence by anyone is disclosed or not by facts alleged. Entry 45 in List III must include inquiries to cover allegations against all persons which bring them within the sphere of Entry I of List ill relating to criminal law. All that "Inquiries" covered by Item 45 require is that they must be "for the purpose of any of the matters specified in List II or List III." The language used-"any of the matters specified"-is broad enough to cover anything reasonably related to any of the enumerated items even if done by holders of ministerial offices in the States. Other subjects will be found in State List II. And, even assuming that neither Entry 94 of List I nor Entry 45 of List I!l, would cover inquiries against ministers in the States, relating to acts connected with the exercise of ministerial powers, we think that Article 248, read with Entry 97 of List I, must necessarily cover an inquiry against Ministers on matters of public importance whether the allegations include A contrary view would, in my violations of criminal Jaw or not. opinion have the wholly unacceptable consequence of placing Ministers We must lean in State Governments practically above the law. against an interpretation which has consequences which, had they flowed from an express enactment of Parliament or of a State Legislature, would have invalidated the provision for conflict with Article 14. It would not be out of place to mention that even for the purposes of an inquiry into the conduct of Judges of the Supreme· Court or of High Courts an Act of Parliament was passed for the specific purposes of Article 124 to provide, through appropriate investigation and inquiry, "proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge" before proceedings under Article 124( 4) could be initiated for their removal. (See: The Judges' (Inquiry) Act 51 of 1968). Hence, even Judges, who have to be protected against unfounded or malicious charges, as they have to give decisions which must necessarily displease at least one out of two or more parties to a case, are not in a more priviIt is true that, as somebody has observed, reckless leged position. charges are perhaps hurled against those holding public offices in our country with the abundance of confetti at a wedding, yet, we cannot do away with inquiries under the Act for this reason. The liability to face such inquiries before a duly appointed impartial Commission is one of those hazards which individuals holding ministerial office have to face. They can perhaps find solace in the thought that inquiries which are thorough and impartial, conducted by competent persons who have held high judicial office, are the best means of clearino them " of charges which are really unfounded and malicious.
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As we think that the powers conferred by Section 3 upon the Central and State Governments, including the power to institute inquiries of the kind set up under each of the two Notifications, are covered by the express constitutional provisions mentioned above, no question of any exclusion, either by necessary implication or by any principle supposed to form a part of or to flow from the basic structure of the Constitution, can arise here. Nor can we, upon the view we take, read down and so interpret Section 3 of the Act as to exclude from its purview inquiries of the kind instituted under the two Notifications. To do so would be to give an incentive to possible misuse and perversion of governmental machinery and powers for objects not warranted by law. Such powers carry constitutional obligations with them. They are to be exercised like the powers and obligations of trustees wlto must not deviate from the purposes of their trusts. Whether a Minister has or has not abused his powers and privileges could be best determined by fair and honest people anywhere only after a just and impartial inquiry has taken place into complaints made against him so that its results are before them.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the principle relied upon by the plaintiff's learned Counsel repeatedly, in support of which a passage from Crawford's "Statutory Construction" (1940 Edn. paragraph 195 at p. 334-335) was also cited, as the basis of the submissions of the learned Counsel, was that what is expressly provided for by the Constitution must necessarily exclude what is not so provided for. This reasoning is an attempted misapplication of the principle of construction "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius." Before, the principle can be applied at all the Court must find an express mode of doing something that is provided in a statute, which, by its necessary implication, could exclude the doing of that very thing and not someFar from this being the case here. as thing else in some other way. the discussion above has shewn, the Constitution makers intended to cover the making of provisions by Parliament for inquiries for various objects which may be matters of public importance without any indications of any other limits except that they must relate to subjects found in the Lists. I have also indicated why a provision like section 3 of the Act would, in any case, fall under entry 97 of List I of Schedule VII read with Articles 248 and 356 of the Constitution even if all subjects to which it may relate are not found spe"ified in the lists. Thus, there is express provision in our Constitution to cover an enactment such as Section 3 of the Act. Hence, there is no room whatsoever for applying the "Expressio Unius" rule to exclude what falls within an expressly provided legislative entry. That maxim has been aptly described as a "useful servant but a dangerous master "(per Lopes L.J. ia Colquhmm , .. Brooks('). The limitations or conditions nnder which this principle of construction operates are freq\lently overlooked by those who attempt to apply it.
