State Through Superintendent of Police, Cbi/sit ETC. v. Nalini and ORS. ETC. ETC.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 11 May 1999
- Judge
- Justice K.T. Thomas
- Neutral citation
- 1999 INSC 235
- Reported in
- [1999] 3 S.C.R. 1
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Section 10 Evidence Act, Section 30 Evidence Act, Section 120B IPC, Section 302 IPC, Section 212 IPC, Section 313 CrPC, Section 120 IPC, Section 120A IPC
- Subject
- Criminal
Full judgment
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STATE THROUGH SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CBI/SIT ETC. v. NALINI AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
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MAY 11, 1999 [K.T. THOMAS, D.P. WADHWA AND SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.]
.J
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) ACT. 1987: Ss. 15, 21-Evidentiary value of confession recorded by Police Officer C under S. 15 against its maker and against co-accused, abettor or Conspirator-Effect of non-obstante clause in S. 15(1)-S. 30 of Evidence Act, whether excluded-Amending Act 43 of J993-Addition of words "or coaccused, abettor or conspirator" in S. J5(1) and deletion of clauses (c) and (d) of S. 2 J-Effect of-Confession of an accused-Admissibility as a substantive evidence against himself as well as a co-accused, abettor or D Conspirator. S. J5-Vo/untary Confession-Sufficient time given to accused for reflection before making confession-Confession recorded shortly before expiry of remand-Effect of ·
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S. 3-Applicability-Conditions for-Mens rea and criminal act-:Commission of terrorist act a sine qua non-Intention to overawe the Government, to strike terror in people, to alienate any s.:tction of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst sections of the people-Intention and consequence-Distinction between.
Ss. 4(1) & 4(3)--Disruptive activity-Acts preceding the killing such as advocating, advising, inciting etc. of killing a public servant or any person bound by oath, and not the act of killing alone, would amount to disruptive activity. · Ss. 3, 4, J2 and JS-Confession under S. JS-Accused tried for offences under Ss. 3 and 4 as well as under other criminal laws-Even if offences under Ss. 3 and 4 not made out, confession made under S. JS would continue to be admissible for offences under other laws.
TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) RULES, J987:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1999] 3 S.C.R.
Rule 15(3)-Confession-Omission to ajfzx signature on certain pagesNot fatal since confession corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence apart from evidence of Co-accused-Ss. 164, 463 Cr. P.C. EVIDENCE ACT, 1872:
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S. 30-Applicability of-Conditions-Difference between S. 30 of Evidence Act and S. 15 of TADA Act.
S.10-Scope and conditions for applicability of-Principle of agency between every conspirator and his associate underlies this provisionStatement made by one conspirator admissible against another conspirator only during the period of subsistence of agency-Conspirator's connection with the conspiracy-Not necessarily snapped after his arrest-Existence of conspiracy-Proof of
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PENAL CODE, 1860: Ss.120-A, 120-B, and 302-Criminal conspiracy-Ingredients-
D Principles governing law of conspiracy-Mere associates however close or even knowledge of conspiracy not enough-Agreement essential for offence of conspiracy. S.302 r/w, S.120-B-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Ss.354(3)
E and 235(2)-Sentencing~Death sentence or life imprisonment-Test of rarest of rare case-Court to take into account the crime and the criminal as also the aggravating and mitigating circu'fnstances-On the facts and circumstances of the case, Held, per majority: four out of seven accused sentenced to death-Three accused sentenced to life imprisonment.
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CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973: /
S.300-Scope of-Second trial on the ground that some more allegcttions were not made in the first trial-Not to be allowed-Double jeoparayc...Constitution of India, Art, 20(2).
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Ss.215 & 465-Charges-Defects in charge-sheet alleged-Powers of G Reference Court.
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S.313-Improper examination of accused-Examination by Reference Court to correct the error-Scope of LEGAL MAXIMS
(1) Actus non facit reum mens nisi sit rea-App/icability of
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STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
(2) Justicia non novit patrem nee matrem-Applicability of
(3) "Nemo debet is vexari pro eadem causa"-Meaning and applicability of WORDS & PHRASES "Substantive Evidence", "Shall presume"-Meaning of
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On May 21, 1991 in Sriperambadur in Tamil Nadu at 10.20 p.m. a human bomb exploded which resulted in the death of former Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi as also 18 others and leaving 43 persons seriously
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According to the prosecution, this was th~ handi work of LTTE because of its hatred towards Raj iv Gandhi since LTTE believed that it was forced to be a signatory to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord signed on July 22, 1987. In accordance with the said accord, Government of India took upon itself certain role of maintaining peace in Sri Lanka and disarming of LTTE, for which D purpose the Government of India sent Indian Peace Keeping Force (JPKF). It was alleged that IPKF committed atrocities against Tamilians in Sri Lanka which gave rise to a grouse mainly against Rajiv Gandhi, which resulted in a conspiracy hatched by LITE to eliminate him. LTTE Supremo Prabhakaran and some important functionaries in LTTE viz. Pottu Amman, Akila and Sivarasan master minded the plan to kill Rajiv Gandhi and it was executed E by Sivarasan and Thanu with the back up of other accused. The criminal. conspiracy was hatched at various places in Sri Lanka and India. Certain illegal acts were contemplated in furtherance of the conspiracy viz. to infilerate into India clandestinely, to carry and use unauthorb;ed arms, ammunition and explosives, to set up and operate unauthorised wireless sets in India for p communicating with LTTE leaders in Sri Lanka from time to time, to carry out acts of terrorism and disruptive activities in Tamil Nadu and other places in India so as to scare and create panic in the minds of the people and thereby to strike terror in the people; in the course of the said acts, to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi and others, to cause disappedrance of evidence thereafter and . to escape, to screen themselves from being apprehended, to harbour the - G accused and to escape from the clutches of law and to do other acts necessary to carry out the objects of the criminal conspiracy as per the needs of the situation and ultimately to carry out the objects of the abovesaid criminal conspiracy.
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In all 26 accused - 13 Indians and 13 Sri Lankans were charged with
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
A for the assasination of Rajiv Gandhi. The Designated Court fram~d 251
charges against the accused. Charge no. 1 was under Section 120lJ read with Section 302 IPC, which charge is common to all the accused. In respect of the other 250 charges, the accused were separately tried under different heads viz. Sections 3,4 and 5 of TADA Act, under various provisions of IPC, Sections 3,4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act 1908, Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1925, Section 12 of the Passport Act 1957, Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1947 and under Section (IA) of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1933.
Apart from the above said 26 accused, chargesheets were also laid C against LTTE Supremo Prabhakaran, Chief of Intelligence Wing ofLTTE Pottu Amman and Deputy Chief of Intelligence Wing of LTTE Akila for various offences including the main offence under Section 302 IPC read with Section 120B IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of TADA Act. Steps to apprehend three of the main accused viz. Prabhakaran, Pottu Amman and Akila did not succeed and so they were proclaimed as absconding offenders. The charge D sheet also mentioned 12 other persons as Co-conspirators. Among the 12, two died on the spot (Thanu and Hari Babu) and the remainingJ-0 persons died subsequently, the prominent among them being sivarasan. Thus, in the final charge-sheet filed by CBI, 26 accused were arraigned as members of the conspiracy which targeted Rajiv Gandhi. The Special Judge who tried the E case found all the 26 accused-appellants guilty of various <>ffences charged, the main among them being under Section 302 read with Section 120 IPC. He convicted all the accused and sentenced them to death. State has filed a death reference case for confirmation of the death sentence imposed on all the accused.
The criminal appeals have been filed by the appellant-accused. On behalf of the appellant-accused it was contended that the object of the conspiracy was to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi and not to commit any terrorist act or disruptive activity falling under Sections 3 and 4 of TADA. Thus, the existence of conspiracy was not disputed; it was only contested as regards the objects of the conspiracy and who were the members of the conspiracy. It was contended that the confessions were not voluntary and have been retracted by the accused; that except for A-15, whose confession was recorded on the following day of his arrest and in the case of other accused confessions have been recorded only a day or so, before the police remand was to expire, that in the case of A-1 and A-18 mandatory safeguards have
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ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI ;J
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been violated; that the confession of one accused could not tiave been used for corroboration of the confession of another accused that all the accused were kept together in a building which was the headquarters of CBI and that a Sub-Jail was denotified as jail and handed over to CBI and converted into Police Station and all the accused were transferred there and again kept together under the control of Special Investigation team of CBI; that infact as required by law, the accused should have been kept separated and sufficient time should have been given to them to reflect if they wanted to make the confession that all the confessions were post arraigned confessions and even with reference to Section 10 of Evidence Act the confession of one accused cannot be used agah1st as the other; that it could not be said that the object of conspiracy was not accomplished by the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi and that the conspiracy was still in existence; that as regards the confession of A-1 she had referred some of the accused arraigned before the Court including A-10 though he came into the picture after the ,.ssassination was completed; that A-1 had denied in her statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that her confession was voluntary; that the fact remained that blank papers were got signed from her and so her confession did not satisfy the requirement of 19 N under S.15 of TADA and Rule 15(3) of TADA Rules; that it is not disputed that all the confessions were recorded by PW 52, the Superintendent of Police; that in the confession of A-1 out of 18 pages, only pages 1 to 16 bear her signatures while pages 17 and 18 which are crucial to the confession do not bear her signature; that the Police Officer has appended his certificate at the end of the confession but his recording of the Certificate is immaterial if the accused did not append his/her signature at the end of the confession; thus the omission of signature of A.1 can not cure the defect. On behalf of the State, it was contended that the non-obstante limb in Section 15(1) of TADA "notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the Indian Evidence Act" is a clearer legislative indicator to permit a confession made by an accused against the co-accused to be used with the same force as can be used against the confessor himself; and that the position became clearer after the sub-section was amended by Act 43 of 1993; that the amplitude ofS.10 of the Evidence Act is so large as to render any statement made by a conspirator as substantive evidence if it has succeeded in confirming with the other conditions of the Section; that the decision in Kalp~atli Rai's case needs reconsideration; that the provisions of Sections 15 and 21 of TADA after their amendment provided that a confession of an accused is now admissible in evidence against co-accused; that it is the substantive evidence against the co-accused as well; and that the concept of drawing presumption
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A as mentioned in Section 21 no more existed.
In the Death Reference, a plea was taken on behalf of the accused, for not confirming the death sentence on A-1. Itwas pleaded that she is a woman and is a mother of a small girl who was born during the period of her confinement in jail; that she is very young; that she has also subsequently regretted her act and her participation was the result of indoctrination; and that she did not play any major role. Disposing of the Death Reference and the appeals, the Court,
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HELD : (By the Court) l. The conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court of the offences under Sections 3(3), 3(4) and Section 5 of the TADA Act are set aside in respect of all those appellants who were found by the trial court guilty under the said counts. [424-D]
2. The conviction and sentence passed by the trial court of the offences under Sections 212 and 216 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, Section 25(1-B) of the Arms Acts, Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, Section 12 of the Passports Act, and Section 6(1A) of the Wireless and Telegraphy Act, 1933 in respect of those accused who were found guilty of those offences are confirmed. If they have already undergone the period of sentence under those counts it is for the jail authorities to release such of those against whom no other conviction and sentence exceeding the said period have been passed. [424-E-F]
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3. The conviction for the offence under Section 120-B read with Section 302, Indian Penal Code as against A.1, A.2, A.3, A.9, A.10, A-16 and A.18 is confirmed. [424-F-G] 4. The conviction and sentence for the offences under Section 302 read with Section 120B passed by the trial Court on the remaining accused are set aside. [424-G]
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5. The sentence of death passed by the trial court on A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.18 is confirmed. The death sentence passed on A.9, A.10 and A.16 is altered to imprisonment for life~ [424-H; 425-A) 6. Except A.1, A.2, A.3, A.9, A.10, A.16 and A.18 all the remaining appellants shall be set at liberty forthwith. (425-B) (
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ST A TE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
Per Thomas, J. 1.1. To constitute any offence under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 3 of TADA of the accused should have either committed a terrorist act or have done something concerning a terrorist act which is si11e qu" 11011 for convicting the accused under either of the sub-sections. If terrorist act is absent in the perpetration of any crime it may still amount to certain offences under the ordinary law for which there is procedure and penalty already prescribed by law. But if any such crime should be dealt with under TADA it must be inter-linked with "terrorist act" as defined thereunder. (72-D-E) 1.2. "Terrorist act" is defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the TADA, by giving "the meaning assigned to it. in sub-section (1) of Section 3" and the expression "terrorist" is mandated to be construed accordingly. (72-F) 1.3. A reading ofsub-section(l) ofS.3 of TADA shows that the person who does any act by using any of the substances enumerated in the subsection in any such manner as are specified in the sub-section, cannot be said to commit a terrorist act unless the act is done "with intent" to do any of the four things: (I) to overawe the Government as by law established; or (2) to strike terror in people or any section of the people; or (3) to alienate any section of the people; or (4) to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people. When the law requires that the act should have been done "with intent" to cause any of the above four effects such requirement would be satisfied only if the dominant intention of the doer is to cause the aforesaid effect. It is not enough that the act resulted in any of the four consequences. (73-E-G) 2.1. The legal position remains unaltered that the crucial postulate for judging whether an offence is terrorist act falling under TADA or not is whether it was done with the intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people etc. (76-B)
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2.2. It is true, LTTE leaders were bitterly critical of"lndia-Sri Lanka Accord" which was signed no 22.7.1987. Any one who criticised the policy of a Government could not be dubbed as a terrorist unless he had done any of the acts enumerated with the object of deterring the Government from doing any thing or to refrain from doing anything. (76-D) 2.3. Velluppilai Prabhakaran addressed a meeting on 4.8.1987, the text of the speech was published which is marked as Ex.t. 354. In the said speech
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manner in which it was made. But no word of hatred was expressed towards the Government of India though he aired his opposition towards Sri Lankan Government which he described as "Sinhala racist government". He also spoke bitterly against the Sri Lankan Tamil leaders who supported the Accord. [76-E-F]
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2.4. The IPKF inducted into Sri Lanka was gradually withdrawn in a phased manner, which process was commenced during the Prime Ministership of Raj iv Gandhi himself and continued during the Prime Ministership of V.P. Singh. The attitude of LTIE towards Government oflndia, during the aforesaid period, as seen from the editorial of their own official organs, the "Voice of Tigers" issue dated 19.1.1990, shows that LTTE till then did not contemplate any action to overawe the Government of India. Of course the top layer of LTTE did not conceal their ire against Rajiv Gandhi who was then out of power. In this context it is important to point out what Vellupillai Prabhakaran, who went underground in Sri Lanka and resurfaced on 1.4.1990 after a period of 32 months of disappearance had said. The LTTE supremo had told the newsmen then that they (LTTE) were not against India or the Indian people but against the former leadership in India who is against the Tamil liberation struggle and the LTTE. [77-A-B-E-G]
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2.5. Nothing else is proved in the case either from the utterances of the top brass of LTTE or from any writings edited by them that anyone of them wanted to strike fear in the Government either of Centre or of any State. [77-H] 2.6. From the aforesaid circumstances it is difficult to conclude that the conspirators intended, at any time, to overawe the Government of India as by law established. [78-A] 2.7. So also it cannot be said that the conspirators eve~ entertained an intention to strike terror in people or any section thereof: The mere fact that their action resulted in the killing of 18 persons which would have struck great terror in the people of India has been projected as evidence that they intended to strike terror in people. There is no doubt that the aftermath of the carnage at Sriperumpudur had bubbled up waves of shock and terror throughout India. But there is absolutely no evidence that any one of the conspirators ever desired the death of any Indian other than Raj iv Gandhi. Among the series of confessions made by a record number of accused in any single case, as in this case, not even one of them has stated that anybody had
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ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
the desire or intention to murder any other person along with Rajiv Gandhi except perhaps the murderer herself. Of course they should have anticipated that in such a dastardly action more lives would be vulnerable to peril. But that is a different matter and one cannot attribute an intention of the conspirators to kill anyone other than Raj iv Gandhi and the contemporaneous destruction of the killer also. Even if Sivarasan and the top brass of LTTE knew that there was likelihood of more casualties that cannot be equated to a situation that they did it with an intention to strike terror in any section of the people. [78,.B-D-E] 2.8. In view of the paucity of materials to prove that the conspirators intended to overawe the Government oflndia or to strike terror in the people of India it will be difficult to sustain the conviction of offences under Section 3 of TADA. [78-F]
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Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1994) 3 SCC 569, relied on. Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendera Bhimraj Bijava & D Ors, [1990] 4 SCC 76; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. v. State ofMaharashtra & Ors., [1994] 4 SCC 602; Girdhari Parmanand Vadhava v. State cf Maharashtra, [1996) 11SCC179 and Mohd. Iqbal M Shaikh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, [1998) 4 SCC 494, referred to.
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3.1. The killing of a public servant or killing of any other person bound by oath would be an offence under the Indian Penal Code. But it must be noted that such killing, as such, is not a disruptive activity. Certain type of actions which preceded such killing alone is regarded as a disruptive activity through the legal fiction created by sub-section (3) of Section 4 of TADA. Such actions include advocating, advising, suggesting, inciting, predicting, prephesying, pronouncing or prompting the killing of such persons. If there is any evidence to show that any such preceding act was perpetrated by any of the appellants towards killing of any police officer who was killed at the place of occurrence, it would no doubt amount to disruptive activity. But there is no such evidence that any such activity was done for the purpose of killing any police personnel. However, there is plethora of evidence for establishing that all such preceding activities were done by many among the accused arrayed, for killing Rajiv Gandhi. But unfortunately
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Rajiv Gandhi was not then "a person bound by oath under the Constitution
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to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India". Even the Lok Sabha stood dissolved-months prior to this incident and hence it cannot be found that he
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
A was under an oath as a Member of Parliament. The inevitable fall out of the above situation is that ~one of the conspirators can be caught in the dragnet of sub-section (3) of Section 4 of TADA. [79-F-H; 80-A-D]
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3.2. The prosecution attempted to show that the conspirators intended to disrupt the sovereignty of India. Emphasis was laid on the confessional statements of A-3, A-18 and the photographs proved as M.Os. 256 to 259 which were seized from the bag of A-3. The said items of evidence show that the photos of Fort St. George, Madras (which houses the Government Secretariat of Tamil Nadu and the Legislative Assembly & Legislative Council), Police Headquarters, Central Jail within Vellore Fort etc. had been taken and despatched to the LTTE top brass in Sri Lanka. It is too much a strain to enter a finding, on such evidence that the above activities were unmistakably aimed at disrupting the sovereignty of India. The sketch of Vellore Fort (which houses the Central Jail) was drawn up, most probably, for planning some operation to rescue the prisoners belonging to LTTE who have been interned therein. That of course would be an offence but not an activity which falls within the purview of Section 4 of TADA. Therefore, -conviction of appellants for offences under Sections 3 or 4 of TADA cannot be sustained. [80-D-H] 4.1. Section 12 of the TADA enables the Designated Court to jointly
E try, at the same trial, any offence under TADA together with any other offence "with which the accused may be charged" as per the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (2) thereof empowers the Designated Court to convict the accused, in such a trial, of any offence "under any other law", if it is found by such Designated Court in such trial that the accused is found guilty of such offence. (83-B-C]
4.2. The correct legal position is that the confessional statement duly recorded under Section 15 of TADA would continue to remain admissible as for the other offences under any other law whiCh too were tried along with TADA offences, no matter that the accused was acquitted of offences under TADA in that trial. (83-F]
Bilal Ahmed kaloo v. State ofA.P., [1997] 7 SCC 431and Kalpnath Rai v. State, [1997] 8 SCC 732, dissented from.
5.1. No doubt, the amendment carried out in Section 15(1) and in Section 21(1) was in one package. It was done with a definite·purpose. Before amendment the Designated Court had a duty to presume that an accused had
STATETHROUGHCBiv.NALINI
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committed the offence if his co-accused had, in a confession, involved the former. The words "shall presume" in Section 21(1) denoted that it was the duty of the court to draw such presumption. This means, the court should have treated the confession of one accused as against a co-accused to be substantive evidence against the latter, and in the absence of proof to the contrary, the Designated Court Would have full power to base a conviction of the co-accused upon the confession made by another accused. [85-E-Gl 5.2. But the amendment of 1993 has completely wiped out the said presumption against a co-accused from the statute book. Parliament has taken away such empowerment. After the amendment, the Designated Court could use the confession of one accused against another accused only if two conditions are fulfilled: (1) The co-accused should have been charged in the same case along with the confessor. (2) He should have been tried together with the confessor in the same case. Before the said amendment, the Designated Court had no such restriction as the confession of an accused co~ld have been used against a co-accused whether or not the later was charged or tried together with the confessor. Thus the amendment in 1993 was a clear climbing down from a draconian legislative fiat which was in the field of operation prior to the amendment in so far as the use of one confession against another accused was concerned. The contention that the amendment in 1993 was intended to make the position more rigorous as for a co-accused is, therefore, untenable. [85-G-H; 86-A-C) 6.1. There are provisions in the Indian Evidence Act which prohibit the admissibility of certain confessions, e.g. Section 25 of the Evidence Act prohibited proving any confession made by an accused to a police officer. Section 26 prohibited proving any confession made. by an accused to any person while that accused was in the custody of police. Section 27 permitted only a very limited part of the information supplied by the accused to a police officer, whether it amounts to a confession or not. What Section 15(1) of TADA has done was to remove the said ban against admissibility of confessions made to police officer and brought it on a par with any other admissible confession under the Evidence Act. A confession made to a Magistrate is admissible under t~e Evidence Act, and a confession made by an accused to any person other than a police officer, if the accused was not in police custody, is also admissible under the Evidence Act. (86-E-G) 6.2. The effect of the non obstante clause, when read with the words ''shall be admissible in the trial of such person or a co-accused or abettor or conspirator" would only mean that the confession made to a police officer
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A under Section 15(1) shall also become a confession like other admissible confession under the Evidence Act. But it was not even in the legislative contemplation of Parliament to elevate a confession made to police officer to a status even higher than a judicial confession recorded by a Magistrate. [86-A; 87-AI
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6.3. While considering the evidentiary value of a confession made by one accused as against another accused apart from S.30 of the Evidence Act, one aspect that has to be borne in mind is that any confession when it is sought to be used against another has certain inherent weaknesses. First is, it is the statement of a person who claims hjmself to be an offender, which means, it is the version of an accomplice. Second 'is, the truth of it cannot be tested by cross-examination. Third is, it is not an item of evidence given on oath. Fourth is, the confession was made in the absence of the co-accused against whom it is sought to be used. (87-B-C] 6.4. It is well nigh settled, due to the aforesaid weaknesses, that confession of a co-accused is a weak type of evidence. A confession can be used as a relevant evidence against its maker because Section 21 of the Evidence Act permits it under certain conditions. But there is no provision which enables a confession to be used as relevant evidence against another person. It is only Section 30 of the Evidence Act which, at least, permits the Court to consider such a confession as against another person under the conditions prescribed therein. If Section 30 was absent in the Evidence Act no confession could ever have been used for any purpose as against another co-accused until it is sanctioned by other statute. So, if Section 30 of the Evidence Act is also to be excluded by virtue of the non-obstante clause contained in Section 15(1) of TADA, under what provision a confession of one accused could be used against another co-accused at all? Section 15(1) of TADA does not say that a confession can be used against a co-accused. It only says that a confession would be admissible in a trial of not only the maker thereof but a co-accused, abettor or conspirator tried in the same case. (87-D-F) 6.5. The established position which gained ground for a very long time is that while a confession is substantive evidence against its maker it cannot be used as substantive evidence against another person even if the latter is a co-accused, but it can be used as a piece of corroborative material to support other substantive evidence. The non-obstante words in Section 15(1) of TADA are not intended to make it substantive evidence against the nonmaker, particularly after the amendments made in 1993. [88-H; 89-A)
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) SCR 526 and Hari Charan kurmi and logia Hajam v. State of Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 623, relied on.
Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR (1949) PC 257, referred to.
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7.1. Whether a particular accused had ceased to be a conspirator or B not, at any point of time, is a matter which can be decided on the facts of that particular case. Normally a conspirator's connection with the conspiracy would get snapped after he is nabbed by the police and kept in their custody because he would thereby cease to be the agent of the other conspirators. Of course, there might be rare cases in which a conspirator would continue to confabulate with the other conspirators and persists with the conspiracy C even after his arrest. That is precisely the reason why it may not be possible to lay down a proposition of law that one conspirator's connection with the conspiracy would necessarily be cut off with his arrest. (92-C-D) 7.2. In the instant case, prosecution could not establish that the accused who were arrested, continued to conspire with those conspirators remaining outside. Prosecution cannot contend that the confession made by one accused in,this case can be substantive evidence against another accused under section 10 of the Evidence Act. At any rate it cannot be held that confessions made by an accused can be used as substantive evidence against another coaccused on the principle enunciated in Section 10 of the Evidence Act. 7.3. The conclusion that emerges is that confessional statement made by an 11ccused after his arrest, if admissible and reliable can be used against a confessor as substantive evidence, but its use against the other co-accused would be limited only for the purpose of corroboration of other evidence. [92-G)
Mirza Akabar v. King-Emperor, AIR (1940~ PC 176; Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. The State of Bombay, [1958) SCR 161 and State of Gujarat v. Mohammed Atik and Ors., (1998) 4 SCC 351, referred to.
