T.m.a. Pal Foundation and ORS. v. State of Karnataka and ORS.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 31 October 2002
- Judge
- Justice B.N. Kirpal
- Neutral citation
- 2002 INSC 454
- Reported in
- [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 587
- Acts & sections
- Article 30 Constitution, Article 29 Constitution, Article 19 Constitution, Article 337 Constitution, Article 13 Constitution
Full judgment
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION AND ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
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OCTOBER 3 1, 2002 [B.N. KIRPAL, CJ., G.B PATTANAIK, V.N. KHARE, S. RAJENDRA BABU, SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, RUMA PAL, S.N. VARIA VA, K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, P. YENKATARAMA REDDI, ASHOK BHAN AND ARIJIT PASA YAT, JJ.]
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Constitution of India, 1950: Article 30-Private Institutions-Government RegulationsApplicability of and its extent-Held: in case of private unaided educational institution Government can put conditions pertaining to academic and educational matters and welfare of students and teachers only, but not in the matter of administration-In case of private aided educational institutions, once aid is granted, Government as a condition of grant of aid, can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and management of the institution-But such institutions cannot be treated as wholly owned and controlled by Government-Hence Government cannot interfere. w~th constitution of governing bodies-Autonomy of aided institution would be less than that of an unaided institution. '
Articles 29(2) and 30(1)-Right of Aided Private Minority Institution to Administer itself-Government regulation-Extent of applicability toHeld, right under Article 30(1) is not absolute although right to administer includes right to grant admission to students of its choice-But when such F minority institution is granted aid, Article 29(2) would apply-Hence one of the rights of administration of the minorities i.e. right to grant admission would be eroded to some extent-However, there is an interplay between the two Articles-Such an institution should admit non-minority students based on merit to a reasonable extent, whereby minority character of the institution G is not annihilated and at the same time rights granted under Article 29(2) are not subverted-The reasonable extent would depend on variable factors and specific percentage cannot be fixed-Articles 28(1) and (3). Article 30(2)-Meaning, Scope and effect of-Whether the provision
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A gives a right to ask for grant and aid from the State-In case of State aided
institution extent of its autonomy -Held, grant of aid is not a constitutional imperative-The provision means that grant of aid by State could not be denied to religious/linguistic minority institution only on the ground that the management of the institution is by minority-But if an abject surrender of right to management is. made a condition of aid, the denial of aid would be violative of the provision-However, conditions of aid that do not involve a surrender pf substantial right of management would not be inconsistent with constitutional guarantees ev~n if they indirectly impinge upon some facets of administration-Article 337.
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Article 30(1), VII Schedule List III Entry 2 5-Linguistic and Religious Minority-Unit of-Whether within the State or the country as a wholeHeld, it would be decided state-wise-Inclusion of 'education' in VII Schedule, List II/ Entry 25 would not affict determination ofa "religious" or "linguistic" minority.
Articles J9(J)(g), 26 and 30-Estab/ishment and administering of educational institution-Held: Is covered by these Articles and hence a fundamental right. Articles 26 and 30-Difference between-Discussed
Unnikrishnan 's case-Reconsideration of-Held, the case, in so far as it framed the scheme relating to grant of admission andfv:ing offee, overruled.
Interpretation of Constitution-Harmonious construction-Held, when constitutional provisions are interpreted it has to be borne in mind that the interpretation should be such as to further the object for which they were incorporated-They cannot be read in isolation and have to be read harmoniously to provide meaning and purpose-They cannot be interpreted as to render another provision redundant-Purposive and harmonious interpretation required.
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Interpretation of Statute-Historical facts and Constituent Assembly debates---'-Aid of-Held, aid can be taken for construing the provisions of an Act or the Constitution. Doctrines:
Doctrine of real de facto equality-Applicability of
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATEOFKARNATAKA
Words and Phrases:
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"Occupation"-Meaning of in the context of Article 19(/)(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950. "Minority "-Meaning of "Religious and Linguistic Minority"-Meaning ofin the context ofArticle 30 of the Constitution.
"Private educational institution "-Meaning of Earlier, a 5 Judges Bench of this Court was of the view that Article 30 of the Constitution of India did not clothe a minority educational institution with power to adopt its own method of selection and doubted C the correctness of the decision in St. Stephen's College v. University ofDelhi, [1992] 1 SCC 558. The matter was then placed before 7 Judges Bench who .directed the matter to be placed before 11 Judges Bench because it felt that in view of 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, whereby "education" had been included in Entry 25 of List III of VII Schedule of the D Constitution, the question as to who would be regarded as "minority" was required to be considered because the earlier cases deciding the issue related to pre-amendment era, when 'education' was only in State List. Eleven questions were referred to the Constitution Bench. In view of the arguments led by the parties in the petitions, the following five main issues arose for consideration: 1.
Is there a fundamental right to set up educational institutions and if so, under which provision?
2.
Does Unnikrishnan 's case require reconsideration?
3.
In case of private institutions, can there be Government Regulations and, if so, to what extent?
4.
In order to determine the existence of a religious or linguistic minority in relation to Article 30, what is to be the unit-the State or the country as a whole?
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To what extent can the rights of aided private minority institutions to administer be regulated?
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Answering the questions, the Court HELD: Per majority (By B.N. Kirpal, CJ for himself and for G.B. Pattanaik, S. Rajendra Babu, K.G. Balakrishnan, P. Venkatarama Reddi
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and Arijit Pasayat, JJ.)
1.1: The expression "education" means and includes education at all levels f~_om the primary school level upto the post-graduate level. It includes ·professional education. The expression "educational institutions" means institutions that impart education. The right to establish and administer educational institutions is guaranteed under the Constitution to all citizens under Articles 19(l)(g) and 26, and to minorities specifically under Article 30. The right is subject to the provisions of _Articles 19(6) and 26(a). However, minority institutions will have a right to admit students belonging to the minority group. [708-D-F]
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1.2. Article 19(1 )(g) em ploys four expressions, viz., profession, .. occupation, trade and business. Education has so far not been regarded as a trade or business where profit is the motive. Even if there is any doubt about whether education is a profession or not, it does appear that education will fall within the meaning of the expression "occupation". Article 19(J)(g) uses the four expressions so as to cover all activities of a citizen in respect of which income or profit is generated, ~nd which can consequently be regulated under Article 19(6). "occupation" is, inter alia, defined as "an activity in which one engages" or "a craft, trade, profession or other means of earning a living". The establishment and running of an educational institution where a large number of persons are employed as teachers or administrative staff, and an activity is carried 'on that results in the iin parting of knowledge to .the students, must necessarily be regarded as an occupation, even if there is no element of profit generation. It is difficult to comprehend that education, per se, will not fall under any of the four expressions in Article 19(1)(g). "Occupation" would be an activity o{.a person undertaken as a means of livelihood or a mission in life. The question of whether there is a fundamental right or not cannot be dependent upon whether it can be made the subject matter of controls. 1640-D-F; 642-G, B) Unnikrishnan JP. and Ors. v. State qfAndhra Pradesh and Ors., 1199;3) t sec 645, partly overruled. Sodan Singh and Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Ors., J1989J 4 sec 155, relied on. The State of Bombay v. R.MD. Chamarbaugwala, J1957J SCR 874:: AIR (1957) SC 699, referred to.
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1650; Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume LXVII, referred to. 1.3. The right to establish and maintain educational institutions may also be sourced to Article 26(a), which grants, in positive terms, the right to every religious denomination or any section thereof to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, subject to public order, morality and health. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore, religious denominations or sections thereof, which do not fall within the special categories carved out in Articles 29(1) and 30(1), have the right to establish and maintain religious and educational institutions. This would allow members belonging to any religious denomination, including the majority religious community, to set up an educational institution. Given this, the phrase "private educational institution" would include not only those educational institutions set up by secular persons or bodies, but also educational institutions set up by religious denominations; the word "private" is used in contradistinction to Government institutions. 1642-D~FJ 2.1. The scheme framed by this Court in Unnikrishnan 's case and the direction to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right, is unconstitutional. However, the principle that there should not be capitation fee or profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities does not, however, amount to profiteering. 1708-A, BJ 2.2. The restrictions imposed by the scheme, in Unnikrishnan 's case, made it difficult, if not impossible, for the educational institutions to run efficiently as a result of economic losses. Thus, such restrictions cannot be said to be reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. 1647-BI
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2.3. The Unnikrishnan juagment has created certain problems, and raised thorny· issues. In its :inxiety to check the. commercialization of ed'ocation, a scheme of "free:'' and "payment" seats was evolved on the assumption that the economic capacity of the first 50% of admitted G students would be greater than the remaining 50%, whereas the converse has proved to be the reality.: In this scheme, the "payment seat" student would not only pay for his own seat, but also finance the cost of a "free seat" classmate. In practice, it has been the case of the marginally less merited rural or poor student bearing the burden of a rich and well- H
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A exposed urban student. [647-E, F)
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2.4. By rraming this scheme, which has led to the State Governments legislating in conformity with the scheme, the private institutions are indistinguishable from the Government institutions; curtailing all the essential features of the right of administration of a private unaided educational institution can neither be called fair nor reasonable. 1647-H; 648-AJ 2.5. Decision in Unni Krishnan's case, insofar as it framed the scheme relating to the grant of admission and the fixing or the fee, was not correct, and to that extent, the said decision and the consequent directions given to UGC, AICTE, Medical Council of India, Central and State governments, etc., are overruled. 1649-GJ Unni Krishnan JP. and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1993) 1 sec 645, partly overruled.
R. Chitralekha and Anr. v. State of Mysore and Ors., 11964} 6 SCR 368; Minor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras and Ors., [1968] 2 SCR 7a6, Kumari Chitra Ghosh and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., 11969] 2 SCC 228; St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, [1992] 1 SCC 558 and Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State ofKarnataka and Ors., [1992] 3 SCC 666, referred
E to. 3.1. Article 30(1) gives religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The use of the words "of their choice" indicates that even professional educational institutions would be covered by Article 30. [704-CI
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3.2. Admission of students to unaided minority educational institutions, viz.,schools and undergraduate colleges where the scope for merit-based selection is practically nil, cannot be regulated by the concerned State or University, except for providing the qualifications and minimum conditions of-eligibility in the interest of academic standards. [704-E]
3.3. The right to admit students being an essential facet of the right to administer educational institutions. of their choice, as contemplatecl under Article 30 of the Constitution, the State Government or the University may not be entitled to interfere with that right, so long as thr~ admission to the unaided educational institutions is on a transpar.ent basis
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T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION"· STATE OF KARNATAKA
and the merit is adequately taken care of. The right to administer, not A being absolute, there could be regulatory 111:easures for ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence thereof, and it is more so in the matter of admissions to professional institutions. [704-F, Gl r
3.4. The right to establish an educational institution can be regulated; but such regulatory measures must, in· general, be to ensure the B maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure (including qualified staff) and the prevention of mal-administration by those in charge of management. The fixing of a rigid fee structure, dictating the formation and composition of a governing body, compulsory nomination of teachers and staff for appointment or nominating students C for admissions would be unacceptable restrictions. With regard to the core components .of ~he rights under Articles 19 and 26(a), while the State has the right to prescribe qualifications necessary for admission, private unaided colleges have the right to admit students of their choice, subject to an objective and rational procedure of selection and the compliance of conditions, if any, requiring admission of a small percentage of students D belonging to weaker sections of the society by granting them freeships or scholarships, if not granted by the Government. In setting up a reasonable fee structure, the element of profiteering is not as yet accepted in Indian conditions. The fee structure must take into consideration the need to generate funds to be utilized for the betterment and growth of the E educational institution, the betterment of education in that institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students. In any event, a private institution will have the right to constitute its own governing body, for which qualifications may be prescribed by the State or the concerned University. It will, however, be objectionable if the State retains the power to nominate specific individuals on governing bodies. F Nomination by the State, which could be on a political basis, will be an inhibiting factor for private enterprise to embark upon the occupation of establishing and administering educational institutions. For the same reasons, nomination of teachers e.ither directly, by the department or through a service commission will be an unreasonable inroad and an G unreasonable restriction on the autonomy of the private unaided educational institution. [652-H; 653-A, B; 652-D-G] 3.5. There has to be a difference in the administration of private · unaided institutions and the government-aided institutions. Whereas in the latter case, the Government will have greater say in the administration, H
· . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
· d ' ad · sions and fixing. of rees, in the case of private unaided · • · h A me1u mg m15
institutions maximum autonomy in the day-to-day admmtstrahon as to be with private unaided institutions. Bureauc~ati~ or ~overnmen_tal interference in the administration of such an inshtutaon will undermtne its independence. While an educational institution is not a bu~iness, in order to examine the degree of independence that can be gtven to a recognized educational institution, like any private entity that does not seek aid or assistance from the Government, and that exists by virtue of the funds generated by it, including its loans or borrowings, it is important to note that the essential ingredients of the management of the private institution include recruiting students and staff, and the quantum or fee
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.. 3.6. It would be unfair tQ apply the same rules and regulations r~gulating admission to both aided and unaided professional institutions. It must be born~ in mind that unaided professional institutions are entitled to ·a utonomy in their administration while, at the same time, they do not forego or discard the principle of merit. It would, therefore, be permissible for the University or the Government, at the time of granting recognition, to require a private unaided institution to provide for merit-based selection while, at the same time, giv.ing the Management sufficient discretion in admitting students. The same principles may be applied to other nonprofessional but unaided educational institutions \'iz., graduation an!~ post graduation non ~professional colleges or institutes. {658-G, H; 659-BJ
· 3.7. Inasmuch as the occupation of education is, in a sense, regarded as charitable, the Government can provide regulations that will ensure
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excellence in education, while forbidding the charging of capitation fee and profiteering by th~ institution. 1654-D, El · . .
3.8. In the case of private unaided educational institutions, the
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authority granting recognition or affiliation can certainty lay down conditions (or the grant of recognition or affiliation; these conditions must pertain broadly to academic and educational matters and welfare of students and teachers .. but how the private unaided institutions are to run is a matter of administration to be taken ~are of by the Management of those institutions. Conditions granting recognition or affiliation can broadly cover academic and educational matters including tbe welfure or students and teachers. 1658-E; 659-01 · , . f
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3.9. Conditions or affiliation or recognition, which pertain to the
T.M.A. PAI FOUNDATION v. STATEOFKARNATAKA
academic and educatioalal character of the institution and ensure uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses are valid, and that they do not violate even the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution; but conditions that are laid down for granting recognition _ should not be such as may lead to Governmental control of the administration of the private educational institutions. [660-A, B] 3.10.0nce aid is granted to a private professional educational institution, the Government or the State agency, as a condition of the grant of aid, can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and management of the institution. The State, which gives aid to an educational institution, can impose such conditions as are necessary for the proper main$enance of the high standards of education as the financial burden is shared by the State. The State would also be under an obligation to protect . the interest of the teaching and non-teaching staff. At the same time it has to be ensured that even an aided institution does not become a Government-owned and controlled institution. Normally, the aid that is granted is relatable to the pay and allowances of the teaching staff. In addition, the Management of the private aided institugons has to incur revenue and capital expenses. Such aided h.1stitutions cannot obt~in that extent of autonomy in relation to management and administration as would be available to a private unaided institution, but at the same time, it cannot also be treated as an educational institution departmentally run by Government or as a wholly owned and controlled Government institution and interfere with constitution of the governing bodies or thrusting the staff without reference to Management. The autonomy of a private aided institution would be less than that of an unaided institution. (660-E, F; 661-B-D; 661-G] Re: Kera/a Education Bill, 1957 (1959( SCR 995, relied on.
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4.1. Linguistic and religious minorities are covered by the expression "minority" under Article 30 of the Constitution. Since reorganization of the States in India has been on linguistic lines for the purpose of determining the minority, the unit will be the State and not the whole of India. Thus, religious and linguistic minorities, who have been put at par in Article 30, have to be considered State-wise. [703-E, Fl
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D.A. V. College v. State of Punjab and Ors., [19711 Supp. SCR 688 and D.A. V. College Bhalinda v. State of Punjab and Ors., 119711 Supp. SCR 677, relied on.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
Re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [195'9) SCR 995, referred to. 4.2. If the State has to be regarded as the unit for determining "linguistic minority" vis-a-vis Article 30, then with "religious minority" being on the same footing, it is the State in relation to which the majority or minority status will have to be determined. [662-D]
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4.3. The Forty-Second Amendment to the Constitution included education in the Concurrent List under Entry 25. The minority for the purpose ·of Article 30 cannot have different meanings depending upon who is legislating. Language being the basis for the establishment of different States for the purposes of Article 30, a "linguistic minority" will have to C be determined in relation to the State in which the educational institution is sought to be established. The position with regard to the religious minority is similar, since both religious and linguistic minorities have been put at par in Article 30. [663-D-F]
5.1. A minority institution may have its own procedure and method D of admission as well as selection of students, but such a procedure must be fair and transparent, and the selection of students in professional and higher education colleges should be on the basis of merit. The procedure adopted or selection made should not tantamount to mal-administration. Even an unaided minority institution ought not to ignore the merit of the E students for admissi9n, while exercising its right to admit students to the colleges aforesaid, as in that event, the institution will fail to achieve excellepce. 1705-EJ 5.2. !\ierit may be determined either through a common entrance test conducted by the concerned .University or the Government followed by counselling, or on the basis of an entrance test conducted by individual F institutions-the method to be followed is for the University or the Government to decide. The authority may alsn devise other means to ensure that admission is granted to an aided professional institution on the basis of merit. In the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the Government or the University to provide that consideration should G be shown to the weaker sections of the society. [705-H; 706-A, BJ 5.3. So far as the statutory provisions regulating the facets of administration are concerned, in case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as the conditions of affiliation to an · H university or board have to be complied with, but in the matter of day~
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATEOFKARNATAKA
to-day management, like the appointment of staff, teaching and nonteaching, and administrative control over them, the management should have the freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency. However, a rational procedure for the selection of teaching staff and for taking disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself. [706:.0-E) 5.4. For redressing the grievances of employees of aided and unaided institutions who are subjected to punishment or termination from service, a mechanism will have to be evolved, and appropriate tribunals could be constituted, and .till then, such tribunals could' be presided ·over by a Judicial Officer of the rank of District Judge. [706-F, G]
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5.5. The State or other controlling authorities, however, can always
prescribe the minimum qualification, experience and other conditions bearing on the merit of an individual for being appointed as a teacher or a p·rincipal of any educational institution. [706-G]
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5.6. No person attending an educational institution can be required D to take part in any religious instruction or any religious worship, unless the person or his/her guardian has given his/her consent thereto, in a case where the educational institution has been recognized by the State or receives aid out of its funds. In any institution, whether established by the majority or a minority religion, if religious instruction is imparted, no E student can be compelled to take part in the said religimJs instruction or in any religious worship. An individual has the absolute right not to be compelled to take part in any religious instruction or worship. Article 28(3) thereby recognizes the right of an individual to practice or profess his own religion. (666-B-DJ 5.7. To some extent, Article 26(1)(a) and Article 30(1) overlap, insofar as they relate to the establishment of educational institutions; but whereas Article 26 gives the right both to the majority as well as minority communities to establish and maintain institutions for charitable purposes, which would, inter alia, include educational institutions, Article 30(1) refers to the right of minorities to establish and maintain educational institutions of their choice. Another difference between Article 26 and Article 30 is that whereas Article 26 refers only to religious denominations, Article 30 contains the right of religious as well as linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 1667-C, D] The State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, 11951] SCR
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.CR.
A 525 and The State ofBombay v. Bombay Education Society and Ors., J19551 1 SCR 568, referred to.
