The Auma India Employees Association v. The Secretary to Government
- Court
- High Court of Karnataka
- Date of judgment
- 11 November 2026
- Bench
- Justice Anu Sivaraman, Justice K.s.bharath Kumar
- Case number
- WA No. 79 of 2024
- Result
- DISMISSED
- Acts & sections
- Section 34 Industrial Disputes Act, Section 18 Industrial Disputes Act
- Subject
- Service, Labour
Full judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S.BHARATH KUMAR WRIT APPEAL NO.79 OF 2024 (L-RES) BETWEEN: THE AUMA INDIA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 24, MADHUVANTI 1ST FLOOR 1ST A CROSS CHIKKABOMMASANDRA NEW TOWN YELAHANKA BENGALURU 560 065 Digitally signed by PAVITHRA N Location: High Court of Karnataka
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY …APPELLANT (BY SRI. VILAS RANGANATH DATAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1.
THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR VIKASA SOUDHA BENGALURU-560 001
2.
THE AUMA INDIA
PLOT NO.38/A AND 39/B 2ND PHASE PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA BENGALURU-560 058 REPRESENTED BY ITS HEAD-RESOURCES SRI. VINAY M.S. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. BYREGOWDA N., AGA FOR R1; SRI. S.N.MURTHY, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. SOMASHEKAR, ADV. FOR R2) THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE RECORDS IN WP No.3473/2018 AND ON PERUSAL OF THE SAME BE PLEASED TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 08.12.2023 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE TO DISMISS THE SAID WRIT PETITION.
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT
ON
06.10.2026
AND
COMING
ON
FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S.BHARATH KUMAR
CAV JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)
This Writ Appeal is filed challenging the order dated 08.12.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.3473/2018 (L-RES), whereby the order dated 10.01.2018
passed
by
Secretary
to
Government
granting permission to prosecute respondent No.2 under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was quashed. 2.
We have heard Shri. Vilas Ranganath Datar,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Shri. S.N. Murthy, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Somashekar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and Shri. Byregowda N, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondent No.1. 3.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
submits that the appellant is a registered Trade Union representing workmen employed in respondent No.2 establishment, which is engaged in the manufacture of electrical
actuators
and
gearboxes.
A
settlement
was
entered into between the Management and the workmen under Section 12(3) read with Section 18(3)
of the
Industrial Disputes Act in the year 2010, for the period ending on 31.03.2015. Before its expiry, the appellant submitted a Charter of Demands dated 17.02.2014. By order dated 24.02.2015, the State Government referred the dispute concerning the Charter of Demands to the Industrial Tribunal, Bengaluru, for adjudication. 4.
The appellant had submitted a complaint dated
28.08.2013 to the State Government alleging unfair labour practices by the Management and seeking permission to prosecute respondent No.2. The State Government sought clarification from the Labour Commissioner, pursuant to which the Assistant Labour Commissioner called upon the parties to submit their responses and furnished a report dated 27.04.2017. Thereafter, a meeting was convened on 15.12.2017 pursuant to a notice dated 07.12.2017. By order dated
10.01.2018,
State
Government
granted
permission to prosecute the Management, recording that discretionary payment of rewards resulted in differentiation
and violation of the Standing Orders, leading to inducement of members to leave the Union. The Management challenged the said order in Writ Petition No.3473/2018. 5.
