The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and Others.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
6 September 1955
Judge
Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das
Neutral citation
1955 INSC 36
Reported in
[1955] 2 S.C.R. 603
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Acts & sections
Article 226 Constitution, Article 286 Constitution, Article 132 Constitution, Article 245 Constitution, Article 394 Constitution, Article 19 Constitution

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Full judgment

2 S.C.R.

THE BENGAL IMMUNITY COMPANY LIMITED

Septembw 6

'·

THE ST ATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS. (S.

R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI,

]AGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA

and

JAFER IMAM

JJ.]

Constitution of India-Arts. 141, 226, 286(1), (2) and (3)-Art. 286(J)(a) read tvith the Explanation-Construction of-Whether controlled by Art. 286(2)-Situs of a sale or purchase determined by general law or created by fiction in the Explanation-Whether relevant fo1· ascertaining inter-State character of such sale or punhaseAppellant company registered in Calcutta-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Bihar Act XIX of 1947)-S. 13-Whether appellant company liable to Sales Tax-Where goods deliveted in the State of Bihm· as a direct result of sale for purposes of consumption there-Art. 226-Petition thereunder-.\1.aintainability of-Supreme Court whether competent to modify or review its pri01· decisions-Art. 141-Meaning of-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, s. 33-Taxing sales or purchases taking place in the course of inter-State trade-Validity of-Act whether wholly ultra vires and void. The appellant company, having its registered office in Calcutta and its factory and laboratory in the District of 24-Parganas in \Vest Bengal, carried on the business of manufacturing and selling sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines. It was registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act. Its products haYing extensive sales throughout India and abroad were despatched from Calcutta against orders accepted by the appellant company in Calcutt'1. It had no agent or manager in Bihar nor any office or laboratory in that State. A notice under s. 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 was issued by the Bihar Sales Tax authorities calling upon the appellar:t company to apply for registration and to submit returns showing its turn over for a period between the 26th of January, 1950 and 30th September 1951. The appellant company denied its liability on the grounds, inter alia that it was not resident in Bihar, it carried on no business there and none of its sales took place in Hihar. It characterized the notice under s. 13(5) as ultra vires and illegal and called upon the Sales Tax authorities to cancel it forthwith. The Bihar Sales Tax authorities maintained that all sales in West Bengal or in any other State under which goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purposes of consumption in that State were liable to Bihar Sales Tax. Ultimately the appellant company presented before the High Court at Patna a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution claiming the reliefs mention.:d above. The High Court dismissed the petition holding that it was not maintainable. On appeal under a certificate

The &ngal lmmlllliJv

Company limited

Tire Stale of Bihar and others

[1955}

under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution:. Held, (per curiam) (i) that the High Court was not right in holding that the petition under Art. 226 was misconce,ived. In so holding the High Court overlooked the fact that the petitioners' contention was that the Act, in so far as it. purported to tax a non-resident in respect of inter-State sales or purchases of goods was ultra vires the Constitution. There are various provisions in the Act laying down certain conditions, which dealers must comply with or submit to. They consti_tuted restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed to

every citizen of India by Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and these onerous conditions could not be justified as reasonable restrictions

within the meaning of clause (6) of Art. 19 and further the remedy under the Act cannot be said to be adequate and was indeed useless if the Act providing for such remedy was itself ultra vires and void : (ii) that there is nothing in the Constitution which prevent& the Supreme Court from departing fron1 a previous decision of its own if the court is satisfied of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public. ~t..feld, per S. R. DAs, AcTr~c C. J., V1v1AN BosE, BHAGW.ATI and fAFER IMAM JJ. (JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AvYAJ. and B. P. S1NHA JJ., Jisse,,ting) that the present is· a fit case for reviewing the previous majority decision of the Supre1ne Court in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ([.1953) S.C.R. 1069), in view of several circumstances relating to the case.

Held, per ·s. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., V1v1AN BosE, BttAGWATI and }AFER IMAM JJ. (JAGANNADHADAs, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P. SINHA JJ., dissenting). The operative provisions of the several parts of Art. 286, namely clause (l){a), clause (l)(b), clause (2) and clause (3) arc intended to deal with different topics and, one cannot be projected or read into another anc1 therefore the Explanation in clause ( 1) (a) cannot be legitimately extended to clause (2) either as an exception or as a proviso thereto or read as curtailing or limiting the ambit of clause (2).

The sales or purchases made by the appellant company which were sought to be taxed by the State of Bihar actually took place in the course of inter·State trade or commerce. Parliament not having by law otherwise provided, no State law could, therefore, tax these sales or purchases, that is to say, Bihar could not tax by reason of clause (2) although they fell within the Explanation and other States could not tax. by reason of both clause ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation and clause (2). What is an inter-State sale or purchase continues to be so irrespective of 'tl1e State where the sale is to be located cithc.r under the . general law when it is finally determined what the. general law is or by the fiction crean:d by the Explanation. The situs of a sale or purchase •is wholly irrelevant as regards its intcr...Statc character.

2 S.C.R.

Until Parliament by law made in exercise of the powers vested in it by clause (2) of Art. 286 provides otherwise, no State can The B<l!gal impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or puri:hases lmmuniry of goods when such sales or purchases take place in the course of Company Limiltd inter-State trade or commerce and the majority decision in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ((1953] S.C.R. 1069) The State of Bihar and othas in so far as it decides to the contrary cannot be accepted as well founded on principle or authority. In view of the above interpretation upon Art. 286 the charging section of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 read with the relevant definitions cannot operate to tax inter·State sales or purchases and as Parliament has not otherwise provided, the Act, in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases that take place in the course of interState trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal and void. The Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but does not exclude in express terms · subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be declared wholly ultra vires and void for it is feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those levied on exempted subjects and to exciude the latter in the assessment of the tax. Held (per JAoANNADHADAs, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P. SINHA JJ.). The scheme of Art. 286(1)(a) is, that it fixes the situs of the sales with a view to avoid multiple taxation and for that purpose it· divides them into two categories-inside sales and outside salesand cnaets cha~ a State cannot tax an outside sale. When in the same context the &planation declares that a sale in the course of inter-State trade must be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods arc delivered for consumption, its purpose is clearly to take it out of inter-State trade and stamp it with the character of an intra-State sale.

Whether regard is had to the object of the enactment or its language, the Explanation must be held to authorise the imposition of tax by the delivery Statc. Article 286(2) applies to sales in the course of inter-State trade.

The salc!s which fall within the Explanation an! intta-Statc sales. The grolHlds covered by the two provisions uc distinGt and separate. :Each has operation within its CIWn sphere, and there is no conllict between them. Accerdirtg to die vit:w ellpre!SCd· by Bose J. in The Sllltc of Bombay v. Tht United Motors (India) Ltd. ((1953] S.C.R. 1069) and by Das J. in S1111e of TravM1cor11-CocAit1 v. Shanmuglla Vilas Cashuv Nut Factory ([1954] S.C.R. 53) Articll! 286(2) controls the Explartation. This cannot be sttstaintd on the language! of the enactment. The Explanation; is not fiFJl'l'SS'd to be subjert t~ Art. 286(2). N'bc decs the- latter cootaia tile words "notwiHi.ssmling anyehing OOBt*Md in the Explanation to Art. 286(I)(a)". These arc simple and familiar capsoession. used by the legislature wh11n it intends that a particular provision in the Statute should be subject to or override

Tu Bengal 1..mu11it1 Company L1mittd

Tu Stale ef Bihar and olhns

[ 19551

another. Nor is th~re anything in the language of the Explanation providing that its operation is not to be in. praesenti but contingent on Parliamentary legislation under Art. 286(2). To construe, therefore, Art. 286(2) as controlling the Explanation, one must import into the Statute words which are not there and thereby cut down the operation of the Explanation \vhich on its terms is of equal authority and potency with Art. 286(2).

The impugned Act in so far as it authorises the imposition of tax. or. sales falling within the Explanation to Art. 286(J)(a) is neither ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature nor bad on the ground that it is extra-territorial in its operation. Per ]AGANNADHADAS J. The only reasonable: construction of Art. 286(I)(a) taken with the Explanation is that this provision while intended to prohibit taxation by States on outside: sales was also meant to demarcate: the boundary between inside sales and out· side sales and to assimilate one particular category of outside sales into the field of inside sales and to make it available for taxation by the consuming State.

CIVIL APPELLATE No. 159 of 1953.

JuRISDICTION :

Civil

Appeal

Appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 4th December 1952 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Misc. Judicial Case No. 241 of 1952.

N. C. Chatterji (V. S. Sawhney, S. N. Mukerii and R. R. Biswas, with him) for the appellant company. The High Court was wrong in holding that there was no warrant for issuing a writ under article 226 of the Constitution on the facts of the case. Although no actual assessment was made by the Sales Tax authorities the issue of notice by them constituted a sufficient threat which the High Court had jurisdiction to quash by means of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution: see Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ([1954] S.C.R. 1122), The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R. 1069}, Mohammad Yasin v. The Town Area Committee, falalabad ([1952) S.C.R. 572), The King v. Commissioners for the General Purposes of the IncomeTax for Kensington ([19141 3 K.B. 429), Gtnerai Com• missioners for the purposes of Income Tax for Kensington v. Aramayo ([1916] 1 A.C. 215), Madan Gopal Kabra v. The Union of India ([1951 l l.T.R. 214), Sales

2 S.C.R.

(fJ7

Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs Budh Prakash /ai Prakash ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 423), Commissioner of Police, lJombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji (f1952J S.C.R. 135). Article 286(2) which is in Part XII of the Constitution is meant to implement the supremacy of Parliament with regard to inter-State trade or commerce. That Article puts an embargo on the power of the State Legislature to levy any tax with respect to interState trade or commerce. Only when the embargo is lifted by appropriate Parliamentary Legislation that the State Legislature can levy any tax on sales or purchases in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Article 286 puts a fetter on the State Legislatures and the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) does not confer any power on any State Legislature to levy any tax. The Explanation is meant to explain only · clause (1) (a) of article 286, that is, what is an outside sale or purchase. It does not remove fetter and it does not convert any inter-State sale or purchase into an intra-State transaction. See the judgment of Bose J. in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ([19531 S.C.R. 1069) and that of Das J. in The State of Travancore-Cochin "· Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nttt Factory (f 19541 S.C.R. 53). The construction of the Explanation by the learned Judges of the High Court is not correct. They were wrong in assuming that if article 286(2) is construed in a full and unqualified sense, the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) would become nugatory and of no effect. They also erred in holding that the Explanation expressly confers legislative power, and that the Explanation is in the nature of an exception which excludes a particular class from a larger class. The High Court erred in holding that the Explanation created a nexus for conferring jurisdiction on the State Legis1ature. Test of territorial nexus 1s no longer applicable after the coming into force of the Constitution. See The State of Bombay v. 'i.'he United Motors (India) Ltd. ([19531 S.C.R. 1069). On a proper reading of all the sections of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 the idea seems to be that the intention was only to tax the dealers within the

The Bmgal Immunity Company Limitetf

The State of Bilrur and others

-

18&5

TM B<q•I ~

Comptmy Limittd '

\It;

The Sltlle of Biltar Gnd oJllm

[1955]

State of Bihar, as some of the provisions of the Act would be incapable of enforcement outside the State. Consequently the appellant which has no office or agent within the State could not be taxed. See ss. 1, 2(c), 2(g), 4, 10, 14-A, 17, 26(a) (c) (b) & (k), of the Act. Bihar Legislature has . no power to authorise imposition of tax on outside dealers. The legislative competence of a State Legislature is derived from Article 246 read with the Lists. Under article 245(2) Parliament is given power to enact legislation with respect to extra-territorial operation. State Legislature has no such power. The combined effect of article 246(3) read with item 54 of List II is that the State Legislature is competent only to make law imposing tax on sale or purchase of goods for the whole or any part of that State. Under article 245 of the Constitution power is limited within the boundary of the State. Taxable event must happen in that State. See Swifte v. Attorney-General for Ireland ( [ 1912] A.C. 276), Commercial Cable Company v. Attorney-General for N_ewfoundland ([1912] A. C. 820), and MacLeod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales ([1891] A.C. 455). High Court failed to appreciate the true effect of the judgment in Wallace . Brotherr and Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tar, Bombay City and Bombay Suburban District ( [ 1948 I 75 I.A. 87). The Australian case cited by the High Court viz., Q. Gilpin Limited v. Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (New South Wale!) ([1935] 52 C.L.R. 189) has been overruled in Hugher and Vale! Proprietary, Ltd. v. State of New South Wales ([1954] 3 All. E.R. @). M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( B. Se11 and P. K. Bose: with him), for the State of West Bengal (Intervener). Bihar Sales Tax Act has to be read as a whole and on a correct reading of the Act it clearly appears that the Act is intended to apply only to dealers in Bihar. Bihar cannot tax the sale because it takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and the State is barred from taxing such sales by reason of clause (2) of article 286. The ques. tion is whether the majority view in the case of State

2 S.C.R.

.of Bombay v. Unittd Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R. 1069) is correct. Article 245 read with Entry 54 in List II gives the Legislative power whereas article 286 imposes restrictions on such Legislative power of .a State. There are four restrictions placed by that article-the first by clause ( 1) (a), the second by clause (l)(b), the third by clause (2) and the fourth by clause (3). Basis of article 286(2) is to ensure freedom of movement throughout the country which principle is to be found in article 301. Article 286(2) gives authority to the Parliament to watch over the principles underlying article 301 and to see what restrictions are necessary. In determining the ambit ·of clause (2) it is not permissible to apply the Explanation. If you do so then logically you must also apply it to clause 1(b). If the majority decision in Statt of Bombay v. Unittd Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R. 1069) is right on the interpretation of clause (2) then that clause becomes absolutely meaningless.

