Supreme Court Advocates-On-Record Association and Another v. Union of India
Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — NJAC struck down; collegium system for appointing judges continues.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 16 October 2015
- Judge
- Justice J.S. Khehar
- Neutral citation
- 2015 INSC 285
- Reported in
- [2015] 13 S.C.R. 1
- Acts & sections
- Article 124 Constitution, Article 217 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution, Article 13 Constitution, Article 368 Constitution
- Subject
- Service
Full judgment
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 1
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER
v. UNION OF INDIA (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13 of 2015)
OCTOBER 16, 2015
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. CHELAMESWAR, MADAN B. LOKUR, KURIAN JOSEPH, c ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.] Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 Collegium system of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Cowt, and Chief Justices and Judges to the High Courts; and transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts from one High Court, to another- New scheme contemplated D for replacing the Collegium system - Six-member National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) set up under the aegis of Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 read with the National Judicial Appointments Commission E Act, 2014-NJAC composed of: (a) the Chief Justice of India, Chairperson, ex officio; ·(b) two other senior Judges of Supreme Court, next to the Chief Justice of India as Members, ex officio; (c) the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice as Member, ex officio; (d) two eminent persons, F to be nominated as Members - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - Va/idjty of- Held (per order of the Court): It is unconstitutional and void - National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Judiciary- Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts -Appointment and transfer G of Judges - Procedure . National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Collegium system of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, and Chief Justices and Judges to the High Courts; h
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and transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts from one High Court, to another- New scheme contemplated for replacing the Col/egium system - Six-member National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) set up under the aegis of Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 B read with the Nationai Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014- NJAC composed of: (a) the Chief Justice of India, · Chairperson, ex officio; (b} two other senior Judges of Supreme Court, next to the Chief Justice of India as Members, ex officio; (c) the Union Minister in charge of Law C and Justice as Member, ex officio; (d} two eminent persons, to be nominated as Members - National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Validity of - Held (per order of the Court): It is unconstitutional and void Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014- Judiciary - Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts - Appointment and transfer of Judges- Procedure.
Judiciary - Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges- Procedure- Col/egium E system of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, and Chief Justices and Judges to the High Courts; and transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts from one High Court, to another- New scheme contemplated for replacing the Collegium system - Six-member National Judicial F Appointments Commission (NJAC) set up under the aegis of Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 read with the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - NJAC composed of: (a) the Chief Justice of India, Chairperson, ex officio; (b) two other senior Judges of G Supr~me Court, next to the Chief Justice of India as Members, ex officio; (c) the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice as Member, ex officio; (d) two eminent persons, to be nominated as Members- Held (per order of the Court): The collegium system, as existing prior to the Constitution
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(Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014, declared to be operative - However, to consider introduction of appropriate measures, if any, for an improved working of the "collegium system", matter listed on a subsequent date ..:. Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014.
Judiciary ~ Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Selection and appointment of Judges - Parliament, if empowered to provide for an alternative procedure - Held (per Khehar, J.): It is open to the Parliament, while exercising C its power under Article 368, to provide for some other alternative procedure for the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, so long as, the attributes of "separation of powers" and "independence of the judiciary", which are "core" components of the "basic structure" of the D Constitution, are maintained. Constitution of India -Amendment to - Scope - Held (per Khehar, J.): The "basic structure" of the Constitution is inviolable ~ The Constitution cannot be amended so as to negate any "basic features" thereof-Also, if a challenge is raised to an ordinary legislation based on one of the "basic features" of the Constitution, it would be valid to do so.
Constitution of India - Art. 368 - Constitutional Amendments - Will of the People and Judicial Review Limitations on the amending power - Appointment and F transfer of Judges in higher judiciary- Broad based Judicial Appointment Commission comprising of members of the judiciary, the executive and eminent! important persons from public life 'proposed to be constituted, to replace the prevailing G procedure, contemplated under Articles 124(2) and 217(1)To achieve the purported objective, Articles 124 and 217 inter a/ia amended, and Articles 124A, 1248 and 124C inserted in the Constitution, through the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, by following the procedure contemplated H
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under Article 368(2), more particularly, the proviso thereunder - Simultaneously therewith, the Parliament enacted the NJACAct- Said Constitutional amendment and legislative enactment, challenged before Supreme Court - Held (per Khehar, J.): There are declared limitations, on the amending B . power conferred on the Parliament, which cannot be breached - If a constitutional amendment breaches the "core" of the Constitution or destroys its "basic or essential features" in a manner which was patently unconstitutional, it would have crossed over forbidden territory - This aspect, would C undoubtedly fall within the realm of judicial review - In the above view of the matter, the impugned constitutional amendment, as a/so, the NJAC Act, would be subject to judicial review on the touchstone of the "basic structure" of the Constitution, and the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in that behalf, even though the impugned constitutional amendment may have been approved and passed unanimously or by an overwhelming majority, and notwithstanding the ratification thereof by as many as twentyE eight State Assemblies - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - National Judicial Appointments· Commission Act, 2014 .
.Judiciary- Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Independence of F judiciary - Primacy conferred on the Chief Justice of India and his col/egium of Judges - Held (per Khehar, J.): In the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, and also, in the matter of transfer of Chief Justices and Judges from one High Court to any other High Court, under Articles G 124, 217 and 222, primacy conferred on the Chief Justice of India and his collegium of Judges, is liable to be accepted as an integral constituent of the above provisions (as originally enacted) - Therefore, when a question with reference to the selection and appointment (as also, transfer)
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of Judges to the higher judiciary is raised, alleging that the A "independence of the judiciary" as a "basic feature/structure" o~ the Constitution has been violated, it would have to be ascertained whether the primacy of the judiciary exercised through the Chief Justice of India (based on a collective wisdom of a collegium of Judges), had been breached- Then B alone, would it be possible to conclude, whether or not, the "independence of the judiciary" as an essential "basic feature" of the Constitution, had been preserved (-and had not been breached}- Constitution of India -Articles 124, 21 land 222.
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Judiciary - Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Procedure - New scheme contemplated for replacing the Col/egium system National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) set up under the aegis of Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) D Act, 2014 read with the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - NJAC to comprise of members of the judiciary, the executive and eminent/important persons from public life - Whether as a matter of practicality, the impugned constitutional amendment can be consi.dered to E have sustained, primacy in the matter of decision making, under the amended provisions of Articles 124, 217 and 222, in conjunction with the inserted provisions of Articles 124A to 124C, with the judiciary- Held (per Khehar, J.): Primacy of the judiciary would not be considered to have been sustained, F merely by ensuring that the judicial component in the membership of the NJAC, was sufficiently capable, to reject the candidature of an unworthy nominee - In the matter of primacy, the judicial component of the·NJAC, should be competent by itself, to ensure the appointment of a worthy· G nominee, as well - Under the substituted scheme, even if the Chief Justice of India and the two other senior most Judges of the Supreme Court (next to the Chief Justice of India), consider a nominee to be worthy for appointment to the higher
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judiciary, the concerned individual may still not be appointed, if any two Members of the NJAC. opine otherwise- This would be out-rightly obnoxious, to the primacy of the judicial component- The magnitude of the instant issue, is apparent from the fact that the two "eminent persons" ("lay persons, B according to the Attorney General), could defeat the unanimous recommendation made by the Chief Justice of India and the two senior most Judges of the Supreme Court, favouring the appointment of an individual under consideration - Without any doubt, demeaning primacy of C the judiciary, in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary - The instant issue, is demonstrably far more retrograde, when the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice also supports the unanimous view of the judicial component, because still the dissenting voice of the "eminent persons" would prevail - It is apparent, that primacy of the judiciary has been rendered a further devastating blow, by making it extremely fragile - Articles 124A(1)(a) and (b) do not provide for an adequate E' representation in the matter, to the judicial component, to ensure primacy of the judiciary in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higherjudiciary, and therefore, the same are liable to be set aside and struck down as being violative of the "basic structure" of the Constitution of lndiaF Thus viewed, the "basic structure" of the Constitution would be clearly violated, if the process of selection of Judges to the higher judiciary was to be conducted, in the manner contemplated through the NJAC - The impugned constitutional amendment, being ultra vires the "basic G structure" of the Constitution, is liable to be set aside Constitution of India -Arts. 124A (1 )(a) and (b).
Judiciary - Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges - Procedure - New scheme contemplated - National Judicial Appointments Commission
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(NJAC) set up - NJAC to comprise of members of the judiciary, the executive and eminenVimportant persons from public life - Participation of the political-executive - Ifjustified - Presence of Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as an ex officio Member of the NJA C - Challenge to - Held (per Khehar, J.): The political-executive, as far as possible, should not have a role in the ultimate/final selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary - Specially keeping in mind the enormity of the participation of the political-executive, in actions of judicial adjudication Reciprocity, and feelings of pay back to the politicalexecutive, would be disastrous to "independence of the judiciary" - Since the executive has a major stake, in a majority of cases, which arise for consideration before the higher judiciary, the participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as an ex officio Member of the NJAC, would be clearly questionable - Consequent upon the participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, a Judge approved for appointment with the Minister's support, may not be able to resist or repulse a plea of conflict of interest, raised by a litigant, in a matter when the executive has an adversarial role- In the NJAC, the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice would be a party to all final selections and appointments of Judges to the higherjudiciary - It may be difficult for Judges approved by the NJAC, to resist a plea of conflict of interest (if such a plea was to be raised, and pressed), where the political-executive is a party to the /is - The above, would have the inevitable effect of undermining the "independence of the judiciary", even where such a plea is repulsed - Therefore, the rote· assigned to the political-executive, can at best be limited to a collaborative participation, excluding any role in the final determination Mere participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, in the final process of selection, as an ex officio
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A Member of the NJA C, would render the amended provision of Article 124A(1 )(c) as ultra vires the Constitution, as it impinges on the principles of "independence of the judiciary" and "separation of powers" - In the process of evolution of societies across the globe, the trend is to free the judiciary B from executive and political control, and to incorporate a system of selection and appointment of Judges, based purely on merit- For it is only then, that the process ofjudicial review will effectively support nation building - Progression of the concepts of "independence of the judiciary" and 'Judicial C review" were now being recognized the world over - The diminishing role of executive and political participation, on the matter of appointments to the higher judiciary, is an obvious reality - In recognition of the above trend, there cannot be any greater and further participation of the D executive, than that which existed hitherto before -And in the Indian scenario, as is presently conceived, through the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases - It is therefore imperative to conclude, that the participation E of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice in the final determinative process vested in the NJAC, as also, the participation of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha (and in case of there being none - Leader of the single largest Opposition Party in the House F of the People), in the selection of"eminent persons", would be a retrograde step, and cannot be accepted - Constitution of India -Art. 124A(1)(c). Judiciary- Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Procedure G Composition and structure of NJAC- NJAC to comprise of members of the judiciary, the executive and two "eminent persons""- Issue arising out of non-description of qualifications and disqualifications of "eminent persons" Two "eminent persons" to be nominated to the NJA C vested
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with a power of veto - Propriety of- Held (per Khehar, J.): The issue of description of the qualifications (-perhaps, also the disqualifications) of "eminent persons" is of utmost importance, and cannot be left to the free will and choice of the nominating authorities, irrespective of the high constitutional positions held by them- Specially so, because the two "eminent persons" comprise of 1/3rd strength of the NJA C, and double that of the political-executive component, and as such, will have a supremely important role in the decision making process of the NJAC-Article 124A(1 )(d) is liable to be set aside and struck down, for having not laid down the qualifications of eligibility for being nominated as "eminent persons", and for having left the same vague and undefined - It is even otherwise difficult to appreciate the logic of including two "eminent persons': in the six-Member NJAC - It is difficult to appreciate what inputs the "eminent persons", satisfying the qualification depicted by the Attorney General, would render in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higherjudiciary- The sensitivity of selecting Judges is so enormous, and the consequences of making inappropriate appointments so dangerous, that if those involved in the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, make wrongful selections, it may we/I lead the nation into a chaos of sorts - It is also difficult to appreciate the wisdom of the Parliament, to introduce two Jay persons, in the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, and to simultaneously vest with them a power of veto- The second proviso under s.5(2), and s.6(6) of the NJAC Act, clearly mandate, that a person nominated to be considered for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court, and persons being considered for appointment as Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts, cannot be appointed, if any two Members of the NJA C do not agree to the proposal - In the
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scheme of the selection process of Judges to the higher judiciary, contemplated under the impugned constitutional amendment read with the NJAC Act, the two "eminent persons" are sufficiently empowered to reject all recommendations, just by themselves - Not just that, the B two "eminent persons" would also have the absolute authority to reject all names unanimously approved by the remaining four Members of the NJAC - That would obviously include the power to reject, the unanimous recommendation of the entire judicial component of the NJA C - The vesting of such C authority in the "eminent persons", is clearly unsustainable, in the scheme of ."independence of the judiciary" -Article 124A(1)(d) is liable to be set aside and struck down as being violative of the "basic structure" of the Constitution D Constitution of India-Art. 124A(1)(d)- Constitution (Ninetyninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - National Judicial . Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Second proviso u/s. 5(2) ands. 6(6). Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts -
E Appointment and transfer of Judges - Participation of the political-executive establishment- Role of the "civil society" in India - Held (per Khehar, J.): The Constitution does not .envisage the "spoils system" (also known as the "patronage system'?, wherein the political party which wins an election, F gives Government positions to its supporters, friends and relatives, as a reward for working towards victory, and as an incentive to keep the party in power- It would be of utmost importance to shield judicial appointments, from any politicalexecutive interference, to preseNe the "independence of the G judiciary", from the regime of the spoils system - PreseNing primacy in the judiciary, in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the, higher judiciary would be a safe way to do so - It is difficult to hold that the wisdom of appointment of Judges, can be shared with the political-
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executive- In India, the organic development of civil society, · A has not as yet sufficiently evolved - The expectation from the judiciary, to safeguard the rights of the citizens of this country, can only be ensured, by keeping it absolutely insulated and independent, from the other organs of governance- The present status ofthfj evolution of the "civil B society" in India, does not augur the participation of the political-executive establishment, in the selec;tion and appointment of Judges to the higherjudiciary, or in the matter of transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of one High Court, to another - Higher judiciary, ·which is the savior of the C fundamental rights of the citizens of this country, by virtue of the constitutional responsibility assigned to it under Articles 32 and 226, must continue to act as the protector of the civil society- Constitution of India-Arts. 32 and 226.
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National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Functioning of the NJAC- Quorum for- Meeting of National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), when valid Strength required for valid decision making - Held (per . Khehar, J): In case a statutory provision vests a decision E making authority in a body of persons witho_ut stipulating the minimum quorum, then a valid meeting can be held only if the majority of all the members of the body, deliberate in the process of decision making- On the same analogy therefore, a valid decision by such a body will necessitate a decision F by a simple majority of all the members of the body - If the . aforesaid principles are made applicable to the NJAC, the natural outcome would be, that a valid meeting of the NJA C must have at least four Members participating in a sixMember NJAC - Likewise, a valid decision of the NJAC can G only be taken (in the absence of any prescribed prerequisite), by a simple majority, namely, by at least four Members of ·the NJAC (three Members on either side, would not make up the simple majority) - Judiciary - Higher Judiciary H
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Constitutional Courts -Appointment and transfer of Judges - Procedure. National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - ss. 5(2) and 6(6) - Validity- Judiciary- Higher JudiciaryConstitutional Courts -Appointment and transfer of Judges B - Power of veto vest~d in any two Members of the NJA C - . Held (per Khehar, J.): The power of veto vested in any two Members of the NJAC, would adversely impact primacy of the judiciqry, in the matter of selection and appointment of C Judges to the higherjudiciary (as also theirtransfer)-ss.5(2) and 6(6) breach the "basic structure" of the Constitution, with reference to the "independence of the judiciary" and the "separation of powers" - ss. 5(2) and 6(6), therefore, liable to be declared as ultra vires the Constitution.
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National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - s. 5(1) - Appointment of the Chief Justice of India Procedure - s.5(1) provided that the NJAC would recommend the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court, for being appointed as Chief.Justice of India, subject to the condition, that he was considered "fit" to hold the office Contention that the term "fit" had not been elaborately described and it was always open to the Parliament to purposefully define fitness, in a manner as would sub-serve the will of the executive and this could/would seriously affect the "independence of the judiciary" - Held (per Khehar, J.): It was not within the realm of Parliament, to subject the process of selection of Judges to the Supreme Court, as well as, to the position of Chief Justice of India, in uncertain and ambiguous terms - It was imperative to express, the clear parameters of the term "fit", with reference to the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court under s.5 - The term "fit" can be tailor-made, to choose a candidate far below in the seniority list- The position adopted by the Attorney General, namely, that the term "fit" used in s.5(1) would be read to
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mean only "... mental and physical fitness ... " is affirmed and crystalised - If that is done, it would be legal and constitutional - However, if the position adopted ~reached the "independence of the judiciary'; in the manner suggested by the petitioners, the same would be assailable in Jaw.
National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - s. 5(2), first proviso - Validity of -Appointment of a High Court Judge - First proviso to s.5(2) providing that while making recommendation for appointment of a High Court Judge, apart from seniority, the ability and merit of such Judge shall be considered by NJAC - Held (per Khehar, J.):Undoubtedly, postulating "seniority" in the first proviso under s.5(2), is a laudable objective -And if seniority is to be supplemented and enmeshed with "ability and merit'; the most ideal approach, can be seen to have been adopted But what appears on paper, may sometimes not be correct in practice - Experience shows, that Judges to every High Court are appointed in batches, each batch may have just two or three appointees, or may sometimes have even ten or more individuals-A group of Judges appointed to one High Court, will be separated from the lot of Judges appointed to another High Court, byjust a few days, or by just a few weeks, and sometimes by just a few months- In the all India seniority of Judges, the complete batch appointed on the same day, to one High Court, will be placed in a running serial order (in seniority) above the other Judges appointed to another High Court, just after a few days or weeks or months - Judges appointed later, will have to be placed en masse below the earlier batch, in seniority- If appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, is to be made on the basis of seniority (as a primary consideration), then the earlier batch would have priority in the matter of elevation to the Supreme Court-And hypothetically, if the batch had ten Judges (appointed together to a particular High Court), and if all of them have proved
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themselves able and meritorious as High Court Judges, they will have to be appointed one after the other, when vacancies of Judges arise in the Supreme Court - In that view of the matter, Judges from the same High Court would be appointed to the Supreme Court, till the entire batch is exhausted B Judges from the same High Court, in the above situation where the batch comprised often Judges, will occupy a third of the total Judge positions in the Supreme Court- That would be clearly unacceptable - Consideration of Judges on the basis of their seniority, by treating the same as a primary C consideration, would adversely affect the present convention of ensuring represeritation from as many State High Courts, as is possible - The convention in vogue is, to maintain regional representation -Accordingly, the first proviso under s. 5(2) is liable to be struck down and set aside. National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - s.6(1) - Validity of-Appointment of a Judge of a High Court as Chief Justice of a High Court- s. 6(1) providing that NJAC shall recommend on the basis of inter se seniority of E High Court Judges and ability, merit and any other criteria of suitability as may be specified- Held (per Khehar, J.): s. 6(1) . has the same seniority connotation as expressed with reference to the first proviso under s.5(2) - For exactly the same reasons as noticed in the case of the first proviso under F s.5(2), based on seniority (as a primary consideration), ten High Courts in different States could have Chief Justices drawn from one parent High Court- s. 6(1) therefore liable to meet the same fate, as the first proviso under s.5(2); and is liable to be struck down and set aside. National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014
- s. 7 - Validity of- Appointment of Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the Supreme Court or, the Chief Justice of a High Court or the Judge of a High Court - s. 7 providing that the H President would make such appointments on
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· recommendations made by NJAC - The first proviso to s. 7 A providing that the President may require NJA C to reconsider recommendation made by it- Held (per Khehar, J.): It is not possible to accept that s. 7 by providing that the President could requite the NJAC to reconsider a recommendation made by it, would in any manner violate Articles 124(2) and B 217(1) (which mandate, that Judges would be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the NJAC)- It would .be improper to infer, that the action of the President, requiring the NJAC to reconsider its proposal, amounted to rejecting the proposal made by the NJAC - For, if the NJAC was to C reiterate the proposal made earlier, the President even in terms of Section 7, was bound to act in consonance therewith (as is apparent from the second proviso under s. 7 of the NJACAct).
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National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - s. 8- Validity of- Functions of the Convener, with reference io NJA C - s. 8 provides for the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Department of Justice, to be the convener of NJA C- It was contended that such an onerous responsibility, E · could not be left to the executive alone.it was imperative to exclude all executive participation in the proceedings of the NJAC-Held (per Khehar, J.): It has already been concluded, that the participation of the Union Minister in charge of L?W · and Justice, as a Member of the NJAC, as contemplated F under Article 124A(1), in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, would breach the concepts of "separation of powers" and the "independence of the judiciary", which are both undisputedly components of the "basic structure" of the Constitution of/ndia - For exa<?tlY the G same reasons, s. 8 is not sustainable in law - In a body like the NJAC, the administrative functioning cannot be under executive or legislative control - The only remaining alternative, is to vest the administrative control of such a body,
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with the judiciary. Constitution of India - Amendment to, set aside by a process of judicial review - Consequence - Impugned Constitution (99th Amendment) Act set aside by five-Judge Bench of Supreme Court, as being violative of the "basic structure" of the Constitution- Effect of- Would Articles 124, 127, 128, 217, 222, 224, 224A and 231, as they existed prior to the impugned amendment, would revive; and on such revival, the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases, would again regulate selections and appointments, as also, transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary- Held (per Khehar, J.): The present situation is one where, the impugned constitutional amendment by a process of judicial review, has been set aside - Such being the position, whatever be the cause and effect of the impugned constitutional amendment, the same will be deemed to be set aside, and the position preceding the amendment will be restored - It does not matter what are the stages or steps of the cause and effect of the amendment, all the stages and steps will stand negated, in the same fashion as they were introduced by the amendment, when the amended provisions are set aside - If neither the impugned constitutional provision, nor the amended provisions of the Constitution would survive, it would lead to a breakdown of the constitutional machinery, inasmuch as, there would be a lacuna or a hiatus, insofar as the manner of selection and appointment of Judges to the higherjudiciary is concerned - Such a position cannot be the result of any sound process of interpretation - The clear intent of the Parliament, while enacting the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was to provide for a new process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary by amending the existing provisions - Naturally therefore, when the amended provision postulating a different procedure is set aside, the original process of selection and
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appointment under the unamended provisions would revive A -When a judgment sets aside, an amendment or a repeal by the legislature, it is but natural that the status quo ante, would stand restored - With the setting aside of the impugned Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended thereby, would B automatically revive, and the status quo ante would stand restored - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - Judiciary - Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges. Constitution of India - Art. 124A - Validity of Constitution and composition of National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) - Held (per Khehar, J.): Article 124A constitutes the edifice of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014- The striking down of Article 124A would automatically lead to the undoing of the amendments made to Articles 124, 1248, 124C, 127, 128, 217, 222, 224, 224A and 231 - This, for the simple reason, that the latter Articles are sustainable only if Article 124A is upheld - If the inclusion of anyone of the Members of the NJAC is held to be unconstitutional, Article 124A will be rendered nugatory, in its entirety- Clauses (a) and (b) of Article 124A(1) do not provide an adequate representation, to the judicial component in the NJAC, clauses (a) and (b) ofArticle 124A(1) are insufficient to preserve the primacy of the judiciary, in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges, to the higher judiciary (as also transfer of Chief Justices and Judges, from one High Court to another) - The same are accordingly, violative of the principle of"independence of the judiciary" - Clause (c) of Article 124A(1) is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution, because of the inclusion of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice as an ex officio Member of the NJAC- Clause (c) of Article 124A(1) impinges upon the principles of "independence of the
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A judiciary", as well as, "separation of powers'' -Also, clause (d) of Article 124A(1) which provides for the inclusion of two "eminent persons" as Members of the NJAC is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution, for a variety of reasons The same is violative of the "basic structure" of the Constitution B - In the above view of the matter, all the clauses (a) to {d) of Article 124A(1) are liable to be set aside - The same are, accordingly struck down - In view of the striking down ofArticle 124A(1), the entire Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 is liable to be set aside - The same is accordingly hereby C struck down in its entirety, as being ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution - Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 - Judiciary- Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts -Appointment and transfer of Judges'- Procedure. Constitution oflndia-Art. 124C- Validity of- Held (per Khehar, J.): The National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 inter alia emanates from Art. 124C It has no independent existence in the absence of the NJAC, constituted under Art. 124A(1)- Since Arts. 124A and 124C E have been set aside, as a natural corollary, the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 is also liable to be set aside, and the same is accordingly hereby struck down - In view of the above, it was not essential to have examined the constitutional vires of individual provisions of F the NJACAct-Allthe same, the challenge raised to Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof have been examined - ss. 5, 6 and 8 of the NJAC Act found to be ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution - National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - ss.5, 6 and 8- Judiciary- Higher JudiciaryG Constitutional Courts -Appointment and transfer of Judges - Procedure .