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5.8. Constitution in Part Ill does not contain or give any absolute right. All rights conferred in Part Ill of the Constitution are subject to at least other provisions of the said Part. It is difficult to comprehend that the framers of the Constitution wouid have given such an absolute right to the religious or linguistic minorities, which would enable them to establish and administer educational institutions in a manner so as to be in conflict with the other parts of the Constitution. It is difficult to accept that in the establishment and administration of educational institutions by the religious and linguistic minorities, no law of the land, even the Constitution, is to apply to them. [692-E, Fl
5.9. Even though the words of Article 30(1) are unqualified, this Court has held that at least certain other laws of the land pertaining to ,. health, morality and standards of education apply. The right under Article D 30(1) is, therefore, not absolute or above other provisions of the law. By the same analogy, there is no reason why regulations or·conditions concerning, generally, the welfare of students and teachers should not be made applicable in order to provide a proper academic atmosphere, as such provisions do not in any way interfere with the right of administration or management under Article 30(1). [693-A, Bl
5.1 0. Article 30(1) is a sort of guarantee or assurance to the linguistic and religious minority institutions of their right to establi~h and administer educational institutions of their choice. Secularism and equality being two of the basic features of the Constitution, Article 30(1) ensures protection to the linguistic and religious minorities, thereby preserving the secularism F of the country. Furthermore, the principles of equality must necessarily apply to the enjoyment of such rights. No law can be framed that will discriminate against such minorities with regard to the establishment and administration of educational institutions vis-a-vis other educational. institutions. Any law or rule or regulation that would put the educationat institutions run by the minorities at a disadvantage when compared to the G institutions run by the others will have to be struck down. At the samE: time, there also cannot be any reverse discrimination. The essence ofi Article 30(1) is to ensure equal treatment between the majority and thf~ minority institutions. No one type or category of institution should bf! disfavoured or, for that matter, receive more favourable treatment than H another. Laws of the land, including rules and regulations, must apply
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T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATEOFKARNATAKA
equally to the majority institutions as well as to the minority institutions. The minority institutions must be allowed to do what the non-minority institutions are permitted to do. (693-C-GI
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St..Xav,iers College v. University ofDelhi, 119921 1 SCC 558, relied on. 5.11. Like any other private unaided institutions, similar unaided educational institutions administered. by linguistic or religious minorities are assured maximum autonomy in relation thereto; e.g., method of recruitment of teachers, charging of fees and admission of students. They will have to comply with the conditions of recognition, which cannot be such as to whittle down the right under Article 30. (693-G, H; 694-A] 5.12. The grant of aid is not a constitutional imperative. The founding fathers have not incorporated the right to grants in Article 30, whereas they have done so under Article 337. Article 30(2) only means what it states, viz., that a minority institution shall not be discriminated against when aid to educational institutions is granted. If an abject surrender of the right to management is made a condition of aid, the denial of aid would be violative of Article 30(2). However, conditions of aid that do not involve a surrender of the substantial right of management would not be inconsistent with constitutional guarantees, even if they indirectly impinge upon some facet of administration. If, however, aid were denied on the ground that the educational institution is under the management of a minority, then such a denial would be completely invalid. The implication of Article 30(2) is also that it recognizes that the minority nature of the institution should continue, notwithstanding the grant of aid. (694-B-F] 5.13. The right under Article 30(1) implies that any grant that is given by the State to the minority institution cannot have such conditions attached to it, which will in any way dilute or abridge the rights of the minority institution to establish "-nd administer that institution. The conditions that can normally be permitted to be imposed, on the educational institutions receiving the grant, must be related to the proper utilization of the grant and fulfillment of the objectives of the grant. Any such secular conditions so laid, such as a proper audit with regard to the utilization of the funds and the manner in which the funds are to be utilized, will be applicable and would not dilute the minority status of the educational institutions. Such conditions would be valid if they are also imposed on other educational institutions receiving the grant. (694-H; 695-A)
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5.14. It cannot be said that no conditions can be imposed while givin~: aid to a minority institution. Whether it is an institution run by th(~ majority or the minority, all conditions that have relevance to the proper utilization of the grant-in-aid by an educational institution can be imposed, Article 28(1) does not state that it applies only to educational institutions B that are not established or maintained by religious or linguistic minorities. Furthe-r~ ore, upon the receipt of aid, the provisions of Article 28{3) would apply to all educational institutions whether run by the minorities or the non-minorities. If Articles 28(1) and (3) apply to a minority institution that receives aid out of State funds, there is nothing in the language of Article 30 that would make the provisions of Article 29(2) inapplicable. Like C Article 28(1) and Article 28(3), Article 29(2) refers to "any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds". A minority institution would fall within the ambit of Article 29(2) in the same manner:in which Article 28(1) and Article 28(3) would be applicable to an aided minority institution. It is true that one of the rights to administer D an educational institution is to grant admission to students. Article 29(2) curtails the right to grant admission to a certain extent. By virtue of Article 29(2), no citizen can be denied admission by an aided minority institl'ltion on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or arty of them._lt is no doubt true that Article 29(2) does curtail one of the powers of the minority institution, but on receiving aid, some of the rights that an E unaided ~minority institution has, are also curtailed by Article 28(1) and 28(3). A minority educational institution has a right to impart religious instruction-this right is taken away by Article 28(1), if that minority institution is maintained wholly out of State funds. Similarly on receiving aid out of state funds or on being recognized by the State, the absolute right of a minority institution requiring a student to attend religious F instruction is curtailed by Article 28(3). If the curtailment of the right to administer a minority institution on receiving· aid or being wholly maintained out of state funds as provided by Article 28 is valid, there is no reason why Article 29(2) should not be held to be applicable. There is nothing in the language of Article 28(1) and (3), Article 29(2) and Article G 30 to suggest that, on receiving aid, Article 28(1) and (3) will apply, but Article 29(2) will not. Therefore, it cannot be said that the institutions covered by Article 30 are outside the injunction of Article 29(2). 1695-C-H; 696-A-E}
5.15. Article 29~2) is capable of two interpretations - one interpretation is the minority institution, once it takes any aid, cannot
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
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make any reservation for its own community or show a preference at the time of admission. The other interpretation is that it is a protection against discrimination on the ground of religion, race, caste or language, and does not in any way come into play where the minority institution prefers students of its choice. [696-G, H; 697-B]
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5.16. Both Articles 29 and 30 form a part of the Fundamental Rights Chapter in Part III of the Constitution. Article 30 is confined to minorities, be it religious ot linguistic, and unlike Article 29(1), the right available under the said Article cannot be availed by any section of citizens. The main distinction between Article 29(1) and Article 30(1) is that in the former, the right is confined to conservation of language, script or culture. The right given by Article 29(1) is fortified by Article 30(1), insofar as minorities are concerned. The right to establish an educational institution is not confined to conservation of language, script or culture. When constitutional provisions are interpreted, it has to be borne in mind that · the interpretation should be such as to further the object of their incorporation. They cannot be read in isolation and have to be read harmoniously to provide meaning and purpose. They cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders another provision redundant. If necessary, a purposive and harmonious interpretation should be given. f697-F, H; 698-AJ
5.17. Although the right' to administer includes within it a right to grant admission to students of their choice under Article 30(1), when such a minority institution is granted the facility of receiving grant-in-aid, Article 29(2) would apply, and necessarily, therefore, one of the rights of administration of the minorities would be eroded to some extent. Article 30(2) is an injunction against the State not to discriminate against the minority educational institution and prevent it from receiving aid on the ground that the institution is under the management of a minority. It is in this context that some interplay between Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) is required. As long as the minority educational institution permits admission of citizens belonging to the non-minority class to a reasonable extent based upon merit, it will not be an infraction of Article 29(2), even though the institution admits studen'ts of the minority group of its own choice for whom the institution was meant. What would be a reasonable extent would depend upon variable factors, and it may not be advisable to fix any ·specific percentage. The situation would vary according to the type of institution and the nature of education that is being imparted in the institution. Usually, at the school level, although it may be possible to
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A fill up all the seats with students of the minority group, at the higher level,
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either in colleges or in technical institutions, it may not be possible to fill up all the seats with the students of the minority group. However, even if it is possible to fill up all the seats with students of the minority group, the moment the institution is granted aid, the institution will have to admit students of the non-minority group to a reas1mable extent, whereby the character of the institution is not annihilated, and at the same time, the rights of the citizen engrafted under Article 29(2) are not subverted. It is for this reason that a variable percentage of admission of minority students depending on the type of institution and education is desirable, and indeed, necessary, to promote the constitutional guarantees enshrined in both Article 29(2) and Article 30. [698-B, D; F-H; 699-A, BJ
St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, 119921 1 SCC 558, relied on.
5.18. The basic ratio laid down by this Court in St. Stephen's College is correct. However, rigid percentage cannot be stipulated. It has to b'e left to the authorities to prescribe a reasonable percentage having regard to the type of institution, population and educationaJ needs of minoritie~:. As Article 29 and Article 30 apply not only to institutions of higher education but also to schools, a ceiling of 50% would not be proper. It will be more appropriate that, depending upon the level of the institution, whether it be a primary or secondary or high school or a collegl!, professional or otherwise, and on the population and educational needs of the area in which the institution is to be located, the state properly balances the interests of all by providing for such a percentage of students of the minority community to be admitted, so as to adequately serve the interest of the community for which the institution was established. [707-G, 700-B, CJ
St. Stephen 's College v. University of Delhi, (1992] I SCC 558, partly overruled. Indira Sawhney v. Union of india and Ors., 119921 Suppl. 3 SCC 215, Q referred to.
5.19. The aided linguistic minority educational institution is given the right to admit students belonging to the linguistic minority to a reasonable extent only to ensure that its minority character is preserv·ed and that the objective of establishing the institution is not defeated. If ~;o, such an institution is under an obligation to admit the bulk of the students
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
. fitting into the description of the minority community. Therefore, the ·students of that group residing in the State in which the institution is located have to be necessarily admitted in a large measure because they constitute the linguistic minority group as far as that State is concerned. The management bodies of such institutions cannot resort to the device . of admitting the linguistic students of the adjoining State in which they are in a majority, under the facade of the protection given under Article 30(1). If not, the very objective of conferring the preferential right of admission by harmoniously constructing Articles 30(1) and 29(2) may be distorted. [700-G, H; 701-A, B]
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5.20.The admissions to aided institutions, whether awarded to minority or non-minority students, cannot be at the absolute sw~et will and pleasure of the management of minority educational institutions. As the regulations to promote academic excellence and standards do not e~~croach upon the guaranteed rights under Article 30, the aided minority educational institutions can be required to observe inter se merit amongst the eligible minority applicants and passage of common entrance test by the candidates, where there is one, with regard to admissions in professional and non-professional colleges. If there is no such test, a rational. method of assessing comparative merit has to be evolved. As regards the non-minority segment, admission may be on the basis of the common entrance test and counselling by. a state agency. In the courses for which such a test and counselling are not in vogue, admission can be on the basis of relevant criteria for the determination of merit. It would be open to the State authorities to insist on allocating a certain percentage of seats to those belonging to weaker sections of society, from amongst the non-minority seats. (700-D-FJ
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5.2J.It will be wrong to presume that the Government or the Legislature will act against the Constitution or contrary to the public or national interest at all times. Viewing every action of the Government with skepticism, and with the belief that it must be invalid unless proved otherwise, goes against the democratic form of Government. It is no doubt true that the Court has the power and the function to see that no one including the Government acts contrary to the law, but the cardinal principle of our jurisprudence is that it is for the person who alleges that the law has been violated to prove it to be so. In such an event, the action of the Gove.r::nment or the authority may have to be carefully examined, -·· but it js.,f:mpro.per to.,. proceed on the assumption that, merely because an ~-- ··~
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allegation is made, the action impugned or taken must be bad in law. Such being the position, when the Government frames rules and regulations or lays down norms, especially with regard to education, one must assume that unless shown otherwise, the action taken is in accordance with law. Therefore, it will not be in order to so interpret a Constitution, and Articles. 29 and 30 in particular, on the presumption that the State will normally not act in the interest of the general public or in the interest of concerned! sections of the society. [701-D-G]
Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Ors. v. State ofBombay and Anr., [1963} 3 SCR 837; Rev. Father W Proost and Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Ors., [1969} 2 SCR 73; Sta'f ?f Kerala, Etc. v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, etc., [1971] 1 SCR 734; D.A.!V. College v. State ofPunjab andOrs., [1971] Supp. SCR 688; The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. etc. v. State ofGujarat and Anr., [1975] 1 SCR 17.3; Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 820;Christian Medical College Hospital Employees' Union and Anr. v. Christian Medical College Vel/ore Association and Ors., [1988]1 SCR 546; Gandhi Faizeam College Shahajhanpur v. University of Agra and Anr, [1975]3 SCR 810; All Saints High School, Hyderabad Etc. Etc. v. Government of A.P. and Ors. Etc. [1980] 2 SCR 924; Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India and Ors., [1987] 1 SCR 238 and Re: Kerala Education Bill, [1957-1959] SCR 995, referred to. Per V.N. Khare, 1 (Supplementing):
1.1. The test who are linguistic or religious minorities within the
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meaning of Article 30 would be one and the same either in relation to a State legislation or Central legislation. There cannot be two tests one in relation to Central legislation and other in relation to State legislation. Therefore, the meaning assigned to linguistic or religious minorities would not be different when the subject "Education" has been transferred to the "Concurrent List" from the "State List". The test who are linguistic or religious minorities as settled in Kerala Education Bill's case continues llo hold good even after the subject "Education" was transposed into Entry 25 List III of Seventh Schedule by the 42nd Amendment Act. If differetnt meaning is given to the expression ''minority" occurring in Article 30 in relation to a central legislation, the very purpose for which protection h:as been given to minority would disappear. The test to determine the status of linguistic minority would not be different than the religious minoritit~s. (716-D-GI
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
1.2. The transposition of the subject Education from List II and List III has not brought change to the test for determining who are minorities for the purposes of Article 30 of the Constitution. Various entries in three lists of the Seventh Schedule are not powers of legislation but fields of legislation. These entries are mere legislative heads and demarcate the area over which the appropriate legislatures are empowered to enact law. The power to legislate is given to the appropriate legislature by Article 246 and other Articles of the Constitution. (715-E, F]
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Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [1959] SCR 995, relied on. D.A. V. College v. State of Punjab, 11971) Suppl. S.C.R. 697, distinguished.
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A.M Patroni v. F. C. Kesavan, AIR (1965) Kerala 75, referred to. 2.1. Although Article 30(1) strictly may not be subject to reasonable restrictions, it cannot be disputed that Article 30(1) is subject to Article 28(3) and also general laws and the laws made in the interests of national security, public order, morality and the like governing such institutions will have to be necessarily read into Article 30(1 ). It cannot be held that the Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 30(1) is absolute in terms. Thus, looking into the precedents, historical fact and Constituent Assembly debates and also interpreting Articles 29(2) and 30(1) contextually and textually, the irrestible conclusion is that Article 30(1) is subject to Article 29(2) of the Constitution. 1734-F-HI
The State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society and Ors., [1955]1 SCR 568; Kerala Education Bill, [1957-1959] SCR 995; D.A. V. College etc. v. State ofPunjab and Ors., [1971] Sup pl. SCR 688 and St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, (1992]1 sec 558, relied on.
Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Ors., [19691 2 SCR 7~; State of Kerala etc. v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial etc., 119711 1 SCR 734; Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Ors. v. State of Bombay and Anr., 11963( 3 SCR 837; Rev. Magr. Mark v. Government of Kerala and Ors., [1979) 1 SCR 609 and State ofMadras v. ~rimathi Champakam Dorairajan etc., (19511 .G SCR 525, referred to. 2.2. Rights conferred on linguistic or religious minorities are not in the nature of privilege or concession, but their entitJement flows from the doctrine of equality, which is the real de facto equality. Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind, whereas equality in fact may involve
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. '
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establishes equilibrium between different situations. Where there is a plurality in a society, the object of law should be not to split the minority group which makes up the society, but to find ~t political, social and legal means of preventing them from falling apart and so destroying the society of which they are members. The attempt should be made to assimilate the minorities with majority. It is a matter of common ~nowledge that in some of the democratic countries where minority rights were not protected, those democracies acquired status of theocratic States. (737·G, H; 738·A, B)
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. 2.3. Right conferred on minority under Artkle 30(1) would serve no
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purpose when they cannot admit students of their own community in their own institutions. In order to make Article 30(1) workable and meaningful, such rights must be interpreted in the manner in which they serve the minorities as well as the mandate contained in Article 29(2). Thus, where minorities are found to have established and admiuistering their own educational institutions, the doctrine of the real de facto equality has to be applied. The doctrine of the real de facto equality envisages giving a preferential treatmen1: to members of minorities in the matter of admission in their own institution. On application of doctrine of the real de facto equality in such a situation not only Article 30(1) would be workable and meaningful, but it would also serve the mandate contained in Article 29(2}. Thus while maintaining the rule of non·discrimination envisaged by Article 29(2), the minorities should have also right to give preference to th~: students of their own community in the matter of admission in their ow111 institution. Otherwise, there would be no meaningful purpose of Articlf~ 30(1) in the Constitution. {738-D-F) · 2.4. If Article 29(2) is meant for the benefit of minority, there was no sense in. using the word 'caste' in Article 29(2). The word 'caste' i.s unheard of in religious minority communities and, therefore, Article 29(2) was never intended by the framers of the Constitution to confer any exclusive rights to the minorities. (734·E]
2.5. Even if ·there are no qualifying expressions "subject to other provisions of this part" and "notwithstanding anything" either in Article 30(1) or Article 29(2), Article 30(1) is subject to Article 29(2) of the Constitution. 1734-Dl The Durgah Committee,· Ajmer and Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali and Ors.,
...
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
[1962] I SCR 383 and Tikayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of A Rpjasthan and Ors., 119641 t SCR 561, relied on. Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Ors. v. State of Bombay and Anr., 11963] 3 SCR 837, referred to. 2.6. Article 337 of the Constitution provides that grants or B Government aid has to be given to the Anglo-Indian institution provided they admit 40% of members from other community. Taking the clue from Article 337 and spirit behind Article 30(1), it appears appropriate that "''tlinority educational institutions be given preferential rights in the matter · · of admission of children of their community in their own institutions while admitting students of non-minorities which, advisedly, may be upto 50% C based on inter se merits of such students. However, it would be subject to assessment of the actual requirement of the minorities, the types of the institutions and the courses of education for which admission is being sought for and other relevant factors. [739-A-C] State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan etc., 11951] SCR 525, relied on.
The Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society and Anr. etc. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., [19751 1 SCR 173, referred to. "Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities" by Prof. Francesco Capotorti, referred .to. 3.1. State must see that the regulatory measures of control of such institutions should be minimum and there should not be interference in the internal or day-to-day working of the Management. However, the State would be justified in enforcing the s~andard of education in such institutions. In case of minority professional institutions, it can also be stipulated that passing of common entrance test held by the State agency is necessary to seek admission. It is for the reason that the products of such professional institutions are not only going to serve the minorities but also to majority community. So far as the redressal of grievances of staff and teachers of minority institutions are concerned, a mechanism has to be evolved. Setting· up a Tribunal for particular class of employees is neither expedient nor condudve to the interest of such employee. In that view of tbe matter, each District Judge which includes the Addl. District Judge of the respective district be designated as Tribunal for redressal of the grievances of the employee and staff of such institutions. (739-D-FJ
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3.2. Seeing the nature of the minority institutions the grounds available under labour laws are too wide and it would be appropriate if adverse decisions of the Management are tested on grounds of breach of principl~s of natural justice and fair play or any regulation made in that respect. [739-G, HI
4. One of the known methods to interpret a provision of an enactment or the Constitution is to look into the historical facts or any document preceding the legislation. Constituent Assembly debates although not conclusive, yet the intention of framers of the Constitution in enacting provisions. of the Constitution can throw light in ascertaining the intention behind such provision. The report of the Constituent Assembly debates can legitimately be taken into consideration for construction of the provisions of the Act or the Constitution. (724-B, H; 725-AI
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His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru etc. v. State ofKera/a and Anr. Etc., [1973) 4 SCC 225 and R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, AIR (1984) SC 684, relied on. Per Quadri; J. (Partly dissenting):
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1.1. All the citizens have a right to establi~h and administer educational institutions under Articles 19(1)(g) and 26.The minorities have an additional right to establish and administer educational institution 'of their choice' under Article 30(1). The extent of these rights are, therefore, different. A comparison of Articles 19,26 and 30 would show that whereas the educational institutions established and run by the citizens under Article 19(l)(g) and Article 26(a) are subject to the discipline pf Article§. I 9(6) and 26 there are no such limitations in Article 30 of the Constitution~, so in that the right conferred thereunder is absolute. H~wever, tht! educational institutions established by the minorities under Article 30(1 ) will be subject only to the regulatory measures which should be consisten1t with Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The right of the minority institution~; to admit students of the minority, if any, would not be affected in any way by receipt of State aid. [745-E-H) 1.2. Regulations postulated for granting recognition or aid ought to be with regard to excellence of education and efficiency of administration, viz., to make certain healthy surroundings for the institutions, existence of competent teachers possessing requisite qualifications and maintaining
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T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
fair standard of teaching. Such regulations are not restrictions on the right but merely deal with the aspects of proper administration of an educational institution, to ensure excellence of education and to avert maladministration in minority educational institutions and will, therefore, be permissible. This is on the principle that when the Constitution confers a right, any regulation framed by the State in that behalf should be to facilitate exercise of that right and not to frustrate it. [749-C, DJ
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In re: Kera/a Education Bill, (1957-1959] SCR 995, relied on. Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. etc. v. State ofGujarat and Anr., {1975) 1 SCR 173, referred to. 1.3. The sine qua non of a good and efficient administration is that it is fair and transparent. Therefore, it will be in the fitness of things and in the interest of good administration of the minority educational institutions (whether aided or unaided) to frame their own regulations. This will inspire confidence in both the State and its agencies as well as the public and the student community. (749-G, H; 750-A) 1.4. If the evil of collection of capitation fee is done away with by the private educational institutions (both non-minority and minority) much of the controversy about intervention by the State and complaints by citizens could be avoided. Collection Qf capitation fee being the wors~ part of mal-administration can properly be the subject-matter of regulatory control of a State. Receiving donations by an educational institution, unconnected with admission of students, could not obviously be treated as an equivalent of collection of capitation fee. [750-D, E)
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1.5. The expression 'of their choice' includes not only the choice of . F the institution to be established and administered by the minorities, like institution for elementary, primary, secondary, university, vocational and technical and medical education, but also the choice of the students who have to be imparted education in such institutions. {746-G-H; 747-A]
The State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society and Ors.. [1955) 1 G SCR 568; In Re: The Kerala Education Bill, (1957·1959] SCR 995; D.A. V. College, Jullunder etc. v. The State of Punjab and Ors., AIR (1971) SC 1737 and The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. etc. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., [1975] 1 SCR 173, referred to. 1.6. The expression 'to establish' means to set up on permanent basis.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002} SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A The expression 'to administer' means to manage or to attend to the running of the affairs. 1747-Bl ·,
Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. etc. v. State ofGuja~at and Anr., (197511 SCR 173, relied on.
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t'. 7. To make the right under Article 30 real and effective, the regulatory measures have to be consistent with that right. Regulations could be aimed at excellence of education and efficient administration of such institutions as that would be i.n the interest of the educationaR institutions of the minorities. Any regulation which is not in the interest of the minority educational institutions but is in the interest of an outsidl! agency would whittle down the right of the minority to administer the institution and would be violative of Article 30 of the Constitution. Tht~ true t~st to judge the validity of any regulations imposed by the State fo:r grant~ng recognition and/or aid is the dual test viz., (i) the regulations must be reasonable; and (ii) it must be regulative of the educational character of the institution and conducive to making the institution an effecHve vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. (755-A-C]
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Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Ors. v. State ofBombay and Anr., [1963) 3 SCJR 837 a'n(l The Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society and Anr. Etc. v. State o[Gujarat and Anr:, [1975]' 1 SCR 173, relied on. . 1.8. There can. be no demur to the dicta that Government regulations cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the riglbt to establish and administer a mere illusion but to say that the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be above the law, would, amount to confe'~ring supremacy to the ordinary law over the provisions of tllte ,. Cons!itution which would be contrary to Article 13 of the Constitution, as the laws whether existing or. made in exercise of power conferred IDy the c;onstitution have to be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and Part III which includes Article 30 and not vice versa. (758-C, D]
Constitutional Laws of India by H.M. Seervai 3rd Edn.; Law Lexicon 2nd Edition, Reprint 2000, referred to.
1.9. The limitations incorporated in Articles 19, 25 and 26 canu1ot be read into Article 30. What Article 30 predicates is institutional autonomy on the educational institutions established and administered in
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
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exercise of the right conferred thereunder, which cannot be interfered with ·A by the State except to the extent of framing reasonable regulations in the interest of excellence of education and to prevent mal-administration. · 1759-H; 760-AI The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. etc. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., [1975] 1 SCR 173; D.A. V. College, Jul/under etc. v. The State of Punjab and Ors., AIR (1971) SC l 737; State of Kerala v. Very Rev Mother Provincial Etc., [197111 SCR 734; Father W. Proost and Ors. v. State of Bihar ancfOrs., (1969] 2 SCR 73; Rt. Rev. Bishop S.K.Patro and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1970] I SCR 172 and In All Saints High School, Hyderabad etc. etc. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. etc., 11980] 2 SCR 924, relied on.