The Supreme Court can overrule its previous ·decision if it is satisfied that the decision was erroneous: London Strut Tramways Company v. London County Council ([18981 A. C. 375), In rt Transftrrtd · Civil Strvants (!rt/and) Comptnsation ([1929] A.C. 142), Tht Tramways cast (No. 1) (18 C.L.R. 54), Smith v. Al/wright (321 U.S. 649; 88 L. Ed. 987) and Vinayak v. Mortshwar (I.LR. [1944] Nag. 342). Even if the ban imposed by clause (2) of article 186 did not apply, Bihar is not competent to tax on a reading of article 246(3), Entry 54, List II and article 286(1) (a). The word 'sale' in Entry 54, means passing of property in the sense of the Sale of Goods Act, s. 4. Sec Salt! Tax Offictr, PilibAit v. Mtssrs Budh Prakash Jai Praka.rh ([19551 1 S.C.R. p. 243}. 'On a true construction of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) Bihar is competent to levy a purchase tu and not a sales tax in respect of transactions entered into by dealers residing outside. The Explanation cannot be read as extra-territorial. It must be read as consistent with article 245. Although the Federal

1'955 Th• Bea,..t

lmmunil,J Company Limited v• The Slilll of Bih• and other<

Th~ B~ngal

Immunity Cumpany Limittd The Stall of Bihar and othos

[1955J

Legislature had extra-territorial power under the Government of India Act, 1935 the Provincial Legis_lature · did not have such power. The position is the same under the Constitution : The Governor-General in Council v. The Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. ([1944] F.C.R. 229) and In re S. Mohan Kumaramangalam (A.LR. 1951 Mad. 583). So far, nexus theory has been applied to extra-territoriality as between two independent States. Decision of the Supreme Court in Poppatlal Shah's case is applicable to component parts of the same State; Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras ([1953]' S.C.R. 677), The State of Bombay v. The United hfotors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R. 1069, 1078) and The Governor-General in Council v. The Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. ([1944] F.C.R. 229). It is doubtful if nexus theory is applicable to this kind of legislation. -In any event. the nexus theory is not · applicable under the Constitution of India. If machinery for enforcement of the Ai:t has extra-territorial operation and is linked up with the charging section the whole scheme of taxation is bad due to the prov1S1ons of article 245. In any event the machinery is bad. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Rajeswari Prasad and S. P. Varma, with him) for Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., (Intervener) supported the appellant. T. N. Subramanya Aiyar (T. V. R. Tatachari, with him) for M. A. Kuriakose (Intervener) adopted the arguments of the Attorney-General and referred to V. 0. Vakkan v. The Government of the Province of Madras ([19521 2 M.L.J. 353), Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras (A.LR. 1953 Mad. 91), Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd., Monghyr v. The State of Bihar (A.LR. 1950 Pat. 450),, The State of Bzhar v. Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (A.LR. 1954 Pat. 14), Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 148 and Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., p. 174. Lal Narain Sinha (B.K.P. Sinha and R.C. Prasad,. with him), for the respondent (State of Bihar).

2 S.C.R.

Article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II is by itself enough to grant legislative competence to the making of laws imposing tax on sales of inter-State character having a . real and sufficient territorial connection with the taxing State. Delivery of goods within the State where such delivery. takes place in performance of the contract of sale is by itself real and sufficient territorial connection. The position was the same under section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 read with Entry 48 of List II. A legislation on the basis of a real and sufficient connection is not invalid on the ground of ext.ta-territorial .operation. The Governor-General in Council v. The Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. (1944 F.C.R. 229), Wallace Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City and Bombay Suburban District ([1948] 75 I.A. 86), Broken Hill South Limited (Public Officer) v. The Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) (56 C.L.R. 337), Commissioners of Taxation v. Kirk (1900 A.C. 588) and In re S. Mohan Kumaramangalam (A.LR. 1951 Mad. 583, 588). So far as conception of sale is concerned it comprises of several elements. The situs of the sale is where the various ingredients of the sale take place. Article 286(l)(a) dr)CS not govern the whole of interState trade or commerce. It does not apply to a case where goods are delivered in the purchasing State for purposes other than consumption. Article 286(1)(a) has no application to cases where the Explanation itself does not apply. If a Bengal dealer sells to a Bihar purchaser and delivery takes place in Bihar and if the purpose is consumption then the Explanation applies and Bihar alone can tax. If the purpose is not consumption the Explanation does not apply, the matter is set at large, and States will be entitled to tax on the nexus theory. The ban imposed by clause (2) of article 286 does not apply to cases covered by article 286(l)(a). The class of sales fallipg under the purview of Article 286(1)(a) form a special class of inter-State sales which on general principles of interpretation cannot be affected by the general provisions of clause (2). Article 286(1)(a) and article 286(2) are exactly on the same topic and they

The Bengal Immunity Company Limited The Stau of Bihar and others

Tht Btotol

1-11.1

Cmtpany Liviited

Tlw Slat1 of Bih1Jr orul olhtr$

[1955]

are to achieve the same purpose, i.e., elimination of multiple taxation on a single sale. The device employed in article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation is to convert inter-State sale into an intra-State sale and thereby to localise a sale and to take away the taxing power of other States. Article 286( 1) (a) and article 286(2) are complimentary to each other and they have to be interpreted harmoniously so that each of them can operate within its own field. Whilst article 286(2) comprises all classes of inter-State trade, article 286(1) (a) deals with a special class. If article 286(2) applies to cases covered by article 286 (!) (a) and the Explanation then it will result in discrimination against local trade in favour of intcrState trade and this will be inconsistent with the pr<>visions of Part XIII of the Constitution. The purpose of article 286 being to eliminate multiple taxation and article 286(1) (a) having achieved that purpose in regard to a class of sales falling within it, it is no longer necessary for that purpose to apply article 286(2) to the aforesaid class. The Constitution itself has divided inter-State sales into two categories. In regard to one class it has itself provided as to which State will tax the sale and under what conditions. In regard to the other class the Constitution itself has imposed a ban in general terms and granted Parliament power in general to relax that ban to such extent as Parliament thinks fit. The sale though of an interState character has been converted into an intJra-Statc sale by reason of the legal fiction. If power of taxation is given all ancillary powers are included in that very power. V. K.- T. Chari, Advocate-General of Mlldras (K. Veerasami, with him) for the State of Madras (Intervener). A State is sovereign within the limits of the subject matter of List II as well as within its geographical area. The te..t of legislative competence both as regards the subject matter and the geographical limits is the same whether it is the Parliament or the State Legislature. As to the subject matter the rul~ that applies is that of "pith and substance" and inO. dental invasion of the other Lists is permitted. As

2 S.C.R.

to area, the test is the territorial connection or nexus as the limiting factor. The connection must be relevant and real and if the connection is real then any impact on persons, things, acts or events outside the State is permissible and valid. The word 'extra-territoriality' is used in the sense of legislation with respect to conduct of citizens when they are outside the country. [Reference was made to Charter Act of 1833, s. 43, Government of India Act, 1915, s. 65 ( 1) (a), Hodge v. The Queen (9 A. C. 117), The Commissioner of Stamp Duties (New South Wales) v. Miller and another (48 C.L.R. 618), The Australasian Scale Company Limited v. The Commissioner of Taxes (Queens Land) (53 C.L.R. 534), Broken Hill South Limited v. The Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) (56 C.L.R. 337)]. Under the Government of India Act, 1935 the requirement of levying sales tax was that the goods belonging to the seller must be located within the Province and that those goods should have been made the subject matter of a sale transaction. To establish territk>rial connection for sale. transaction the sine qua non is that the goods belonging to the seller must be located within the Province and that the goods should be made the subject matter of a sale transaction. The Explanation to article 286(1) (a) is a deliberate reversal of the pre-existing position. T. L. Shet1de, Adt1ocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and M. Adhikari (I. N. Shroff, with them) for the State of Madhya Pradesh (Intervener). Whereas the legislative power of all States under article 246(3) read with Entry 54 List II to tax all outside transactions of sale or purchase has been curtailed or restricted by clause l(a) and also by clause (2) of article 286 the said legislative power of the deliverv State is fully saved by the Explanation of clause I (a) and is not ~ubject to the provisions of clause (2). Every delivery State is competent to tax extra-territorially within the ambit of the Explanation and is not fettered by clause (2). Clause (2) puts a ban on all inter-State transactions except those covered by

the Explanation. The contention that the Explanation does not come into effect until the ban under

Thr B'••al fmmumJ1

Compan.J Limit•d Thi StoJt of Bihar and •Iha•

The Bengal Immunity Company Limited The Stale fl.( Bihar

and others.

[1955]

clause ( 2) is lifted by Parliament is incorrect and untenable and moreover such a contention directly contravenes the provisions of article 394 of the Constitution. The operation of the Explanation excludes the operation of clause (2) and vice versa. Sales Tax is in fact and substance only a purchase tax paid on one and the same transaction. Intention was to put an end to the evil of multiple taxation. S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Punjab (Intervener). Article 286(1)(a) like article 286(2) deals with only sales or purchases which take place during the course of inter-State trade or commerce, i.e., trade or commerce in which more than one State have interest. The words 'inter-State ·trade or commerce' have to be given the widest possible meaning. The Explanation has the effect of divesting a transaction of its inter-State character. Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales (1950 A.C. 235) and Bank of N. S. W. v. The Commonwealth (76 C. L. R. 1). Assuming that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to. overrule its own decision there is no reason for doing so. Sec Denning on The Changing Law, 1935 Edn., p. 5. Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Mysore, K. S. Hajela, AdvocateGeneral of Rajasthan (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the. State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent. N. C. Chatterji replied. 1955. September 6. The judgment of S. R. Das, Acting Chief Justice, Bose and Jafer Imam JJ. wa• delivered by S. R. Das Acting Chief Justice. Bhagwati, fagannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar and · B. P. Sinha JJ. delivered separate judgments.

2 S.C.R.

DAs Acre. C.J.-This appeal, filed under a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Patna, is directed against the judgment of that High Court pronounced on the 4th December 1952 whereby it dismissed the application made by the appellant company under article 226 of the Constitution praying for an appropriate writ or order quashing "the proceedings issued by the opposite parties for the purpose of levying and realising a tax which is not lawfully leviable on the petitioners" and for other ancillary reliefs. The relevant facts appearing from the petition filed in support of the appellant company's aforesaid application are as follows : The appellant company is an incorporated company carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines. Its registered head office is at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagar in the district of 24-Perganas in West Bengal. It is registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and its registered number is S. L. 683A. Its products have extensive sales throughout the Union of India and abroad. The goods are despatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted by . the appellant company in Calcutta. The appellant company has neither any agent or manager in Bihar nor any office, go<lown or laboratory in that State. On the 24th October 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the appellant company which concluded as follows :"Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act. Steps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar Sales Jax dues in any Bihar Treasury at an early date under intimation to this Departplent." On the 18th December, 1951 a notice was issued by the Superintendent, Commercial ·Taxes, Central Circle Bihar, Patna calling upon the appellant company (i) to apply for registration and (ii) to submit returns showing its turnover for the period commencing from the 26th January, 1950 and ending with the 30th

The Bengal Immuni!J: Company Limited

The State of Bihar and others Das Actg. C. ].

Tiu Bmgal ltrm1Uni!J Company Limited T 11' Slal1 of Bihm end tJthers DtU Adg. C. J.

[1955}

September, 1951. This notice was issued under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) read with rule 28. It was drawn up according to Form No. 8 prescribed by the rules and was headed "Notice of hearing under section 13(5) ". The reason for issuing this notice, as recited therein, was that on information which had come to his possession the Superintendent was satisfied that the appellant company was liable to pay tax but had nevertheless wilfully failed to apply for registration under the Act. Thereafter there was some correspondence between the appellant company and the Bihar Sales Tax authorities to which it is not necessary to refer in detail. Suffice it to say that while the appellant company denied its liability on the ground, inter alia, that it was not resident in Bihar, it carried on no business there, none of its sales took place in Bihar and that it did not collect any sales tax from any person of that State, the Bihar Sales Tax authorities maintained that under section 33, which was substantially based on article 286 of the Constitution and was inserted in the Act by the' President's Adaptation Order promulgated on the 4th April, 1951, all sales in West Bengal or any other State under which the goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purpose of consumption in that State were liable to Bihar Sales Tax. Eventually on the 29th May, 1952 the Assistant Superintendent of Sales Tax, Bihar called upon the appellant company to comply with the notice by the 14th June, 1952 and threatened that, in default of compliance, he would proceed to take steps for assessment to the best of his judgment. The appellant company by its letter dated the 7th June, 1952 characterised the notice under section 13 (5) as ultra vires and entirely illegal and called upon the Superintendent to forthwith rescind and cancel the same. On the 10th June, 1952 the appellant company presented before the High Court at Patna a petition under article 226 claiming the reliefs hereinbefore mentioned. The respondents did not file any affidavit in opposition controverting any of the alle-

2 S.C.R.

,

gations of facts made in the petition and it must, The Bengal accordingly, be taken that those facts are admitted Im mun it;: as correct by the respondents. The High Court disCompany Limited y. missed the petition on the 4th December, 1952 but on The State of Bihar the next day issued a certificate, under article 132(1) and others of the Constitption, that the case involved a subDas Actg. C.J. stantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Hence the present appeal. In view of the importance of the issues involved in this 'appeal the States of Madras, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa, Punjab, Pepsu, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin and Rajastban applied for and obtained leave to intervene in this appeal. Si111ilar leave was applied for by and was granted to Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., and one M. K. Kuriakose. The State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., and M. K. Kuriakose have supported the appellant company while the rest of the intervcners have opposed the appeal. Before the High Court the question of maintainability of the petition was raised by the respondents as a preliminary objection and it was answered in their favour by the High Court. In its judgment the High Court noticed that facts had not been investigated nor had the liability of the appellant company been determined and that in fact no on:1a of assessment had been made. It pointed out that it was not a case for the Sales Tax Officer usurping a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or acting in excess of his jurisdiction or acting ma/a fide. The High Court took the view that the Act undoubtedlv conferred jurisdiction on the Sales Tax Officer to. investigate the question of liability of a dealer to Sales Tax under the Act and accordingly he was acting well within his jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notice. lf on assessment the Sales Tax Officer erroneously holds the appellant liable t<l any tax, the Act provides for rectifying that error by appeal or revision under sec- · tions 24 and 25 of the Act. According to the High Court such a decision, however erroneous, will, nevertheless, be a decision within the ambit of pis jurisdiction and the High Court cannot interfere with it by 2-84 S.C. India/59

6i8 The Bengal Immunity

...

Company Limited The State of Bihar and othtrs D.as Actz. C.]•

11955]

a writ of prohibition or certiorari to quash. The High Court accordingly held that the petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. We are unable to agree with the above conclusion . In reaching that conclusion the High Court appears to have overlooked the fact that the main contention of the appellant company, as set forth ·in its petition, js that the Act; in so far as it purports to tax a nonresident dealer in respect of an inter-State sale or purchase of goods, is ultra vires the Constitution and wholly illegal. In the impugned Act there are various provisions laying · down conditions which dealers must comply with or submit to, namely, to give only a few instances, compulsory registration of dealers (Section 10), filing of returns (Section 12), attendance and production of evidence in support of the return (Section 13), production, inspection and seizure of books of account or documents and search of premises (Section 17). Section 26 prescribes penalties for contravention cif the provisions of the Act. These and other like provisions in the Act undoubtedly constitute restrictions on the fundamental right to carry on business which is guaranteed to every citizen of India by article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. If, as contended, the Act is ultra vires the Constitution and consequently void these onerous conditions can never be justified as reasonable restrictions within the meaning of clause ( 6) of that article as this Court held in the case of Mohammad Yasin v. The Town Area Committee, Jalalabad( 1 ). The same view was also expressed in the State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.('), and again only recently in HimmatlaJ Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh('). It is urged that the appellant being a company is not a ~itizen ;ind cannot, therefore, claim any fundamental right under article 19 which is available only to citize~ and, therefore, the decisions of this C',ourt referred to above have no application. While it is noteworthy that the second case mentioned above (I) [1952} 3 S.C.R. 572. (2) [1953 4- S.CcR. 1069, 1077. (3) [1954 s s.c.R. 1122, 1121.