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Judiciary - Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Constitutional History H in regard to Appointment of Judges in India - Discussed -
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Held (per Lokur, J.): The conclusions that can be drawn from the background histo1ical facts are as follows: (1) The independence of the judiciary has been always recognized and acknowledged by all concerned - (2) Prior to Independence, the appointment of a judge to a superior court was entirely the discretion of the Crown - The Constituent Assembly felt that such a 'supreme and absolute' power should not vest in the President or the government of the day or the Chief Justice of India (as an individual) and therefore a fetter was placed on that power by requiring the President to mandatorily consult the Chief Justice of India (with the discretion to consult other judges) for the appointment of a judge to the Supreme Court- For the appointment of a judge of the High Court also, consultation with the Chief Justice of India was mandatory-In addition, consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Governor of the State was mandatory-Significantly, there is no mention of consultation with anybody from civil society - (3) Any doubt about the individual role of the President in the process of appointment ofjudges came to rest and it was clear that the President was expected to act only on the advice of the Council of Ministers - (4) Similarly, the Chief Justice of India is not expected to act in an individual or personal capacity but must consult his/her senior judges before making a recommendation for the appointment of a judge - (5) Dr. Ambedkar and the Constituent Assembly did not accept the 'unfettered discretion' theory in the Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) but this view was subsequently rejected in the First Judges case which brought in the 'ultimate power' theory propounded by Justice Bhagwati and Justice Desai - (6) Executive interference in the appointment process (with perhaps an informal method of 'take over? had started around the time of Independence and got aggravated post Independence, peaking towards the end of the 1980s - (7) Not a single instance given where the
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President recommended a person for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court- The Chief Minister of a State might have made a recommendation (although no instance was given) but that was required to be routed through the Chief Justice of the High Court, as per the Memorandum of Procedure - (8) Only one instance was given, pre the First Judges case where an appointment as a judge of the High Court was made without the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India - Post the First Judges case as many as seven such appointments were made - This is a clear indication that the 'ultimate power' theory propounded in the First Judges case translated into 'absolute executive primacy' - The dream of Dr. Ambedkar became a nightmare, thanks to the political executive - (9) The 'ultimate power' theory or the 'absolute executive primacy' theory is now diluted and the last word in the appointment of a judge of the Supreme Court is shared between the President and the Chief Justice of India in terms of the Second Judges case and the Third Judges case - Historically, giving the last word to the executive has been criticized by no less than the AttorneyGeneral Shri M. C. Setalvad who chaired the Law Commission of India when the 141h Report was given - That system has not worked well at all as noted from time to time - (10) The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution as well as a responsible judge from the House of Lords were of the opinion that the procedure for appointment of judges as laid down in the Second Judges case and the Third Judges case broadly serves the purpose of maintaining the independence of the judiciary and providing a suitable method for appointment ofjudges of the superior Courts. Judiciary- Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges- Procedure- 'Absolute executive primacy' system or the 'ultimate power' theory and
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the 'col/egium system' of appointment of fudges postulated A by the Second Judges case and the Third Judges case Discussed- Held (per Lokur, J.): Both the 'absolute executive primacy' system or the 'ultimate power' theory and the 'col/egium system' of appointment ofjudges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts were acceptable systems in their B time - The 'executive primacy' system was, unfortunately, abused by the executive and the judiciary could do precious little about it, bound as the judges are by the Rule of Law- It is because of this abuse that the constitutional provisions were revisited at the instance of the Bar of Supreme Court- C It is this insight that resulted in the Second Judges case and a meaningful and pragmatic interpretation of the Constitution - To say that the col/egium system has failed and that it needs replacement would not be a correct or a fair post mortem.
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Judiciary - Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Procedure - Process of consideration - Col/egium system - Two stages - Prerecommendation stage and post-recommendation stage Impact and effect of Second Judges case - 'Consultation' E occurring in Article 124(2) and Article 217(1) of the Constitution - Meaning of- Held (per Lokur, J.): The process of consideration of a person for appointment as a judge is important both at a stage prior to the recommendation being made by the Chief Justice of India in consultation with his/ F her colleagues, constituting a 'col/egium' and also after the recommendation is sent by the Chief Justice of India to the executive -At both stages, the process is participatory- In the pre-recommendation stage, it is a participatory process involving the Chief Justice of India and his/her colleagues, G constituting the collegiums - It is at this stage that the Chief Justice of India takes the opinion of the other judges and anybody else, if deemed necessary - This stage a/so includes the participation of the executive because it is at
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A this stage that the Chief Justice of India receives inputs from
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the executive about the frailties, if any, of a person who may eventually be appointed a judge - In the postrecommendation stage also the process is participatory but primarily with the executive in the event the executive has some objection to the appointment of a particular person for strong and cogent reasons to be recorded in writing Therefore, when a person is considered tor appointment as a judge, there is extensive and intensive participatory consultation within the judiciary before the Chief Justice of India actually recommends a person for appointment as a judge; and after the recommendation is made, there is consultation between the executive and the judiciary before the process is carried further - Difficulty in considering and accepting a recommendation arises only if there is a difference of opinion during consultations between the executive and the judiciary - The Second Judges case effectively resolves this controversy - At the prerecommendation stage, it is quite possible that the executive is in possession of material regarding some personal trait or weakness of cha racier of a lawyer or a judge that is not known to the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the High Court and which may potentially disentitle that person from being appointed a judge - It is then for the executive, as a consultant, to bring this information or material to the notice of the Chief Justice of India - Since the judiciary has the responsibility of recommending an appropriate candidate for appointment as a judge, primacy is accorded to the view of the judiciary (symbolized by the view of the Chief Justice of India) that will weigh and objectively consider the material or information and take a final decision on the desirability of the appointment- The Chief Justice of India may, for good reason, accept the view of the executive or may, also for good reason, not accept the view of the executive - It is in this
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sense that 'consultation' occurring in Article 124(2) and Article A 217(1) of the Constitution has to be understood- Constitution oflndia-Articles 124(2) and 217(1). Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges - 991h Constitution Amendment Act inter alia amended Article 124(2) and introduced Article 124A - Article 124(2) of the Constitution required the NJAC constituted. under Article 124A to make recommendation to the President for the appointment of a judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court- NJAC and the role of the Presidentpiscussed - Held (per Lokur, J.): There is no·clarity on the role of the President - In any event, the discretion available to the President to consult judges of the Supreme Court in the matter of appointment of judges is taken away - The decision of the President is subject to the opinion of two eminent persons neither of whom is constitutionally accountable - There is a doubt on the well established principle of Cabinet responsibility-A statute- the NJA C Act, not the Constitution binds the President contrary to the constitutional framework- The ggrh Constitution Amendment Act makes serious and unconstitutional inroads into Article 124(2) of the Constitution, as originally framed - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014.
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Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges - Role of the Chief Justice of India F and the Judiciary- In context to ggth Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act- Discussed - Held (per Lokur, J.): The unanimous opinion of the Judiciary can be rejected by two eminent persons or one eminent person and the Law Minister (whose opinion is subject to the opinion of the G Council of Ministers, whom he/she represents) - The unanimous opinion of the judiciary as an institution, an opinion that was respected (and deservedly so) counts for virtually nothing with the passage of the ggrh Constitution H
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Amendment Act and the NJAC Act- The Chief Justice of India is rendered, by the ggih Con.stitution Amendment Act to a mere voting statistic and one among six in the NJAC virtually stripping him/her of the constitutional responsibility of appointing judges to the superior courts and denuding him/ B her of the authority conferred by history, constitutional convention and the Constitution- The Chief Justice of India and the institution of the judiciary is now subject to a veto by civil society in its decisions - The entire scheme of appointment of judges postulated by the Constituent C Assembly is _made topsy-turvy by the ggrh Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act - Constitution (Ninety-· ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014.
Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges - Presence of eminent persons in NJAC- Challenged- Held (per Lokur, J.): In principle, there can be no objection to consultation with eminent persons from all walks of life in the matter of appointment of judges - But E that these eminent persons can veto a decision that is taken unanimously or otherwise by the Chief Justice of India (in consultation with other judges and possibly other eminent persons) is unthinkable - it confers virtually a monarchical power on the eminent persons in the NJA C, a power without F any accountability- The categories of eminent persons ought not to be limited to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, other backward classes, minorities or women but that is a matter of policy and nothing more can be said about this, except that ·a rethink is necessary - There can be no guidelines for G deciding who is or is not an eminent person for the purposes of nomination to the NJAC, but that the choice is left to a high powered committee is a sufficient check, provided the decision of the committee is unanimous.
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Appointment of Judges - Presence of the Law Minister in A NJAC- Challenge to, on ground that the Union of India is the biggest litigant in the courts and to have the Law Minister as a member of the NJAC might prove detrim~ntal to a fair selection, if not counter-productive- Held (per Lokur, J.): The struggle for the independence of the judiciary has always B been pivoted around the exclusion of the executive in decision-taking, but the inclusion of the Law Minister in the NJAC is counter-productive, historically counter-majoritarian and goes against the grain of various views expressed in various committees - More so, since the Law Minister can C exercise a veto in the decision-taking body - Presence of the Law Minister in the NJAC is totally unnecessary and ii/advised - Presence of the Law Minister in the NJA C casts a doubt on the principle of Cabinet responsibility.
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Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges - Article 124(2) of the Constitution as originally framed made it mandatory for the President to consult the Chief Justice of India in the appointment ofjudges - NJAC and impact on mandatory consultation - Held (per E Lokur, J.): The ggth Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act have reduced the consultation process to a farce - a meaningful participatory consultative process no longer exists- The shared responsibility between the President and the Chief Justice of India in the appointment of judges is F passed on to a body well beyond the contemplation of the Constituent Assembly- The possibility of having committed judges and the consequences of having a committed judiciary, a judiciary that might not be independent is unimaginable. Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges- NJAC and the appointment of High Court judges - Held (per Lokur, J.): The combined effect of the ggth Constitution Amendment Act and Section 6 of the
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NJAC Act is that the entire control over the appointment of a judge of a High Court is taken over by the NJAC and the paradigm is completely altered with the Chief Justice of a High Court downgraded from a mandatory consultant, and the originator of a recommendation for appointment as postulated by Article 217(1) of the Constitution as conventionally understood, to someone who merely makes a nomination and thereafter is not required to be consulted one way or the other with respect to the nomination made Process of initiating a recommendation for the appointment of a judge, generally accepted since Independence, has been radically changed, with well entrenched constitutional conventions being given short shrift - The Chief Justice of the High Court has been reduced to the role of a nominating officer, whose opinion is taken only for nomination purposes but not taken as a consultant in so vital a matter as the appointment of a judgf! - The constitutional importance given to the Chief Justice of a High Court has been completely whittled down virtually to a vanishing point- Constitution of India -Art. 217(1) - Constitution (Ninety-Ninth} Amendment Act, 2014 - National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014-s.6. .
Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges - Convenor of the NJAC - The F Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Justice is the convenor of the NJAC in terms of Section 8(3) ·of the NJAC Act - Held (per Lokur, J.):. The duties and responsibilities of the convenor have not been delineated in the NJAC Act and, the rules and regulations under the Act G have not been framed - It is therefore difficult to appreciate the functions that the convenor is expected to perform- That apart, the Secretary is an officer of the· government and is not answerable to the NJA C - The Secretary is paid a salary and allowances from the government coffers - This is quite
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unlike officers of the High Courts or the Supreme Court who A are directly answerable to their respective Chief Justice Moreover, their salary and allowances are charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India - The 'independence' of these officers is maintained while that of the Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Justice is not - B Moreover, the Secretary holds a transferable position and can be changed at the whims and fancies of the executive, depriving the NJAC of continuity and, in a sense, leaving it high and dry whenever it pleases the executive ~ This is clearly objectionable - National Judicial Appointments C Commission Act, 2014 - s. 8(3). Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges - Confidentiality requirements · Functioning of the NJAC-Held (per Lokur, J.): The balance between transparency and confidentiality is very delicate and if some sensitive information about a particular person is made public, it can have a far reaching impact on his/her reputation and dignity - The ggth Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act have not taken note of the privacy concerns of an individual - This is important because it was submitted by the Attorney-Genera/ that the proceedings of the NJAC wi/I be completely transparent and any one can have access to information that is available with the NJA C This is a rather sweeping generalization which obviously does not take into account the privacy of a person who has been recommended for appointment, particularly as a judge of the High Court or in the first instance as a judge of the Supreme Court - The right to know is not a fundamental right but at best it is an implicit fundamental right and it is hedged in with the implicit fundamental right to privacy that all people enjoy - The balance between the two implied fundamental rights is difficult to maintain, but the ggth Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act do not even attempt to consider, Jet
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alone achieve that balance - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014.
Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges - 991h Constitution Amendment Act declared as altering the basic structure of the Constitution Effect of- Held (per Lokur, J.): The constitutional provisions amended by the 991h Constitution Amendment Act spring back to life on the declaration that the ggrh Constitution C Amendment Act is unconstitutional - Constitution (NinetyNinth) Amendment Act, 2014.
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Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 Validity of- Held (per Lokur, J.): It alters the basic structure of the Constitution by introducing substantive changes in the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts and rewriting Art.124(2) and Art.217(1) of the Constitution, thereby seriously compromising the independence of the judiciary - Consequently, the ggrh Constitution Amendment Act is unconstitutional - The 99th Constitution Amendment Act has completely changed the constitutional position and changed the role of the President in the appointment process as a/so substantially modified the mandatory consultation with the Chief Justice of India and substituted or replaced the entire process by a recommendation of the NJAC - The 99th Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act raise a series of unanswered questions- It is true that the Constitution cannot specify and incorporate each and every detail, particularly procedural details - But the same time, the substantive requirements of the NJAC scheme must be apparent from the 99th Constitution Amendment Act read with the NJAC Act, particularly when it seeks to overthrow an existing method of appointment of judges that maintains the independence of the judiciary- Vital issues cannot be left to be sorted out
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at a later date through supplementary legislation or A supplementary subordinate legislation, otherwise an unwholesome hiatus would be created, making matters worse - Constitution oflndia'-Arts. 124(2) and 217(1). National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Validity of - Held (per Lokur, J.): Since the 99th Constitution B Amendment Act is unconstitutional, the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 which is the child of the 99th Constitution Amendment Act cannot independently survive on the statute books - Even otherwise, it violates C Article 14 of the Constitution by enabling substantive arbitrariness in the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts - Judiciary - Higher judiciary Constitutional Courts -Appointment and transfer of Judges - Constitution of India -Art. 14. D Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment of Judges - Independence of the judiciary and the appointment process - Held (per Lokur, J.): The independence of the judiciary begins with the appointment of a judge - There is no doubt that the appointment of a judge E to the Supreme Court or the High Court is an integral part of the independence of the judiciary- However, it is not possible to agree with the Attorney-General when he says that though the appointment of a judge is a part of the independence of the judiciary, it is but a small part and certainly not a F predominant part - It is really the foundational part of the independence of the judiciary- The process for appointment and the actual appointment of a judge to a High Court or the Supreme Court is a predominant part of the independence of the judiciary and, therefore, an integral part of the basic G structure of the Constitution. Constitution of India - Amendment to - Grounds of challenge - Difference from grounds for challenging a Parliamentary statue - Held (per Lokur, J.): An amendment H
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A to the Constitution can be challenged only if it alters the basic structure of the Constitution - Whereas a law can be
challenged if: (1) It is beyond the competence of the Legislature; (2) It violates Article 13 of the Constitution; (3) It is enacted contrary to a prohibition in the Constitution; and (4) It is enacted without following the procedure laid down in the Constitution - Doctrines I Principles - Basic structure doctrine.
Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts C Appointment of Judges - Factors to be considered - Held (per Lokur, J.): There are two crucial factors- (1) Professional . skills, judicial potential, suitability and temperament of a person to be a good judge, and (2) personal strengths, weaknesses, habits and traits of that person -As far as the professional skills, judicial potential, suitability and temperament of a person being a good judge is concerned, the most appropriate person to make that assessment would be the Chief Justice of India (in consultation with the other judges) and not somebody from outside the legal fraternityE On the other hand, as far as the personal strengths, weaknesses, habits and traits of a person are concerned, appropriate inputs can come only from the executive, since the Chief Justice of India and other judges may not be aware of them - Chief Justice of India is the 'expert' with regard to F potential while the executive is the 'expert' with regard to the antecedents and personal traits - Since these two facets of the personality of a would-be judge are undoubtedly distinct, there cannot be a difference of opinion between the judiciary and the executive in this regard since they both express an G opinion on different facets of a person's life - The Chief Justice of India cannot comment upon the 'expert opinion' of the executive nor can the executive comment upon the 'expert opinion' of the Chief Justice of India.
Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts -
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Appointment of Judges - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Validity of - Held (per Lokur, J.): The Second Judges case acknowledged that the President has the discretion to turn down a recommendation made by the Chief Justice of India, but only under certain circumstances - This was the fetter on the discretion of the President - However, the ggrh Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act have completely taken away the discretion of the President to turn down a recommendation for the appointment of a judge, reducing the constitutional significance of the President - The ggrh Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act have taken away this freedom of consultation from the President, who has no option but to take into account only the recommendation of the NJAC and not travel beyond that - Once again, the constitutional significance and importance of the President is considerably reduced, if not taken away- The 99'h Constitution Amendment Act and the NJACAct have considerablylimited and curtailed the authority of the Chief Justice of India (both individually as well as institutionally) and the Chief Justice of India is now precluded from taking the opinion of other judges or of any person outside the NJAC - The Chief Justice of India has been reduced to an individual figure from an institutional head - The ggrh Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act reversed the process well thought out in the Second Judges case and the Third Judges case and have taken away the constitutional authority of the Chief Justice of India and placed it on a platter for the NJA C to exploit- Given our constitutional history, the established conventions, the views of various committees over the last seventy years and the views of scores of legal luminaries beginning with Mr. Motilal Setalvad, the throes through which the judiciary has gone through over several decades and the provisions of our Constitution,
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Article 124A as introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 impinges on the independence of the judiciary and in the matter of appointment of judges (which is a foundational and integral part of the independence of the judiciary) and alters the basic structure of the Constitution - It is accordingly declared unconstitutional - The other provisions of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 cannot stand by themselves and are therefore also declared unconstitutional - Similarly, the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 confers arbitrary and unchartered powers on various authorities under the statute and it violates Article 14 of the Constitution and is declared unconstitutional - Even otherwise, the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 cannot stand alone in the absence of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - The result of this declaration is that the 'co/legium system' postulated by the Second Judges case and the Third Judges case gets revived - However, the procedure for appointment of judges as laid down in these decisions read with the (Revised) Memorandum of Procedure definitely needs fine tuning- There is a need to have a 'consequence hearing' to assist in the matter for steps to be taken in the future to streamline the process and procedure of appointment of judgf!S, to make it more responsive to the needs of the people, to make it more transparent and in tune with societal needs, and more particularly, to avoid a Fifth Judges case Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014- National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014. Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 Validity of - Appointment and transfer of Judges in Constitutional Courts - Scheme and structure - Discussed - Held (per Kurian, J.): During the first phase of the working of the Constitution, the Executive claimed an upper hand in
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the appointment and the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justices of the High Courts concerned were only to be 'consulted', the expression often understood in its literaf sense - The decision was taken by the Executive with the participation of the Chief Justice - This process fell for scrutiny in the decision of Supreme Court in Samsher Singh case wherein a seven-Judge Bench, inter alia held that "independence of the Judiciary" is a cardinal principle of the Constitution which "is guarded by the relevant article making consultation with the Chief Justice of India obligatory" and that "in all conceivable cases consultation with that highest dignitary of Indian justice will and should be accepted by the Government of India''- The Bench dealing with the First Judges Case, which had a coram only of seven, however, held otherwise, though with a majority of four against three The nine-Judges Bench in the Second Judges Case overruled the First Judges Case, holding that appointment of Judges to the High Courts and the Supreme Court forms an integral part of the independence of judiciary, that independence of judiciary is part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the Executive cannot interfere with the primacy of the judiciary in the matter of appointments - Third Judges Case, in 1998, is only an explanatory extension of the working of the principles in the Second Judges Case by institutionalizing the procedure of appointment, introducing the Collegium- Thus, the structural supremacy of the judiciary in the constitutionally allotted sphere was restored by the Second and Third Judges Cases - This Bench is bound by the ratio that independence of judiciary is part of the basic structure of Constitution and that the appointment of Judges to the High Courts and the Supreme Court is an integral part of the concept of independence of judiciary-And for that simple reason, the Constitution 99rh Amendment is declared unconstitutional -
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Judiciary- Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts.
National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - ,Validity of- Held (per Kurian, J.): Since it is being held by the majority that the amendment itself i.e. Constitution 99th amendment is bad, there is no point in dealing with the validity of the creature of the amendment, viz., the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014- It does not exist under law- Judiciary- Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges.