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Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina, 1197911 SCR 820, referred to. 1.10. The framers of the Constitution, who have subjected the fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 to limitations contained therein, chose not to subject Article 30(1) to any such limitation. In incorporating the right of the minorities, whether based on religion or language, to establish and -administer educational institutions 'of their choice' which obviously postulates secular education, they were not unmindful of the fact that the right which was conferred under Article 30 was also in respect of a secular aspect. It \YOuld be erroneous to assume that in placing limitations on certain Fundamental Rights and omitting to do so on certain others, if are inconsequential, they carried on the exercise in·futility. Such an assumption cannot be made in respect of any legislation, much less can it be assumed in regard to ~he Constituent Assembly. (751-D, E] 1:11. It cannot be said that though the Constitution itself has not subjected the right under Article 30 to the regulatory control of the State or to other limitations as in Articles 19, 25 and 26, the State's regulatory power and other limitations incorporated in the aforemention~d Articles should be read in Article 30 of the Constitution or that incorporating limitations in Articles 19, 25, 26 ~nd not incorporating them in Article 30 is of no significance, cannot but be rejected. When the Constitution itself has designedly not imposed or permitted imposition of any limitation or restriction by the State on a fundamental right under Article 30, neither the Court by process of interpretation nor legislation much less an exclusive regulation can be permitted to cut down the width of the
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constitutional right termed as a fundamental right. [751-F-H)
In re: Kerala Education Bill, (1957-1959) SCR995, relied on.
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1.i2. The legislative power of a State or Union is subject to the fundamental rights and the legislature cannot indirectly take away or abridge fundamental rights which it could not do directly for granting either recognition or aid. [752-C) 2.1. Article 29(2) does not apply to a private educational institution which is not receiving aid out of State funds. Article 29(2) confers an individual right on every citizen to seek admission into any educationalt institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds. It embodies the principle of equality in a truncated form and, therefore, a. citizen can be denied admission by an educational institution whethel' maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on ground other than the prohibited grounds - religion, race, caste, language or any one of them. The denial of admission by an institution directly based only on one of the forbidden grounds specified in Article 29(2) is impermissible. It is a qualified extension of the principle enshrined in Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. It affords a limited protection to citizens against discrimination on the enumerated grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any one of them. In. contra-distinction to Article 14, which is an all pervading general provision and Article 15(1), clause (2) of Article 29 has a limited scope. [760-D, E; 761-C, EJ ~tate of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society and Ors., [1955) 1 SCR
568, relied on . .. .
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Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh, (1946) LR 73 I.A. 59, referred to. 2.2. The expression 'any educational institution' in Article 29(2) is a genus of which an aided minority educational institution is a species. Having regard to the provisions of clauses (1) and {2) of Article 30, the classification has nexus with the object sought to be achieved by clause (2) of Article 29. [761-FI I
2.3. Granting of aid to minority institutions cannot be such as to denude them of their character as minority institutions. Eve~;~ after receiving aid, they remain minority educational institutions in aH their attributes. On grant of aid by the State, Article 29(2) does not control Article 30(1). (763-AJ
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATEOFKARNATAKA
Pradeep Kumar Biswas and Ors. v. Indian Institute ofChemical Biology and Ors., [2002] 5 SCC 111; referred to. 2.4. The right conferred on the student community under Article 29(2) is a truncated right though it is available to each student and against all the institutions maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State funds. Nevertheless, the right under Article 30(1) is ~ special right conferred on minorities, whether based on religion or language, to establish and to administer educational institutions of their choice and with that goes the special right of the minority students to seek admission in such institutions. Article 29(2) even if regarded as a special right in regard to the student community is of general application in regard to all the institutions maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State funds when compared to special right conferred on minorities under Article 30. A provision may be special in one aspect and general in other aspect.
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[763~B~D)
Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Anr. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR (1991) D SC 855 and The Lifo Insurance Corporation of India v. D. J. Bahadur and Ors.,. AIR (1980) SC 2181, relied on. 2.5. On the principle of generalia specia/ibus non derogant, the general right of the students under Article 29(2) of the Constitution available in respect of au educational institutions in general does not prevail over the special right conferred on the minority educational institutions established and administered under Article 30(1) and receiving aid by virtue of Article 30(2) of the Constitution.. f763-G I 2.6. Unlike Article337, there is nothing in clause (2) of Article 30 to suggest that gr:ant of aid will result in making a percentage of seats available for non-minority students or be subject to Article 29(2). On the institutions deciding to take aid from the State, the right of minority students to seek admission in such institutions cannot be affected. [764-B, D)
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke; 438 US 265 (1.978); G City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 .u.s. 469 and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.l93 (1979), referred to. 2. 7. There is nothing specific in the constitutional debates to suggest that Article 29(2) was intended to cut down the rights conferred under clauses (l) and (2) of Article 30 of the Constitution. 1767-C)
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2.8. By serving their own linguistic minorities and throwing their institution open to the majority groups only on fulfillment of the need of · minorities in a State, is not in violation of the scheme of Article 29(2) and Article 30 of the Constitution. Therefore, by not applying Article 29(2) of the Constitution to minority educational institutions based on religion or B language, the principle of equality or secularism will not in any way be violated. [771-B, C]
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2.9. Fixing a percentage for intake of minority students in minority education institutions would impinge upon the right under Article 30 as it would amount to cutting down that right. The best way to ensure compliance with Article 29(2) as well as Article 30(1) is to consider individual cases where denial of admission of a non-minority student by a minority educational institution is alleged to be in violation of Article 29(2) and provide appropriate relief. (774-D, El St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, (19921 1 SCC 558,
D overr~l,ed. The State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society and Ors., (1955J I SCR 568 and Re: Kerala Education Bill, [1957-1959) SCR 995.,
distinguished. State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam dorairajan etc., (19511 SCR
E 525, referred to.
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2.1 0. It cannot be said that if Article 28 applies to institutions established and administered under Article 30(1), Article 29(2) also should be applicable to it. The right co~ferred under any provision of the Constitution including Article 30 does not either expressly or by necessary implication empower any educational institution including a minority educational institution to compel anybody to have instructions in the educational institution established and administered thereunder much less religious instructions or to attend any religious worship. Article 28 forms part of the group of Articles placed under the caption 'Right to freedom of Religion' and not part of 'Cultural and Educational Rights'. But that apart, clause (3} of Article 28 is a personal right. It is a specles of the principle of freedom of religion enshrined in Article 25. Article 28(3) stands in the same position to Article 25(1) as Article 29(2) to Article 15(1). (775-F-Hl 2.1 1. It cannot be said that just as Article 26 was held to be subject
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
to Article 25, so also Article 30 should be read subject to Article 29(2). 1776-B}
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The Dargah Committee, Ajmer and Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali and Ors., [1962] I SCR 383 and Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors., [1964] I SCR 561, distinguished.
...
2.12. To create inroads into the constitutional protection granted to minority educational institutions by forcing students of dominant groups of the choice of the State or agenr.y of the State for admission in. such institutions in preference to the choice of minority educational institutions will amount to a clear violation of the right specifically guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution and will turn the Fundamental Right into a promise of unreality which will be impermissible. Right of minorities to admit students of non-minority of their choice in their educational institutions set up under Article 30 is one thing but thrusting students of non-minority on minority educational institutions, whatever may be the percentage, irrespective of and prejudicial to the need of the minority in such institution, is entirely another. lt is the former and not the latter course of action which will be in conformity with the sc:heme of clause (2) of Article 29 and clauses (1) and (2) of Article 30 of the Constitution.. [776-D-E}
3. Admissibility of speeches made in the Constituent Assembly for interpreting provisions of the Constitution is not permissible. [766-C]
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A.~. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR (1950) SC 27 and Trav-Cochin v. Bombay Company Ltd., AIR (1952) SC 366, relied on.
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala, [1973] 4 SCC 225; R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, AIR (1984) SC 684; /ndra Sawhney etc. etc. v. Union of India and Ors. etc. etc., AIR (1993) SC 477; K.S. Paripoornan v. State ofKerala, AIR (1995) SC 1012 and P. V. Narasimha Rao v. State, (CBI/SPE) AIR (1998) SC 2120, referred to.
Black-Clawson v. Papierwerke AG, [1975 AC 5911 and of the Privy Council in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Prem Nath Mullick, 1895 (22)
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I.A. 107, referred to. Ruma Pal, J. (Partly dissenting)
1. The question whether a group is a minority or not must be determined in relation to the source and territorial application of the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A particular legislation against which protection is claimed. The protection
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under Article 30 is against any measure, legislative or otherwise, which infringes the rights granted under that Article. The right is not claimed in a vacuum-it is claimed against a particular legislative or executive measure and the question of minority status must be judged in relation to the offending piece of legislation or executive order. If the source of the infringing action is the State, then the protection must be given against the State and the status of the individual or group claiming the protection must be determined with reference to the territorial limits of the State. If however the protection is limited to State action, it will leave the group which is otherwise a majority for the purpose of State legislation, vulnerable to Union legislation which operates on a national basis. When the entire nation is sought to be affected, surely the question of minority status ,must be determined with reference to the country as a whole. [779-B; 777-B, C) Re: Kerala Education Bill, (1957-1959] SCR 995; D.A. V. College v. State of Punjab, I [1971] Supp. SCR 688 and D.A. V. College v. State of Punjab, (II) [1971] Supp. SCR 677, referred to.
2.1. Article 30(1) creates a special class in the field of educational institutions - a -class which is entitled to special protection in the matter of setting up and administering educational institutions of their choice. [786-H; 787-A) In Re: Kerala Education Bill, [1957- 1959) SCR 995; Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay, [1963) 3 SCR 837; Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. State ofBihar, 11969) 2 SCR 173; State ofKerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, [1971 J I SCR 734; The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. etc. v. State ofGujarat and Anr., [1975] l SCR 173 and Lily Kurian v. Lewina, [1979] 2 SCC 124, referred to.
2.2. A semantic analysis of the words used in Article 30(1) indicates that the right to admit students is an intrinsic part of Article 30(1). The right to set up an educational institution necessarily includes not only the selection of teachers or educators but also the admission of students. If the administration of an. educational institution includes and means its organisation then the organisation cannot be limited to the infrastructure for the purposes of education and exclude the persons for whom the infrastructure is set up, namely, the students. The right to admit students is, therefore, part of the right to administer an educational institution. 1787-C, D, El
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
2.3. The benefit which has been guaranteed under Article 30 is a A protection or benefit guaranteed to all members of the minority as a whole. The content of the right lies not in merely managing an educational institution but doing so for the benefit of the community. Benefit can only lie in the education received. It would be meaningless. to give the minorities... the right to establish and set up an organisation for giving education an end in itself, and ~eny them the benefit of the education. This would render the right a mere form without any content. The benefit to the community and the purpose of the grant of the right is in the actual education of the members of the community. (787-F; 788-A-C)
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2.4. The words 'of their choice' occurring in Article 30(1) is not qualified by any words of limitation and would include the right to admit students of the minority's choice. Since the primary purpose of Article 30(1) is to give the benefit to the members of the minority community in question that 'choice' cannot be exercised in· a manner. that deprives the community of the benefit. Therefore, the choice must be directed towards fulfilling the needs of the community. How that n~ed is met, whether by ;~eneral education or otherwise, is for the community to determine. [788-D]
State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society, [1955] 1 SCR 568; Kera/a Education Bill, [1957-1959] SCR 995; Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay, [1963) 3 SCR 837; The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College, Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., [1975] 1 SCR 173 and St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, [1992) 1 SCC 558, referred to. 2.5. The right to admission being an essential part of the constitutional guarantee under Article 30(1), a curtailment of that fundamental right in so far as it affects the benefit of the minority community would amount to an infringement of that guarantee. [790-F]
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2.6. An Institution set up by minorities for educating members of the minority community does not cease to be a minority institution merely because it takes aid. There is nothing in Article 30(1) which allows the drawing of a distinction in the exercise of the right under that Article between needy minorities and affluent ones. Article 30(2) of the Constitution reinforces this when it says, "The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language". This !!ssumes that even after the
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grant of aid by the State to an educational institution under the management of the minority, the educational institution continues to be a minority educational institution. In the context of Article 30(1) and having regard to the content of the right, namely, the education of the minority community, the word 'management' in Article 30(2) must be construed to mean the 'process' and not the 'persons' in management. 'Aid' by definition means to give support or to help or assist. It cannot be that by giving 'aid' one destroys those to whom 'aid' is given. "The obvious purpose of Article 30(2) is to forbid the State from refusing aid to a minority educational institution merely because it is being run as a minority ed·ucational institution. Besides Article 30(2) is an additional right conferred on minorities under Article 30(1). It cannot be construed in a llUlnner which is destructive o.f or as a limitation on Article 30(1). Therefore, grant of aid under Article 30(2) cannot be used as a lever to take away the rights of the minorities under Article 30(1). . [790-F-H; 791-B-DI
Rev. Sidhajbhai Sqbhai v. State of Bombay, (1963] 3 SCR 837, relied
on.
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Kiidangazhi Manakkal Narayanan Nambudirpad v. State of Madras, AIR (1954) Madras 385; Ramanuja v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (1972) SC 1586; Quareshi v. State ofBihar, (1959] SCR 629; Chiranjit La/ Chowdhury, v. Union of India and Ors., [19591 SCR 869 and Keshawananda Bharti v. State of Kera/a, AIR (1973) SC 146, referred to. Reynolds v. United States, [1978] 98 US 145; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 IUS l and Tiiinois v. Board of Education, 1947 (82) Law Ed. 649, referred to. Concise Oxford Dictionary lOth Edition 864, referred to.
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3.1. The right to admit minority students to a minority educational institution is an intrinsic part of Article 30(1) . To say that Article 29(2) prevails over Article 30(1) would be to infringe and to a large extent wipe out this right. The-re would ·be no distinction between a minority educational institution and other institutions and the rights under Article 30(1) would be rendered wholly inoperational. It is no answer to say that the rights of unaided minority institutions would remain untouched because Article 29(2) does not relate to unaided institutions at all. Whereas if one reads Article 29(2) as subject to Article 30(1) then effect can be given
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T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
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to both. And it is the latter approach which is to be followed in the interpretation of constitutional provisions. In other words as long as the minority educational institution is being run for the benefit of and catering to the needs of the members of that community under Article 30(1), Article 29(2) would not apply. But once the minority educational institution travels beyond the needs in the sense of requirements of its own community, at that stage it is no longer exercising rights of admission guaranteed under Article 30(1). To pot it differently, when the right of admission is exercised not to meet the need of the minorities, the rights of admisiion given under Article 30(1) is to that extent removed and the institution is bound to admit students for the balance in keeping with the provisions of Article 29(2). (795-D-G]
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Kerala Education Bill, (1957-1959) SCR 995; Ahmedabad St. Xaviers · College and Anr. etc. v. State ofGujarat and Anr., (1975)1 SCR 173 and Sri Venkataramana Dev Aru v. State of Mysorl3; [1958] SCR 895, referred to. 3.2. Article 29(2) does not operate to deprive aided . . minority institutions the right to admit members of their community to educational institutions established and administered by them either on any principle of interpretation or on any concept of equality or secularism. 1796-B, Cl 3.3. Article 29(2) has not been expressed as a positive right. Nevertheless in substance it confers a right on a person not to be denied admission into an aided institution only on ~he basis of religion, race etc. . The language of Article 29(2) renects the language used iil other nondiscriminatory Articles in the Constitution namely, clauses (1) and (2) of Article IS and clauses (I) and (2) of Article 16. (792-A, BJ 3.4. Article 29(2) does not create an absolute right for citizens to be admitted into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds. It does not prohibit the denial of admission on grounds other than religion, race, caste or language. Therefore, reservation of admissions on the ground of residence, occupation of parents or other bases has been held to be a valid classification which does not derogate from the principles of equality under Article 14. Even in respect of the "prohibited" bases, like the,.other non-discriminatory Articles, Article 29 (2) is constitutionally subject to the principle of 'rational classification'. If a person is denied admission on the basis of a constitutional right, that is not a denial only on the basis of religion, race
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A etc. This ~s exemplified in Article 15(4). (792-E-Gl Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, 1196912 SCC 228 and D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore, (19711 Supp. SCR 608, referred to.
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· 3.5. To the extent that legislation is enacted under Article 15 (4) making 'special provision in respect of a particular caste, there is a denial of admission to others who do not belong to that caste. Nevertheless, Article 15(4) does not contradict the right under Article 29(2). This is because of the use of the word 'only' in Article 29(2). Article 15(4) is based on the rationale that Schedule Castes and Tribes are not on par with other members of society in the matter of education and, therefore, special provision is to be made for them. It is not, therefore, only caste but this additional factor which prevents clause 15(4) from conflicting with Article 29(2) and Article 14. [793-B, C) 3.6. Under Article 337, grants are made available for the benefit of the Anglo-Indian community in respect of education, provided that any educational institution receiving such grant makes available at least 40% of the annual admissions for members of communities other than the Anglo-Indian community. To the extent of such reservation, there is necessarily a denial of admission to non-Anglo Indians on the basis of race. [793-DJ 3.7. Constitution has also carved out a further exception to Article 29(2) in the form of Article 30 (1) by recognising the rights of special classes . in the form of minorities based on language or religion to establish. and administer ·educational institutions of their choice. The right of the minorities under Article 30(1) does not opera~e as discrimination against other citizens only on the ground of religion or language. The reason for such classification is not only religion or language per se but minorities based on religion and language. Although, it is not necessary to justify a classification made by .the Constitution, this fact of 'minorityship' is the obvious rationale for making a distinction, the underlying assumption being that minorities by their very numbers are in a politically disadvantaged situation and require special protection at least in the field of education. Articles 15(4), 337 and 30 are therefore facets of substantive equality by making special provision for special classes on special considerations. [793-E-G I 3:8. Even on general principles of interpretation, it cannot be said
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T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATEOFKARNATAKA
that Article 29(2) is absolute and in effect wipes out Article 30(1). Article 29(2) refers to 'any educational institution'-the word "any" signifying the generality of its application. Article 30(1) on the other hand refers to 'educational institutions established and administered by minorities'. Clearly, the right under Article 30(1) is the more particular right and on the principle of 'generalia specialibus non derogant' , it must be held that Article 29(2) does not override the educational institutions even if they are aided under Article 30(1). [793-H; 794-A, B]
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Bhinka V. Charan Singh, AIR (1959) SC 960; relied on. Pandit MS.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha, 11959) Suppl. 1 SCR 806 and In Re: The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and C Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 (Central Provinces and Berar Act No.· XIV of 1938), referred to.
3.9. Article 29(2) appears under the heading 'Protection of interests of minorities'. On general principles of interpretation, the heading is at least a pointer or aid in construing the meaning of Article 29(2). Therefore, if two interpretations of the words of Article 29(2) are possible, the one which is in keeping with the heading of the Article must be preferred. It would follow that Article 29(2) must be construed in a manner protective of minority interests and not destructive of them. 1794-B-D) 3.10. Article 28(1) and (3) do not in terms apply to linguistic minority educational institutions at all. Furthermore, the right to set up an educational institution in which religious instruction is to be imparted is a right which is derived from Article 26(a) which provides that every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, and not under Article 30(1). Educational institutions set up under Article 26(a) are, therefore~ subject to clauses (1) and (3) of Article 28. Article 30(1) is a right additional to Article 26(a). This follows from the fact that it has been separately and expressly provided for and there is nothing in the language of Article 30(1) making the right thereunder subject to Articles 25 and 26. Unless it is so construed Article 30(1) would be rendered redundant. Therefore, what Article 30 does is to secure the minorities the additional right to give general education. Although in a particular case a minority educational institution may combine general education with religious instruction that is done in exercise of the rights derivable from Article 26(a) and Article 30(1) and not under Article 30(1) alone. Clauses
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A (1) and (3) of Article 28, therefore, do not apply to Article 30(1). [794-G; 795-A-CJ St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. etc. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., I1975) l SCR 173, referred to.
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3.11. There is nothing in the speeches of the Constituent Assembly which shows an intention on the part of the Constituent Assembly to abridge in any way the special protection afforded to minorities under Article 30(1). 1796-G] K.P. Verghese v. Income Tax Officer, [1982] 1 SCR 629; Sanjeev Cake v. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd, [19831 l SCR 1000; P. V. Narasimha Rao, [1998) 4 SCC 626 and Keshawananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [19731 4 sec 225, referred to.
3.12. There is no question of striking a balance between Article 29(2) and 30(1) as if they were two competing rights. Where Article 29(2) is nothing more than a principle of equality, and when the whole object of conferring the right on minorities under Article 30 is to ensure that there will be equality between the majority and the minority, if the minorities do not have such ·special protection they will be denied equality, it must follow that Article 29(2) is subject to the constitutional classification of minorities under Article 30(1). 1799-C, El St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, 119921 I SCC 558, overruled. Champakam Dorairaja11 v. State of Madras, 11951 J SCR 525 and State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society, {19551 SCR 568, distinguished.
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The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. Etc. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., Jl975J l SCR 173, referred to.