2 S.C.R.

was concerned with the rights of a company, ·it is, nevertheless, unnecessary, for the purposes of this appeal, to decide whether a juristic person like a company is a citizen as defined in Part II of the Constitution and as such entitled to the benefits of Artick 19. Nor is it necessary to consider whether there has been any infraction of the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by article 14 in that being a juristic person it cannot claim any of the rights under article 19 which only citizens can do. It is also true that article 31 which protects citizens and non-citizens alike cannot be availed of as it deals with deprivation of property otherwise than by way of levying or collecting taxes as held by this Court in Ramjilal v. Income-Tax Officer, Mohindargarh(1) and that, therefore, the Act does not constitute an infringement of the fundamental right to property under that article. It is, however, clear from article 265 that no tax can be levied or collected except by authoritv of law which must mean a good and valid law. The contention of the appellant company is that the Act which authorises the assessment, levying and collection of sales tax on inter-State trade contravenes and constitutes an infringement of article 286 and is, therefore, ultra vires, void and unenforceable. If, therefore, this contention be well founded, the remedy by way of a writ must, on principle and authority, be ·available to the party aggrieved. It has been argued that the application was prem.1ture, for there has, so far, been no investigation or finding on facts and no assessment under section B of the Act. The appellant co:npany, contending, as it does, that the Act is ultra vires and void, ~hou1d have ignored the notice served on it and should 'not have rushed into Court at this stage. This line of argument appears to us to be utterly untenabie. i:n the first place, it ignores the plain fact that this notice, calling upon the appellant company to forthwith get itself registered as a dealer, and to submit a return and to deposit the tax in a treasury in Bihar, places (1) [1951] 2 S.C.R. 127.

The Bengal lmmwiity Company Limited The State of Bihar and others

Das Aclg. C.J.

The Bengal lmmunip Company Ltmiltd The State of Bihar and others Das ..4.ctg. C.Ji

r1955J

upon it considerable hardship, harassment and liability which, if the Act is void under article read with article 286 constitute, in presenti, an encroachment on and an infringement of its right which entitles it to immediately appeal to the appropriate Court for redress. In the next place, as was said by this Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji ('), when an order or notice emanates from the State Government or any of its responsible officers directing a person to do something, then, although the order or notice may eventually transpire to be ultra vires and bad in law, it is obviously one which prima facie compels obedience as a matter of prudence and precaution. It is, therefore, not reasonable to expect the person served with such an order or notice to ignore it on the ground that it is illegal, for he can only do so at his own risk and peril. This Court has said in the last mentioned case that a person placed in such a situation has the right to be told definitely by the proper legal authority exactly where he stands and what he may or may not do. Another plea advanced by the respondent State 1s that the appellant company is not entitled to take proceedings praying for the issue of prerogative writs under article 226 as it has adequate alternative remedy under the impugned Act by way of appeal or revision. The answer to this plea is short and simple. The remedy under the Act cannot be said to be adequate and is, indeed, nugatory or useless if the Act which provides for such remedy is itself ultra vires and void and the principlt :elied upon can, therefore, have no application where a party comes to Court with an allegation that his right has been or is being threatened to be infringed by a law which is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it and as such void and prays for appropriate relief under artide 226. As said bv this Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The Stdte of Madhya Pradesh (supra) this plea of the State stands negatived by the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (I) [19521 3 s.c.R. 135, 148, 149.

2 S.C.R.

(India) Ltd. (supra). We are, therefore, of the opm1on, for reasons stated above, that the High Court was not right in holding that "the petition under article 226 was misconceived or was not maintainable. It will, therefore, have to be examined and decided on merits. Coming, then, to the merits of the petition, the principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned in its petition is leviable by the State of Bihar. The legal capacity of the State of Bihar to tax these sales is questioned on the following grounds, namely:(A) that the sales sought to be taxed having taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and Parliament not having by law provided otherwise, all States are debarred from imposing tax on such sales by reason of article 286(2); (B) that even if the ban under article 286(2) did not apply, the State of Bihar is not competent to impose tax on such sales on a correct reading of article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II in the Seventh Schedule and article 286(1); (C) that the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 can have no extra-territorial operation and cannot, therefore, impose tax on such sales by a non-resident seller; (D) that on a true construction of the Act itself, it does not apply to the sales sought to be taxed. Re (A) : The main controversy in this appeal has centred round this ground. It raises a question of construction of article 286 of the Constitution. In the judgment under appeal the High Court took the view that ·;ales or purchases in the course of inter-State trade or commerce referred to in article 286 (2) must be construed so as to exclude the particular class of sales or purchases described in the Explanation to clause (a) of article 286 (1) and that, therefore, the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, in so far as they purported to impose tax on such sales, were not ill conflict with article 286(2) as so construed. After this decision of the Patna High Court the question came up for consideration before a Constitution

195$ The Bengal

Jmmu•i!J' Company Limited Thi State of Bihar and others Das Actg. C.J.

Tke Bmgal Immunity Company Limited V·

TM State of Bihar a'fld others

Das Actg. C.J.

11955]

Bench of this Court in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra). The majority of that Bench held that article 286(l)(a), read with the Explanation thereto and construed in the light of articles 301 and 304, prohibited the taxation of sales or purchases. involving inter-State elements by all States . except the State in which the goods were actually delivered for the purpose of consumption therein and that clause (2) of article 286 did not affect the power of the State in which delivery of the wlO<!s was so· made to tax the sales or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation, the effect of which was to convert such inter-State transactions into intra-State transactions and to take them out of the operation of clause (2) of that article. It is quite clear that if this majority view is to prevail this. ground uqied by learned counsel for the appellant company and strongly supported by the learned AttorneyGeneral appearing for the interveners, the State of West Bengal and Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., and by learned counsel for M. K. Kuriakose must fail. It has, accordingly, been pressed upon us that we are not hound by the maiority decision in that appeal from Bombay and that it is still open to us to examine and ascertain for ourselves the true meaning, import and scope of the article in question. Learned counsel for some of the interveners question our authority to go behind the majority decision. It is, therefore, necessary at this stage to determine this preliminary question before entering upon a detailed discussion on the question of construction of article 286. In England, the Court of Appeal has imposed upon its power of review of earlier precedents a limitation, subject to certain exceptions. The limitation thus accepted is that it is bound to follow its own derisions · and those of courts of Co--ordinate jurisdiction, and the "full" Court is in the same position in this respect as a division Court consisting of three members. The only exceptions to this rule are: (l) the Court is entitled and bound to decide which of the two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow: (2) the Court is hound to refuse to follow a decision of

2 S.C.R.

its own which, though not expressly overruled, cannot, in its opinion stand with a decision of the House of Lords; and (3) the Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own, if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam, e.g., where a Statute or a rule having statutory effect which would have affected the decision was not brought to the attention of the e:lr!ier Court. [See Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.(1) which, on appeal to the House of Lords, was approved by Viscount Simon in L.R. 1946 A.C. 163 at p. 169]. A decision of the House of Lords upon a question of law is. con<0lusive and binds the House in subsequent case. An erroneous decision of the House of Lords can be set right only by an Act of Parliament. fSee Street Tramways v. London County Council (2) ]. This limitation was repeated by Lord Wright in Radcliffe v. Ribble Motor Services Ltd. (3). The High Court in Australia, which is the highest Court in that Commonwealth, has not adopted such a rigid rule. In the Tramways case (4) the rule was thus laid down by Griffith, C.J. at p. 58: "In my opinion, it is impossible to maintain an abstract proposition that Court is either legally or technically bound by previous decisions. Indeed, it may, in a proper case, be its duty to disregard them. But the rule should be applied with great caution, and only when the previous decision is manifestly wrong, as, for instance, if it proceeded upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired Statute, or is contrary to a decision of another Court which this Court is bound to follow; not, I think, upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the members of the later Court might arrive at a different conclusion if the matter was res integra. Otherwise there would be grave danger of want of continuity in the interpretation of law." In the same case Barton, J. m the concluding paragraph of his judgment at p. 69 expressed himself thus: "In conclusi9p, I would say that l never thought (I) L.R. 19H K.B. 718 C.A. (3) 1939 A.C. 215, 245.

(2) 1898 A.C. 375.

(4) [1914) 18 C.L.R. 54.

The Bengal

Immunit,J Company Limited

The State of Bihar ar.d others

Das Actg. C.J.

T;t Ben~al lmmuni'.Y Company Limited

••

T fie Statt of Bihar and othtrs

V.s A.-tg. C.J.

f1955]

that it was not open to this Court to review its previous decisions upon good cause. The question is not whether the Court can <lo so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need for continuity and con,istency in the judicial decision. Changes in the number of appointed Justices can, I take it, never of themselves furnish a reason for review. That the prior decision was that of little more than half their number might be urged with greater fairness, but it cannot be urged against W hyhrow's case which was decichl by the whole Court then .in existence save the Justice who as President of the Arbitration Court, . was a party respondent to the order nisi. But the Court can always listen to argument as to whether it ouglit to review a particular decision, and the strongest reason for an overruling is that a decision is manifestly wrong and its continuance is injurious to the public interest". It is interesting to note that in that case all the Judges agreed that the decision in W hybrou/s case wa. to be treated as open to review (Per Griffith, C.J. at p. 58) although in the end, after reviewing the position afresh in the light of new arguments advanced before it, the Court came to the same conclusion. Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co.(') may also be referred to as an instance where the High Court of Australia departed from its previous decision. In the United States of America there have been a considerable number of cases in which the Supreme Court has explicitly and avowedly overruled its prior decisions but there have been more insta11ces in which the doctrines declared in prior cases have been in paf.I: evaded or modified without explicit repudiation. (Willoughby-Constitution of the United States, 2nd E:rln., Vol. I, pp. 74-75). In State of Washington v. Dawson & Co.( '), Brandies, J. in his dissenting ju,lgment said : "The doctrine of .<tare deci.<is should not deter us from overruling that case and those which follow it. (I) [1920] 28 C.L.R. 129. (2) 264 U.S. 646; 68 L.Ed. 219.

2 S.C.R.

The decisions are recent ones. They have not been acquiesced in. They have no.t created a rule of property around which vested interests have clustered. They affect solely matters of a transitory nature. On the other hand, they affect seriously the lives of men, women and children, and the general welfare. Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal. inexorable command. The instances in which the Courts have disregarded its admonition are many". In a foot-ncte to this judgment the learned Judge set out a large number of instances where the earlier decisions had been overruled. In another dissenting judgment in David Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Company(1) the same learned Judge, after quoting a passage from the judgment of Mr. Justice· Lurton in Hertz v. Woodman( 2 ) proceeded to say: "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled right. Compare National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99; 26 L.Ed. 443-444· This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of seriom rnncern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often OV('Truled its earlier decisions. The:: Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning recognising that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical science~, is appropriate also in the )udicial function". In his separate but concurring judgment in Mark Grave.< v. People of tl1e State of Nefll York(3) Frankforter, J. observed : "Judicial exegesis is unavoidable with reference to an act like our Constitution, drawn in many particular~ with purposed vagueness so as to leave room for the unfolding future. But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not (I) 285 U.S. 393; 76 L.Ed. 815. (2) 218 U.S. 205, ·212; 54. L.Ed. 1001, 1005. (3) 306 r .S. 466; 83 L.Ed. 927.

The Bengal bnmunity Company Limited v, The Stll.te of Bihar mu/ others Das Actg. C.J.

The Be111.al Immunity Company Limited

...

The StaU ef Bihar and othtrs Das Actg. C.J.

l 1955]

what we have said about it". In this case two previous d·~cisions were expressly overruled and two more were impliedly overruled. We now come to the Privy Council which, prior to the commencement of our Constitution, was the highest Court of Appeal to hear appeals from the Indian High Courts. In a case about Compensation to Civil Servants('), in repelling the contention that the Board was bound in law, and without examination, to follow an earlier decision whether they consi<lered it right or wrong the Marquess of Reading said : "Their Lordships are unable to hold that this proposlt:ion stated in such an extreme form is estab.. lished. It may well be said that the Board would hesitate long before disturbing a solemn decision by a prewus Board, which raised an identical or even a similar issue for determination; but for the proposition that the Board is, in all circumstances, bound to follow a previous decision, as it were, blindfold, they are unable to discover any adequate authority. In other words, no inflexible rule, which falls in all circumstances to be applied, has been laid down". In the Attorney-General of Ontario v. The Canada Temperance Federation(') Viscount Simon stated the practice of the Board in the following terms : "Their Lordships do not doubt that in tendering humble advice to His Majesty, they are not absolutely bound by previous <lecisions of the Board, as is the House of Lords by its own judgments. In ecclesiastical appeals, for instance, on more than one occasion the Board has tendered advice contrary to that given in a previous case, which further historical research has shown to have been wrong. But on constitutional questions it must be seldom indeed that the Board would depart from a previous decision which it may be assumed will have been acted upon both by Governments and subjects". Finally, in Phanindra Chandra Neogy v. The King(') Lord Simonds said at p. 88 : (I) L.R. 1929 A.G. 242; A.LR. 1929 P.C. B4, 87. (2) [1946] 50 c.w.N. 535; A.LR. 1946 P.c. 88. (3) L.R. 76 I.A. IO; 1939 Dom. L.R. 87 (P.C.).