A.1 (Nalini): 8.1. According to the prosecution, A.I is the sole surviving conspirator who participated in the assassination. She is the daughter of co-accused A.21 and sister of another co-accused A.20. She had fallen in love with accused no. 3 during the period of conspiracy; their marriage took place on 21.4.91 and she gave birth to a female child. Exhibit P.77 is the confessional statement of A.1 in which she has stated that Sivarasan brought two girls (Suba and
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A Thanu) and that A.I was made to believe that Raj iv Gandhi was the person
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who was responsible for all the atrocities committed on LTTE followers in Sri Lanka. She has also stated that Sivarasan wanted her to play the role of chaperone to Suba and Thanu wherever they went. Accordingly, she took them to a ,meeting in Madras addressed by Shri V.P. Singh. She also took them to a ready-made shop and bought a Churidar suit (orange and green colour) and Dupatta which Thanu was wearing when she died alongwith Rajiv Gandhi. A.I has also confessed that Sivarasan collected details of topography of Sriperambadur from her and warned her not to divulge this to any one else ~pd that she was asked to take leave from her office on 21.5.1991 under some false pretext. She also confessed that she accompanied Suba, Thanu and Sivarasan as also Photographer Haribabu to Sriperambadur where Rajiv Gandhi was to address a meeting. She also stated that Sivarasan told her that Raj iv Gandhi and Thanu as also Photographer Hari Babu died. Thereafter, she alongwith Sivarasan and Suba hurriedly left the place and reached Madras. The Designated Court acted on her confessional statement as valid and proved, and relied on that statement. [92-H; 93-A-B-H; 94-A-B; 95-B] 8.2. Exhibit P.77 was recorded in 18 pages, the first 16 pages contained the signatures of A.I; in the last two pages her signatures are not there. The requirement that confessional statement shall be signed by the maker has been substantially complied with despite the slip in obtaining the signature in the last two pages. According to P.W. 52 the Superintendent of Police who recorded the statement, the said slip was an inadvertent omission. But that omission does not mean that the confession was not signed by A.I. The contention that the confession was extracted by coercive methods is not supported by any material. In fact when A.twas produced before the Judicial Magistrate soon after recording the confession she did not even express any complaint regarding the conduct of any personnel of the Special Investigation Team. [95-E-F; 96-A] 8.3. Exhibit P.77 is corroborated by the evidence of PW.132 who is a teacher and is acquainted with A.I. The evidence of PW.I32 was fully believed by Trial Judge. There is no reason to take a different view on that evidence. Its corroborative value is unassailable because A. I herself admitted in her confessional statement that she made such a disclosure regarding the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi to PW. I32. Another item of corroborative evidence is M.O.I44 Video Cassette in which the photograph of A. I could be discerned and admitted by the defence counsel to be correct. The confessional statement of A.I is also corroborated by the two letters exhibit
l. STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI ~ ...-
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P.96 and 95 written by Suba and Thanu jointly of Pottu Amman and Akita. A PW.179 who was the Manager of a retail textile shop identified Thanu ·. alongwith the orange and green colour Churidar worn by her, from a photograph shown to him. He stated that he remembered A.1 because she and the two girls with her insisted on quick delivery of the stitched dress on the same day. That apart, the I~vestigating officer could trace out PWI 79 only because A.I told him of the place wherefrom the Churidhar was B purchased. That portion was admitted in evidence under S.27 of the Evidence Act. [96-E-F) 8.4. PW 96 was an officer in a Company in which A.1 was working. He has deposed that A.I took half-a-day casual leave on 21.5.199I and left the office by I2 noon. PW.32 is a woman Sub-Inspector who was deputed to do duty at the venue of the meeting to be addressed by Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperambadur. She was one of the persons injured in bomb-blast. She has identified from photographs, Sivarasan, Bari Babu as also A.I. There is no dispute about the genuineness of the photograph. PW.215 has stated in her evidence that she is a resident of Sriperambadur and on 21.5.1991 she saw standing outside her house at about 10.45 p.m. waiting for her Son. She found two ladies and one male coming to her and they asked for water to drink. She also deposed that they told her that Rajiv Gandhi died at the meeting venue. She has also stated that all the three persons went towards Madras side. She has also identified them from a photograph. PW.103 is an Auto Rickshaw driver at Thiruvallur. He has deposed that he has dropped some persons at the meeting venue at Sriperambadur. Later he identified them from the photograph, as A.I, Sivarasan and Suba. [97-H; 98-A-D; 99-A-B) 8.5. The prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that A.I was one of the conspirators and she participated in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by playing a very active role. [99-D]
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A.2 (Santhan Ravi Raj) 9.1. A.2 was arrested in connection with Rajiv Gandhi murder case on 22.7.1991. His confessional statement was recorded on 17.9.1991 by the Superintendent of Police under s.15 of TADA, and marked as Exhibit P.104. In April 1991 he came from Sri Lanka to Tamil Nadu in a group led by Sivarasan. He was introduced to photographer Bari Babu by Sivarasan. It seems Vellupillai Prabhakaran had great confidence in A.2 particularly after the murder of Padmanabha who was leader ofEPRLF, a rival organisation of Sri Lankan Tamils. The killing was carried out by Sivarasan with the help
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A of useful information supplied to him by A.2. [99-F)
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9.2. On the day of Raj iv Gandhi's assassination A.2 met Sivarasan who w_as preparing himself for going to Sriperambadur. Sivarasan had concealed a pistol beneath his kurta and checked up from A.2 whether it was visible from outside. After A.2 said it was not visible Sivarasan left that place. On the night of the assassination Sivarasan told A.2 that Raj iv Gandhi was murdered and that Thami also died. However, only on the next day Sivarasan revealed to A.2 that Hari Babu also died. In his confessional statement A.2 has narrated that occasions on which he and Sivarasan met. He has also deposed that Sivarasan wanted him to keep his two bags and conceal them. A.2 did accordingly. He had also shifted A.8 to several places to escape from the police clutches. He had also handed over a wireless set to a person called Suresh Master. The vivid details contained in the confessional statement, in all probabilities, must have been supplied by himself because he alone knew what all he did and where-all he went and whom all he met. The confessional statement of A.2 is also corroborated by the evidence of PW.120 and PW. 111. [100-G-H, D-F; 102-A-B) 9.3. PW.285 was the Superintendent of Police who arrested· A.2. PW.285 deposed that A.2 had told him the place where three plastic bags and one cloth bag were concealed, Subsequently, these bags were seized. One such bag contained the clothes and cosmetices belonging to Suba. Another bag contained certain articles of Sivarasan including a diary maintained by him. The evidence of other PWs. also corroborated the confessional statement of A.2. [102-B-D) 9.4. In view of the above, it could be concluded that the prosecution has succeeded in proving that A.2 was also one of the conspirators in the conspiracy leading to the assassination ofRajiv Gandhi. [102-H] A.3 (Murugan @ Dhas)
10.1. In his confessional statement marked Exhibit P.81, A.3 has admitted that he joined the suicide Squad of LTTE and came to India in January 1991, when he was received by Sivarasan. He got sketches of Fort St. George, Madras and Vellore Fort prepared under the instructions of his bosses in Sri Lanka. According to his own confession, he persuaded A.1 to associate with LTTE work by giving her repeated narrations of atrocities committed by IPKF soldiers on LTTE members. He made A.I to become revengeful towards Rajiv Gandhi. It is only A.3 who suggested that the
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services of A.I could be utilised for concealing the Sri Lankan identity of the two girls namely Suba and Thanu. He also confessed that on 18.4.1991 he attended a meeting ofRajiv Gandhi at Marina Beach, Madras and Haribabu took photos of Raj iv Gandhi and supplied them to Sivarasan. He also confessed that he attended another meeting addressed by V.P. Singh alongwith A.1 and the two girls from Sri Lanka namely Thanu and Suba, as also Sivarasan and Haribabu. He confessed that it was for the purpose of conducting a trial as to how far the two girls would be able to go near the Rostrum and garland a former Prime Minister. [103-H; 104-A] 10.2. A.3 admitted in his confessional statement that he rendered a lot of help in carrying out the object of the conspiracy i.e. the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi though he did not go to Sriparambadur. Except for the general criticism made that all confessions were extracted by coercive methods, no specific criticism has been raised against the confessional statement of A.3. Thus there is no reason to think that his confessional statement is tainted due to any reason whatsoever. [104-F]
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10,3. Exhibit P.521 is a forged press accreditation card in the name of A.3 containing his photo. This was seized from his house. Evidently it was a prepara~ion to attend public meetings addressed by persons like Prime Minister or former Prime Minister. [105-B]
10.4. After the arrest of A.3 police seized six baggages which were hurried in a pit These contained letters written by Suba and Thanu addressed to Pottu Amman and Akita in Sri Lanka. [105-C-D]
10.5. PW;233 has deposed that she was living in a house in which another family consisting of A.20 and his mother A.21 were residing. She said that on a number of occasions Sivarasan and A.3, were frequenting the house. She further said that she saw A.3, A.18 and A.20 in association with photographer Haribabu visiting the house. A.1 also stated in her confessional statement her association with A.3 and the places they visited together. [105-F] 10.6. In view of the above corroborative items of evidence, the confessional statement of A.3 could be relied on as a true version. The active and positive invoivement of A.3 in the conspiracy for assassinating Rajiv Gandhi looms large in his confession. Thus there is no doubt that A.3 was also one of the conspirators. [105-H; 106-A] A.4 (Shanker @ Koneswaran @ Russo)
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11. The Designated Court reached a conclusion on the strength of certain circumstances like (i) A.4 was a fullfledged member of LTTE; (ii) that he was also closely associated with A.1 and A.3; (iii) that he was staying in a Lodge which was frequented by Sivarasan; and (iv) some payments made by Sivarasan to A.4. However, merely because a person is shown to be an active worker: of LTTE that by itself would not make him a member of the conspiracy. It can not be forgotten that a conspiracy for such a purpose would be strictly confined by a limited number of persons lest any tiny leakage is enough to explode the entire bubble of the cabal. The circumstances relied on by the Designated Court could only prove that A.4 was an ardent LTTE votary having close acquaintance with Sivarasan. But from that step of conclusion it is not legally permissible to reach a final conclusion that he too was in the conspiracy to murder Rajiv Gandhi. (106-G-H; 107-A-D] A.5 (D.Vijayanandan): 12. As in the case of A.4, the circumstances arrayed by the prosecution
D against A.5 may at the worst, show him to be an active LTTE votary. But beyond that stage the circumstances would not push him into the dragnet of the conspiracy. [108-C] A.6 (Sivaruban):
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13.1. A.6 was an active member ofLTTE. His left leg was amputated. The Designated Court raised a doubt as to why A.6 who is not a senior leader of LTIE be sent to Jaipur when artificial leg could have been fixed at Madras or Bangalore. It also raised another doubt as to why during his long stay in Jaipur, he could not get the ~rtificial leg fixed. With these two doubts the Designated Court came to the conclusion that there was force in the prosecution case that A,6 was deputed to Jaipur for finding out a hide out for Sivarasan and Suba to escape after the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi. If A.6 required an artificial leg, it is not a proper querry as to why he could not have got it fixed at any other place. Why one is preferring a particular place to a less renowned place for such reparative devices, is too difficult a question for any person to answer. As regards the second doubt, one really does not know whether a period of one month is too long for completing the process of artificial leg attachment or whether any work was in progress at the centre. [108-H; 109-A-C] 13.2. A circumstance which created susp1c1on in the mind of investigating agency was that A.6 also came to India alongwith 8 other
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persons and that his associates might have cautioned him that he too would be caught by the police and advised him to shift to another place. No doubt that is an incriminating circumstance against A.6, but it is too much of a strain to jump to the conclusion that A.6 was also a conspirator for assassinating Rajiv Gandhi. [109-D-E] .
A. 7 (Kanagasabapathy) and A.8 (Athirai @ Sonia @ Gowri):
14.1. No confessional statement was recorded by any person from A.7. However, a confessional statement attributed to A.8 is marked as Exhibit P.97. A.8 is a girl from Sri Lanka. She had a love affair with a boy there but he died in a raid conducted by IPKF during 1989. Thereafter, she was recruited in the L TTE and given training in shooting. A. 7 and A.8 left Sri Lanka and reached India in April 1991. Sivarasan helped them with money. [109-G-H; 110-A; 110-D-E] 14.2. There is no material to show her involvement in the conspiracy for Rajiv Gandhi murder. She could not be attributed with even any knowledge that Rajiv Gandhi would be murdered. The worst that could be found against her is that her young mind was transformed into a stormy petrel of LTTE through brain washing. That does not mean that she should necessarily have been cabbled into the conspirac~. [110-F] 14.3. A.7 had gone to Delhi with the money supplied by.Sivarasan. Trial Court drew an inference that Sivarasan would have sent A. 7 to New Delhi for fixing up a hide out. Even if it was so, there is no evidence to show that A.7 was ever conspired with for the murder ofRajiv Gandhi. [110-G-H; 111-A] 14.4. Another circumstance relied on by the Designated Court to draw inference that A.7 had the knowledge of the conspiracy was that PW 109, the niece of A. 7 on seeing the photograph of Sivarasan; in connection with the murder ofRajiv Gandhi asked A.7 about it. To this A.7 replied his niece not to imagine anything and for heaven sake not to entertain any bad things about him and A.8, as otherwise she would have to face God's punishment. In fact these words used by A.7 to his niece PW. 109 could as well have been said as he was certain that he was not involved in the murder ofRajiv Gandhi. But the trial took it the other way around. [111-D] 14.5. PW.62 is a teacher. She had stated in her evidence that Sivarasan brought A.8 to her house and requested for accommodating her in the house. She also said Sivarasan used to visit A.8. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of PW.62 or that of PW.109. No doubt A.7 and A.8 were very
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A close to Sivarasan who had taken m~ch interest in them. But then all those
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who work for LTTE cause were familiar with Sivarasan. It is also true that all conspirators had worked in unison with Sivarasan and they were ard_ent L TTE personnel. But the converse can not be a necessary inference i.e., aU those LTIE personnel who associated with Sivarasan should have been bro~ght within the radius of conspiracy to murder Rajiv Gandhi as particip~nt~ thereof. Thus inspite of the association that A. 7 and A.8 had with LTTE movement and also with Sivarasan, a genuine doubt could be entertained as to whether these two accused would have conspired with others in 1DUrdering Rajiv Gandhi. [112-A-C; 111-E) A.9 (Robert Payas): 15.1. Exhibit P.85,~onfessional statement of A.9. He was in close contact with kanthan (a sen'ior: LTt:Eieader) and Sivarasan. LTTE was bearing all the expenses of A.9 and his family. Sivarasan used to visit them frequently. A.3 also went to the house of A.9 and stayed there for a couple of days. A.2 Sivarasan and Kanthan used to chalk out plans for movements while staying in the·house of A.9. It is also stated that A. 9 remained in his house on 21.5.1991 from the afternoon till next day expecting some message from Sivarasan. On 24.5.1991 Sivarasan went to the house of A.9. On 27.5.1991 A.9 and A.2 decided between themselves to escape from the Police. So they moved from place to place incognito. [112-E-H; 113-A-B] 15.2. PW.197 is a Dental Surgeon. He remembers A.9 and A.3 as thh used to visit his clinic. According to him on the next day of the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi, crackers were exploded in the house of A.9. In M.O. 180 which is proved to be the diary of Sivarasan there are many entries showing various amounts paid to A.9. In his confessional statement A.3 had stated that a wireless set was ijistalled in the house of A.9 by LTTE militant Kantan and that it was from that wireless set Sivarasan used to contact Pottu Amman in Sri Lanka. The aforesaid items of evidence have rendered the confessional statement made by A.9 as wholly true. Thus the finding of the Designated Court that A.9 was very much involved in the conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi, is concurred with. [113-D-E; 114-A-C) A.10 (S. Jayakumar):
16.1. A.10 is the brother-in-law of A.9. The confessional statement shows that he was sent to India alongwith a hard-core LTTE personnel (Nixon). A house was arranged at Madras for his stay. LTTE leaders Kanthan
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and Sivarasan used to supply money to A.10 and also to his brother-in-law A A.9. Once Sivarasan brought a suitcase consisting of his diary, dress, a pistol and one AK-47 gun besides plenty of bullets. The pistol was concealed in a book in which a cavity was made out for the firearm A.10 knew that Sivarasan brought two girls from Sri Lanka and he understood that Raj iv Gandhi was the focus of their hatred. He asked his wife to stitch a cloth cover for keeping the pistol of Sivarasan. He also confessed that he saw Sivarasan B keeping the pistol concealed and set out for the public meeting at Sriperumbudur. By midnight Sivarasan returned with Suba and Nalini (A.I) and it was confirmed that Rajiv Gandhi was killed by Thanll.. He has also confessed that on 23.5.1991 Sivarasan kept all his things in a suit~ase (except the pistol) and entrusted the pistol to A-10. The suit-case was put in C a pit dug by A-10 and was closed with a concrete slab. The confessional statement of A.9 (brother-in-law of A.10) was relied on to corroborate the statement of A.10. Some neighbours of A.10 have also deposed that Sivarasan was frequenting the house of A.10 and once Sivarasan brought two girls in the first week of May 1991. Testimoney of the abovesaid witnesses was believed by the trial Court and there is no reason to take a different view. D [114-D-H; 115-A-DI 16.2. When A.10 was arrested, he gave information that he had hurried the suit-case and on the strength of the said statement the suit-case was unearthed which contained diaries of Sivarasan, the Sri Lankan Passport of A-2 and some live cartridges as· also a Tamil Dictionary in which a cavity was carved out for keeping a pistol. It can therefore be concluded without hesitation that prosecution has succeeded in proving that A.10 was an active participant in the conspiracy for the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi. (116-D-G) A.11 (Shanthi): 17. A.11 is the wife of A.10. There is no material apart from living with her husband (A.10) to suggest that she had any role in the conspiracy. It is very unfortunate that for the role played by her husband, she has been sentenced to death under S.302 read with Section 120B IPC. [116-H; 117-A-B]
A.12 (Vijayan@ Perumal Vijayan): 18.1. A.12 was introduced to Sivarasan by a close relative. Sivarasan offered to meet all his expenses in going to India on a condition that he should work for LTTE. Thus A.12 came to India alongwith his wife and father-in-law. Sivarasan met him in India and persuaded him to take a house
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A in Madras to accommodate some LTTE personnel. Sivarasan was regularly
making payments to A.12. Sivarasan also brought a suit-case containing a wireless set and asked A.12 to keep it in his house. Sivarasan also told A.12 that two girls would be brought from Sri Lanka for an important work and requested him to keep that information secret. Accordingly sivarasan brought Suba and Thanu to the house of A.12. Sivarasan also directed A.12 to dig a pit for keeping the wireless set as well as some guns. A.12 obeyed. On 21.5.1991 Sivarasan visited the house of A.12 and asked Thanu and Suba to get ready. Later Sivarasan took the girls in an auto-rickshaw. On the next day, Sivarasan visited A.12 and told him that Rajiv Gandhi was murdered. (117-F; 118-A-CJ
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18.2. No doubt A.12 was used by Sivarasan without letting him know of his plan to murder Rajiv Gandhi. Even from the articles recovered from his house nothing could be attributed to A.12 regarding his knowledge that · Sivarasan was planning to murder Rajiv Gandhi. However, after the murder of Rajiv Gandhi A.12 helped Sivarasan and Suba to escape from being D caught. It might be that Sivarasan could secure such help from A.12 on the strength of the financial assistance which he gave to A.12 and his family at the time of his need. But this cannot be stretched to infer further backward to think that A.12 played any part in the conspiracy to murder Rajiv Gandhi. [118-E-F) A.13 (V.Selvaluxmi):
19. A.13 is the wife of A.12. The Investigating agency could not elicit any confession from her. There is practically no evidence to show that A.13 was ever involved in the conspiracy to assassinate Raj iv Gandhi. (118-H; 119-A]
" (S.Bhaskaran): F i\ ~..__ A.14 ....._
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20. A.14 is father-in-law of A.12 and father of A.13. No confession has ~ell elicited from him. There is no evidence to show that he had prior knowledge of the plan to murder Rajiv Gandhi but there is evidence to show that he came to know of the assassination and tried to project Sivarasan and G others from being caught or detected. No doubt the evidence of PW.97 indicates that A.14 was interested in securing a safe place for Sivarasan and . Su.ha to escape from police detection. It is also possible that he would have been pursuaded to help Sivarasan and Suba on the strength of the help which Sivarasan rendered to the family. However, it could only be concluded that A.14 would have harboured Sivarasan and Suba and tried to screen them H from being caught by the police. [119-B-H; 120-A)
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A.15. (S. Shanmugavadivelu@ Thambi Anna): 21. A.15 has been used by the LTTE leader Santhan (A.2) for the safe custody of cash. As and when required Santhan used to collect cash from him. Thus the mere fact that A. 2 has chosen A.15 as a safe person to keep money is hardly sufficient to conclude that he was involv.ed in Rajiv Gandhi murder conspiracy. [120-G-H) -
A.16 (Ravichandran) and A.17 (Suseendran): 22.1 A.16 and A.17 were tried in another criminal case for offences under ss.3(3), 3(4) and 5 of TADA and Section 5 of the Explosives Substance Act and Section 3(1) of the Arms Act. They were convicted of those offences and sentenced to various (erms of imprisonment Admittedly, the said judgment has become final and the convicted persons have undergone the punishment period. [121-A-C] 22.2. The well-known maxim '11emo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa' (no person should be twice vexed for the same offence) embodies the well established Common Law rule that no one should be put to peril twice for the same offence. The principle which is sought to be incorporated into Section 300 of the Procedure Code is that no man should be vexed with more than one trial for offences arising out of identical acts committed by him. When an offence has already been the subject of judicial adjudication, whether it ended in acquittal or conviction, it is negation of criminal justice to allow repetition of the adjudication in a separate trial on the same set of facts. Though Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India embodies a protection ·against second trial after a conviction of the same offence, the ambit of the sub-article is narrower than the protection afforded by Section 300 Cr. P.C. Section 300 has further widened the protective wings by debarring a second trial against the same accused on the same facts even for a different offence, if a different charge against him for such offence could have been made under S.221(1) of the Code or he could have been convicted for such other offence under S.221(2) of the Code. There is no doubt that the offences mentioned above were fully covered by the trial and therefore the prosecution is debarred in this case from proceeding against A.16 and A.17 for the abovesaid offence. Consequently, the conviction and sentence passed by the Designated Court are set aside. Coming to the offences under S.302 read with Section 120B IPC as far as it concerns A.16, there are certain incriminating statements found in his confession. (122-E-H; 123-B-E-F) Manipur Administration v-. Thokheam Bira Singh, AIR (1965) SC 87, ~~~
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22.3 A.16 and A.17 reached India in December 1990 and met Sivarasan. After a few days Sivarasan gave a sum ofRs.1.5 lakhs to A.16 for buying any kind of vehicle for the use of LTTE movement Sivarasan also asked A.16 to start a make-believe Travel Agency in Delhi. On different occasions Sivarasan had paid. huge sums of money to A.16. (124-B~EJ
22.4. Certain P. Ws. deposed to the effect that A.16 was close to Sivarasan, A.2 and Kanthan and they were in constant touch with each other. Some of the wireless messages sent by Pottu Amman from Sri Lanka also confirmed that A.16 was asked to help Sivarasan to escape to Sri Lanka. Thus from the corroborative evidence, the confessional statement of A.16 seems to be a true version of his involvement in Raj iv Gandhi's murder. Hence it could safely be concluded that A.16 was also a member of the criminal conspiracy. (125-F; 126-D-E]
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22.5. In the case of A.17 also the portions of his confessional statement relating to the offences covered by the earlier trial are to be excluded. A.17 was touring various places in Tamil Nadu for the work of LTTE. He also made efforts to save Sivarasan and Suba but there is nothing in the confessional statement to indicate that be knew the assassination plan earlier. The recovery of walkie talki would show that A.17 was actively helping Sivarasan and Suba to escape from the clutches oflaw. But that is not enough to credit him with the advance knowledge of Raj iv Gandhi's murder. Possibly on coming to know of the predicament of LITE personnel like Sivarasan and Suba, A.17 would have developed a desire to help them. But that is not enough to conclude that he had prior knowledge that Rajiv Gandhi would be murdered. (127-B-D] A.18 (Perarivelan@ Arivu):
23.1. A.18 had close association with LITE people from 1989 onwards. He was selling L TTE publications. When he learnt that Tamil people in Sri Lanka were suffering a lot due to the atrocities committed by IPKF, he developed a vengeful attitude t.owards Rajiv Gandhi. In October 1990 he reached India alongwith some other LTTE people. He started residing with A.20 where A.3 was also residing. In March 1991 A.18 accompanied A.3 to Vellore for preparing sketch of the Fort because L TTE prisoners were interned there. Blasting ofVellore Fort for rescuing LTTE prisoners was one of the programmes ofLTTE in India. \
23.2. From his confessional statement it is clear that Kanthan, Sivarasan and Nixon were visiting A.3 occasionally and fro~ their conversation
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A.18 understood that they were planning to carry out a very dangerous task. In fact it was A.18 who brought a battery and a motor cycle for Sivarasan. The batteries were meant for blasting a bomb. A.18 also attended the meeting ofV.P. Singh alongwith Suba, Thanu, A.1 and A.3. A.18 also confessed that on 20th May 1991 he went to the house of A.20, where he saw Sivarasan A.l, A.3 and Haribabu (photographer). Sivarasan told him about the public meeting which Rajiv Gandhi might address the next day. Thereupon A.18 bought a colour film for Haribabu. [128-A-E) 23.3. On 21.5.1991, A.18 and A.20 went to see a film at 9.30 P.M. While returning, he came to know that Rajiv Gandhi was murdered. On the next day, he packed his things and kept them in the house of a friend. On 23.5.1991 Sivarasan met him and gave details of the assassination ofRajiv Gandhi. [128-F-G1 23.4. There are also corroborating evidence by some P.Ws. about the active involvement of A.18 in the criminal conspiracy. In view of all the above, it is concluded that A.18 was actively involved in the criminal conspiracy to assassinate Raj iv Gandhi. [131-A)
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A.19 (Irumborai): 24. A.19 was in contact with A.2 (Santhan), Suresh Master and some other leaders of LTTE. A.2 told A.19 that LTTE was making arrangements to kill an important leader quickly but A.19 did not understand who that leader was. The rest of the confessional statement relates to the help rendered by him to Sivarasan, Suba, Nehru, Vicky etc. to hide themselves from the police. It is not discernible from the confessional statement whether A.19 knew that Raj iv Gandhi was going to be murdered. Reliance was placed by the prosecution on a letter written by Trichy Santhan in which he has advised A.19 not to say that Rajiv Gandhi incident was known to him earlier. However, it was a statement made by a person who is now dead. It does not relate to any transaction of the circumstances which resulted in his death. So the statement would not fall within the ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act If the statement has to be brought within the ambit of Section 10 of the Evidence Act, the pre-condition has to be satisfied that there should be reason to believe that A.19 and Trichy Santhan were members of the conspiracy to murder Rajiv Gandhi. The letter from Trichy Santhan to A.19 could be an advice that he should not loosely talk that he knew about Rajiv Gandhi's murder earlier. It does not necessarily mean that A.19 knew it earlier. Therefore, A.19 has to be given the benefit of reasonable doubt
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regarding his involvement in the conspiracy for assassinating Rajiv Gandhi though he was involved in helping the offenders to escape from Police. (131-E-H; 132-A-H; 133-AI A.20 (Bhagyanathan):
-c
25.t. A.20 is the brother of A.I and Son of A.21. According to his confession (Ex.P.69), he became closer to one Muthuraja, an important person in the LTTE and they became friends. He also became friendly with A.18. Muthuraja arranged a press to be transferred to A.20 and he agreed to print LTTE publications at that press. A.20 also accommodated A.3 to stay in his house. On the request of Muthuraja, A.3 brought Sivarasan to the house of A.20 in the month of April, 1991. A.20 sent a letter to Baby Subramanian, another LTTE senior leader offering full cooperation for the cause of Tamil liberation in Sri Lanka. On 20th May, 1991, Haribabu (photographer) visited the house of A.20. Kodak film obtained by A.18 was given to Haribabu by A.20. On the date of assassination i.e. 21.5.1991, A.20 and A.18 went to the house of Muthuraja and came to know that Raj iv Gandhi was murdered. On 23.5.1991, Sivarasan reached the house of A.20 and informtd him that Haribabu also died. On 24.5.1991, A.20 compelled his mother to go along with Sivar:isan, Suba and A.1 to Tirupati. A.20 also confessed that he had destroyed the LTTE stickers which were with him. (133-B; 134-B) 25.2. When he saw the photo of Sivarasan in the newspaper connecting him with Rajiv Gandhi's murder, A.20 became very much bewildered. However, A.20 did not know that Rajiv Gandhi was going to b~ assassinated. Moreover, A.20 did not say anything in his confession which could even impliedly connect him with Raj iv .Gandhi's murder or the conspiracy though A.20 was a strong sympathiser of LTTE. Except the letter written by Trichy Santhan to A.18, (the admissibility of which has been discussed earlier in detail in respect of A.18) there is no material to show that A.20 was a party to the conspiracy of murdering Raj iv Gandhi. (134-C-E; 135-C) A.21 (Padma):
26.1. A.21 is the mother of A.1 and A.20. It is very unfortunate that A.21 was convicted as conspirator in Raj iv Gandhi's murder case and was sentenced to hanging. This Court is unable to find anything which involves her in the conspiracy. Of course there is some evidence to show that A.21 is privy to accommodate some of the offenders in Raj iv Gandhi's murder case. A.21 has confessed that she was prevailed upon by A.3 to accommodate H him in her house and that A.3 used to help the family with money. A.3 was
I
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STATE TflROUGH CBI v. NALINI
,.