3.13. Rights of linguistic minorities assumed special significance and support when much after independence, the imposition of a 'unifying language' led not to unity but to an assertion of differences. States were formed on linguistic basis showing the apparent paradox that allowing for and protecting differences leads to unity and integrity and enforced assimilation may lead to disaffection and unrest. The recognition of the principle of "unity in diversity" has continued to be the hall mark of the Constitution-a concept which has been further strengthened by affording further support to the protection of minorities on linguistic basis in 1956
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION r. STATE OF KARNATAKA
by way of Articles 350-A and 350-B and in 1978 by introducing clause (1A) in Article 30. 1797-E-GJ
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Society of St. Joseph's College v. Union of India, 12002) 1 SCC 273, referred to. 3.14. Article 29(2) pertains to the right of an individual and is not a class right. It would therefore apply when an individual is denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State funds, solely on the basis of the ground of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. It does not operate to create a class interest or right in the sense that any educational institution has to set apart for non-minorities as a class and without reference to any individual applicant, a fixed percentage of available seats. Unless Articles 30(1) and 29 (2) are allowed to operate in their separate fields then what started with the voluntary 'sprinkling' of outsiders, would become a major inundation and a large chunk of the right of an aided minority institution to operate for the benefit of the community it was set up to serve, would be washed away. Therefore the requirement of the minority community for admission to a minority educational institution should not be left to the State or any other Governmental authority to determine. If the Executive is given the powt=r to determine the requirements of the minority community in the matter of admission to its educational institutions, it would be subjecting the minority educational institution in question to an "intolerable encroachment" on the right under Article 30 (1) and let in by the back door as it were, what should be denied entry altogether. [800-C, D, H; 801-A)
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S.N. Variava, J. (for himself and Ashok Bhan, J.) (Partly dissenting)
1.1. The scheme framed in Unnikrishnan 's case cannot be considered to be a reasonable restriction and requires re-consideration and that the regulations must be minimum. The majority of our population come from the poorer section of our society. They cannot and will not be able to afford the fees which will now be fixed pursuant to the judgment. There must therefore be an attempt, not just on the part of the Government and the State, but also by the educational institutions to ensure that students from the poorer section of society get admission. One method would be by making available scholarships or free seats. If the educational institution is willing to provide free seats then the costs of such free seats could also be partly covered by the fees which are now to be fixed. There should be
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A no harm in the rich subsidising the poor. (802-C, D]
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1.2. The concerned authorities will always be entitled to prevent by enactment or by regulations the charging of exhorbitant fees or capitation fees. The fee structure, fixed under any regulation or enactment, will have_ to be reworked so as to enable educational institutions not only to break even but also to generate some surplus for future development/expansion and to provide for free seats. (802-E-G] 1.3. An educational institution must grant admission on some identifiable and acceptable manner. It is only in exceptional cases, that the management may refuse admission to a student. However such refusal must not be whimsical or for extraneous reasons meaning thereby that the re3fusal must be based on some cogent and justifiable reasons. (802-H; 803-A] 2. EducationJllnstitutions receiving State aid cannot claim to have complete autonomy in the matter of administration. They are bound by various statutory provisions which ·are enacted to protect the interests of the education, students and teachers. Many of the statutes were enacted long back and stood the test of time. Nobody has ever challenged the provisions of these enactments. The regulations made by the State, to a great extent, depend on the extent of the aid given to institutions including minority institutions. Statutory provisions such as labour laws and welfare legislations etc. would be applicable to minority educational institutions. The State which gives aid to educational institution including minority educational institution can impose such conditions as are necessary for the proper maintenance for the higher standards of education. (804-A, B, D, 803-BI Kesvanananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, (1973} 4 SCC 225 and R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, AIR (1984) SC 684, relied on.
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3.1. The rights under Article 30 were created so that minorities need have no apprehension that they would not be able, either in the religious or in the educational fields, to do what the politically powerful majority could do. Principles of equality required that the minorities be given the same rights. There never was any intention or desire to create a special or privileged class of citizens. (807-G, H; 808-CI St. Xavier College v. State of Gujarat, (1975( 1 SCR 173 and Kesvanananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, (19731 4 SCC 225, referred to.
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
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3.2. Minorities have full rights to establish and administer educational institution at their own costs, but if they choose to take State aid they must then abide by the Constitutional mandate of Article 29(2) and with principles of equality and secularism. The same result follows if principles of interpretation are applied. It is settled law that if the language of the provision, being considered, is plain and unambiguous the same must be given effect to, irrespective of the consequences that may result or arise. While interpreting provisions of a Statute, if two interpretations are possible, one which leads to no conflict between the various provisions and · another which leads to a conflict between the various provisions, then the interpretation which leads to no conflict must always be accepted. [824-D-FJ 3.3. The framers of the Constitution unambiguously and unanimously intended that rights given under Article 30(1) could be fully enjoyed so long as the educational institutions were established and administered at their own costs and expense. Once State aid was taken, then principles of equality and secularism, on which our Constitution is based, were to prevail and admission could not be denied to any student on grounds of religion, race~ caste, language or any of them. [824-F..Gl
3.4. Plain reading of Article 29(2) shows that it applies to "any educational institution" maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds. The words ''any educational institution" takes within its ambit an educational institution established under Article 30(1). It is to be remembered that when Article 29(2) (i.e. Article 23(2)] was framed it was part of the same Article which contained what is now Article 30(1). Thus it was clearly meant to apply to Article 30(1) as well. Article 30 nowhere provides that the provisions of Article 29(2) would not apply to it. Article 30(1) does not exclude the applicability of the provisions of Article 29 (2) to educational institutions established under it. A plain reading of the two Articles indicates that the rights given under Article 30(1) can be fully exercised so long as no aid is taken from the State. It is for this reason that Article 30 does not make it compulsory for a minority educational institution to take aid or for the State to give it. All that Article 30(2) provides is that the State in granting aid to educational institutions shall not discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority. In cases where the State gives aid to educational institutions the State would be bound by the Constitutional mandate of Article 29(2) to ensure that no citizen is denied
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admission into the educational institution on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. By so insisting the State would not be discriminating against a minority educational institution. It would only be performing the obligation cast upon it by the Constitution of India. 1824-H; 825-A-D)
3.5. Article 30(2) merely provides that the State shall not discriminate on the ground that it is under the management 'lf a minority. Article 30(2) does not provide that State shall not in granting aid impose any condition which would restrict or abridge the rights guaranteed under Article 30(1). The framers were aware that when State aid was taken the principles of equality and secularism, which are the basis of our Constitution, would have t~ prevail. The framers of the Constitution considered the principle of equality and secularism to be more important than the rights under Article 30(1). Thus in Article 30(2) it was advisedly not provided that rights under Article 30(1) could not be restricted or abridged whilst granting aid. A plain reading of Article 30(2) shows that the framers of the Constitution envisaged that certain rights would get restricted and/or abridged when a minority educational institute chose to receive aid. It must also be noted that when property rights were deleted [by deletion of Article 19(1)(t)] the framers ofthe Constitution realised that rights under Article 30(1) would get restricted or abridged unless specifically protected. Thus Article 30(1A) was introduced. Article 30(1A), unlike Article 30(2), specific~lly provides the acquisition of property of a minority educational institute must be in a manner which does not restrict or abrogate the rights under Article 30(1). When the framers so intended they have specifically so provided. 1825-E-H; 826-A]
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3.6. Article 15(1) prohibits the State from discriminating against citizens on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. If the State were to give aid to a minority educational institution which only admits students of its community then it would be discr4m~nating against other citizens. who cannot get admission to such institutions. Such an interpretation would also lead to clash between Article G 30 and Article 28(3). There may be a religious minority educational institute set up to teach th.eir own religion. Such an institute may, if it is unaided, only admit students who are willing to say their prayers. Yet once aid is taken such an institution cannot compel any student to take part in . religious instructions unless the student or his parent consents. If Article H 30(1) were to be read in a manner which permits State aided minority
T.M.A. PAf FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
educational institutions to admit students as per their choice, then they A could refuse to admit students who do not agree to take part in religious instructions. The prohibition prescribed in Article 28(2) could then be rendered superfluous and/or nugatory. Apart from rendering Article 28(2) nugatory such an interpretation would set up a very dangerous trend. All minority educational institutions would then refuse to admit students who B do not agree to take part in religious instructions. 1826-G, H; 827-A-, B) 3. 7. All citizens have a fundamental right to establish and carry on an educ.ational institution under Article l9(1)(g). An educational institution can also be established and maintained under Article 26(a). An educational institution could also be established under Article 29(1) for purposes of C conserving a distinct language, script or culture. All such educational institutions would be governed by Article 29(2). Thus if a religious educational institution is established under Article 26(a) it would on receipt of State aid have to comply with Article 29(2). Similarly an educational institute established for conserving a distinct language, script or culture would, if it receives State aid, have to comply with Article 29(2). It would D be anomalous to say that an educational institute set up to teach religion or to conserve a distinct language, script or culture has to comply with Article 29(2) but an educational institute set up to give general secular education does not have to comply with Article 29(2). Article 30 was not framed to create a special or privileged class of citizens. It was framed E only for purposes of ensuring that the politically powerful majority did not prevent the minority from having their educational institutes. Article 30(1) cannot be given a meaning which would result in making the minorities, whether religious or linguistic, a special or privileged class of citizens. It should be given a meaning which would further the basic and overriding principles of our Constitution viz. equality and secularism. The F interpretation must not be one which would create a further divide between citizen and citizen. [827-E-H; 828-A·C) 3.8. From any point of view i.e. historical or contextual or on principles of pure interpretation or on principles of"stare decisis" the only interpretation possible is that the rights under Article 30(1) are conferred G on minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice at their own cost. This right is a special right which is given by , way of protection so that the majority, which is politically powerful, does not prevent the minorities·from establishing their educational institutions. [847-EJ H
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3.9. Article 30 merely protects the right of the minority to establish and administer an educational institution, i.e. to have the same rights as those enjoyed by majority. Article 30 gives no right to receive State aid. It is for the institution to decide whether it wants to receive aid. If it decides to take State aid then Article 30(2) merely provides that the State will not discriminate against it. When State, whilst giving aid, asks the minority educational institute to comply with a constitutional mandate, it can hardly be said that the State is discriminating against that institute. The State is bound to ensure that all educational institutes, whether majority or minority, comply with the constitutional mandate. (829-A-C) · 3.10. It would be paradoxical to hold that the rights under Article 30(1) are_ subject to municipal and other laws, but that they are not subject _to the constitutional mandate under Article 29(2). It would be paradoxical to hold that Article 30(1) is subject to Article 28(3) but not"to Article 29(2). · When Article 29(2),was introduced it was part of the same Article (viz. Article 23) which also included what is now Article 30(1). The only interplay between Articles 29(2) and 30(1) is that once State aid is taken, then students of all communities must be admitted. Reserving seats for students of one's own community would in effect be refusing admission on grounds of religion, race, caste or creed. As there is no conflict the question of balancing rights under Article 30(1) and Article 29(2) of the Constitution does not arise. 1848-F-H; 849-B, CJ
San Antonio Independent School District v. Demetrio P. Rudriguez, (4~1 US 1), referred to.
G
3!.tt. Linguistic and religious minorities are covered by the expression "minority" under Article 30 of the Constitution. Since reorganization of th.e States in lndJa has been on linguistic lines, therefore, for the purpose of determining the minority, the unit will be the State and not the whole of India. Thus, religious and linguistic minorities, who have been put at par in Article 30, have to be considered State-wise. [849-E, F] 3.12. Article 30(1) gives religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The use of the words "of their choice" indicates that even professional educational institutions would be covered by Article 30. (850-C] 3.13. Admission of students to unaided minority educational institutions, viz., Schools where scope for merit based selection is
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
practically nil, cannot be regulated by the State or the University (except for providing the qualifications and minimum conditions of eligibHity in the interest of academic standards). Right to admit students being an essential facet of ri~ht to administer educational institutions of their choice, as contemplated under Article 30 of the Constituti~n, the State Government or the University may not be entitled to interfere with that right in respect of unaided minority institutions provided however that the admission to the unaided educational institutions is on transparent basis and merit is the criteria. The right to administer, not being an absolute one, there could be regulatory measures for ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence thereof and it is more so, in the matter of admissions to undergraduate Colleges and professional institutions. The moment aid is received or taken by a minority educational institution it would be governed by Article 29(2) and would then not be able to refuse admission on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Observance of inter se merit amongst the applicants must be ensured. In the case of aided professional institutions, it can also be ~ stipulated .that passing of common entrance test held by the State agency is necessary to seek admission. [850-E-H; 851-A] 3.14. A minority institution may have its own procedure and method of admission as well as selection of students, but such procedure must be fair and transparent and selection of students in professional and higher educational colleges should be on the basis of merit. The procedure adopted or selection made should not tantamount to mal-administration. Even an unaided minority institution, ought not to ignore merit of the students for admission, while exercising its right to admit students to the colleges aforesaid, as in that event, the institution will fail to achieve excellence. {851-C, D) 3.15. Whilst giving aid to professional institutions, it would be permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by-rules or regulations, the conditions on the basisofwhich admission will be granted to different aided colleges by virtue of merit~ coupled with the reservation policy of the State. In the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the Government or the University to provide that consideration should • be shown to the weaker sections of the society. [851-E-Hl 3.16. So far as the statutory provisions ·regulating the facets of administration is concerned, in case of an U;Daided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be minimal and the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A conditions of recognition as well as conditions of affiliation to an University
or Board have to be complied with, but in the matter of day-to-day management, like appointment of staff, teaching and non-teaching and administrative control over them, the Management should have the freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency. However, a rational procedure for selection of teaching staff and for taking disciplinary action has to be evolved by the Management itself. Regulations can be framed governing service conditions for teaching and other staff for whom aid is provided by the State without interfering with overall administrative control of Management over the staff, Government/ University representative can be associated with the selection committee and the guidelines for selection can be laid down. In regard to un-aided minority educational institutions such regulations, which will ensure a check over unfair practices and general welfare of teachers could be framed. There could be appropriate mechanism to ensure that no capitation fee is charged and profiteering is not resorted to. The extent of regulations will not be the same for aided and un aided institutions. [852-C, D, F-H]
3.17. The ratio laid down in St. Stephen's College case is not correct. Once State aid is taken and Article 29(2) comes into play, then no question arises of trying to balance Articles 29{2) and 30(1). Article 29(2) must be given its full effect. [853-F)
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3.~8. The scheme framed by this Court in Unni Krishnan's case and the direction to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right, is unconstitutional. However, the principle that there should not be capitation fee or profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities does not, however, amount to profiteerir.g. (853-H; 854-A]
3. 19. The expression "education" in the Articles of the Constitution
G
means and includes education at all levels from the primary school level up to the post-graduate level. It includes professional education. The expression "educational institutions" means institutions that impart education, where "education" is as understood hereinabove. (854-C, D) 3.20. The right to establish and administer educational institutions._ is guaranteed under the Constitution to all citizens under Articles 19(1 )(g) and 26, and to minorities specifically under Article 30. But this right will be subject to the provisions of Articles 19(6) and 26(a). However, minority
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATIO~ v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
institutions will have a right to admit students belonging to the minority group, in the manner as discussed hereinabove. [854-E]
A
Unnikrishnan J.P. v. State ofA.P., {1993] I SCC 645, partly overruled. State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, 1951 SCR 525; The State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society and Ors., [1955] I SCC 568 andRe : The Kerala Education Bill, [1957-19591 SCR 995, relied on.
Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay, [1963] 3 SCR 837, distinguished.
Rev. Father W. ?roost v. State of Bihar, [1969] 2 SCR 73; D.A. V. College v. State of Punjab, [1971) Supp. SCR 688; Gandhi Faizeam College v. Agra University, [1975] 3 SCR 810; Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College and Anr. etc., v. State of Gujarat and Anr.; 11975] 1 SCR 173 and St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, [1992] 1 SCC 558, overruled.
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Rev. Bishop S.K. Patro v. State of Bihar, [1970] 1 SCR 172; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, [1971]1 SCR 734 and D.A. V. College D v. Punjab, [1971] Supp. SCR 677, rderred to. 4. In interpreting the provisions of a Statute or the Constitution it is the duty of the Court to find out the legislative intent. It has been held that Constituent Assembly debates are not conclusive but that, in a Constitutional matter where the intent of the framers of the Constitution is to be ascertained, the Court should look into the proceedings and the relevant data, including the speeches, which throw light on ascertaining the intent. In considering the nature and extent of rights conferred on minorities one must keep in mind the historical background and see how and for what purpose Article 30 was framed. [805-B, C)
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of"' Kera/a, [1973] 4 SCC 225, followed.
R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antu/ay, AIR (1984) SC 684, relied on.
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 317 of
(J
1993. (Under Artde 32 of the Constitution of India)
WITH Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 252/79, 54-57, 2228/81, 2460, 2582, 2583-
I .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A 84, 3362, 3517, 3602, 3603, 3634, 3635, 3636, 8398, 8391, 5621, 5035,
c
3701, 3702, 3703, 3704, 3715, 3728, 4648, 4649, 2479, 2480, 2547, 3475/ 82, 7610, 4810, 9839, 9683-84/83, 12622-24/84, 119, 133/87, 620/89, 133/ 92, 746, 327, 350, 613, 597, 536, 626, 444, 417; 523, 474, 485, 484, 355, 525,469, 392, 629, 399, 531, 603, 702, 628, 663, 284, 555, 343, 596,407, 737, 7~8, 747, 479, 610, 627, 685, 706, 726, 598, 482, 571/93, 295, 764, D. No: 1741194, W.P. Nos. 331 , 446, 447/95, 364,435/96, 456, 454,447, 485/ 97,356,357, 328/98, 199,294,279,35, 181,373,487,23/99,561 of2000, 6, 132 of2002, Civil Appeal Nos. 1236-1241, 2392/77,687/76,3179,3180, 3181' 3182, 1521-56, 3042-91/79,2929-31' 1464/80, 2271' 2443-46/81, 4020, 290, 10766/83,5042,5043/89,6147,5381/90, 71, 72, 73/91, 1890-91,2414, 2625/92, 4695-4746, 4754-4866/93, 5543-5544/94, 8098-8100, 1.1321/95, 4654-4658/97, 608, 3543, 3584-3585/98, 5053-5054 of 2000, 5647, 56485649, 5650, 5651, 5652, 5653-5654, 5655, 5656/2001,2334/2002, S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9950, 9951/79, 11526, 863/80, 12408/85, 8884/86, 12320/87, 14437, 18061-62/93, 904-05, 11620/94, 23421 /95,4372/96, 103~0, 10664/97, 1216, 9779-9786,6472-6474, 9793/98,5101,4480,4486/2002 T.C. (Civil) No. 26/ 90 and T.P. (Civil) Nos. 1013-14 of 1993.
Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General, K.N. Raval, Additional Solicitor General, K.K. Venugopal, B. Sen, H.W. Dhabe, Soli J. Sorabjee, P.P. Rao, · Mahinder Anand, Anoop G. Chaudhary, Rakesh K. Dwivedi, Dinesh Dwivedi, E Ms. K. Amareswari, F.S. Nariman, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Kapil Sibal, Sushil Kumar, Indira Jaisingh, Ashok Grover, Anil B. Divan, G.L. Sanghi, K. Parasaran, K. Rajendra Choudhury, Habibulla Basha, Dipankar P. Gupta, V.A. Mohta, T.R. Andhyarujina, Shanti Bhushan, Salman Khurshid, K.C. Kaushik, Preetesh Kapur, Ms. Aparjita Singh, Ms. Meenakshi Sakhardande, Ms. Gayatri Goswami, Siddhartha Chowdhary, R.N. Poddar, B.K. Prasad, C. F Radhakrishna, B.V. Balram Das, K.V. Vishwanathan, Ms. Revathy Raghavan, Ms. Seema Bengani, Ajeet, Haripriya Padmanabhan, Ms. Diviya Kapur, S.C. Mishra, Adv. Gent. U.P., Ajay K. Agarwal, Ravi P. Mehrotra, Arivind Verma, C. Siddharth, Mahesh Chandra, Ms. Alka Agrawal, Ms. Anamika Agrawal, Rajeev Sharma, Aarohi Bhalla, Garvesh Kabra, A.N. Jayaram Adv. Genl., Karnataka, Sanjay R Hegde, Satya Mitra, R. Anand Pamanabhan, K.R. G Sasiprabhu, John Mahtew, R.B. Madoodkar, V.N. Raghupathy, S.S. Shinde, A. Mariarputham, Ms. Aruna Mathur, G. Balaji, Ashok Kumar Pandey, Lokesh Kumar, R.S. Suri~ Jai Prakash Dhanda, Ms. Raj Rani Dhanda, K.P.Singh, Sunder Khatri, Satish K. Agnihotri, Sakesh Kumar, Prakash Shrivastava, R.M. Sharma, Ranji Thomas, Ms. Bharati Upadhyaya, Javed M. Rao, Ms. Niranjana ., H Singh, Abhishek Chaudhary, Saket Singh, B.B. Singh, Ajay K. Agrawal,
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
~
Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Ms. K. Madhavi Latha, A. Raghuvir, K. Subbarao, A ·.. T.V. Ratnam, Rajesh Pathak, Ashok Mathur, K.C. Kaushik, D.S. Mahra, Manish Singhvi, S.C. Shanna, Dr. Roxna Swamy, A. Lodo, B. Subbayya Shetty, Bharat Sangal, R.N. Keswani, Amitesh Kumar, Lakshmi Raman Singh, Vivek Singh, Mohd. Taiyab Khan, Imran Qaisar, Adolf Mathew, C. Mastan Naidu, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Ms. Pooja, K.V. Mohan, S. Ravindra Bhat, B Naveen R. Nath, Ms. Anupama Grover, Rakesh K. Sharma, Siddharth Dave, Brijesh Kalappa, P.R. Ramasesh, P.P. Singh, H.K. Puri, R. Jagannath Goulay, M.K. Dua, Makarand D Adkar, B.E. Ahvad, S.D. Singh, Ejaz Maqbool, A. T.M. Sampath, V. Balaji, Naresh Kaushik, S.C. Gupta, N.K. Roy, Rajesh Singh, Madhu N. Naik, Ms. Madhu Sudan Naik, Ms. Shilpa Chohan, Ms. Lalita Kaushik, B. Partha Sarthy, K.L. Shastry, Attar Singh, Kurshid Ahmed, E. M.S. C Anam, Fazlin Anam, P.H. Parekh, E.R. Kumar, Krishna Srinivasan, Sanjiv Sen, Atul Chitale, Ms. Suchitra Atul Chitale, Lalita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ms. Maulini Swarup, A. Mariarputham, Parmanand Gaur, S.N. Bhat, Ms. V.D. Khanna, Ms. Manik Karanjawala, Ms. Varuna B Gugnani, Ms. Binu Tamta, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Prateek Jalan, P.C. Shanna, Ms. Asha Nayar, N.P. D Agarwalla, Pavan Kumar, Ms. P. Niroop, Subhash Sharma, Shambhunath Singh, N.R. Choudhary, S. John Chandraraj, Pradeep Tiwary, S. Uppal, Ilyas Ali, V. Balachandran, P. Narasimhan, E.C. Agrawala, Rishi Agarwal, Mahesh Agarwal, Alok Agarwal, Manu Krishnan, Dr. Jose P. Verghese, S.P. Shanna, C. Mastan Naidu, Sanjay Jain, O.C. Mathur, Ms. Meera Mathur, B.A. Ranganadhan, Ashish Sharma, Shri Narain, Sandeep Narain, Ms. Anjali, E Krishan Mahajan, Ms. Chandra Shushan Prasad, Ruchira Gupta, Ms. Gurvinder Suri, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Rajeev Merkhedkar, Ms. Madhur, C. Badri Nath Babu, Bimal Roy Jad, C.M. Angodi, S. Nanda Kumar, V. Vijayan, L.K. Pandey, Rohit Mammen Alex, M. Veerappa, Prem Malhotra, lndeevar Goodwill, Tara Chandra Shanna, K.R. Nagaraja, Raj Kumar Mehta, Ms. Kiran Suri, Ms. Bina Gupta, Rajeev Kumar Shanna, 8.8. Singh, Ms. Rani Chhabra, F Ravindra Kumar, A. V. Rangam, A.S. Bhasme, MJ. Paul, Ms. Rachana Joshi Issar, Shivaji M Jadhav, M.K. Dua, E.C. Vidya Sagar, H.S. Parihar, Umesh Bhagwat, S.K. Mehta, Syed Ali Ahmad, Tanweer Ahmad, Mohan Pandey, G.K. Bansal, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Shiva Pujan Singh, R.C. Venna, S. Muralidhar, B. Partha Sarthy, H.A. Raichura, M.T. George, K.S. Bhati, S.V. Deshpande, G Rathin Das, Ms. B. Sunita Rao, Ms. Lily Isabel Thomas, Krishnamurthi Swami, N. Ganpathy, Mahabir Singh, Rakesh K. Shanna, Bhargava V. Desai, Sanjeev Kr. Singh, Ms. Vanita Mehta, Ms. Pratibha M. Singh, Ms. Kavita Wadia, R.D. Upadhyay, Rudreshwar Singh, Tapesh Kr. Singh, Shishir Pinaki, Prabhat Kr. Singh, Aneesh Ahmed, R.P. Wadhwani, Anand Nandan, Alok Kumar, T.V. Ratnam, M.P. Jha, J. Nagar. Arvind Varma, Ms. Sumita Mukherjee, Vishwajit H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Singh, Prashant Kumar, T. Raja, Anil Kumar Tandale, P.K. Manohar, M.K.D. Namboodiri, Ms. Baby Krishnan, Ms. Anu Mehta, V.K. Sidharthan, Deba Prasad Mukherjee, Sudhir Nandrajog, Nikhil Nayyar, Ms. Bina Madhavan, P. Prasanth, S.U.K.. Sagar, Ms. J. Godbole, Naveen Prakash, Rahul Singh, Rana Mukherjee, Ms. Indira Sawhney, Sanjay Sen, Sushil Kumar Jain, Pradeep Aggarwal, A.P. Dhamija, A. Mishra, Ms. Anjali Doshi, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, L.P. B Singh, Ms. Pratibha Jain, O.K. Jain, Bhagchand Jain, A.P. Jain, Sanjay Kr. Pathak, Ms. Deepti Jain, Hemant S. Jain, R.C. Papriwal, J.M. Khanna, T.N. Bhat, Ms. Shefali Khanna, B.K. Punj, Subhash Chandra Jain, Ms. S.K. Mehta, Ms. Annapoorani, V.G. Pragasam, Ms. Chandan Ramamurthi, Ms. Lalit Mohini Bhat, Sudrash Menon, Ambrish Kumar, Ugra Shankar Prasad, D.N. Gupta, C Rakesh K. Sharma, Ms. Janaki Ramachandran, S.C. Sharma, Dr. M.P. Raju, lsaae Mohanlal, Pravir Chaudhary, Senthil Jagadeesan, V. Ramasubramnian, Ms. Madhu Sikri, K.R. Nambiar, Subhash C. Sharma, S.W. Kanagaraj, T.M. Reddy, Sudarsh Menon, R. Nedumaran, K.K. Mani, R. Ayyam Perumal, S. Srinivasan, S.R. Setia, S. John Chandraraj, Dr. A. Francis Julian, Sumit Kumar, M.A. Chinnasamy, Pradeep Tiwary, K. Swami, K. Ilias Ali, Suren Kumar D Uppal, Dr. R. Prakash, R.N. Reshwani, Ram Lal Roy, Dr. O.K. Jain, Zaki Ahmad Khan, Imtiaz Ahmed, Ms. Naghma Imtiaz, Anis Suhrawardy, Dr. Nafis . A. Siddiqui, Anis Ahmed Khan, M. Qamaruddin, Ms. M. Qamaruddin, Ambar Qamaruddin, Manish Goswami, Pratap C. Mahapatra, J.M. Khanna, Shakil Ahmed Syed, Ms. S. Subhashini, S.K. Puri, Rajesh Srivastava, Uljwal Banerjee, E Ms. Anandita Gupta, Vivek Gambhir, P.N. Jha, B.K. Pal, A.K. Sanghi, Sardar Ajit Singh, Badar D. Ahmad, Ms. Sunanda Roy, Jayant Tripathi, Vivek N. Sharma, Pramod Swarup, Praveen Swarup, Ms. Pareena Swarup, Amit Singh Rathi, Vishal Gupta, Dr. Anil Kumar Mittal, Prashant Bhushan, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Ms. Purnima Bhat, M.M. Kashyap, U.A. Rana, M.J.S. Rupal, Lakshman, R.B. Masoodkar, Uday Gupta, M.N. Shroff, N. Ganapathy, Ashok F K. Mahajan, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, G. Umapathy, S. Jayakumar, Shailendra Bhardwaj, Rakesh K. Sharma, Ms. Anupama Grover and Ms. Nanita Sharma, for the appearing parties. The Judgments of the Court were delivered.by
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KIRPAL, CJ. 1. India is a land of diversity - of different castes, peoples, communities, languages, religions and culture. Although these people enjoy complete political freedom, a vast part of the multitude is illiterate and lives below the poverty line. The single most powerful tool for the upliftment and progress of such diverse communities is education. The state, with its H limited resources and slow-moving machinery, is unable to fully develop the
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION~·- STATE OFKARNATAKA (KIRPAL, CJ]
genius of the Indian people. Very often, the impersonal education that is A imparted by the state, devoid of adequate material content that will make the students self-reliant, only succeeds in producing potential pen-pushers, as a result of which sufficient jobs are not available. 2. It is in this scenario where there is a lack of quality education and adequate number of schools and colleges that private educational institutions B have been established by educationists, philanthropists and religious and linguistic minorities. Their grievance is that the unnecessary and unproductive load on their back in the fonn of governmental control, by way of rules and regulations, has thwarted the progress of quality education. It is their contention that the government must get off their back, and that they should be allowed C to provide quality education uninterrupted by unnecessary rules and regulations, laid down by the bureaucracy for its own self-importance. The private educational institutions, both aided and unaided, established by minorities and non-minorities, in their desire to break free of the unnecessary shackles put on their functioning as modem educational institutions and seeking to impart quality education for the benefit of the community for whom they D were established, and others, have filed the present writ petitions and appeals asserting their right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice unhampered by rules and regulations that unnecessarily impinge upon their autonomy. 3. The hearing of these cases has had a chequered history. Writ Petition E No.350 of 1993 filed by the Islamic Academy of Education and connected petitions were placed before a Bench of 5 Judges. As the Bench was prima facie of the opinion that Article 30 did not clothe a minority educational institution with the power to adopt its own method of selection and the correctness of the decision of this Court in St. Stephen's College v. University . p of Delhi, [ 1992] 1 SCC 558 was doubted, it was directed that the questions that arose should be authoritatively answered by a larger Bench. These cases were then placed before a Bench of 7 Judges. The questions framed were recast and on 6th February, 1997, the Court directed that the matter be placed before a Bench of at least 11 Judges, as it was felt that in view of the FortySecond Amendment to the Constitution, whereby "education" had been - G included in Entry 25 of List IU of the Seventh Schedule, the question of who would be regarded as a "minority" was required to be considered because the earlier case laws related to the pre-amendment era, when education was only in the State List. When the cases came up for hearing before an eleven Judge Bench, during the course of hearing on 19th March, 1997, the following H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A order was passed:-
c
"Since a doubt has arisen during the course of our arguments as to whether this Bench would feel itself bound by the ratio propounded in - In Re Kerala Education Bill, [1957-1959] SCR 955 and the Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State ofGujarat, [1975]1 SCR 173, it is clarified that this sized Bench would not feel itself inhibited by the views expressed in those cases since the present endeavour is to discern the true scope and interpretation of Article 30(1) of the Constitution, which being the dominant question would require examination in its pristine purity. The factum is recorded." 4. When the hearing of these cases commenced, some questions out of the eleven referred for consideration were reframed. We propose to give answers to these questions after examining the rival contentions on the issues arising therein.
...
5. On behalf of all these institutions, the learned counsels have submitted
D that the Constitution provides a fundamental right to establish and administer
G.
educational institutions. With regard to non-minorities, the right was stated to be contained in Article 19( 1)(g) and/or Article 26, while in the case of linguistic and religious minorities, the submission was that this right was enshrined and protected by Article 30. It was further their case that private educational institutions should have full autonomy in their administration. While it is necessary for an educational institution to secure recognition or affiliation, and for which purpose rules and regulations or conditions could be prescribed pertaining to the requirement of the quality of education to be provided, e.g., qualifications of teachers, curriculum to be taught and the minimum facilities which should be available for the students, it was submitted that the state should not have a right to interfere or lay down conditions with regard to the · admi~istration of those institutions. In particular, objection was taken to the nominations by the state on the governing bodies of the private institutions, as well as to provisions with regard to the manner of admitting students, the fixing of the fee structure and recruitment of teachers through state channels. 6. The counsels for these educational institutions, as well as the Solicitor General of India, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, urged that the decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., [1993] 1 SCC 645 case required reconsideration. lt was submitted that the scheme that had been framed in Unni Krishnan's case had imposed unreasonable restrictions on the administration of the private
..
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL,CJ.]
educational institutions, and that especially in the case of minority institutions, the right guaranteed to them under Article 30(1) stood infringed. It was also urged that the object that was sought to be achieved by the scheme was, in fact, not achieved.
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7. On behalf of the private minority institutions, it was submitted that on the correct -interpretation of the various provisions of the Constitution, and B Articles 29 and 30 in particular, the minority institutions have a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The use of the phrase "of their choice" in Article 30( I) clearly postulated that the religious and linguistic min_orities"'could establish and administer any type of educational institution, whether it was a school, a degree college or a professional college; C it was argued that such an educational institution is invariably established primarily for the benefit of the religious and linguistic minority, and it should be open to such institutions to admit students of their choice. While Article 30(2) was meant to ensure that. these minority institutions would not be denied aid on the ground that they were managed by minority institutions, it was submitted that no condition which curtailed or took away the minority D character of the institution while granting aid could be imposed. In particular, it was submitted that Article 29(2) could not be applied or so interpreted as to completely obliterate the right of the minority institution to grant admission to the students of its own religion or language. It was also submitted that · while secular laws relating to health, town planning, etc., would be applicable, E no other rules and regulations could be framed that would in any way curtail or interfere with the administration of the minority educational institution. It was emphasized by the learned counsel that the right to administer an educational institution included the right to constitute a governing body, appoint teachers and admit students. It was further submitted that these were the essential ingredients of the administration of an educational institution, F and no fetter could be put on the exercise of the right to administer. It was conceded that for the purpose of seeking recognition, qualifications of teachers could be stipulated, as also the qualifications of the students who could be admitted; at the same time, it was argued that the manner and mode of appointment of teachers and selection of students had to be within the exclusive G domain of the educational institution.
8. On behalf of the private non-minority unaided educational institutions, it was contended that since secularism· and equality were part of the basic structure of the Constitution, the provisions of the Constitution should be interpreted so that the rights of the private non-minority unaided institutions
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
were the same as that of the minority institutions. It was submitted that while reasonable restrictions could be imposed under Article 19(6), such private institutions should have the same freedom of administration of an unaided institution as was sought by the minority unaided institutions. 9. The learned Solicitor General did not dispute the contention that the right to establish an institution had been conferred on the non·minorities by Articles 19 and 26, and on the religious and linguistic minorities by Article 30. He agreed with the submission of the counsels for the appellants that the Unni Krishnan decision required reconsideration, and that the private unaided educational institutions were entitled to. greater autonomy. He, however, contended that Article 29(2) was applicable to minority institutions, and the claim of the minority institutions that they could preferably admit students of their own religion or language to the exclusion of the other communities was impermissible. In other words, he submitted that Article 29(2) made it obligatory even on the minority institutions not to deny admission on the ground of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
p
10. Several States have totally disagreed with the arguments advanced by the learned Solicitor General with regard to the applicability of Article 29(2) and 30(1 ). The States of Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Rajasthan have submitted that the words "their choice" in Article 30(1) enabled the minority institutions to admit members of the minority community, and that the inability of the minority institutions to admit others as a result of the exercise of "their choice" would not amount to a denial as contemplated under Article 29(2). The State of Andhra Pradesh has not expressly referred to the inter-play between Article 29(2) and Article 30( I), but has stated that "as the minority educational institutions are intended to benefit the minorities, a restriction that at least 50 per cent of the students admitted should come from the particular minority, which has established the institution, should be stipulated as a working rule", and that an institution which fulfilled the follo~ing conditions should be regarded as minority educational institutions:
1.
All the office bearers, members of the executive committee of the society must necessarily belong to the concerned religious/ linguistic minority with~ut exception.
2.
The institution should admit only the concerned minority candidates to the extent of sanctioned intake permitted to be filed by the respective managements.
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T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATEOFKARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
and that the Court "ought to permit the State to regulate the intake in minority
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educational institutions with due regard to the need of the community in the area which the institution is intended to serve. In no case should such intake
exceed 50% of the total admissions every yef;lr." 11. The State of Kerala has submitted, again without express reference to Article 29(2), "that the constitutional right of the minorities should be
extended to professional education also, but while limiting the right of the minorities to admit students belonging to their community to 50% of the total intake of each minority institution".
12. The State of Karnataka has submitted that "aid is not a matter of right but receipt thereof does not in any way dilute the minority character of the institution. Aid can be distributed on non-discriminatory conditions but in so far as minority institutions are concerned, their core rights will have to be protected.
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13. On the other hand, the States of Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Maharashtra, .West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have submitted that Article 30(1) is subject to Article 29(2), arguing that a minority institution availing of state aid loses the right to admit members of its community on the basis of the need of the community.
14. The Attorney General, pursuant to the request made by the court, made submissions on the constitutional issues in a fair and objective manner. We record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by him and the other learned counsel.
15. We may observe here that the counsels were informed that it was not necessary for this Bench to decide four of the questions framed, relating to the issue of who could be regarded as religious minorities; no arguments were addressed in respect thereto.
16. From the arguments aforesaid, five main issues arise for consideration in these cases, which would encompass all the eleven questions G framed that are required to be answered. 17. We will first consider the arguments of the learned counsels under these heads before dealing with the questions now remaining to be answered. 1. IS THERE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO SET UP EDUCATIONAL
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INSTITUTIONS AND IF SO, UNDER WHICH PROVISION?
18. With regard to the establ ish~ent of educational institutions, three Articles of the Constitution come into play. Article 19( I)(g) gives the right to all the citizens to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business; this right is subject to restrictions that may be placed under B Article 19(6). Article 26 gives the right to every religious denomination to establish and maintain an institution for religious purposes, which would include an educational institution. Article 19(1 )(g) and Article 26, therefore, confer rights on all citizens and religious denominations to establish and maintain educational institutions. There was no serious dispute that the majority C community as well as linguistic and religious minorities would have a right under Articles 19(1 )(g) and 26 to establish educational institutions. In addition, Article 30( I), in no uncertain tenns, gives the right to the religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
19. We will first consider the right to establish- and administer an educational institution under Article 19( I)(g) of the Constitution, and deal with the right to establish educational institutions under Article 26 and 30 in the next part of the judgment while considering the rights of the minorities.
20. Article 19( I)(g) employs four expressions, viz., profession, E occupation, trade and business. Their fields may overlap, but each of them does have a content of its own. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature [See The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, [1957) SCR 874: AIR (1957) SC 699. Education has so far not been regarded as a trade or business where profit is the motive. Even F if there is any doubt about whether education is a profession or not, it does appear that education will fall within the meaning of the expression "occupation". Article l9(l)(g) uses the four expressions so as to cover all activities of a citizen in respect of which income or profit is generated, and which can consequently be regulated under Article 19(6). In Webster's Third New International Dictionary atpage 1.650, "ocr . m" is, inter alia, defined G as "an activity in which one engages" or " ... :-: ., trade, profession or other means of earning a living". 21. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume LXVII, the word "occupation" is defined as under:-.
"The word "occupation" also is employed as referring to that which
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OFKARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
occupies time and attention; a calling; or a trade; and it is only as employed in this sense that the word is discussed in the following paragraphs.
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There is nothing ambiguous about the word "occupation" as it is used in the sense of employing one's time. It is a relative term, in common use with a well-understood meaning, and very broad in its s~ope and B significance. It is described as a generic and very comprehensive term, which includes every species of the genus, and compasses the incidental, as well as the main, requirements of one's vocation, calling, or business. The word "occupation" is variously defined as meaning the principal business of one's life; the principal or usual business in C which a man engages; that which principally takes up one's time, thought, and energies; that which occupies or engages the time and attention; that particular business, profession, trade, or calling which engages the time and efforts of an individual; the employment in which one engages, or the vocation of one's life; the state of being occupied or employed in any way; that activity in which a person, D natural or artificial, is engaged with the element of a degree of permapency attached.'~ 22. A F:hre Jrige Bmdl :in Sodan Singh and Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Ors., [ 1989] 4 SCC 155 at page 174, para 28, observed as follows: " ...... The word occupation has a wide meaning such as any regular work, profession, job, principal activity, employment, business or a calling in which an individual is engaged....... The object of using four analogous and overlapping words in Article l9(l)(g) is to make the guaranteed right as comprehensive as possible to include an the avenues and modes through which a man may earn his livelihood. In a nutshell the guarantee takes into its fold any activity carried on by a citizen of India to earn his living....... ". 23. In Unni Krishnan's case, at page 687, para 63, while referring to education, it was observed as follows:-
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" ....... It may perhaps fall under the category of occupation provided no recognition is sought from the State or affiliation from the University is asked on the basis that it is a fundamental right.. .." 24. While the conclusion that "occupation" comprehends the H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A establishment of educational institutions is correct, the proviso in the aforesaid
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observation to the effect that this is so provided no recognition is sought from the state or affiliation from the concerned university is, with the utmost respect, erroneous. The fundamental right to establish an educational institution cannot be confused with the right to ask for recognition or affiliation. The exercise of a fundamental right may be controlled in a variety of ways. For example, the right to carry on a business does not entail the right to carry on a business at a particular place. The right to carry on a business may be subject to licensing laws so that a denial of the licence prevents a person from carrying on that particular business. The question of whether there is a fundamental right or not cannot be dependent upon whether it can be made the subject matter of controls. 25. The estahlishment and running of an educational institution where a large number of persons are employed as teachers or administrative staff, and an activity is carried on that results in the imparting of knowledge to the students, must necessarily be regarded as an occupation, even if there is no element of profit generation. It is difficult to comprehend that education, per se, will not fall under any of the four expressiom: in Article 19(1)(g). "Occupation" would be an activity of a person undertaken as a means of livelihood or a mission in life. The above quoted observations in Sodan Singh's case correctly interpret the expression "occupation" in Article 19(l)(g). 26. The right to establish and maintain educational institutions may also be source to Article 26(a), which grants, in positive terms, the right to every religious denomination or any section thereof to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, subject to pub I ic order, morality and health. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore, religious denominations or sections thereof, which do not fall within the special categories carved out in Article 29( 1) and 30( 1), have the right to establish and maintain religious and educational institutions. This would allow members belonging to any religious denomination, including the majority religious community, to set up an educational institution. Given this, the phrase "private educational institution" as used in this judgment would include not only those educational institutions set up by secular persons or bodies, but also educational institutions set up by religious denominations; the word "private" is used in contradistinction to government institutions.
2.
DOES UNNIKRISHNAN'S CASE REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION? 27. In the case of Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka and Ors.,
...
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
64 ".)
[1992] 3 sec 666, the challenge was to a notification of June 1989, which provided for a fee structure, whereby for government seats, the tuition fee was Rs. 2,000 per annum, and for students from Karnataka, the fee was Rs. 25,000 per annum, while the fee for Indian students from outside Karnataka, under the payment category, was Rs. 60,000 per annum. It had been contended that charging such a discriminatory and high fee violated constitutional guarantees and rights. This attack was sustained, and it was held that there was a fundamental right to education in every citizen, and that the state was duty bound to provide the education, and that the private institutions that discharge the state's duties were equally bound not to charge a higher fee than the government institutions. The Court then held that any prescription of fee in excess of what was payable in government colleges was a capitation fee and would, therefore, be illegal. The correctness of this decision was challenged in Unni Krishnan's case, where it was contended that if Mohini Jain's ratio was applied, the educational institutions would have to be closed down, as they would be wholly unviable without appropriate funds, by way of tuition fees, from their students. 28. We will now examine the decision in Unni Krishnan's case. In this case, this Court considered the conditions and regulations, if any, which the state could impose in the running of private unaided/aided recognized or affiliated educational institutions conducting professional courses such as medicine, engineering, etc. The extent to which the fee could be charged by such an institution, and the manner in which admissions could be granted was also considered. This Court held that private unaided recognized/affiliated educational institutions running professional courses were entitled to charge a fee higher than that charged by government institutions for similar courses, but that such a fee could not exceed the maximum limit fixed by the state. It held that commercialization of education was not permissible, and "was opposed to public policy and Indian tradition and therefore charging capitation fee was illegal." With regard to private aided recognized/affiliated educational institutions, the Court upheld the power of the government to frame rules and regulations in matters of admission and fees, as well as in matters such as recruitment and conditions of service of teachers and staff. Though a question was raised as to whether the setting up of an educational institution could be regarded as a business, profession or vocation under Article 19( 1)(g), this question was not answered. Jeevan Reddy, J., howeve·r, at page 751, para 197, observed as follows:" ....... While we do not wish to express any opinion on the question
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whether the right to establish an educational institution can be said to be carrying on any "occupation" within the meaning of Article 19( 1)(g), - perhaps, it is - we are certainly of the opinion that such activity can neither be a trade or business nor can it be a profession within the meaning of Article 19(1 )(g). Trade or business normally connotes an activity carried on with a profit motive. Education has never been commerce in this country......."
29. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board V. A. Rajappa and Ors., [1978] 2 sec 213, wherein it had been held that educational institutions would come within the C, expression "industry" in the Industrial Disputes Act, and that, therefore, education would come under Article 19(1 )(g). But the applicability of this decision was distinguished by Jeevan Reddy, J., observing that "we do not think the said observation (that education as industry) in a different context has any application here". While holding, on an interpretation of Articles 21,
41, 45 and 46, that a citizen who had not completed the age of 14 years had D a right to free education, it was held that such a right was not available to citizens who were beyond the age of 14 years. It was further held that private educational institutions merely supplemented the effort of the state in educating the people. No private educational institution could survive or subsist without recognition and/or affiliation granted by bodies that were the authorities of E the state. In such a situation, the Court held that it was obligatory upon the authority .granting recognition/affiliation to insist upon such conditions as were appropriate to ensure not only an education of requisite standard, but also fairness and equal treatment in matters of admission of students. The Court then formulated a scheme and directed every authority granting recognition/affiliation to impose that scheme upon institutions seeking F recognition/affiliation, even if they. were unaided institutions. The scheme that was framed, inter alia, postulated (a) that a professional college should be established and/or administered only by a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or the corresponding Act of a State, or by a Public Trust registered under the Trusts' Act, or under the Wakfs Act, and that no individual, firm, company or other body of individuals would be G permitted to establish and/or administer a professional college (b) that 50% of the seats in every professional college should be filled by the nominees of the Government or University, selected on the basis of merit determined by a common entrance examination, which will be referred to as "free seats"; the remaining 50% seats ("payment seats") should be filled by those candidates H . who pay the fee prescribed therefor, and the allotment of students against
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATIONv. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
payment seats should be done on the basis of inter se merit detennined on A the same basis as in the case of free seats (c) that there should be no quota reserved for the management or for any family, caste or community, which may have established such a college (d) that it should be open to the professional college to provide for reservation of seats for constitutionally permissible classes with the approval of the affiliating university (e) that the B fee chargeable in each professional college should be subject to such a ceiling as may be prescribed by the appropriate authority or by a competent court (f) that every state government should constitute a committee to fix the ceiling on the fees chargeable by a professional college or class of professional colleges, as the case may be. This committee should, after hearing the professional colleges, fix the fee once every three years or at such longer C intervals, as it may think appropriate (g) that it would be appropriate for the University Grants Commission to frame· regulations under its Act regulating the fees that the affiliated colleges operating on a no grant-in-aid basis were entitled to charge. The AICTE, the Indian Medical Council and the Central Government were also given similar advice. The manner in which the seats were to be filled on the basis of the common entrance test was also indicated. D 30. The counsel for the minority institutions, as well as the Solicitor General, have contended that the scheme framed by this Court in Unni Krishnan's case was not warranted. It was represented to us that the cost incurred on educating a ~tudent in an unaided professional college was more E than the total fee, which is realized on the basis of the formula fixed in the scheme. This had resulted in revenue shortfalls. This Court, by interim orders subsequent to the decision in Unni Krishnan's case, had permitted, within the payment seats, some percentage of seats to be allotted to Non-Resident Indians, against payment of a higher amount as detennined by the authorities. Even thereafter, sufficient funds were not available for the development of those F educational institutions. Another infinnity which was pointed out was that experience has shown that most of the "free seats" were generally occupied by students from affluent families, while students from less affluent families were required to pay much more to secure admission to "payment seats". This was for the reason that students from affluent families had better school G education and the benefit of professional coaching facilities and were, therefore, able to secure higher merit positions in the common entrance test, and thereby secured the free seats. The education of these more affluent students was in a way being cross-subsidized by the financially poorer students who, because of their lower position in the merit list, could secure only "payment seats". It was also submitted by the counsel for the minority institutions that Unni H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Krishnan's case was not applicable to the minority institutions, but that notwithstanding this, the scheme so evolved had been made applicable to them as. well.
31. Counsel for the institutions, as well as the Solicitor General, submitted that the decision in Unni Krishnan's case, insofar as it had framed the scheme relating to the grant of admission and the fixing of the fee, was unreasonable and invalid. However, its conclusion that children below the age of 14 had a fundamental right to free education did not call for any interference.
32; It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the parties that the C implementation of the scheme by the States, which have amended their rules and regulations, has shown a number of anomalies. As already noticed, 50% of the seats are to be given on the basis of merit determined after the conduct of a common entrance test, the rate of fee being minimal. The "payment seats" which represent the balance number, therefore, cross-subsidize the D "free seats". The experience of the educational institutions has been that students who come from private schools, and who belong to more affluent families, are able to secure higher positions in the merit list of the common entrance test, and are thus able to seek admission to the "free seats". Paradoxically, it is the students who come from less affluent families, who are normally able to secure, on the basis of the merit list prepared after the E common entrance test, only "payment seats".
33. It was contended by petitioners' counsel that the implementation of the Unni Krishnan scheme has in fact ( 1) helped the privileged from richer urban families, even after they ceased to be comparatively meritorious, and (2) resulted in economic losses for the educational institutions concerned, and made them financially unviable. Data in support of this contention was placed on record in an effort to persuade this Court to hold that the scheme had failed to achieve its object.
34. Material has also been placed on the record in an effort to show G that the total fee realized from the fee fixed for "free seats" and the "payment seats" is actually less than the amount of expense that is incurred on each student admitted to the professional college. It is because there was a revenue shortfall that this Court had permitted an NRI quota to be carved out of the 50% payment seats for which charging higher fee was permitted. Directions were given to UGC, AICTE, Medical Council of India and Central and State H governments to regulate or fix a ceiling on fees, and to enforce the same by
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION,.. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
imposing conditions of affiliation/permission to establish and run the institutions.
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35. It appears to us that the scheme framed by this Court and thereafter followed by the governments was one that cannot be called a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Normally, the reason for establishing an educational institution is to impart education. The institution B thus needs qualified and experienced teachers and proper facilities and equipment, all of which require capital investment. The teachers are required to be paid properly. As pointed out above, the restrictions imposed by the scheme, in Unni Krishnan's case, made it difficult, if not impossible, for the educational institutions to run efficiently. Thus, such restrictions cannot be C said to be reasonable restrictions. 36. The private unaided educational institutions impart education, and that cannot be the reason to take away their choice in matters, inter alia, of . selection of students and fixation of fees. Affiliation and recognition has to be available to every institution that fulfills the conditions for grant of such affiliation and recognition. The private institutions are right in submitting that it is not open to the Court to insist that statutory authorities should impose the terms of the scheme as a condition for grant of affiliation or recognition; this completely destroys the institutional autonomy and the very objective of establishment of the institution.
37. The Unni Krishnan judgment has created certain problems, and raised thorny issues. In its anxiety to check the commercialization of education, a scheme of "free" and "payment" seats was evolved on the assumption that the economic capacity of the first 50% of admitted students would be greater than the remaining 50%, whereas the converse has proved to be the reality. In this scheme, the "payment seat" student would not only pay for his own seat, but also finance the cost of a "free seat" classmate. When one considers the Constitution Bench's earlier statement that higher education is not a fundamental right, it seems· unreasonable to compel a citizen to pay for the education of another, more so in the unrealistic world of competitive examinations which assess the merit for the purpose of admission solely on G the basis of the marks obtained, where the urban students always have an edge over the rural students. In practice, it has been the case of the marginally less merited rural or poor student bearing the burden of a rich and wellexposed urban student. 38. The scheme in Unni Krishnan's case has the effect of nationalizing H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A education in respect of important features, viz., the right of a private unaided institution to give admission and to fix the fee. By framing this scheme, which has led to the State Governments legislating in confonnity with the scheme, the private institutions are indistinguishable from the government institutions; curtailing all the essential features of the right of administration of a private unaided educational institution can neither be called fair or B reasonable. Even in the decision in Unni Krishnan's case, it has been observed by Jeevan Reddy, J., at page 749, para 194, as follows:
c
"The hard reality that emerges is that private educational institutions are a necessity in the present day context. It is not possible to do without them because the Governments are in no position to meet the demand - particularly in the sector of medical and technical education which call for substantial outlays. While education is one of the most important functions of the Indian State it has no monopoly therein. Private· educational institutions - including minority educational institutions - too have a role to play."
39. That private educational institutions are a necessity becomes evident from the fact that the number of govemment~inaintained professional colleges has more or less remained stationary, while more private institutions have been established. For example, in the State of Karnataka there are 19 medical colleges out of which there are only 4 government-maintained medical E colleges. Similarly, out of 14 Dental Colleges in Kamataka, only one has been established by the government, while in the same State, out of 51 Engineering Colleges, only 12 have been established by the government. The aforesaid figures clearly indicate the important role played by private unaided educational institutions, both minority and non-minority, which cater to the F needs of students seeking professional education. 40. Any system of student selection would be unreasonable if it deprives the private unaided institution of the right of rational selection, which it devised for itself, subject to the minimum qualification that may be prescribed and to some system of computing the equivalence between different kinds of G qualifications, like a common entrance test. Such a system of selection can involve both written and oral tests for selection, based on principle of fairness. 41. Surrendering the total process of selection to the state is unreasonable, as was sought to be done in the Unni Krishnan scheme. Apart from the decision in St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, [ 1992] I H sec sss, which recognized and upheld the right of a minority aided institution
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OFKARNATAKA [KIRPAL, C.l.]
to have a rational atlmission procedure of its own, earlier Constitution Bench decisions of this Court have, in effect, upheld such a right of an institution devising a rational manner of selecting and admitting students.
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42. In R. Chitralekha and Anr. v. State of Mysore and Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 368, while considering the validity of a viva-voce test for admission to a government medical college, it was observed at page 380 that colleges run B by the government, having regard to financial commitments and other relevant considerations, would only admit a specific number of students. It had devised a method for screening the applicants for admission. While upholding the order so issued, it was observed that "once it is conceded, and it is not disputed before us, that the State Government can run medical and engineering C colleges, it cannot be denied the power to a~mit such qualified students as pass the reasonable tests laid down by it. This is a power which every private owner ofa College will have, and the Government which runs its own Colleges cannot be denied that power". (emphasis added)
43. Again, in Minor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras and Ors., [1968] D 2 SCR 786, it was observed at page 795 that "so far as admission is concerned, it has to be made by those who are in control ofthe Colleges, and in this case the Government, because the medical colleges are Government colleges affiliated to the University. In these circumstances, the Government was entitled to frame rules for admission to medical colleges controlled by it subject to the rules of the university as to eligibility and qualifications. " The aforesaid E
observations clearly underscore the right of the colleges to frame rules for admission and to admit students. The only requirement or control is that the rules for admission must be subject to the rules of the university as to eligibility and qualifications. The Court did not say that the university could provide the manner in which the students were to be selected. 44. In Kumari Chitra Ghosh and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.,
( 1969] 2 sec 228, dealing with a government run medical college at pages 232-33, para 9, it was observed as follows: "It is the Central Government which bears the financial burden of running the medical college. It .is for it to lay down the criteria for
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eligibility........." 45. In view of the discussion hereinabove, we hold that the decision in Unni Krishnan's case, insofar as it framed the scheme relating to the grant of admission and the fixing of the fee, was not correct, and to that extent, the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A said decision and the consequent directions given to UGC, AICTE, Medical Council of India, Central arid State governmP.nts, etc., are overruled. 3.
IN CASE OF PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS, CAN THERE BE GOVERNM~NT REGULATIONS AND, IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?
46. We will now examine the nature and extent of the regulations that can be framed by the State, University or any affiliating body, while granting recognition or affiliation to a private educational institution.
47. Private educational institutions, both aided and unaided, are established and administered by religious and linguistic minorities, as well as C by non-minorities. Such private educational institutions provide education at three levels, viz., school, college and professional level. It is appropriate to first deal with . the case of private unaided institutions and private aided institutions that are not administered by linguistic or religious minorities. Regulations that can be framed relating to minority institutions will be D considered while examining the merit and effect of Article 30 of the Constitution. Private Unaided Non-Minority Educational Institutions
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48. Private education is one of the most dynamic and fastest growing segments of post-secondary education at the turn of the twenty-first century. A combination of unprecedented demand for access to higher education and the inability or unwillingness of government to provide the necessary support has brought private higher education to the forefront. Private institutions, with a long hls~ory in many countries, are expanding in scope and number, and are becoming increasingly important in parts of the world that relied almost entirely on the public sector. 49. Not only has demand overwhelmed the ability of the governments to provide education, there has also been a significant change in the way that higher education is perceived. The idea of an academic degree as a "private oood" that benefits the individual rather than a "public good" for society is ~ow widely accepted. The logic of today's economics and an ideology of privatization have contributed to the resurgence of private higher education, and the establishing of private institutions where none or very few existed before. 50. The right to establish and administer broadly comprises of the
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K!RPAL, CJ.]
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following rights:(a) to admit students: l
(b) to set up a reasonable fee stru;::ture: (c) to constitute a governing body;
(d) to appoint staff (teaching and non-teaching); and (e) to take action if there is dereliction of duty on the part of any employees
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51. A University Education Commission was appointed on 4th November, 1948, having Dr. S. Radhakrishanan as its Chairman and nine other renowned educationists as its members. The terms of reference, inter alia, included matters relating to means and objects of university education ' and research in India and maintenance of higher standards of teaching and examination in universities and colleges under their control. In the report submitted by this Commission, in paras 29 and 31, it referred to autonomy in education which reads as follows:"University Autonomy. - Freedom of individual development is the basis of democracy. Exclusive control of education by the State has been an important factor in facilitating the maintenance of totalitarian tyrannies. In such States institutions of higher learning controlled and managed by governmental agencies act like m~rcenaries, promote the political purposes of th~ State, make them acceptable to an incre.asing number of their populations and supply them with the weapons they need. We must resist, in the interests of our own democracy, the trend towards the governmental domination of the educational process.
Higher education is, undoubtedly, an obligation of the State but State aid is not to be confused with State control over academic policies and practices. Intellectual progress demands the maintenance of the spirit of free inquiry. The pursuit and practice of truth regardless of consequences has been the ambition of universities. Their prayer is that of the dying Goethe: "More light." or that of Ajax in the mist "Light, though I perish in the light. XXX
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The respect in which the universities of Great Britain are held is due to the freedom from governmental interference which they enjoy
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constitutionally and actually. Our universities should be released from the control of politics.
Liberal Education. ~ All education is expected to be liberal. It should
free us from the shackles of ignorance, prejudice and unfounded belief. If we are incapable of achieving the good life, it is due to faults in our inward being, to the darkness in us. The process of education is the slow conquering of this darkness. To lead us from darkness to light, to free us from every kind of domination except that of reason, is the aim of education."
52. There cannot be a better exposition than what has been observed C by these renowned educationists with regard to autonomy in education. The aforesaid passage clearly shows that the governmental domination of the educational process must be resisted. Another pithy observation of the Commission was that state aid was not to be confused with state control over academic policies and practices. The observations referred to hereinabove D clearly contemplate educational institutions soaring to great heights in pursuit of intellectual excellence and being free from unnecessary governmental controls. 53. With regard to the core components of the rights under Articles 19 and 26(a), it must be held that while the state has the right to prescribe · E qualifications necessary for admission, private unaided colleges have the right to admit students of their choice, subject to an objective and rational procedure of selection and the compliance of conditions, if any, requiring admission of a small percentage of students belonging to weaker sections of the society by granting them freeships or scholarships, if not granted by the Government. Furthermore, in setting up a reasonable fee structure, the element F of profiteering is not as yet accepted in Indian conditions. The fee structure must take into consideration the need to generate funds to be utilized for the betterment and growth of the educational institution, the betterment of education in that institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students. In any event, a private institution will have the right to G constitute its own governing body, for which qualifications may be prescribed by the state or the concerned university. It will, however, be objectionable if the state retains the power to nominate specific individuals on governing bodies. Nomination by the state, which could be on a political basis, will be an inhibiting factor for private enterprise to embark upon the occupation of establishing and administering educational institutions. For the same reasons, H nomination of teachers either directly by the department or through a service ......
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OFKARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.)
commission will be an unreasonable inroad and an unreasonable restriction on the autonomy of the private unaided educational institution. 54. The right to establish an educational institution can be regulated; but such regulatory measures must, in general, be to ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure (including qualified staff) and the prevention of mal-administration by those in charge of m<inagement. The fixing of a rigid fee structure, dictating the formation and composition of a governing body, compulsory nomination of teachers and staff for appointment or nominating students for admissions would be unacceptable restrictions.
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55. The Constitution recognizes the right of the individual or religious C denomination, or a religious or linguistic minority to establish an educational institution. If aid or financial assistance is not sought, then such institution will be a private unaided institution. Although, in Unni Krishnan's case, the Court emphasized the important role played by private unaided institutions and the need for private funding, in the scheme. that was framed, restrictions D were placed on some of the important ingredients relating to the functioning of an educational institution. There can be no doubt that in seeking affiliation or recognition, the Board or the university or the affiliating or recognizing authority can lay down conditions consistent with the requirement to ensure the excellence of education. It can, for instance, indicate the quality of the teachers by prescribing the minimum qualifications that they must possess, E and the courses of study and curricula. It can, for the same reasons, also stipulate the existence of infrastructure sufficient for its growth, as a prerequisite. But the essence of a private educational institution is the autonomy that the institution must have in its management and administration. There, necessarily, has to be a difference in the administration of private unaided F institutions and the government-aided institutions. Whereas in the latter case, the Government will have greater say in the administration, including admissions and fixing of fees, in the case of private unaided institutions, maximum autonomy in the day-to-day administration has to be with the private unaided institutions. Bureaucratic or governmental interference in the administration of such an institution will undermine its independence. While G an educational institution is not a business, in order to examine the degree of independence that can be given to a recognized educational institution, like any private entity that does not seek aid or assistance from the Government, and that exists by virtue of the funds generated by it, including its loans or borrowings, it is important to note that the essential ingredients of the H
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A management, of the private institution include the recruiting students and staff, and the quantum of fee that is to be charged.
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56. An educational institution is established for the purpose of imparting education of the type made available by the institution. Different courses of study are usually taught by teachers who have to be recruited as per qualifications that may be prescribed. It is no ~ecret that better working conditions will attract better teachers. More amenities will ensure that better students seek admission to that institution: One cannot Jose sight of the fact that providing good amenities to the students in the fonn of competent teaching · faculty and other infrastructure costs money. It has, therefore, to be left to the institution, if it chooses not to seek any aid from the government, to determine the scale of fee that it can charge from the students. One also cannot lose sight of the fact that we live in a competitive world today, where professional education is in demand. We have been given to understand that a large number of professional and other institutions have been started by private parties who do not seek any governmental aid. In a sense, a prospective student has various options open to him/her where, therefore, normally economic forces have a role to play. The decision on the fee to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institution that does not seek or is not dependent upon any funds from the government.
57. We, however, wish to emphasize one point, and that is that inasmuch E as the occupation of education is, in a sense, ·regarded as charitable, the government can provide regulations that will ensure excellence in education, while forbidding the charging of capitation fee and profiteering by the institution. Since the object of setting up an educational institution is by · definitioll "charitable", it is clear that an educational institution cannot charge F such a fee as is not required for the purpose of fulfilling that object. To put it differently, in the establishment of an edu'Cational institution, the object should not be to make a profit, inasmuch as education is essentially charitable in nature. There can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus, which may be generated by the educational institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution.
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58. For admission into any professional institution, merit must play an important role. While it may not be nonnally possible to judge the merit of the applicant who seeks admission into a school, while seeking admission to . a professional institution and to becorrle a competent professional, it is necessary that meritorious candidates are not unfairly treated or put at a H disadvantage by preferences shown to less meritorious but more influential
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, C.J.]
applicants. Excellence in professional education would require that greater A emphasis be laid on the merit of a student seeking admission. Appropriate regulations for this purpose may be made keeping in view the other observations made in this judgment in the context of admissions to unaided institutions. 59. Merit is usually determined, for admission to professional and higher education colleges, by either the marks that the student obtains at the qualifying examination or school leaving certificate stage followed by the interview, or by a common entrance test conducted by the institution, or in the case of professional colleges, by government agencies.
60. Education is taught at different levels from primary to professional. It is, therefore, obvious that government regulations for all levels or types of educational institutions cannot be identical; so also, the extent of control or regulation could be greater vis-a-vis aided institutions.
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61. In the case of unaided private schools, maximum autonomy has to D be with the management with regard to administration, including the right of appointment, disciplinary powers, admission of students and the fees to be charged. At the school level, it is not possible to grant admissions on the basis of merit. It is no secret that the examination r~sults at all levels of unaided private schools, notwithstanding the stringent regulations of the governmental authorities, are far superior to the results of the government- E maintained schools. There is no compulsion on students to attend private schools. The rush for admission is occasioned by the standards maintained in ·· such schools, and recognition of the fact that state-run schools do not provide the same standards of education. The State says that it has no funds to establish institutions at the same level of excellence as private schools. But F by curtailing the income of such private schools, it disables those schools from affording the best facilities because of a lack of funds. If this lowering ·of standards from excellence to a level of mediocrity is to be avoided, the state has to provide the difference which, therefore, brings us back in a vicious circle to the original problem, viz., the lack of state funds. The solution would appear to lie in the States not using their scanty resources to prop up G institutions that are able to otherwise maintain themselves out of the fees charged, but in improving the facilities and infrastructure of state-run schools and in subsidizing the fees payable by the students there. [t is in the interest of the general public that more good quality schools are established; autonomy and non-regulation of the schoo I administration. in the right of appointment, admission of the students and the fee to be charged will ensure that more H
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A such institutions are established. The fear that if a private school is allowed to charge fees commensurate with the fees affordable, the degrees would be "purchasable" is an unfounded. one since the standards of education can be and are controllable through the regulations relating to recognition, affiliation and common final examinations.
62. There is a need for private enterprise in non-professional college
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education as well. At present, insufficient number of undergraduate colleges are being ·and have been established, one of the inhibiting factors being that there is a Jack of autonomy due to government regulations. It will not be wrong to. _presume tha~ the numbers of professional colleges are growing at a faster rate than the number of undergraduate and non-professional colleges. While it. is desirable that there should be a sufficient number of professional colleges, it should also be possible for private unaided undergraduate colleges that are non-technical in nature to have maximum autonomy similar to a school.