2 S.C.R.

"Theiv Lordships then have before them a decision upon facts which in no material respect differ from those of the present case. Even so, it is, as they re.· cognise, competent for them humbly to tender advice to His Majesty inconsistent with a previous decision, though it can only be in most exceptional circumstances that such a course should be taken ......... . Recognising the possibility, they have heard full argument and, having done so, see no reason to doubt the validity of the reasoning of the correctness of the conclusion in Gill's case, and they do not think it necessary to repeat what was said there". In considering the applicability of the principles laid down in the decisions hereinbefore mentioned, ic should be borne in mind that the English decisions may well have been influenced by considerations which can rio longer apply to the circumstances prevailing in India. The error, if any, of the Court of Appeal in England, may be corrected bv the House of Lords or eventually by Parliament by a simple majority. The mistakes, if anv, made by the High Court of Australia, if not corrected bv itself in a subsequent case, could be set right by the Privy Council when appeals were taken there or bv the appropriate legislativ~ authority. An error made by the House of Lords or the Privy Council can easily be rectified by Parliament by a simple majority by an amending statute. But in a country governed by a federal constitution, such as the United States of America and the Union of India are, it is bv no means easy to amend the Constitution if an erroneous interpretation is put upon it by this Court. (See article 368 of our Constitution). An erroneous interpretation be of the Constitution may quite conceivably perpetuated or may at any rate remain unrectified for a considerable time to the great detriment to public well being. The considerations adverted to in the decisions of the Supreme Court of America quoted above are, therefore, apposite and apply in full force in determining whether a previous decision of this Court should or. should not he disregarded or overruled. There is nothing in our Constitution which

The Bmgal Immunity Company Limitei The State of Bil.ar and othns

Das Actg. C.J.

The Benial Immunity Company LimiUd The State of Bihar

and others Das .~ctg. C. J.

[195SJ

prevents us from departi11g from a previous dcci,ion if we are convinced of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public. Article !41 which lays down that the law declared bv this Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India quite obviously refers to Courts other rhan this Court. The corresponding provision of the Government of India Act, 1935 also makes it clear that the Courts contemplated are the Subordinate Court<. There are several circumstances relating to the maiority decision of the Court in The Stale of Bomhav v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) to which reference must be made. That appeal was heard immediately before the hearing of the appeal r.ported as The State of Travqncore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory(') commenced. The two appeal< were, as ·a matter of fact, heard one after the other and judgments were reserved in both of them. The constitution of the Benches was. however, different. In the first appeal one of the Judges of that Bench expressly differed from the majority decision and an<>ther learned Judge did not accept the majority d~ci­ sion on many points. In the second appeal one Jud~e of the Bench, who was not a party to the fir>t appeal, differed from the majoritv decision in the first apl"t':ll. The result, therefore. was that the majority decision was definitely differed from by two Judges. Bhagwati J. has now in the judgment he has written in the present appeal which we have had the advantage of reading reconsidered the matter and on further reAection he thinks that the maiority decision on the pre<ei)t issue was erroneous and he now agrees substantially with the view of article 286(1 )(a) read with the Explanation and article 286(2) which was expressed in the two minority judgment< referred to above and which is adopted in the iudgment now being delivered in the present appeal. If Bhagwati J. had then expre5'ed the views he is now doing, ther> the maioritv in the Bomhav appeal would haYe been 3 to 2 and if we add the oninion of the dissenting fudge in the Travanrore-Cochin appeal 1hen judicial opinion would (I) (1954] 5 S.C..R. 53.

2 S.C.R.

have been divided 3 to 3. In this juxtaposition it is difficult to give the majority decision in the Bombay appeal that amount of sanctity and reverence which is usually attributed to an unretracted majority decision of this Court. The majority decision does not merely determine the rights of the two contending parties to the Bombay appeal. Its effect is far reaching as it affects the rights of all consuming public. It authorises the imposition and levying of a tax by the State on an interpretation of a constitutional provision which appears . to us to be unsupportable. To follow that interpretation will result in perpetuating what, with humility we say, is an error and in perpetuating a tax burden imposed on the people which, according to our considered opinion, 1s manifestly and wholly unauthorised. It is not an ordinary pronouncement declaring the rights of two private individuals inter se. It involves an adjudication on the taxing power of the States as against the consuming public generally. If the decision is erroneous, as indeed we conceive it to be, we owe it to that public to protect them against the illegal tax burdens which the States are seeking to impose on the strength of that erroneous recent decision. The third circumstances is that there appears to be some vagueness, if not inconsistency, in the majority judgment itself. At p. 1084 of the authorised reportthe majority judgment says : ''The expn:ssion 'for the purpose of consumption in that State' must. in our opinion, be understood as having reference not merely to the individual impori.er or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to consumers in general within the State. Thus all buyers within the State of delivery from out-of-State sellers, except those buying for re-export out of the State, would be within the scope of the Exolanation and liable to be taxed by the State on their inter-State transactions". This passage seems to suggest that it is only the

huvcrs fa\lin~ within the Explanation who are liable to be taxed by what has been called in the discussion

The Bengal Immunity Company' LimitLd The State of /Jiha• and others Das Actg. C. J.

[1955]

before us as the delivery State. According to this passag<, r<ad by itself, the out-of-State sellers are not lmmwtity considered liable to be taxed on the sales. The whole Company Limited trend of the rest of the majority judgment and the The State of Bihar actuai decision therein run counter to this conclusion, and others for the out-of-State sellers were, by reason of the Das Aclg. C. J. Explanation, subjected to the taxing power of the delivery State. Indeed, Bihar is claiming to tax the appellant company, an out-of-the-State seller, by virtue of the majority decision and all other States intervening and supporting Bibar read the judgment in that way and none of them accepts the quoted passage as containing the actual ratio decidendi of the majority judgment. This confusion, we consider, is also a cogent reason for re-examining that decision. Reference is made to the doctrine of finality of judicial decisions and it is pressed upon us that w< should not reverse our previous decision except in cases where a material provision of law has been overlooked or where the decision has proceeded upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired statute and that we should not differ from a previous decision merely because a contrary view appears to us to be preferable. It is needless for us to say that we should not lightly dissent from a previous pronouncement of this Court. Our power of review, which undoubtedly exists, must be exercised with due care and caution and onlv for advancing the public well being in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case brought to our notice but we do not consider it right to confine our power within rigidly fixed limits as suggested before us. If on a re-examination of the question we ·come to the conclusion, as indeed we have, that the previous majority decision was plainly erroneous then it will be our duty to say so and not to perpetuate our mistake even when one learned Judge who was party to the previous decision considers it incorrect on further reflection. We should do so all the more readily as our decision is on a constitutional ·question and our erroneous decision has imposed ·illegal tax burden on the consuming public and has The Bengal

2 S.C.R.

otherwise given rise to public inconvenience or hardship, for it is by no means easy to amend the Coristitution. Sometimes frivolous attempts may be made to question our previous decisions but if the reasons on which our decisions are founded are sound they will by themselves be sufficient safeguard against such frivoious attempts. Further, the doctrine of stare aecisis has hardly any application to an isolated and stray decision of .the Court very recently made and not followed by a series of decisions based thereon. The problem before us does not involve overruling a series of decisions but oniy involves the question as to whether we should approve or disapprove, follow or overrule, a very recent previous decision as a precedent. In any case, the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule of law and cannot be permitted to perpetuate our errors to the detriment to the general welfare of the public or a considerable section thereof. It is pointed out that all the States are realising sales tax in respect of sales or purchases of goods where the goods are actually delive.red for consumption within their respective boundaries on the faith of our previous decision and a reversal of that decision will upset the economy of the States and will indeed render them liable to refund moneys already ·collected by them as taxes. This circumstance, it is pressed upon us, should alone deter us from differing from the previous decision. We are not impressed by this argument. It has not yet been decided by this Court that moneys paid under a mutual mistake of law induced by a wrong judicial interpretation of a statute or the CQnstitution must necessarily be refundable as money had and received. If, as contende<l, moneys so paid are in law refundable the States cannot complain any more than a private individual in similar· circumstances could do. Finally, if the State economy is upset the appeal must be to Parliament which under article 286(2) itself has ample power to make suitable legislation. The impugned decision is a recent one. The judicial opinion was divided, if not evenly balanced. One of

The Bengal lmmUTi.ity Company Limited

The State of Bihar and otlters Das Actg. C. ].

The B1ragal lmmunitv Compan_;~ Liinited The State of Bif1ar

and others Das Actg. C. ].

'

11955]

the four Judges who formed the majority has revised his opinion as stated above. The decision on the point noted above seems to be somewhat inconsistent and is, at any rate, not quite clear. It has encouraged the imposition of tax burdens on the consuming public on an interpretation of the Constitution which appears to us to be plainly erroneous. It has given rise to considerable inconvenience and hardship to business people who have not acqniesccd in it by any means. To rectify the error by the legislative process is difficult, for a constitutional amendment reqnires a specified majority which may not always be available and if it involves an amendment of the legislative lists it will require the consent of a requisite number of the States which, in this instance, cannot reasonably be expected. In the premises, we think that it is precisely a case wher7, in the public interests, the meaning, scope and effect of article 286 should be re-examined afresh in the light of the fresh arguments now advanced before us and the experience we have since acquired. In our judgment the majority deci.sion in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) is, in the circumstances alluded to; open to review and we are entitled to re-examine article 286 in order to ascertain its true meaning, scope and effect so far as it is necessary for the purposes of this appeal and we proceed on this basis. It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's ·case(') was decided that". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:ht. What was the common law before the making of the Act., 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide., 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth., and (I) 3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 E.R. 637.

r

2 S.C.R.

4th. The true reason of the remedy ; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico". In In ,re Mayfair Property Company( 1 ) Lindley, M.R. in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case". In Eastman Photographic Material Company v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks(2) Earl of Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows : "My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the Statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to th() ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy. These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion". It appears to us that this rule is equally applicable to the construction of article 286 of our Constitution. In order to properly interpret the provisions of that article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief. The position with respect to taxation on sales or purchases of goods that prevailed in the country had better be stated in the language of Patanjali Sastri, C. J. who delivered the majority judgment in the State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra). After expressing the view, based on the authority of the Wal/ace Brothers' Case(3) that in the case of sales tax, it · was not necessary that the sale should take place within the territorial limits of the State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale, like the agree-

M L.R. [1898] A.C. 571, 576. (3) 1948 F.C.R. I.

(!} L.ll. [1898] 2Ch. 28, 35.

. 3-84 S. C. India/59

The Bncgal Immuniry Campany Limilt4 The State of Biliat' and othws Das Actg. C. J-

The Bmga.l Immunity Co1t1p«ny LimiUd Tilt Slat• of Bihar and others

D•s Actg. C. ].

[1955]

ment to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods, etc., should have a territorial connection with the State and that, broadly speaking, local activities . of buying and selling carried on in the State in relation to local goods would be a sufficient basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, providecj of course that such activities ultimately resulted in a concluded sale to be taxed, the learned Chief Justice proceeded to say:"In exercise of the legislative power conferred upon them in substantially similar terms by the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial Le~is­ latures enacted Sales Tax laws for their respective Provinces, acting on the principle of territorial nexus referred to above; that is to say, they picked out one or more of the ingredients constituting a sale and made them the basis of their sales tax legislation. Assam and Bengal made, among other thing~ the actual existence of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxabilitv. In Bihar the production or manufacture of the goods in the Province was made an additional ground. A net of the widest range perhaps was laid in the Central Provinces and Berar where it was sufficient if the goods were actually "found" in the Province at any time after the Contract of Sale or Purchase in respect thereof was made. Whether the territorial nexus put forward as the basis of the taxing power in each case would be sustained as sufficient was a matter of doubt not ,.having been tested in a Court of law. And such claims to taxing power led to multiple taxation of the same transaction by Provinces and cumulation of the burden falling ultimately on the consummg public. This situation posed to the Constitution makers the problem of restricting the taxing ·power on sales or purchases involving inter-State elements, and alleviating the tax burden on the consumer. At the same time they were evidently anxious to maintain the State power of imposing non-discriminatory taxes on goods imported from other States, while upholding the economic unity of India by providing for the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce.

2 S.C.R.

In their attempt to harmonise and achieve these somewhat conflicting objectives, they enacted articles 286, 301 and 304". Leaving out, for the moment, the question as to whether articles 301 and 304 have any bearing on the question of construction of article 286, as to which we entertain a contrary opinion, the above passage quite adequately depicts the oictml". of chaos and confusion that was brought about in inter-State trade or commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing power by the different Provincial Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus between the respective Provinces and the sales or purchases sought to be taxed. Tt was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of inter-State trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the Constitution makers adopted article 286 m the Constitution which runs as follows :"286. (1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place( a) outside the State; or (b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India. Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State. (2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce: Provided that the President may by order direct

Thi Bengal

Immunity Company Limited T ht State of BibMr Mruf ot/ierJ D•s .dctg. C. J.

Tire Bmg•I /111munil)' ComjJtmJ Limited

The State of Bihat tJNl t1lhlrs

Das)Actg. C. J.

[1955]

that any tax. on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediatdy before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until th~ thirty-first day of March, 1951. (3) No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent". Article 286 is in Part XII of the Constitution which deals with "Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits". It is one of the several articles which are grouped under the heading "Miscellaneous Financial Provisions" in Chapter I of that Part. It is to be noted that it has not found ·a place in Part XI, Chapter I whereof deals with "Legislative Rdations" including "Distribution of Legislative Powers" between Parliament and the Legislatures of States. The marginal note to article 286 is "Restrictions as to imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods'', which, unlike the marginal notes in Acts of the British Parliament, is part of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent Assembly, prima facie, furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the article. Apart from the marginal note, the very language of that article makes it abundantly clear that its object is to place restrictions on the legislative power of the States with respect to the imposition of taxes on the sales or purchases of goods. It will be recalled that section 100(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 read with Entry 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act gave power to the Provincial Legislatures to make laws with respect to "Taxes on sale of goods and on advertisements". Pursuant t::> the. legislative power thus conferred on them the Fr<'~ vincial Legislatures enacted Sales Tax Acts for thei1 respective Provinces. Althougli in most of those Acts

2 S.C.R.

"Sale" was first defined as meaning transfer of the property in the goods, so as to make the passing of the property within the Province the principal . basis for the imposition of the tax, yet by means of Explanations to that definition, those Acts gave extended meanings to that word and thereby enlarged the scope of their operation. The imposition of ux on the sales or purchases of goods on the basis of a very slight territorial connection or nexus resulted in what has been graphically described by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in the passage quoted above from the majority judgment in the Bombay appeal. This imposition of multiple taxes on one and the same transaction of sale or purchase was certainly calculated to hamper and discourage free flow of trade within India regarded as one economic unit. This undesirable state of affairs had to be put right. Therefore, while the Constitution makers by article 246(3) read with Entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution conferred power on the Legislatures of Part A and Part B States to make law with respect to "Taxes op the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers" they at the same time by article 286 clamped on that legislative power several fetters. Broadly speaking, the fetters thus placed on the taxing power of the States are that no law of a State shall impose or autnorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place, (a) outside the State or (b) in the course of import or export or ( c) except in so far as Parliament otherwise provides, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and lastly ( d) that no law made by the Legi~ lature of a State imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of a,ny such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. It should be noted that these arc four separate and independent restrictions placed upon the legislative competency of the States to make a law with respect to matters enumerated in Entry 54 of List II. In order

T!w B,,,,,,l

J,,,mlllli? Company l1rniU' The Stall of Bifuzr &'1111· ol/rll'I

-

DtU kit· C. J.