The learned Single Judge held that Section 34 of
the Industrial Disputes Act is intended to prevent frivolous and harassing prosecutions and requires the appropriate Government to apply its mind to the relevant material before making a complaint or authorising its Institution. The Government must independently satisfy itself that the facts warranting prosecution exist and that Institution of the complaint is expedient. On examining the complaint, the learned Single Judge found that the allegations related to interference
with
workmen’s
right
to
organise,
discrimination affecting trade union membership, contracting out regular work, transfers, failure to implement an award, settlement or agreement and refusal to bargain collectively in good faith. It was found that the complaint did not contain an allegation concerning payment of rewards to induce members to leave the Union. However, permission for prosecution had been granted on the basis of discriminatory
payment of rewards inducing members to leave the Union, rather than on the allegations contained in the complaint. The order also failed to specify the clauses of the Fifth Schedule allegedly violated. 6. State
The learned Single Judge further found that the Government
Commissioner’s
had
acted
recommendation
upon without
Labour
independently
considering the material before it. Though the Government could accept and act upon the report, the statutory responsibility to decide whether prosecution should be authorised vested in the Government and could not be exercised by the Labour Commissioner. Holding that the order did not disclose independent application of mind or adequate reasons addressing the substance of the matter,
learned
Single
Judge
quashed
order
dated
10.01.2018.
7.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
contends that the learned Single Judge erred in treating the grant of permission under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act as a quasi-judicial exercise. It is contended that
the decision is administrative in nature and requires only prima facie satisfaction that prosecution is warranted, without detailed reasons or adjudication of the allegations on merits. The State Government had independently considered
complaint,
departmental
Management’s
reports,
after
objections
affording
both
and
parties
an
opportunity of hearing. The fact that the authority did not accept all the allegations, but confined the permission to discriminatory payment of rewards and the consequent inducement to leave the Union, demonstrated application of mind.
8.
It is contended that the substance of the order
disclosed the alleged unfair labour practices and that omission to expressly specify the relevant clauses of the Fifth Schedule did not justify quashing the permission. Undue or excessive increments and rewards were alleged to constitute wage increases intended to induce workmen to relinquish their Union membership. Whether such payments amounted to inducement, discrimination or unfair labour practices was a matter to be established by evidence before
the jurisdictional Magistrate. It is therefore contended that that the learned Single Judge entered into the merits and failed
to
properly
consider
decisions
relied
upon
concerning the scope of the power under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
9. reports
It is further contended that the departmental constituted
internal
administrative
assistance
obtained to ascertain the prima facie veracity of the allegations which were not required to be furnished to the parties. It is also contended that Section 89 of the Industrial Relations
Code,
2020
does
not
govern
present
proceedings, which arose from a complaint made in 2013, before the Code came into force.
10.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
has placed reliance on the following decisions:•
Raj
Kumar
Gupta
v.
Lt.
Governor,
Delhi
reported in AIR 1997 SC 2680; •
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222;
•
Mysore Structurals Ltd. v. State of Karnataka reported in (2002) 1 SCC 477, and
S.N.
•
Hada
v.
The
Binny
Limited
Staff
Association reported in ILR 1987 KAR 3762 (FB).
11.
The learned Additional Government Advocate
appearing
for
respondent
No.1
contends
that
Management had been issued notice and had submitted its reply to the Union’s complaint. It is submitted that sufficient opportunities of hearing were afforded and that the order dated 10.01.2018 granting permission for prosecution was passed after considering the objections and submissions of both parties.
12.
The
respondent
learned
No.2
senior
submits
that
counsel
appearing
State
for
Government
granted permission for prosecution solely on the clarification furnished
by
Labour
Commissioner
without
independently considering the material or specifying the clauses
of
Fifth
Schedule
allegedly
violated.
The
clarification issued by the Labour Commissioner was neither furnished to the Management nor was an opportunity afforded to controvert its contents. It is therefore contended
that the order suffered from non-application of mind and violation of the principles of natural justice and that the learned Single Judge rightly quashed it.
13.
It is further submitted that, in view of the
changed statutory framework under the Industrial Relations Code,
2020,
particularly
Section
providing
for
composition of offences, no purpose would be served by remanding the matter for fresh consideration. It is further submitted that the appellant must pursue such remedy as may be available under the Code.
14.