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63. It was submitted that for maintaining the excellence of education, it w2s important that the teaching faculty and the members of the staff of any educational institution performed their duties in the manner in which it is required to be done, according to the rules or instructions. There have been cases of misconduct having been committed by the teachers and other members of the staff. The grievance of the institution is that whenever disciplinary action i~ sought to be taken in relation to su.::h misconduct, the rules that are nonnally framed by the government or the university.are clearly loaded against the Management. It was submitted that in some cases, the rules require the prior permission of the governmental authorities before the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding, while in other cases, subsequent permission is required before the imposition of penalties in the case of proven misconduct. While emphasizing the need for an independent authority to adjudicate upon the grievance of the employee or the Management in the event of some punishment being imposed, it was submitted that there should be no role for the government or the university to play in relation to the imposition of any penalty on the employee. 64. An educational institution is established only for the purpose of imparting education to the students. In such an institution, it is necessary for all to maintain discipline and abide by the rules and regulations that have been lawfully framed. The teachers are like foster-parents who are required to look after, cultivate and guide the students in their pursuit of education.
TM.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATEOFKARNATAKA (KIRPAL, CJ.J
The teachers and the institution exist for the students and not vice versa. A Once this principle is kept in mind, it must follow that it becomes imperative for the teaching and other staff of an educational institution to perform their duties properly, and for the benefit of the students. Where allegations of misconduct are made, it is imperative that a disciplinary enquiry is conducted, and that a decision is taken. In the case of a private institution, the relationship B between the Management and the employees is contractual in nature. A teacher, if the contract so provides, can be proceeded against, and appropriate disciplinary action can be taken if the misconduct of the teacher is proved. Considering the nature of the duties and keeping the principle of natural justice in mind for the purposes of establishing misconduct and taking action thereon, it is imperative that a fair domestic enquiry is conducted. It is only C on the basis of the result of the disciplinary enquiry that the management will be entitled to take appropriate action. We see no reason why the Management of a private unaided educational institution should seek the consent or approval of any governmental authority before taking any such action. In the ordinary relationship of master and servant, governed by the terms of a contract of employment, anyone who is guilty of breach of the terms can be proceeded D against and appropriate relief can be sought. Normally, the aggrieved party would approach a court of law and seek redress. ln the case of educational institutions, however, we are of the opinion that requiring a teacher or a member of the staff to go to a civil court for the purpose of seeking redress is not in the interest of general education. Disputes between the management E and the staff of educational institutions must be decided speedily, and without the excessive incurring of costs. It would, therefore, be appropriate that an educational Tribunal be set up in each district in a State, to enable the aggrieved teacher to file an appeal, unless there already exists such an educational tribunal in a State - the object being that the teacher should not suffer through the substantial costs that arise because of the location of the tribunal; if the F tribunals are limited in number, they can hold circuit/camp sittings in different districts to achieve this objective. Till a specialized tribunal is set up, the right of filing the appeal would lie before the District Judge or Additional District Judge as notified by the government. It wilt not be necessary for the institution to get prior permission or ex post facto approval of a governmental G authority while taking disciplinary action against a teacher or any other employee. The State government shall determine, in consultation with the High Court, the judicial forum in which an aggrieved teacher can file an appeal against the decision of the Management concerning disciplinary action or termination of service.
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65. The. reputation of an educational institution is established by the quality of its! faculty and students, and the educational and other facilities that the college.has to offer. The private educational institutions have a personality of their own, and in order to maintain their atmosphere and traditions, it is but necessary that they must have the right to choose and select the stud'ents who can be. admitted to their courses of studies.- It is for this reason that in B the St. Stephen's College case, this Court upheld the scheme whereby a cutoff percentage was fixed for admission, after which the students were interviewed and thereafter selected. While an educational institution cannot grant admission on its whims and fancies, and must follow some identifiable or reasonable methodology of admitting the students, any scheme, rule or C regulation that does not give the institution the right to reject candidates who might otherwise be qualified according to, say, their p((rfonnance in an entrance test, would be an unreasonable restriction under Article 19(6), though appropriate guidelines/modalities can be prescribed for holding the entrance test in a fair manner. Even when students are required to be selected on the basis of merit, the ultimate decision to grant admission to the students who D have othe~ise qualified for the grant of admission must be left with the educational institution concerned. However, when th·~ institution rejects such students, such rejection must not be whimsical or for extraneous reasons.
66. ·In the case of private unaided educational institutions, the authority granting recognition or affiliation can certainly lay down conditions for the grant of recognition or affiliation; these conditions must pertain broadly to ' academic and educational matters and welfare of students and teachers • but how the private unaided institutions are to run is a matter of administration to be taken care of by the Management of those institutions.
F Private Unaided Professional Colleges
6?., We now come to the regulations that can be framed relating to private unaided professional institutions.
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68: It would be unfair to apply the same rules and regulations regulating admission to both aided and unaided professional institutions. It must be borne in mind that unaided professional institutions are entitled to autonomy in their administration while, at the same time, they do not forgo or discard the prindiple of merit. It would, therefore, be permissible for the university or the government, at the time of granting recognition, to require a private unaided institution to provide for merit-based selection while, at the same
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T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KlRPAL, CJ.]
time, giving the Management sufficient discretion in admitting students. This A can be done through various methods. For instance, a certain percentage of the seats can be reserved for admission by the Management out of those students who have passed the common entrance test held by itself or by the State/University and have applied to the college concerned for admission, while the rest of the seats may be tilled up on the basis of counselling by the B state agency. This will incidentally take care of poorer and backward sections of the society. The prescription of percentage for this purpose has to be done by the government according to the local needs and different percentages can be fixed for minority unaided and· non-minority unaided and professional colleges. The same principles may be applied to other non-professional but unaided educational institutions viz., graduation and post graduation non- C professional colleges or institutes. 69. In such professional unaided institutions, the Management will have the right to select teachers as per the qualifications and eligibility conditions laid down by the State/University subject to adoption of a rational procedure of selection. A rational fee structure should be adopted by the Management, which would not be entitled to charge a capitation fee. Appropriate machinery can be devist!d by the state or university to ensure that no capitation fee is charged and that there is no profiteering, though a reasonable surplus for the furtherance of education is permissible. Conditions granting recognition or affiliation can broadly cover academic and educational matters including the welfare of students and teachers.
70. It is well established all over the world that those who seek professional education must pay for it. The number of seats available in government and government-aided colleges is very small, compared to the number of persons seeking admission to the medical and engineering colleges. F All those eligible and deserving candidates who could not be accommodated in government colleges would stand deprived of professional education. This void in the field of medical and technical education has been filled by institutions that are established in different places with the aid of donations and the active part taken by public-minded individuals. The object of establishing an institution has thus been to provide technical or professional G education to the deserving candidates, and is not necessarily a commercial venture. In order that this intention is meaningful, the institution must be recognized. At the school level, the recognition or affiliation has to be sought from the educational authority or the body that conducts the school-leaving examination. It is only on the basis of that examination that a school-leaving H
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A certificate is granted, which enables a student to seek admission in further
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courses of study after school. A college or a professional educational institution has to get recognition from the concerned university, which normally requires certain conditions to be fulfilled before recognition. It has been held that conditions of affiliation or recognition, which pertain to the academic and educational character of the institution and ensure uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses are valid, and that they do not violate even the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution; but conditions that are laid down for granting recognition should not be such as may lead to governmental control of the administration of the private educational institutions. Private' Aided Professional institutions (non-minority)
71. While giving aid to professional institutions, it would be permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by rules or regulations, the conditions on the basi.s of which admission will be granted to different aided col1eges by virtue of merit, coupled with the reservation policy of the state. The merit may be determined either through a common entrance test conducted by the University or the Government followed by counselling, or on the basis of an entrance test conducted by individual institutions- the method to be followed is for the university or the government to decide. The authority may also devise other means to ensure that admission is granted to an aided professional institution on the basis of merit. ln the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the government or the university to provide that consideration should be shown to the weaker sections of the society. 72. Once aid is granted to a private professional educational institution, the government or the state agency, as a condition of the grant of aid, can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and management of the institution. The state, which gives aid to an educational institution, can impose such conditions as are necessary for the proper maintenance of the high standards' of education as the financial burden is shared by the state. The state would also be under an obligation to protect the interest of the teaching and non-teaching staff. In many states, there are various statutory provisions to regulate the functioning of such educational institutions where the States give, as a grant or aid, a substantial proportion of the revenue expenditure including salary, pay and allowances of teaching and non-teaching staff. It would be its responsibility to ensure that the teachers working in those institutions are governed by proper service conditions. The state, in the case of such aided institutions, has ample power to regulate the method of selection and appointment of teachers after prescribing requisite qualifications for the
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same. Ever since In Re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [1959] SCR 995, A this Court has upheld, in the case of aided institutions, those regulations that served the interests of students and teachers. Checks on the administration may be necessary in order to ensure that the administration is efficient and sound and will serve the academic needs of the institutions. In other words, rules and regulations that promote good administration and prevent maladministration can be formulated so as to promote the efficiency of teachers, B discipline and fairness in administration and to preserve harmony among affiliated institutions. At the same time it has to be ensured that even an aided institution does not become a government-owned and contro11ed institution. Normally, the aid that is granted is relatable to the pay and allowances of the teaching staff. In addition, the Management of the private aided institutions C has to incur revenue and capital expenses. Such aided institutions cannot obtain that extent of autonomy in relation to management and administration as would be available to a private unaided institution, but at the same time, it cannot also be treated as an educational institution departmentally run by government or as a wholly owned and controlled government institution and interfere with Constitution of the governing bodies or thrusting the staff D without reference to Management. Other Aided Institutions
73. There are a large number of educational institutions, like schools and non-professional colleges, which cannot operate without the support of E aid from the state. Although these institutions may have been established by philanthropists or other public-spirited persons, it becomes necessary, in order to provide inexpensive education to the students, to seek aid from the state. In such cases, as those of the professional aided institutions referred to hereinabove, the Government would be entitled to make regulations relating F to the terms and conditions of employment of the teaching and non-teaching staff whenever the aid for the posts is given by the State as well as admission procedures. Such rules and regulations can also provide for the reasons and the manner in which a teacher or any other member of the staff can be removed. In other words, the autonomy of a private aided institution would be less than that of an unaided institution. G 4. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF A RELIGIOUS OR UNGUISTIC MINORITY IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 30, WHAT IS TO BE THE UNIT- THE STATE OR THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE? 74. We now consider the question of the unit for the purpose of H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A detennining the definition of "minority" within the meaning of Article 30( 1).
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75. Article 30(1) deals with religious minorities and linguistic minorities. The opening words of Article 30(1) make it clear that religious and linguistic minorities have been put at par, ·insofar as that Article is concerned. Therefore, whatever the unit - whether a state or the whole of India - for determining a linguistic minority, it would be the same in relation to a religious minority. India is divided into different linguistic states. The states have been carved out on the basis of the language of the majority of persons of that region. For example, Andhra Pradesh was established on the basis of the language of that region, viz., Telugu. "Linguistic minority" can, therefore, logically only be in relation to a particular State. If the determination of "linguistic minority" for the purpose of Article 30 is to be in relation to the whole oflndia, then within the State of Andhra Pradesh, Telugu speakers will have to be regarded as a "linguistic minority". This will clearly be contrary to the concept of linguistic states. 76. If, therefore, the state has to be regarded as the unit for determining "linguistic minority" vis-a-vis Article 30, then with "religious minority" being
on the same footing, it is the state in relation to which the majority or minority status will have to be determined. 77. In the Kerala Education Bill case, the question as to whether the
E minority community was to be determined on the basis of the entire population
of India, or on the basis of the population of the State forming a part of the Union was posed at page 1047. It had been contended by the State of Kerala that for claiming the status of minority, the persons must numerically be a minority in the particular region in which the educational institution was situated;· and that the locality or ward or town where the institution was to be situated had to be taken as the unit to determine the minority community. No final opinion on this question was expressed, but it was observed at page 1050 that as the Kerala Education Bill "extends to the whole of the State of Kerala and consequently the minority must be determined by reference to the entire population of that State. "
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78. In two cases· pertaining to the DA V College, this Court had to consider whether the Hindus were a religious minority in the State of Punjab. In D.A. V. College v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1971] (Supp.) SCR 688, the question posed was as to what constituted a religious or linguistic minority, and how it was to be determined. After examining the opinion of this Court H in the Kerala Education .Bill case, the Court held that the Arya Samajis, who
T. MA PAI FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNA TAKA [KfRPAL, CJ .]
were Hindus, were a religious minority in the State of Punjab, even though they may not have been so in relation to the entire country. In another case, D.A.V. College Bhatinda v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1971] (Supp.) SCR 677, the observations in the first D.A.V. College case were explained, and at page 681, it was stated that ''what constitutes a linguistic or religious minority must be judged in relation to the State inasmuch as the impugned Act was a State Act and not in relation to the whole of India. " The Supreme Court rejected the contention that since Hindus were a majority in India, they could not be a religious minority in the state of Punjab, as it took the state as the unit to determine whether the Hindus were a minority community.
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79. There can, therefore, be little doubtthat this Court has consistently held that, with regard to a state law, the unit to determine a religious or · linguistic minority can only be the state.
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80. The Forty-Second Amendment to the Constitution included education in the Concurrent List under Entry 25. Would this in any way change the position with regard to the determination of a "religious" or "linguistic minority" for the purposes of A11icle 30?
81. As a result of the insertion of Entry 25 into List III~ Parliament can now legislate in relation to education, which was only a state subject previously. The jurisdiction of the Parliament is to make laws for the whole or a part of India. It is well recognized that geographical classification is not E violative of Article 14. It would, therefore, be possible that, with respect to a particular State or group of States, Parliament may legislate in relation to education. However, Article 30 gives the right to a linguistic or religious minority of a State to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The minority for the purpose of Article 30 cannot have different F meanings depending upon who is legislating. Language being the basis forthe establishment of different states for the purposes of Article 30, a "linguistic minority" will have to be determined in relation to the state in which the educational institution is sought to be established. The position with regard to the religious minority is similar, since both religious and linguistic minorities have been put at par in Article 30: G
5.
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE RIGHTS OF AIDED PRIVATE MINORITY INSTITUTIONS TO ADMINISTER BE REGULATED?
82. Article 25 gives to all persons the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. This right, however, . H
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A is not abSolute. The opening words of Article 25( 1) make this right subjeer
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to pub Iic order, morality and health, and also to the other provisions of Part . III of the Constitution. This would mean that the right given to a person under 25(1) can be curtailed or regulated if the exercise of that right would violate other provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution, or if the exercise thereof is not in consonance with public order, morality and health. The general law made by the government contains provisions relating to public order, morality and health; these would have to be complied with, and cannot be violated by any person in exercise of his freedom of conscience or his freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion. For example, a person cannot propagate his.religion in such a manner as to denigrate another religion or bring about dissatisfaction amongst people. 83. Article 25(2) gives specific power to the state to make any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secula~ activity, which may be associated with religious practice as provided by sub-: clause (a) of Article 25(2). This is a further curtailment of the right to profess, practice and propagate religion conferred on the persons under Article 25( I)'.'· Article 25(2)(a) covers only a limited area associated with religious practice, in respect of which a law can be made. A careful reading of Article 25(2)(a) indicates that it does not prevent the State from making any Jaw in relation to the religious practice as such. The limited jurisdiction granted by Article 25(2) relates to the making of a law in relation to economic, financial, political • or other secular activities associated with the religious practice.
84. The freedom to manage religious affairs is provided by Article 26. This Article gives the right to every religious denomination, or any section thereof, to exercise the rights that it stipulates. However, this right has to be p exercised in a manner that is in conformity with public order, morality and health. Clause (a) of Article 26 gives a religious denomination the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes. There is no dispute that the establishment of an educational institution comes within the meaning of the expression "charitable purpose". Therefore, while Ar1icl~ 25( 1) grants the freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice and . G propagate religion, Article 26 can be said to be complementary to it, and · provides for every religious denomination, or any section thereof, to exercise the rights mentioned therein. This is because Article 26 does not deal with the right of an individual, but is confined to a religious denomination. Article 26 refers to a denomination of any religion, whether it is a majority or a H minority religion, just as Article 25 refers to all persons, whether they belong
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.J
to the majority or a minority religion. Article 26 gives the right to majority A religious denominations, as well as to minority religious denominations, to exercise the rights contained therein. 85. Secularism being one of the important basic features of our Constitution, Article 27 provides that no person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated for the payment of expenses for the promotion and maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. The manner in which the Article has been framed does not prohibit the state from enacting a law to incur expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination, but specifies that by that law, no person can be compelled to pay any tax, the proceeds of which are to be so utilized. In other words, if there is a tax for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination, no person can be compelled to pay any such tax. 86. Article 28(1) prohibits any educational institution, which is wholly maintained out of state funds, to provide for religious instruction. Moral education dissociated from any denominational doctrine is not prohibited; but, as the state is intended to be secular, an educational institution wholly maintained out of state funds cannot impart or provide for any religious instruction.
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87. The exception to Article 28(1) is contained in Article 28(2). Article E 28(2) deals with cases where, by an endowment or trust, an institution is established, and the terms of the endowment or the trust require the imparting of religious instruction, and where that institution is administered by the state. In such a case, the prohibition contained in Article 28(1) does not . apply. If the administration of such an institution is voluntarily given to the F government, or the government, for a good reason and in accordance with law, assumes or takes over the management of that institution, say on account of mal-administration, then the government, on assuming the administration ofthe institution, would be obliged to continue with the imparting of religious instruction as provided by the endowment or the trust. 88. While Article 28( 1) and Article 28(2) relate to institutions that are wholly maintained out of state funds, Article 28(3) deals with an educational institution that is recognized by the state or receives aid out of state funds. Article 28(3) gives the person attending any educational institution the right . not to take part in any religious instruction, which may be imparted by an Institution recognized by the state, or receiving aid from the state. Such a
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A person also has the right not to attend any religious worship that may be
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conducted in such an institution, or in any premises attached thereto, unless such a person, or if he/she is a minor, his/her guardian, has given his/her consent. The reading of Article 28(3) clearly shows that no person attending an educational institution can be required to take part in any religious instruction or any religious worship, unless the person or his/her guardian has given his/her consent thereto, in a case where the educational institution has been recognized by the state or receives aid out of its funds. We have seen that Article 26(a) gives the religious denomination the right to establish an educational institution, the religious denomination being either of the majority community or minority community. In any institution, whether established by the majority or a minority religion, if religious instruction is imparted, no student can be compelled to take part in the said religious instruction or in any religious worship. An individual has the absolute right not to be compelled to take part in any religious instruction or worship. Article 28(3) thereby recognizes the right of an individual to practice or profess his own religion. In other words, in matters relating to religious instruction or worship, there can· be no compulsion where the educational institution is either recognized by the state or receives aid from the state.
89. Articles 29 and 30 are a group of articles relating to cultural and educational rights. Article 29(1) gives the right to any section of the citizens E residing in India or any part thereof, and having a distinct language, script or culture of its own, to conserve the same. Article 29( 1) does not refer to any religion, even though the marginal note of the Article mentions the interests of minorities. Article 29( 1) essentially refers to sections of citizens who have a distinct language, script or culture, even though their religion may not be the same. The common thread that runs through Artie le 29( 1) is F language, script or culture, and not religion. For example, if in any part of the country, there is a section of society that has a distinct language, they are entitled to conserve the same, even though the persons having that language may profess different religions. Article 29(1) gives the right to all sections of citizens, whether they are in a minority or the majority religions, to conserve G their language, script or culture.
90. In the exercise of this right to conserve the language, script or culture, that section of the society can set up educational institutions. The right to establish and maintain educational institutions of its choice is a necessary concomitant to the right conferred by Article 30. The right under Article 30 is not absolute. Article 29(2) provides that, where any educational -
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
institution is maintained by the state or receives aid out of state funds, no A citizen shall be denied admission on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The use of the expression "any educational institution" in Article 29(2) would refer to any educational institution established by anyone, but which is maintained by the state or receives aid out of state funds. In other words, on a plain reading, state-maintained or aided educational institutions, whether established by the Government or the B majority or a minority community cannot deny admission to a citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste or language. 91. The right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions is provided for by Article 30(1). To some extent, Article 26(1)(a) C and Article 30( I) overlap, insofar as they relate to the establishment of educational institutions; but whereas Article 26 gives the right both to the majority as well as minority communities to establish and maintain institutions for charitable purposes, which would, inter alia, include educational institutions, Article 30(1) refers to the right of minorities to establish and maintain educational institutions of their choice. Another difference between D Article 26 and Article 30 is that whereas Article 26 refers only to religious denominations, Article 30 contains the right of religious as well as linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 92. Article 30( I) bestows on the minorities, whether based on religion or language, the right to establish and administer educational institution of E their choice. Unlike Articles 25 and 26, Article 30(1) does not specifically state that the right under Article 30(1) is subject to public order, morality and health or to other provisions of Part III. This sub-Article also does not specifically mention that the right to establish and administer a minority educational institution would be subject to any rules or regulations. 93. Can Article 30(1) be so read as to mean that it contains an absolute right of the minorities, whether based on religion or language, to establish and administer educational institutions in any manner they desire, and without being obliged to comply with the provisions of any law? Does Article 30( 1) give the religious or linguistic minorities a right to establish an educational institution that propagates religious or racial bigotry or ill will amongst the people? Can the right under Article 30(1) be so exercised that it is opposed to public morality or health? In the exercise of its right, would the minority while establishing educational institutions not be bound by town planning rules and regulations? Can they construct and maintain buildings in any
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A manner they desire without complying with the provisions of the building bylaws or health regulations?
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94. In order to interpret Article 30 and its interplay, if any, with Article 29, our attention was drawn to the Constituent Assembly Debates. While referring to them, the learned Solicitor General submitted that the provisions of Article 29(2) were intended to be applicable to minority institutions seeking protection of Article 30. He argued that if any educational institution sought aid, it could not deny admission only on the ground of religion, race, caste or language and, consequently, giving a preference to the minority over more meritorious non-minority students was impermissible. [t is now necessary to refer to some of the decisions of this Court insofar as they interpret Articles 29 and 30, and to examine whether any creases therein need ironing out. 95. In The State ofMadras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] SCR 525, the State had issued an order, which provided that admission to
students to engineering and medical colleges in the State should be decided by the Selection Committee, strictly on the basis of the number of seats fixed for different communities. While considering the validity of this order, this Court interpreted Article 29(2) and held that if admission was refused only on the grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them, then there was a clear breach of the fundamental right under Article 29(2). The s~id order was construed as being violative of Article 29(2), because students who did not fall in the particular categories were to be denied admission. In this connection it was observed as follows: " .... so far as those seats are concerned, the petitioners are denied admission into any of them, not on any ground other than the sole ground of their being Brahmins and not being members of the community for whom those reservations were made ......" 96. This government order was held to be violative of the Constitution and constitutive of a clear breach of Article 29(2). Article 30 did not come
up for consideration in that case.