!955 ;he Bengal lmmuniry Company Limited The St ate of Bihar and others Das Actg. C. J.

[1955]

to make the ban effective and to leave no loophole the Constitution makers have considered the different aspects of sales or purchases of goods and placed checks on the legislative power of the States at different angles. Thus in clause (l)(a) of article 286 the question of the situs of a sale or purchase engaged their attention and they forged a fetter on the basis of such situs to cure the mischief of multiple taxation by the States on the basis of the nexus theory. In clause (l)(b) they comidered sales or purchases from the point of view of our foreign trade and placed a ban on the States' taxing power in order to make our foreign trade free from any interference by the States by way of a tax impost. In clause (2) they looked at sales or purchases in their inter-State character and imposed another ban in the interest of the freedom of internal trade. Finally, in clause (3) the Constitution makers' attention was rivetted on the character and quality of the goods themselves and they placed a fourth restriction on the States' power of imposing tax on sales or purchases of goocls declared to be essential for the life of the community. These several bans may overlap in some caseo but in their respective scope and operation they are sep;irate and independent. They deal with different phase, of a sale or purchase but, nevertheless, they are distinct and one has nothing to do with and is not dependent on the other or others. The States' legislative rower with respect to a sale or purchase may be hit bv one or more of these bans. Thus, take the case of a sale of goods declared by Parliament as essential by a selkr in West Bengal to a nurchaser in Bihar in which goods are actually delivered as a direct result of such sale for consumption in the State of Bihar. A law made by West Bengal without the assent of the Prcsi:knt taxing this sale will he unconstitutional because ( l) it wiJI offend article 286(1) (a) as the sale has taken place outside tlic territory by .virtue of the Explar1'1tion to clause (1) (a), (2) it will also offend article 286(2) as the sale has taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and (3) such law will also be contrary to article 286(3) as the goods are

2 S.C.R.

essential commodities and the President's assent to the law was not obtained as required by clause (3) of article 286. This appears to us to be the general scheme of that article. We come now to the particular bans. Although the Legislatures of the States were empowered by article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II to make a law with respect to taxes on sales or purchases of goods, the different State Legislatures, as already mentioned, considered themselves free to make a law imposing tax on sales or purchases of goods provided they had some territorial nexus with such sales or purchases, e.g., that one or other of the ingredients or events which go to make up a sale or purchase was found to exist or had happened within their respective territories. ·whether they were right or wrong in so acting is a question which has not been finally decided by the Courts but the fact is that they did so. This resulted in multiple taxation which manifestly prejudiced the interests of the ultimate consumers and also hampered the free fl.ow of inter-State trade or commerce. So the Constitution makers had to cure that mischief. The first thing that they did was to ta!(e away the Statts' taxing power with respect to sales or purchases which took place outside theii respective territorie;. This they did by clause ( 1) (a). If the matter had been left there, the solution would have been imperfect, for then the question as to which sale or purchase takes place outside a State would yet have remained open. So the Constitution makers had to explain what an outside sale was and tliis they did by the Explanation set forth in clause ( 1). The language employed in framing the Explanation, however, has given scope fpr argument to counsel and presented considerable difficulties to the Court m ascertaining its purpose and intendment. If the Explanation simply said "For the purposes of subclause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place outside a State when the goods have actually been delivered for the purpose of consumption in another State, notwithstanding the fact, etc., etc.", then none of the difficulties would have arisen

The Beft~al Immunity Company Limited The State of Bihar and others Das Actz. c. J.

Th1Bmgal Immunity

Company Limited Tiu State of Bihsr 1112d others Dos Aag. C. J.

[1955]

at all. But why, it is asked did the Constitution makers seek to explain what was an outside sale or purchase by saying that a sale or purchase was to be deemed to take place inside the particular State mentioned in tht Explanation? Was the purpose of the Explanation only to explain what was an outside sale or purchase or was it also its purpose to allot or assign a particular class of sales or purchases of the kind mentioned therein to a particular State so as to put the question of situs of the sales or purchases of that description beyond the pale of controversy ? These are. questions which arise and are raised because of the somewhat involved language of the Explanation. Four different views as to the true meaning and effect of the Explanation have been suggested for our consideration and arguments have been advanced for and against the correctness of each of them. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion in the matter. We propose accordingly to note the possible views and record very briefly the criticisms relating to each of those views and the suggested answers to such criticisms.

One view which has been called the strict view is this. In clause (1) (a) the Constitution makers have placed a ban on the taxing power of the States with respect to sales or purchases which take place outside the State. If the matter had been left ther~ the ban would have been imperfect, for the argument would have still remained as to where a particular sale or purchase took place. Does a sale or purchase take place at the place where the contract of sale is made, or where the property in the goods passes or where the goods are delivered? These questions are answered bv the Explanation. That Explanation is "for the purposes of sub-clause (a)" i.e., for the purpose of explaining which sale or purchase is to be regarded as having taken place outside a State. By saying that a particular sale or purchase is to be deemed to take place in a particular State the Explanation only indicates that such sale or purchase has taken place outside all other States. The Explanation is neither an

2 S.C.R.

Exception nor a Proviso but only explains what is an outside sale referred to in sub-clause (a). This it does by creating a fiction. That fiction is only for the purposes of sub-clause (a) and cannot be extended to any other purpose. It should be limited to its avowed purpose. To say that this Explanation confers legislative power on what for the sake of brevity has been called the delivery State is to use it for a collateral purpose which is not permissible. Further, it is utterly illogical and untenable to say that article 286 which was introduced in the Constitution to place restrictions on the legislative powers of the State, by a side wind, as it were, gave enlarged legislative powers to the State of delivery by an explanation sandwiched between two restrictions. This construction runs counter to the entire scheme of the article and the explanation and one may see no justification for imputing such indirect and oblique purpose to this article. Had the Constitution makers so desired they could have done so in a more direct and straight-forward way. To hold that the Explanation has, besides its declared purpose, another hidden purpose of conferring or enlarging legislative power is to build up a fanciful argument merely on the unfelicitous and involved language used _in the Explanation although it is distinctly not the purpose of the Explanation and althoµgh it does not purport substantively and propno vigore, to confer any legislative power on any State. Its only purpose is to explain what an outside sale is, so that, by one stroke, as it were, it takes away the taxing power, in respect of sales or purchases of the kind referred to in the Explanation, of all States other than the State where such sales or purchases are, by the Explanation, to be deemed to have taken place. This view of the Explanation was taken in the dissenting judgment in the case of the State of Tr.wancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (supra). The view that the Explanation is only for the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (1) and cannot be carried over to clause (2) was also taken in the dissenting judgment in the State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) at p. 1103.

The BengaJ Immunity Company Limited The State of Bihar a~d others

Das Actg. c. ].

Tht Ben1al . Immunity C:?mpany Limited TM State of Bihar

and otMrs

Das Aclg. C. ].

[1955]

The criticislI} that has been levelled against thi1 strict view of the Explanation is that it will not entirely eliminate the claims of the States to tax sales or purchases on the basis of the nexus theory. Suppose, it is said, Parliament lifts the ban .placed on inter-State trade or commerce by clause (2), all States will, in that situation, claim the right to tax sales or purchases if any one of the ingredients or events making up the sale is to be found to exist or to have happened in that State. It has been suggested in reply to this criticism that this apprehension is not at all well-founded. When Parliament will lift the ban imposed by clause (2), the Explanation will continue to operate, so that inter-State sales or purchases falling within it will still be deemd to have taken place in the delivery State and, therefore, outside all other States none of which latter States will, by reason of the ban imposed by clause (I) (a), be entitled to tax such sale. The ban under clause (2) being lifted the delivery State will become free to tax such sales or purchases in exercise of the taxing power conferred on it by article 246(3) read with Entry 54 in List II. Then, it is asked, what will happen to those sales or purchases which do not fall within the Explanation? After Parliament hfts tbe ban under clause (2) which State will tax sales or purchases in which goods are actually delivered in a particular State. not for consumption in that State but, say, for re-export to another State for consumption ? One of the suggested answers was that those sales or purchases were not like! y - to be numerous, for ordinarily a dealer would not actually get the goods imported into a State only for re-exporting the same to another State for consumption in the last mentioned State but would find it more convenient and economical to arrange for the delivery of the goods straight to the last mentioned State. A further suggestion was that it might well be that when Parliament would by law lift the ban of clause (2) it would, by the same law, provide which .of the States would tax such inter-State sales or purchases which were not covered by the Explanation and on what basis.

2 S.C.R.

.. ..

-

This suggested answer, in its turn, raises a question as to the scope and ambit of the legislative power conferred on Parliament by clause (2). The .opening words ·of clause (2), namely, . "Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide" clearly indicate that the lifting of the ban may be total or partial, that is to say, Parliameilt may lift the ban wholly and unconditionally or it may lift it to such extent as it may think fit to do and on such terms as it pleases. It is to be remembered that under Entry 42 of List I Parliament alone may make law with respect to inter-State trade or commerce. It is, therefore, conceded that in exercise of its legislative powers under that entry read with article 286(2) Parliament may make a law permitting the States to tax interState sales or purcj1ases of certain commodities only. It is also not questioned that Parliament may, by way of regulating inter-State trade or commerce, fix a ceiling rate of tax on sales or purchases of goods which the law made hy the States under Entry 54 of List II, may not exceed. Can Parliament also override the Explan:ition? If not, cannot Parliament at least provide which of the States may tax inter-State sales or purchases of goods which do not fall within the Explanation ? These are some of the questions which may arise as and when Parliament will choose to make a law· in exercise of the powers conferred on it and it will then be time enough to discus> and decide those questions. It is not for the C0urts to advise Parliament in advance as to the scope of . its legislative competency under clause (2) and, therefore, we only note those questions and leave them here. The second view as to the meaning and effect of the Explanation is that it once for all fixes rhe situs of a sale or purchase so that one knows when such a sale or purchase is outside a State and when it is inside a State. To put it differently, States are told when a sale or purchase is )inside a particular State and, therdore, the States are also told when a sale or purchase is outside a State. In short the Explanation not c;mly explains what is an outside sale or purchase but al59 actually fixes the situs of a sale or

The Bengal Immunity Ctmftany Limited T/it State of Bihar •nd others Das Actg. C. J.

[19551

purchase in a particular State. This view of the Explanation was taken in the majority decision in Immunity the State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. Company Limited (supra). The majol:ity decision quite clearly concedes 1'11.e Stall of Bi/uzr that the Explanation does not, by itself, confer any and others legislative power on any State, not even the delivery JJas Actg. C. J. State, with respect to sales or purchases of the kind mentioned therein but as it fixes the situs of such sales or purchases in the delivery State that State is left free to tax them in exercise of its legislative powers under article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II. The criticism offered against this view is, first of all, that it uses the Explanation for a purpose which is beyond that of sulrclause (a). This view turns the fiction created expressly for sub.clause (a) into a reality fixing the location of such sales and purchases for all purposes. In the next place this · view ignores the existence of clause (2) which imposes a different ban on the legislative power of all States including the delivery State also, so that as long as Parliament does not lift the ban no State, not even the delivery State, may tax sales or purchases which take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, even though they may fall within the Explanation. The further objection is that this view also does not completely eliminate the confusion arising from the nexus theory. Suppose Parliament lifts the ban under clause (2), which State will tax sales or purchases which do not come within the Explanation? The· same answer was suggested as was done in reply to similar objections to the first view. That, as we have said, will call for decision if and when Parliament exercises its legislative powers under clause (2). · The third view, which was adQmbrated and discussed in the separate judgment of Bhagwati, J. in the case of The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) is that the Explanacion concerns itself with notionally fixing the situs of sales or purchases in the delivery State only but in no way affects the taxing power of the State in which, under the general law relating to the sale of goods, the property in the goods has passed. The result of this view is The Bmgfl/

2 S.C.R.

said to be that the State in which the sales or purchases are to be deemed to have taken place may tax them but the State in which, under the general law relating to the sale of goods, the property in the goods has passed may also tax them if and when. Parliament lifts the ban of clause (2). This view, it is said, is open to all the criticisms to which the second view is subject and in addition to that a further objection • has been suggested against this view, namely, that it will perpetuate double, if not multiple, taxation on one and the same transaction of sale or purchase at least after Parliament lifts the ban. A fourth view has also been suggested before us as a possible view although it was not put forward on the previous occasion. It is founded on the non-obstante clause in the Explanation. It is said that clause ( 1) (a) and the Explanation concern themselves with only two States, namely the title State, i.e.. the State in which, ~n<ler the general law, title to the goods passes to the purchaser and the delivery State, i.e., the State in which goods are actually delivered as a direct result of the sale or purchase for consumption in that State. The purpose of the Explanation is said to be to demarcate the taxing power of only these two States by taking out the sales or purchases of the kind mentioned therein from the sphere of the taxing power of the title State and subjecting them to the taxing power of the delivery State. In the ju,xtaposition of those two States clause (l)(a) read with the Explanation provides that the title State cannot tax because such sales or purchases are, by the fiction, made to take place outside its territory and that the delivery State can tax because the sales or purchases in question are, by the fiction, made to take place inside its territory. In short, the result of clause (l)(a) read with the Explanation, according to this view, is that the State which cannot tax such sales or purchases · on the ground that thev have taken place outside its territory is only that State in which the property in the goods has passed. The criticism is immediately put forward that if clause (l)(a) and the Explanation are limited in their opeation only to the two States men-

Tire B"'gal tI111munity Company Limited

T/14 Stau of Bi/iM and olh4rs

Das Aclg. C. ].

~9.>S

[1955 J

tioned above then the other States which also claimed to tax on the strength of the nexus theory, e.g., the Immunit,Y State where the contract was made, or the State where Company Limitti the goods were produced or manufactured or were v' Thi Stat1 of Bihu found, will be outside the ban and the mischief of and others multiple taxation which the Constitution makers .Das ;fclg. C. J. were out to curb will continue to be rampant and unabated. This view is also subjected to some of the other criticisms mentioned in connection with the other views of the Explanation. As we have already stated, we do not desire, on this occasion, to express any opinion on the validity claimed for or the infirmities imputed to any of these several views, for, in our opinion, it is not necessary to do so for disposing of this appeal. Whichever view is taken of the explanation it should be limited to the purpose the Constitution makers had in view when il1ey incorporated it in clause (1). It is quite obvious that it created a legal fiction. Legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose. Here the avowed purpose of the Explanation is to explain what an outside sale referred to in sub-clause (a) is. The judicial decisions referred to in the dissenting judgment in The State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shannwgha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (supra) at pp. 81 and 82 and the case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Fin.cbury Borough Council(') clearly indicate that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it was created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. It should further be remembered that the cle>minant, if not the sole, purpose of article 286 is to place restrictions on the legislative powers of the States, subject to certain conditions in some cases and with that end in view article 286 imposes several bans on the taxing power of the States in relation to sales or purchases viewed from different angles and according to their different aspects. In some cases the ban is absolute as, for example, with regard to outside sales covered by clause (!)(a) read with the Explanation, or with regard to imports and exports .covered by .clause ( 1)(b) and in som.e cases it is conT 11' Btng•l

(!) L. R. 195~ A.C. 109. 132.