(I)
[1888] 21 Q.B.D. p. 52@ 65.
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To advance the balder and broader proposition that what is not A specifically mentioned in the Constitution must be deemed to be deliber.ately 6!\"cluded from its purview, so that nothing short of a Constitut_o tional amendment could authorise legislation upon it, is really invent a "Casus Omissus" so as to apply the rule that, where ;here 1s such a gap in the law, the Court cannot fill it. The rule, however, is equally clear that the Court cannot so interpret a statute as "to produce a casus omissus" where there is really none (see : The Mersey Docks B and Harbour Board v. Penderson Brotherst'). If our Constitution itself provides for legislation to fill what is sought to be construed as a lacuna how can legislation seeking to do this be held to be void because it performs its intended function by an exercise of an expressly conferred legislative power '? In declaring the purpose of the provisions. so made and the authority for making it, Courts do not supply an omission· or fill up a gap at all. It is Parliament which can do so and € has done it. To hold that parliament is incompetent to do this is . to substitute an indefensible theory or a figment of one's imaginationthat the Constitution stands in the way somehow-for that which only a clear Constitutional bar could achieve. This brings me to the next question to be considered : Are there any special rules relating to the construction of Constitutions in general or of our Constitution in particular ? And, i£ there be any such rules, would their application support the restrictive construction, submitted on behalf of the plaintiff for our acceptance, on the Parliament's power to enact section 3 of the Act? These seem to b.e important questions which need answers with some clarity if possible. A written Constitntion, like any other enactment, is embodied in a and document. There are certain genernl rules of interpretation construction of all documents which, no doubt, apply to the Constitution as well. Nevertheless, the nature of a Constitution of a Sovereign · Republic, which is meant to endure and stand the test of time, the strains and stresses of changing circumstances, to govern the exercise of all Governmental powers, continuously, and to determine the destiny ot a nation could be said to require a special approach so that judicial intervention does not unduly thwart the march of the nation towards the goals it has set before itself.
..
Napoleon Bonaparte once said that the best Constitution for any country is one which is both short and vagne. Obviously, he memt that a Constitution must have the capacity to develop and to be easily adapted to the changing needs of the nation, to the vicissitudes of its fortunes, to the growth and expansion of various spheres of its lifesocial economic, political, legal, cultural, and psychological. If the Constitution is unable to perform this function it fails. Prof. Willis, whose work on "Constitutional Law of the United States" has been £ited before this Court, has said (at p. 19):
der.
"Our original Constitution was not an anchor but a IU.11The Constitution of one period has not been . the
(I) [1888] 13 A.C. 595@ 602
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Constitution of another period. As one period has succeeded another, the Constitution has become larger and larger." This elasticity or adaptability of the American Constitution· may account for its durability.
Although, a written Constitution, which is always embodied in a· document, must necessarily be subject to the basic cannons of construction of documents, yet, its very nature as the embodiment of the fundamental law of the land, which has to be adapted to the changing needs of a nation, makes it imperative for Courts to determine the meanings of its parts in keeping with its broad and basic purposes and objectives. This approach seems to flow from what may be called a basic principle of construction. of documents of this type : that the paramount or predominant objects and purposes, evident from the contents, must The prevail over lesser ones obscurely embedded here and there. Constitutional document, in other words, must be read as a whole and construed in keeping with its declared objects aud its functions. The dynamic needs of the nation, which a Constitution mu&t fulfil, leave no room for merely pedantic hairsplitting play with words or semantic quibblings. . This, however, ·does not mean that the Courts, acting under the guise of a judicial power, which certainly extends to even making the Constitution, in the sense that they may supplement it in those parts of it where the letter of the Constitution is silent or mayleave room for its development by either ordinary legislation or judicial· interpretation, can actually nullify, defeat, or distort the reasonably clear meaning of any part of the Constitution in order to give expression to some theories of their own abont the broad or basic scheme of· the Constitution. The theory behind the Constitution which can be taken into account for purposes of interpretation, by going even so far ~s to fill what have been called the '~nterstices" or spaces left unfilled, due perhaps to some deliberate vagueness or indefiniteness in the Jetter of the Constitution, must itself be gathered from express provisions of the Constitution. The dubiousness of expressions used may be cured by Court by making their meanings clear and definite if necessary in the light of the broad and basic purposes set before themselves by the Constitution makers. And, these meanings may, in keeping with the objectives or ends which the Constitution of every nation must serve, The power of change with changing requirements of the times. judicial interpretation, even if it includes what mav be termed as "intersticial" law making, cannot extend to direct conflict with express orovisions of the Constitution or to ruling them out of existence. What the express provisions authorise cannot be curtailed by importing limits based on a mere theory of limitations on legislative powers. The statement of general principles of construction set out above, is borne out by earlier pronouncements of this Court-some emphasizing the clearly expressed meanings of words used in the Constitution, which canI)ot be deviated from. others layin~ stress on the paramount purposes and objectives of the Constitution Jl1akers, some assertin$ the