..
initially brought to her house by Sivarasan. Subsequently, Sivarasan brought . Suba and Thanu to her house on 25.S.1991. On 25.5.1991, she went ~o her Nursing Home (she was working as a Nurse) as usual and returned in the evening. Late in the night, she came to know of the assassination of the Rajiv Gandhi (A.18 and A.20 told her about it). Subsequently on 23.5.1991, she came to know from her daughter (A.1) the details of the killing of Raj iv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur. According to A.21, she was frightened on hearing this and at the same time started worrying about her daughter (A.I) and her son-in-law (A.3). (135-C-H; 136-BJ 26.2. From the above, it could be seen that the only inculpative statement in Ex. P.73 is that A.21 harboured offenders in her house after coming to know that they were involved in the murder of Raj iv Gandhi. She is liable to be convicted for that. [136-D)
C
A.22 {Suba Sundram): 27.1. A.22 is a photographer and a sympathiser of LTTE movement. Haribabu is a cameraman attached to his photo Studio. No confessional statement .was elicited from A.22 which could be used under sec. 15 of TADA. The Trial Court relied on certain circumstances and found that A.22 was a member of the conspiracy and that he had harboured the offenders. If the circumstances relied on by the Trial Court are individually analysed, many of them cannot be treated as incriminating circumstances at all. (136-E-F; 137-G-H) 27.2. The evidence of PW.25 that A.22 phoned her and advised her to remove the incriminating articles from the house of Haribabu is hardly sufficient for holding that A.22 called her over phone. She never heard the voice of A.22 earlier. So also anybody else could have called her in the name of A.22. (138-A)
27.3. Most probably A.22 was owner of the camera which Haribabu took to Sriperumbudur. So his concern was to get his valuable property back. He would have sought the help of others for that purpose. The conduct of A.22 can only show that he evinced much interest in securing his property. But that can hardly be a circumstance which is consistent only with the guilt G of the accused. Thus it is difficult to concur to the finding of the Trial Court that A.22 was a member of the conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. (138-C-DJ A.23 (Dhanasekaran @Raju): 28. The statement recorded from A.23 shows clearly that he had
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[1999) 3 S.C.R.
A absolutely no knowledge about the murder ofRajiv Gandhi, though he was
involved in helping the offenders to escape. The circumstance used against him by the Trial Court was that he purchased a Maruti Gypsy which was used by Sivarasan, Suba and others for moving from place to place but all such travels were subsequent to the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi. Thus jumping to conclusion on the basis of the said circumstance is impermissible and contrary to the well established principles governing circumstantial evidence. Therefore, the Trial Court's conclusion regarding involvement of A.3 in the conspiracy to murder Rajiv Gandhi is dissented from. [138-G; 139-A-D] A.24 (Rajasuriya @ Rangan):
c
29.1. A.24 was working in LTTE in Sri Lanka and reached India in 1989. According to his statement he was conducting a travel agency without obtaining the required permission for it. He also confessed that he was making fake travel documents for his clients and he was closely associated with LTTE movements in India. The LTTE leaders gave him an assignment to look after the injured LTIE men and for their transportation. However he did not say that he had any .mowledge about Rajiv Gandhi's murder before the assassination took place. [139-F-H] 29.2. In June, 1991, A.24 himself gave hospitality to Sivarasan, Suba and Suresh Master and thereafter helped them escape by Tanker Lorry. The circumstance that A.24 visited A.26 and PW.22 stating that A.24 brought a Maruti Gypsy for painting could only help in finding that A.24 was actively helping the accused to escape from the police. A.24 being an active L TTE votary would have dec.ided to help other LTTE people to escape from the police clutches though he knew about their involvement in the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi only after he himself came to know of the assassination. As such no inference could be drawn that A.24 was involved in the conspiracy to murder Rajiv Gandhi. [139-H; 140-A-F] A.25 (Vigneswaran@Vicky):
30.1. A.25 has admitted in his confessional statement that he was working for LTTE since 1985. He moved to India in 1987 and was doing some business in medicines for which Trichy Santhan extended financial help. He has deposed that 2 days after the murder of Raj iv Gandhi he was told by Trichy Santhan not to venture to stay in Trichy and therefore A25 decided to shift to Coimbatore. He came to know of Sivarasan only after newspapers published his photo, though he had seen him before. (141-A-CJ
.
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STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
30.2. A.25 also admitted his activities for helping Sivarasan, Suba etc. to escape from the police. However, there is not anything in the statement which could involve him in the conspiracy to murder Raj iv Gandhi. Apart from his role in helping the accused, there is no evidence to suggest that A.25 had even knowledge that Raj iv Gandhi would be murdered by anyone whom he knew. [141-D)
30.3. The Trial Court after referring to various items of evidence concluded that A.25 was also instrumental in the transportation ofSivarasan, Suba and Nehru from Madras to Bangalore in a Tanker Lorry driven by PW230. This is a conclusion which needs no interference. [141-E) 30.4. The Trial Court adverted to the association A.25 had with Trichy C Santhan and concluded that A.25 played an active part in consonance with the direction ofTrichy Santhan in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. This conclusion cannot be upheld for want of evidence. [141-G-H) A.26 (Ranganath):
31.1. The Trial Court has held A.26 also guilty of the offence under sec.120-B read with sec.302 IPC and rest of the offences included in the charge. The finding of the Trial Court that A.26 is guilty of offences under secs.212 and 216 IPC, is concurred with. [142-F) 31.2. There is absolutely no evidence whatsover connecting A.26 with the conspiracy to assassinate Raj iv Gandhi. Thus it is very unfortunate that the Trial Court has convicted A.26 also of the offence under section 120-B read with sec. 302 IPC and sentenced him to be hanged. [142-G] CONVICTION 32.1. The conviction for the offence under Sec. 120-B read with Sec.302 IPC as against A.1, A.2, A.3,A.9,A.10,A.16 and A.18 is confirmed. However, the conviction and sentence passed on all the accused under Section 120-B IPC read with all the other counts of offences (except Sec.302 IPC) is set aside. The conviction and sentence passed by the trial court on those appellants who were convicted of offences under Sec.3(3), Sec.3(4) and Sec.5 of TADA, is also set aside. [424-F-G, D, A; 423-F-H) 32.2. The conviction passed by the Trial Court for the offences under Secs.212 and 216 IPC, Sec.14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, Sec.25(1-B) of the Arms Act, Sec.5 of the Explosive Substance Act, Sec.12 of the Passports
G .
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
Act and Sec.6(1-A) of the Wireless and Telegraph Act, 1933, in respect of those accused who were found guilty of those offences is confirmed.[424-E) SENTENCE:
C
...
33.1. The conspirators in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination can be vivisected into four broad categories: [146-DJ First, those who formed the hardcore nucleus which took the decision to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi; Second, those who induced others to join the ring and played active as well as supervisory roles in the conspiracy; Third, those who joined the conspiracy by inducement whether through indoctrination or otherwise; Fourth, those among the conspirators who participated in the actual commission of murder. Persons who fall within the first category cannot normally escape from capital punishment if their case ends in conviction. Velluppillai prabhakaran, Pottu Amman, Akila, Sivarasan and Trichy Santhan have been described as persons falling within the radius of the first category. As they were not tried for the offences so far, no observation concerning them in the sphere of sentencing exercise is made. . ' [146-D-GJ 33.2. A.2,A.3 and A.18 belonged to the second category even if they slip out of the first. They were not merely carrying out the orders of the first category personnel but they made others to work according to their directions in order to achieve the target. The role played by them was prominently direct and active. They were in the leadership layer among the conspirators. There is nothing extenuating as for the said three persons in their activities for Implementation of the decisions of the cabal. Hence, the extreme penalty imposed by the trial court on A.2, A.3 and A.18 for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of the •PC is confirmed. [146-H; 147-A-B) 33.3. A.1 belongs to the fourth category. In the normal spectrum of consideration death penalty is the first priority to be chosen for her. She is an elderly and educated woman. One gets the impression, on reading her confession, that she was led into the conspiracy by playing on her feminine sentiments. She became an obedient participant without doing any dominating role. She was persistently brain-washed by A-3 who became her husband and then the father of her child. Suba and Thanu would certainly have etched a woeful picture regarding the attrocities committed by IPKF on women and girls of Tamil origin in Sri Lanka. By such indoctrinative exercises she would have honestly believed in the virtue of offering her help to the task i'. undertaken by the conspirators. In the confessional statement made by her
-.
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STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
31 '
brother A.20 he revealed one fact i.e. A-1 had confided to him on 23.5.1991 A itself that as a matter of fact she realised only at Sriperumbudur that Thanu was going to kill Rajiv Gandhi. Perhaps that may be a true fact. But she would not have dared to retreat from the scene as she was tucked into the tentacles of the conspiracy octopus from where it was impossible for a woman like A-1 to get extricated herself. She knew how Sivarasan and Santhan had liquidated those who did not stand by them. Padmanabha's B episode would have been a lesson for her. Considering the fact that she belongs to the weaker sex and her helplessness in escaping from the cobweb of Sivarasan and company, the mere fact that she became obedient to all the instructions of Sivarasan, need not be used for treating her conduct as amounting to "rarest of the rare cases" Indicated in Bachan Singh's case. C (147-C-G) Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 and Rajendra Prasad v. State of'U.P., (1979) 3 SCC 646, refer,f'ed fo:· l
33.4. Another consideration which cannot be overlooked is that she is the mother of a little female child who would not have even experienced D material huddling as that little one was born in captivity. Of course, the maxim "Justicia non novit patrem nee matrem" (Justice knows no father nor mother) is a pristine doctrine. But it cannot be allowed to reign with its rigour in the sphere of sentence determination. As the death sentence passed on the father of that small child is confirmed, an effort to save its. E mother from gallows may not milita.te againstj!IS gladdi so that an innocent child can be saved from imposed orphanhood. Thus, on an evaluation of the plus and minus, pros and cons, the sentence passed on A-1 is altered to one of imprisonment for life. [147-H; 148-A-B) 33.5. A-9, A-10 and A-16 do not belong to the first or even to the F second category. They were LTIE followen and they just obeyed the commands of leaders like Slvarasan who had the capacity to dominate over them. Hence their sentence is altered from death penalty to imprisonment for life. (148-C)
Per Wadhwa. J. (Partly dissenting):
1.1. TADA was enacted to meet extra-ordinary situation existing in the country. Its departure from the law relating to confession as contained in Evidence Act is deliberate. Law has to respond to the reality of the situation. What is admissible is the evidence. Confession of the accused is admissible with the same force in its application to the co-accused who is tried in the same case. It is primary evidence and not corroborative. When the legislature H
(
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[1999) 3 S.C.R.
A enacts that Evidence Act would not apply, it would mean all the provisions of the Evidence Act including Section 30. By judicial interpretation or judicial · rigmarole, the Court cannot again bring into operation Section 30 of the Evidence Act any such attempt would not appear to be quite warranted. [211-D-FJ
1.2. The confession of an accused made voluntarily and validly under Section 15 of TADA is admissible against co-accused as a substantive evidence. Substantive evidence however, does not necessarily mean substantial evidence. It is the quality of evidence that matters. As to what value is to be attached to a confession will fall within the domain of appreciation of evidence. As a matter of prudence, court may look for some corroboration if confession is C to be used against a co-accused though that will again be within the sphere of appraisal of evidence. [213-A-C)
1.3. Sufficient time was given to the accused in the circumstances of the case for them to reflect if they wanted to make confession. Merely because confession was recorded a day or so before the police remand was to expire would not make the confession involuntary. No complaint was made before the trial court that confession was the result of any coercion, threat or use of any third degree method or even playing upon psychology of the accused. In the case of A-18, it was submitted that when he was produced before PW-52 on 14.8.1991 his statement was recorded that he wanted to give confession statement voluntarily. But then while giving time to him for reflection PW 52 wrongly recorded the name of A.9. After examining the proceedings of 14.8.1991 and of 15.8.1991 there is no doubt that the name of A.9 was merely typing error and no advantage can be drawn from that. (204-F-H; 205-A-B] 1.4. Confession of A.I runs into 18 pages. The certificate as required by Rule 15(3) of TADA Rules in the form prescribed has been appended by / PW-52, the Superintendent of Police at the end of the confession. Signatures of A-1 appear on pages 1 to 16. In his testimony PW-52 has submitted that his not getting signatures of A-1 at the end of confession is an omission. There is no cross-examination of PW-52 as to why the omission occurred. It has not been suggested that the omission was deliberate. Statement of PW52 is forthright. There could certainly be a human error but that would not mean that Section 463 Cr.P.C. becomes inapplicable. What Section 463 requires is that evidence could be led of police officer recording the confession as to why provisions of Rule 15(3) could not be complied while recording the confession. It has not been suggested or brought on record as to how the
_,
ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
omission of signatures of A.I on the last pages of the confession has injured her in her defence on the merits of the case. The confession has been corroborated in material particulars by means of independent evidence even if the confessions of the co-accused are set apart. Confession of A-1 was recorded on 7.8. i991 and was sent to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on the following day and on 9.8.1991 it was sent to the Designated Court. Her confession was duly made, which was recorded by PW-52, and the same is admitted overruling the objection that Rule 15(3) of the TADA Rules has been violated. [203-H; 204-A-E]
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952) SCR 526 and Hari Charan Kurmi and C Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar, (1964) 2 SCR 623, relied on. Kalpanath Rai v. State (Through CBI), (1997) 8 SCC 732, dissented
from., Abdul Razak Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (1988) Crl.L.J. 382 and Neharoo Mangtu Satnami v. Emperor, AIR (1937) Nag 220, disapproved.
Nazir Ahmadv. King Emperor, AIR (1936) PC 253, Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State ofAndhra Pradesh, (1997) 7 SCC 431 and Bhuboni Sahu v. The King , AIR (1949) PC 257, referred to. Black's Law Dfstionary, referred to.
2.1. That there was a conspiracy to overawe the Goverment is nowhere in the charge. Though it could be said that terror was struck by assassination ofRajiv Gandhi but the Question is whether striking of terror was intended and for that again there is no evidence. Apart from the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi no other act which could be termed as terrorist act has been suggested. The Desiganted Court in its impugned judgment does record any such argument. There is no discussion in the judgment and there is no evidence to which the judgment refers to hold that there was any terrorist act intended to overawe the Government or to strike terror. The Designated Court has clearly held that on the assassination ofRajiv Gandhi, the object of conspiracy was successfully accomplished. When there is no evidence, inference cannot be drawn that act of killing of Raj iv Gandhi was to overawe the Government Even though there is no bar to the examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by this Court in these proceedings but then what is required to be put to the accused is to enable him to personally explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him and when there is no evidence, there
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[1999) 3 S.C.R.
Is no necessity to examine the accused at this stage as that would be a futile exercise. When the prosecution during the course of the trial, which lasted over a number of years, had taken the stand that killing ofRajiv Gandhi was a terrorist act, it cannot now turn about and say that killing itself was not a terrorist act but was committed to achieve the object of conspiracy which was to overawe the Government. As a matter of fact in the statement of PW- / 242, who was a rnember of the Central Committee of LTTE, it has come on record that he met Rajiv Gandhi in March, 1991 when Rajiv Gandhi supported the stand of L TTE and had admitted that it was his mistake in sending IPKF of Sri Lanka and wanted LTIE to go ahead. with its agitation. That being the evidence brought on record by the prosecution there is no question of it now contending that there was conspiracy to overawe the Government. Its stand throughout has been that It was the personal motive of Prabhakaran and others to commit terrorist act by killing Rajiv Gandhi. Under Section 3(1) of TADA overawing the Government cannot be the consequence but it has to be the primary object. There is nothing on record to show that the intention to kill Raj iv Gandhi was to overawe the Government. (322-C-H; 323-A-B] 2.2. Support to the struggle of LTTE in Sri Lanka was from Tamil Nadu and It does not appeal to reason that LTTE would commit any act to overawe the Government. It Is matter of common knowledge that all terrorist acts are published and highlighted which is fundamental to terrorism. Whenever a terrorist act is committed some organisation or the other comes forward to claim responsibility for that. I.n the present case LTTE tried to conceal the fact that it was behind the murder of Raj iv Gandhi. The object to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi was kept a closely guarded secret. LTTE was not owning the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi and it cannot, therefore, be said that it was done to overawe the Government LTIE did not want publicity and wanted to keep friendly relations with India and the people of India. (323-B-E]
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v. State of Maharashtra and others,
(1994) 4 SCC 602; Jumman and others v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1957) SC 469; Ram Shankar Singh and others v. State of West Bengal, (1962) Suppl. 1SCR49 and Ram Shankar Singh and others v. State of West Bengal, [1962) Suppl. 1 SCR 49, relied on.
Black's Law Dictionary, referred to.
-
3. Charge of disruptive activities under Section 4(3) of TADA is against A-1 and A-18. There is no charge under Section 3(3) of TADA against A24, A-25, and A-26. They are charged under Section 3(4) of TADA. Charge
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ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
.under Section 3(3) is against A.1 to A.23. Examining the whole aspect of the A matter, it is seen that there is no offence either under Section 3 or 4 of TADA has been committed. Since, there is no terrorist act and no disruptive · activity under Section 3 and 4 of TADA, charges under Section 3(3), 3(4) and 4(3) of TADA must also fail against all the accused. (324-B-D)
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4.1. In the present case, there is no evidence to support the charge as B regards the period of conspiracy. It is as important to know the period as to ascertain the object of conspiracy. It appears that the peri~d of conspiracy in the charge from July 1987 to May 1992 has been mentioned as the lndoSri Lankan Accord was entered into in July 1987 and LTTE was declared an unlawful association by notification dated May 14, 1992 issued under the C Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. There is, however, no evidence that the conspiracy was h.atched immediately on entering into the accord and was terminated only on the issue of the notification. A statement made by a conspirator before tbe commencement of the conspiracy is not admissible against the co-conspirator under Section 10 of the Evidence Act. Similarly, a statement made after the conspiracy has been terminated on achieving Its D object or it is abandoned or it is frustrated or the conspirator leaves·.the conspiracy in between, is not admissible against the co-conspirator. Fixing the period of conspiracy is, thus important as provisions of Section 10 would apply only during tile existence of the conspiracy. The object of the conspiracy was the killing of Raj iv Gandhi. It is not that immediately the object of E conspiracy is achieved, Section 10 becomes inapplicable. For example principle like that of res gestae as contained in Section 6 of the Evidence Act will continue to apply. (333-E-H) 4.2. It is true that the provision as contained in Section 10 Is a departure from the rule of hearsay evidence. There can be two objections to F the admissibility of evidence under Section 10 and they are (1) the conspirator whose evidence is sought to be admitted against co-conspirator Is not confronted or cross-examined in Court by the co-conspirator and (2) prosecution merely proves the existence. ,of reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired to 'commit an offence and that brings G into operation the existence of agency relationship to implicate co-conspirator. But then precisely under Section 10 of the Evidence Act statement of a conspirator is admissible against co-conspirator on the premise that this relationship exists. Prosecution, no doubt, has to produce independent evidence as to the existence of the conspiracy for Section 10 to operate but it need not prove the same beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal conspiracy H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1999] 3 S.C.R.