Having considered the contentions advanced, we
notice that the complaint dated 28.08.2013 filed by the appellant raised several allegations of unfair Labour Practice against the employer. It was contended that the labourers are deprived of their fair salary and other benefits, the office bearers of the Union were suspended for silly reasons and their increments and other benefits are deducted. It is further
contended
that
scheduled
caste
labourers
are
targeted. It is also stated that the Management had threatened the workers requiring them to resign from the
membership of the Association and has shown discrimination in granting increments and other benefits of the workmen. It is further contended that senior employees are deprived of promotions
just
because
they
are
members
of
Association and baseless allegations were made against them. Further, the complaint reveals that allegations are raised in terms of abolition of regular nature of work by contracting out such work to break a strike, mala fide transfers, failure to implement award settlement and refusal to bargain collectively in good faith.
15.
On
Government
receipt sought
of a
complaint,
clarification
from
State
Labour
Commissioner. The Assistant Labour Commissioner called upon the parties to submit their responses and furnish a report dated 27.04.2017. Thereafter, a notice was issued on 07.12.2017 and requiring parties to attend a meeting convened by the Labour Commissioner on 15.12.2017. A detailed report was placed before the State Government by the Labour Commissioner. Copies of this report are produced as Exhibit 'R8' in the writ appeal. However, it is the specific
case of the employer that no copies of this report was furnished to the parties and its contents were not disclosed. By order dated 10.01.2018, the State Government granted the permission to prosecute the Management. It is clear from the order dated 10.01.2018 that there was no independent application of mind by the Government on the complaint raised by the appellant. The Government had relied entirely on the report submitted by the Labour Commissioner without any application of mind. The learned Single Judge considered these aspects and found that the complaint with regard to unfairly inducing workmen to relinquish their Union membership had not been made out even in the report of the Labour Commissioner. After considering the contentions, the learned Single Judge held as follows:"x x x x x There was no bar for the State Government to accept the Labor Commissioner’s report and to act upon it. But the State Government had to independently consider the matter. A perusal of the order reveals that the first respondent does not even bothered to independently consider the material before it. Instead, the Government simply acts upon the recommendation of the Labor Commissioner as though
it must simply affix the seal to approve the conclusion reached by the Labor Commissioner. Thus, it must be concluded that the order passed by the first respondent is a result of the decision of the Labor Commissioner and not that of the State Government. Section 34 does not give such a power to the Labor Commissioner, but, that the power there under vests with the State Government. If the accord of sanction for prosecution is made without application of mind, the same shall be quashed on judicial review."
16.
Having considered the contentions advanced, we
are of the opinion that the power under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act is to be exercised by the State Government. It is an independent exercise of jurisdiction at the hands of the Government that is contemplated under the provisions of Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, which reads as follows:"34. Cognizance of offences. (1)
No Court shall take cognizance of any offence
punishable under this Act or of the abetment of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government. (2)
No Court inferior to that of [a Metropolitan
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class] [Substituted by Act 46 of 1982, Section 20, for " a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class"
(w.e.f. 21.8.1984).] shall try any offence punishable under this Act."
17.
It is therefore clear that the power to make a
complaint with regard to an offence punishable under the Act is specifically vested in the appropriate Government. The prosecution for offences under the Act is a serious matter involving consequences to the Management. It is in the said circumstances that the discretion has been vested specifically with the Government to make a complaint with regard to such offences. It is clear that it can be only on a proper application of mind that an order can be issued by the State Government seeking the prosecution of the Management for an offence under the Act.
18.
In the instant case, from a reading of the order of
the Government dated 10.01.2018, it is clear that there has been
no
independent
Government. The
exercise
Government
of
discretion
has only
by
extracted
opinion expressed by the Labour Commissioner and granted permission on the basis of the same.
19.
In the said circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the learned Single Judge was indeed justified in having set aside the order of the Government. We find no error in the exercise of jurisdiction which requires a correction under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. The appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.
All
pending
interlocutory
applications
shall
disposed of.
Sd/(ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE
Sd/(K.S.BHARATH KUMAR) JUDGE PN
stand