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Constitutional Law - Interpretation of Constitution Typology of constitutional arguments- "Historical': "textual", "structural", "prudential", "doctrinal" and "ethical" - Effect of Constitution 991h amendment - Held (per Kurian, J.): In interpreting the Constitution, all the tools are to be appropriately used, and quite often, in combination too - In the present case, the Constitution 99th amendment has introduced a new constitutional scheme for appointment of Judges to the High Courts and the Supreme Court - The three constitutional wings, their powers and functions under the Constitution, and their intra relationship being the key issues to be analysed in the present case, the 'structural tool' is to be prominently applied for resolving the issues- Validity of the Constitution 99th amendment is to be tested on the touchstone of the theory of the basic structure - Separation of powers is the tectonic structure of the Constitution of India - Under the constitutional scheme, one branch does not interfere impermissibly with the constitutionally assigned powers and functions of another branch - The permissible areas of interference are the checks and balances- But there are certain exclusive areas for each branch which can be described as powers central~ There shall be no interference on powers central of each branch -Any attempt by diluting the basic structure to create a committed judiciary, however remote be the possibility, is to be nipped in the bud - The
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Parliament has no power to gerrymander the Constitution - A The Constitution ggth amendment impairs the structural distribution of powers, and hence, it is impermissible - . ·Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014. Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - New scheme 8 envisaged in terms of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 for replacing the Collegium system - Whether even if the said Constitutional amendment is struck down, the Collegium does not resurrect - Held (per C Kurian, J.): The argument does not appeal even to common sense - The 991h Amendment sought to 'substitute' a few provisions in the Constitution and 'insert' a few new provisions - Once the process of substitution and insertion by way of a constitutional amendment is itself held to be bad and D impermissible, the pre-amended provisions automatically resurface and revive - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014. Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Collegium system Need for improvement therein - Held (per Kurian, J.): The present Collegium system lacks transparency, accountability and objectivity- The trust deficit has affected the credibility of the Collegium system, as sometimes observed by the civic society - Quite often, very serious a/legations and many a time not unfounded too, have been raised that its approach has been highly subjective - The allegations certainly call for a deep introspection - It is a curable situation yet - No doubt, the fault is not wholly of the Collegium - The Second and Third Judges Case had provided effective tools in the /)ands of the Executive to prevent aberrations - Executive seldom effectively used those tools - Therefore, the Co/legium system needs to be improved requiring a 'glasnost' and a 'perestroika', and hence the case needs to
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be heard further in this regard.
Constitution of India - Art.368 - Amendment of Constitution - Limitation on Power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution - Test of basic"Structure - Held (per Goel, J.): Article 368 of the Constitution provides for power to 8 amend the Constitution and procedure therefor - A constitutional amendment has to pass the test of basic structure - Whether or not the basic structure was violated has to be finally determined by the Supreme Court from case C tocase. ·Constitution of India - Basic structure I feature - What is- Held (per Goel, J.): Whether a feature of the Constitution is basic feature or part of basic structure is to be determined having regard to its place in the scheme of the Constitution o and consequence of its denial on the working of the Constitution. Judiciary- Judiciary and democracy- Held (per Goel, J.): It is the faith of the people in the impartiality and competence of judiciary which sustains democracy - The E judiciary is entrusted the power to control the power of the Executive and the Legislature whenever it is alleged that the said organs have exceeded their constitutionally assigned authority- This is the essence of the democracy.
Judiciary- Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges- Scheme and structure - Whether primacy of Judiciary in Appointment of Judges is part of basic structure:; Held (per Goel, J.): The decisions of the Supreme Court expressly lay down that independence G of judiciary and judicial review are part of basic structure Broad separation of powers between the three departments of the State is a part of doctrine of checks and balances- It is also a part of democracy - Independence of judiciary is integral to the entire scheme of the Constitution without which
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neither primacy of the Constitution nor Federal character, Social Democracy nor rights of equality and liberty can be effective - The earlier decisions in Second and Third Judges' case have to be taken as binding precedents - Once it is so, it has to be held that primacy of the judiciary in appointment of judges is part of the basic structure - Appointment of judges is part of independence ofjudiciary- It is the faith of the people in the impartiality and competence of judiciary which sustains democracy- If appointment ofjudges, which is integral to functioning ofjudiciary is influenced or controlled by the Executive, it will certainly affect impartiality ofjudges and their functioning - The acknowledged scheme of the Constitution and its working is not to allow domination of the Executive in appointment of Judges - Even by amendment primacy of judiciary in appointment of judges cannot be excluded - Plea of presumption of constitutionality can be of no avail where an established basic feature of the Constitution is sought to be damaged - Similarly, the plea that Parliament is best equipped to assess the needs of the people is not enough reason to extend the power of Parliament to amend the basic feature of the Constitution The change of time does not justify greater role for the Executive in appointment of judges - Independence of judiciary is key element in the entire functioning of the Constitution and such independence is integrally linked with the appointment of judges free from Executive interference - Any perceived shortcoming in the working of existing mechanism of appointment of judges cannot by itself justify alteration or damage of the existing scheme once it is held to be part of basic feature - Primacy of judiciary and limited role of the Executive in appointment of judges is part of the basic structure of the Constitution - The primacy of judiciary is in initiating a proposal and finalising the same - The CJ/ has the last word in the matter- The Executive is at liberty to
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give suggestions prior to initiation of proposal and to give feedback on character and antecedents of the candidates proposed and object to the appointment for disclosed reasons as held in Second and Third Judges' cases. Judiciary - Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Amendment in scheme and structure - National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) set up under the aegis of Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 read with the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - NJAC to comprise the Chief Justice of India, Chairperson, ex officio; two other senior Judges of Supreme Court, next to the Chief Justice of India as Members, ex officio; the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice as Member, ex officio; and two eminent persons, to be nominated by a Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of Opposition in the House of the People Whether under the impugned amendment the basic feature of primacy of judiciary in appointment of judges has been altered or damaged - Held (per Goel, J.): Under the unamended scheme of appointment ofjudges, which is a basic feature of the Constitution, the President is to make appointment, after consultation with the CJ/ representing the judiciary- Dfsregarding the views of the CJ/ is permissible in exceptional situations for recorded reasons having bearing on character and antecedents of a candidate and if such reasons are found to be acceptable to the CJ/ - Under the amended scheme, no such final view can be taken by the CJ/ - Without giving any reason, the Minister or the nominated members can reject the unanimous view of the judges - Chief Justice of the High Court is not a member of the Commission and has no Constitutional role in appointment/transfer of the judges of the High Courts- Mere fact that without the judges, the Minister and the nominated
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members cannot make an appointment is not at par with the situation where a decision itself is taken by the CJ/ representing the judiciary- Even if in appointing two eminent members CJ/ is a/so a member of the Committee, the fact remains that the PM and the Leader of the Opposition have significant role in appointing such members, who will have power not only equal to the CJ/ and two senior most judges of the Supreme Court in making appointment of judges of the Supreme Court and appointment/transfer of judges of the High Courts but also right to reject the unanimous proposal of the CJ/ and the two senior most judges - Such composition of the Commission cannot be held to be conducive to the independence of judiciary - Appointment ofjudges of the Supreme Court and appointment/transfer of judges of the High Courts, can certainly be influenced to a great extent by the Law Minister and two nominated members, thereby affecting the independence of judiciary - The amendment does away with the primacy of even unanimous opinion of the judicial members as such opinion is not enough to finalise an appointment-The primacy ofjudiciary as always understood in binding judicial precedents comprises of initiation of name and taking a final call- These two core features constitute identity of the primacy ofjudiciary - This concept of primacy is compromised if the judiciary is unable to initiate a proposal in the first instance or if such proposal can be effectively rejected - The impact thereof being that the appointment of judges could be made under the influence of the Executive represented by the Law Minister or the non-judge members in whose appointment the predominant voice is not of the judiciary - The impact of such appointments will be that the judges appointed will owe their appointments to the Executive which may be destructive of the public confidence and impartiality of judiciary a.nd adversely affect the role of the judiciary as an important
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impartial constitutional organ - Constitutionally conferred judicial primacy in appointment ofjudges cannot be whittled down or sought to be controlled by those who are not given or allowed to take over such functions - Even granting the best of intentions, the Parliament could not act beyond the authority conferred on it by the Constitution - Thus, taking away primacy of judiciary or conferring such primacy on a body which is not at par with the said concept is certainly not a choice available with the Parliament- The Constitution of India has its own background and personality - Models of other countries could not be blindly followed so as to damage the identity and personality of the Indian Constitution - The Judicial Commissions referred to by the Attorney General do not show the trend of reducing the pre-existing role of judiciary- In fact, the trend is for reducing the pre-existing role of the Executive - In the impugned amendment it is the reverse - Thus, the contention of working of other Constitutions or setting up of judicial Commissions with varying compositions in other countries does not justify the impugned amendment which is contrary to the basic structure of the Indian Constitution - There is no merit in the contention that in the present case mere alteration in a constitutional provision does not amount to damage of a basic feature - It is not a case of simple amendment to iron out creases - Its impact clearly affects the independence of judiciary - Predominant role of the Executive is not permissible - The new scheme damages the basic feature of the Constitution under which primacy in appointment of judges has to be with the judiciary - Under the new scheme such primacy has been given a go-bye- Thus the impugned amendment cannot be sustained - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014. Judiciary - Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Amendment in
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scheme and structure - National Judicial Appointments A Commission (NJAC) set up under the aegis of Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 read with the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014- NJAC apart· from Judges comprising of Law Minister and two eminent persons to be nominated by a specified Committee- One of B the eminent person was to be nominated from amongst the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, Minorities or Women Such reservation for one of the nominated members challenged- Held (per Goel, J.): The views of the Constitution C makers and eminent expert committees clearly show that role of the Executive in appointment ofjudges has to be minimum and by and large limited to check the character and antecedents of the candidates and not to finally assess the D merit and suitability of such candidates - In this view of the matter, even ifthe contention that no guideline was required for criteria for appointment of eminent persons when the Committee will be comprised of high dignitaries is accepted the fact remains that such persons will play not merely E supporting but pre-dominant role in appointing Supreme Court and High Court judges which will not be congenial to the independence of judiciary - There is no justification for reservation for one of the nominated members being from · specified categories- Such provision is against the scheme F of the Constitution and contrary to the object of selecting judges purely by merit - The nature of appointment does not justify any affirmative action for advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes or for the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or women - The G appointment ofjudges has to be on evaluation of merits and suitability of the candidates - Religion, caste or sex of the evaluator has no relevance. Judiciary - Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts -
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Appointment and transfer of Judges - Evaluation and suitability of a candidate for appointment as judge of the Supreme Court or High Courts - Held (per Goel, J.): The · appointment of a judge of the Supreme Court is normally made out of Chief Justices of High Courts or senior judges B or eminent lawyers or eminent jurists whose merit is better known to senior judges- Their evaluation has to be impartial and free from any political or other considerations- Persons making selection are required to be best placed to assess their merit and suitability - Pre-dominant and decisive role C of the judiciary is a requirement not only of independence of judiciary and separation of powers but also for inspiring confidence of the people at large necessary for strength of the Democracy- The citizens having a grievance of violation of their fundamental and legal rights against the Executive or the Legislature expect that their grievance is considered by persons whose appointments are not influenced by the Executive or the Legislature- If an appointment is perceived as being influenced by political consideration or any other E extraneous influence, faith in impartiality, which is hall mark of independence of judiciary, will be eroded - The scheme in other countries cannot be mechanically followed when it is in conflict with the basic scheme of the Indian Constitution.
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Constitutional Law - Amendment of Constitution F 'Identity test' and the 'impact test' - Held (per Goel, J.): The word amendment literally means betterment or improvement and sponsor of amendment may always claim improvement - Such claim has to be tested by applying the 'identity test' and the 'impact test' - The amendment should not affect the G identity of an essential feature of the Constitution - The impact of the amendment on the working of the scheme of the Constitution has to be taken into account- This brings to some extent subjective element which is unavoidable even while testing any legislation which is alleged to be violative
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of fundamental rights and justified on the concept of A 'reasonable restrictions' - In this regard, effect of Executive interference which has been documented by expert studies cannot be held to be irrelevant or ignored on the ground that this is a subject of wisdom of Parliament- It is not merely the text of the amendment but also its impact and potential which B has to be kept in mind on 'identity' of the original scheme and the 'width' of the power under the new scheme- The new scheme may iron out the creases but the mechanism should be comparable to the substituted scheme - Words and Phrases - "amendment" - Meaning of. C Judiciary - Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Procedure - New scheme and structure - Six-member National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) set up - NJAC apart D from Judges comprising of Union Law Minister and two eminent persons to be nominated by a specified Committee - Presence of Law Minister and two eminent persons - If proper- Held (per Goel, J.): Under the new scheme, the Law Minister has been given role equal to the CJ/ - Right from E the commencement of the Constitution, this role of the Law Minister was never envisaged while initiating the process and finalizing it - Law Minister, in participatory scheme, could at best. suggest a name or give his comments on the names proposed but the proposal could and was always initiated by F the CJ/ - At the stage of initiation, if equal authority is conferred, this will erode the primacy ofjudiciary- Other two persons to be nominated by a Committee which also has predominant political voice to be placed at par with the CJ/ in initiating and finalizing a proposal destroys the original G scheme beyond its identity-Any suggestion before initiation of a name or feedback even after initiation may be useful and may not affect independence of judiciary but equal participation by the Law Minister and two outsiders in final
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decision for initiation or appointment can be detrimental to the independence ofjudiciary- It cannot be wished away by presuming that the Law Minister and the two distributors will not be influenced by any extraneous consideration - Such a presumption will be contrary to the acknowledged factual experience - It will also be against the concept of separation ofjudiciary from the Executive- More over this will be contrary to the basic intention of the Constitution makers. National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - ss.2, 3, 5(2), Second proviso to s.5(2), 5(3), 6(1), 6(2), 6(3), 6(6), 6(8), 8 & 13- Validity of the NJACAct-Held (per Goel, J.): In view of the conclusion about the Constitution (Ninetyninth Amendment) Act being beyond the competence of the Parliament, it is not necessary to discuss the validity of the NJAC Act as the said Act cannot survive once the amendment is struck down - However, consistent with the view that primacy of judiciary in appointment of judges cannot be compromised, and on that ground not only s.2 of the Amendment dispensing with the mandatory consultation with the judiciary as contemplated under the unamended provisions, s.3 conferring power on the NJAC (under Article 1248) and providing for composition of the Commission under Article 124A giving a role to the Law Minister and two eminent persons equal to the CJ/ in recommending appointments as CJ/, Judges of Supreme Court, Chief Justices and other Judges of the High Courts and recommending transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of the High Courts are unconstitutional but also Article 124C giving power to the Parliament to regulate the procedure and to lay down the manner of selection was also unconstitutional, the impugned Act has to bf) struck down - It goes far beyond the procedural aspects- In s.5(2) 'suitability criteria' is left to be worked out by regulations - Second proviso to s.5(2) and
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s. 6(6) give veto to two members of the Commission which is A not contemplated by the Amendment - s.5(3) and s.6(8) provide for conditions for selection to be laid down by regulations which are not mere procedural matters - s. 6 authorises the recommendations for appointment as judges of the High Courts without the proposal being first initiated B by the Chief Justice of the High Court- s.6(1) provides for recommendation for appointment of Chief Justice of a High Court on the basis of inter se seniority of High Court Judges - This may affect giving representation to as many High Courts as viable as, in inter se seniority, many judges of only C one High Court may be senior most - s. 6(2) provides for seeking nomination from Chief Justices of High Courts, but s.6(3) empowers the Commission itself to make recommendation for appointment as Judge of the High Court D and seek comments from Chief Justice after short listing the candidates by itself- s.8 enables the Central Government to appoint officers and employees of the Commission and to lay down their conditions of service - The Secretary of tf1e Government is the Convenor of the Commission - s. 13 E requires all regulations to be approved by the Parliament These provisions in the Act impinge upon the independence of judiciary - Even if the doctrine of basic structure is not applied in judging the validity of a parliamentary statute, independence ofjudiciary and rule of law are parts ofArticles F 14, 19 and 21 of the ConsUtuUon and absence of independence of judiciary affects the said Fundamental · Rights - The NJAC Act is thus liable to be struck down Constitution of India -Arts. 124A, 1248 and 124C. Judiciary- Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts - G Appointment and transfer of Judges - Procedure Amendment in - Effect of Amendment being struck down Held (per Goel, J.): The contention that even (f Amendment is held to be void, the pre-existing system cannot be restored
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has no logic - In exercise of power of judicial review, a provision can be declared void in which case the legal position as it stands without such void provision can be held to prevail - It is not a situation when position has not been made clear while deciding an issue- On amendment being struck down, B the pre-existing system stands revived- Constitution (Ninetyninth Amendment) Act, 2014.
Judiciary- Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Procedure - Review C of Working of the Existing System- Held (per Goel, J.): Since the system existing prior to amendment will stand revived on the amendment being struck down and grievances have been expressed about its functioning, such grievances ought to be considered - Such grievances ought to be gone into for which the matter needs to be listed for hearing - The impugned Constitution Amendment and the NJAC Act are struck down as unconstitutional - Pre-existing scheme of appointment ofjudges stands revived- The matter be listed for consideration of the surviving issue of grievances as to E working of pre-existing system - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 - National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014. Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Scheme of the F Constitution - History and debates in the Constituent · Assembly- Consultation with the Chief Justice of India Interpretation of - Role of the Parliament - Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): The legislative history clearly indicates that the members of the Constituent G Assembly clearly refused to vest an absolute and unfettered power to appoint Judges of the constitutional courts in any one of the 3 branches of the Constitution - Constituent Assembly declined to assign any role to the Parliament - It H declined to vest an unbridled power in the executive -At the
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same time did not agree with the proposal that the CJl's A concurrence is required for any appointment - Word 'consultation' instead of 'concurrence' was used, but that was done merely to indicate that absolute discretion was not given to any one, not even to the Chief Justice of India as individual, much less to the executive, which earlier had absolute B discretion under the Government of India Acts - The Court never held that consultation means concurrence as is sought to be interpreted in some quarters and even in the stated objects and reasons for the Amendment. Constitution of India -Amendment to- Effect of- Held C (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): Amendment of one or some of the Articles constituting a basic feature may or may not result in the destruction of the basic structure of the Constitution - It all depends on the context-Amendment of D a single article may result in the destruction of the basic structure of the Constitution depending upon the nature of the basic feature and the context of the abrogation of that article if the purpose sought to be achieved by the Article constitutes the quintessential to the basic structure of the E Constitution. Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): Any appointment process established under the Constitution must necessarily be conducive for establishment of not only an independent judiciary but also ensure its efficiency- the two qualities essential for preservation of liberty.
Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts - G Appointment of Judges - Whether primacy to the opinion of the judiciary in the matter ofjudicial appointments is essential - Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): There is abundance of opinion (in discerning and responsible quarters of the civil society in the legal fraternity, jurists, H
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political theorists and scholars) that primacy to the opinion of judiciary is not a normative or constitutional fundamental for establishment of an independent and efficient judiciaryThe basic feature of the Constitution is not primacy of the opinion of the CJ/ (Collegium) but lies in non- investiture of B absolute power in the President (Executive) to choose and appoint judges of Constitutional Courts -- To assume or assert that judiciary alone is concerned with the preservation of liberties and does that job well, is an assumption that is dogmatic, bereft of evidentiary basis and historically C disproved - Judiciary is not the only constitutional organ which protects liberties of the people -Accordingly, primacy to the opinion of the judiciary in the matter of judicial appointments is not the only mode of securing independence of judiciary for protection of liberties - Consequently, the assumption that primacy of the Judicial Branch in the appointments process is an essential element and thus a basic feature is empirically flawed without any basis.
Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Selection of Judges - Scheme envisaged in terms of sixmember National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) - Whether the presence of the Law Minister in the NJAC, which confers 116 of the voting power per se undermines the independence of the judiciary - Held (per F Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): No- The Executive with a vast administrative machinery under its control is capable of making enormous and valuable contribution to the selection process - The objection is justified to some extent on the trust deficit in the Executive Branch in the G constitutional sense, to be a component of the NJA C - The same logic applies a fortiari to the Judicial branch, notwithstanding the belief that it is the least dangerous branch - The Constituent Assembly emphatically declined to repose exclusive trust even in the CJ/ - To wholly eliminate the
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Executive from the process of selection would be inconsistent A with the foundational premise that government in a democracy is by chosen representatives of the people Such exclusion has no parallel in any other democracy whose models were examined by the Constituent Assembly - Established principles of constitutional government B practices in other democratic constitutional arrangements and the fact that the Constituent Assembly provided a role for the Executive clearly prohibit the inference that Executive participation. in the selection process abrogates a basic feature-Exclusion of the Executive Branch is destructive of C the basic feature of checks and balances- a fundamental principle in constitutional theory. Constitution of India-Art. 124A(1)(d)- Stipulation in Article 124A(1 )(d) that the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) should also consist of two eminent persons nominated by a Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of Opposition - Legality of - Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): To believe that members of the judiciary alone could bring valuable inputs to the appointment process requires great conceit and disrespect for the civil society All power could be misused including judicial power - The remedy is not to deny grant of power but to structure it so as to eliminate the potential for abuse - The power to nominate two eminent persons is conferred upon three high constitutional functionaries - the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the CJ/ - It is elementary political knowledge that the Prime Minister and the Leader of Opposition would always have conflicting political interests and would rarely agree upon any issue - Nonetheless, possibility of a bipartisan compromise cannot be ruled out Though, the presence of CJ/ in the Committee should normally be a strong deterrent, the possibility of the CJ/ failing
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to perceive a political compromise or helplessness in the event of such compromise, cannot be ruled out - It is incontestable that nomination of eminent persons is not immune to judicial review- There is thus possibility of delay in functioning of NJAC and inevitably the process of B appointments to constitutional courts - It is, therefore, essential that there must be an entrenched process of nomination of eminent persons which eliminates risk of possible bipartisan compromises - The only conceivable curative is to incorporate another tier of scrutiny/n the process C of nomination - Following safeguard would bring this process within permissible contours of the basic feature simultaneously eliminating the 'delay factor' - The Committee contemplated under Article 124-A(1)(a) should prepare a panel of three members for each of the two categories of the nominees (for eminent persons) - in all a panel of six persons - Such panel should be placed before the full house of the Supreme Court for voting - Nominees securing the highest vote in each of the two categories should E eventually be nominated as eminent members of the NJAC - Such procedure would still preserve the choice of eminent persons primarily with the Committee contemplated under Art. 124-A, while incorporating sufficient safeguard against possible abuse of the power by the Committee.