KARNATAKA V. UNION (Beg, C.J.. )
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uudoubted power of Courts to decl~e void legislation in conflict with A' the Constitutional provisions, others pointing out the plenitude of legislative powers conferred by. the Constitunon upon Parliaimi_nt and the State Legislatures, presumed to know best the needs of the people, so that Courts could not lightly invalidate statutes. I will briefly refer to some of the past pronouncements of this Court where emphasis would naturally differ from case to case according to the particular B· context in which some rule of construction arose for consideration. Kania, C. J., quite clearly laid down a basically sound approach, if I may so characterise it with great respect, to the interpretation of the Constitution in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras(!), when he said: "In respect of the construction of a Constitution Lord Wright in James v. The Commonwealth of Austraiia (1936 A.C. 578 at 614) observed that "a Constitution must not be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense." Mr. Justice Higgins in Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Brewery Employees' Union (1908 6) Com. L.R. 469 @ 611-12, observed : 'Although we are to interpret words of the Constitution on the same principles of interpretation as we apply to any ordinary law, these very principles of interpretation compel us to take into account the nature and scope of the Act that we are interpreting-to remember that it is a Constitution, a mechanism under which laws are to be made and not a mere Act which declares what the law is to be'. In In re the Central Provinces and Berar Act XIV of 1938 (1939 FCR 18 ( 193 7), Sir Maurice Gwyer, C.J., after adopting these observations said : 'especially is this true of a federal ConstiE. tution with its nice balance of jurisdictions. I conceive that a broad and liberal spirit should inspire tliose whose duty it is to interpret it; but I do not imply by this that they are free to stretch or pervert legal or constitutional theory or even for the purpose of supplying omissions or of correcting supposed errors'. There is considerable authority for the statement that the Courts are not at liberty to declare an Act void because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the ConstJtution bnt not expressed in words. Where the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by lilecessary implication, the general powers conferred npon the legislature we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having discovered something in the spirit of the Constitution which is not even mentioned in the instrument. It is difficult upon any general principles to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative p0wer by jndicial interposition, except so far as the express words of a written Constitntion give th11t anthority. It is also stated, if the words be positive and without ambiguity, there is no authority for a Court to vacate or repeal a Statute on that gronnd alone. But, it is only in express constitntional provisions limiting legislative power and controlling the temporary will of a -----~
(1) [1950] 1 S.C.R. 88@ 119 to 120.
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majority by a permanent and paramount law· settled by the deliberate wisdom of the nation that one can find a safe and solid ground for the authority of Courts of justice to declare void any legislative enactment. Any assumption of authority beyond this would be to place in the hands of the judiciary powers too great and too indefinite either for its own security or the protection of private rights."
In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh('), this Court held that where· two constructions are possible, "the Court should adopt that which will implement and discard that which will stultify the apparent intention of the makers of the Constitution".
Another principle which this Court has repeatedly laid down, for cases in which two constructions may be reasonably possible, is that it should adopt one which harmonizes rather than one which produces a conflict between Constitutional provisions (See : /. C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab( 2 ); K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras & Kerala( 3 ); Mohd. Hanif v. State Bihar('); State of M.P. v. Ranojirao Shinde( 5 ); Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P.(6), Devadasan v. Union of lndia(7). Courts liave been advised to adopt the construction "which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and eschew the other which will lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well-established provisions of existing law nugatory {See: Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala( 8 ). In Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) Sikri C.J., said about the mode of construing the Constitution : "One must not construe it as an ordinary statute. The Constitution, apart from setting up a machinery for Government, has a noble and grand vision in the Preamble."