A is a partnership in agreement and there is in each conspiracy a joint or mutual agency for the execution of a common object which is an offence or an actionable wrong. When two or more persons enter into a conspiracy any act done by any one of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This B means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators In execution of or in reference to their common intention is deemed to have been said, done or written by each of them. A conspirator is not, however, responsible for acts done by a conspirator after the termination of the conspiracy. Court has to guard itself against readily accepting the statement of a conspirator against the co-conspirator. Section 10 is a special provision C in order to deal with dangerous criminal combinations. Normal rule of evidence that prevents the statement of one co-accused being used against another under Section 30 of the Evidence Act does not apply in the trial of conspiracy in view of Section 10 of that Act. When it is said that court has to guard itself against readily accepting the statement of a conspirator D against co-conspirator, it means that court looks for some corroboration to be on the safe side. It is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence bordering on law. All said and done ultimately it is the appreciation of evidence on which the court has to embark. (337-C-H; 338-A] Major E.G. Barsav v. The State of Bombay, [1962] 2 SCR 195; Sardar
E Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, [1964) 2 SCR 378; Noor
Mohammed Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra, [1970) 1 SCC 696; Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab, [1977] 4 SCC 540; Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi and others v. State of Maharashtra, (1980] 2 SCC 465; Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and others v. State of Maharashtra, [1981] 2 SCC 443; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kishan Lal Pardhan and others, (1987] 2 SCC 17; Kehar Singh and others v. State (Delhi Administration), (1988) 3 SCC 609 and Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India and others, [1993] 3 SCC 609, relied on. State of Maharashtra and others v. Som Nath Thapa and others, (1996]
G 4 sec 659, referred to.
King v. Jones, (1832) Band AD 345; Mulcahy v. Reg, (1868) LR 3 HL 306; Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) AC 495,528; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, (1973) AC 807; Regina v. Arda/an & Ors., (1972) 1WLR463 CA; United States v. Falcone et al, (109 Federal Reporter 2d Series) 579 and United States of America v. Salvatore Falcone & Ors., 85 lawyers Ed. 311
t
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
UG 205, referred to.
5. Some of the broad principles governing the law of conspiracy are:
-•
(i) Under Section 120A IPC offence of criminal conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal act by illegal means. When it is legal act by illegal means overt act is necessary. Offence of criminal conspiracy is exception to the general law where intent alone does not constitute crime. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention. Not only intention, but there has to be agreement to carry out the object of <he intention, which is an offence. It would not be enough for the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely entertained a wish however, horrendous it may be, that offence be committed. (338-D-E) (ii) Acts subsequent to the achieving of object of conspiracy may tend to prove that a particular accused was party to the conspiracy. Once the object of conspiracy has been achieved, any subsequent act, which may be unlawful, would not make the accused a part of the conspiracy like giving shelter to an absconder. (338-F-G] (iii) Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually, both the existence of the conspiracy and its objects have to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused. [338-G] (iv) Conspirators may, for example, be enrolled in a chain-A enrolling B, B enrolling C and so on and all will be members of a single conspiracy if they so intend and agree, even though each member knows only the person who enrolled him and the person whom he enrolls. There may be a kind of umbrella-spoke enrolment, where a single person at the centre doing the enrolling and all the other members being unknown to each other. These are theories and in practice it may be difficult to tell whether the conspiracy in a particular case falls into which category. It may, however, even overlap. But then there has to be present mutual interest. Persons may be members of single conspiracy even though each is ignorant of the identity of many others who may have diverse role to play. It is not a part of the crime of conspiracy that all the conspirators need to agree to play the same or any active role. [338-H; 339-A-C] (v) When two or more persons agree to commit a crime of conspiracy,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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A then regardless of making or considering any plans for its commission, and
C
despite the fact that no step is taken by any such person to, car,fy out their common purpose, a crime is committed by each and every one who joins in the agreement..There has thus to be two conspirators and there may be more than that. To prove the charge of conspiracy it is not necessary that intended crime was committed or not. It committed it may further help prosecution to prove the charge of conspiracy. (339-D-E) (vi) It is not necessary that all conspirators should agree to the common purpose at the same time. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the consummation of the intended objective, and all are equally responsible. What part each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the fact as to when a conspirator j~ined the conspiracy and when he left. [339-F) (vii) A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it has forced them into a joint trial and the court may consider the entire mass of evidence against every accused. Prosecution has to produce' evidence not only to show that each of the accused has knowledge of object of conspiracy but also of the agreement. In the charge of conspiracy, court has to guard itself against the danger of unfairness to the accused. Introduction of evidence against some may result in the conviction of all which is to be avoided . By means of evidence in conspiracy, which is otherwise inadmissible in the trial of any other substantive offence prosecution tries to implicate the accused not only in the conspiracy itself but also in the substantive crime of the alleged conspirators. There is always difficulty in tracing the precise contribution of each member of the conspiracy but then there has to be cogent and convincing evidence against each one of the accused charged with the offence of conspiracy. (339-G-H; 340.-A-B) (viii) Jt is the unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment, which is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy. Offence of criminal conspiracy is complete even though there is no agreement as to the means by which the purpose is to be accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement, which is the gravemen of the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement which amounts to a conspiracy need not be formal or express, but may be inherent in the inferred from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts and conduct of the conspirators. The agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at the same time, but may be reached by successive actions evidencing their joining of the conspiracy. (340-C-E)
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(ix) A criminal conspiracy is partnership in crime, and there is in each conspiracy a Joint or mutual agency for the prosecution of a common plan. Thus, if two or more persons enter into a conspiracy any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them. And this joint responsibility extends not only to what is done by any of the conspirators pursuant to the original agreement but also to collateral acts incidental to and growing out of the original purpose. A conspirator is not responsible however, for acts done by a co-conspirator after termination of the conspiracy. The joinder of a conspiracy by a new member does not create a new conspiracy nor does it change the status of the other conspirators and the mere fact that conspirators individually or in groups perform different tasks to a common end does not split up a conspiracy into several different conspiracies. [340-F-H; 341-AJ
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(x) A man may join a conspiracy by word ~r by deed. However, criminal D · responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a merely passive ~ttitude towards an existing conspiracy, One who commits an overt act with knowledge of the conspiracy is guilty. And one who tacitly consents to the object of a conspiracy and goes along with other conspirators, actually standing by while the others put the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends . E to take no active part in the crime. [341-B-CJ
Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, [1964] 2 SCR 378; State of Gujarat v. Mohammed Atik & Ors., [1998] 4 SCC 351; Mirza Akbar v. King Emperor, AIR (1940) PC 176 and Bhagwandas Keshwani and another v. State of Rajasthan, [1974] 4 sec 611, relied on.
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6. One has to consider whether all or any of the acused were members _of the conspiracy, keeping in view the following aspects: [341-D-E] ·(a) Presence ofLTTE on India soil before and after Indo-Sri Lankan Accord is undisputed. The activities went ostensibly underground after the Accord. LTTE was having various activities in India and some of these were: (i) printing and publishing of books and magazines for LITE propaganda, (ii) holding of camps for arms training in India and various other places in Tamii Nadu (This was done openly till the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord), (iii) collection and raising of funds for its war effects in Sri Lanka, (iv) treatment of injured . LTTE cadres in India, (v) medical assistance and (vi) transporting of goods
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
A like petrol, diesel, lungies, medicines, wireless equipment and explosives and even provisions to Sri Lanka. [341-E-G] (b) Hiring of houses in Tamil Nadu for various activities of the LTTE, which included houses for the treatment of injured LTTE cadres. [341-G]
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(c) Sivarasan was having other activities in Tamil Nadu. He was to make arrangements for A.2 to go to Switzerland and for A-7 and A-8 to go , to Delhi and from there to Germany. He was to make arrangement to recruit persons to impart arms training in Sri Lanka through A-16 and A-17 and to arrange houses at Madras through A-9,A-10 and A-12 for the stay of LTTE cadres. He financed A-5 in Madras for purchase of books for LTTE library in Jaffna. Shanmugham (DA) in his confession (Exh.P-1300) stated that Sivarasan with others stayed in a house at Kodiakkarai and they ~e arranging to send petrol and diesel oil by boat to LTTE in Sri Lanka. [341-H; 342-A-C]
(d) In case of some of the accused including deceased accused there is no evidence whatsoever that they were members of the conspiracy. Prosecution had been unfair to charge them with conspiracy. [342-C]
(e) There is no evidence that all the nine persons, who arrived in India by boat on 1.5.1991, namely Sivarasan, Suba, Thanu, Nero, Dixon, A-2, A4, A-5 and A-6 were members of the conspiracy. In this group there was A6, who came to India to have an artificial leg fixed which he had lost in a battle with Sri Lankan Army. [342-D-E]
(t) Prosecution also nam~d jamuna @ Jameela (DA) as a conspirator, who had also come to India for fixing an artificial limp, which she had also lost in a battle with Sri Lankan Army. There is not even a whisper in the whole mass of evidence that she had even knowledge of any conspiracy to kill Raj iv Gandhi. Simply because she was found dead having committed suicide along with Sivarasan, Suba and others at Bangalore, could not make her a member of the conspiracy. [342-E-F)
(g) From frequent and unexplained meetings of some of the accused with others, who have been charged with conspiracy, it connot be assumed that they all were members of the conspiracy. This is particularly so when LTTE was having various activities on Indian soil for its war efforts in Sri Lanka. Notebook (Exh.P-1168) seized by the police gives bio-data of some LTTE cadre working in India though that list is not extensive. It also contains the bio-data of A-19. [342-G-H]
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
(h) All the persons, who came from Sri Lanka during the strifle did ,,.r
not come through authorized channels. It is also to be seen if the accused now charged with conspiracy and alleged too have come to India in the guise of refugees were not in fact refugees. Rather evidence shows that A-9, A10 and A-11 as one group and A-12, A··l3 and A-14 as the second group, were in fact wanting to come to India due to conditions prevailing in Sri B Lanka. They had no money to pay to LTTE. They were exempted from paying any toll to LTTE on their agreeing to hire houses in Tamil Nadu for stay of LTIE cadre and on their being promised help by LTTE. When they so agreed they were not aware that what was the object behind their hiring the houses. Evidence regarding providing shelter to the conspirators either before or after the object of the conspiracy has been achieved, is not conclusive to C support the charge of conspiracy against them. (343-A-D) (i) A-9, A-10 and A-12 were hard-core LTTE activists. They were living in Sri Lanka with their families and suffered because of the turmoil there. They may be sympathizers of LTTE having strong feelings against IPKF. Considering the background in which they accepted the offer of LTTE to meet their expenses in India. It could be that they themselves fell into the trap because of the circumstances in which their facilities were placed in Sri Lanka and the conditions prevailing there. [343-D-E) A.23 (Dhanasekaran). A.24 (Rangam). A.25 (Vicky) & A.26 (Ranganath):
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7. There is no evidence against A.23, A.24, A.25, and A.26 that they were members of the conspiracy. They came in the picture after the object of the conspiracy was achieved. They knew that Sivarasan and Thanu had committed the murder ofRajiv Gandhi, but intentionally screened them from legal punishment. Evidence against A.23 shows that he transported Sivarasan and Suba in an oil tanker owned by him from Madras to Bangalore to evade their arrest. His confession is corroborated amongst others by PW-232, insurance surveyor, PW-245 cashier of the petrol pump and his driver PW.230. Similarly A.24 helped and assisted and A.25 in transporting Sivarasan and Suba from Madras to Bangalore. At Bangalore, also he transported Sivarasan, Suba and others in Maruti Gypsy, the colour of which was changed in order to avoid detection by ttie police. His confession is also corr\°> borated by other witnesses, mainly by PW.222 mechanic of workshop who repainted the Maruti Gypsy. [343-H; 344-A-F) A.26 gave shelter to Sivarasan, Suba, Nero and others in his house knowing fully well that Sivarasan and Suba were involved in the assassination
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<
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A ofRajiv Gandhi. He helped A.24 to take the Maruti Gypsy and Fiat Car for
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·changing the colour. This shows his total involvement in harbouring Sivarasan, Suba and others. He also helped renting a house for them in a false name. His wife (PW. 65) has deposed against him. There is no evidence to show that A.26.was under any threat and that on that account he had harboured the accused Sivarasan, Suba and others. Thus, these four accused namely A.23, A.24, A.25 and A.26 have been rightly convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years. A.26 has also been convicted for an offence under Section 216 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. A.24 and A.25 being foreign nationals have also been convicted and sentenced for an offence under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act since they came to India through an illicit channel without holding any valid travel documents and unauthorizedly stayed in India. Conviction and sentence under all these charges have not been challenged. (345-A-F) A.I (Nalini):
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8. A.I in her confession has implicated herself. The challenge to her confession being involuntary has already been rejected. She linked many others in the chain of conspiracy. Her confession gives her a pivotal role in the conspiracy. She made extra judicial confession to PW.132 and PW.115. The confession of A.I also stands corroborated in material particulars by other evidence including the confessional statement of her mother, brother and husband. In her association with A.3 (her husband) Sivarasan, Suba and Thanu, she developed extreme hatred against IPKF and Rajiv Gandhi. She got associated with LTTE activities sometime in February 1991. She did have a lurking feeling that some action was in contemplation by Sivarasan, Suba and Thanu. On 7.5.1991 she got a positive feeling that they were planning to kill certain leaders. No doubt if she had the knowledge that a conspiracy was afoot to kill Rajiv Gandhi that would not make her part of the conspiracy. But then she became a conspirator only when she agreed with the group to go ahead to kill Rajiv Gandhi and became part of the group. Prosecution witnesses have also proved various documents and material objects which fully corroborate the confession made by A.I. Thus her becoming a member of the conspiracy to murder Raji"Gandhi stands fully proved. [345-G-H; 348-Al A.2 (Santhan),
9. In his confession A.2 has admitted to his role in the elimination of
)
ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
Padmariabha, EPRLF leader and others in Madras. On 16.5.199t Sivarasan A had told him that he was going to help Suba and Thanu to finish Rajiv Gandhi. He was handling the money given by Kanthan and making payments under instructions from Sivarasan. On 21.5.1991, A.2 met Sivarasan. He saw Sivarasan keeping a pistol in his Pyjama. Sivarasan asked him whether it was protruding outside his dress. A.2 said it was not. Thereafter, Sivarasan . B went out and returned around mid night and told A,2 that Rajiv Gandhi and Thanu had died and also told that he had brought A.1 with him. This shows that.till that time A.2 did not know A.1. Thereafter, the role of A.2 was dodging the police and harbouring the fellow co-accused. A.2, before, during and after th'e assassination of Rajiv Gandhi consciously and willingly associated with Sivarasan in achieving the object of the conspiracy. Even C after knowing that Sivarasan, Suba and Thanu were going to kill Rajiv Gandhi, A.2 continued to associate with them and after the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi he made strenuous efforts to shift Sivarasan out of Madras with a view to evade arrest. He paid money to Sivarasan to finance his criminal syndicate. Knowledge could be imparted to A.2 that some of the money was D used to achieve the object of killing Rajiv Gandhi. From this and other circumstances it could be inferred that he participated in the crime and he · was a member of the conspiracy to kill Rajiv Gandhi. No doubt as originally planned A.2 was to go abroad and for that purpose attempt was made to get him passport, visa etc. but was not successful and in the meanwhile he became member of the conspiracy, being a confident of Sivarasan. It is E agreement which is Si11e qua 11011 of the offence of the conspiracy which is quite discernible in the case of A.2. (348-B; 349-B-H) A.3 (Murugan): 10.1. A.3 is a Sri Lankan National and a hard-core LITE activist. He was memberofthesuicidesquad of LITE. In January 1991, he came to India on the direction of the absconding accused Pottu Amman. He was given specific jobs of preparing sketches of interior of Madras Fort, Police · Headquarters at Madras and various other police stations and their locations. He was also asked to take photographs and Video cassettes of these places. When he arrived in India he was received by Sivarasan. In course of time, he came in contact with A.20, A.21 and A.1. He was also introduced to the deceased accused Haribabu by A.20. He gave financial help to the family of A.21. To show that he was staying in Madras to learn English, A.3 joined some institutions. He started visiting A.1 at her office and house. He told A.1 that Sivarasan was bringing two LTTE tigresses from Sri Lanka for LTTE
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
A operations and requested her to accommodate them in her house, to which
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A.1 agreed. A.1 was infatuated towards A.3. Though initially A.3 did not agree, subsequently they got married. Blasting ofVellore Fort and releasing of the LTTE militants detained there was one of the words entrusted to him in India. By the end of March 199I, Sivarasan told A.3 that he would garland Raj iv Gandhi in a public meeting and asked A.3 whether he could arrange an Indian girl for that purpose. At that point of time, Murugan understood that the target was Rajiv Gandhi since he was responsible for the atrocities committed by IPKF and there was lot of feelings to wreak vengeance on him. A.3 understood that Sivarasan had come with a plan to murder Rajiv Gandhi. A.3 told Sivarasan that he would arrange an Indian girl and introduced A.I to him. A.3 and A.1 attended the public meeting at Marina Beach which was addressed by Rajiv Gandhi and Jayallalitha. [350-A-H; 3SI-A-B] 10.2. On 7.5.I991, A.3 alongwith A.1, Suba, Thanu, Sivarasan, Haribabu and A.I8 attended the public meeting addressed by V.P. Singh, former Prime· Minister at Madras. This operation was a "dry run" operation. These accused · conducted the rehearsal at the public meeting for the purpose of gaining access to the VIP under the guise of garlanding him. At this point of time, A.3 was sure that Raj iv Gandhi would be the target. In order to gain access to V.P. Singh, in the public meeting, press accreditation cards were forged which were prepared by Haribabu for A.3 and Sivarasan. Subsequently they were seized. On 21.5.199I, when A.I came to the house of her mother (A.2I), A.3 reminded her to go to her house where Sivarasan, Suba and Th_anu were to meet her as they have to proceed towards Sriperambadur, where Rajiv Gandhi was to address a public meeting. Thus, the conduct of A.3 before and after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi leaves no doubt that he had agreed to achieve th~ object of conspiracy which was to murder Raj iv Gandhi. There is also sufficient evidence on record to show as to how after the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi, A.3 and A.1 absconded and took refuge at various places in Tamil Nadu and Kamataka and the fact that the identity of A.3 was concealed by them. Confession of A.3 stands corroborated by the confession of his co-accuse<I A.1, A.2, A.18, A.20 and A.21 and by independent witnesses, showing his being a member of the criminal conspiracy with the object of killing Raj iv Gandhi. [351-C-H; 352-A-G] A.4. (Shankar): 11. Evidence shows that A.4 had association with Sivarasan, A.2, A.9
H and other members of LTTE. This is far from showing that A.4 had even any
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•I ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
knowledge of the plan to murder Raj iv Gandhi, the object of conspiracy. Simply because he came to India on 1.5.1991 in the group ofSivarasan and others will not be enough to impart even knowledge to him of the conspiracy with the object to kill Rajiv Gandhi. A.4 has also been charged for an offence under Section 3(3) of TADA and for offence punishable under Section 14 of Foreigners Act 1946. Charge under Secti9n 3(3) of TADA must fail since no offence under TADA has been made out against the accused. As regards the offences under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, he has been convicted and sentenced. The conviction and sentence under the charge have not been challenged. [353-C-Fl A.5 (Vijayanandan): 12. A.5 is a Sri Lankan National and is also a senior member ofLTTE. There is no ~vidence to show that A.5 had been knowledge of any conspiracy to kill Rajiv Gandhi. Mere association with Sivarasan or A.18 would not make A.5 a member of the conspiracy alleged against him. Since he came to India clandestinely, he had been charged for an offence under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. There is no challenge to his conviction and sentence to this charge. The other charges against him under Section 3(3) of TADA stands dismissed. [353-F-G; 354-C-D)
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A.6 (Ruben): 13. A.6 is Sri Lankan Tamil and is an LTTE militant. He was one of E the members of the group arrived on Indian soil on 1.5.1991 from Sri. Lanka. He had lost his one leg during the fight against Sri Lankan Army. Ht: went to Jaipur via Delhi from Madras by train on 17.5.1991 in the company of PW.111 and an attendant. He was seen oif by A.2 and Sivarasan. Simply because Sivarasan was looking after the interest of A.6 and meeting the F expenses, would not impart him with the knowledge of conspiracy and even if he had knowledge, there is no evide~ce to show that he agreed or was party to the object of the conspiracy. Charge against A.6 under Section 3(3) of TADA has to be dismissed. His conviction and sentence for an offence under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act have not been challenged. [354-E-F; 355-E-G) A. 7 (Kangasabapathy) A.S. (Athirai) : 14. A.7 is a Sri Lankan Tamil and an LTTE helper. He alongwith A.8, a hardcore LTTE militant girl came to India in the last week of April 1991. a.8 in her confession had stated that she got specialised training in LTTE
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A camps. A.8 was told that she would go to Delhi with A.i for making
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[1999] 3 S.C.P.