Constitution of India - Art. 1248(c) - Article 1248 set forth the duties of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) - Art. 124B(c) obligating NJAC to ensure that the person recommended is of ability and integrity- Contention that the amendment does not lay down G any guidelines to be followed by the NJAC for assessing ability and integrity - Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): Even in the absence of any express declaration, such an obligation is inherent and implied, having regard to functional responsibilities entrusted to the NJAC - The
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precision is only an abundanti cautela - Having regard to the nature (i) of the document by which such obligation is created; (ii) fhe composition of the body (NJAC} upon which the obligation is cast; and (iii) the nature of the assignment, the argument is required to be rejected - NJAC is a constitutional authority created to perform an important constitutional function - Its charter is the Constitution itse/fNotwithstanding, the prolixity of our Constitution, a constitution is not expected or required to spell out every minute detail regarding administration of the State - Three members of the highest judicial body of this country, a member of the Union Cabinet and two eminent persons chosen by a Committee consisting of three exalted office holders under the Constitution constitute the NJAC- To suggest that the NJAC requires detailed guidelines expressly spelt out in the text of the Constitution amounts to judicially mandating inflexible standards for constitutional drafting - The task of expounding a Constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute - Even prior to the amendment, the constitutional text had no express guidelines for the President and the CJ/ to follow-After the amendment, the obligation is unvaried - The only change is in the composition of the players to whom the task is entrusted and the mode of performing the task is altered with a-view to achieve greater degree of transparency in the selection process- To contend that the amendment is destructive of the basic structure since it does not lay down any guidelines tantamounts to holding that the design of the Constitution as originally enacted is defective! ·
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National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 G - s.6(6) - Stipulation under s.6(6) of the Act that if any two members of the NJAC do not agree with the recommendation proposed by the NJAC, the NJAC shall not recommend such candidate - Legality of - Held (per
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Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): The question whether the content of s. 6(6) confers a power of veto or prescribes a special majority is only of semantic relevance - Whatever name one calls it, the result is the same - The two members of the NJAC can override the opinion of the other four and stall the recommendation - There is nothing inherently illegal about such a prescription. Judiciary - Higher judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges- Collegium system - If appropriate for assessment of the suitability of candidates for appointment as Judges of Constitutional Courts - Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): The fiasco created in Dinakaran case and Shanti Bhushan case would justify the participation of the members of the civil society in the process to eliminate from the selection process the maladies involved in the process - The abovementioned two are not the only cases where the system failed - It is a matter of public record that in the last 20 years, after the advent of the collegium system, number of recommendations made by the collegia of High Courts came to be rejected by the col/egium of the Supreme Court - There are also cases where the collegium of the Supreme Court quickly retraced its steps having rejected the recommendations of a particular name made by the High Court collegium giving scope for a great deal of speculation as to the factors which must have weighed with the collegium to make such a quick volte face - Such decisions may be justified in some cases and may not in other cases - There is no accountability in this regard - The records are absolutely beyond the reach of any person including the judges of the Supreme Court who are not lucky enough to become the Chief Justice of India - Such a state of affairs does not enhance the credibility of the institution and is not good for the people of this country. Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 -
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Validity of - Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): The amendment is upheld.
National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Validity of- Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): In view of the majority decision holding the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act to be unconstitutional and void, there is no useful purpose in examining the constitutionality of the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014. Constitution of India - "Basic Features" and "Basic Structure" - Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): The expressions 'basic structure' and 'basic features' convey two different ideas - The basic structure of the Constitution is the sum total of the basic features of the Constitution The basic features are components of basic structure- Either a particular Article or set of Articles can constitute a basic feature of the Constitution - Amendment of one or some of the Articles constituting a basic feature may or may not result in the destruction of the basic structure of the Constitution. Practice and Procedure - Supreme Court - Recusal of Judge at the asking of a litigating party- If proper - New scheme contemplated for replacing the Collegium system of appointment and transfer of Judges in Constitutional Courts - National Judicial Appointments Commission set up under the aegis of Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 read with the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 - Constitutional validity of the said two enactments challenged in writ petitions filed before the Supreme Court of India- Matter originally listed before threeJudge Bench - Later referred to a five-Judge Bench, comprising of Ani/ R. Dave, Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ. - Subsequently, Hon'ble CJ/ reconstituted the Bench with J.S. Khehar, J.
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Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ. - Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. S. Khehar, Presiding Judge on the reconstituted Bench, at that time was a member of the Collegium of five H<?n'ble Judges - When the reconstituted Bench commenced hearing, prayer made for recusal of Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. S. Khehar from the Bench Prayer for recusal on ground that the position of Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.S. Khehar as the Presiding Judge on the Bench was not consistent with (and apparently at conflict with) his position as a member of the 'Collegium' which exercises significant constitutional power; and that it was inappropriate if a sitting member of a Collegium sat in judgment over a scheme that sought to replace it- Held: Not tenable- Held (per Khehar, J.): There is no doubt about the fact, that I have been a member of the 1+4 collegium, and it is likely that I would also shortly become a Member of the NJAC, if the present challenge raised by the petitioners was not to succeed - I would therefore remain a part of the selection procedure, irrespective of the process which prevails- That however is the position with reference to four of the instant five-Judge Bench - Besides me, my colleagues on the Bench- J. Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur and Kurian Joseph, JJ. would in due course be a part of the collegium (if the writpetitioners were to succeed), or alternatively, would be a part of the NJAC (if the writ-petitioners were to fail) - In such eventuality, the averment of conflict of interest, ought to have been raised not only against me, but also against my three colleagues - But, that was not the manner in which the issue has been canvassed- The prayer for my recusal is thus not well founded- If I were to accede to the prayer for my recusal, I would be initiating a wrong practice, and laying down a wrong precedent - A Judge may recuse at his own, from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice - That would be a matter
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of his own choosing- But recusal atthe asking of a litigating party, unless justified, must never to be acceded to - For that would give the impression, of the Judge had been scared out of the case, just by the force of the objection -A Judge before he assumes his office, takes an oath.to discharge his duties without fear or favour- He would breach his oath of office, if he accepts a prayer for recusal, unless justified - It is my duty to discharge my responsibility with absolute earnestness and sincerity- It is my duty to abide by my oath of office, to uphold the Constitution and the laws - My decision to continue to be a part of the Bench, flows from the oath which I took, at the time of my elevation to this Court Held (per Chelameswar, J.) (for himself and Goel, J.): It is one of the settled principles of a civilised legal system that a Judge is required to be impartial - It is said that the hallmark of a democracy is the existence of an impartial Judge - From earlier decisions, the following principles emerge; (1) If a Judge has a financial interest in the outcome of a case, he is automatically disqualified from hearing the case; (2) In cases where the interest of the Judge in the case is other than financial, then the disqualification is not automatic but an enquiry is required whether the existence of such an interest disqualifies the Judge tested in the light of either on the principle of "real danger" or "reasonable apprehension" of bias; and (3) The Pinochet case added a new category i.e that the Judge is automatically disqualified from hearing a case where the Judge is interested in a cause which is being promoted by one of the parties to the case - It is nobody's case that, in the case at hand, Justice Khehar had any pecuniary interest or any other interest falling under the second of the above-mentioned categories - By the very nature of the case, no such interest can arise at all- Insofar as the principle of law laid down in Pinochet case is concerned, all the parties to these proceedings claim to be promoting
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the cause of ensuring the existence of an impartial and independent judiciary - The only difference of opinion between the parties is regarding the process by which such a result is to be achieved - Therefore, it cannot be said that Justice Khehar shares any interest which any one of the parties to the proceeding is seeking to promote - The implication of submission made by the petitioners is that Justice Khehar would be pre-determined to hold the impugned legislation to be invalid - One fails to understand the stand of the petitioners - If such apprehension of the petitioners comes true, the beneficiaries would be the petitioners only- The grievance, if any, on this ground should be on the part of the respondents - Only a party who has suffered or likely to suffer an adverse adjudication because of the possibility of bias on the part of the adjudicator can raise the objection - The significant power as described by the petitioners does not inhere only to the members of the Collegium, but inheres in every Judge of the Supreme Court who might be called upon to express his opinion regarding the proposals of various appointments of the High Court Judges, Chief Justices or Judges of Supreme Court- While the members of the Collegium are required to exercise such "significant power" with respect to each and every appointment of the above-mentioned categories, the other Judges of the Supreme Court are required to exercise such "significant power'', at least with respect to the appointments to or from the High Court with which they were earlier associated with either as judges or Chief Justices - The argument of the petitioners, if accepted would render all the Judges of this Court disqualified from hearing the present controversy-A result not legally permitted by the "doctrine of necessity" - For the above-mentioned reasons, the submission that Justice Khehar should recuse from the proceedings is liable to be rejected - Held (per Kurian, J.):
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There is no situation warranting recusal of Justice Khehar in this case - However, it is appropriate also to deal with the other side of the coin, whether a Judge should state reasons for his recusal in a particular case- Being an institution whose hallmark is transparency, it is only proper that the Judge discharging high and noble duties, at least broadly indicate the reasons for recusing from the case so that the litigants or the well-meaning public may not entertain any misunderstanding that the recusa/ was for a/together irrelevant reasons like the cases being very old, involving detailed consideration, decision on several questions of law, a situation where the Judge is not happy with the roster, a Judge getting unduly sensitive about the public perception of his image, Judge wanting not to cause displeasure to · anybody, Judge always wanting not to decide any sensitive or contro_versial issues, etc. - Once reasons for recusa/ are indicated, there will not be any room for attributing any motive for the recusal - This would help to curb the tendency for forum shopping - Impartiality of a Judge is the sine qua non for the integrity institution- Transparency in procedure is one of the major factors constituting the integrity of the office of a Judge in conducting his duties and the functioning of the court - The litigants would always like to know though they may not have a prescribed right to know, as to why a Judge has recused from hearing the case or despite request, has not recused to hear his case - Reasons are required to be indicated broadly- Of course, in case the disclosure of the reasons is likely to affect prejudicially any case or cause or interest of someone else, the Judge is free to state that on account of personal reasons which the Judge does not want to disclose, he has decided to recuse himself from hearing the case- Held (per Lokur, J.): When an application is made for the recusal of a judge ftom hearing a case, the application is made to the concerned judge and not to the Bench as a
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whole - Therefore, Justice Khehar is absolutely correct in stating that the decision is entirely his - As far as the view expressed by Justice Kurian Joseph that reasons.should be given while deciding an application for recusal, I would prefer not to join that decision - In the first place, giving or not giving B reasons was not an issue herein- That reasons are presently being given is a different matter a/together- Secondly, the giving of reasons is fraught with some difficulties - The issue of recusal from hearing a case is not as simple as it appears - The questions thrown up are quite significant and since it C appears that such applications are gaining frequency, it is time that some procedural and substantive rules are framed in· this regard - If appropriate rules are framed, then, in a given case, it would avoid embarrassment to other judges on the Bench - Judiciary- Higher Judiciary- Constitutional Courts-Appointment and transfer of Judges.
Judiciary- Higher Judiciary - Constitutional Courts Appointment and transfer of Judges - Primacy of the judiciary- Earlier decisions of Supreme Court in First Judges E case, Second Judges case and Third Judges case - In the First Judges case (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India), the function of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was described as an executive function, and it was held by a seven-Judge Bench per majority, that the ultimate power of F appointment, unquestionably rested with the President- The judgment was overruled in the Second Judges case (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India), wherein it was held by a nine-Judge Bench that primacy with reference to the ultimate power of appointment G (or transfer) vested with the judiciary - Exposition of law declared in the Second Judges case, was reaffirmed by a nine-Judge Bench in the Third Judges case (In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 1998) - The Union of India, then framed a Memorandum of Procedure on 30.6.1999, for the
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appointment of Judges and Chief Justices to the High Courts and the Supreme Court, in consonance with the Second Judges case and Third Judges case - And appointments came to be made thereafter, in consonance with the Memorandum of Procedure - New scheme now contemplated under the ambit of the National Judicial Appointments Commission set up under the aegis of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 read with National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014- But constitutional validity of these two enactments directly challenged in the instant proceedings- Petitioners inter alia relied on the judgment in the Second Judges case, and the judgment in the Third Judges case whereas Respondents, inter alia relied on the judgment rendered in the First Judges case, and sought reconsideration of the decisions rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases- Prayer for reference to a larger Bench, and for reconsideration of the Second and Third Judges cases - Held (per order of the Court): Not tenable - Held (per Khehar, J.): The power of review was exercised and stood expended when the First Judges case was reviewed by a larger Bench in the Second Judges case -And for sure, it was wholly unjustified for the Union of India, which had conceded during the course of hearing of the Third Judges case, that it had accepted as binding, the decision rendered in the Second Judges case, to try and re-agitate the matter all over again - The matter having been revisited, and the position having been conceded by the Union of India, it does not lie in the mouth of the Union of India, to seek reconsideration of the judicial declaration, in the Second and Third Judges cases - Further, there is a complete comity of purpose between the judiciary and the political-executive in the matter of selection and appointment of High Court Judges - And between them, there is clear transparency also - As views are exchanged in writing, views and counter-views, are
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in black and white - It is not possible to accept, that in the procedure contemplated under the Second and Third Judges cases, Judges at their own select Judges to the higher judiciary, or that, the system of lmperium in lmperio has been created for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary Viewed closely, the judgments in the Second and Third Judges cases, were rendered in a manner as would give complete effect to the observations made by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar with reference to Article 124 (as originally incorporated) - It is cleady erroneous for the respondents to contend, that the consultative process postulated between the President with the other Judges of the Supreme Court or the High Courts in the States, at the discretion of the President, had been done away with by the Second and Third Judges cases - Nothing of the sort- It has been, and is still open to the President, in his unfettered wisdom, to the consultation indicated in Article 124 - Additionally, it is open to the President, to rely on the same, during the course of the mandatory "consultation" with the Chief Justice of India - The above, further demonstrates the executive role in the selection of Judges to the higherjudiciary- Historically also, all the three wings of governance, have uniformally maintained, that while making appointments of Judges to the higherjudiciary, "independence of the judiciary" was accepted as an integral component of the spirit of the Constitution, and thereby, the term "consultation" used in the provisions under consideration, had to be understood as vesting primacy with the judiciary, with reference to the subjects contemplated under Articles 124, 217 and 222 - In view of the above historical exposition, there is really no legitimate reason for the respondents to seek a review of the judgments in the Second and Third Judges cases - Also the framers of the Constitution while drafting Article 50 of the Constitution, were clear and unanimous in their view, that there need to be a
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judiciary, separated from the influences of the executiv.e Supreme Court on a harmonious construction of the provisions of the Constitution, in the Second and Third Judges cases, rightfully held, that primacy in the above matter, vested with the judiciary, leading to the inference, that the term "consultation" in the provisions under reference, should be understood as giving primacy to the view-expressed by the judiciary, through the Chief Justice of India - Further, the Supreme Court, through a five-Judge Bench, in Sisir Kanta Satapathy case, has held, that recommendations made by the High Court in the consultative process envisaged under Article 233, is binding on the Governor - In the face of the aforestated binding precedent, on a controversy, which is startlingly similar to the one in hand, and has never been questioned, it is quite ununderstandab/e how the Union of India, desires to persuade this Court, to now examine the term "consultation" differently with reference to Articles 124 and 217, without assailing the meaning given to the aforesaid term, with reference to a matter also governing the judiciary - Held (per Lokur, J.): At least since 1935, if not earlier, the appointment ofjudges was made in accordance with the view of the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the High Court as the case may be - But even in those cases where there were aberrations pre-1959 (with the Chief Justice of the High Court having been by-passed) the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India was taken - The executive, therefore, never had real primacy in the matter of appointment ofjudges - The Constitution postulates a consultative and participatory process between the constitutional functionaries for appointing the 'best' possible person as a judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court - In this consultative process the final word is given, by a constitutional convention and practice developed over the years, to the Chief Justice of India since that constitutional functionary is best equippe.d
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to .appreciate the requirements of effective justice delivery, to maintain the independence of the judiciary, to keep at bay . external influences, 'eliminate political influence even at the stage of initial appointment of a Judge' and as the head of the judiciary, his/her judgment ought to be trusted in this regard - Dr. Ambedkar was of the confirmed view that the judiciary should be independent and impartial and ifthe Chief Justice of India does not have the final say in the matter then the judiciary is, in a sense, under some other authority and' therefore not independent to that extent- The constitutional convention, the constitutional scheme and the constitutional practice recognize the responsibility of the judiciary in the appointment ofjudges and this was merely formalized in the Second Judges case- The theory of the separation of powers or the distribution of powers was maintained by the Second Judges case rather than thrown overboard- The Constitution enjoins upon its branches 'separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity' and the Second Judges case has effectively maintained this equilibrium between the judiciary and the political executive, keeping the independence of the judiciary in mind, including the appointment ofjudges- Taking all these factors and the CAD into account, all of which were discussed in the Second Judges case it is difficult to accept the contention that the Second Judges case requires reconsideration on merits The Second Judges case was accepted by the AttorneyGeneral as mentioned in the Third Judges case and also by the President who did not raise any question about the interpretation given to Article 124(2) and Article 217(1) of the Constitution - These constitutional authorities having accepted the law laid down in the Second Judges case, there is no reason to reconsider that decision - There are no exceptional circumstances, clear and compelling reasons for reconsideration, nor can it be said that the Second Judges
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case was plainly erroneous or that it has a baneful effect on the public - On the contrary, the decision restored the independem;e of the judiciary in real terms and eliminated the baneful effect of executive controls - Also, it was categorically laid down in Samsher Singh case that the last word in matters pertaining to judiciary should be with the Chief Justice of India - Samsher Singh case was decided by a Bench of seven judges and no one has said that that decision requires reconsideration or that it does not lay down the correct law- The Second Judges case merely reiterates the 'last word' view in a limited sense- The Second Judges case has been correctly decided and the conventions and the principles laid down therein flow from our constitutional history and these.do not need any reconsideration - The only question now is whether the 991h Constitution Amendment Act violates the basic structure of the Constitution and to decide this question it is not necessary to reconsider the Second Judges case or the Third Judges case - This is apart from the fact that reconsideration is not warranted at law, even on merits - Held (Kurian, J.): Once the Supreme Court has addressed an issue on a substantial question of law as to the structure of the Constitution and has laid down the law, a request for revisit shall not be welcomed unless it is shown that the structural interpretation is palpably erroneous- None before this Bench could blur the graphic picture on the scheme of appointment of Judges and its solid structural base in the Constitution portrayed in the Second Judges Case - Held (per Goel, J.): The settled principle is that court should not, except when it is demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubts that its previous ruling given after due deliberation and full hearing was erroneous, revisit earlier decisions so that the law remains certain - In exceptional circumstances or under new set of conditions in the light of new ideas, earlier view, if considered mistaken, can be
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reversed - While march of law continues and new systems can be developed whenever needed, it can be done only if earlier systems are considered unworkable - No such situation has arisen - On settled principles, no case for revisiting earlier decisions by larger Benches is made out As regards the contention that there was patent error in the earlier decisions, the Second Judges' case shows that the Constituent Assembly Debates were exhaustively quoted and considered - Neither the debates nor the text adopted by the Constitution show that the power of appointment of Judges was intended to be conferred on the Executive or the Legislature - The practice and convention ever since the commencement of the Constitution showed that proposal for appointment was always initiated by the Judiciary and the last word on the subject belonged to the CJ/ - This scheme was consistent with the intention of the Constitution makers - The Judicial <:;ommissions in other countries and provisions of Constitutions of other countries conferring power on the Executive to appoint Judges may also not call for reconsideration of the Second Judges' case as many of such and similar provisions were duly considered in the Second Judges' case - No case thus made out for revisiting the earlier decisions in Second and Third Judges' cases - Held (Chelameswar, J.) (Minority opinion): This nation has witnessed many unpleasant events connected with judicial appointments - events which lend credence to the speculation that the system established by the Second and Third Judges cases in its operational reality is perhaps not the best system for securing an independent and efficient judiciary - There are conflicting opinions regarding the jurisprudential soundness of the judgment of Second Judges case - It is not necessary to examine that aspect of the matter for the purpose of determining the present controversy.
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In the judgment of Khehar. J.: S.P. Gupta v. Union oflndia 1981 (Supp) SCC 87 : 1982 SCR 365; Supreme CourtAdvocates-onRecord Association v. Union of India (1993) 4 sec 441 : 1993 (2) Suppl. scR 659; Re: Special Reference No.1 of 1998 (1998) 7 SCC 739 : 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400; Subhash Sharma v. Union oflndia1991 Supp (1) SCC 574: 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR 433; Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth (1977) 4 sec 193: 1978 (1) SCR 423; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587; Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 (2002) 8 SCC 237 : 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 366; S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC 126 : 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 621; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) sec 211: 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a (1973) 4 SCC 225 : 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (197 4) 2 SCC 831 : 1975 (1) SCR 814; Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1; Bhim Singh v. Union of India (2010) 5 SCC 538: 2010 (6) SCR 218; State of U.P. v. Jeet s. Bisht (2007) 6 sec 586 : 2001 (7) SCR 705; Suraz India Trust v. Union of India (2012) 13 sec 497: 2011 (4) SCR 224; Jindal Stainless Limited v. State of Haryana (2010) 4 SCC 595: 2010 (4) SCR 743; Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96: 1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497; Kera/a State Science and Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. (2006) 6 SCC 258 : 2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 243; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) 6 SCR 603; Magan/al Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay (1974) 2 SCC 402:
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1975 (1) SCR 1; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754: 1989 (3) SCR 316; Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 sec 111 : 2002 (3) SCR 100; Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2011) 4 SCC 450 : 2011 (4) SCR 19; State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004) 10 SCC 201 : 2004 (1) SCR 564; India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1990) 1 SCC 12 : 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 692; ·Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability v. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 97; State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. (1953) SCR 1069; Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North (1965) 2 SCR 908; Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union oflndia (1961) 2 SCR 828; Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1980) 1 SCC 223 : 1980 (1) SCR 769; Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. State of. Rajasthan (1993) 1 SCC 364 : 1992 (3) Suppl. SCR 103; Registrar(Admn.), High Court of Prissa, Cuttack v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy (1999) 7 SCC 725 : 1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 473; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of/ndia (1980) 3 SCC 625: 1981 (1) SCR 206; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachil/hu 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 : 1992 (1) SCR 686; Madras Bar Association v. Union of/ndia (2014) 10 SCC 1: M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212: 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336; Sardari Lal v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 1547 : 1971 (3) SCR 461; Union of India v. R. Gandhi (2010) 11 SCC 1 : 2010 (6) SCR 857; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 4 SCALE 1; State of Madras v. V. G. Row (1952) SCR 597; I. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR (1967) SC 1643 : 1967 SCR 762; Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 85 : 1971 (3) SCR 9; Centre for Public Interest
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Litigation v. Union of India (2012) 3 SCC 1 : 2012 (3) SCR 147; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary{2014) 2 SCC 532; Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of/ndia (1990) 4 SCC 366 : 1990 (3) SCR 441; Re: the Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380; Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (2014) 8 SCC 682: 2014 (6) SCR 873; Dr. Kashinath G Jalmi v. The Speaker AIR 1993 SC 1873; A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 (2) SCR 272; Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union oflndia Ram AIR (1951) SC 41 : 1950 SCR 869; Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar AIR (1958) SC 538: 1959 SCR 279; B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan (1975) 1SCC166: 1975 (2) SCR 774; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi (2008) 4 sec 120 : 2008 (3) SCR 330; Mohd. HanifQuareshiv. State of BiharAIR 1958 SC 731: 1959 SCR 629; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar1952 SCR 284; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp SCC 1 : 1976 SCR 347; Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCC 362 : 1981 (2) SCR 1; Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir1989 Supp (2) SCC 364: 1989 (3) SCR 19 ; State of Bihar v. Bihar DisW/ery Limited (1997) 2 sec 453 : 1996 (9) suppl. scR 479; Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore (1961) 3 SCR 707; Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P. (1976) 1 SCC 843 : 1976 (3) SCR 1; B.K. Srinivasan v. State of Karnataka (1987) 1 SCC 658: 1987 (1) SCR 1054; People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 363; In re: Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 AIR 1941 FC 72; Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha 1961 (1) SCR 96; R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324 : 1993
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(1) SCR 891; Property Owners' Association v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 4 SCC 49 : 1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 230; Property Owners'Association v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 4 SCC 455; Property Owners'Association v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 7 SCC 522; State of Maharashtra v. Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. (1977) 1 SCC 643: 1977 (1) SCR 1002; India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore (1975) 3 SCC 512 : 1975 (2) SCR 612; Ko/hapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India (2000) 2 sec 536 : 2000 (1) SCR 518; State of U.P. v. Hirendra Pal Singh (2011) 5 SCC 305: 2010 (15) SCR 854; Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Association of India v. Director Gen.era/ of Civil Aviation (2011) 5 SCC 435 : 2011 (5) SCR 1019; State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder(2011) 8 SCC 737: 2011 (11) SCR 1094; Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. State of Punjab (1969) 1 sec 475 : 1969 (3) SCR 447; K.A Abbas v. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 780 : 1971 (2) SCR 446; T.N. Seshan v. Union oflndia (1995) 4 sec 611 : 1995 (2) Suppl. scR 106; t.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1: 2007 (1) SCR 706; Lily Thomas v. Union of India; (2013) 1 sec 653: 2013 (10) SCR 1130; Chief Election Commissioner v. Jan Chaukidar (2013) 7 SCC 507; State of Karnataka v. Union of India (1977) 4 SCC 608 : 1978 (2) SCR 1; Ku/dip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1 : 2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 1; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 : 2008 (4) SCR 1; Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. (2003) 4 sec 104 : 2003 (1) SCR 666; Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited v. Rajesh Kumar(2012) 7SCC1: 2012 (4) SCR 118; State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah (2000) 4 SCC 640:
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2000 (2) SCR 299; Nawal Kishore Mishra v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad (2015) 5 SCC 479 : 2015 (3) SCR 107; West U.P. Sugar Mills Association v. State of U.P. (2002) 2 SCC 645: 2002 (1) SCR 897; Gammon India Ltd. v. Special ,· Chief Secretary (2006) 3 SCC 354: 2006 (2) SCR 304 - referred to.
Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum AIR 1955 SC 352; Firm A. T.B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras AIR 1963 SC 928 : 1963 Suppl. SCR 435; B.N. Tewari v. Union of India AIR 1965 SC 1430 : 1965 SCR 421; Koteswar Vittal Karnath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co. (1969) 1 SCC 255: 1969 (3) SCR 40; Mulchand Odhavji v. Rajkot Borough Municipality (1971) 3 SCC 53; Mohd. Shaukat Hussain Khan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1974) 2 SCC 376: 1975 (1) SCR 429; Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 (2) SCR 287; Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India
1988 (Supp) sec 30 : 1988 SCR 1034; and State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal (1996) 5 sec 60 : 1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 98 - held inapplicable. Speech by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on 15.7.1947; "Constitutional Law of India", 4 1h edition, by H.M. Seervai; Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission on Judicial Reform (1958); The Beijing Statement of Principles of the "Independence of the Judiciary"; Speech of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (in the Constituent Assembly on 24.5.1949); "Roses in December - An Autobiography" by M.C. Chagla; "Neither Roses Nor Thorns" by H.R. Khanna; "Constitutional Law of India -A Critical Commentary' by H.M. Seervai; Articles titled "Making the Angels
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Weep", and "Where Angels Fear to Tread" by Lord Cooke of Thorndon; "Story of a Chief Justice", by U.L. Bhat; 5th V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture by Ruma Pal, J., on the topic "An Independent Judiciary"; "The Other Side of Justice" by S.S. Sodhi; "Before Memory Fades" by Fali S. Nariman; Article bearing the title "Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts", by Nick Robinson; Article - "The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence" by Bertram Raven, Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 8, No.1, 2008, pp. 1-22; Article - "Effects of a Favour and Liking on Compliance" by Dennis T. Regan, Cornell University; "Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion" - Robert Cialdini, Regent's Professor Emeritus of Psychology and Marketing, Arizona State University; Article titled "Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary", by Laura E. Little, Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law; Paper on "Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence" by Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Law School, University of Chicago, November 2008; and Southerland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition, Volume I referred to. In the order of Chelameswar. J.: Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association & Ors. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441; and P.O. Dinakaran(1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee, (2011) 8 sec 380 - referred to. Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal, (1852) 10 ER 301; Regina v. Gough (1993) AC 646; Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte,
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(1999) 1 All E.R. 577; Wakefield Local Board of Health v. WestRiding and Grimsby Rly Co. (1865) 1 Q.B. 84; R V. Byles exp. Hollidge (1912) 77 J.P. 40; R. v. Nailsworth Licensing Justices exp. Bird [1953) 1 W.L.R. 1046; R v. Lilydale Magistrates Court exp. Ciccone [1973) V.R. 122; R. v. Antrim Justices [1895) 21.R. 603; To/putt (H.) & Co. Ltd. v. Mole [1911) 1K.B.836; and Corrigan v. Irish Land Commission [1977] l.R. 317 referred to. R. Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal: Principles, Process and Problems, (Hart Publishing, 2009) - referred to.
In the judgment of Chelameswar. J.: His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kera/a & Another (1973) 4 sec 225 : 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1982 SC 149: 1982 SCR 365; L. C. Chandra Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 (2) SCR 1186; Supreme Court Advocates-onRecord Association & Others v. Union of India (1993) 4. sec 441 : 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659; Union of India H. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth &Anr. (1977) 4sec193: 1978 (1) SCR 423; Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court and Ors. (1969) 3 SCC 56 : 1970 (2) SCR 666; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab Al R 1974 SC 2192 : 1975 (1) SCR 814; Subhash Sharma v. Union oflndia (1991) Supp.1SCC574 : 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR 433 ; Special Reference No.1 of 1998 (1998) 7 SCC 739 : 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400; Shanti Bhushan & Another v. Union of India & Another (2009) 1 SCC 657 : 2008 (17) SCR 791; PD. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry
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Committee (2011) 8 SCC 380 : 2011 (10) SCR 1064; P.O. Dinakaran (2) v. Judges Inquiry Committee & Another (2011) 8 SCC 474; L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 (2) SCR 1186; l.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. (1967) 2 SCR 762; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 625; Waman Rao & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 362; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp sec 1; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 sec 1; M. Nagaraj & Others v. Union of India & Others (2006) 8 SCC 212; l.R. Coelho (Dead) By LRs v. State of T.N. (2007) 2 SCC 1; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27; ADM Jabalpur v. S.S. Shukla Etc.Etc. AIR 1976 SC 1207; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. AIR 1967 SC 1; Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board AIR 1967 SC 295 - referred to.
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Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S 137 (1803); Valente v. Queen {Supreme Court of Canada] (1985) 2 SCR 673; Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (1999) 1 Al.I E.R. 577 - referred to. Sir William Blackstone's, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1765) Vol. I p. 269; Fali S. Nariman, Before Memory Fades: An Autobiography, [First Edition Hay House (2010 ), p.348 ]; Constituent Assembly Debates, 24th . May 1949 (Vol. Vlll);Abhinav Chandrachud, The
Informal Constitution : Unwritten Criteria in Selecting Judges for the Supreme Court of India, (Oxford University Press, United Kingdom 2014) See Pages 113 to 120; Iyer, V.R. Krishna, Judiciary: A reform agenda-II, The Hindu (on line edition) 15.08.2002; "An Independent Judiciary"
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. - speech delivered by Ms. Justice Ruma Pal atthe 5th V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture on 101h November 2011; Mehta, Pratap Bhanu, 'Whom do you trust', The Indian Express, May 14, 2015; The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002 chaired by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah; Fali S. Nariman, Before Memory Fades - An Autobiography, p. 389; Laurence H. Tribe, God Save this Honorable Court, First Edition, p.1011; Laurence H. Tribe (American Constitutional Law) Second Edition - referred to. In the order and judgment of Lokur. J.: Court on its own motion v. State & Others MANU/ DE/9073/2007; Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 : 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India 1981 (Supp) SCC 87 : 1982 SCR 365; Subhash Sharma v. Union of India. 1991 Supp (1) sec 574: 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR . 433; Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 (1998) 7 SCC 739: 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400; Union of ·India v. Sanka/chand Himmatlal Sheth (1977) 4 SCC 1993; R. Pushpam v. State of Madras AIR 1953 Mad 392; Sardari Lal v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 411: Jyoti Prakash Mitter v. Chief Justice, Calcutta [1965] 2 SCR 53; Union of India v. Jyoti ProkashMitter(1971)1 SCC396: 1971 (3) SCR 483; RamJawaya Kapurv. State of Punjab [1955) 2 SCR 225; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a (1973) 4 SCC 225: 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 1975 Supp SCC 1 : 1976 SCR 347; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 : 1981 (1) SCR 206; l.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2sec1 : 2001 (1) SCR 706; Bhim Singh
.
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v. Union of India (2010) 5 SCC 538 : 2010 (6) · SCR 218; State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kera/a (2014) 12 SCC 696; Mul/aperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 643: 2006 (2) SCR 740; Administrator-Genera/ of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullick (1894-95) 22 I.A. 107; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras 1950 SCR 88; State of Travancore-Cochin v. The Bombay Co. Ltd. 1952 SCR 1112; Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967) 2 SCR 762; Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon (1972) 2 SCR 331; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217: 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454; S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC .126 : 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 621; Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 sec 1 : 2014 (9) SCR 965; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. StateofBihar& Ors. AIR 1955 SC 661 : 1955 SCR 603; State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (1953) 4 SCR . 1069; Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 532 : 1961 SCR 828; Keshav Mills v. CIT AIR 1965 SC 1636 : 1965 SCR 908; New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. CIT (1960) 1 SCR 249; Magan/al Chhaganlal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1974) 2 SCC 402 : 1975 (1) SCR 1; Northern India Caterers v. State of Punjab. AIR 1967 SC 1581 : 1967 SCR 399; Pet/ad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. Ltd., Pet/ad v. CIT (1963) Supp 1 SCR 871; Ganga Sugar Corporation v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1980) 1 SCC 223 : 1980 (1) SCR 769; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 : 1989 (3) SCR 316; Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Rajasthan (1993) 1 SCC 364 : 1992 (3) Suppl. SCR 103; Builders' Association of India v. Union
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1.
of India. (1989) 2 sec 645: 1989 (2) SCR 320; Khajoor Singh, Keshav Mills Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 sec 111 : 2002 (3) SCR 100; Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India (1975) 1 SCC 485; K. . Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1985) 1 SCC 582 : 1985 (2) SCR 914; Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (1985) 3 SCC 737: 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 949; R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) sec 324 : 1993 (1) SCR 891; Sub·committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 699; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 (2) SCR 375; Krishna Swami v. Union of India (1992) 4-SCC 605 : 1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 53; Union of India v. Madras Bar Association (2010) 11SCC1: 2010 (6) SCR 857; State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 sec 592 : 1978 (1) SCR 1; State of Karnataka v. Union of India (1977) 4 SCC 608: 1978 (2) SCR 1; Ku/dip Nayar v. Union of India (1996) 1 sec 1 : 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 11; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 : 2008 (4) SCR 1; Madras Bar Association . v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 1; Minerva Miffs v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 : 1981 (1) SCR 2()6; Minerva Mills in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1983) 1 sec 147 : 1983 (1) SCR 1000; M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212 : 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336; Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981) 1SCC166; Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India [1950] SCR 869; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959] SCR . 279; R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC 675: 1982 (1) SCR 947; Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough tytunicipality (1969) 2 SCC
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283 : 1970 (1) SCR 388; K. Sankaran Nair v. Devaki Amma Malathy Amma (1996) 11 SCC 428 : 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 839; Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 77 : 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 639; Re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (1993) Supp (1) SCC 96 : 1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497; Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of Kera/a (1996) 7 SCC 637 : 1996 (2) SCR 23; AK. Gopalan v. The State of Madras [1950] 1 SCR 88; Ja/an Trading Company (P) Ltd v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha Union [1967] 1 SCR 15; Karnataka Bank Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 2 sec 254 : 2008 (1) SCR 986; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar [1959] SCR 629; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar {1952] SCR 284; State ofAP. v. McDowell & Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709: 1996 (3) SCR 721; Public Services Tribunal Bar Assn v. State of U.P. (2003) 4 SCC 104: 2003 (1) SCR 666; Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel v. Union of India. 1962 Supp (2) SCR 1.; Kihoto Ho/Johan v. Zachillhu 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 : 1992 (1) SCR 686; D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat 1986 Supp SCC 20 : 1986 SCR 479; Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 5 sec 536 : 1996 (1 O) Suppl. SCR 585; Babula/ Parate v. State of Bombay [1960] (1) SCR 605; Raja Ram Pal v. Lok Sabha (2007.) 3 SCC 184: 2007 (1) SCR 317; AK. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 sec 211: 1982 (2) SCR 272; Centre for PIL v. Union of India (2011) 4 SCC 1: 2011 (4) SCR 445; Registrar General, High Court of Madras v. R. Gandhi (2014) 11SCC547: 2014 (4) SCR 77; Indira Nehru Gandhi and Minerva Mills. (2007) 2 SCC 1; Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India (1992) 2 SCC 428; Renu v. District Judge (2014) 14 SCC 50; Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641;
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State of U.P. v. Raj Narain (1975) 4 SCC 428: 1975 (3) SCR 333; Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers 592: 1988 (3) Bombay (P) Ltd. (1988) 4 Suppl. SCR 212; West U.P. Sugar Mills Assn. v. State of U.P. (2002) 2 SCC 645: 2002 (1) SCR 897; B.N. Tewari v. Union of India AIR 1965 SC 1430: 1965 SCR 421; Firm A. T.B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras AIR 1963 SC 928 : 1963 Suppl. SCR 435; Indian Express Newspapers (Born) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641: 1985 (2) SCR 287; State of TN. v. K. Shyam Sunder(2011) 8 SCC 737: 2011 (11) SCR 1094 - referred to.
sec
United Mine Workers of America 325 US 897 (1945); Hanrahan v. Hampton 446 US 1301 (1980); Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLO 1996 SC 324; Black Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg Aktiengesel/schaft [1975] AC 591; The State v. T Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); AttorneyGeneral for N. S. W. v. The Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. 85 CLR 237; The Queen v. Beauregard. [1986] 2 SCR 56; Marbury v. Madison: 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; Re: Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures [1965] 1 SCR 413; The Pocket Veto case 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929); Compare Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas 248 U.S. 276; Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52; State v. South Norwalk 77 Conn. 257; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952); Anderson v. Gorrie [1895] 1 Q.B. 668; McC (A Minor), Re [1985] A.C. 528; Lochner v. New York 198 US 45; Ferguson v. Skrupa 372 US 726; Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Co. 249 US 152, 157; Abrams v. United States 250 · US 616 (1919); The Queen v. Beauregard [1986]
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2 SCR 56; Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. 1973 3 All ER 54 - referred to. Sapru Committee Report, 1945, Chapter V, Paragraphs 259, 261 and 268, https:// archive.org/stream/ saprucommittee035520mbp/saprucommittee 035520 mbp djvu.txt; B. Shiva Rao: 'The Framing of India's Constitution' Select Documents, Volume II & Volume IV; Indian Constitution - Cornerstone of a Nation by Granville Austin at page 126, footnote 39; .bttl2if pa rliamentofi ndia. nic. in/ls/debates.htm; Lecture on Judicial Independence, Lord Phillips; 141h, 801h and 121•1 Report of the Law Commission of India; .!:ill.J2.;J/ www.tnsja.tn.nic.in/article/Judicial%20 Independence %20JSVJ.pdf; Granville Austin: Working a Democratic Constitution page131; · http:UdoLqov.in/sites/ default/files I memohc.pdf; http://doj.qov.in/sites/default/ files/memosc.pdf; Article titled "Merit" in the Appointment of Judges' by By Professor M.P. Singh, (1999) 8 SCC (Jour) 1; Supreme But Not Infallible, Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India page 48, 53; A Grammar of Politics (Works of Harold J. Laski), 297; Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, page 64; "Learning and Science", speech at Harvard Law School Association (June 25, 1895); Speeches by Oliver Wendell Holmes (1896). p. 67-68; Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law by Jonathan K. Van Patten, Volume2 Benchmark page 117, 129 (1986) ; Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection S'ystems, 10 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. 7, n.9 (2001 ); Judicial Independence, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law by David
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1.
Dyzenhaus, (2001-2004) 10 Otago L Rev 345 at 345-346; The Frontline, Volume 25 Issue 20 · September 27, 2008 to October 10, 2008; btta;1I www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ kennedy testimony 02 14 07.pdf; Report entitled 'Judicial Independence: Law and Practice of Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights', http:// www.interights.org/documenV142/index.html: The Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region as amended at Manila on 28th August, 1997; 3rd lecture on 'Judicial Appointments' delivered on 4th December, 2012 of the 54th series of Hamlyn Lectures titled 'Aspects of Law Reform - An Insider's Perspective'; Appointing Australian Judges: A New Model by Simon Evans and John Williams, [2008] Sydney Law Review Volume 30 page 295; hlli!~// sydney.edu.au{law/slr/slr30 2/Evans.pdf; http://www.sabar.co.za/I aw-jou rn a I s/2010/ december/201 O-december-vol023-no3-pp4348.pdf; http://www.lawsociety.orq.bw/news/ Position%20Paper%20on%20Appointment%2 Oof'/o20Judges%20Final%2014%20june%202012%2 O'Final' .pdf; Carly Van Orman, Introduction to the Symposium: The Judicial Process Appointments Process, 10 Wm. &Mary Bill Rts. J. 1 (2001 ), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/ wmborj/vol10/iss1/2; 'The Appointment and Removal of Judges' by Sir Anthony Mason AC · KBE, formerly Chief Justice of Australia; .!J1!nJ1 www. j udcom. nsw~gov.a u/pu bl ications/ education-monographs-1 /monograph1 I fbmason.htm; Shimon Shetreet, Judges on Trial (North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, (1976), p 46; Akkas, Sarkar Ali (2004)
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"Appointment of Judges: A Key Issue of Judicial Independence," Bond Law Review: Vol. 16: lss. 2, Article 8; b.!iQJJ epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol16/iss2/8 referred to. In the order of Kurian. J.: S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P (1974) 3 SCC 459: 1974 (1) SCR 697 - referred to. R v. Sussex Justices Ex parte Mc-earthy (1923) All ER Rep. 233; Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia et al. v. Pollak et al. 343 U.S. 451 (1952); The President of the Republic of South Africa etc. v. South African Rugby Football Union etc.1999 (4) SA 147- referred to. In the judgment of Kurian. J.: His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kera/a and another (1973) 4 sec 225 : 1973 (O) Suppl. scR 1; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another (1974) 2 SCC 831 :1975 (1) SCR 814-referred to. State v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission Manu/USSC/0060/2015- referred to.
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In the judgment of Goel. J.: Special Reference No.1 of 1998 (1998) 7 SCC 739 : 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400; SCAORA v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659; Property Owners'Association v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 4 SCC 49 : 1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 230; Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kera/a 1973 (4) SCC 225 : 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp. SCC 1 : 1976 SCR 347; Minerva Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 : 1981 (1) SCR 206; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India,
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1.
"(1997) 3 sec 261 : 1997 (2) scR 1186; 1.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1: 2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 197; M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 sec 212 : 2001 (9) SCR 259; S.P Gupta v. Union of India 1981 Supp. SCC 87 : 1982 SCR 365; Subhash Sharma v. Union of India 1991 Supp (1) SCC 574: 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR 433; Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth 1977 (4) sec 193 : 1978 (1) scR 423; Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab 1974 (2) SCC 831: 1975 (1) SCR 814: Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. UOI (2012) 3 SCC 1: 2012 (3) SCR 147; ManoharLal Sharma v. UOI (2014) 2 SCC 532; S.R. Bommai v. UO/ (1994) 3 SCC 1 : 1994 (2) SCR 644; Rameshwar Prasad v. UOI (2006) 2 sec 1 : 2006 (1) SCR 562; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1SCC388: 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 12; Kihoto Hol/ohan v. Zachilfhu (1992) Supp. (2) 651 : 1992 (1) SCR 686; Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEB/ (2012) 10 SC 603: 2012 (12) SCR 256; Chandra MoulishwarPrasad v. Patna High Court 1969 (3) SCC 56 : 1970 (2) SCR 666; Manoj Narula v. Union of India 2014 (9) SCC 1 : 2014 (9) SCR 965; Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality (1969) 2 sec 283 : 1970 (1) SCR 388; Bhim Singh Ji vs. Union of India (19B1) 1 SCC 166; Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 : 2008 (4) SCR 1; Mafat Lal Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536 : . 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 585; lnderpreet Singh Kah/on v. State of Punjab (2006) 11 SCC 356 : 2006 (1) Suppl. SCR 772: Maneka Gandhi v. UOI (1978) 1 sec 248 : 1978 (2) SCR 621; v. G. Row v. State of Madras (1952) SCR 597; Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. U0/ 1971 (1) SCC 85 : 1971 (3) SCR 9; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of
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India (1970) 1 SCC 248; Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India 1972 (2) SCC 788: 1973 (2) SCR 757; S.R. Bommai v. UOI (1994) 3 sec 1 : 1994 (2) SCR 644; P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P (1994) 3 sec 1 : 1994 (2) SCR 644; Amrik Singh Lyalpuri v. UOI (2011) 6 SCC 535: 2011 (5) SCR 560; Union of India v. Madras Bar Asson. (2010) 11 SCC 1 : 2010 (6) SCR 857; Madras Bar Asson. v. UOI (2014) 10 SCC 1: Special Reference No.1(1965)1 SCC 413; Lily Thomas v. Union of India 2013 (7) SCC 653 : 2013 (10) SCR 1130; Chief Election Commissioner v. Jan Chaukidar 2013 (7) SCC 507 - referred to. Seervai, 41h Edition, Constitutional Law of India; 141h and 121•1 Report of the Law Commission; Report dated 26.9.2001 as included in Vol. II of the Report of the NCRWC, 2002, Paras 9.6 and 9. 7 - referred to. · Case Law Reference
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In the judgment of Khehar, J.:
E £Thfl, Reff!.rfl,nCfl. ordf:.C.I 1982 SCR 365 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400 F 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR 433 1978 (1) SCR 423 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 366 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 621 G 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1 1975 (1) SCR 814 (2014) 9 sec 1 2010 (6) SCR 218
referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to
Para 2 Para 2 Para2 Para 11 Para 16(iii) Para 26 Para 26 Para 26 Para 26 Para 26 Para 26 Para 26 Para 33
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD . ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1.