In the very case Khanna J. observed :
"A Constitution cannot be regarded as a mere legal document to be read as a will or an agreement nor is constitution like a plaint or a written statement filed in a suit between two litigants. xx xx xx xx xx (I) [19521 S.C.R. 889 at 980-81.
(2) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762 at 791. (3) [l 960] 3 S.C.R. 887 at 905. (4) [19591 S.C.R. 629 at 648. (5) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 489. (6) [19631 Suppl. (l) S.C.R. 885 at 91 l. (7) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 680 at 695. (8) [19731 4 S.C.C. 225 at 426 (1973 Suppl S.C.R.l).
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It provides for the framework of the different organs of the State, viz the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. A Constitution also reflects the hopes and aspirations of a people". Repeatedly, this Court has declared that a broad and liberal c?nstruction in keeping with the purposes of a Constitution must be given preforence over adherence to too literal an interpretation (see : e.g. Sakal Papers <P) Ltd. v. Union of India,('), of the Constitution. ¥
t
In particular, the plenitude of power to legislate, indicated by a legislative entry, ha8 to be given as wide and liberal an interpretation a~ is reasonably possible. Thus, in Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State ;,f lf.P.,(2) this Court said: " ... .it is an elementary cardinal rule of interpr~tation that the. words used in the Constitution which confer legislative power must receive the most liberal construction and if they are words of wide amplitude, they must be interpreted so a~ to give effect to that amplitude. It would be out of place to put a narrow or restricted constructiqn on words of wide amplitude in a Constitution. A general word used in an entry like the present one must be construed to extend to all ancilliary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be held to be included in it".
In Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon,( 3 ) Sikri, C.J., after discussing the tests adopted both in India and i11 Canada for determining whether a particular subject falls within the Union or the State List observed ·(at p. 51) :
-y-
"It seems to us that the function of Art. 246(1), read with entries 1-96 List I is to give positive power to Parliament to Object is not to debar legislate in respect of these entries. Parliament from legislating on a matter, even if other provivisions of the Constitution enable it to do so. Accordingly, we do not interpret the words 'any other matter' occurring in entry 97 List I to mean a topic mentioned by way of exclusion. These words really refer to the matters contained in each of the entries 1 to 96. The words 'any other matter' had to be used because entry 97 List I follows entries 1-96 List I. It is true that the field of legislation is demarcated by entries 1-96 List I, but demarcation does not me~n that if entry 97 List I confers additional powers we should refuse to give effect to it. At any rate, whatever doubt there may be on the interpretation of entry 97 List I is removed by the wide terms of Art. 248. It is framed in the widest possible terms. On its terms the only question to be asked is : Is the matter , sought to be legislated on included in List II or in List III or is the tax sought to be levied mentioned in List II or in List --...,.-(I) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842: (2) [1961] I S.C.R. 220@
13) [1972] 2 S.C.R. 33.
228-229.
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III ? No question has to be asked about List I. If the answer is in the negative, then it follows that Parliament has power to make laws with respect to that matter of tax".
It will be seen that the test adopted in Dhilloris case (supra) was that if a subject does not fall within a specifically demarcated field found in List II or List III it would fall in List I apparently because of the amplitude of the residuary field indicated by entry 97, List I, Legislative entries only denote fields of operation of legislative power which is actually conferred by one of the articles of the Constitution. It was pointed out that' Artiole 248 of the <L'onstitution conferring legislative The validity of the· power is "framed in the widest possible terms". Wealth Tax Act was upheld in that case. The argument that a wide range given to entry 97 of List I, read with Article 248 of the Coustitution, would destroy the "federal structure" of our Republic was rejected there. On an application of a similar test here, the powers given to the Central 'Government by Section 3 of the Act, now before us, could not be held to be invalid on the ground that the federal structure of the State is jeopardized by the view we are adopting in conformity with the previous decisions of this Court.
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I may next refer to what may be regarded as certain special features of our Constitution so as to indicate its broad purposes and .objectives.