2 S.C.R.

ditional, e.g., in the cases of inter-State sales or purchases under clause (2) which is, in terms, made subject to the proviso thereto and also to the power of Parliament to lift the ban. Again, in some cases the bans may overlap but nevertheless, they are distinct and independent of each othec The operative provisions of the several parts of article 286, namely, clause (l)(a), clause (l)(b), clause (2) and clause (3) are manifestly intended to deal with different topics and, therefore, one cannot be projected or read into another. On a careful and anxious consideration of the matter in the light of the fresh arguments advanced and discussions held on the present occasion we are definitely of the opinion that the Explanation in clause ( l) (a) cannot be legitimately extended to clause (2) either as an exception or as a proviso thereto or read as curtailing or limiting the ambit of clause (2). Indeed, in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (fodia) Ltd. (supra) at pp. 1083-1084 and again at p. 1086 the majority judgment also accepted the position that the Explanation was not an exception or proviso either to clause (l)(a) or to clause (2). If, therefore, the Explanation cannot be read into clause (2) because of the express language of the Explanation and also because of the difference in the subject-matter of the operative provisions of the two clauses, then it must follow that, except in so far as Parliament may by law provide otherwise, no State law can impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or purchases when such sales or purchases take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and irrespective of whether such sales or purchases do or do not fall within the Explanation. It is not necessary, for the purposes of this appeal, to enter upon a discussion as to what is exactly meant by inter-State trade or commerce or by the phrase "in the course of", for it is common ground that the sales or purchases made by the appellant company which are sought to be taxed by the State of Bihar actually took place in the course of inrer-State trade or commerce. Parliament not having by law otherwise provided, no State law <;an, therefore, tax these sales or purchases, that is

The Benial ·Jm.,unity Com;a11y Limited T lie State of Bihar . •nd •thers

Das .Mz. c. J.

[1955]

to say, Bihar cannot tax by reason of clause (2) although they fall within the Explanation and other States cannot tax by reason of both clause ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation and clause (2). This conclusion The Siat1 of Bihar lead us now to consider the arguments by which the and oth1rs respondent State and the intervening States which Dos A.ctg. C. J. support the respondent State seek to get over this position. In the forefront is placed the argument that found favour with the majority of the Bench which decided the case of The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.· (supra). That argument is to be found in the majority judgment at pp. 1085-1086. Shortly put, the majority opinion was that the operation of clause (2) stood excluded as a result of the legal fiction enacted in the Explanation. In their view the effect of the Explanation in regard to inter-State dealings was to invest what, in truth, was an inter-State transaction with an int'ra-State character in relation to the State of delivery and clause (2) could, therefore, have no application. They recognised that the legal fiction was to operate "for the purposes of subclause (a) of clause ( 1)" and that that meant merely that the Explanation was designed to explain the meaning of the expression "outside the State" in clause (1) (a). They, nevertheless, came to the conclusion that when once it was determined with the aid of the fictional test that a particular sale or purchase had taken place within the taxing State, it followed as a corollary, that the transaction lost its inter-State character and fell outside the purview of clause (2), not because the fiction created by the Explanation was used for the purpose of clause (2), but because such sale or purchase became, in the eye of the law, a purely local transaction. In his own inimitable language the learned Chief Justice, who wrote and delivered the majority judgment, concluded the discussion on this point by saying that the statutory fiction completely masked the inter-State character of the sale or purchase which, as a collateral result of such masking, fell outside the scope of clause (2). In spite of the great respect we always entertain for the The Beng1d Immunity Comp11ny Limited

2 S.C.R.

op1ruons of the then learned Chief Justice and the other learned Judges who constituted the majority we are unable to accept the aforesaid arguments or the conclusions as correct for the reasons we now proceed to state. The situs of an intangible concept like a sale can only be fixed notionally by the application of artificial tules i11vented either by Judges as part of the judgemade law of the land.. or by some legislative authority. Bur a< far as we know, no fixed rule of universal application has yet been definitely and finally evolved for determining this for all purposes. There are many conflicting theories: One, which is more popular and frequently put forward and is referred to :irid m:iy, indeed, be urged to have been adopted bv the Constitution in the non-obstante clause of the F:xplanation, favours the place where the property in the goods passes, another which is said to be the American view and which was adopted in G. Govindaraju/11 Naidu & Co. v. The State of Madras( 1 ) fixes upon the place where the contract is concluded, a third which prevails in the continental countries of Europe prefers the place where the goods sold are actually deliYered, a tourth ooims to the place where the essential ingredients which go to make up a sale are most densely grouped. In this situation if the Explanation were not there and the ban under clause (2) were to be raised unconditionally it would become necessary for the Courts to reach a conclusion and choose between these conflicting views. Article 286( 1)(a), it should be noted, does not say that an inside sale mav be taxed. It only says that no outside sale shall be ta~ed. Now if a State claims that the sale is inside because part of its ingredients lies within its boundaries, by the same logic it is also an outside sale because the remaining parts are outside its territories and if it is an outside sale it cannot be taxed whether or not it can be deemed to be mside for some particular purpose. The prohibition of article 286(1)(a) is against taxing an outside sale and if the sale is outside even partially it may well be argued that no State legislature can (I) A.LR. 1953 Mad. 116. 4-84 S. C. India/59.

1955·

Th• Ben.~a/ Immunity Compa11y L1'mitld

The State of Bihar and others Das Actg. C. J-

The Bengal

linmunity Company Limittd

,-

T h6 Stall of Bihar and ot/;e's

Das Act:. C.J.

f19551

override the Constitution by deeming it to be an ir._s;de sale. Therefore, if the last of the aforesaid theories were to be adopted, then either no State would be able to tax, or all having the requisite nexus would be able to do so. But this, in our opinion, is the very mischief which the Constitution makers wished to avoid and that, as we understand the ·majority iudgmcnt in the Bombay case, was their view also. So that view can be placed on one side. On any one of the other views the situs would have to be fixed artificially in one place ancl then one would have to apply the logic of the majority decision and hold that as soon as the situs is determined to be in one place by judicial fiction, i.e., a fiction enunciated by judicial decision, the interState character of the transaction must cease. The majority hold that this is the result when the situs is placed in only one State, namely, the delivery State, because of the fiction which the Explanation creates. The same result would have to follow logically if the situs were to be established by judicial fiction instead of by a constitutional one. The reasoning of the majority, pushed to its logical conclusion, will inevitably lead us to hold that all inter-State transactions must eventually be converted into intra-State transactions and, therefore, become amenable to the taxing power of the State within whose territories they are, by the constitutional or judicial fiction, to be deemed . to take place. In this view there will remain no inter-State transaction on which clause (2) may possibly operate. The argument which leads to this astounding conclusion has only to be stated to be rejected. The truth is that what is an interState sale or purchase continues to be so irrespective of the State where the sale is to be located either under the general law when it is finally determined what the general law is or by the fiction created by the Explanation. The situs of a sale or purchase is wholly irrelevant as regards its inter-State character. We find no cogent reason in support of the argument that a fiction created for certain definitely expressed purposes, namely, the purposes of clause (1) (a) can legitimately be used for the entirely foreign and

'

2 S.C.R.

collateral purpose of destroying the inter-State character of the transaction and converting it into an intraState sale or purchase Such metamorphosis appears to us to be beyond the purpose and purview of ciause (l)(a) and the Explanation thereto. When we apply a fiction all we do is to assume that the situation created by the fiction is true. Therefore, the same consequences must flow from the fiction as would have flown had the facts supposed to be true been the actual facts from the start. Now, even when the situs of a sale or purchase is in fact inside a State, with no essential ingredient taking place outside, nevertheless, if it takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, it will be hit by clause (2). If the sales or purchases are in the course of inter-State trade or commerce the stream of inter-State trade or commerce will catch up in its vortex all such sales or purchases which take place in its course wherever the situs of the sales or purchases may be. All that the Explanation does is to shift the situs from point A in the stream to point X also in the stream. It does not lift the sales or purchases out of the stream in those cases where they form part of the stream. The shifting of the situs of a sale or purchase from its actual situs under the general law to a fictional situs under the Explanation takes the sale or purchase out of the taxing power of all States other than the State where the situs is fictionally fixed. That is all that clause (1) (a) and the Explanation do. Whether the delivery State will be entitled to tax such a sale or purchase will depend on the other provisions of the Constitution. The assignment of a fictional situs to a sale or purchase has no bearing or effect on the other aspects of the sale or purchase, e.g., its inter-State character or its export or import character which are entirely different topics. This fixing of a situs for a sale or purchase in any particular State either under the general law or under the fiction does not conclude the matter. It has yet to be ascertained whether that sale or purchase which by virtue of the Explanation has taken place in the delivery State was made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. For this

The Bengal Immunity Company Limited

The State of Bihar and others Das Actg. C.J.

-, 6). The Bengal Immunity Company Limited

Tht State of Bihar and others Das .4.ct.!!. C.J.

[1955]

purpose the Explanation can have no relevancy or Jpplication at all. Another argument adumbrated m the majority judgment in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) at p. 1081 and at pp. 1086-1087 and elaborated before us is that just as the freedom of trade referrod to in article 301 has been made to give way to the States' power of 1mposmg nondiscriminatory taxes by article . 304 so must article 286(2) be regarded as subject to the States' taxing power, for the protection of article 286(2) could not have been intended to be larger. This argument was refuted by the dissenting judgment in that Bombay case (supra) at pp. 1102-1103 and p. 1127 and also by the dissenting judgment in The State of TravancoreCochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (supra) at p. 89. Nothing that we have heard on the present occasion induces us to depart from the views expressed on this subject in those dissenting judgments. It is next urged that the Explanation in effect operates as an exception or a proviso to clause (2). This view runs directly counter to the express language of the Explanation itself. So the argument is formulated in a slightly different way. It is said that clause (2) contains the enunciation of the general rule and the Explanation embodies a particular or special rule. According to a cardinal rule of construction the particular or special rule must control or cut down the general rule. This view was adopted by the High Court in the judgment under appeal and also found favour with one of the Judges in the Bombay case (supra). It appears to us that this argument overlooks the basic fact that clause (I) (a) to which is appended the Explanation and clause (2) deal with Jilferent topics altogether. The Explanation is concemed with explaining what is an outside sale or purchase by fixing a fictional situs. It cannot be read as a provision independent of clause (!)(a). It does not, by itself and in terms, confer any legislative power on anv State. It is true that the Explanation may apply to fix the situs of many inter-State transactions but that is only for ascertaining. for the

2 S.C.R.

purposes of clause (l)(a), whether it has taken place in side or outside a particular State. The inter-State aspect of the sales or purchases is not within the purview of clause (l)(a) which looks at sales or purchases from the point of view of their location only. Clause (2), on the other hand, takes note of the interState character of sales or purchases which is an entirely different topic. The two provisions do not relate to the same subject and, therefore, it is not possible to hold that one is the enunciation of a general rule and the other the enunciation of a particular or special rule on one and the same subject. The principle of construction relied upon cannot, in our opinion, be called in aid in construing clause (2) and the Explanation of clause (l)(a). If the Explanation cuts down clause (2), it must also, on a parity of reasoning, cut down clause (3) which, as will hereinafter be explained more fully, could not possibly have been intended by the Crmstitution makers. lt must also cut down clause ( 1) (b) dealing with import an<l export; but to hold that would run counter to the decision in State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. The Bombay Co. Ltd.( 1 ). In our opinion to use the Explanation to cut down the operation of clause (2) or clause (3) will be to us.~ it for a purpose other than its legitimate' and avowed purpose. The same argument is put in a slightly different way and in a more attractive form. It is said that we must construe article' 286. as a whole and give meaning to every part of it. Sales or purchases which fall within the Explanation to clause (1) (a) clearly partake of the character of inter-State transactions. Therefore, if we construe clause (2) of article 286 literally and strictly then the whole of clause (1) (a) and the Explanation will be redundant and useless and will have no immediate operation and will remain a dead letter, at any rate, until Parliament, in exercise of its powers under clause (2), lifts the ban. We must, it is urged, make an attempt to avoid such a result and adopt such a construction as will not only · give effect to each part of the article but also make each . part (I) [195°) 3 S.C.R. 1112.

The Bengal Immunity Company Limi1t~

"·

The Stale of Billa• and others

Das Act.~. C.].

The &ngal . Immunity Company Limited

The State of Bihar ant[ others

Das Actg. C.J.