. 2007 (7) SCR 705 2011 (4) SCR 224 2010 (4) SCR 743 1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497 2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 243 (1955) 6 SCR 603 1975 (1) SCR 1 1989 (3) SCR 316 2002 (3) SCR 100 2011(4) SCR19 2004 (1) SCR 564 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 692 (1992) 4 sec 97 (1953) SCR 1069 (1965) 2 SCR 908 (1961) 2 SCR 828 1980 (1) SCR 769 1992 (3) Suppl. SCR 103 1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 473 (The Qrr!.,er Qn m!l_rit§.l 1981 (1) SCR 206 1992(1) SCR 686 (2014) 10 sec 1 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 1971 (3) SCR 461 2010 (6) SCR 857 (2015) 4 SCALE 1 (1952) SCR 597 1967 SCR 762 1971 (3) SCR 9 2012 (3) SCR 147 (2014) 2 sec 532 1990 (3) SCR 441
referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to
Para 33 Para 36 Para 38 Para 45 Para 47 Para 49 Para 49 Para 49 Para 49 Para 51 Para 51 Para 51 Para 51 Para 52 Para 52 Para 58 Para 58 Para 58 Para 100
referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to
Para 5 Para 5 Para 11. Para 15 Para 26 Para 37 Para 40 Para 43 Para 44 Para 45 Para 46 Para 46 Para 47
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(1979) 1 sec 380 referred to Para 47 2014 (6) SCR 873 referred to Para 47 AIR 1993 SC 1873 referred to Para 54 1982 (2) SCR 272 referred to· Para 58 1950 SCR 869 referred to Para 71 1959 SCR £19 referred to Para 71 1975 (2) SCR 774 referred to Para 71 2008 (3) SCR 330 referred to Para 71 1959 SCR 629 referred to Para 72 1952 SCR 284 referred to Para 72 1976 SCR 347 referred to Para 78 1981 (2) SCR 1 referred to Para 78 1989 (3) SCR 19 referred to Para 81 1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 479 referred to Para 81 (1961) 3 SCR 707 referred to Para 99 1976 (3) SCR 1 referred to Para 99 1987 (1) SCR 1054 referred to Para 99 (2005) 5 sec 363 referred to Para 99 1961 (1) SCR 96 referred to ·Para 102 1993 (1) SCR 891 referred to Para 105 1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 230 referred to Para 107 (2001) 4 sec 455 referred to Para 107 (2013) 1 sec 5?2 referred to Para 107 AIR 1955 SC 352 held inapplicable Para 108 1963 Suppl. SCR 435 held inapplicable Para 108 1965 SCR 421 held inapplicable Para 108 1969 (3) SCR 40 held inapplicable Para 108 (1971) 3 sec 53 held inapplicable . Para 108 1975 (1) SC_R 429 held inapplicable Para 108 1977 (1) SCR 1002 referred to Para 108 1975 (2) SCR 612 referred to Para 108
. SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1.
2000 (1) SCR 518 referred to Para 108 2010 (15) SCR 854 referred to Para 108 2011 (5) SCR 1019 • referred to Para 108 2011 (11) SCR 1094 referred to Para 108 1969 (3) SCR 447 referred to Para 121 1971 (2) SCR 446 referred to Para 121 1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 106 referred to Para 122 referred to Para 130 2007 (1) SCR 706 referred to Para 138 (2013) 1 sec 507 referred to Para 138 2013 (10) SCR 1130 1978 (2) SCR 1 referred to Para 215 referred to Para 215 2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 1 2008 (4) SCR 1 referred to Para 215 2003 (1) SCR 666 referred to Para 216 2012 (4) SCR 118 referred to Para 217 2000 (2) SCR 299 referred to Para 218 2015 (3) SCR 107 referred to Para 218 held inapplicable Para 250(vii) 1985 (2) SCR 287 1988 SCR 1034 held inapplicable Para 250(viii) 1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 98 held inapplicable Para 250(ix) referred to Para 250 (xi) 2002 (1) SCR 897 2006 (2) SCR 304 referred to Para 250(xi) In the Qrder of Chelameswar, J.: (1993) 4 sec 441 referred to Para 2 (2011) 8 sec 380 referred to Para 25 In the judgment of Chelameswar, J,: 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 11 1982 SCR 365 referred to Para 14 1997 (2) SCR 1186 referred to Para 28 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659 referred to Para 39 1978 (1) SCR 423 referred to Para 40
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1970 (2) SCR 666 referred to 1975 (1) SCR 814 referred to 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR 433 referred to 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400 referred to 2008 (17) SCR 791 referred to 2011 (10) SCR 1064 referred to (2011) 8 sec 474 referred to 1997 (2) SCR 1186 referred to (1980) 3 sec 625 referred to (1981) 2 sec 362 referred to (1975) Supp sec 1 referred to (1994) 3 sec 1 referred to (2006) 8 sec 212 referred to (2001) 2 sec 1 referred to AIR 1976 SC 1207 referred to AIR 1967SC1 referred to AIR 1967 SC 295 referred to In the jyggm!ilw Qf LQkyr, J,: 1996 SC 324 referred to 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659 referred to 1982 SCR 365 referred to 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR 433 referred to 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400 referred to (1977) 4 sec 1993 referred to (1971) 1sec411 referred to [1965] 2 SCR 53 referred to 1971 (3) SCR 483 referred to [1955] 2 SCR 225 referred to 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1 referred to 1976 SCR 347 referred to 1981 (1) SCR 206 referred to
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Para 42 Para42 Para 45 Para 56 Para 59 Para 59 Para 59 Para 64 Para 72 Para 73 Para 73 Para 79 Para 80 Para 81 Para 103 Para 106 Para 111 Para 7 Para 51 Para 55 Para 55 Para 103 Para 105 Para 139 Para 142 Para 142 Para 195 Para 196 Para 197 Para 200
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2007 (1) SCR 706 referred to 2010 (6) SCR 218 referred to (2014) 12 sec 696 referred to 2006 (2) SCR 740 referred to referred to 1950 SCR 88 1952 SCR 1112 referred to referred to (1967) 2 SCR 762 (1972) 2 SCR 331 referred to 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454 referred to 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 621 referred to 2014 (9) SCR 965 referred to 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587 referred to 1955 SCR 603 referred to (1953) 4 SCR 1069 referred to 1961 SCR 828 referred to 1965 SCR 908 referred to referred to (1960) 1 SCR 249 (1963) Supp 1 SCR 871 referred to 1975 (1)· SCR 1 referred to 1967 SCR 399 referred to 1980 (1) SCR 769 referred to .1989 (3) SCR 316 referred to 1992 (3) Suppl. SCR 103 referred to 1989 (2) SCR 320 referred to 2002 (3) SCR 100 referred to (1975) 1sec485 referred to 1985 (2) SCR 914 referred to 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 949 referred to [1986] 2 SCR 56 referred to 1993 (1) SCR 891 referred to [1965] 1SCR413 referred to
Para 202 Para 203 Para 204 Para 204 Para 208 Para 213 Para 214 Para 220 Para 228 Para 229 Para 229 Para 230 Para 243 Para 243 Para 249 Para 250 Para 250 Para 250 Para 251 Para 251 Para 252 Para 253 Para 256 Para 256 Para 257 Para 257 Para 263 Para 263 Para 263 Para 264 Para 270
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) 4 sec 699 referred to 1994 (2) SCR 375 referred to 1992 (1) ·Suppl. SCR 53 referred to 2010 (6) SCR 857 referred to 1978 (1) SCR 1 referred to 1978 (2) SCR 1 referred to 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 17 referred to 2008 (4) SCR 1 referred to (2014) 10 sec 1 referred to 1981 (1.) SCR 206 , referred to referred to 1983 (1) SCR 1000 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 referred to (1981) 1 sec 166 referred to [1950] SCR 869 referred to [1959] SCR 279 referred to 1982 (1) SCR 947 referred to 1970 (1) SCR 388 referred to 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 839 referred to 1994 (1)-Suppl. SCR 639 referred to 1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497 referred to 1996 (2) SCR 23 referred to [1950] 1 SCR 88 referred to [1967] 1SCR15 referred to 2008 (1) SCR 986 referred to [1959] SCR 629 referred to [1952] SCR 284 referred to [1986] 2 SCR 56 referred to 1996 (3) SCR 721 referred to 2003 (1) SCR 666 referred to 1962 Supp (2) SCR 1 referred to 1992 (1) SCR 686 referred to
[2015] 13 S.C.R. Para 297 Para 298 Para 299 Para 300 Para 361 Para 386 Para 387 Para 388 Para 389 Para 397 Para 398 Para 399 Para 401 Para 406 Para 407 Para 409 Para 412 Para 414 Para 415 Para416 Para 417 Para 421 Para 423 Para 432 Para 439 Para 443 Para 449 Para 453 Para 454 Para 455 Para 456
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1986 SCR 479 referred to 1996(10) Suppl. SCR 585 referred to 1960 (1) SCR 605 referred to 2007 (1) SCR 317 referred to referred to 1982 (2) SCR 272 2011 (4) SCR 445 referred to referred to 2014 (4) SCR 77 1992 (2) SCR 109 referred to 2014 (2) SCR 537 referred to 1985 (2) SCR 287 referred to 1975 (3) SCR 333 referred to 1988 (3) Suppl. SCR 212 referred to 2002 (1) SCR 897 referred to referred to 1965 SCR 421 1963 Suppl. SCR 435 referred to referred to 1985 (2) SCR 287 2011 (11) SCR 1094 referred to In th~ Qrd~r of Kurian, J.: 1974 (1) SCR 697 referred to In the j!,Ji;!gm~nt Qf K!Jrian, J.: 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1 referred to referred to 1975 (1) SCR 814 In the judgment of Goel, J.: 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400 referred to 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659 referred to 1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 230 referred to 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1 referred to 1976 SCR 347 referred to 1981 (1) SCR 206 · referred to referred to 1997 (2) SCR 1186 2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 197 referred to
Para 458 Para 459 Para 461 Para 462 Para 497 Para 500 Para 502 Para 544 Para 551 Para 552 Para 553 Para 554 Para 558 Para 558 Para 558 Para 558 Para 560
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Para8 Para 1 Para 2
Para 3.4 Para 3.4 Para 10 Para 15 Para 15.4 Para 15.5 Para 15.6 Para 15.7
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2007 (9) SCR 259 referred to 1982 SCR 365 referred to 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR 433 referred to 1978 (1JSCR 423 referred to 1975 (1) SCR 814 referred to 2012 (3) SCR 147 referred to (2014) 2 sec 532 referred to 1994 (2) SCR 644 referred to 2006 (1) SCR 562 referred to 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 12 referred to 1992 (1) SCR 686 referred to 2012 (12) SCR 256 referred to 1970 (2) SCR 666 referred to 1970 (1) SCR 388 referred to 2014 (9) SCR 965 referred to (1981) 1sec166 referred to 2008 (4) SCR 1 referred to . · 1996 (10) Suppl.SCR 585 referred to 2006 (1) Suppl. SCR 772 referred to 1978 (2) SCR 621 referred to (1952) SCR 597 referred to 1971 (3) SCR 9 referred to (1970) 1 sec 248 referred to 1973 (2) SCR 757 referred to 1994 ( 2) SCR 644 referred to 2011 (5) SCR 560 referred to 2010 (6) SCR 857 referred to (2014) 10 sec 1 referred to (1965) 1 sec 413 referred to 2013 (10) SCR 1130 referred to 2013 (7) sec 507 referred to
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Para 15.8 Para 16.4 Para 16.5 Para 17 Para 17.2 Para 18 Para 18 Para 18 Para 18 Para 18 Para 18 Para 18.1 Para 18.5 Para 18.9 Para 18.10 Para19.1 Para19.1 Para 19.3 Para 19.3 Para 19.7 Para 19.7 Para 19.7 Para 19.7 Para 19.7 Para 19.14 Para 19.14 Para 19.14 Para 19.14 Para 19.14 Para 20.4 Para 20.4
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1.
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) A No.13of2015. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. WITH W. P. (C) Nos. 23, 70, 83, 108, 124, 14, 18, 24, 209, 309, 310, 323 and 341of2015 and T. P. (C) Nos. 391 and 971 of 2015.
Ranjit Kumar, SG, Mukul Rohatgi, AG, P. S. Narasimha, ASG, Fali S. Nari man, Prof. Bhim Singh, Anil B. Divan, R. K. c. P. Shankar Das, K. N. Bhat, V. Mohana, Ram Jethmalani, K. K. Venugopal,T. R. Andhyarujina, Ajit Sinha, Ravindra Shrivastava, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Sr. Advs., S. S. Shamshery,. lrshad Ahmad, Gaurav Bhatia, C. D. Singh, Saurabh Ajay Gupta, Suryanarayana Singh, AAGs, Subhash C. Kasyap, D Pranav Vyas (For Surya Kant), Santosh Paul, Joseph Aristotle S., Arvind Gupta, M. B. Elakkumanan, Malay Swapnil, Priya Aristotle, Savita Singh, Prashant Bhushan, Prashant Kumar, Syed Rehan, Ranvir Singh, Anindita Pujari, Jitendra Mahapatra, A. C. Philip, Rabin Majumder, Suman, V. N. E Subramaniam, Subhasish Bhowmick, S. K. Sinha, Joydeep Mukherjee (For Rabin Majumder), Sriram Parakkat, Vishnu Shankar Jain (For Ankur S. Kulkarni), Prachi Bajpai, D. L Chidananda, Madhvi Divan, Abhinav Mukherji, Binu Tamta, Dr. Arghya Sengupta, Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Devanshi Singh, Diksha F Rai, Ninad Laud, Ajay Sharma, Ritwik Sharma, Samit Khosla, Nikhil Rohatgi, Gurmehar S. Sistani (For B. V. Balaram Das), Gautam Narayan; Devashish Bharuka, Sandeep Singh, Amit Sharma (For Ms. Ruchi Kohli), H. K. Naik (For Gautam Takuldar), Ankur Talwar, Rohit Bhat, Prerna Priyadarshini, G Suhasini Sen, Ankit Kr. (For Mishra Saurabh), Nishant Kanteshwarkar, Arpit Rai, Anip Sachthey, Saakaar Sardana, K. Enatoli Serrya, Edward Belho, Amit Kumar Singh, Abhisth Kumar, Abhishek Kumar Singh, Vijay Pratap Yadav, Som Raj H
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[2015] 13 S.C.R.
Choudhury, Anitha·Shenoy, V. N. Raghupathy, Tapesh Kumar Singh, Mohd. Waquas, Anurag Singh, Aswarya K. Sinha, Rachana Srivastava, Shashi Juneja, A. P. Mayee, Ramesh Babu M. R., Swati Setia, Sapam Biswajit Meitei, Z. H. Issac Haiding, Ashok Kumar Singh, Hemantika Wahi, Vinakshi Kadan, Jagjit Singh Chhabra (For Kuldip Singh), Sibo Sankar Mishra, Pragati Neekhra, Indra Pratap Singh, Prakash Kumar Singh, Arun Monga, Kudrat S3ndho (For Tushar Bakshi), M. Yogesh Kanna, Jayant Patel, Krishna Sarma, Avijit Roy, Navnit Kumar, Barnali Das, Deepika (For M/s. Corporate Law Group), Guntur Prabhakar, Prerna Singh, Nupur Singhal, Sanjay Visen, Anil Kumar Chopra, Ashok Kumar Thakur, Im ran Khan Burni, Advs., for the appearing parties. Mathews J. Nedumpara, Manohar Lal Sharma, R. K. Kapoor, Bishwajit Bhattacharyya, Rajiv Daiya, P. M. Duraiswamy (Petioner-in-person). Ashish Dixit (Respondent-in-person) The following Judgments and Orders of the Court were delivered:
JUDGMENT
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. Index*
Si.No
Contents
Par·agrapl:s
The Recusal Order
,' - '8
2.
The Reference Order The Challenae The Background to tt1e Challenge Motion by tt1e respondents for tt1e review of the Second and Third Judges cases.
I II.
Ill.
·-.
Pages
1 . 101 1 - 9 10 - 19
16 - 169 16 - 19 19 - 61
20 - 53
61 - 115
*Ed. note: The pages mentioned in the index above giving the scheme of the judgment denotes the page number of the original judgment.
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] IV.
V. VI.
3.
I. II.
Ill IV.
v VI. VII.
Objection by the petitioners, to the Motion for review The Consideration Conclusion
54 - 59
115 - 124
60 - 100
124-168 168 - 169
The Order on Merits 1 - 258 Preface 1- 4 Petitioners' 5 - 66 Contentions, on l'v1e.rits Respondents' 67 - 132 Response on Merits. The Debate and the 133- 245 Deliberation The effect of striking 246- 253 down the impugned constitutional amendment Conclusions 254- 256 Acknowledament
170-439 170-171 171 - 252
253 -325
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326 - 419 419 - 436
D 436-438 438 -439
THE RECUSAL ORDER
1. In this Court one gets used to writing common orders, for orders are written either on behalf of the Bench, or on behalf of the Court. Mostly, dissents are written in the first person. Even though, this is not an order in the nature of a dissent, yet it needs to be written in the first person. While endorsing the F opinion expressed by J. Chelameswar, J., adjudicating upon the prayer for my recusal, from hearing the matters in hand, reasons for my continuation on the Bench, also need to be expressed by me. Not for advocating any principle of law, but for laying down certain principles of conduct. 2. This order is in the nature of a prelude - a precursor, to the determination of the main controversy. It has been necessitated, for deciding an objection, about the present composition of the Bench. As already noted above, J.
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[2015] 13S.C.R.
Chelameswar, J. has rendered the decision on the objection. The events which followed the order of J. Chelameswar, J., are also of some significance. In my considered view, they too need to be narrated, for only then, the entire matter can be considered to have been fully expressed, as it ought to be. I also need to record reasons, why my continuation on the reconstituted Bench, was the only course open to me. And therefore, my side of its understanding, dealing with the perception, of the other side of the Bench.
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3(i) A three-Judge Bench was originally constituted for hearing these matters. The Bench comprised of Anil R. Dave, J. Chelameswar and Madan B. Lokur, JJ .. At thatjuncture,Anil R. Dave, J. was a part of the 1+2 collegium, as also, the 1+4 collegium. The above combination heard the D matter, on its first listing on 11.3.2015. Notice returnable for 17 .3.2015 was issued on the first date of hearing. Simultaneously, hearing in Y. Krishnan v. Union of India and others, Writ Petition (MD) No.69 of 2015, pending before the High Court of Madras (at its Madurai Bench), wherein the same E issues were being considered as the ones raised in the bunch . of cases in hand, was stayed till further orders.
(ii) On the following date, i.e., 17.3.2015 Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Senior Advocate, in Supreme CourtAdvocates-onF Record Association v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No.13 of2015), Mr.Anil B. Divan, Senior Advocate, in Bar Association of India v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No;108 of 2015), Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate, in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No.83 of 2015) G and Mr. Santosh Paul, Advocate, in Change India v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No.70 of 2015), representing the petitioners were heard. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Attorney General for India, advanced submissions in response. The matter was shown as part-heard, and posted for further hearing on H 18.3.2015.
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
(iii) The proceedings recorded by this Court on 18.3.2015 A reveal, that Mr. Santosh Paul, (in Writ Petition (C) No.70 of 2015) was heard again on 18.3.2015, whereupon, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Solicitor General of India, also made their submissions. Thereafter, Mr. DushyantA. Dave, Senior Advocate - and the President of Supreme Court Bar B Association, addressed the Bench, as an intervener. Whereafter, the Court rose for the day. On 18.3.2015, the matter was adjourned for hearing to the following day, i.e., for 19.3.2015.
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(iv) The order passed on 19.3.2015 reveals, that submissions were advanced on that date, by Mr. DushyantA. Dave, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, Senior Advocate, and Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara. When Mr. Fali S. Nariman was still addressing the Bench, the Court rose for the • D day, by recording inter a/ia, "The matters remained Partheard." Further hearing in the cases, was deferred to 24.3.2015. (v) On 24.3.2015, Mr. Fali S. Nariman and Mr. Anil B. Divan, were again heard. Additionally, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi concluded his submissions. On the conclusion of hearing, judgment was reserved. On 24.3.2015, a separate order was also passed in Writ Petition (C) No.124 of 2015 (Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Supreme Court of India, through Secretary General and others). It read as under:
'The application filed by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara to argue in person before the Court is rejected. The name of Mr. Robin Mazumdar, AOR, who was earlier appearing for him, be shown in the Cause List.''
(vi) On 7.4.2015, the following order came to be passed by the three-Judge Bench presided by Anil R. Dave, J.: "1. In this group of petitions, validity of the Constitution (Ninety-Nimth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014 (hereinafter
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referred to as 'the Act') has been challenged. The challenge is on the ground that by virtue of the aforestated amendment and enactment of the Act, basic structure of the Constitution of India has been altered and therefore, they should be set aside. 2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and the parties appearing in-person at length. 3. It has been mainly submitted for the petitioners that all these petitions should be referred to a Bench of Five Judges as per the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India for the reason that substantial questions of law with regard to interpretation of the Constitution of India are involved in these petitions. It has been further submitted that till all these petitions are finally disposed of, by way of an interim relief it should be directed that the Act should not be brought into force and the present system with regard to appointment of Judges should be continued. 4. Sum and substance of the submissions of the counsel opposing the petition is that all these petitions are premature for the reason that the Act has not come into force till today and till the Act comes into force, cause of action cannot be said to have arisen. In the circumstances, according to the learned counsel, the petitions should be rejected. 5. The learned counsel as well as parties in-person have relied upon several judgments to substantiate their cases. 6. Looking at the facts of the case we are of the view that these petitions involve substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India and therefore we direct the Registry to place all the matters of this group before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India so that they can be placed before a lamer Bench for its consideration. 7. As we are not deciding the cases on merits, we do not think it appropriate to discuss the submissions made by the learned counsel and the parties in-person.
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SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 8. It would be open to the petitioners to make a prayer for interim relief before th.e larger bench as we do not think it appropriate to grant any interim relief at this stage."
4. During the hearing of the cases, Anil R. Dave, J. did not participate in any collegium proceedings.
5. Based on the order passed by the three-Judge Bench on 7.4.2015, Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, constituted a five-Judge Bench, comprising of Anil R. Dave, Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph andAdarsh Kumar Goel, JJ. 6. On 13.4.2015 the Constitution (Ninety-ninth C Amendment) Act, 2014, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014, were notified in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary). Both the above enactments, were brought into force with effect from 13.4.2015. Accordingly, D on 13.4.2015 Anil R. Dave, J. became an ex officio Member of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, on account of being the second senior most Judge after the Chief Justice of India, under the mandate of Article 124A(1 )(b). 7. When the matter came up for hearing for the first time, before the five-Judge Bench on 15.4.2015, it passed the following order: "List the matters before a Bench of which one of us (Anil R. Dave, J.) is not a member."
It is, therefore, that Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, reconstituted the Bench with myself, J. Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ., to hear this group of cases. 8. When the reconstituted Bench commenced hearing G on 21.4.2015, Mr. Fali S. Nariman made a prayer for my recusal from the Bench, which was seconded by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara (petitioner-in-person in Writ Petition (C) No.124 of 2015), the latter advanced submissions, even though he H
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[2015) 13S.C.R.
had been barred from doing so, by an earlier order dated 24.3.2015 (extracted above). For me, to preside over the Bench seemed to be imprudent, when some of the stakeholders desired otherwise. Strong views were however expressed by quite a few learned counsel, who opposed the B prayer. It was submitted, that a prayer for recusal had earlier been made, with reference to Anil R. Dave, J. It was pointed out, that the above prayer had resulted in his having exercised the option to step aside (- on 15.4.2015). Some learned counsel went to the extent of asserting, that the recusal of Anil C · R. Dave, J. was not only unfair, but was also motivated. It was also suggested, that the Bench should be reconstituted, by requesting Anil R. Dave, J. to preside over the Bench. The above sequence of facts reveals, that the recusal by Anil R. D Dave, J. was not at his own, but in deference to a similar prayer made to him. Logically, if he had heard these cases when he was the presiding Judge of the three-Judge Bench, he would have heard it, when the Bench strength was increased, wherein, he was still the presiding Judge.