Our Constitution lias, in it, not only an elevating preamble setting forth the presumed wi.Jl of the whole people of India, conceived of as one entity, but a set of Fundamental Rights in Part III. Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution, a rough separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial E branches of Government, a pragmatic federalism which, while distributing legislative powers between the Parliament and State Legislatures, with a concurrent field also, and indicating the spheres of Governmental powers of State and Central Governments, is overlaid, as already indiby cated above, by strongly 'unitary' features, particularly exhibited lodging in Parliament the residuary legislative powers, and in the Central Govt, the executive power of appointing State Governors, and Chief F Justices and Judges of High Courts, powers of giving appropriate directions to the State Governments, and of even displacing the State Legislatures and Governments in exceptional circumstances or emergencies of not very clearly defined am bits or characters. No other "federation" in the world has exactly similar unitary features. One wonders whether such a system is entitled to be dubbed "federal" in a sense denoting anything more than a merely convenient division of functions opera· The function of "supervisionn is certainly that G tive in ordinary times. of the Central Government with all that it implies. It may be noticed that the basic allegiam·e contemplated by the Constitution is, legally speaking, to the Constitution itself about whose advent this Court once said (in Virendra Singh & Ors. v. Tile State of U.P.(')).
U
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" .... , . at one moment of time the new order was born with the new allegiance springing from the same source for (1) [1955] S,C.R, 415 at 436.
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all, grounded on the same basis : the sovereign will of the people of India with no class, no caste, no race, no creed, no distinction, no reservation".
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The Constitution, as its Preamble makes it clear, is of a sovereign republic. The legal sovereignty which it represents includes legal legislative sovereignty which must embrace the power of making any law on any subject. Such .legislative power to enact any law must, B therefore, vest somewhere in a legislative organ of the Republic. It cannot be placed anywhere outside these organs. To apply the test fom.ulated in Dhillon's case (supra) the Parliament alone would have the power to enact by a simple majority, by reason of Article 248 read with entry 97 of List I, if it falls neither in List II nor in List rn. As indicated above, the contention on behalf of the plaintiff, if accepted, would expel the power. of legislation itself on any matter involv- c ing an inquiry into the conduct of Governmental affairs by a minister in a State Government from the legislative Lists and place it under Article 368. This means that, although the express provisions of the Constitution, broadly interpreted, as they should be, would prima facie authorise a provision such as Section 3 of the Act, yet, we should imply a Constitutional prohibition against such an enactment by Parliament even if its wide terms could as they prima facie do, include in- D quiries against State Ministers exercising Governmental p0wers.
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As indicated above, the first step of the argument mentioned above is a theory of what the Constitution must necessarily contain as contrasted with ordinary law. To support this submission, a passage was cjted from the judgment of Wanchoo J, in I. C. Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr.(') which ~ootains the following question from Ivor Jennings on "The Law and the Constitution" (1933 Ed.ti. at p. 51 onwards) : "A written constitution is thus the fundamental law of a country, the express embodiment of the doctrine of the reign of Jaw. All public authorities--legislative, administrative and judicial .... take their powers directly or indirectly from it ...... whatever the nature of the written constitution it is clear that there is a fundamental distinction between constitutional law and the rest of the law, .... There is a clear separation, therefore, between the constitutional law and the rest of the law" . •,
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The learned Judge then went on to observe : "It is becanse of this difference between the fundamental law (namely, the Constitution) and the law passed .nnder the legislative provisions of the Constitution that it is not possible in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the fundament:M law to change the fundamental law by ordinary legislation passed thereunder, for such ordinary legislation must always confonn to the fundamental law (i.e. the Constitution)." (l) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762@ 828.
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In Golaknath's case, Wanchoo J. had also pointed out at page 827 :
"The Constitution is the fundamental law and no law passed under mere legislative power conferred by the Constitution can affect any change in the Constitution unless there is an express power to that effect given in the Constitution itself. But subject to such express power given by the Constitution itself, the fundamental law, namely the Constitution, cannot be changed by a law passed under the legislative provisions contained in the Constitution as all legislative acts passed under the power conferred by the Constitution must conform to the Constitution can make no change therein. There are a number of Articles in the Constitution which expressly provide for amendment by law, as, for example, 3, 4, . 10, 59(3), 65(3), 73(2), 97, 98(3), 106, 120(2), 135, 137, 142(1), 146(2), 148(3), 149, 169, 171(2), 186, 187(3), 189(3), 194(3), 195, 210(2), 221(2), 225, 229(2), 239(1), 241(3), 283(1) and (2). 285(2), 287, 300(1), 313, 345, 373, Sch. V. cl. 7 and Sch. VI cl. 2!; and so far as these Articles are concerned they can be amended by Parliament by ordinary law-making process. But so far as the other Articles are concerned they can only be amended by amendment of the Constitution under Art. 368. Now Art. 245 which gives power to make law for the whole ·or any part of the territory of India by Parliament is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" and any law made by Parliament whether under Art. 246 read with List 1 or under Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I must be subject to the provisions of the Constitution. If therefore the power to amend the Constitution is contained in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List J, that power has to be exercised subject to the prm~ sions of Constitution and cannot be used to change · the fundamental law (namely, the Constitution) itself."