(1955)

applicable in presenti. That, it is pointed out, can well be done if clause (2) is interpreted in a restricted manner. The argument runs-give full and immediate. effect to the Explanation and then leave clause (2) to govern or operate on cases which do not fall within the Explanation. In effect this argument means that we must treat all transactions of sales or purchases falling within the Explanation as outside clause (2). Shorn of its thin veneer of disguise this argument is nothing more than the argument that the Explanation, in effect, operates as an exception to clause (2) and all the cnttmms applicable to to that construction will apply mutatis mutandis the argument in the present form. Apart from that there are obvious fallacies which render the argument utterly unacceptable. We now proceed to deal with these fallacies seriatim. (i) In the first place, the mere circumstance that a provision in the Constitution will, on a proper cof!struction, take effect on the happening of a future event can, by itself, be no ground for not giving effect to the plain language of that provision. Take the very next provision in article 286 itself, namely, clause It has no present application and its usefulness (3). will ensue only when Parliament by law declares certain goods to be essential for the life of the community. The fact that the Explanation, in so far as it relates to inter-State sales, may nor have an immediate operation until Parliament lifts the ban under clause (2) need not unnecessarily oppress us or lead us to adopt a forced construction only to give the whole of it an immediate and present operation. (ii) In the second place, it is not correct to say that the Explanation, construed as suggested above, can have no immediate operation at all. It certainly has immediate operation to render sales and purchases which fall within the explanal:!on to be outside sales and purchases so as immediately to take away the taxing power of all States other than the delivery State with respect to them. Further cases ma,y arise in which purchases or sales which are outside clause (2)_ may, nevertheless, fall within and be immediately

2S.C.R.

governtd by the Explanation. We do not wish to ex-· press any opm1on on . )'ypothetical cases but the following illustration will show that on a given view of the law . the Explanation would be called into play d~spite tbe' fact that clause (2) . was not attraded. Take, for instance, a case where both the seller and the buyer reside and carrv on business in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab. Let us say that the seller has a godown in the State of Delhi where his goods are stored and that the buyer has also a retail shop at Connaught Circus also in the State of Delhi. The ' buyer and the seller enter into a contract at Gurgaon for the sale of certain goods and a term of the contract is that the goods contracted to be sold will be actually delivered from the seller's godown to the buyer's retail shop, both in the State of Delhi, for consumption in the State of Delhi. Pursuant to this contract made in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab, the buyer pavs the full price of the goods at Gurgaon and the seller hands over to the buyer - also at Gurgaon a delivery order addressed to the seller's godown-keeper in Delhi to deliver the goods to the buyer's retail shop. As a direct result of this sale the seller's gcxlown-keeper, on the presentation of this delivery order, actually deliver_s the goods to the buyer's retail shop at Connaught ~ircus for consumption in the State of Delhi. On one view of the law, the situs of such a sale would be Gurgaon. We need not decide that it is, because that type of case is not before us and there may be other views to consider, but it is certainly a possible view. It is also possible to hold that this is not inter-State trade or commerce, because there is no movement of goods across a State boundary. Again, we need not decide that because that also may be controversial. But given these two postulates the transaction would fall squarely within the Explanation and yet it would not come within clause (2), for there is no movement of the goods acrrn the border of any State and both the seller and the buyer are in the same place. Surely, the Explanation will, in presenti, govern such cases irrespective of whether Parliament has lifted the ban under clause

The Bengal Immunity Company Limited

,..

Thi Stat; of Bih"' and othtr.r

Das Artg. C.J.

The Benpal immunity

Company Limikd TM State of Bihcr and othLrs

Dm ..4.cl.(· C.J.

[19551

(2). It these postulates are accepted then by virtue of clause ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation the State of Delhi alone will be entitled to impose a tax on such a sale or purchase and the State of Punjab will be precluded from doing so bv reason of the fictional sitt<S assigned to such a sale or purchose by the Explanation, although the contract was made, price was paid and symbolical or constructive delivery of the goods by the handing over of the delivery order took place in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab. (iii) It is not correct to say that ciause (l)(a) read with the Explanation is wholly useless .. It may well be argued that there was scope for the operation of clause (!)(a) and the Explanation as and when the President exercised the powers vested in him by the Proviso to clause (2). It will be noticed that under that proviso the President's order was to take effect "notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause". This non obstante clause does not, in terms, supersede clause (1) at all and, therefore, prima facie, the President's order was subject to the prohibition of clause (I) (a) read with the Explanation. It is, however, pointed out that the proviso says that any tax which was being lawfully levied by the States immediately before the commencement of the Constitution will continue to be levied .until the date therein specified. It is said that before the Constitution sales tax was levied bv the different States on the basis of the nexus theory irrespective of the situs of the sales or purchases and. therefore, this very proviso clearly indicates that the intention of the Constitution makers was that all taxes imposed on the basis of the nexus theorv must continue irrespective of the provisions of the Explanation which fictionally fixes the situs of the sales or purchases in the delivery State. The argument is not without some force but cannot prevail. It is true that the different States used to levy sales tax on the basis of slight nexus but the legality ,of them had not, at the date of the Constitution, been tested in a Court of law. Therefore, the proviso authorised the President by order to continue only such of them as were

2S.C.R.

being "lawfully" levied and consequently there is no reason to think. that the President's order was intended to continue all sales taxes previously ":}e.yie<l irrespective of their legality. In the next place, there is nothing to be surprised at if the President's qrder was made to operate subject to the prohibition of ~lause (1) (a) read with the Explanation. Finally, to · accede to this argument must mean that we must read into the proviso s0mething which is not there. To give effect to this argument we shall have to alter the non obstante clause towards the end of the proviso and substitute the Words "of the foregoing clauses" for the words "of this clause". However, we need not rest our decision on this point. It will certainly operate as soon as Parliament, in exercise of the power vested in it by clause (2), lifts the ban imposed on the States. Upon the lifting of the ban by Parliament those inter-State sales or purchases which fall within the Explanation will, by virtue of it, he deemed to take place within the delivery State and such sales or purchases being, as a re-suit of such fiction, outside all other States none of them will be entitled to tax such sales or purchases. Whether the delivery State will be entitled to make a law imposing tax on such sales or purchases in exercise of the legislative powers vested in it by article 24o (3) read with Entry 54 in Lisr II or whether Parliament, while lifting the ban, may also by the same law authorise the delivery State to do so or what is the extent of the authority vested in Parliament by the opening words of clause (2) are questions which will arise for consideration only after the ban under clause (2) is lifted and we need not in advance express any opinion on a foture problem. (iv) If we accept the argument that we are to give full effect to clause (I) (a) and the Explanation and let it operate immediately on all transactions which come within their terms and leave clause (2) to govern only those cases which are outside clause (l)(a) read with the Explanation then, on a parity of reawning, we shall have to give effect to clause (l)(a) and the Explanation and leave clause ( 1) (b) and also clause (3) to govern only those cases which do not

The Bengal Immunity Company Limited The State of Biho1 and others Das Act.~. C. J.

'.i-M Btnga/ lnununity Co111pan_v Limited

T!it Slate of Bihar and olhtrs Das Actg. C. J.

[1955}

fall within c.lause ( 1)(a) read with the Explanation. To illustrate this point, take clause (3). Suppose under clause (3) Parliament by law declare' certain goods, say wheat, to. be essential for the lite of the community. Suppose there is a sale of such essential goods by a seller in the State of Delhi to a buyer in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab in which as a direct result of such sale the goods are delivered in Gurgaon in Punjab for consumption in that State. According to the argument we have to give full efkct first to clause ( 1)(a) and the Explanati::>n and accordingly we must hold that the transaction is wholly covered by the Explanation and, therefore, Punjab will be entitled to tax it and clause (3) must be left to govern only cases other than those which fall within the Explanation. If the argument were sound it must follow that the State of Punjab will be perfectly justified in saying that for the purpose of making a law imposing a tax on such sales or purchases its law need not be reserved for the assent of the President at all. It may well say that the restrictive requirements of reserving the bill for the President" s assent and of obtaining such assent before the law n:iay take effect apply only to a law which imposes tax on sales or. purchases which are outside the Explanation. In other words, the State of Punjab, in our illustratioo, will be entitled to ,:ay that clause (3) governs only those cases of sales or purchases of essential goods which do not come within the description mentioned in the Explanation, namely, for instance, only those sales or purchases in which essential goods are delivered in a State not for consumption in that State but for re-export to another State. This will rob clause (3) of practically the best part of its content and, therefore, of its usefulnes• and defeat• the very purpose the. Constitution makers obviously had of safeguarding sales or purchases of essential commodities by imposing the restriction requiring the reservation of the bill for the President's assent and the obtaining of such assent. When a famine is raging in say Punjab, and . sales and purchases are made of wheat which is declared as essential

2 S.C.R.

to the life of the community and as a direct result of such sale wheat is delivered in the Punjab for consumption there the State of Punjab may, according to the reasoning underlying the argument, put up the price of these essential goods by imposing a sales tax by making a law to that effect and ignoring the safeguards prescribed by clause (3). An argument which leads us to a result so utterly absurd and untenable in reason cannot for a moment be countenanced. No less than five reasons have been suggested in support of the argument that a restricted construction should be placed on clause (2) of article 286. It will be convenient to deal with them at this stage one by one. (a) In the first place, it is urged that clause (2) should be construed in a restricted way because the class of sales falling within article 286(l)(a) forms a special class of inter-State sales and they cannot be affected by the general provisions of article 286( 2). This argument totally overlooks the real scheme of article 21:16. It fails to note that bv this article the Constitution makers were imposing 'restrictions on the taxing power of the States with respect to sales or purchases in their diff.:rent aspects viewed from entirely different angles which we h<,ve heretofore already explained. The subject-matters of the different parts of article 286 are, therefore, different and distinct and the principle of interpretation, namely, the special provision cutting down the general provision cannot be properly invoked. (b) The second reason urged is that if article 286(2) applies to the class of sales or purchases falling within article 286(l)(a) then it will result in discrimination against local trade and in favour of interState trade and this will be inconsistent with the provisions of Part XII I of the Constitution. It is said that when a Bihar dealer sells certain goods to a Bihar purchaser the former is obliged to pay sales tax which he passes on to the 'Bihar purchaser but when the Bihar purchaser directly imports into Bihar similar goods from say a West Bengal dealer for consump-

The Bm.~al

lmmunily Compariy Limited

The-Stale ef Bihar "nd others Das Actg. C. J.

The Bengal

lmnnmipi

Company Limited ·v, Thi Stt:ttt of Bihar and others Das Act,g. C. J.

[1955]

tion in Bihar that transaction will not be liable to Bihar Sales Tax as it will be an inter-State transaction. This, it is said, will prejudice the Bihar seller for all Bihar purchasers will then be driven to purchasing goods from out-of-State sellers and local producers will suffer a set back. The argument is that as a literal construction of clause (2) will result in such discrimination against local trade, the cardinal rule of interpretation, namely, reading the written provision literally ancl giving to the words their ordinary natural meaning should give way to a restricted construction. This argument overlooks several basic things. lf there is any real hardship of the kind refened to, there is Parliament which is expressly invested with the power of lifting the ban under clause (2) either wholly or to the extent it thinks fit to do. Why should the Court be called upon to discard the cardinal rule of interpretation for mitigating a hardship, which after all may be entirely fanciful, when the Constillltion itself has expressly provided for another authority more competent to c:.valuate the correct position to do the needful? This argument also fails to take into account the benefit which the consuming public derives from the free flow of goods from one State to another resulting in lower prices. Further, the argument overlooks the fact that the se>-called hardship, if any, is brought about, not really by reason of the liberal construction of clause (2) but by reason of the State of Bihar imposing a sales tax on an intra-State transaction. The State of Bihar is not obliged to levy a sales tax on sales or purchases of goods in respect of which there is competition between out-of-State producers, manufacturers and dealers and the Bihar producers, manufacturers and dealers and, indeed, if it intends to encourage its local manufac!llrers or producers it should not do so. It will not do for the State of Bihar to say that it must levy a sales tax on intra-State sales or purchases which it is not obliged to do and at the same time that it must protect the Bihar dealers or producers and enable them to compete With outside dealets or producers and, therefore, ask us to construe the

2 S.C.R.

Constitution in an unnatural way so as to enable it to have the best of both worlds. It is immediately retorted that the welfare State must have sufficient revenue to run itself, that if it is to forego sales tax its economy will be totally upset. This harrowing picture of economic collapse of the States has been pressed upon this Court on this as on the previous occasion and it evidently oppressed the minds of the Judges who were parties to the majority decision. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the matter a little more closely. Ordinarily, inter-State trade or commerce is done between a dealer in one State and a dealer in another State. The dealer in the consuming State in his turn sells the goods in retail to actual consumers. There can be no objection to insisting upon all inside dealers getting themselves registered and submitting returns showing goods imported and sold by them and bringing their annual turnovers to tax which they will pass on to the actual consumers. Call it a purchase tax vis-a-vis the earlier transaction under which the goods were delivered in Bihar for consumption in that State or call it a sales tax vis-a-vis the subsequent local sales by the Bihar dealer to actual consumers in Bihar, the State will get the full revenue on these local sales or purchases from the local · sellers. There can be no doubt that sales or purchases of this kind to or from one dealer to another dealer actually form the bulk of inter-State trade or commerce. To take them out of clause (2) will be to make the protection of inter-State trade or commerce wholly illusory and to rob clause (2) of the best part of its content and utility. Ordinarily individual local consumers buy goods in the local market and do not generally bring goods for their personal consumption from outside dealers. It is only in exceptional cases that a local consumer will be energetic enough to bring goods from outside the State for his consumption and their number will be small. It is only those stray individual consumers who are energetic enough to get goods direct from a dealer in another State and may be willing to pay freight, etc.. and undertake the risk of loss or damage who may ev<!de

The Bengal Immuni!Y Company L1miltd Tho State of Bihat and others

Das Actg. C. ].

The Btnial Immuni!J Compan_'I' Limited Th.t State of Bihar and others Das Ac

ti. C. J.

[1955]

the tax. The difficulty in tracing such stray actual local consumers cannot be any cogent reason for adopting the unnatural construction sought to be put upon clause (2) of article 286. If big Bihar purchasers, e.g., Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., who are very heavy consumers of coal, prefer to get their supply of coal from Ranigunge coal fields in West Bengal for consumption in their large factories at Tatanagar in Bihar to getting their supplies from the Jharia coal fields in Bihar and thereby evade sales tax to the detriment of the revenues of the State of Bihar, then again there is Parliament to mitigate such hardship by malting suitable laws in exercise of its power under article 286(2). Such supposed hardship is, in our view, no ground for putting a forced and unnatural interpretation upon article 286. ( c) The third reason in support of a restricted construction of article 286(2) is thus formulated : The purpo~ of article 286 being to eliminate multiple taxation and article 286( 1)(a) having already achieved that purpose with regard to the class falling within the Explanation, it was no longer necessary for that purpose to apply article 286(2) to that class. This reasoning appears to us to be untenable. It overlooks the patent fact that the different parts of the article look upon sales and purchases from different perspectives and place different bans on the taxing power of the States at different angles. The circumstance that the bans may in given cases overlap is no justification for concluding that the subject-matter of th~ different provisions is the sanie. This line of reasoning assumes that the only purpose of article 286 is to eliminate multiple taxation. The purposes of the different parts of the article have to be ascertained from the language of the article itself read in the light of the contemporary history of the legislative activities of the different States with respect to taxes on sales or purchases of goods' and the chaos and confusion that arose and the havoc that ensued as a result of those activities. There was multiple taxation which imposed a heavy burden on the consumers and which was also calculated to impede and hinder the free flow of inttt•

>

>

2 S.C.R.

State trade or commerce. The Constitution makers, therefore, imposed several bans on the taxing power of the States with respect to sales or purchases, namely, first on the basis of their situs, secondly and thirdly on the basis of the character of the transactions,, e.g., foreign trade or inter-State trade and fourthly on the basis of the nature or quality of the goods sold or purchased, i.e., whether they have been declared to be essential to the life of the community. As regards inter-State trade or commerce the clear intention of the Constitution makers was to place an absolute ban for the time being, subject to the proviso, and to give some time to Parliament to study the situation and to evaluate the result of the ban and to lift the ban to such extent as it thought fit in the interest of the general public and that of interStatc trade or commerce. If the matter is approached in this way it becomes abundantly clear that this part of the argument we arc now considering proceeds on a wrong assumption of the purpose of the Constitution. (d) A restricted construction of article 286(2) is said to he necessary and called for because the Constitution itself has divided inter-State sales or purchases into two categories and in regard to one class it has itself provided both as to which State will tax them and under what condition and in regard to the other class the Constitution has imposed a ban in general terms and granted power to Parliament in general terms to relax such ban as Parliament thinks fit. This is clearly begging the question and does not require any elaborate refutation. ( e) Another string to the bow is that because of the legal fiction created by the Explanation the interState sales or purchases were converted into intraState transactions. This, it will he recalled, was the reasoning adopted in the majority decision in 'I' he State Qf Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra). We are unable to accept this argument for the reasons given above which need not be repeated here. It is said that the picture of harassment and inconvenience to the traders referred to in the dissenting

The Bmga/ lmm1111i!J Company L1mittd The Slate of Bihflr a•d othlr.< Das Actg. C. J.