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arrangements for her stay and at the guise of learning Hindi or Computer. She understood that the purpose of the arrangement was to collect information about some targeted places in Delhi, relating to the work of the organisation and that if LTTE people came to Delhi they could stay in her house without causing any suspicion. There is nothing to show that she had even the inkling of the object of conspiracy. Prosecution sought to draw inference that both A. 7 and A.8 were members of the conspiracy. It is difficult to reach any such conclusion. The evidence only shows their association with Sivarasan and nothing more. Charges under Sections 3(3),(3(4) of TADA against A.7 and A.8 fail and they, like other co-accused, are acquitted of these charges. There is nothing on record to s~ow that A.7 and A.8 went to Delhi in order to fix a hide out for screening the accused involved in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Charge under Section 212 against both of them must also fail and they are acquitted. Since A. 7 and A.8 clandestinely came to India through illicit channels without any valid document, their conviction and sentence under Section 14 of the Foreigners.Act is upheld. (355-H; 356-A-C; 357-E-F] A.9 (Robert Payas). A.10 (Jayakumar) & A.11 (Shanthi):
15.1. A.9 and A.10 are Sri Lankiln Tamils. A.11 is Indian Tamil, married to A.10. Wife of A.9 is the sister of A.10. All the circumstances relied on by the prosecution even if taken to be correct, .it is difficult to conclude that A.9 was a member of the conspiracy. His association with Sivarasan or even his knowledge about the conspiracy can not make him a conspirator. It is the crime which is the sine qua non of the offence of conspiracy. Suspicion howsoever strong does not take the place of proof. Wireless messages are transmitted and received in coded language. It Is no body's case that A.9 knew the nature or the contents of the messages. It must not be lost sight of that LTTE had various activities and all LTTE men were not necessarily involved in achieving the object of conspiracy. Evidence shows that other LTTE activities who had come to India were also engaged in arranging houses for various purposes like housing the injured LTTE cadre, storing of medicines .etc. (354-H; 359-B-D)
15.2. There is nothing on record to show that A.10 and A.11 knew of the 'dangerous mission' or for whose assassination Suba and Thanu were brought by Sivarasan. The couple was in dire financial needs and with the promise of financial help and to start some business in India away from the turmoil in Sri Lanka, they agreed to come to India and to hire a house for
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ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
, 47 I
LITE militants to stay. But they did not know what Sivarasan was upto. Thus, A
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it is difficult to infer any agreement to make A.9, A.. 10 and A.11 as memben of the conspiracy having the object to kill Raj iv Gandhi. As a matter of fact, there is hardly any circumstance against A.11 to make her a member of the conspiracy. These accused have a strong feeling against Rajiv Gandhi and they may have strong suspicion that Sivarasan, Suba and Thanu had come for some dangerous mission but there is no evidence to infer that this would make them members of the conspiracy. It is correct that A.10 harboured Sivarasan, A.1 and Suba after having come to know about their involvement in the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi but from that it cannot be inferred that he was a member of the conspiracy. However, no charge can be levelled against A.11 of harbouring, merely because she was living in the house with her husband A.10. Charges under Section 3(3) and 3(4) of TADA against A.9, A.10 and A.11 are not made out and their conviction and sentence under the5e charges are set aside. Charge under Section 212 IPC is however made out against A.10 but not against A.11. She is acquitted of this charge while conviction and sentence of A.10 is maintained. A.10 and A.11 have also been charged for an offence punishable under S.25(1-B) (a) of the arms Act, 1959 as they were found in unauthorised possession of arms and ammunition without a valid licence, con.cealed in a pit dug in the kitchen in the hous' of A.11. No charge can be fastened on A.11 though it has to be upheld against A.10. His conviction and sentence, under Section 25(1-B)(a) of Arms Art is maintained. A.11 is acquitted of the charge under Arms Act and her conviction and sentence set aside. (361-H; 362-A]
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A.12 (Vijayan). A.13 (Selvaluxmi) & A.14 (3haskaran):
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16.1. A.12 is a Sri Lankan Tamil and a helper of LTTE A.13 is his wife and A.14 is the father of A.13. A.13 and A.14 are Indian Tamils. The evidence against these accused at the most shows their association with -Sivarasan. The evidence that they had knowledge of the conspiracy is lacking. Their knowledge about the murder of Raj iv Gandhi was acquired by them only after Rajiv Gandhi was killed. In any case mere knowledge of the existence of conspiracy is not enough. One has to agree to the object of conspiracy to be guilty of the offence under Section 120A IPC. A.12 would not know the nature of the messages which were transmitted or received from the wireless set installed in his house as all these "'.ere in coded language. (364-D-GJ
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16.2. These three accused have also been charged for offence under Section 3(3) of TADA and have been jointly charged for offences under Section 3(4) of TADA. These charges must fail and they are acquitted of these charges. These three accu-sed are also charged for an offence under Section 212 IPC for having harboured Sivarasan, Suba and Nero knowing that they had committed murder of Raj iv Gandhi and others. They all have been convicted and sentenced. A.12 and A.13 are also charged for an offence under Section 6(1A) of the Wireless Telegraphy Act for unauthorised ·possession of unlicensed wireless transmitter used for transmitting messages by Sivarasan and Nero using code sheets for such transmission to other .conspirators in Sri Lanka. They have been convicted and sentenced. Though A.12 and A.14 have been rightly convicted and sentenced under these charges, the said charges cannot stand against A.13. All members of the household cannot be charged like this without any thing more. A.13 being the wife of A.12, was living with her husband and merely on that account knowledge and intention cannot be attributed to her, particularly when no overt act is alleged against her. Thus she is acquitted of all these charges and her conviction and sentence is set aside. [364-E-H; 365-A-B]
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A.15 (Shanmugavadivelu):
17. A.15 is a Sri Lankan Tamil living in India since 1987. In his confession he did not talk of the fact that he a·pproached PW.102 and PW.114 for sending A.2 abroad. It is wrong on the part of the prosecution to allege on the basis of evidence that A.8 was regularly visiting A.15. There is no such evidence. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest even remotely that when A.2 asked A.15 to keep certain amount with him and took that amount back on certain dates, A.15 had even an inkling that there was any conspiracy afoot or that A.2 and Sivarasan were members of the conspiracy. It is difficult to accept the prosecution case that the arrival of A.2 in India was known to A.15 much earlier. From what the prosecution alleges, no case whatsoever of A.15 being member of the conspiracy has been made out. Rather evidence shows his and his wife's hatred for L TIE and its men. Apart from the charge of conspiracy A.15 has also been charged for offence under Section 3(3) of TADA which again stands failed against him. He is acquitted of all the charges and his conviction and sentence set aside. [365-C; 366-G-H; 367-A-D] A.16 (Ravi) & Al 7 (Suseendran) :
18.1. Both A.16 and A.17 though Indian Tamils, became strong LTTE activists. A.16 had been a frequent visitor to Sri Lanka to meet LTIE leaders
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ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
there. Due to the attrocities committed by IPKF, both A.16 and ~17 developed hatred against IPKF. In his confession A.16 did say that he had a strong suspicion that the target was Rajiv Gandhi but that would c~rtainly not make him a member of the conspiracy. In Wireless message dated 7.5.1991, sent by Sivarasan to Pottu Amman, he categorically stated that only three persons namely he, Suba and Thanu knew about the object of the conspiracy. Association, however, strong of A.16 with Sivarasan and between A.16 and A.17 could not make them members of the conspiracy without more. (367-E-F; 369-B-C] 18.2. As regards attempts of A.16 and A.17 for creation ofa separate armed force in Tamil Nadu, they have already been tried in the Designated Court No.2 alongwith others and acquitted of the charge of conspiracy, but convicted under Section 5 of TADA. (369-D]
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18.3. A.16 and A.17 have been separately charged for offences under Section 3(3) and 3(4) of TADA. These charges fail against them like against other co-accused and they are acquitted of the same. A.16 and A.17 have also been separately charged for offences under Section 212 IPC and have been convicted and sentenced. Similarly, they have been separately charged for offences under Section 5 of TADA and convicted and sentenced. That certainly could not have been done as they have been already tried for an offence under S.5 of TADA and convicted and sentenced. Facts constituting the charge under Section 5 of TADA in the other case and in the present case are the same. Thus the conviction of A.16 and A.17 in the present case under Section 5 of TADA is set aside and they are acquitted of this charge. [372-F-H; 373-A] A.18 (Arvu): 19. A.18 an Indian Tamil, joined the LTTE movement and started his propaganda work for LTTE in lildla and was in its pay·roll. He came in contact with Bhagyanathan (A.20) and deceased accused Haribabu. He took training in Suba Studio of A.22. The conduct of A.18 before and after the assassination of Raj iv Gandhi leaves no one in doubt that he was member of the conspiracy. It is not necessary for a conspirator to be present at the scene of the crime to be a member of the conspiracy. Circumstances show that A.18 was in the thick of conspiracy. He knew that to explode the IED, power source would be 9 volt battery and that is why he purchased battery of that power, which was ultimately used in exploding the device killing Rajiv Gandhi and others. The plea of the defence that the version of A.18 that this battery was used for explosion of the IED was his knowledge derived after
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
the explosion cannot be accepted. A.18 has, therefore, been rightly convicted for various offences charged against him by the Designated Court. [373-E; 376-B·D] A.19 (Irumborai):
20.1. A.19 was assisting in the treatment of injured LTTE cadres in B Tamil Nadu and other places. In his confession A.19 narrated important incidents which took place between him and deceased accused Trichy Santhan. He had gone to Jaffna in Sri Lanka along with A.18 and Baby Subramaniam. He had taken on rent a house in Madras which was used for the stay of injured LTTE cadre. A.19 was present in the house at Bangalore when C Sivarasan, Suba and Nero were brought there hidden in tanker lorry, by A.23, A.24 & A.25. When A.19 was on his way to Jaffna in Sri Lanka arranging a boat he was intercepted by the Indian Navy and handed over to the Police. Letters (Exhibit P.128 and P.129) were recovered from him. A.19 learnt about the death ofRajiv Gandhi on the morning of22.S.1991 and to him the murder of Rajiv Gandhi seemed to be a brave deed and an act of D revenge. But then, whatever feeling a person may have that would not make him a member of the conspiracy. Apart from the fact that A.19 knew certain members of the LTTE operating in India, there is no evidence whatsoever that he had any knowledge of the conspiracy with the object to kill Raj iv Gandhi. . The letters (Exhibit P.t28 and P.129) are not admissible in evidence. There E is nothing on record to show that deceased accused Trichy Santhan was a member of th~ conspiracy to kill Raj iv Gandhi. On the other hand, evidence shows that he was looking after the LTTE cadre in India and supplying · medicines to Sri Lanka to support the war efforts of LTTE there. It also cannot be presumed that since these documents were recovered from A.19 F he knew the contents thereof or that the contents were correct. The letters were written much after the object of the conspiracy had been achieved and the author dead. [376-E-F-G; 377-G; 378-A-C) 202. A.19. has also been charged for an offence under S.3(4) of TADA. This charge against him must fail. He has also been charged under S.212 G IPC on the allegation that he assisted Sivarasan; Suba and Nero to hide in a house at Indira Nagar (Bangalore) to evade their arrest. There l;las also been a charge against him for an offence under S.12 of the Passport Act. His conviction and sentence under these charges have not been challenged . . Though he is acquitted of charge of conspiracy to murder Rajiv Gandhi, his conviction and sentence under Section 212 IPC and Section 3 of the Passport H Act is confirmed. [378-C-D]
ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
--
A.20 (Bhagyanathan) & A.21 (Padma): 21.l. A.20 and A.21, son and mother respectively are Indian Tamils. A.1 and Kalyani are daughters of A.21. The circumstances relied on by the prosecution do not make out any case against A.20 and A.21 that they were having any knowledge of the conspiracy or knew of the object of the conspiracy. Pottu Amman did know about A.21 and A.20 because of A.1 and the fact that A.3 was staying in their house. No inference of any con.spiracy can be drawn from the mere fact that Sivarasan sent the wireless message about the arrest of A.20 and A.21. Moreover, mere association with LTTE hard-core militants or the fact that those militants turned out to be the persons responsible for the killing of Raj iv Gandhi would not make A.20 and A.21 members of the conspiracy to kill Rajiv Gandhi. There is nothing unusual in A.3 providing financial help to A.21 in view of the fact that he was staying in her house and also having close relationship of A.1. Thus charge of any conspiracy against A.21 and A.20 must fail. Charge under Section 3(3) of TADA against both of them also fails. However, they have been rightly convicted and sentenced for offences under Section 212 IPC. Their conviction under Section 212 IPC and sentence was not challenged. [380-H; 381-A-C) 21.2. A.21 has also been charged for an offence under Section 6(1)(a) of Wireless Telegraphy Act and found guilty and sentenced. This was because she was in possession of two code sheets used by A.3, which was the material used for communicating from India to other conspirators, namely Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman in Sri Lanka and those sheets were handed over to A.21 for safe custody. There is no evidence to suggest that A.21 had any knowledge of the code sheets or what the code sheets were about. A.21 was not aware of the contents of the code sheets or for what purpose these were put to use by A.3. Therefor~, the charge against her under s.6(1A) of Indian Wireless and Telegraphy Act must also fail. [380-C-F; 381-E]
c
A.22 (Suba Sundaram):
.
22. A.22 is the owner of Suba News Photo Services also called Suba Studio. Here A.18, A.20 Haribabu and PW.151 took training from A.22 Suba Studio was a meeting Point for LTTE activists. A.22 was in regular touch with LTTE leaders and was in correspondence with them. He was making strenuous efforts for getting the camera with the photographs taken by Haribabu before he died. According to the prosecution, the sole purpose was to destroy any clue that the investigating agency might get from the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l 999] 3 S.C.R.
A photographs taken by Haribabu about the role of LTTE and others in the
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crime. Prosecution also alleged that A.22 made all attempts to conceal the identity of Haribabu that he was an LTTE activist and that he had been engaged by Sivarasan and others to take photographs of the incidents; that though A.22 ·was aware that Haribabu had gone to the public meeting ofRajiv Gandhi and that he was working for LTTE he got a statement issued by Haribabu's father denying that his son was a member ofLTTE and that A.22 wanted all the materials relating to LTTE lying in the house ofHaribabu to be destroyed so that no one could find out the link ofHaribabu'with LTTE. However, all these factors will not make A.22 a member of the conspiracy with the object to kill Rajiv Gandhi. Even his knowledge of conspiracy cannot be inferred from the circumstances relied on by the prosecution. A.22 has been charged for an of~ence under section 3(3) of TADA which charge must fail. He has also been charged (or an offence under Section 201 IPC for which he has been found guilty an.d convicted and sentenced. However, there is no challenge to his conviction under these charges. [38I-F; 382-G-H; 383-A-D]
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE: 23.I A.11, A.I3 and A.I5 are acquitted of all charges. Their conviction and sentence are set aside. [383-F]
23.2. None of the accused has committed any offence under Ss.3,4 or 5 of TADA. Their c.>nviction and sentence under these sections are set aside. [383-F] 23.3. Conviction and sentence of the accused except A.I, A.2, A.3 and A.I8 under all other charges are maintained. 'Conviction and sentence of all the accused under Section I20B IPC read with all other counts as mentioned in Charge no.I is set aside except conviction of A.I, A.2, A.3 and A.I8 under Section UOB read with Section 302 IPC. [383-G]
23A. Conviction of A.I under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC on various counts is upheld and so also of A.I8 under Section 302 IPC. ·conviction and sentence of A.I under Section 326 IPC read with Section ~4 G IPC and that of A.I8 under sections 109 and 326 IPC and Sections 109 and 324 IPC are maintained. [383-H]
23.5. Conviction of A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.18 under'S.120B read with S.302IPC is confirmed since the crime could not have been committed but for the. assistance rendered by them. Each o( the four accused had a role to play in the commission of the crime. It is not that A.I did not understand
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ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI.
the nature or the crime and her participation. She was a willing party to the· A crime. One has to see both the crime and the criminal. A.l in her association with A.3 and others developed a great hatred towards Rajiv Gandhi and wanted to have a revenge. Merely because A.1 is a women and a mother or a child who was born while she was in custody cannot be the ground not to award the extreme penalty to her. She is an educated woman and was working as a stenographer in a private firm. She was living alone, away trom her B mother, sister· and brother since April 1990 and started living in a rented apartment from October 1990. She became friendly with A.3 when she was introduced to him in her office by her sister Kalyani and PW.233. Before this date also she was close to some of the LTTE activists. She developed fondness towards A.3 and wanted to marry him. However, A.3 declined saying C he was a committed LTTE activist and as per code of LTTE he could not marry. However, subsequently, while both of them were in custody and came to know that she was pregna~t, A.3 married her. It was in July 1991 she gave birth to a re.male child. [392-A-H]
~.
23.6. The crime was committed after previous planning and executed with extreme brutality. The crime sent shock waves in the country. Along with Rajiv Gandhi, 15 others, most ofthtm were police men on duty, lost their lives. There were as many as two 'dry runs' as to how to reach Rajiv Gandhi after penetrating the security cordon. Though the object of the conspiracy was not to commit any terrorist act or any disruptive activity nevertheless murder of a former Prime Minister for what he did in the interest of the country was an act of exceptional depravity on the part of the accused, an unparalleled act in the annals of crimes committed in this country. [393-D-G)
23. 7. It is not that intensity or the belt bomb strapped on the waist or Thanu was not known to the conspirators as after switching on the first switch on her belt.~omb Tlianu asked Sivarasan to move away. Haribabu was so keen to have close-up picture or the crime that he met his rate in the blast ~tself: There is no mitigating circumstance to upset the award or death sentence on the accused namely A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.18 all of whom deserve extreme penalty. Therefore, the award of sentence or death on these 4 accused is confirmed. [393-G-H; 394-A]
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1980] 2 SCC 684, Dhananjoy Chatterjee Alias Dhana v. State of West Bengal, [1994) 2 SCC 220 and Bheru Singh s/o. Kalyan Singh State of Rajasthan, (1994] 2 SCC 467, relied on.
v.
Masalti v. State of U.P., [1964) 8 SCR 133 and Natwar/al Sakar/al
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1999) 3 S.C.R.
Mody v. The State of Bombay, [1963) 65 BLR 660 (SC), referred to. Paynew v. Tennessee, 111 5.Ct.2597 (91); Booth v. Maryland, (482 U.S. 496); South Carolina v. Sathers, (490, U.S.805) and R v. Howells and others, (1999) 1 ALL ER 50, referred to.
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Per S.S.M. Quadri. J. (Partly dissenting) 1.1. The provisions ofsub-sections(2), (3) and (4) of Section 3 of TADA Act would be attracted only when a person accused of the offences under the said provisions, has committed a terrorist act within the meaning of Section 3(1) of the TADA Act. A perusal of the provision shows that it embodies the principle expressed in the maxim 'actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea; both 'mens rea' and a criminal act are the ingredients of the definition of "Terrorist Act". The mens rea required is the intention to overawe the Government as by law established; or (ii) to strike terror in the people or any section of the people; or (iii) to alienate any section of the people; or (iv) to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people. The actus reus should comprise of doing any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is li}<.ely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detaining any person and threatening to kill or injure such persons in order to compel the Government or any other persons to do or abstain from doing any act. [397-G; 398-C-F] 1.2. A perusal of the charges discloses that the intention to overawe the Government is not mentioned therein. The question here does not relate to defect in the charge but to the content of the charge and without the said germane words in the charge, it cannot be said that the charge includes the intention to overawe the Government The charge framed is confined only to those acts which are referred to therein. Therefore, the conviction recorded by Designated Court in the judgment under appeal for offences under the TADA Act cannot be maintained. The appellants are accordingly acquitted of the charges under TADA Act. [398-G; 399-A-C) 2.1. To record conviction under Section 120-B, it is necessary to find the accused guilty of criminal conspiracy as defined in Section 120-A IPC.
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
--
2.2. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are; (i) an agreement between two or more persons; (ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either an illegal act; or an act which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. Though the meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing/or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means is a sine qua non of criminal conspiracy, yet in the very nature of the offence which is shrouded with secrecy no direct evidence of .the common intention of the conspirators can normally be produced before the Court. Having regard to the nature of the offence, such a ~eeting of minds of the conspirators has to be inferred from the circumstances proved by the prosecution if such an inference is possible. (400-B-D) 2.3. In reaching the stage of meeting of minds, two or more persons share information about doing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. This is the first stage where each is said to have knowledge of a plan for committing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. Among those sharing the information some or all may form an intention to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. Those who do form the requisite intention would be parties to the agreement and would be conspirators but those who drop out cannot be roped in as collaborators on the basis of mere knowledge unless they commit acts or omissions from which a guilty common intention can be inferred. It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from inception to the end of the conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them a~d some others may quit from the conspiracy. All of them cannot but be treated as conspirators. Where in pursuance of the agreement the conspirators commit offences individually or adopt illegal means to do a legal act which has a nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of them will be liable for such offences even ifsome of them have not actively participated in the commission of those offences. [402-B-E]
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2.4. The agreement, sine qua non of conspiracy, may be proved either by direct evidence which is rarely available in such cases or it may be inferred from utterances, writings, acts, omissions and conduct of the parties to the conspiracy which is usually done. In view of Section 10 of the Evidence Act anything said, done or written by those who enlist their support to the object of conspiracy and those who join later or make their exit before completion of the object in furtherance of their common intention will be relevant facts to prove that each one of them can justifiably by treated as a conspirator. [402-F)
;
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,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1999] 3 S.C.R.
3. Section 12(1) of the TADA Act authorises the Designated Court to try offences under the TADA Act along with another offence with which the accused may be charged under the Cr.P.C. at the same trial. The only limitation on the exercise of the power is that the offence under the TADA Act is connected with the offence being tried together. Sub-section (2) provides that the Designated Court may convict the accused person of offence under that Act or any rule made thereunder or under any other law and pass any sentence authorised under that Act or the rules or under any other law, as the case. may be, for the punishment thereof if in the course of any trial under the TADA Act the accused persons are found to have committed any offence either under that Act or any rule or under any other law.(404-C-D) 4.1. Confessions"recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act and admitted in the trial of offences under the TADA Act and under Section 120B read with Section 302 IPC can be relied upon to record conviction of the appellants for the said offences under IPC even though they are acquitted of offences under the TADA Act. (404-E-F] Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, (1964] 2 SCR 378, Shivnarayan Laxminaravan Joshi & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (1980] 2 SCC 465, Mohammad Usman Mohammed Hussain Maniyar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (1981] 2 SCC 443, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Krishan Lal Pardhan & Ors., [1987] 2 SCC 17 and State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Somnath Thapa & Ors., [1996] 4 SCC 659, relied on. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1997] 7 SCC 431, dissented from.
4.2. An analysis of sub-section(l) of Section 15 of TADA Act shows that it has two limbs. The first limb.bars application of provisions of the code of Criminal Procedure and the IJJdian Evidence Act to a confession made by a person before a police officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by him in any of the modes noted in the section. The second limb makes such a confession admissible de hors the provisions of the Evidence Act in the trial of such person or co-ac_cused, abettor or conspirator for an offence under the TADA Act or rules made thereunder provided the co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and tried in the same case together with the accused. The import of Section 15(1) is that insofar as the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and Evidence Act come in conflict
.
'
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
with either recording of a confession of a person by a police officer of the rank mentioned therein, in any of the modes specified in the section, or its admissibility at the trial, they will have to yield to the provision of Section 15(1) as it is given overriding effect. [405-H; 406-A-C) 4.3. Section 162, 164, 281and463 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which have a bearing on the question of recording of statement/confession of a person and Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act which deal with various aspects of confession of an accused stand excluded vis-a-vis Section 15(1) of the TADA Act and cannot be called in aid to invalidate recording of confession of an accused by a police officer of the specified rank and/or its admissibility in the trial of the co-accused, abettor or conspirator charged and tried in the same case together with the accused for an offence under the TADA Act or rules made thereunder. The non obstante clause in Section 15(1) of the TADA Act dots not exclude the application of all the provisions of Cr.P.C. and the Indian Evidence Act in the trial of offences under TADA Act. [406-D-E]
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4.4. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act defines, inter alia, the term 'evidence' to mean and include all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under the inquiry (which is called 'oral evidence') and all documents produced for inspection of the court (which is called 'documentary evidence'). The plea of 'guilty' by the accused at the trial cannot, therefore, be treated, as falling within the meaning of evidence as it is not a statement made by a witness before the Court. The extra judicial confession made to any person which is allowed to be proved by the Court will be a part of the statement of a witness made before the Court, so it will be evidence within the meaning of that term. A confession recorded by a magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. also satisfies the requirements of the definition of the term 'evidence'. A confession recorded under Section 15(1) ofthe TADA Act is also within the ambit of evidence under Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act and there is no dissension on this. (406-H; 407-A-C)
5.1. The difference between Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 15(1) of the TADA Act may also be noticed. Whereas the former provision requires that the maker of the confession and others should be tried jointly for the same offence, the latter provision does not require that joint trial should be for the same offence. Another point of distinction is that under Section 30 of the Evidence Act. the Court is given discretion to take into consideration the confession against the maker as well as against those
r-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1999] 3 S.C.R.
A who are being tried jointly for the same offence, but Section 15(1) of TADA
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Act mandates that confession of an accused recorded thereunder shall be admissible in the trial of the maker of confession or co-accused, abettor or conspirator, provided the co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and tried with the accused in the same case. Both Section 30 to the Evidence Act as well as Section _15 of the TADA Act require joint trial of the accused making confession, and co-accused abettor or conspirator. [410-B-D) 5.2. Having excluded the application of Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act to a confession recorded under Section 15(1) of the TADA Act, a selfcontained scheme is incorporated therein· for recording confession of an accused and its admissibility in his trial with co-accused, abettor or conspirator for offences under the TADA Act or the rules made thereunder or any other offence under any other law which can jointly be tried with the offence with which he is charged at the same trial. There is thus no room to import the requirements of Section 30 of the Evidence Act in Section 15 of the TADA Act. (410-E-F) 6.1. It is true that Section 21 of the Evidence Act declares that admission ·is relevant and permits its proof against the person who makes it. Even when confessions which are species of admissions are not hit by Sections 24, 25 or 26 and are relevant or when they became relevant under Sections 27,28 and 29, they can only be proved against the maker thereof. Admittedly, there is no provision in the Evidence Act for making confession of an act::used relevant or admissible 'against co-accused. In the setting of those provisions Section 30 of the Evidence Act is enacted which is a clear departure from the principles of English Law. It permits taking into consideration of a confession made by one of the persons being tried jointly for the same ·offence as against the co-accused. It is in such a case a confession of an accused, recorded in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the Evidence Act, has to satisfy the requirements of Section 30 of the Evidence Act for using it against the co-accusP.d. [411-E-Gl 6.2. The confession of a co-accused is not evidence as defined in
G Section 3 of the Evidence Act and Section 30 enables the Court to take into
consideration the confession of a co-accused to lend assurance to other evidence against the co-accused. The expression 'may take into consideration' means that the. use of the evidence of confession of an accused may be used for purposes of corroborating the evidence on record against the co-accused and no conviction can be based on such confession. (413-H; 414-A-B]
,/
ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINJ .......
Kalpnath Rai v. State (Through CBI), [1997) 8 SCC 732, dissented
....
from. Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR (1949) PC 257; Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhyu Pradesh, [1952) SCR 526 and Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar, [1964) 6 SCR 623, relied on.
Wigmore on Evidence, para 866, third edition; & Taylor: Treatise on the Law of Evidence, Volume 1, Twelfth Edition, para 865, referred to.