The passages cited above cannot provide a · foundation for the theory that "constitutional Law" and the rest of the law can, in respect of their contents or subject matter be placed in two sharply divided or distinct and water-tight compartments with no overlapping or nncertain fields between them. It must not be forgotten that WanG choo, J. repeatedly explained, by putting in the words namely, the "Constitution" within brackets, that he was really concerned with indicating the special featnres of a very detailed or comprehensive Constitution such as ours. Indeed as regards the snbject matter of the laws contained in the Constitution and these which may be introduced by the ordinary law making procednre, the above mentioned H judgment of Wanchoo J. itself indicates how even certain parts of the law found in onr written Constitntion may be amended by the ordinary law making procedure. This passage was nsed by the learned Connsel for the plaintiff to urge that additions or changes in
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KARNATAKA v. UNION
(Beg, C.J.)
"Constitutional Law" cannot be made by ordinary law making proce- A. dure but must take place only in accordance with the provisions found in Article 368 unless the Constitution expressly provides otherwise. This contention, however, overlooks the fact that Article 368 of the Constitution only provides the procedure for an amendment of "the Constitution", and says nothing about any amendment of other laws by the introduction of or changes in laws which may conceivably be classed or construed as "constitutional laws" because of their subject B; matter. This passage should not be torn out of its context, in which the difference in procedure, between the one for an amendment of "the Constitution", provided by article 368, and that for ordinary legislation, contemplated by Articles 245 to 248, was under consideration. It was in that connection that the observation was rightly made that, unless there is specific authority given by constitutional provisions for changing the law laid down by "the Constitution" itself, by adopting C only the ordinary law making procedure, a change in the law contained in express provisions of the constitution" itself could not be brought about without complying with Article 368 of the Constitution. This follows obviously from the very notion of a Constitution as an embodiment of a "fundamental law" which serves as a touchstone for all other "laws". The "fundamental distinction" between "the Constitutional law" or "the fundamental law" and the ordinary laws, referred to there, D• was meant to bring ont only this difference in the nses made of laws which, being "fundamental", can test the validity of all other laws on a lower normative level and these other laws which are so tested. In that very speci"'l or restricted sense, the law not found in "the Constitution" could not be "constitutional" or "fundamental" law. Other parts of the law, even though they may appertain to important constitutional matters, are not parts of "the Constitution", and, therefore, E. could not test the validity of laws made by Parliament. What was said with reference to the actual provisions of the Constitution could not, however, be used to infer some bar on legislative power which is not there in the Constitution at all for reasons repeatedly indicated above.
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In an earlie~ part of this judgi:ient, it is held that legislative power to enact a provIS1on such as Sect10n 3 of the Act could be found in any event, in Article 248 read with entry 97 of List I, even if it c~uld possibly be urged that it is not covered by entries 94 of list I and 45 of List III, which seem to exhaust the three Lists in so far as the subject matters of enquiries are concerned. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff tried to introduce some doubts on the ground that there is no specific entry in any of the lists to cover the conduct of Ministers in State Governments in relation to governmental functions: And it was submitted, reference to sub.iects specified in the Lists would ex~ clu~c _those _which, are, unspecified. It cou.ld ~e urged in reply that, as md1cated m Dh~llon s case (supra), a legislative entry only indicates the field of operation of the power, but the sources of ordinary legislative power are to1 be found in one of the Articles 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, or 253 of the Constitution, and, so far as the field of operation of the le~islative power is concerned, both entry 94 of List f and entry 45 of List III are so widely worded as to embrace inquiries
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touching any of the fields indicated by any of the entries in the lists. A Minister must necessarily exercise governmental powers in relation to one of these fields. It is not necessary to specify which tha! field is. The field of power to legislate about inquiries is indicated in wide enough terms to make it unnecessary to specify the field, in the law made itself, to which the inquiry must relate. It is enough if the enquiry set up relates to a matter of "public importance." Again, it is not a necessary part of an entry in a legislative list, which only roughly indicates a field of legislation, that it must also specify the classes of persons who may be affected by the legislation. That is neither a CO!!Stitutiona:l nor a reasonable requirement.