9(i) Mr. Fali S. Nariman strongly refuted the impression sought to be created, that he had ever required Anil R. Dave, J. to.recuse. In order to support his assertion, he pointed out, that he had made the following request in writing on 15.4.2015: "The provisions of the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and of the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 have been brought into force from April 13, 2015. As a consequence, the Presiding Judge on this Bench, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil R. Dave, has now become (not out of choice but by force of Statute) a member ex officio of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, whose constitutional validity has been challenged. It is respectfully submitted that it would be appropriate if it is declared at the outset- by an order of this Hon'ble
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] Court- that the Presiding Judge on this Bench will take no part whatever in the proceedings of the National Judicial Appointments Commission." Learned senior counsel pointed out, that he had merely requested the then presiding Judge (Anil R. Dave, J.) not to take any part in the proceedings of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, during the hearing of these matters. He asserted, that he had _never askedAnil R. Dave, J. not to hear the matters pending before the Bench.
(ii) The submission made in writing by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara for the recusal of Anil R. Dave, J. was in the following words:
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" ..... VI. Though Hon'ble Shri Justice Anil R. Dave, Who heads the Three-Judge Bench in the instant case, is a Judge revered and respected by the legal fraternity and D the public at large, a Judge of the highest integrity, ability and impartiality, still the doctrine of nemo iudex in sua causa or nemo debet esse judex in propria causa - no one can be judge in his own cause -would require His Lordship to E recuse himself even at this stage since in the eye of the 120 billion ordinary citizens of this country, the instant case is all about a law whereunder the exclusive power of appointment invested in the Judges case is taken away and is invested in the fair body which could lead to F displeasure of the Judges and, therefore, the Supreme Court itself deciding a case involving the power of appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court will not evince public credibility. The question then arises is as to who could decide it. The doctrine of necessity leaves no other G option then the Supreme Court itself deciding the question. But in that case, it could be by Judges who are not part of the collegium as of today or, if an NJAC is to be constituted today, could be a member thereof. With utmost respect, Hon'ble Shri Justice Dave is a member of the collegium; H
[2015) 13 S.C.R.
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His Lordship will be a member of the NJAC if it is constituted today. Therefore, there is a manifest conflict of interest. VII. Referendum. In Australia, a Constitutional Amendment was brought in, limiting the retirement age of Judges to 70 years. Instead of the Judges deciding the correctness of the said decision, the validity of the amendment was left to be decided by a referendum, and 80% of the population supported the amendment. Therefore, the only body who could decide whether the NJAC as envisaged is acceptable or not is the people of this country upon a referendum. VIII. The judgment in Judges-2, which made the rewriting of the Constitution, is void ab initio. The said case was decided without notice to the pubic at large. O,nly the views of the government and Advocates on record and a few others were heard. In the instant case, the public at large ought to be afforded an opportunity to be heard; at least the major political parties, and the case should be referred to Constitutional Bench. The constitutionality of the Acts ought to be decided, brushing aside the feeble, nay, apologetical plea of the learned Attorney General that the Acts have been brought into force and their validity cannot be challenged, and failing to come forward and state in candid terms that the Acts are the will of the people, spoken through their elected representatives and that too without any division, unanimous. The plea of the Advocates on Record Association that the notification bringing into force the said Acts be stayed be rejected forthwith; so too its demand that the collegium system, which has ceased to be in existence, be allowed to be continued and appointments to the august office of Judges of High Courts and Supreme Gourt on its recommendation, for to do so would mean that Judges of the High Courts who are currently Chief Justices because they were appointed at a young age in preference over others will be appointed as
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SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAG DISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] Judges of the Supreme Court and if that is allowed to happen, it may lead to a situation where the Supreme Court tomorrow will literally be packed with sons and sons-inlaw of former Judges. There are at least three Chief Justices of High Courts who are sons of former Judges of the Supreme Court. The Petitioner is no privy to any confidential information, not even gossips. Still he believes that if the implementation of the NJAC is stayed, three sons of former Judges of the Supreme Court could be appointed as Judges of the Supreme Court. The Petitioner has absolutely nothing personal against any of those Judges; the issue is not at all about any individual. The Petitioner readily conc.edes, and it is a pleasure to do so, that few of them are highly competent and richly deserving to be appointed. IX. Equality before law and equal protection of law in the matter of public employment. The office of the Judge of the High Court and Supreme Court, though high constitutional office, is still in the realm of public employment, to which every person eligible ought to be given an opportunity to occupy, he being selected on a transparent, just, fair and non-arbitrary system. The Petitioner reiterates that he could be least deserving to be appointed when considered along with others of more meritorious than him, but the fact that since he satisfies all the basic eligibility criteria prescribed under Articles 124A, as amended, and 217, he is entitled to seek a declaration at the hands of this Hon'ble Court that an open selection be made by advertisement of vacancies or such other appropriate mechanism. X. Judicial review versus democracy. Judicial review is only to prevent unjust laws to be enacted and the rights of the minorities, whatever colour they could be in terms of religion, race, views they hold, by a legislation which enjoys brutal majority and an of the executive which is tyrannical.
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It is no way intended to substitute the voice of the people by the voice of the high judiciary. XI. Article 124A, as amended, is deficient only in one respect. The collegium contemplated thereunder is still fully loaded in favour of the high judiciary. Three out of the six members are Judges. In that sense it is failing to meet to be just and democratic. But the Parliament has in its wisdom enacted so and if there is a complaint, the forum is to generate public opinion and seek greater democracy. The Petitioner is currently not interested in that; he is happy with the Acts as enacted and the principal relief which he seeks in the instant petition is the immediate coming into force of the said Acts by appropriate notification and a mandamus to that effect at the hands of this Hon'ble Court."
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10. When my recusal from the reconstituted Bench was sought on 21.4.2015, I had expressed unequivocally, that I had no desire to hear the matters. Yet, keeping in view the reasons expressed in writing by Mr. Fali S. Nariman, with reference to Anil R. Dave, J. I had disclosed in open Court, that I had already E sent a communication to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, that I would not participate in the proceedings of the 1+4 collegium (of which I was, a member), till the disposal of these matters. Yet, the objection was pressed. It needs to be recorded that Anil R. Dave, J. was a member of the 1+2 collegium, as F well as, the 1+4 collegium from the day the hearing in these matters commenced. Surprisingly, on that account, his recusal was never sought, and he had continued to hear the matters, when he was so placed (from 11.3.2015 to 7 .4.2015). But for my being a member of the 1+4 collegium, a prayer had been G made for my recusal.
11. It was, and still is, my personal view, which I do not wish to thrust either on Mr. Fali S. Nariman, or on Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara, thatAnil R. Dave, J. was amongst the most suited, to preside over the reconstituted Bench. As noticed
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
. above, he was a part of the 1+2 collegium, as also, the 1+4 A collegium, under the 'collegium system'; he would continue to discharge the same responsibilities, as an ex officio Member of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, in the 'Commission system', under the constitutional amendment enforced with effect from 13.4.2015. Therefore, irrespective B of the system which would survive the adjudicatory process, Anil R. Dave, J. would participate in the selection, appointment and transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary. He would, therefore, not be affected by the determination of the present C controversy, one way or the other. 12. The prayer for my recusal from the Bench was pressed by Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Senior Advocate, in writing, as under: "8. In the present case the Presiding Judge, (the Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.S. Khehar) by reason of judgments D reported in the Second Judges case Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 sec 441, (reaffirmed by unanimously by a Bench of 9 Judges in the Third Judges case Special Reference No.1 of 1998, Re. (1998 7 SCC 739), is at present a E member of the Collegium of five Hon 'ble Judges which recommends judicial appointments to the Higher Judiciary, which will now come under the ambit of the National Judicial Appointments Commission set up under the aegis of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth F Amendment) Act, 2014 read with National Judicial Appointments Commission Act No.40 of 2014- if valid; but the constitutional validity of these enactments has been directly challenged in these proceedings. The position of the Presiding Judge on this Bench hearing these cases of constitutional challenge is not consistent with (and apparently conflicts with) his position as a member of the 'collegium'; and is likely to
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be seen as such; always bearing in mind that if the Constitution Amendment and the statute pertaining thereto are held constitutionally valid and are upheld, the present presiding Judge would no longer be part of the Collegium-the Collegium it must be acknowledged exercises significant constitutional power.
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9. In other words would it be inappropriate for the Hon'ble Presiding Judge to continue to sit on a Bench that adjudicates whether the Collegium system, (as it is in place for the past two decades and is stated (in the writ petitions) to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution), should continue or not continue. The impression in peoples mind would be that it is inappropriate if not unfair if a sitting member of a Collegium sits in judgment over a scheme that seeks to replace it. This is apart from a consideration as to whether or not the judgment is (or is not) ultimately declared invalid or void: whether in the first instance or by Review or in a Curative Petition." The above prayer for my recusal was supported by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara, petitioner-in-person, in writing, as under: "..... Hon'ble Shri Justice J.S. Khehar, the presiding Judge, a Judge whom the Petitioner holds in high esteem and respect, a Judge known for his uprightness, impartiality and erudition, the Petitioner is afraid to say, ought not to preside over the Constitution Bench deciding the constitutional validity or otherwise of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 ("the said Acts", for short). His Lordship will be a member of the collegium if this Hon'ble Court were to hold that the said Acts are unconstitutional or to stay the operation of the said Acts, for, if the operation of the Acts is stayed, it is
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
likely to be construed that the collegium system continues A to be in force by virtue of such stay order. Though Hon'ble Shri Justice J.S. Khehar is not a member of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, for, if the NJAC is to be constituted today, it will be consisting of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India and two seniormost Judges of this B Hon'ble Court. With the retirement of Hon'ble Shri H.L. Dattu, Chief Justice of India, His Lordship Hon'ble Shri Justice J.S. Khehar will become a member of the collegium. Therefore, an ordinary man, nay, an informed onlooker, an expression found acceptance at the hands of C this Hon'ble Court on the question of judicial recusal, will consider that justice would not have been done if a Bench of th.is Hon'ble Court headed by Hon'ble Shri Justice J.S. Khehar were to hear the above case. For a not so informed D onlooker, the layman, the aam aadmi, this Hon'ble Court hearing the Writ Petitions challenging the aforesaid Acts is nothing but a fox being on the jury at a goose's trial. The Petitioner believes that the Noble heart of his Lordships Justice Khehar could unwittingly be influenced by the E nonconscious, subconscious, unconscious bias, his Lordships having been placed himself in a position of conflict of interest. 3. This Hon'ble Court itself hearing the case involving the power of appointment of Judges between the collegium F and the Government, nay, the executive, will not evince any public confidence, except the designated senior lawyers who seem to be supporting the collegium system. The collegium system does not have any confidence in the ordinary lawyers who are often unfairly treated nor the G ordinary litigants, the Daridra Narayanas, to borrow an expression from legendary Justice Krishna Iyer, who considered that the higher judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular, is beyond the reach of the ordinary man. An
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ordinary lawyer finds it difficult to get even an entry into the Supreme Court premises. This is the stark reality, though many prefer to pretend not to notice it. Therefore, the Petitioner with utmost respect, while literally worshipping the majesty of this Hon'ble Court, so too the Hon'ble presiding Judge of this Hon'ble Court, in all humility, with an apology, if the Petitioner has erred in making this plea, seeks recusal by Hon'ble Shri Justice J.S. Khehar from hearing the above case."
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13. As a Judge presiding over the reconstituted Bench, I found myself in an awkward predicament. I had no personal desire to participate in the hearing of these matters. I was a part of the Bench, because of my nomination to it, by Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India. My recusal from the Bench at the asking of Mr. Fali S. Nariman, whom I hold in great esteem, did not need a second thought. It is not as if the prayer made by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara, was inconsequential.
14. But then, this was the second occasion when proceedings in a matter would have been deferred, just E because, Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, in the first instance, had nominated Anil R. Dave, J. on the Bench, and thereafter, had substituted him by nominating me to the Bench. It was therefore felt, that reasons ought to be recorded, after hearing F learned counsel, at least for the guidance of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, so that His Lordship may not make another nomination to the Bench, which may be similarly objected to. This, coupled with the submissions advanced by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. Harish N. Salve and Mr. K.K. Venugopal, that G parameters should be laid down, led to a hearing, on the issue ofrecusal.
15. On the basis of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel, the Bench examined the prayer, whether I should remain on the reconstituted Bench, despite my being a member of the 1+4 collegium. The Bench, unanimously
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
concluded, that there was no conflict of interest, and no other A justifiable reason in law, for me to recuse from the hearing of these matters. On 22.4.2015, the Bench passed the following short order, which was pronounced by J. Chelameswar, J.: "A preliminary objection, whether Justice Jagdish Singh B Khehar should preside over this Bench, by virtue of his being the fourth senior most Judge of this Court, also happens to be a member of the collegium, was raised by the petitioners. Elaborate submissions were made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondents. C After hearing all the learned counsel, we are of the unanimous opinion that we do not see any reason in law requiring Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar. to recuse himself from hearing the matter. Reasons will follow." 16. After the order was pronounced, I disclosed to my D colleagues on the.Bench, that I was still undecided whether I should remain on the Bench, for I was toying with the idea of recusal, because a prayer to that effect, had been made in the face of the Court. · My colleagues on the Bench, would have nothing of it. They were unequivocal in their protestation.
17. Despite the factual position noticed above, I wish to record, that it is not their persuasion or exhortation, which made me take a final call on the matter. The decision to remain a member of the reconstituted Bench was mine, and mine alone. F The choice that I made, was not of the heart, but that of the head. The choice was made by posing two questions to myself. Firstly, whether a Judge hearing a matter should recuse, even though the prayer for recusal is found to be unjustified and unwarranted? Secondly, whether I would stand true to the oath G of my office, if I recused from hearing the matters? 18. The reason that was pointed out against me, for seeking my recusal was, that I was a part of the 1+4 collegium. But that, should have been a disqualification for Anil R. Dave, J.
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as well. When he commenced. hearing of the matters, and till 7.4.2015, he suffered the same alleged disqualification. Yet, the objection raised against me, was not raised against him. When confronted, Mr. Fali S. Nariman vociferously contested, that he had not sought the recusal of Anil R. Dave, J. He B supported his assertion with proof. One wonders, why did he not seek the recusal of Anil R. Dave, J.? There is no doubt about the fact, that I have been a member of the 1+4 collegium, and it is likely that I would also shortly become a Member of the NJAC, if the present challenge raised by the petitioners C was not to succeed. I would therefore remain a part of the selection procedure, irrespective of the process which prevails. That however is the position with reference to four of us (on the instant five-Judge Bench). Besides me, my colleagues on the Bench - J. Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur and Kurian D Joseph, JJ. would in due course be a part of the collegium (if the writ-petitioners before this Court were to succeed), or alternatively, would be a part of the NJAC (if the writ-petitioners were to fail). In such eventuality, the averment of conflict of E interest, ought to have been raised not only against me, but also against my three colleagues. But, that was not the manner in which the issue has been canvassed. In my considered view, the prayer for my recusal is not well founded. If I were to accede to the prayer for my recusal, I would be initiating a wrong F practice, and laying down a wrong precedent. A Judge may recuse at his own, from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice. That would be a matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of a litigating party, unless justified, must never to be acceded to. For that wo·uld give the impression, of the Judge G had been scared out of the case, just by the force of the ·objection.A Judge before he assumes his office, takes an oath to discharge his duties without fear or favour. He would breach his oath of office, if he accepts a prayer for recusal, unless justified. It is my duty to discharge my responsibility with H absolute earnestness and sincerity. It is my duty to abide by
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
my oath of office, to uphold the Constitution and the laws. My A decision to continue to be a part of the Bench, flows from the oath which I took, at the time of my elevation to this Court.
THE REFERENCE ORQER
I. THE CHALLENGE: 1. The question which has arisen for consideration, in the present set of cases, pertains to the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 20~4 (hereinafter referred to as, the Constitution (99thAmendment) Act), as also, that of the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as, the NJAC Act).
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2. During the course of hearing on the merits of the controversy, which pertains to the selection and appointment D of Judges to the higher judiciary (i.e., Chief Justices and Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court), and the transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of one High Court to. another, it emerged that learned counsel for the respondents, were inter alia relying on the judgment rendered in S.P. Gupta E v. Union of lndia 1 , (hereinafter referred to as, the First Judges case); whereas, the learned counsel for the petitioners were inter alia relying on thejudgment in Supreme CourtAdvocateson-Record Association v. Union of lndia 2 (hereinafter referred to as, the Second Judges case), and the judgment in Re: · F Special Reference No.1 of 19983, (hereinafter referred to as, the Third Judges case). 3. Per se, the stance adopted by learned counsel for the respondents in placing reliance on the judgment in the First Judges case, was not open to them. This, for the simple reason, that the judgment rendered in the First Judges case, had been 1981 (Supp) sec 87 (1993) 4 sec 441 ' (1998) 1 sec 739
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A overruled by a larger Bench, in the Second Judges case. And furthermore, the exposition of law declared in the Second Judges case, was reaffirmed by the Third Judges case.
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4. Visualizing, that the position adopted by the respondents, was not legally permissible, theAttomey General, the Solicitor General, and other learned counsel representing the respondents, adopted the only course open to them, namely, to seek reconsideration of the decisions rendered by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases. For the above objective it was asserted, that various vital aspects of the matter, had not been brought to the notice of this Court, when the controversy raised in the Second Judges case was canvassed. It was contended that, had the controversy raised in the Second Judges case, been examined in the right perspective, this Court would not have recorded the conclusions expressed therein, by the majority. It was submitted, thattill the respondents were not permitted to air their submissions, with reference to the unacceptability of the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases, it would not be in the fitness of matters, for this Court to dispose of the present controversy, by placing reliance on the said judgments. 5. Keeping in mind the importance and the sensitivity of the controversy being debated, as also, the vehemence with which learned counsel representing the respondents, pressed for a re-examination of the judgments rendered by this Court, in the Second and Third Judges cases, we permitted them, to detail the basis of their assertions.
6. Before embarking on the issue, namely, whether the G judgments rendered by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases, needed to be revisited, we propose first of all, to determine whether or not it would be justified for us, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, keeping in view the technical parameters laid down by this Court, to undertake
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
the task. In case, we conclude negatively, and hold that the A prayer seeking a review of the two judgments was not justified, that would render a quietus to the matter. However, even if the proposition canvassed at the behest of the respondents is not accepted, we would still examine the submi.ssions canvassed at their behest, as in a matter of such extreme importance and B sensitivity, it may not be proper to reject a prayer for review, on a mere technicality. We shall then endeavour to determine, whether the submissions canvassed at the hands of the respondents, demonstrate clear and compelling reasons, for a review of the conclusions recorded in the Second and Third C Judges cases. We shall also venture to examine, whether the respondents have been able to prima facie show, that the earlier judgments could be seen as manifestly incorrect. For such preliminary adjudication, we are satisfied, that the present D bench-strength satisfies the postulated requirement, expressed in the proviso under Article 145(3). 7. Consequent upon the above examination, if the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases, are shown to prima facie require a re-look, we would then delve on the merits of the main controversy, without permitting the petitioners to place "reliance on either of the aforesaid two judgments. 8. In case, we do not accept the submissions advanced at the hands of the petitioners on merits, with reference to the main controversy, that too in a sense would conclude the matter, as the earlier regime governed by the Second and Third Judges cases, would become a historical event, of the past, as the new scheme contemplated under the impugned Constitution (99thAmendment)Act, along with the NJACAct, would replace the earlier dispensation. In the above eventuality, the question of re-examination of the Second and Third Judges cases would be only academic, and therefore uncalled for.
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9. However, if we accept the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, resulting in the revival of the earlier process, and simultaneously conclude in favour of the respondents, that the Second and Third Judges cases need a re-look, we would be obliged to B refer this matter to a nine-Judge Bench (or even, to a larger Bench), for re-examining the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases.
II. THE BACKGROUND TO THE CHALLENGE: C
10. Judges to the Supreme Court of India and High Courts ·of States, are appointed under Articles 124 and 217 respectively. Additional Judges and acting Judges for High Courts are appointed under Articles 224 and 224A. The transfer of High Court Judges and Chief Justices, of one High D Court to another, is made under Article 222. For the controversy in hand, it is essential to extract the original Articles 124 and 217, hereunder:
"124. Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court. (1) There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law • prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven other Judges. (2) Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty-five years: Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted:
Provided further that-
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] (a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office;
(b) a Judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in clause (4 ). (2A) The age of a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be determined by such authority and in such manner as Parliament may by law provide. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court unless he is a citizen of lndiaand-
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(a) has been for at least five years a Judge of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession; or (b) has been for at least ten years an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such courts in succession; or
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(c) is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist.
Explanation /.-In this clause "High Court" means a High Court which exercises, or which at any time before the commencement of this Constitution exercised, jurisdiction in any part of the territory of India. Explanation 1/.-ln computing for the purpose of this clause the period during which a person has been an advocate, any period during which a person has held judicial office not inferior to that of a district Judge after he became an advocate shall be included. (4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an order .of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the House present and voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such
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removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.
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(5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under clause (4 ). (6) Every person appointed to be a Judge of the Supreme Court shall, before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the President, or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule. (7) No person who has held office as a Judge of the Supreme Court shall plead or act in any court or before any authority within the territory of India." "217. Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court.-(1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall hold office, in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided in article 224, and in any other case, until he attains the age of sixty-two years: Provided that(a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the Pres)dent, resign his office;
(b) a Judge may be removed from his office by the President in the manner provided in clause (4) of article 124 for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court; (c) the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to be a Judge of the
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
Supreme Court or by his being transferred by the A President to any other High Court within the territory of India. (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and-
(a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the territory of India; or (b) has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such courts in succession;
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Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause (a) in computing the period during which a person has held judicial office in the territory of India, there shall be included any period, after he has held any judicial office, during which the person has been an advocate of a High Court or has held the office of a member of a tribunal or any post, under the Union or a State, requiring special knowledge of law;
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(aa) in computing the period during which a person has E been an advocate of a High Court, there shall be · included any period during which the person has held judicial office or the office of a member of a tribunal or any post, under the Union or a State, requiring special knowledge of law after he became an advocate; (b) in computing the period during which a person has held judicial office in the territory of India or been an advocate of High Court, there shall be included any period before the commencement of this Constitution during which he has held judicial office in any area whic:h was.comprised before the fifteenth day of August, 1947, within India as defined by the Government of India Act, 1935, or has been an advocate of any High Court in any such area, as the case may be.
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(3) If any question arises as to the age of a Judge of a High Court, the question shall be decided by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the decision of the President shall be final."