7.1. The amendments effected in Section 15(1) and Section 21(1) of the TADA Act by Act 43of1993 are relevant. The words 'co-accused, abettor or conspirator' and the proviso are added in sub-section(l) of Section 15, clauses (c) and (d) of sub-section(l) of Section 21 are deleted. Before the amendment of Sections 15 and 21, the sweep of the legal presumption contained therein was that in a prosecution for any offence under subsection(l) of Section 3 of the TADA Act on proof of the facts mentioned in ' of Section 21, it was mandated clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) ofsub-section(l) that the Designated Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the accused had· committed such offence. Clauses (c) and (d), which are deleted from sub-section(!) of Section 21 by Act 43 of 1993, related to a confession made by a co-accused that the accused had committed the offence and to the confession made by the accused of the offence to any person other than a police officer. The effect of the said clauses was that in the event of the co-accused making confession inculpating the accused or in the event of the accused himself making an extra-judicial confession to any person other than a police officer the legal presumption that the accused had committed such offence would arise. [414-B-E)
·.~
7.2. The presumption is, however, reputable and so the burden of showing that the offence was not committed would shift to the accused. The normal presumption in criminal cases is that till it is proved to the contrary the accused will be deemed to be innocent and that position is altered by Section 21(1). After deletion of clauses (c) and (d) by Act 43 of 1993 the statutory presumption under Section 21(1) will not apply to situations where a confession is made by a co-accused that the accused had committed the offence (clause (c)) or where the accused himself made a confession of the offence to any person other than a police officer (clause (d)) and the normal rule of presumption of innocence of the accused will apply. What was in the realm of 'as proved' has after the amendment become only substantive evidence admissible as against the co-accused. [414-G-H; 415-A)
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
7.3. In view of the use of the expression 'shall presume' in Section 21 (1) of the TADA Act, the confession of one accused as against the other co-accused cannot be said to be 'substantive evidence'; such a confession will be regarded as proof of the fact that the accused had committed such offence unless the contrary is proved. 'Substantive evidence' of a fact by itself does not amount to 'proof of that fact'. Ther~ is no presumption in law that substantive evidence of a fact has to be treated as proof of that fact. (41S..E-F] 7.4. After the amendment of Section 21(1), the confession of an accused recorded by the police officer under Section 15(1) of the TADA Act is in the same position as that recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and that it cannot be placed on a higher pedestal in regard to its evidential value. If that be so, in a trial under the TADA Act when there are two categories of confessions - one a judicial confession recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the other by a police officer under Section 15(1) of the TADA Act, the court will have to give the same evidential value to such confesslons as against the co-accused. (415-G-H) 7.5. If the expression 'substantive evidence' is understood in the sense of evidence of a fact in issue or a relevant fact and not proof of what it contains and that it has to be evaluated by the. Court like any other category of ev!dence no difficulty arises. The difficulty will, however, arise, if 'substantive evidence' is equated with the position flowing from the application ~ of legislative mandate by incorporating 'shall presume' as that will nullify the effect of legal presumption in Section 21(1) of the TADA Act. Even if confession of an accused as against co-accused tried with accused i~ the same case is treated 'substaJ!tive evidence' understood in the limited sense of fact in issue or relevant fact~ ihe rule· of prudence requires that the court should examine the same with great care. J416-A-B] 7.6. The evidence of confession of co-accused is not required to be given on oath, nor is given in the presence of the accused, and its veracity cannot be tested by cross-examination. Though the evidence of an accomplice is free from these shortcomings yet an accomplice is a person who having taken part in the commission of offence, to save himself, betrayed his former associates and placed himself on a safer plank - 'a position in which he can hardly fail to have a strong bias in favour of the prosecution' the position of the accused who has given confessional statement implicating a co-accused is that he has placed himself on the same plank and thus he sinks or sails alo,.Q1WVitb the co-allcused on the basis of his confession. For these reasons,
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI
in so far as use of confession of an accused against a co-accused is concerned, rule of prudence cautions the judicial discretion that it cannot be relied upon unless corroborated generally by other evidence on record. [416-F-GJ
Conviction: 8. The conviction of all the appellants recorded by the Designated Court for offences under the TADA Act and also the conviction of A-4, A5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-11, A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15, A-17, A-19, A-20, A-21, A22, A-23, A-24, A-25 and A-26 for the offences under Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC are set aside. The conviction of A-1, A-2, A-3, A-9, A10, A-16 and A-18 of offences under Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC is confirmed. [423-H; 424-AI
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Sentence: 9.1. The death sentence of A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-18 is confirmed. However it is not a fit case to confirm the death sentence awarded to A-9, A-10 and A-16(Ravichandran) and their deatl• sentence is commuted to life imprisonment. [424-B-CJ 9.2. On the death sentence of A-1, highlighting the mitigating circumstances, it was pleaded that she is a woman and is mother of a small girl who was born during the period of her confinement in jail, she is very young; she has also subsequently regretted her act and her participation was the result of indoctrination by A-3 and that she did not play any major role. These are indisputably the mitigating circumstances. Surely in our culture a woman has to be treated with beneficence and kindness. But then in this case the person who opted to become a human bomb was a woman. Suba who gave moral support to sacrifice her life on the anvil of some ideology and to end up by annihilating others lives was also a woman. About the role of Al, it is not a case where she was caught up in a sudden situation and become a mute comrade, the mind not towing the body. It was indeed the other way round. On her own saying she had developed a strong feeling against Rajiv Gandhi and decided that a lesson should be taught for the mass killings and rapes in Sri Lanka by IPKF. She admitted that she was mentally prepared by Sivarasan, Murugan, Thanu and Suba for any kind of retaliatory action including killing of leaders. Even on May 2, 1991, she felt that the said persons were going to assassinate the leaders and she voluntarily participated thereafter and attended the meeting addressed by V.P. Singh on the night of 7th May. 1991 in Madras. She had never been free from the feeling that
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Sivarasan, Murugan, Thanu and Suba had come for a dangerous mission. Before leaving for Sriperambudur she was aware of the fact that Thanu was concealing an apparatus inside her dress. Nonetheless she went along with Suba and Thanu to provide cover to them as planned by Sivarasan for which she had already agreed earlier. Without her providing cover to Thanu and Suba, perhaps they would not have the confidence for attending the meeting including the fateful meeting. She was actually present at the scene of occurrence along the Thanu and Suba when Thanu exploded herself as a human bomb as a result of which Shri Raj iv Gandhi and 18 other persons died and 43 persons were seriously injured which included police officers and innocent persons. The facts on record strongly suggest her participation was not the result of helplessness but a well designed action with her free will to make her part of the contribution to the unholy plan and wicked conspiracy. [420-H; 421-A-C; 422-A-D] 9.3. A crime committed on Indian soil against the popular national .,. leader, a former Prime Minister of India, for a political decision taken by him in his capacity as the head of the executive and which met with the approval of the Parliament, by persons running political organisation in a foreign country and their agents in concert with some Indians for the reason that it did not suit their political objectives and of their organisation, cannot but be a 'rarest of the rare' case. In such a case the part played by A-1 is a canJid participation in the crime of conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi who was himself a young popular leader so much loved and respected by his fellow citizens. The conspirators including A-1 had nothing personal against him but he was targeted for the political decision taken by him as the Prime Minister of India. A-1 played her part in execution of the conspiracy which resulted in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and death of many police officers and innocent citizens including a small girl. For a person like Al, taking into consideration all the mitigating circumstances, there is no room for any leniency, kindness and beneficence. Once A-1 is found to fall in the rarest of the rare case, declining to confirm the death sentence will stultify the course of law and justice. Thus, there is no alternative but to confirm the death sentence awarded by the Designated Court to A-1. [419-D-E; 421-A-C; 422-E~H; 423-A] Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1980) SC 989, Machni Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, [1983] 3 SCR 413; Kehar Singh & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration), [1988) 3 SCC 609 and Mahesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1987] 3 sec 80, relied on.
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.)
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Death Reference case No. 1 of 1998 (@ D. No. 1151 of 1998) Etc.
(Under Section 366 Criminal Procedure Code).
,. Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, N. Natarajan, S. Siva Subramaniam, Jacob Deniel, Mariaputham, Romy Chacko, S.A. Matto, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, A.D. N. Rao, P. Parmeshwaran, N. Chandrasekharan, S. Duraisamy, T. Ramadass, Ilangovan, Sunder Mohan, B. Gopi Krishna Jai Srilank, K. Vijay Kumar, V. Rama Subramaniam, T. Raja, K. Thennan and D.K. Singh for the appearing parties. The following Judgments/Order of the Court were delivered :
THOMAS, J. Rajiv Gandhi, a former Prime Minister of India was assassinated on 21-5-1991 at a place called Sriperumpudur in Tamil Nadu. The assassin was an adolescent girl named Thanu who was made into a human bomb and she got herself exploded at 10.19 P.M. at very close proximity to the viisiting former Prime Minister. In a trice the life of Rajiv Gandhi was snuffed out and his body was smashed into smithereens. As for the assassin nothing except a few pieces of charred limbs and her sundered head were left behind. In the explosion lives of 18 others also got extinguished. Investigation pointed to a minutely orchestrated cabal, masterminded by some conspirators to extirpate the form.er Prime Minister from this terrestrial terrain. In the final charge-sheet made by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) all the 26 appellants now before us, were arraigned as members of the conspiracy which targeted, inter alia, Rajiv Gandhi. The Special Judge who tried the case found all the 26 appellants guilty of various offences charged, the gravamen of them being section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC. All of them were hence convicted of those offences and all of them were sentenced to death. These appeals by right are under Section 19 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA for short). The Special Judge submitted the records to this Court for confjrmation of the death sentence. We heard all the above matters together at great length, perhaps the longest heard criminal appeal in this country. Shri Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General who was assisted by a team of Advocates argued the prosecution side adroitly and with great dedication. The accused's side was represented by Shri N. Natarajan, Senior Counsel who was assisted by array of counsel with meticulous preparation and admirable resorcefulness.
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We were verily benefited by the remarkable contribution made by the counsel for both sides. We record our uninhibited thanks to them. We may narrate, as briefly as possible, the events which preceded and succeeded the assassination as they would unfurl the conspectus of the case. The genesis can be traced to a movement which burgeoned in Sri Lanka for ventilating the grievances of the people of Tamil origin and for making certain demands for the Tamil speaking people of the island. Under the leadership of one Veluppillai Piribhakaran, a militant oganisation called "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (hereinafter referred to as 'LTTE' as the abbreviation) came to existence in the island. When the movement became belligerent the Government of Sri Lanka adopted sterner measures to curb their activities. Eventually a series of confrontations took place between the Goverment of Sri Lanka and the activists of L TTE. When Sri Lankan Government found it difficult to meet the situation by themselves, the Government sought assistance from Government of India for tackling the problem. This was reciprocated by the Government of India. Some parleys took place between the diplomats of both nations in 1987. The President of Sri Lanka (Mr. Jayawardhane) and the Prime Minister of India (Mr. Rajiv Gandhi) met together at New Delhi and Velluppillai Piribhakaran was also invited to be involved. An accord was signed by the aforesaid three persons by which Indian Government agreed, inter alia, to form a cadre called Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF for short). One of the tasks assigned to the force was to disarm LTTE militants. Pursuant to the terms of the accord Government of India despatched large number of IPKF personnel to Sri Lanka. While discharging their duties the IPKF committed many excesses which became inhuman conduct towards the followers of LTTE. Consequently hostility developed in the minds of LTTE cadre towards IPK Force. To register their protest against such excesses one of the LTTE hardcore a~tivists by name dileepan undertook a fast and he succumbed to it after a few days. Skirmishes became rampant between members of the IPK Force and LTTE activits. In October 1987, a vessel carrying 17 LTTE functionaries was intercepted by the Sri Lankan navy while patrolling on the high seas and the passengers were held captives. Leaders of LTTE made a bid to save them by appealing to the Indian Government to intervene, but there was no response. 12 out of 17 captives committed suicide by consuming Pottasium cyanide. There was counter attack on IPK Force when LTIE commands captured a
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_ship carrying provisions for the army, and in the encou.nter which ensued I I Jndian soldiers were killed. In the meanwhile one Varadaraja Perumal who was an accredited leader of a rival organisation called Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLE) got elected from the Northern Zone as a follow-up step of the terms of Sri Lanka-India Accord to which reference was made above. Later the Indian Government under the leadership of Raj iv Gandhi agreed for making a gradual deinduction of IPk Force from Sri Lanka.
In the general election which was held in I 989, a new Government headed by Sri V.P. Singh as Prime Minister came to power in India. The C new Government accelerated the process of deinduction of IPK Force. However the said Government did not last long and another Government with Sri. K. Chandrashekhar as Prime Minister assumed office. That Government too did not last long and the political changes in India reached a stage when the Lok Sabha was dissolved and the President of India issued a notification for fresh election. Rajiv Gandhi started campaigning for the D Congress (I) Party. He made his views public when a correspondent of Amrit Bazar Patrika interviewed him which was published in the Sunday Magzine of the newspaper on the 12th and 19th of August. 1990. The pith of the interview, concerning Sri Lankan policy, was that Rajiv Gandhi did not favour withdrawal of the IPK Force from Sri Lanka and he was critical of the approach made by V.P. Singh Government towards Sri Lanka. In the election manifesto published by Congress (I) for the ensuing general election the party reiterated its commitment to the India-Sri Lanka agreement of July 1987 as the basis for the settlement of outstanding issues relating to the Tamil population of Sri Lanka, and assured to ensure the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
The events which took place subsequent thereto were so intertwined with the above narrated political developments that this case cannot be understood without etching the afore-presented backdrop. We may now proceed to describe the prosecution case.
A criminal conspiracy was hatched and developed by the hardcore LTTE cadre which spread over a long period of 6 years commencing from July 6, .1987 and stretching over till May 1992. The main objects of the conspiracy were: (l) to carry out acts of terrorism and disruptive activities in Tamil Nadu and other places in India during the course of which to assassinate Rajiv
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Gandhi and others, (2) to cause disappearance of evidence thereof, (3) to harbour all the conspirators living in India and (4) to escape from being apprehended and to screen all those who were involved in the conspiracy from legal consequences. As a follow-up step of the conspiracy, during the first half of its period LTTE commandos arrived on the Indian shore in different batches. The first batch arrived on 12-9-1990 which consisted of Perumal Vijayan (12th accused) and his wife Selvaluxmi (13th accused) and Bhaskaran (14th accused). They were seen off at Jaffna in Sri Lanka by one of the top ranking hardcore LTTE leader by name Sivarasan.
It is appropriate to mention now itself that the said Sivarasan would have been one of the most seriously involved accused in this case, but he is not alive now as he abruptly ended his life when he was sure of being nabbed by the police. Among the conspirations nobody else seems to have played a greater role on the Indian soil than what Sivarasan had played. Sivarasan reached India sometime in December 1990 and in collaboration with those who arrived in the first batch he managed to secure a house buiding in a locality called kodangiyoor at Madras. The next batch consisted of Robert Payas (9th accused), his wife and sisters and Jayakumar (10th accused) together with his wife Shanthi (I Ith accused). They arrived in India in September 1990. They took another house on rent at a more secluded locaiity in kodangiyoor as suggested by Sivarasan who too started residing therein. The third batch consisting of Ravichandram (16th accused) and Suseendram (17th accused) came to India on December 17, 1990. Murugan (3rd accused) reached India in January 1991 and Radhayya (7th accused) and Chandralekha@ Athirai @ Guari (18th accused) reached India in April 1991. In the meantime two persons, Arivu (18th accused) and In1mborai (19th accused) went back to Sri Lanka in the company of another important LTIE activists called Baby Subramaniam. They collected instructions from Veluppillai Piribhakaran. Sivarasan was huttling betweeen India and Sri Lanka quite often during the above period. The final arrivals were the most dedicated hardcore LTTE commandos who were brought on the Indian soil by Sivarasan on 1st May, 199 I. That batch consisted of the grit Thanu (who offerd herself to become the human bomb) and her close friend Suba besides Santhan (2nd accused) Shankar (4th accused), Vijayanandan (5th accused) and Sivaruban@ Ruban (6th accused). They were seen off at Sri Lanka by a man called Pottu Omman (who was
j ' STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
described as chief of intelligence wing of LTTE). The targets of the conspiracy, according to the prosecution, were Fort St. George at Madras (which houses the Government Secretariat of Tamil Nadu and a lot of important State Government buildings), Tamil Nadu Police Headquarters and other police stations, Vellore Fort (in which the Central Jail is situate) Krishna Raja Sagar Dam (Karnataka) Vidhan Soudha at Bangalore. Among the persons the targets were Rajiv Gandhi, Varadaraja Perumal and c~rtain other unspecified but identified personage. Pursuant to the scheme of the conspirators, photos of Fort St. George, Madras Police Headquarters and a few other police stations were taken and forwarded them to the top leaders of LTTE at Sri Lanka. A sketch of Vellore Fort was drawn up which too was despatched to the island. Sivarasan sheltered Suba and Thanu for a few days in the house of Jayakumar (A- l 0) and shifted them to the house of Vijayan (A-12). As instructed by Sivarasan a wireless set was installed in the house of Vijayan (A-12) and fitted it with operational facilities as station No. 910. Another wireless set was installed in the house of Robert Payas (A-9). In October 1990, a house was taken on rent by Nalini (A-1) at High Court Colony, Villivakkom, Madras, Murugan (A-3) Suba and Thanu used to see Nalini and Sivarasan. In March 1991, another house was taken on rent by Rangan (A-24) at Park Avem..e, Madras and one more house was taken by him at Bangalore. Both houses were taken on rent as per the instructions given by Sivarasan. When information reached that Rajiv Gandhi was addressing a meeting at Marina Beach, Madras on 18-4-1991 four persons-Nalini (A-1), Murugan (A-3), Subha Sundaram (A-22) and one Haribabu went to the meeting place. The conspirators thought of conducting a trial for the purpose of assassinating Rajiv Gandhi. When they got information that V.P. Singh, a former Prime Minister, 'J8-S addressing a meeting at Madras on 7th May, 1991 Sivarasan took Suba and Thanu to that place (Nandanam, in Madras), Nalini (A-1), Murugan (A-3) and Ari"u (Perarivalan) and Haribabu also accompanied them. The idea was to give advance training to Suba and Thanu as to how to go near a former Prime Minister V.P. Singh arrived at the meeting place only during the wee hours of 8th May, 1991. Before V.P. Singh could address the gathering, Nalini (A-1), Thanu and Suba made a bid to garland the visiting former Prime Minister on the rostrum of the meeting. The success of the aforesaid trial emboldened Suba and Thanu and they on 9th May, 1991 conveyed their confidence in achieving the target to Akila who was Deputy
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A Chief of intelligence wing of LTIE. (Akila was also put in charge of the Women Wing of the organisation).
With the success they felt achieved in the trial run the main conspirators started acting swiftly. On 11-5-1991, Nalini (A-1) took Suba and Thanu to a tailoring shop and purchased some clothes including a Salwar-Kameez:On 175-1991, Sivarasan and Santhan (A-2) sent Sivaruban (A-6) to Jaipur to find out a hide-out for the conspirators and to take the some on rent under a pseudonymous name. The tour programme of Rajiv Gandhi was published in the local
C newspapers on 19-5-199 l and then Sivarasan came to know that Rajiv Gandhi would address a meeting at Sriperumpudur on 21st May, 1991. Sivarasan determined not to miss that oportunity. He ascertained all about Sriperumpudur from Nalini (A- I) and then he told Nalini that the target was only Raj iv Gandhi.
On 20-5-1991, Arivu (A-18) purchased a 9-Watt golden power battery from a shop. Sivarasan deputed Kanagasabapathy (A-7) to gd to Delhi to fix up a house as a hide out to be used during the days after accomplishing the target. Sivarasan confabulated with Nalini (A-1), Murugan (A-3), Aruvu (A18) and Haribabu at the house of Jayakumar (A-IO). Sivarasan instructed Nalini to take half a day's leave under some pretext or the other. Arivu (A18) and Bhagyanathan (A-20) procured a Kodak film and supplied it to Haribabu who was a freelance photographer. On 21-5-1991, Hairbabu bought a garland made of sandalwood presumably for using it as a camouflage (for murdering Rajiv Gandhi). He also secured a camera. Nalini (A-1) wangled leave from her immediate boss (she was working in a company as P.A. to the Managing Dirctor) l!nder the pretext that she wanted to go to Kanchipuram for buying a saree .. Instead she went to her mother's place. Padma (A-21) is her mother. Murugan (A-3) was waiting for her and on his instruction Nalini rushed to her house at Villivakkom (Madras). Sivarasan reached the house of Jayakumar (A-10) ancl he got armed himself with a pistol and then he proceeded to the house c>rVijayan (A-12). Sivarasan directed Suba and Thanu to get themselves ready for the final event. Suba and Thanu entered into an inner room. Thanu was fitted with a bomb on her person together with a battery and switch. The loosely stitched Salwar-Kameez which was purchased earlier was worn by Thanu and it helped
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STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
her to conceal the bomb and the other accessories there to. Sivarasan asked Vijayan (A-12) to fetch an auto-rickshaw.
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The auto-rickshaw which Vijayan (A-12) brought was not taken close to his house as Sivarasan had cautioned him in advance. He took Suba and Thanu in the auto-rickshaw and dropped them in the house of Nalini (A-1 ). Suba expressed gratitude of herself and her colleagues to Nalini (A-1) for the wholehearted participation made by her in the mission they had undertaken. She then told Nalini that Thanu was going to create history by murdering Rajiv Gandhi. The three women went with Sivarasan to a nearby temple where Thanu offered her last prayers. They then went to "P~'s Corner" (Which is a starting place of many bus services at Madras). Haribabu was waiting there with camera and garland. All the 5 proceeded to Sriperumpudur by bus. After reaching there they waited for the arival of RajivGandhi. Sivarasan instructed Nalini (A-1) to provide necessary cover to Suba and Thanu so that their identity as Sri Lankan girls would not be disclosed due to linguistic accent. Sivarasan further instructed her to be with Suba and to escort her after assassination to the spot where Indira Gandhi's statue is situate and to wait there for 10 minutes for Sivarasan to reach. Nalini (A-1), Suba and Thanu first sat in the enclosure earmarked for ladies at the meeting place at Sriperumpudur. As the time of arrival of Raj iv Gandhi was nearing Sivarasan took Thanu alone from that place. He collected the garland from Suba and escorted Thanu to go near the rostrum. Thanu could reach near the red carpet where a little girl (kokila) and her mother (Latha Kannan) were waiting to present a poem written by kokila on Rajiv Gandhi. When Raj iv Gandhi arrived at the meeting place Nalini (A-1) and Suba got out of the enclosure and moved away. Rajiv Gandhi went near the little girl kokila. He would have either received the poem or was about to receive the same, and at that moment the hideous battery switch was clewed by the assassin herself. Suddenly the pawn' bomb got herself blown up as the incendiary device exploded with a deadening sound. All human lives within a certain radius were smashed to shreds. The head of a female, without its torso, was seen flinging up in the air and rolling down. In a twinkle, 18 human lives were turned into fragments of flesh among which included the former Prime Minister of India Raj iv Gandhi and his personal security men, besides
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A Thanu and Haribabu. Many others who sustained injuries in t11e expl:bsion, however, survived.
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Thus the conspirators perpetrated their prime target achievement at 10.19 P.M. on 21-5-1991 at Sriperumpudur in Tamil Nadu.
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After hearing the sound of explosion Nalini (A-1) and Suba ran across and reached Indira Gandhi statue, Sivarasan joined them without delay. He confirmed to them that Rajiv Gandhi was murdered and conveyed that their comrade Haribabu was also killed in the blast. Then they proceeded to a nearby house, took water therefrom and then escaped in an auto-rickshaw. They reached the house of Jayakumar (A-10). Sivarasan transmitted wireless message to the LTTE supremo in Sri Lanka regarding the killing to Rajiv Gandhi. Pottu Omman, the chief of intelligence of LTTE confirmed receipt of the message and in reply sent certain queries.
The next phase of activities of the conspirators consisted of attempts to abscond, to screen the offenders and to destroy the evidence regarding conspiracy. . On 24-5:1991 the newspapers published a photograph ofThanu holding a garland in her hand at Sriperumpudur in the company of a few other females waiting for the arrival of Rajiv Gandhi. On seeing it Pottu Omman sent a wireless query to Sivarasan whether Thanu was identifiable in the photo. Sivarasan , Suba, Nalini (A-1 ), her husband Murugan (A-3) and mother Padma (A-21) proceeded to Tirupati to offer thanks-giving worship to the Lord, and they returned Madras on the next day. Sivarasan thereafter moved from place to place and Suba was shifted to different houses. In the first week of June 1991, Sivarasan felt that he was within the penumbra of suspicion of the police. Thereupon he entrusted the remaining work to be carried out by Murugan (A-3). Though Sivarasan advised Nalini to escape to Sri Lanka she did not do so for practical reasons known to her. She and her husband Murugan (A-3) again proceeded toTirupati on 9-6-1991 in cognito. Murugan got his head tonsured by way of redeeming a vow. By the midd1e of June, photographs of Nalini (A- I) and Suba appeared in the newspapers. Sivarasan kept Pottu Ommaninformed of the developments in India through wireless transmissions.
f' STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
On 11-6-1991 Bhagyanathan (A-20) and Padma (A-21) were arrested by the police. Three days later Nalini (A-1) and Murugan (A-3) were arrested. The said development was communicated by Sivarasan to the LTTE Headquarters at Sri Lanka and thereafter he in the company of Suba and Dhanasekaran (A-23), Rangan (A-24) and Vicky (A-25) and one LTIE activist by name Nehru had skulked to Bangalore and concealed themselves in a house at Indira Nagar. Irumborai (A-19) was already accommodated in that house. On 16-8-1991 they shifted to another house situated at Kananakuntte in Bangalore. The police got some scent regarding the above hide-out and they rushed to that place. But by the time the police could trace them out, Sivarasan, Suba, Nehru and Amman and other LTTE activists, who too were hiding in the same house, ended their lives by committing suicide. The remaining accused were arrested on different days at different places. On completion of the investigation the CBI laid charge-sheet against all the 26 appellants besides Veluppillai Piribhakaran (the Supremo of LTTE), Pottu Omman (the chief of intelligence wing of LTIE) and Akila (Deputy Chief of intelligence) for various offences including the main offence under Section 302 read with Section 120 and Sections 3 & 4 of the TADA. In the chargesheet names of 12 other persons were also mentioned as co-conspirators. Among them two had died at the spot (Thanu and Haribabu) and the remaini?lg 10 persons died subsequently. Their names are: (i) Sivarasan@ Raghuban (2) Suba@Nitya@Mallika (3) Nehru @Nero (4) Suresh Master (5) Omman@ Gangai Kumar (6) Driver Anna@ Keerthy (7) Jamuna@ Jamila (8) Shanmugham (9) Trichy Santhan@ Gundu Santhan (10) Dixon. All steps taken to apprehend three of the main accused ( 1) Veluppillai Piribhakaran (2) Pottu Omman and (3) Akita did not succeed and hence they were proclaimed as absconding offenders. Remaining 26 persons (who are appellants before us ) were charged for offences under Section 302 and Sections 326, 201, 212 and 316 read with Section 120-B ofIPC; Section 3 subsection either (2) or (3) or (4) of the TADA. Ravichandran (A-16) and Suseendran (A-17) were, in addition, charged under Section 5 of the TADA. Less serious offences under certain provisions of Explosive Substanc,e Act, Arms Act, Passport Act, Foreigners Act and Wireless Telegraphy Act were indicted on a few accused. (It is not necessacy to pinpoint the different offences mentioned in the charge-sheet against each accused as the same shall be referred to when we consider the liability of each accused.