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This Court has already held that overlapping of fields oE operation of legislative power does not take away the legislative power. Indeed, C as we have said, both entries 94 of List I and 45 of List III must necessarily be related to a variety of fields of operation of legislativ0 power. And, in any case, even if an inquiry on a matter of "public importance" relates to an unspecified field, it should be covered by entry 97 of List I itself. Therefore, it is immaterial whether we hold that entry 97 of List I by itself singly or that entry, read with entry 94 of List I, conld be deemed to cover the field of operation of such legislation, D what is material and important is that the three entries-Nos. 94 and 97 of List I and 45 of List III are bound to cover, between them, legislation authorising inquiries such as the one entrusted to the Grover Commission. If the subject of inquiries against Ministers in State Governments is not mentioned specifically either in any of the articles of the Constitution or in the legislative lists it does not follow from it that legislation covering such inquiries is incompetent except by means E of a constitutional amendment. On the contrary, such a subject would be prima facie covered by the wide terms of article 248 for the very reason that the Constitution contains no express or implied bar which conld curtail the presumably plenary powers of legislation of our Parliament Once we have located the legislative power in one of the articles of the Constitution, authorising ordinary legislation by Parliament for inquiries covered by section 3 of the Act, and we find also the appropriate entries in legislative Lists I and III indicating the fields of operation of that legislative power of Parliament, the well recognised principle which would apply and exclude an implied bar against the exercise of that plcnary power has been stated by this Court and also by other Courts in Commonwealth countries on several occasions. That G principle follows logically from R. v. Burah (1878) (3 A. C. 889) which is the locus classicus on the subject The general principle laid down in Burah's case was that once what is conferred upon a Parlia. ment or other Legislature is legislative power, its plenary character must be presumed so that, unless the instrument conferring the power to legislate itself contains some express limitation on the exercise of legislative power, the ambit of that power cannot be indirectly cut H down by supposed implications. The cases on this subject were comprehensively considered by this Court in Kesavananda B!urrati's case (supra) where the majority view was that there can be no merely implied limitations on expressly conferred legislative powers. This Court
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KARNATAKA v. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
there referred to and adopted the principles laid down in Burah's case (supra) . Palekar J. quoted the following passage from it (jn Kesarnnanda Bharati's case at p. 607) :
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"The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question; and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it vio!ates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions."
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In that case, Judges of this Court also relied upon Attorney General for the Province of Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion of Canada(') where Earl Loreburn had said (at p. 583) : "In the interpretation of a completely self-governing Constitiition founded npon a written organic instrument such as the British North America Act, if the text is explicit the text is conclusive, alike in what it directs and what it forbids. When the text is ambiguous, as for example, when the words establishing two mutually exclusive jurisdictions are wide
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enough to bring a particular power within either, recourse
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must be had to the context and scheme of the Act."
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The learned Additional Solicitor General has strongly relied upon the State of Victoria v. The Commonwealth( 2 ) where earlier cases applying the reasoning contained in Burah's case (supra) were surveyed and Barwick C. J. cited the two passages set out abcve by us, on0 from Lord Selbome's judgment in Burah's case (supra) and the other from the judgment o! Earl Loreburn in the Province of Ontario's case (supra) from Canada. Barwick. C.J. also cited the following passage from the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. ( 3).
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"'The nature and principles of legislation' (to employ the words of Lord Selborne in Burah's case), the nature of dominion self-government and the decisions just cited entirely preelude, in our opinion, an a priori contention that the grant of legislative power to the Commonwealth Parliament as rcpresentin~ the will of the whole of the people of all the States of Australia sh0uld not bind within the geographical area of the Commonwealth and within the limits of the enumerated powers, ascertained by the ordinary process of construction, the States and their agencies as representing separate sections of the territory."
(I\ [1912) App. Cas. 571.
(2) 45 Amtralian Law Journal Reports 251-22 C.L.R. 353. (3\ [1910) 28 C.L.R. 129@ 152-153. 6- J C42SupremeCourt'77
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SUPREME COU:RT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R ..
In Victoria's case (supra), Barwick C.J., although not in entire agreement with the way in which Sir Owen Dixon, C.J., had expressed hnnself in Wes