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97. In The State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society and Ors., [1955] 1 SCR 568, the State had issued a circular, the operative portion of
which directed that no primary or secondary school could, from the date of that circular admit to a class where English was used as a medium . of instruction, any pupil other than pupils belonging to a section of citizens, the language of whom was English, viz., Anglo-Indians and citizens of non-
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION r. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
Asiatic descent. The validity of the circular was challenged while admission A was refused, inter alia, to a member of the Gujarati Hindu Community. A number of writ petitions were filed and the High Court allowed them. In an application filed by the State of Bombay, this Court had to consider whether the said circular was ultra vires Article 29(2). In deciding this question, the Court analyzed the provisions of Articles 29(2) and 30, and repelled the contention that Artie)~ 29(2) guaranteed the right only to the citizens of the B minority group. It was observed, in this connection, at page 579, as follows: " ......The language of Article 29(2) is wide and unqualified and may well cover all citizens whether they belong to the majority or minority group. Article 15 protects all citizens against the State whereas the C protection of Article 29(2) extends against the State or anybody who denies the right conferred by it. Further Article 15 protects all citizens against discrimination generally but Article 29(2) is a protection against a particular species of wrong namely denial of admission into educational institutions of the specified kind. In the next place Article 15 is quite general and wide in its terms and applies to all citizens, D whether they belong to the majority or minority groups, and gives protection to all the citizens against discrimination by the State on certain specific grounds. Article 29(2) confers a special right on citizens for admission into educational institutions maintained or aided by the State. To limit this right only to citizens belonging to minority groups E will be to provide a double protection for such citizens and to hold that the citizens of the majority group have no special educational rights in the nature of a right to be admitted into an educational institution for the maintenance of which they make contributions by way of taxes. We see no cogent reason for such discrimination. The heading under which Articles 29 and 30 are grouped together- namely F "Cultural and Educational Rights"- is quite general and does not in tenns contemplate such differentiation. If the fact that the institution is maint?.ined or aided out of State funds is the basis of this guaranteed right then all citizens, irrespective of whether they belong to the majority or minority groups; are alike entitled to the protection of this G fun damental right.. ....." 98. It is clear from the aforesaid discussion that this Court came to the conclusion that in the case of minority educational institutions to which protection was available under Article 30, the provisions of Article 29(2) were indeed applicable. But, it may be seen that the question in the present H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
form i.e., whether in the matter of admissions into aided minority educational institutions, minority students could be preferred to a reasonable extent, keeping in view the special protection given under Article 30(1 ), did not arise for consideration in that case.
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99. In the Kerala Education Bill case, this Court again had the occasion B to consider the interplay of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution. This case was a reference ulJder Article 143( 1) of the Constitution made by the President of India to obtain the opinion of this Court on certain questions relating to the constitutional validity of some of the provisions of the Kerala Education Bill, 1957, which had been passed by the Kerala Legislative Assembly, but C had been reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President. Clause -3(5) of the Bill, made the recognition of new schools subject to the other provisions of the Bill and the rules framed by the Government under clause (36); clause (15) authorized the Government to acquire any category of schools; clause 8(3) made it obligatory on all aided schools to hand over the fees to the Government; clauses 9 to 13 made provisions for the regulation D and management of the schools, payment of salaries to teachers and the terms and conditions of their appointment, and clause (3 3) forbade the granting of temporary injunctions and interim orders in restraint of proceedings under the Act.
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100. With reference to Article 7.9(2), the Court observed at page I 055, while dealing with an argument based on Article 337 that "likewise Article 29(2) provides, inter alia, that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educat_ional institution receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them". Referring to Part Ill of the Constitution and to Articles 19 and 25 to 28 in particular, the Court said:" ..... Under Article 25 all persons are equally entitled, subject to public , order, morality and health and to the other provisions of Part IH, to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Article 26 confers the fundamental right to every religious denomination or any section thereof, subject to public order, morality and health, to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to acquire property and to administer such property in accordance with Jaw. The ideal being to constitute India into a secular State, no religious instruction is, under Article 28(1 ), to be provided :in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL , CJ.]
and under clause (3) of the same Article no person attending any A educational institution recognized by the State or receiving aid out of . State funds is to be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted· in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his B guardian has given his consent thereto. Article 29( 1) confers on any section of the citizeriS having a distinct language, script or culture of its own to have the right of conserving the same. Clause (2) of that Article provides that no citizen sh::tll be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any C of them." l 01. Dealing with Articles 29 and 30 at page 1046, it was observed as follows:"Articles 29 and 30 are set out in Part III of our Constitution which D guarantees our fundamental rights. They are grouped together under the sub-head "Cultural and Educational Rights". The text and the marginal notes of both the Articles show that their purpose is to confer those fundamental rights on certain sections of the community which constitute minority communities. Under clause ( l) of Article 29 any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any E part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own has the right to conserve the same. It is obvious that a minority community can effectively conserve its language, script or culture by and through educational institutions and, therefore, the right to establish and maintain educational in~titutions of its choice is a necessary F concomitant to the right to conserve its distinctive language, script or culture and that is what is conferred on all minorities by Article 30(1) which has hereinbefore been quoted in full. This right, however, is subject to clause 2 or Article 29 which provides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of G religion, race, caste, language or any of them." 102. It had been, inter alia, contended on behalf of the state that if a single member of any other community is admitted in a school established for a particular minority community, then the educational institution would cease to be an educational institution established by that particular minority H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A community. It was contended that because of Article 29(2), when an
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educational institution established by a minority community gets aid, it would be precluded from denying admission to members of other communities because of Article 29(2), and that as a consequence thereof, it would cease to be an educational institution of the choice of the minority community that established it. Repelling this argument, it was observed at pages 1051-52, as follows:" .. :...This argument does not appear to us to be warranted by the language of the Article itself. There is no such limitation in Article 30( 1) and to accept this limitation will necessarily involve the addition of, the words "for their own community" in the Article whirh is ordinarily not permissible according to well established rules of interpretation. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the purpose of Article 29(2) was to deprive minority educational institutions of the aid they receive from the State. To say that an institution which receives aid on account of its being minority educational institution must not refuse to admit any member of any other commurlity only on the grounds therein mentioned and then to say that as soon as such institution admits such an outsider it will cease to be a minority institution is tantamount to saying that minority institutions will not, as minority institutions, be entitled to any aid. The real import of Article 29(2) and Article 30( t) seems to us to be that they clearly contemplate a minority institution with a sprinkling of outsiders admitted into it. By admitting a non-member into it the minority institution does not shed its character and cease to be a minority institution. Indeed the object of conservation of the distinct language, script and culture of a minority may be better served by propagating the same amongst non-members of the particular minority community. In· our opinion, it is not possible to read this condition into Article 30( 1) of the Constitution." t 03. It will be seen that the use of the expression "sprinkling of outsiders"
in that case clearly implied the applicability of Article 29(2) to Article 30( I); G the Court held that when a minority educational institution received aid, outsiders would have to be admitted. This part of the state's contention was accepted, but what was rejected was the contention that by taking outsiders, a minority institution would cease to be an educational institution of the choice of the minority community that established it. The Court concluded at H page I06~, as follows:-
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KlRPAL, CJ.)
" .... We have already observed that Article 30( l) gives two rights to A the minorities, (l) to establish and (2) to administer, educational institutions of their choice. The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to maladminister. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers, possessing B any semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching br which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason, then, that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to C ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided ....." 104. While noting that Article 30 referred not only to religious minorities but also to linguistic minorities, it was held that the Article gave those minorities the right to establish educational institutions of their choice, and that no limitation could be placed on the subjects to be taught at such educational institutions and that general secular education is also comprehended within the scope of Article 30(1). It is to be noted that the argument addressed and answered in that case was whether a minority aided institution loses its character as such by admitting non-minority students in terms of Article 29(2). It was observed that the admission of 'sprinkling of outsiders' will not deprive the institution of its minority status. The opinion expressed therein does not really go counter to the ultimate view taken by us in regard to the inter~play of Articles 30( 1) and 29(2)
105. In Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Ors. v. State of Bombay and Anr., [1963] 3 SCR 837, this Court had to consider the validity of an order issued p by the Government of Bombay whereby from the academic year 1955~56, 80% of the seats in the training colleges for teachers in non-government training colleges were to be reserved for the teachers nominated by the Government. The petitioners, who belonged to the minority community, were, inter alia, running a training college for teachers, as also primary schools. The said primary schools and college were conducted for the benefit of the G religious denomination of the United Church of Northern India and Indian Christians generally, though admission was not denied to students belonging to other communities. The petitioners challenged the government order requiring 80% of the seats to be filled by nominees of the government, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioners were members of a religious H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A denomination and that they constituted a religious minority, and that the educational institutions had been established primarily for the benefit of the Christian community. It was the case of the petitioners that the decision of the Government violated their fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 30( 1), 26(a), (b), (c) and (d), and 19(1)(t) and (g). While interpreting Article 30, it B was observed by this Court at pages 849-850 as under:-
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" ....All minorities, linguistic or religious have by Article 30(1) an absolute right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice; and any Jaw or executive direction which seeks to infringe t~e substance of that right under Article 30( 1) would to that extent be ,void. This, however, is not to say that it is not open to the State to impose regulations upon the exercise of this right. The fundamental freedom is to establish and to administer educational institutions, it is a right to establish and administer what are in truth educational institutions, institutions which cater to the educational needs of the ,citizens, or sections thereof. Regulation made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public o,rder and the like may undoubtedly ·be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed, they secure the proper functioning· of the institution, in matters educational."
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106. While coming to the conclusion that the right of the private training colleges .to admit students of their choice was severely restricted, this Court referred 'to the opinion in the Kerala Education Bill case, but distinguished it by observing that the Court did not, in that case, lay down any test of reasonableness of the regulation. No general principle on which the reasonableness of a regulation may be tested was sought to be laid down in the Kerala Education Bill case and, therefore, it was held in Sidhajbhai Sabhai 's case that the opinion in that case was not an authority for the proposition that all regulative measures, which were not destructive or annihilative of the character of the institution established by the minority, provided the regulations were in the national or public interest, were valid. In this connection it was further held at page 856, as follows:-
"The right established by Article 30 (1) is a fundamental right declared · in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Article 19, it is not subject to reasonable restrictions. It is intended to • be a real right for the protection of the minorities in the .matter of setting up of educational institutions of their own choice. The right
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATIONv. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so-called A regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the public or national interest, though not in its interest B as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Article 30 ( 1) will be but a "teasing illusion'\ a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition mus~ be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such C regulation must satisfy a dual test- the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it."
l 07. The aforesaid decision does indicate that the right under Article 30( 1) is not so absolute as to prevent the government from making any regulation whatsoever. As already noted hereinabove, in Sidhajbhai Sabhai 's case, it was laid down that regulations made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality and public order could E be imposed. If this is so, it is difficult to appreciate how the government can be prevented from framing regulations that are in the national interest, as it seems to be indicated in the passage quoted hereinabove. Any regulation framed in the national interest must necessarily apply to all educational institutions, whether run by the majority or the minority. Such a limitation must necessarily be read into Article 30. The right under Article 30(1) cannot F be such as to override the national interest or to prevent the government from framing regulations in that behalf. It is, of course, true that government regulations cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer a mere illusion; but the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be above the law. It will further be seen that in Sidhajbhai Sabhai 's case, no reference was made ~o Article 29(2) of G the Constitution. This decision, therefore, cannot be an authority for the proposition canvassed before us. 108. Our attention was invited to the decision in Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Ors., [1969] 2 SCR 73, but the said case
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A has no a·pplication here. In that case, it was contended, on behalf of the State
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of Bihar, that, as the protection to the minority under Article 29( 1) was only a right to conserve a distinct language, script or culture of its own, the college did not qualify for the protection of Article 30( 1) because it was not founded to conserve them and that consequently, it was open to all sections of the people. The question, therefore, was whether the college could claim the protection of Section 48-B of the Bihar Universities Act read with Article 30(1) of the Constitution, only if it proved that the educational institution was furthering the rights mentioned in Article 29(1). Section 48-8 of the Bihar Universities Act exempted a minority educational institution based on religion or language from the operation of some of the other provisions of that Act. This CoU:it, while construing Article 30, held that its width could not be cut down by introducing in it considerations on which Article 29(1) was based. Articles 29( 1) and 30( I) were held to create two separate rights, though it was possible that they might meet in a given case. While dealing with the contention of the state that the college would not be entitled to the protection under Article 30(1) because it was open to all sections of the people, the Court referred to the observations in the Kerala Education Bill case, wherein it had been observed that the real import of Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) was that they contemplated a minority institution with a sprinkling of outsiders admitted into it. The Court otherwise had no occasion to deal with the applicability of Article 29(2) to Article 30( 1). · 16'9. In State ofKerala, Etc. v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, Etc. [1971] 1 SCR 734, the challenge was to various provisions of the Kerala University Act, 1969, whose provisions affected private colleges, particularly those founded. by minority communities in the State of Kerala. The said provisions, inter alia, sought to provide for the manner in which private colleges were to be administered through the constitution of the governing body or managing councils in the manner provided by the Act. Dealing with Article 30, it was observed at pages 739-40 as follows: • I
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"Article 30(1) has been construed before by this Court. Without referring to those cases it is sufficient to say that the clause contemplates two rights which are separated in point of time. The first right is the initial right to establish institutions of the minority's choice. Establishment here means the bringing into being of an institution and it must be by a minority community. It matters not if a. single philanthropic individual With his OW~ means, founds the 'institution or the community at large contributes the funds. The position ·
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
in law is the same and the intention in either case must be to found A an institution for the benefit of a minority community by a member of that community. It is equally irrelevant that in addition to the minority community others from other minority communities or even from the majority community can take advantage of these institutions. Such other communities bring in income and they do not have to be B turned away to enjoy the protection. The next part of the right relates to the administration of such institutions. Administration means ·•management of the affair.s' of the institution. This management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institution as ·they think fit, and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and the institution in particular will be best served. No part of this management can be taken away and vested in another body without an encroachment upon the guaranteed right."
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The Court, however, pointed out that an exception to the right under Article D 30 was the power with the state to regulate education, educational standards and allied matters. It was held that the minority institutions could not be allowed to fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational institutions, or under the guise of the exclusive right of management, allowed to decline to follow the general pattern. The Court stated that while the management must be left to the minority, they may be compelled to keep in E step with others. 110. The interplay of Article 29 and Article 30 came up for consideration again before this Court in the D. A. V. College case [1971] (Supp.) SCR 688. Some of the provisions of the Guru Nanak University Act established after the reorganization of the State of Punjab in 1969 provided for the manner in which the governing body was to be constituted; the body was to include a representative of the University and a member of the College. These and some other provisions were challenged on the ground that they were violative of Article 30. In this connection at page 695, it was observed as follows:"It will be observed that Article 29(1) is wider than Article 30(1 ), in that, while any Section of the citizens including the minorities, can invoke the rights guaranteed under Article 29(1), the rights guaranteed under Article 30(1) are only available to the minorities based on religion or language. It is not necessary for Article 30(1) that the minority should be both a religious minority as well as a linguistic
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minority. It is sufficient if it is one or the other or both. A reading of these two Articles together would lead us to conclude that a religious or linguistic minority has a right to establish and administer educational institutions of its choice for effectively conserving its distinctive language, script or culture, which right however is subject to the regulatory power of the State for maintaining and facilitating the excellence of its standards. This right is further subject to clause (2) of Article 29 which provides that no citizen shall be denied admission ·into any educational institution which is maintained by the State or receives aid out of State funds, on grounds only of religion·, race, caste, language or any of them. While this is so these two articles are not inter-linked nor does it penn it of their being always read tog~ther."
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Though it was observed that Article 30(1) is subject to 29(2), the question whether the preference to minority students is altogether excluded, was not considered.
111. One of the questions that arose in this case was as to whether the petitioner was a minority institution. In this case, it was also observed that the Hindus of Punjab were a religious minority in the State of Punjab and that, therefore, they were entitled to the protection of Article 30(1). Three of the provisions, which were sought to be challenged as being violative of Article 30, were Clauses 2(1 ), 17 and 18 of the statutes framed by the E University under Section 19 of the University Act. Clause 2(l)(a) provided that, for seeking affiliation, the college was to have a governing body of not more than 20 persons approved by the Senate and including, amongst others, two representatives of the University and a member of the College. Clause 17 required the approval of the Vice-Chancellor for the staff initially appointed F by the College. The said provision also provided that all subsequent changes in the staff were to be reported to the Vice-Chancellor for his/her approval. Clause 18 provided that non-govem.ment colleges were to comply with the requirements laid down in the ordinances governing the service and conduct of teachers in non-government colleges, as may be framed by the University. After referring to Kerala Education Bill, Sidhajbai Sabhai and Rev. Father G W. Proost, this Court held that there was no justification for the provisions contained in Clause 2(1 )(a) and Clause 17 of the statutes as they interfered with the rights of management of the minority educational institutions. P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J., observed that "these provisions cannot, therefore, be
made as conditions of affiliation, the non-compliance of which would {nvolve dis-affiliation and consequently they will have to be struck down as offending
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T~M.A. PM FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
Article 30(1)."
112. Clause 18, however, was held not to suffer from the same vice as Clause 17 because the provision, insofar as it was applicable to the minority institutions~ empowered the University to prescribe by-regulations governing the service~nd conduct of teachers, and that this was in the larger interest of the instituti~n.s, and in order to ensure their efficiency and excellence. In this connection;· it was observed at page 709, that: "Uniformity in the conditions of service and conduct of teachers in all non-Government Colleges would make for harmony and avoid frustration. Of course while the power to make ordinances in respect of t:he matters referred to is unexceptional the nature of the infringement of the right, if any, under Article 30(1) will depend on the :actual purpose and import of the or4inance when made and the man-ner in which it is likely to affect the administration of the educational institution, about which it is not possible now to predicate."
...
113. In The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. Etc. v . State of Gujarat and Anr., [1975] 1 SCR 173, this Court had to consider the
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constitutioh~l validity of\certain provisions of the Gujarat University Act,
1949, insofar as they were made to apply to the minority Christian institution. The impugned provisions, inter alia, provided that the University may
determine that all instructions, teaching and training in courses of studies, in E respect of which the University was competent to hold examinations, would be conducted by the U~iversity and would be imparted by the teachers of the University. Another provision. provided that new colleges that may .seek affiliation, were to be the c·onstituent colleges of the University. The Court considered th.e scope and ambit of the rights of the minorities, whether based on religion· or language, to· establish and administer educational institutions F of their choice· under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. In dealing with this aspect, Ray, C.J ., at page 192, while considering Articles 25 to 30, observed as follows:"Every section of the public, the majority as well as minority has G rights in respect of religion as contemplated in Articles 25 and 26 and rights in respect of language, script, cult~re as contemplated in Article · 29. The whole object of conferring the right on minorities under Article 30 is to ensure that there will be equality between the majority and the minority. If the minorities do not have such special protection they will be denied equality."
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
114. Elaborating on the meaning and intent of Article 30, the learned Chief Justice further observed as follows:"The real reason embodied in Article 30( I) of the Constitution is the conscience of the nation that the minorities, religious as well as linguistic, are not prohibited from establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice for the purpose of giving their children the best general education to make them complete men and women of the country. The minorities are given this protection under Article 30 in order to preserve and strengthen the integrit.Y and unity of the country. The sphere of general secular education is intended to develop the commonness of boys and girls of our country. This is in the true spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity through the medium of education. If religious or linguistic minorities are not given protection under Article 30 to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, they will feel isolated and separate. General secular education will open doors of perception and act as the natural light of mind for our countrymen to live in the whole." ,,
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liS. The Court then considered whether the religious and linguistic minorities, who have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, had a fundamental right to affiliation. Recognizing that the affiliation to a University consisted of two parts, the first part relating . to syllabi, curricula, courses of instruction, the qualifications of teachers, library, laboratories, conditions regarding health and hygiene of students (aspects relating to establishment of educational institutions), and the second part ccinsist~ng of terms and conditions regarding the management of institutions, it was held that with regard to affiliation, a minority institution must follow the statutory measures regulating educational standards and efficiency, prescribed courses of study, courses of instruction, the principles regarding the qualification of teachers, educational qualifications for entry of students into educational institutions, etc. 116. While considering the right of the religious and linguistic minorities to administer their educational institutions, it was observed by Ray, C.J., at page 194, as follows:'
." ......The right to administer is said to consist of four principal matters. First is the right to choose its managing or governing body. It is said ·• that the founders of the minority institution have faith and confidence in their own committee or body consisting of persons selected by
T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KIRPAL, CJ.]
them. Second is the right to choose its teachers. It is said that minority A institutions want teachers to have compatibility with the ideals, aims and aspirations of the institution. Third is the right not to be compelled to refuse admission to students. In other words, the minority institutions want to have the right to admit students of their choice subject to reasonable regulations about academic qualifications. Fourth is the B right to use its properties and assets for the benefit of its own institution." '
117. While considering this right to administer, it was held that the same was not an absolute right and that the right was not free from regulation. While referring to the observations of Das, C.J., in the Kerala Education Bill C case, it was. reiterated in the St. Xaviers College case that the right to administer was not a right to mal-administer. Elaborating the minority's right to administer at page 196, it was observed as follows:" .....The minority institutions have the right to administer institutions. This right implies the obligation and duty of the minority institutions D to render the very best to the students. In the right of administration, checks and balances in the shape of regulatory measures are required to ensure the appointment of good teachers and their conditions of service. The right to administer is to be tempered with regulatory measures to facilitate smooth administration. The best administration will reveal no trace or colour of minority. A minority institution E should shine in exemplary eclecticism in the administration of the institution. The best compliment that can be paid to a minority institution is that it does not rest on or proclaim its minority character." 118. Ray, C.J., concluded by observing at page 200, as follows:"The ultimate goal of a minority institution too imparting general secular education is advancement of learning. This Cour