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The special Judge, after a marathon trial, convicted all the 26 accuseq of all the· main offences charged against each of them. He sentenced all of them to the extreme penalty under law (i.e. death) for the principal offence under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC. In addition thereto A-1 was again sentenced to death under Section (3) (I) (ii) of the TADA. Ravichandran (A-16) and Suseendran (A-17) were further convicted under Section.5 of TAI?A and were sentenced to imprisonJ!lent for life. For other offence~ of which the accused were convicted the trial court awarded sentences of lesser terms of imprisonment.
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Before we proceed to discuss the evidence relating to the main offence under section 302 re.ad with section 120-B of tPC it would be advantageous to consider whether prosecution could sustain offences under TADA (except the offence under Section ·5 thereof which was fastened only against Ravichandran (A-16) and Suseendran (A-17) as that can be dealt with separately). To constitute any offence under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 3 of TADA the accused should have either committed a terrorist act or have done something concerning a terrorist act which is sine qua non for convicting the accused under either of the sub-sections. If terrorist act is absent in the perpetration of any crime it may still amount to certain offences under the ordinary law for which there is procedure and penalty already prescribed by law. But if any such crime should be dealt with under TADA it must be inter-linked with "terrorist act" as defined thereunder.
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"Terrorist act" is defined is Section 2(l)(h) of the TADA, by giving "the meaning assigned to it in sub-section (1) of Section 3" and the expression "terrorist" is mandated to be construed accordingly.
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It is therefore necessary to look at Section 3(1) more closely. We may
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extract the first three sub-sections of Section 3:
(I) Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst, different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or. inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous
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nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act. ·
(2) Whoever commits a terrorist act, shall,(i) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death or imprisonment for life and shall be liable to fine; (ii) In any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less ~han five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. (3) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. A reading of the first sub-section shows that the person who does any act by using any of the substances enumerated in the sub-section in any such manner as are specified in the sub-section, cannot be said to commit a terrorist act unless the act is done "with intent" to do any of the four things : (l) to overawe the Government as by law established; or (2) to strike terror in people or any section of the people; or (3) to alienate any section of the people; or (4) to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people.
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When the law requires that the act should have been done "with intent" to cause any of the above four effects such requirement would be satisfied only if the dominant intention of the doer is to cause the aforesaid effect. It is not enough that the act resulted in any of the four consequences.
It must be recapitulated now that the constitutional validity of section 3 of TADA was challenged in this Court and a Five-Judge Bench has upheld the provisions in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1994] 3 SCC 569 by striking a note of caution that since provisions of TADA tend to be very harsh and drastic containing stringent provisions they must be strictly
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construed. The Bench approved the observations made by Ahmadi, J (as the lear!_led Chief Justice then was) in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijaya & Ors., [ 1990] 4 SCC 76. "Therefore, when a law visits a person with serious penal consequences extra care must be taken to ensure that those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute are not roped in by stretching the language of the law." (Para 8) Dealing with the facts of that case where the accused was alleged to have killed one Raju and another Keshav for gaining supremacy in the underworld this Court has stated that "a mere statement to the effect that the show of such violence would create terror or fear in the minds of the people and none would dare to oppose them cannot constitute an offence under Section 3(1) of the Act" and then observed thus: "The consequence of such violence is bound to cause panic and fear; but the intention of committing the crime cannot be said to be to strike terror in the people or any section of the people." A Two-Judg~ Bench of this Court has considered the distincition between the act done with the requisite intent and another act which had only ensued such consequences. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1984] 4 SCC 602 Dr. Anand, J (as the learned Chief Justice then was) has stated thus: "Thus unless the act complained of falls strictly within the latter and spirit of Section 3(1) of TADA and is committed with the intention as envisaged by that section by means of the weapons etc. as are enumerated therein with the motive as postulated thereby, an accused cannot be tried or convicted for an offence under Section 3(1) ofTADA." (Para 11) The further reasoning contained in the Judgment is the following :
"Likewise if it is only as a consequence of the criminal act that fear, terror or/and panic is caused but the intention of committing the particular crime cannot be said to be the one strictly envisaged by Section 3(1), it would be impermissible to try or convict and punish an accused under TADA. The comission of the crime with the intention to achieve the result as envisaged by the section and not merely where the consequence of the crime committed by the accused create that result, would attract the provisions of Section 3(1)
__..,
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
-
of TADA. Thus, if for example a person goes on a shooting spree and kills a number of persons, it is bound to create terror and panic in the locality but if it was not committed with the requisite intention as contemplated by the section, the offence would not attract Section 3(1) of TADA." (para 11) The Bench on the aforesaid reasoning, concluded thus:
--
"Thus, the true ambit and scope of Section 3(1) is that no convfction under Section 3( 1) of TADA can be recorded unless the evidence led by the prosecution establishes that the offence was committed with the intention as envisaged by Section 3(1) by means of the weapons etc. as enumerated in the section and was· committed with the motive as postulated by the said section. Even at the cost of repetition, we may say that where it is only the consequence of the ~riminal act of an accused that terror, fear or panic is caused, but the crime was not committed with the intention as envisaged by Section 3(1) to achieve the objective as envisaged by the section, an accused should not be convicted for an offence under Section 3(1) of TADA." (emphasis supplied)
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(para 15) Two other decisions rendered by a Two-Judge Bench of this Court were cited before us. In Girdhari Parmanand Vadhava v. State of Maharashtra, [ 1996] 11 sec 179 it has been pointed out that the intention of the wrong doer can be inferred from the circumstances. After referring to the case law i.e. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) the Bench had held that "terrorist activity is not confined to unlawful activity or crime committed against an individual or individuals but it aims at bringing about terror in the minds of people or section of people disturbing public order, public peace and tranquillity, social and communal harmony, disturbing or destablising public administration and threatening security and integrity of the country. In the instant case, the intention to strike terror in the minds of the people can be reasonably inferred because Birju declared such intention in on uncertain terms by indicating that Vaibhav.should be killed in order to St'.nd the message to the people in the locality that if the demand of Birju and his associates was not met, extreme consequence of killing of an innocent person would be resorted to."
In Mohd. Iqbal M Shaikh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, [1998] 4 SCC 494 the same combination of learned Judges reiterated the principle by reference to Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and inferred from the facts of the case that the
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
offence fell under Section 3 of TADA. Thus the legal position remains unaltered that the crucial postulate for judging whether the offence is a terrorist act falling under TADA or not is whether it was done with the intent to overawe the Govenment as by law established or to strike terror in the people etc.
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Learned Additional Solicitor General endeavoured to show that the intention of the conspirators'was to overawe the Government of India. His contention w'as that assassination of Raj iv Gandhi was a follow up action for restraining the Government from proceeding with the implementation of IndiaSri Lanka Accord. In ~ther words, the focus of the conspirators was the Government of India and Ra,jiv Gandhi was targeted to deter that focal point, according to learned Additional Solicitor General. This contention can be examined by a reference to the evidence in this case. It is true, LTTE leaders were bitterly critical of"India-Sri Lanka Accord" which was signed on 22-7-1987. Any one who criticised the policy of a Government could not be dubbed as a terrorist unless he had done any of the acts enumerated with the object of detering the Government from doing anything or to refrain from doing anything. Veluppillai Piribhakaran addressed a meeting on 4-8-1987, the text of the speech was published which is marked in this case as Ext. 354. In the said speech he used strong language to criticise "India-Sri Lanka Accord" and the manner in which it was made. But no word of hatred was expressed towards the Government of India though he aired his opposition towards Sri Lankan Government which he described as "Sinhala recist government". He also spoke bitterly against the Sri Lankan Tamil leaders who supported the Accord. About the Indian Government and its Prime Minister the LTTE supremo said the following: "The Indian Prime Minister offered me certain assurances. He offered a guarantee for the safety and protection of our people. I do have faith in the straightforwardness of the Indi~n Prime Minister and I do have faith in his assurances. We do believe that India will not allow the racist Sri Lankan State to take once again to the road of genocide against the Tamils. It is only out of this faith that we decided to hand over our weapons to the Indian peace keeping force." It must be remembered that political changes which occurred in India
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STATE THROTJGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
thereafter had brought a new Government under the leadership of V.P. Singh as Prime Minister in 1989. The IPKF inducted into Sri Lanka was gradually withdrawn in a phased manner, which process was commenced during the Prime Ministership of Rajiv Gandhi himself and continued during the Prime Ministership of V.P. Singh. The attitude of LTTE towards Government of India, during the aforesaid period, can be seen from what their own official publication "Voice of Tigers" had declared in its editorial column in the issue of the said journal dated 19-1-1990 (which is marked as Ext. 362). The editorial reads as follows: "In the meantime, the defeat of Raj iv Congress Party and the assumption to power of the National Front alliance under Vishwanath Pratap Singh has given rise to a sense of relief and hope to the people of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE has already indicated to the new Indian Government its desire to improve and consolidate friendly ties with India. The new Indian leadership responded positively according to Mr. Karunanidhi, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, the role and responsibility of mediating with the Tamil Tigers. The L TIE representatives who had four rounds of talks with the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister in Madras, are firmly convinced that the Tamil Nadu Governmertt and the new Indain administration are favourably disposed to them and the V.P. Singh's government will act in the interests of the Tamil speaking people by creating appropriate conditions for the LTTE to come to political power in the North-Eastern Province."
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The above editorial is a strong piece of material for showing that LTTE till then did not contemplate any action to overawe the Government of India. Of course the top layer of LTIE did not conceal their ire against Raj iv Gandhi who was then out of power. In this context it is important to point out what Veluppillai Piribhakaran, who went underground in Sri Lanka and resurfaced on 1-4-1990 after a period of 32 months of disappearance had said. (The news about his reemergence was published in the newspaper-a copy of which had been marked as Ext. 363). The LTTE supremo had told the newsmen then as follows: "We are not against India the Indian people but against the former leadership in India who is against the Tamil liberation struggle and the LTIE." Nothing else is proved in the case either from the utterances of the top brass LTTE or from any writings edited by them that anyone to them wanted to strike fear in the Government either of Centre or of any State.
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From the aforesaid circumstances it is difficult for us to conclude that the conspirators intended, at any time, to overawe the Government of India as by law established. Nor can we hold that the conspirators ever entertained an intention to strike terror in people or any section thereof. The mere fact that their action resulted in the killing of 18 persons which would have struck great terror in the people of India has been projected as evidence that they intended to strike terror in people. We have no doubt that the aftermath to the carnage at Sriperumpudur 'had bubbled up waves of shock and terror throughout India. But there is absolutely no evidence that any one of the conspirators ever desired the death of any Indian other than Rajiv Gandhi. Among the series of confessions made by a record number of accused in any single case, as in this case, not even one of them has stated that anybody had the desire or intention to murder one more person along with Rajiv Gandhi except perhaps the murderer herself. Of course they should have anticipated that in such a dastardly action more lives would be vulnerable to peril. But that is a different matter and we cannot attribute an intention of the conspirators to kill anyone other than Rajiv Gandhi and the contemporaneous destruction of the killer also.
Alternatively, even if Sivarasan and the top brass of LTTE knew that . there was likelihood of more casualties that cannot be equated to a situation E that they did it with an intention to strike terror in any section of the people
In view of the paucity of materials to prove that the conspirators intended to overawe the Government of India or to strike terror in the people of India we are unable to sustain the conviction of offences under Section 3 of TADA. The next endearvour is to see whether the conspirators did any "disruptive activities" so as to be caught in the dragnet or Section 4(1) of TADA. The sub-section reads:
"Whoever commits:. or conspires or attempts to commit or abets, advocates, advises, or knowingly facilitates the commission of, any disruptive activity or any act preparatory to a disruptive activity shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine."
"Disruptive activity" is defined in sub-section (2). It is extracted below:
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.)
"For the purposes fo sub-section (1), 'disruptive activity' means any action taken, whether by act or by speech or through any other media or in any other manner whatsoever,(i) which questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India; or
(ii) which is intended to bring about or supports any claim, whether directly or indirectly, for the cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India from the Union." ...,
An attempt was made to briri~ the case within the ambit of sub-section (3) of Section 4 of TADA on the strength of the assassination ofRajiv Gandhi and also on the strength of death of a number of police personnel at Sriperumpudur on the fateful night. Sub-section (3) reads thus: "Without prejudice to the generality to the provisions of sub-section (2), it is hereby declared that any action taken, whether by act or by speech or through any other media or in any other manner whatsoever, which-
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(a) advocates, advises, suggests or incites; or (b) predicts, prophesies or pronounces or otherwise expresses, in such manner as to incite, advise, suggest or prompt, the killing or the destruction of any person bound by oath w1der the Constitution to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India or any public servant shall be deemed to be a disruptive activity within the meaning of this section." The killing of a public servant or killing or any other person bound by oath would be an offence under the Indian Penal Code. But it must be noted that such killing, as such, is not a disruptive activity. Certain type of actions which preceded such killing alone is regarded as a disruptive activity through the legal fiction created by sub-section (3). Such actions include advocating, advising, suggesting, inciting, predicting, prophesying, pronouncing or prompting the killing of such persons. In other words, all the preceding actions directed positively towards killing of such persons would amount to disruptive activity, but not the final result namely, the act of killing of such person.
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[I 999'] ~ S.C.R.
If there is any evidence, in this case, to show tha.t ~ny sµch preceding act was perpetrated by any of the appellants towards killing o~,a~y police officer who was killed at the place of occurrence it would, no douot; amount to disruptive activity. But there is no such evidence that any such activity was done for the purpose of killing any police personnel.
However, there is plethora of evidence for establishing that all such preceding activities were done by many among the accused .arrayed, for killing Rajiv Gandhi. But unfortunately Rajiv Gandhi was not then "a person bound by oath under the Constitution to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India". Even the Lok Sabha stood dissolved months prior to this incident and hence it cannot be found .that he was under an oath as a Member of Parliament.
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The inevitable fall out of the above situation is that none of the conspirators can be caught in the dragnet of sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the TADA.
What remains to be considered for Section 4(1) of TADA is whether any disruptive activity falling within the ambit of the definition in subsection (2) has been established. The attempt which prosecution has made in that regard, is to show that the conspirators intended to disrupt the sovereignty of India. To support the said contention, our attention was drawn to the confessional statement of A-3 (Murugan), A-18 (Arivu) and the photographs proved as M.Os.256 to 259 which were seized from the bag of A-3 (Murugan). The said items of evidence show that photos of Fort st. George, Madras (Which houses the Government Secretariat of Tamil Nadu and the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council), Police Headquarters, Central Jail within Vellore Fort etc. had been taken and despatched to the LTTE top brass of Sri Lanka. It is too much a strain to enter a finding, on such evidence, that the above activities were unmistakably aimed at disrupting the soverignty of India. The sketch of Vellore Fort (Which houses the Central Jail) was drawn up, most probably, for planning some operation to rescue the prisoners (belonging to LTTE who have been interned therein). That of course would be an offence but not an activity which falls within the purview of Section 4 of TADA.
We are, therefore, unable to sustain the conviction of appellants for offences under section 3 or 4 of TADA.
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STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [TH,OMAS, J.]
Now we have to proceed to consider whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the remaining offences found against the appellants.
We may put on record the following concessions made by the learned counsel for all the appellants at the Bar : (I) Prosecution has successfully established that Rajiv Gandhi was B assassinated at 10.19 P.M. on 21-5-1991 at Sriperumpudur by a girl named Thanu who became a human bomb and got hllrself exploded in the same · event; and that altogether 18 persons, including the above two, died in the said explosion.
(II) There is overwhelming evidence to show that assassination of Raj iv Gandhi was resulted from a conspiracy to finish him. (III) It is also established by the prosecution beyond doubt that Sivarasan @ Raghuvaran who was a top brass of LTTE was one of the kingpins of the said conspiracy.
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We may also record at this stage that the two points which are seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants are the following: (1) Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was not the only focal point of the conspiracy. (2) Appellants wee participants in the conspiracy.
In other words, the defence contended that the conspiracy was made only to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi and that none of the appellants had participated in the conspiracy.
/
For deciding the aforesaid major area of dispute, prosecution heavily relies on the statement allegedly made by a number of appellants and recorded purportedly under Section 15 of TADA. (Such statements will, hereinafter, be referred to, for convenience, as confessional statements of the accused). Such confessional statements were recorded by the Superintendent of Police, CBI/ SPG who was deputed in the Special Team of Investigation. Every one of such confessional statements has been signed by the pen.on who is shown as the maker thereof. Such confessional statement consists of inculpatory admissions, narrations which are neither inculpatory nor exculpatory, and incriminating roles attributed to other co-accused. It was not disputed before us that all such confessional statements, if duly recorded, are admissible in evidence in view of Section 15 of TADA. It is necessary to extract that Section which reads thus:
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
"15. Certain confessions made to police officers to be taken into consideration.-{!) Notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the Indian J;vidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), but subject to the provisions of this sectiqn, a confession made by a person before a police officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police officer either in writing or on any mechanical device like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which sounds or images can be reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial of such person (or co-accused, abettor or conspirator) for an offence under this Act or rules made thereunder.
(Provided that co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and tried in the same case together with the accused). (2) The police officer shall, before recording any confession under subsection (1), explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him and such police officer shall not record any such confession unless upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily. Learned counsel for the defence made a bid to exclude the confessional statements from the purview of admissibility in this case on the premise that no offence under TADA could be found against any of the accused and hence the confessional statements would wiggle into the ban of inadmissibility and consequently it cannot be used for offences outside TADA.To butteress up the said contention, learned counsel invited our attention to the following observations made by a two-Judge Be~ch of this Court in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State ofA.P., [1997] 7 SCC 431 : "While dealing with the offences of which the appellant was convicted there is no question of looking into the confessional statement attributed to him, much less relying on it since he was acquitted of all offences under TADA. Any confession made to a police officer is inadmissible in evidence as for these offences and hence it is fairly conceded that the said ban would not wane off in respect of offences under the Penal Code merely because the trial was held by the Designated Court for offences under TADA as well. Hence the case against him would stand or fall depending on the other evidence." Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the above observations do not lay down the correct proposition of law and
ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI (,THOMAS, J.]
it requires reconsideration, more so because the two-Judge Bench did not advert to Section 12 of TADA.That apart, the Bench adopted that view partly because the counsel for respondents in that case had conceded to said position. We are inclined fo consider the position afresh. Section 12 of the TADA enables the Designated Court to jointly try, at the same trial, any offence under TADA together with any other offence "with which the accused may be charged" as per the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (2) thereof empowers the Designated Court to convict the accused, in such a trial, of any offence "under any other law" if it is found by such Designated Court in such trial that the accused is found guilty of such offence. If the accused is acquitted of the offences under TADA in such a trial, but conviGted of the offence under any other law it does not mean that there was only a trial for such other offence under any other law. Section 15 of the TADA enables the confessional statement of an accused made to a police officer specified therein to become admissible "in the trial of such a person". It means, if there was a trial of any offence. under TADA together with any other offence under any other law, the admissibility of the confessional statement would continue to hold good even if the accused is acquitted under TADA offences. The aforesaid implications of Section 12 vis-a-vis Section 15 of TADA have not been acfv~rted to in Bilal Ahmed's case (supra). Hence the observations therein that "while dealing with the offences of which the appellant was convicted there is no question of looking into the confessional statement attributed to him, much Jess relying on it, since he was acquitted of the offences under TADA" cannot be followed by us. The correct position is that the confessional statement duly recorded under Section 15 of TADA would continue to remain admissible as for the other offences under any other law which too were tried along withTADA offences, no matter that the accused was acquitted of offences under TADA in that. trial. While it is not disputed that a duly recorded confessional statement is substantive evidence in a trial of offences under TADA as against the maker thereof, learned counsel for the defence contended that its use against the co-accused (which was tried in the same case) is only for a limited purpose, i.e. to be used for corroborating other evidence. In support of the contention learned counsel relied on the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Kalpanth Rai v. State, [ 1997] 8 SCC 732. The ratio of that decision, on this . point, is that "a confession made admissible under Section 15 of TADA can
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A be used as against a co-accused only in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as stipulated in Section 30 of the Evidence Act."
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Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General pleaded for reconsideration of the aforesaid legal position adumberated in the said decision and contended that the non obstante limb in Section 15{1) of TADA ("notwithstanding anything in the Code or Indian Evidence Act") is a clear legislative indicator to permit a confession made by an accused against a coaccused to be used with the same force as it can be used against the confessor himself. He further contended that the positio1,1 became clearer after the sub-section was amended by Act 43 of 1993. We shall first examine whether the amendment as per Act 43of1993 has improved the position from the pre-amendment position. Before the amendment sub-section {l) of Section 15 read thus : "15. Certain confessions made to police officers to be taken into
D consideration.-(!) Notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), but subject to the provisions of this section, a confession made b:w.tt person before a police officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police officer either in writing or on any mechanical device like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which sounds or images can be reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial of such person for an offence under this Act or rules made thereunder."
After the amendment in 1993 the sub-section reads in the present form (which has been extracted supra). The main changes in the sub~ction, after ' the 1lmendment, are addition of the words "or co-accused, abettor or F conspirator", lmd insertion of a new proviso to the sub-secti?n as "Provided that co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and tried in the same case together with the accused." In this case we may refer to another provision in TADA (Sec. 21) which
G also underwent much changes as per the same amending Act. That provision has a perceptible bearing on Section 15(1) of TADA. That provision, in specific terms, empowered the Designated Court to draw certain presumptions. Section 21 (1 ), as it stood before 1993 amendment, read thus : -
"21. Presumption as to offences_ under Section 3.-{l) In a prosecution for an, offence under sub-section (1) of Section 3; if it is proved-
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
(a) that the arms or explosives or any other substances specified in Section 3 were recovered from the possession of the accused. and there is reason to believe that such arms or explosives or other substances of a similar nature, were used in the commission of such offence; or
(b) that by the evidence of an expert the finger prints of the accused were found at the site of the offence or on anything including arms and B vehicles, used in connection with the commission of such offence; or
(c) that a confession has been made by a co-acused that the accused had committed the offence; or , (d) that the accused had made a confession of the offence to any C person other than a police officer, the Designated Court shall pre~ume, unless the contrary is proved, that the accused had committed such offence." Act 43 of 1993 has snipped out clause (c) which contained the words "that a confession has been made by a co-accused that the accused had committed the offence" and clause (d) which contained the words "that the D accused had made a confession of the offence to any person other than a police officer" of Section 21 (1 ). No doubt, the amendment carried out in Section 15(1) and in Section 21 (1) was in one package. It was done with a definite purpose. Before 'E amendment the De~nated Court had a duty to presume tb4tt an accused had committed the offence if his co-accused had, in a confession, involved the former. The words "shallpresume" in Section 21 (1) denoted that it was the duty of the court to draw such presuqi.ption. (See Section 4 of the Evidence Act).
This means, the court should have· treated the confession of one accused ·as against a co-accused to be substantive evidence against the latter, and in the absence of proof to the contrary, the Designated Court would have full power to base a conviction of the co-accused upon the confession made by another accused. ·
But the amendment of 1993 has completely wiped out the said presumption against a co-accused from the statute book. In other words, after the amendment a Designated Court could not do what it could have done before the amendment with the confession of one accused against a coaccused. Parliament has taken away: such emppwerm~nt. Then what is it that H
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
Parliament did by adding the words in Section 15(1) and by inserting the proviso. After the amendment the Designated Court could use the confession of one accused against another accused only if two conditions are fulfilled: (1) The co-accused should have been charged in the same case along with the confessor. (2) He should have been tried together with the confessor in the same case. Before amendment the Designated Court had no such restriction as the confession of an accused could have been used against a co-accused whether or not the latter was charged orrtried together with the confessor.