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11. The true effect and intent of the provisions of the Constitution, and all other legislative enactments made by the Parliament, and the State legislatures, are understood in the manner they are interpreted and declared by the Supreme Court, under Article 141. The manner in which Articles 124 and 217 were interpreted by this Court, emerges principally from three-Constitution Bench judgments of this Court, which are now under pointed consideration. The first judgment was rendered, by a seven-Judge Bench, by a majority of 4:3, in the First Judges case on 30.12.1981. The correctness of the First Judges case was doubted by a three-Judge Bench in Subhash Sharma v. Union of lndia4, which opined that the majority view, in the First Judges case, should be considered by a larger Bench. The Chief Justice of India constituted a nine-Judge Bench, to examine two questions: Firstly, whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India in regard to the appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and to the High Courts, as well as, transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts, was entitled to primacy? And secondly, whether the fixation of the judge-strength in High Courts, was justiciable? By a majority of 7:2, a nine-Judge Bench of this Court, in the Second Judges case, overruled the judgment in the First Judges case. The instant judgment was rendered on 6.10.1993. Consequent upon doubts having arisen with the Union of India, about the interpretation of the Second Judges case, the President of India, in exercise of his power under Article 143, referred nine questions to the Supreme Court, for its opinion. A nine-Judge Bench answered the reference unanimously, on 28.10.1998. 12. After the judgment of this Court in the Second Judges case was rendered in 1993, and the advisory opinion of this
• 1991 Supp (1) sec 574
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
Court was tendered to the President of India in 1998, the term A "consultation" in Articles 124(2) and 217(1 ), relating to appointment (as well as, transfer) of Judges of the higher judiciary, commenced to be interpreted as vesting primacy in the matter, with the judiciary. This according to the respondents, had resulted in the term "consultation" being understood as B "concurrence" (in matters governed by Articles 124, 217 and 222). The Union of India, then framed a Memorandum of Procedure on 30.6.1999, for the appointment of Judges and Chief Justices to the High Courts and the Supreme Court, in consonance with the above two judgments. And appointments C came to be made thereafter, in consonance with the Memorandum of Procedure. 13. As per the position expressed before us, a feeling came to be entertained, that a Commission for selection and appointment, as also for transfer, of Judges of-the higher judiciary should be constituted, which would replace the prevailing procedure, for appointment of Judges and Chief Justices of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India, contemplated under Articles 124(f) and 217(1 ). It was felt, that the proposed Commission should be broad based. In that, the Commission should comprise of members of the judiciary, the executive and eminent/important persons from public life. In the above manner, it was proposed to introduce transparency in the selection process.
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14. To achieve the purported objective, Articles 124 and 217 were inter alia amended, and Articles 124A, 1248 and 124C were inserted in the Constitution, through the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, by following the procedure G contemplated under Article 368(2), more particularly, the proviso thereunder. The amendment, received the assent of the President on 31.12.2014. It was however given effect to, with effect from 13.4.2015 (consequent upon its notification in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) Part 11, Section 1). H
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Simultaneously therewith, the Parliament enacted the NJAC Act, which also received the assent of the President on 31.12.2014. The same was also brought into force, with effect from 13.4.2015 (by its notification in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) Part 11, Section 1). The above constitutional B amendment and the legislative enactment, are subject matter of challenge through a bunch of petitions, which are collectively being heard by us. In order to effectively understand the true purport of the challenge raised by the petitioners, and the nuances of the legal and constitutional issues involved, it is C imperative to have a bird's eye view of the First Judges case, upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents, in their attempt to seek a review of the Second and Third Judges cases.
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The First Judges case -1981 Supp SCC 87.
15. The Union Law Ministeraddressed a letter dated 18.3.1981 to the Governor of Punjab and to Chief Ministers of all other States. The addressees were inter a/ia informed, that" ... one third of the Judges of High Court, should as far as E possible be from outside t~e State in which the High Court is situated ... ". Through the above letter, the addressees were requested to " ... (a) obtain from all additional Judges working in the High Courts ... their consent to be appointed as F permanent Judges in any other High Court in the country ... " The above noted letter required, that the concerned appointees " ... be required to name three High Courts, in order of preference, to which they would prefer to be appointed as permanent Judges; and (b) obtain from persons who have G already been or may in the future be proposed by you for initial appointment their consent to be appointed to any other High Court in the country along with a similar preference for three High Courts ... ". The Union Law Minister, in the above letter clarified, that furnishing of their consent or indication of their H preference, would not imply any commitment, at the behest of
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
the Government, to accommodate them in accordance with their preferences. In response, quite a few additional Judges, gave their consent to be appointed outside their parent State.
(i) Iqbal Chagla (and the other petitioners) felt, that the letter dated 18.3.1981 was a direct attack on the "independence of B the judiciary", and an uninhibited assault on a vital/basic feature of the Constitution. A series of Advocates' Associations in Bombay passed resolutions, condemning the letter dated 18.3.1981, as being subversive of "judicial independence". They demanded the withdrawal of the letter. Since that was c not done, writ petition was filed by the above Associations in the Bombay High Court, challenging the letter dated 18.3.1981. An interim order was passed by the High Court, restraining the Union Law Minister and the Government from implementing the letter dated 18.3.1981. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred D against the above interim order, came to be dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court. The above interim order, was assailed before this Court. While the matter was pending · before this Court, the Union Law Minister and the Government of India, filed a transfer petition under Article 139A. The transfer E petition was allowed, and the writ petition filed in the Bombay High Court, was transferred to the Supreme Court.
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(ii) A second petition was filed by V.M. Tarkunde, in the High Court of Delhi. It raised a challenge to the constitutional validity F of the letter dated 18.3.1981. One additional ground was raised with reference to the three additional Judges of the Delhi High Court, namely, O.N. Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad, JJ., whose term was expiring on 6.3.1981. Ratherthan being appointed for a further term of two years, their appointment G was extended for three months, from 7 .3.1981. These short term appointments were assailed, as being unjustified under Article 224, besides being subversive of the "independence of the judiciary". This writ petition was also transferred for hearing to the Supreme Court. So far as the circular letter H
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dated 18.3.1981 is concerned, the Supreme Court, on an oral prayer made by the petitioner, directed that any additional Judge who did not wish to respond to the circular letter may not do so, and that, he would neither be refused extension nor permanent appointment, on the ground that he had not sent a reply to the letter dated 18.3.1981. Thereafter, the appointment of S.B. Wad, J., was continued, as an additional Jud!;Je for a period of one year from 7.6.1981, but O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar, JJ., were not continued beyond 7.6.1981. (iii & iv). A third writ petition, was filed by J.L. Kalra and others, who were practicing Advocates, in the Delhi High Court. And a fourth writ petition was filed by S.P. Gupta, a practicing Advocate, of the Allahabad High Court. The third and fourth writ petitions were for substantially the same reliefs, as the earlier two petitions. (v) A fifth writ petition, was filed by Lily Thomas. She challenged. a transfer order dated 19.1.1981, whereby the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras was transferr;ed as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala. The above order had been passed by the President, under Article 222(1 ), after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Likewise, the transfer of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna to the Madras High Court was challenged by asserting, that the power of transfer under Article 222(1 )was limited to Judges of the High Courts, and did not extend to Chief Justices. Alternatively, it was contended, that transfers could only be made with the consent of the concerned Judge, and only in public interest, and after full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India. (vi & vii) A sixth writ petition was filed by A. Rajappa, principally challenging the order dated 19.1.1981, whereby some Chief Justices had been transferred. One additional submission was raised in this petition, namely, that the transfer of the Chief Justices had been made without the prior consultation of the Governors of the concerned States, and further, that the said
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transfers we:ire not in public interest, and therefore, violated the procedural requirements contained in Article 217(1 ). The seventh writ petition was filed by P. Subramanian, on the same grounds, as the petition filed by A. Rajappa.
(viii) An eighth writ petition was filed by D.N. Pandey and Thakur Ramapati Sinha, practicing Advocates, of the Patna High Court. In this petition, Justice K.B.N. Singh, the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court was impleaded as respondent no.3. On a prayer made by respondent no.3, he was transposed as petitioner no.3. As petitioner no.3, Justice K.B.N. Singh filed a detailed affidavit asserting, that his transfer had been made as a matter of punishment, and further, that it had been made on irrelevant and on insufficient grounds, and not in public interest. And further that, it was not preceded by a full and D effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India,
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It is therefore apparent, that the above mentioned petitions related to two different sets of cases. Firstly, the issue pertaining to the_ initial appointment of Judges, and the extension of the term of appointment of additional Judges, on the expiry of their original term. And secondly, the transfer of Judges and Chief Justices from one High Court to another.
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16. The opinions recorded in the First Judges case, insofar as they are relevant to the present controversy, are being summarized herein:
P. N. Bhagwati. J. (as he then was): (i) On the subject of independence of the judiciary, it was opined, that" ... Th~ concept of independence of judiciary is a noble concept which inspires the constitutional scheme and G constitutes the foundatiqn on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity. If there is one principle which runs through the entire fabric of the entire Constitution, it is the principle of the rule of law and under the Constitution, it is the judiciary which is entrusted with the task of keeping every organ of the H
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State within the limits of the law and thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective ... The judiciary stands between the citizen and the State as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive, and therefore, it is absolutely essential that the judiciary must be B free from executive pressure or influence and this has been secured by the Constitution makers by making elaborate provisions in the Constitution. " ... It was felt, that the concept of "independence of the judiciary" was not limited only to the independence from executive pressure or influence, but it was C a much wider concept, which took within its sweep, independence from many other pressures and prejudices. It had many dimensions, namely, fearlessness of other power centers, economic or political, and freedom from prejudices acquired and nourished by the class to which the Judges belong. It was held, that the principle of "independence of the judiciary" had to be kept in mind, while interpreting the provisions of the Constitution (paragraph 27).
(ii). On the subject of appointment of High Court Judges, it . E was opined, that just like Supreme Court Judges, who are appointed under Article 124 by the President (which in effect and substance mewitthe Central Government), likewise, the power of appointment of High Court Judges under Article 217, was to be exercised by the Central Government. Such power, F it was held, was exercisable only" ... after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and, the Chief Justice of the High Court ... " It was concluded, that it was clear on a plain reading of the above two Articles, that the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and such G other Judges of the High Court and of the Supreme Court (as the Central Government may deem necessary to consult), were constitutional functionaries, having a consultative role, and the power of appointments rested solely and exclusively in the H decision of the Central Government. It was pointed out, that
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the above power was not an unfettered power, in the sense, that the Central Government could not act arbitrarily, without consulting the constitutional functionaries specified in the two Articles. The Central Government was to act, only after consulting the constitutional functionaries, and that, the consultation had to be full and effective (paragraph 29).
(iii). On the question of the meaning of the term "consultation" expressed in Article 124(2) and Article 217(1 ), it was held, that this question was no longer res integra, as the issue stood concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth 5 , wherein its meaning was determined with reference to Article 222(1 ). But, since it was the· common ground between the parties, that the term "consultation" used in Article 222(1) had the same meaning, which it had in Articles 124(2) and 217(1 ), it was held that, D " ... therefore, it follows that the President must communicate to the Chief Justice all the material he has and the course he proposes. The Chief Justice, in turn, must collect necessary information through responsible channels or directly, acquaint himself with the requisite data, deliberate on the information E he possesses and proceed in the interests of the administration of justice to give the President such counsel of action as he thinks will further the public interest, especially the cause of the justice system ... " It was further concluded, that the above observation in the Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth F case 5 would apply with equal force to determine the scope and meaning of the term "consultation" within the meaning of Articles 124(2) and 217(1). Each of the constitutional functionaries, required to be consulted under these two Articles, must have for his consideration, full and identical facts bearing G upon appointment or non-appointment of the person concerned, and the opinion of each of them taken on identical material, must be considered by the Central Government,
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before it takes a decision, whether or not to appoint the person concerned as a Judge. It was open to the Central Government to take its own decision, in regard to the appointment or nonappointment of a Judge to a High Court or the Supreme Court, after taking into account and giving due weight to, the opinions expressed. It was also observed, that the only ground on which such a decision could be assailed was, that the action was based on ma/a tides or irrelevant considerations. In case of a difference of opinion amongst the constitutional functionaries, who were to be consulted, it was felt, that it was forthe Central Government to decide, whose opinion should be accepted. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, that in the consultative process, primacy should be that of the Chief Justice of India, since he was the head of the Indian judiciary and paterfamilias of the judicial fraternity, was rejected for the reason, that each of the constitutional functionaries was entitled to equal weightage. With reference to appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court, it was held, that the Chief Justice of India was required to be consulted, but the Central Government was not bound to act in accordance with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, even though, his opinion was entitled to great weight. It was therefore held, that the ultimate power of appointment, rested with the Central Government (paragraph 30).
(iv). On the issue of appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court, it was concluded, that consultation with the Chief Justice of India was a mandatory requirement. But while making an appointment, consultation could extend to such other Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the High Courts, as the Central G Government may deem necessary. In response to the submission, where only the Chief Justice of India was consulted (i.e., when consultation did not extend to other Judges of the Supreme Court, or of the High Courts), whether the opinion H tendered by the Chief Justice of India should be treated as
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binding, it was opined, that there was bound to be consultation, A with one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts, before exercising the power of appointment conferred under Article 124(2). It was felt, that consultation with the Chief Justice of India alone, with reference to the appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, was not a very B satisfactory mode of appointment, because wisdom and experience demanded, that no power should rest in a single individual howsoever high and great he may be, and howsoever honest and well-meaning. It was suggested, that it would be more appropriate if a collegium would make the C recommendations to the President, with regard to appointments to the higher judiciary, and the recommending authority should be more broad based. If the collegium was comprised of persons who had knowledge of persons, who D may be fit for appointment to the Bench, and possessed the qualities required for such appointment, it would go a long way towards securing the right kind of Judges, who would be truly independent (paragraph 31 ). (v) It was held, that the appointment of an additional Judge, must be made by following the procedure postulated in Article 217(1 ). Accordingly, when the term of an additional Judge expired, and he ceased to be a Judge, his reappointment could only be made by once again adopting the procedure set out in Article 217(1 ). The contention, that an additional Judge must automatically and without any further consideration be appointed as an additional Judge for a further term, or, as a permanent Judge, was rejected (paragraphs 38 to 44).
(vi) On the question of validity of the letter of the Union Law G Minister dated 18.3.1981, it was opined, that the same did not violate any legal or constitutional provision. It was felt, that the advance consent sought to be obtained through the letter dated 18.3.1981, from additional Judges or Judges prior to their permanent appointment, would have no meaning, so far H
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as the Chief Justice of India was concerned, because irrespective of the fact, whether the additional Judge had given his consent or not, the Chief Justice of India would have to consider, whether it would be in public interest to allow the additional Judge to be appointed as a permanent Judge in B another High Court (paragraph 54 ).
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(vii) After having determined the merits of the individual claim raised by S.N. Kumar, J., (who was discontinued by the Central Government, while he was holding the position of additional Judge), it was concluded, that it would be proper if the Union of India could find a way, to place the letter dated 7 .5.1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court to the Law Minister, before the Chief Justice of India, and elicit his opinion with reference to that letter. And thereupon consider, whether S.N. Kumar, J., should be reappointed as additional Judge. ·. (viii) With reference to K.B.N. Singh, CJ., it was opined that there was a clear abdication by the Central Government of its constitutional functions, and therefore, his transfer from the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court was held as unconstitutional and void. A.C. Gupta. J.:
(i). On the subject of the "independence of the judiciary", it was opined, that the same did not mean freedom of Judges to act F arbitrarily. It only meant, that Judges must be free, while discharging their judicial functions. In order to maintain "independence of the judiciary", it was felt, that Judges had to be protected against interference, direct or indirect. It was G concluded, that the constitutional provisions should not be construed in a manner, that would tend to undermine the concept of "independence of the judiciary" (paragraph 119). (ii) On the questio.n, whether, on the expiry of the term of office of an additional Judge of a High Court, it was permissible to H drop him by not giving him another term, though the volume of
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work, pending in the High Court, required the services of another Judge? It was opined, that the tenure of an additional Judge, was only dependent on the arrears of work, or the temporary increase in the business of a High Court. And since an additional Judge was not on probation, his performance could not be considerer.I to determine, whether he was fit for appointment as a permanent Judge. Therefore, it was concluded, that if the volume of work pending in the High Court justified the appointment of an additional Judge, there could be no reason, why the concerned additional Judge should not be appointed for another term. The submission that the two years' period mentioned in Article 224, depicted the upper limit of the tenure, and that the President was competent to appoint an additional Judge, for any shorter period, was rejected. Since the fitness of a Judge, had been considered at the time of his initial appointment, therefore, while determining whether he should be reappointed, under Article 217(1 ), it was opined, that the scope of inquiry was limited, to whether the volume of work pending in the High Court, necessitated his continuation.
(iii). Referring to the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court, in connection with S.N. Kumar, J., it was opined, that when allegations were levelled against a Judge with respect to the discharge of his duties, the only reasonable course open, which woul.d not undermine the "independence of the judiciary" was,. to proceed with an inquiry into the allegations and remove the Judge, if the allegations were found to be true (in accordance with the procedure laid down under Article 124(4) and (5) read with Article 218). It was felt that, dropping an additional Judge, at the end of his initial term of office, on the ground that there were allegations against him, without properly ascertaining the truth of the allegations, was destructive of the "independence of the judiciary" (paragraph 123).
(iv). With reference to the non-continuation of S.N. Kumar, J., an additional Judge of the Delhi High Court, it was observed,
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that the letter of the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court dated 7 .5.1981, addressed to the Law Minister, was not disclosed to the Chief Justice of India. As the relevant material was withheld from the Chief Justice of India, it was concluded, that there was no full and effective "consultation", as contemplated by Article 217(1 ). And therefore, the decision not to extend the term of office of S.N. Kumar, J., as additional Judge of the Delhi High Court, though the volume of pending work in the High Court required the services of an additional Judge, was invalid.
(v). On the question, whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India would have primacy, in case of a difference of opinion between the Chief Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India, the view expressed was, that the President should D accept the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, unless such opinion suffered from any obvious infirmity. And that, the President could not act as an umpire, and choose between the two opinions (paragraph 134 ).
(vi). Referring to the judgment in the Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth case 5 , wherein it was concluded, that mass transfers were not contemplated under Article 222(1 ), it was opined, that the President could transfer a Judge from one High Court to another, only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. And that, the Chief Justice of India must consider in each case, whether the proposed transferwas in public interest (paragraph 138).
(vii). With referencetothetransferofK.B.N. Singh, CJ., from the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court, it was opined, G that even if the above transfer had been made for administrative reasons, and in public interest, it was likely to cause some injury to the transferee, and it would only be fair to consider the possibility of transferring him, where he would face least difficulties, namely, where the language difficulty H would not be acute.
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION v. U.0.1. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] S. Murtaza FazalAli. J.: (i) On the issue, whether the transfer of a High Court Judge under Article 222 required the consent of the Judge proposed to be transferred, it was opined, that a non-consensual transfer, would not amount to punishment, nor would it involve any stigma. It was accordingly concluded, that a transfer made after complying with Article 222, would not mar or erode the "independence of the judiciary" (paragraph 345).
(ii). With reference to appointing Chief Justices of High Courts from outside the State, and for having 1/3rd Judges in every C High Court from outside the State, it was expressed, that Article 222 conferred an express power with the President, to transfer a Judge (which includes, Chief Justice) from one State to another. In determining as to how this power had to be exercised, it was felt, th~t the President undoubtedly D possessed an implied power to lay down the norms, the principles, the conditions and the circumstances, under which the said power was to be exercised. A declaration by the President regarding the nature and terms of the policy (which virtually meant a declaration by the Council of Ministers) was E quite sufficient, and absolutely legal and constitutional (paragraph 410). (iii). On the subject of validity of the letter of the Union Law Minister dated 18. 3.1981, it was held, that the same did not in any way tarnish the image of Judges, or marthe "independence of the judiciary" (paragraph 433). (iv). On the question of appointment of additional Judges, and the interpretation of Article 217, the opinion expressed by P.N. Bhagwati and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ. were adopted (paragraph 434 ). (v). Insofar as the interpretation of Article 224 was concerned, the opinion of P.N. Bhagwati and D.A. Desai, JJ. were accepted, (paragraph 537). And accordingly, their conclusion
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about the continuation of S.N. Kumar, J., as an additional Judge, after the expiry of his term of appointment, was endorsed. (vi). On analyzing the decision rendered in the Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth case 5 , inter alia, the following necessary concomitants ofan effective consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India were drawn. That the consultation, must be full and effective, and must precede the actual transfer of the Judge. If consultation with the Chief Justice of India had not taken place, before transferring a Judge, it was held, that the transfer would be unconstitutional. All relevant data and necessary facts, must be provided to the Chief Justice of India, so that, he could arrive at a proper conclusion. Only afterthe above process was fully complied with, the consultation would be considered full and effective.-H was felt, thatthe Chief Justice of India owed a duty, both to the President and to the Judge propos.ed to be transferred, to consider every relevant fact, before tendering his opinion to the President. Before giving his opinion the Chief Justice of India, could informally ascertain from the Judge, if there was any personal difficulty,. or any humanitarian ground, on which his transfer should not be made. And only after having done so, the Chief Justice of India, could forward his opinion to the President. Applying the above facets of the consultation process, with respect to the validity of the order dated 19.1.1981, by which K.B.N. Singh, CJ., was transferred, it was held, that the consultation process contemplated under Article 222, had been breached, rendering the order passed by the President invalid (paragraph 589).
G V.D. Tulzapurkar. J.: (i). Insofar as the question of "independence of the judiciary" is concerned, it was asserted that all the Judges, who had expressed their opinions in the matter, had emphasized, that the framers of the Constitution had taken the utmost pains, to
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secure the "independence of the Judges" of the higher judiciary. To support the above contention, several provisions of the Constitution were referred to. It was also pointed out, that the Attorn'ey General representing the Union of India, had not dispute the above proposition (paragraph 639).
(ii). With reference to additional Judges recruited under Article 224(1 ), from the fraternity of practicing Advocates, it was pointed out, that an undertaking was taken from them at the time of their initial appointment, that if and when a permanent judgeship of that Court was offered to them, they would not decline the same. And additionally, the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court would require them to furnish a further undertaking, that if they decline to accept such permanent judgeship (though offered), or if they resigned from the office of the additional judgeship, they would not practice before the Bombay High Court, or any court or tribunal subordinate to it. Based on the aforesaid undertakings, the contention advanced was, that a legitimate expectancy, and an enforceable right to continue in office, came to be conferred on the additional Judges recruited from the Bar. It was felt, that it was impossible to construe Article 224(1 ), as conferring upon the appointing authority, any absolute power or discretion in the matter of appointment of additional Judges to a High Court (paragraphs 622 and 624 ).
(iii)All submissions made on behalf of the respondents, that granting extension to an additional Judge, or making him a permanent Judge was akin to a fresh appointment, were rejected. It was concluded, that extension to an additional Judge, or making him permanent, did not require redetermination of his suitability under Article 217(1) (paragraph 628).
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(iv). While dealing with the question of continuation of an additional Judge, in situations where there were facts
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disclosing suspected misbehaviour and/or reported lack of integrity, the view expressed was, that while considering the question of continuation of a sitting additional Judge, on the expiry of his initial term, the test of suitability contemplated within the consultative process under Article 217(1) should not be evoked - at least till a proper mechanism, having a legal sanction, was provided for holding an inquiry, against the Judge concerned, with reference to any suspected misbehavior and/ or lack of integrity (paragraph 628). (v) On the scope of consideration, for continuation as a sitting additional Judge (on the expiry of a Judge's initial term), it was opined, that the consultative process should be confined only to see, whether the preconditions mentioned in Article 224( 1) existed or not, or whether, pendency of work justified continuation or not. It was held, that the test of suitability contemplated within the consultative process under Article 217(1 ), could not and should not, be resorted to (paragraph 629).
(vi). On the question of primacy of the Chief Justice of India, with reference to Article 217(1 ), the view expressed was, that E the scheme envisaged therein, by impl