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Thus the amendemnt in 1993 was a clear climbing down from a draconian legislative fiarwhich was in the field of operation prior to the amendment in so far as the use of one confession against another accused was concerned. The contention that the amendment in 1993 was intended to make the position more rigorous as for a co-accused i~, therefore, untenable.
While considering the effect of the non-obstante limb we can see that Section 15(1) of TADA was given protection from any contrary provision in the Evidence Act. B!Jt what is it that Parliament did through Section 15(1) regarding a confession made_ to a police officer? It has only made such confession "admissible" in the trial of such person or the co-accused etc.
There are provisions in the Indian Evidence Act which prohibited admissibility of certain confessions, e.g. Section 25 of the Evidence Act prohibited proving any confession made by an accused to a police officer. Section 26 prohibted proving any confesson made by an accused to any person while that accused was in the custody of police. Section 27 permitted only a very limited part of the information supplied by the accused to a police officer, whether it amounts to a confession or not. What Section 15(1) of TADA has done was to remove the said ban against admissibiliiy of confessions made to police o_fficer and brought it on a par with any other admissible confessions under the Evidence Act. A confession made to a magistrate is admissible under the Evidence Act, and a confession made oy an accused to any person other than a police officer, ifthe accused was not in polfce·,~Jistody, is also admissible under the Evidence Act. The upshot of the above discussion is that the effect of the non obstante clause, when read with the words "shall be admiss;ble in the trial of such person or a co-accused or abettor or conspirator" would only mean that the confession made to a polic( officer under Section 15(1) shall also
STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
become a confession like other admissible confessions under the Evidence Act. But it was not even in the legislative contemplation of Parliament to elevate a confession made to a police officer to a status even higher than a judicial confession recorded by a magistrate. What is the evide11tiary value of a confession made by one accused as against another accused apart from Section 30 of the Evidence Act? While considering that aspect we have to bear in mind that any confession when it is sought to be used against another has certain inherent weaknesses. First is, it is the statement of a person who claims himself to be an offender, which means, it is the version of an accomplice. Second is, the truth of it cannot be tested by cross-examination. Third is, it is not an item of evidence given on oath. Fourth is, the confession was made in the absence of the co-accused against whom it is sought to be used. It is .well-nigh settled, due to the aforesaid we!lknesses, that confession of a co-accused is a weak type of evidence. A confession can be used as a relevant evidence against its maker because Section 21 of the Evidence Act permits it under certain conditions. But there is no provision which enables a confession to be used as relevant evidence against another person. It is only Section 30 of the Evidence Act which, at least, permits the court to consider such a confession as against another person under the conditions prescribed therein. If Section 30 was absent in the Evidence Act no confession could ever have been used for any purpose as against anothP.r co-accused until it is sanctioned by other statute. So, if Section 30 of the Evidence Act is also to be excluded by virtue of the non obstante clause contained in Section 15(1) of TADA, under what provision a confession of one accused could be used against another co-accused at all? It must be remembered that Section 15(1) of TADA does not say that a confession can be used against a co-accused. It only says that a confession would be admissible in a trial of not only the maker thereof but a co-accused, abettor or conspirator tried in the same case.
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Sir John Beaumont speaking for five law lords of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR (1949) PC 257 had made the following observations: "Section 30 seems to be based on the view that an admission by an accused person of his own guilt affords some sort of sanction in support of the truth of his confession against others as well as himself. But a confession
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[1999] 3 S.C.R.
of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come. within the definition of '.evidence' contained in s. 3, Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of ~n approver which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the Court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case: it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence." (Para 9) The above observations had since been treated as the approved and established position regarding confession vis-a-vis another co-accused. Vivian Bose, J. speaking for a Three-Judge Bench in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952] SCR 526 had reiterated the same principle afer quoting the aforesaid observations. A Constitution Bench of this Court has followd it in Hari Charan Kurmi andJogia Hajam v. State ofBihar, (1964] 6 SCR623. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) has stated the legal principle thus: "The point of significance is that when the Court deals with the evidence by an accomplice, the Court may treat the said evidence as substantive evidence and enquire whether it is materially corroborated or not. The testimony of the accomplice is evidence under s. 3 of the Act and ~as to be dealt with as such. It is no doubt evidence of a tainted character and as such, is very weak; but, nevertheless, it is evident and may be acted upon, subject to the requirement which has now become virtually a part of the law that it is corroborated in material particulars. The statements contained in the confessions of the co-accused persons stand on a different footing. In cases where such confessions are relied upon by the prosecution against an accused person, the Court cannot begin with the examination of the said statements. The stage to consider the said confessional statements arrives only after the other evidence is considered and found to be satisfactory. The difference in the approach which the Court has to adopt in dealing with these two types of evidence is thus clear, well-understood and well established."
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Thus the established position which gained ground for a very long time is that while a confession is substantive evidence against its maker it cannot be used as substantive evidence against another person even if the iatter is
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STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
a co-acused, but it can be used as a piece of corroborative material to support other substantive evidence. The non obstante words in Section 15(1) of TADA are not intended to make it substantive evidence against the nonmaker, particularly after amendments were brought about in the sub-s~ction through Act 43 of 1993. Having set the legal position thus, we have now to consider the legal evidence to see whether prosecution has proved the disputed points.
The prime aim of the conspiracy, in this case, was to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. The stand of the prosecution is that the Sri Lanka-India Accord (signed on 27-7-1987) was resented against by the LTTE top brass for C reasons more than one. The acrimony was further fomented up with the LTTE repressives heapen up by the IPKF. The editorials published in the "Voice of Tigers" (the main publication ofLTTE) and the articles reproduced in the compilation made under the nomenclature "Satanic Force" were replete with vituperative epithets expressed by LTTE activists against the said Accord and the actions which IPKF did against them. Rajiv Gandhi was D not spared from the vitriolic onslaughts made through such publications. PW-75 (Basant Kumar) said that he was assigned with the work of preparing "Satanic Force'', by LTIE top brass Veluppillai Piribhakaran, Pottu Omman and another person called Balasingam, containing strong criticism against IPKF and Rajiv Gandhi. PW-75 (Basant Kumar) accepted the work on payment of Rs. 2000/- per month. We have pointed out earlier that LITE was very much concerned about the general elections to the Lok Sabha in the year 1991. They felt that ifRajiv Gandhi came back to power, IPKF would again go to Sri Lanka which means lot more attrocities heaped upon LTIEs and the goal "Tamil Ee lam" would again elude like a mirage. In all probabilities a criminal intent to kill Rajiv Gandhi would have sprouted in the minds of LTTE top brass at the afore-mentioned stage. There is not even a speck of doubt in our mind that the criminal conspiracy to murder Rajiv Gandhi was hatched by at least 4 persons comprising of Veluppillai piribhakaran, Pottu Omman, Sivarasan and Akila. It could have been the scheme of the conspirators to enlist more persons in the field for the successful implementation of their targets.
We have no doubt from the circumstantial evidence in this case, that Thanu, the girl who transformed into a human bomb, and her friend Suba were ·H
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A unflinchingly committed corr.man dos of LTTE and they were also brought into
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the conspiracy ring by the top brass of LTTE. Circumstances proved in this case regarding the aforesaid core points are too many. However, we are spared from the task of enumerating all such circumstances as learned counsel for the accused have fairly conceded about the sufficiency of circumstances which have been proved in this case to establish the aforesaid points. Learned counsel for the appellants have focussed their attack on the indictment against individual accused. They endeavoured to show that none of the appellants was involved in the criminal conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. Hence that is the most disputed point in this case. Before proceeding to discuss the evidence, we have to deal with yet another legal point convassed by Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General, regarding the amplitude of Section I 0 of the Evidence Act. Such a decision is necessary to decide what exactly is the evidence of conspiracy. Learned Additional Solicitor General contended that the width of the provision is so large as to render any statement made by a conspirator as substantive evidence if it has succeded in conforming with the other conditions of the .Section. Such a contention became necessary for him to bring the confessional statement of one conspirator against another conspirator as substantive evidence if there is any legal hurdle in doing so under Section 15 of TADA, as we have already found that confession of one accused is not substantive evidence value. Section 10 of the Evidence Act, can, in this context, be extracted below :
"Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design.Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it."
The first condition which is almost the opening lock of that provision is the existence of "reasonable ground to believe" that the conspirators have conspired together. This condition will be satisfied even when there is some prima facie evidence to show that there was such a criminal conspiracy. If the
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ST ATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
aforesaid preliminary condition is fulfilled then anything said by one of the conspirators becomes substantive evidence against the other, provided that should have been a statement "in reference to their common intention". Under the corresponding provision in the English Law the expression used is "in furtherance of the common object". No doubt, the words "in reference to their com::non intention" are wider than the words used in English Law, (vide Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, [1964] 2 SCR 378.
But the contention that any statement of a conspirator, whatever be the extent of time, would gain admissibility under Section 10 if it was made "in reference" to the common intention, is too broad a proposition for acceptance. We cannot overlook that the basic principle which underlies in Section 10 C of the Evidence Act is the theory of agency. Every conspirator is an agent of his associate in carrying out the object of the conspiracy.' Section l 0, which is an exception to the general rule, while permitting the statement made by one conspirator to be admissible as against another conspirator restricts it to the statement made during the period when the agency subsisted. Once it is shown that a person became snapped out of the conspiracy, any D statement made subsequent thereto cannot be used as against the other conspirators under Section 10. Way back in 1940, the Privy Council has considered this aspect and Lord Wright, speaking for Viscount Maugham and Sir George Rankin in Mirza Akbar v. King-Emperor, AIR (1940) PC 176 has stated the legal position thus:"The words 'common intention' signify a common intention existing at the time when the thing was said, done or written by one of them. Things said, done or written while the conspiracy was on foot are relevant as evidence of the common intention, once reasonable ground has been shown to believe in its existence. But it would be a very different matter to hold that any narrative or slatement or confession made to a third party after the common intention or conspiracy was no longer operating and had ceased to exist is admissible against the other party."
(Page 180) In Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. The State of Bombay, [1958] SCR 161 a Three-Judge Bench has reiterated that the rule of agency is the founding principle of Section 10 of the Evidence Act. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in State ofGujarat v. Mohammed Atik and ors., [1998] 4 SCC 351 has followed
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1999] 3 S.C.R.
A ,the said position and held thus :-
"It is well-nigh settled that Section IO of the Evidence Act is founded on the principle of law of agency by rendering the statement or act of one conspirator binding on the other if it was said during subsistence of the common intention as between the conspirators. If so, once the common intention ceased to exist any statement made by a former conspirator thereafter cannot be regarded as one made 'in reference to their common intention'."
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(Para 14)
C
Whether a particular accused had ceased to be a conspirator or not, at any point of time, is a matter which can be decided on the facts of that particular case. Normally a conspirator's connection with the conspiracy would get snapped after he is nabbed by the police and kept in their custody because he would thereby cease to be the agent of the other conspirators. Of course we are not unmindful of rare c~ses in which a conspirat~r would continue to confabulate with the other conspirators and persists with the conspiracy even after his arrest. That is precisely the reason why we said that it may not be possible to lay down a proposition of law that one conspirator's connection with the conspiracy would necessarily be cut off with his arrest. In this case, prosecution could not establish that the accused who were arrested, continued to conspire with those conspirators remaining outside. Prosecution cannot contend that the confession made by one accused in this case can be substantiv~ evidence against another accused under Section l 0 of the Evidence Act. At any rate we cannot uphold the contention that confessions made by an accused can be used as substantive evid~nce against the another co-accused on the principle enunciated in Section l 0 of the Evidence Act. The conclusion on the above score is that confessional statement made by an accused after his arrest, if admissible and reliable, can be used against a confessor as substantive evidence, but its use against the other co-accused would be limited only for the purpose of corroboration of other evidence. THE CASE AGAINST A-1 (NALINJ) :
A-1 (Nalini) is the sole surviving conspirator who participated in the assassination, if the prosecution case is correct. The principal item of evidence available in this case is her own confessional statement (Ext. P-77) recorded
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STATE THROUGHSJ3I v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
on 9.8.1991. (She was arrested on 14.6.1991). She was aged 27 during the relevant period and has passed M.A. degree. She is the daughter of another co-accused (A2 l - Padma) and sister of yet another co-accused (A20 Bhagyanathan). She had fallen in love with one Murugan (who is accused No. 3) during the period of conspiracy and it is claimed that their marriage was solemnised on 21.4.1991 (within 9 months thereof she gave birth to a female child). She was working as Private Secretary to the Managing Director of a private company - M/s Anabante Silicons.
The evidence in this case shows that A-1 (Nalini) much before her marriage quarrelled with her mother and brother and shifted her residence to No. 11, High Court Colony, Villivakkom, Madras. It was during the said time C that A-3 (Murugan) got acquainted with her and gradully the familiarity grew into a love affair between them. A-3 (Murugan) was a committed LTTE member. In April 1991, A-1 (Nalini) came into contact with Sivarasan. Ext. P-77 confessional statement contains the following facts as to have been stated by A-1 (Nalini): When she was contemplating with the idea of vacating the house at Villivakkom she was dissuaded from doing so by A3 (Murugan) as Sivarasan was expected to bring two girls from Sri Lanka. On 2.5.1991 Sivarasan brought those two girls (Suba and Thanu) to her house. Her mind changing process started thereafter as Murugan, Suba and Thanu were narrating various acts of atrocities which IPKF heaped on LTTE followers in Sri Lanka. Suba told Nalini of a horrendous story of how 7 little girls were raped and killed by the soldiers of IPKF. She was made to believe that Rajiv Gandhi was the person responsible for all such atrocities. She developed vengeful attitude towards Rajiv Gandhi and she too agreed to retaliate. She realised that the two girls were brought for the purpose 0f carrying out a very dangerous retaliatory step. Sivarasan had told Nalini to play the role of a chaperone to Suba and Thanu wherever they went. In Ext. P-77, A-1 (Nalini) is alleged to have further stated that on 7.5.1991 she took Suba and Thanu, under the instructions of Sivarasan to Nandavanom (Madras) where V.P. Singh (a former Prime Minister) was addressing a meeting. Suba and Thanu tried to garland V.P. Singh. Later Sivarasan scolded A-1 (Nalini) for not taking the girls to the rostrum. It was then that Nalini realised as to how the murder was planned to be perpetrated. In the confessional statement A-1 (Nalini) is alleged to have stated that on 11-5-1991 she chaperoned Suba and Thanu to a readymade garment shop
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[1999) 3 S.C.R.
at Puruswakkom (Madras) and bought a choorider suit (orange and green coloured) and a dupatta ..On 17-5-1991, Sivarasan told her ofRajiv Gandhi's Tamil Nadu programme and asked her to attend one of the meetings. She confessed in her statement (Ext. P-77) that by then it was certain for her that Rajiv Gandhi was going to be killed. Sivarasan collected the details of the topography of Sriperumpudur from her and warned her not to divulge the contents of that conversation to any one else. She was instructed to take leave from her office on 21 May, 1991 under some false pretext. She had narrated in the confessional statement the events which happened on the day of assassination and also on its preceding day. According to her, Sivarasan met her on 20-5-1991at6.00 P.M. and told her that the venue of the metting was at Sriperumpudur, and she should fake half day casual leave and not more and that she should made herself available in the house at 3.00 P.M. on the next day for being picked up for escorting Suba and Thanu. On 21st May, 1991 Nalini took half a day's leave and she went to her mother's house at Roypetta (Madras) where A-3 (Murugan) was waiting who told her to hurry up lest Sivarasan would be annoyed. So she reached her house at about 3.00 P.M. A little while thereafter Sivarasan reached the same house with Suba and Thanu. According to her, Thanu was then wearing an orange/green coloured chooridar and was hiding something in her dress. Suba told Nalini that Thanu was going to create history by murdering Rajiv Gandhi. At 4.00 P.M. Nalini took Suba and Thanu to the bus stop. On the way Haribabu also joined them. He had a garland with him. It is further stated in Ext. P-77 that A-1 (Nalini) along with Suba, Thanu, Haribabu and Sivarasan reached the place of occurrence at 7.30 P.M. They stopped at the spot where there was a statue of Indira Gandhi. Sivarasan gave instructions to A-I (Nalini) about the role to be performed by her just before and after the murder, if successful. By following the said instructions she along with Suba ran across Indira Gandhi statue and waited for Sivarasan. Within a few minutes Sivarasan rushed to them and said Rajiv Gandhi and Thanu died and Haribabu also died. Sivarasan gave Nalini a pistol which she handed over to Suba. They hurriedly left the place and on the way got some water to drink from a roadside house and then they went in an auto-rickshaw and reached Kodingyoor at 1.30 A.M. in the night.
The rest of the confessional statement (in Ext. P-77) relates to the hectic movements made by her in association with other accused. It is further recorded therein that on 13-6-1991, A-1 (Nalini) and A-3 (Murugan) went to
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STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS, J.]
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Davangers (in Karanataka) and stayed in the house of Shashikala (PW-132). A-1 (Nalini) told Shashikala of what all happened regarding Raj iv Gandhi's murder. The above were the statements said to have been made by A-1 (Nalini) in Ext. P-77. The Designated Court acted on the said confessional statement as valid and proved and reliable.
A three-fold attack was made against Ext. P-77 by Sri N. Natarajan, learned senior counsel for the accused. First is that the confession was not signed as provided in Rule 15 of the TADA Rules, 1987. Second is that it was not certified as required by the Rules. Third is that the confession was C extracted by coercive methods and is therefore unreliable. Rule 15(3) says that the confession shall be signed by its maker and also the police officer who recorded it. Further, the police officer "shall certify under his own hand that such confession was taken in his presence and recorded by him and that the record contains a full and true account of the confession made by the person". Ext. P-77 was recorded in as many as 18 pages. All the first 16 pages contain the signatures of A-1 (Nalini) but the last two pages don't have the signatures. The ·requirement that confessional statement shall be signed by the maker has been substantially complied with despite the slip in obtaining the signatures in the last two pages. According to PW-52 - the Superintendent of Police who recorded it, the said slip was an inadvertant omission. But that omission does pot mean that a confession was not signed by her at all. The certificate which is required by Rule 15(3) has also been made at the foot of Ext.P-77, but that happened to be made on one of the two pages where the signature of A- I is absent. On the facts we are not persuaded to uphold the contention that Rule 15(3) has not been complied with. That apart, even if there was such an omission the question is whether it would have injured the accused in her defence. Section 463 of the Code permits such an approach to be made in regard to the omissions in recording the confession under Section 164 of the Code. That approach can be adopted in respect of the confession recorded under Section 15 of the TADA as well. The resultant position is that the said omission need not be countenanced since it was not shown that the omission has caused any harm to the a-::cused.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1999] 3 S.C.R.
The contention that the confession was extracted by coercive methods is not supported by any material. We may point out that when A-1 (Nalini) was produced before the Judicial Magistrate soon after recording the confession she did not even express any complaint regarding the conduct of any personnel of the Special Investigation Team. Ext.P-77 has in fact, reached the Judicial Magistrate on the next day itself and thereafter was kept under sealed cover.
The confessional statement of A-1 (Nalini) in Ext.P-77, according to Shri Altaf Ahmad learned Additional Solicitor General, is corrorborated by other substantive evidence and also by the confessional statements made by a C number of other accused in this case. PW-132 (Shashikala) who is a teacher said that she got acquainted with A-1 in 1990 and A-I visited her in the school when she was teaching, on 13-6-1991. Then A-3 (Murugan) was also with her. A-I (Nalini) introduced A-3 (Murugan) as her brother by name -Das. PW-132 further stated that when they (three Persons) went to her house Al told her that her husband, a Sri Lankan citizen, had brought two girls to D Madras. PW-132 has also stated in her evidence that Nalini told her that it was she who took those girls to the meeting place at Sriperumpudur where Rajiv Gandhi came and in the incident which happened there, one of the girls died. P\V-132, on hearing the said news, became frightened. Then both A-1 and A-3 implored her not to disclose it to anybody else.
'fh,~ aforesaid evidence of PW-132 - a teacher, was fully believed by the trial jt;di;e. We have no reason to take a different view on that evidence. Its corrol •orative value is unassailable because A-1 herself admitted in her confe.>sional statement that she made such a disclosure to PW-132.
Another item of corroborative evidence is M.0.144 Video Cassette. (It was viewed on the video in the trial court as well as by us in the Supreme Court). It was the video cassette of the meeting held at Nandavanam (Madras) in the early hours of 18-5-1991 which was addressed by V.P. Singh PW-93 (Suyambu) said in his evidence that he attended the said meeting. When he was shown the video cassette replayed in the court he identified Sivarasan who was sitting at the meeting place, just left to the said witness. It was videographed by PW-18 (Manivanam) as instructed by PW-77 (Ganani). PW77 also identified Sivarasan in the video. We have noticed the presence of A-1 (Nalini) in the meeting when M.O. 144 was displayed in the Court, with the help of a photograph in which A-1 's figure could be discerned by us and admitted by the defence counsel to be correct.
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STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI [THOMAS. J.]
On the next day of the said meeting, i.e. 9th May, two letters were sent by Suba and Thanu jointly to Sri Lanka, one to Pottu Omman and the other to Akila. They are Ext. P-96 and Ext.P-95 respectively. Prosecution has proved that they were the letters written by the aforesaid two girls. We do not deem it necessary to refer to all the materials made available to prove the authorship of those letters because they are no more.
In Ext.P-96, the girls wrote to Pottu Omman "we are confident that we would be successful in co1~pleting the job for which w~ came as we expect a similar opportunity .... :..." In Ext. P-95 they wrote to Akila like this: "we are confident that the work for which we came would be finished promptly as we are expecting another appropriate opportunity ............ It would be C implemented during this month itself ......... Every word which you (Akila) had said to us would remain in our mind till last." The aforesaid telling circumstances confirm the truth of what A-1 has divulged in Ext.P-77. PW-179 (Gunathilal Soni) said in his evidence that he was manager of a retail textile shop called "Queen Comer" at Puruswakkom and that on 115-1991, a chooridar (with orange and green colours) was sold to three ladies one of whom was A-1 (Nalini). From the photograph shown to the witness he identified the other lac.;y as Thanu. The Cash Book which he maintained was marked as Ext. P-899 and the copy of the Bill for the said chooridar was marked as Ext.P-900. It could be argued that it was not possible for any textile retail seller to identify the person who had purchased the good only once. That may be so. But here PW-179 gave one reason for remembering A-1 (Nalini) and the girls, that they insisted on quick delivery of the stitched goods on the same day itself and then PW-179 took measurements of Thanu. Within a few days the witness saw the photo of Thanu in newspapers wearing the chooridar of that colour. That apart, the investigating officer could trace out PW-179 only because A-1 (Nalini) told him of the place wherefrom the chooridar was purchased. That portion was admitted in evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The cumulative effect is that the testimony of PW-179 can be treated as true evidence. It is a highly corroborating material.
PW-96 (Sujaya Narayan) was an officer in Mis. Anaband Silicon Private Ltd. where A-1 (Nalini) was working as Private Secretary to the Managing Director. He gave evidence that A-1 (Nalini) took half a days leave on 21-5-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1999) 3 S.C.R.
A 1991 saying that she wanted to go to Kanchipuram to purchase sarees and left office by 12 noon.
C
One of the most striking corroborative evidence for A-1 's confession regarding her participation in the assassinatiol\ scene of Rajiv Gandhi is the testimony of PW-32 (Anusuya). She is a woman Sub-Inspector who was deputed to do duty at the venue of the meeting to be addressed by Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumpudur. She was one of the injured in the bomb blast. Nobody can dispute that she was on duty because she had come in the photo M.0.33. It was taken just before the occurrence. Pointing out Thanu in the photograph PW-32 (Anusuya) said in her evidence that she was found moving with two male persons at the scene of occurrence before the arrival of Raj iv Gandhi. One of them, on being questioned by PW-32, claimed to be a press photographer (it is with reference to Haribabu). The witness identified the other person as Sivarasan. PW-32 identified A-1 Nalini (who was present in the trial court) as one of the ladies who attended the meeting place. She identified A- I from the photograph when M.0.32 photograph was shown to her. There was no dispute about the genuinenss of the above said photograph. We have absolutely no reason to doubt the correctness of M.0.32. PW-215 (Samundeeswari) said in her evidence that she is a resident at Sriperumpudur and that on 21-5-1991, while she was standing outside her house at about I 0.45 P.M. waiting for her Son to return, she found two ladies and one male getting into her house and they asked for water to drink. She gave them water. The witness identified A-I as one of the ladies and identified