The Bengal lmmtmit)'

Company Limit~d

Th! State of Bihar

and others l),l r Actg. C. 7.

[1955\

judgments is more imaginary than real. It is pointed out that it is only big traders who will have sales of .their goods in all the · States in the Union of India. Those big traders maintain a large staff of clerks and a.:countants and there can be no difficulty if they are ubliged to file returns in each State where they sell their goods. This argument overlooks the practical effects of the different sales tax laws enacted by different States. All big traders will have to get themselves registered in each State, study the Sales Tax Acts of each State, conform to the requirements of all State laws which are by no means uniforms and, finally, may be simultaneously called upon to produce their-books of account in support of their rd:lJrns before the officers of each State. Anybody who has any practical experience of the working of the sales tax laws of the different States knows how iong books are detained by the officers of each State during assessment proceedings. There are different stages of these proceedings, original, appellate and revisional and there will be as many proceedings under each heading as there are States where the goods are sold. The harassment to traders is quite obvious and needs no exaggeration. On the other hand if any risk to the economy of the States ensues from the construction of anicle 286 which commends itself to us, the appeal must be to Parliament which can by law made under the opening words of clause (2) mitigate that risk. For all the foregoing reasons we are definitely of opinion that, until Parliament by law made in exercise of the powers vested in it by clause (2) provides otherwise, no State can impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or purchases of goods when such sales or purchases take place m the course of inter-State trade or commerce and the majority decision ir: Tlie State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) in so far as it decides to the contrary cannot be accepted as well founded on principle or auth<>rity. In the view we have taken on ~uestion (A) it is not nece;sary for us, on this occasion, to discuss the other questions (B), '(C) or (D}. All that remains to

2 S.C.R.

be seen is whether as a result of our finding on question (A) the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 is ultra vires and void in its entirety or it is only bad in so far as it seeks to impose a sales tax on out-of-State sellers in respect of inter-State sales or purchases: This will depend on whether the objectionable parts of the Act are severable from the rest of its provisions. It will be necessary here to refer to a few provisions of the Act. The long title of the Act is "An Act to provide for the levy of a tax on sales of goods in Bihar". The preamble recites that "It is necessary to make an addition to the revenues of Bihar and for that purpose to impose a tax on the sale of goods in Bihar". The Act extends to the whole of the State of Bihar. "Dealer" was originally defined in section 2(c) as meaning: "any person who sells or supplies any goods in Bihar whether for commission, · remuneration or otherwise and includes any firm or a Hindu joint family and anv society, club or association which sells or supplies goods to its members". By the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 the words "in Bihar" were omitted from this definition. Clause (g) of the same section defines sale. That definition has undergone various changes from time to time. The period we are concerned with in this appeal is from 26th January 1950 to the 30th September 1951. Between 1st October 1948 and 31st March 1951 which covers the earlier part of the relevant period the clause stood as follows :"Sale" means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge: Provided that a transfer of goods on hire-purchase or other instalment system of payment shall, notwithst:inding the fact that the seller retains a title 5-84 S. C. lndia/59

Till &tiff"

Co~

Thi Stall of Biltar and othm

Das A•tg. C. J.

Th• Bengal lmmunif.1 Company Limited

Tk1 Stau of Bi/1at and others

Dai Actg. C. J.

[1955]

to any goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed to be a sale : Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (III of 193'b), the sale of any goods(i) which are actually in Bihar at the time when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, or (ii) which are produced or manufactured in Bihar by the producer or manufacturer thereof, shall, wherever the delivery or contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken place in Bihar : Provided further that the sale of goods in respect 0£ a forward contract, whether goods under such contract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery". This definition was amended and between the !st April 1951 and the 31st March 1952 which covers the latter part of the relevant period it read as follows:" 'sale' means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for 'cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge: Provided that a transfer of goods on hire purcha<e or other instalment system of payment shall, notwithstanding the fact that the seller retains a title to any goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed to be a sale : Provided further that the sale of goods in respect of a forward contract, whether goods under such contract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery. Explanation.-The sale of any goods actually delivered in Bihar as a direct result of such sale for the purpuse of consumption in Bihar shall be deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in

•

2 S.C.R.

Bihar, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods, the property in the goods has, by reason of such sale, passed in another State". It will be noted that the Explanation which is substantially a reproduction of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) was introduced for the first time by this amendment. "Turn over" is defined in section 2(i). The charging section is .section 4 which provides, amongst other things, that subject to the provisions of sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 and with effect from the commencement of the Act every dealer whose gross turn over during the year immediately preceding the date of such commencement on sales which have taken place both in and outside Bihar exceeds Rs. 10,000 shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on sales which have taken place in Bihar and from the date of such commencement. It will be noticed that although the long title and the preamble refer to the sale of goods in Bihar the words "in Bihar" were deleted from the definition of the word "sat::" in section 2(g). There are various provisions for working out the scheme of the Act to which no detailed reference need be made. It may, however, be pointed out that a new section was inserted by the Adaptation of Laws (Third Amendment) Order, 1951 which substantially reproduced the provisions of article 286(1) and (2). Although, therefore, the charging section read with the definition of "dealer" and "sale" may be wide enough to cover inter-State sales, the new section 33 makes all those provisions subject to its provisions which are nothing but a reproduction of th<; corresponding provisions of article 286. In view of the interpretation we have put upon article 286 it must follow that the charging section of the Act r.ead with the relevant definitions cannot operate to tax inter-State sales or purchases and it must be held that as Parliament has not otherwise provided, the Act, in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases that take place in the course of interState trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal and void. This being the position the question arises

T Ill Bmgal

Immunity

Compa'!Y Limilld T Ill Stall of Bihar and ot/llrs

Das Actg. C.J.

Thi Bmgal lmmuttil Compaf!1

.cY..ma

Thi SlaU

.r Bi/uJr

and others

Dos Aclg. C.J.

[1955]

whether the Act is bad in toto or is bad only in so far as it offends the provisions of article 286 as construed above. It appears to us that the Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but does not exclude in express terms subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be declared wholly ultra vires and void, for it is feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those levied on exempted subjects and to exclude the latter in the assessment of the tax. In these circumstances it is difficult to say that the scheme of taxing interState sales forms such an integral part of the entire scheme of taxation on sales or purchases of goods as to be inextricably interwoven with it. There is no reason to presume that had the Bihar Legislature known that the provisions of the Act might be held bad in so far as they imposed or authorised the imposition of a tax on inter-State trade or commerce even though Parliament had not by law provided otherwise it would, nevertheless, not have passed the rest of the Act. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed and we issue an order directing that, until Parliament by law provides otherwise, the State of Bihar do forbear and abstain from imposing sales tax on out-of-State dealers in respect of sales or purchases that have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce even though the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such sales or purchases for consumption in Bihar. The State must pay the costs of the appellant in this Court and in the Court below. The interveners must bear and pay their own costs. BHAGWATI J.-I agree with the reasoning and the ·conclusions reached in the judgment just delivered by my Brother S. R. Das. In so far however as I was a party to the judgment in The State of Bombay and Another· v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and Others(') it is but proper that I should record my reasons for doing so. (I) [t95Sl s.c.R. 1069.

2 S.C.R.

The Appellant is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act having its registered office at No. 153, Dharamtala Street, Calcutta and laboratory and factory at Baranagar in the District of 24 Parganas in West Bengal and carrying on business of manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines, etc., in Calcutta. The Appellant has extensive sales of its products throughout the whole of the Union of India and the goods are despatthed by the Appellant from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted at Calcutta and all sales take place within the State of West Bengal. The Appellant has no offices, agents, · managers, godowns or laboratories in the State of Bihar. It is not a resident of Bihar nor has a place of business in Bihar and does not enter into any transaction of sale within the State of Bihar. On the 24th October 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, headquarters Patna, wrote to the Appellant to get itself registered under .the Bihar Sales Tax Act and to take necessary steps to deposit the Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar treasury at an early date, contending that all sales in West Bengal in which the goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purpose of consumption in Bihar were leviable to Bihar Sales Tax with effect from the 26th January 1950. The Appellant denied the right of the State of Bihar to tax the sales effected in West Bengal and by his letter dated the 18th December 1951 the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar sent a notice under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act to the Appellant calling upon it to apply for registration and to submit the return, showing its turn-over for the period from the 26th January 1950 to the 30th September 1951. Correspondence thereafter ensued in which both the parties made futile attempts to convince each other of the legality of the stand taken by it. The Appellant asserted that it was not liable to assessment under the Bihar Sales Tax Act and denied the authority of the State of Bihar to levy sales tax upon

Thi Bengal

Immunity

Comµny Limittd

Thi Stau qf BU!• and olhn1 Bhagwati].

[1955]

the Appellant. The Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar, ultimately by Immuni; his letter dated the 28th May 1952 rejected the conCompany LimiUd tention of the Appellant and asked it to comply with The State of Bihar the notice under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax and oth1rs Act failing which he threatened to proceed to take BhagwatiJ. steps for assessment to the best of his judgment. The Appellant thereupon by its letter dated the 7th June 1952 called upon the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar to forthwith rescind and cancel the notice issued under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act as the said notice was ultra vires of the Constitution and also the Bihar Sales Tax Act and was entirely illegal and inoperative. As the aforesaid demand was not complied with the Appellant filed in the High Court of Judicature at Patna a petition under article 226 of the Constitution asking for appropriate reliefs by way of issue of a writ of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition and any other appropriate writs or orders quashing the proceedings issued for the purpose of levying and realising a tax which was not lawfully leviable on the Appellant and asking the Appellant to file a return and register itself as a dealer. The State of Bihar, Respondent 1, The Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Patna, Respondent 2 and Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar, Respondent 3 were the opposite parties to the petition. They did not file any affidavit in reply. The facts alleged by the Appellant were not denied but arguments on questions of law arising out of the petition were addressed by the Government Pleader appearing for them before the High Court. The High Court held: (1) That the Respondent 3 was acting within his jurisdiction in issuing the notice under section 13(5) and holding that the applicant was liable to pay the tax, that if he made an assessment under section 13 (5) the Act provided a right of appeal whereby any error of law might be corrected by the Appellate authorities prescribed under the Act, that sections 24 and 25 of the Act furnished a complete and effecThe Bengal

2 S.C.R.

tive machinery for appeal and revision against assessments made under the Act and that there was therefore no warrant for issuing a writ under article 226 of the Constitution; (2) That the phrase "sale or purchase in the course of int<:,r-State trade or commerce" in article 286(2) must be construed so as to exclude the particular class of sales or purchases described in the explanation to article 286(1) and that therefore the amended clauses ( c) and (g) of section 2 and section 33 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act were not in conflict with article 286(2); (3) That the Bihar Sales Tax Act was in pith and substance not a law with respect to sale of goods but a law imposing tax on the sale of goods and the legislation fell entirely within Item 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, viz., taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers and that the Act could not therefore be said to be invalid under article .254; (4) That the Bihar Sales Tax Act had been enacted for the purpose of imposing tax on the sale of goods and not for regulating inter-State or intra-State trade and commerce and that therefore the Act did not contravene in any way article 304; and (5) That the Act was also not invalid on the ground that it was t::xtra-territorial in operation, that the jurisdiction to tax existed not only in reg-ard to persons or property but also as regards the business done within the State, that it was not necessary for the purposes of jurisdiction that the entire transaction of sale should have taken place within the territories, that on the other hand the fact that the goods were delivered in Bihar for consumption constituted sufficient nexus or territorial connection which conferred jurisdiction upon the Bihar legislature to impose the tax and that the explanation to article 286{1)(a) expressly corJerred upon the State power to tax sales or purchases of gooCls which were actually delivered for consumption inside the State. The High Court therefore dismbed the petition with

costs.

The Bengal

Immuni?

Compa1rv Limittti

Thi State q; Bihu and ethers

BhagwatiJ.

Tiii Bengal Immunil) Company Limited ;,, Ti.. Stale of Bi\IW and ot/tfrs

Bhagwati].

[1955]

The Appellant applied for leave to appeal to this Court and the High Court granted the requisite certificate under article 132( 1) of the Constitution. At the hearing of the appeal before us the State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Calcutta, the State of Madras, the State of Myso~e, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the State ot Orissa, the State of Pepsu, the State of Rajasthan, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Travancore-Cochin, the State of East Punjab and one M. K. Kuriakose applied for and were granted leave to intervene and counsel for the lnterveners appeared before us and urged their respective points of view. The first question as regards the maintainability of a petition for writ under article 226 on the facts disclosed in the petition can be disposed of very shortly in the words of Mahajan, C. J. in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. Tht: State of Madhya Pradesh & Others( 1 ) where he repelled a similar contention urged by the Advocate-General of the State of Madhya Pradesh:"The learned Advocate-General of the State ..... . . . . . . . however contended that on the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in Raleigh ln~~stment Co. v. Tht: Governor-General-in-Council( ), jurisdiction to question assessment otherwise than by use of the machinery expressly provided by the Act, was inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay, arising by virtue of the assessment and that the liability to pay the sales tax under the Act is a special liability created by the Act itself which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy which ought to be resorted to, and therefore the remedy by a writ ought not to be allowed to be used for evading the provisions of the Act, especially a fiscal Act ............. : ........... . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . In our opinion the contentions raised by the learned Advocate-General arc not well founded. It is plain that the State evinced an intention that it could certainly proceed to apply the penal provisions of the Act against the appellant if it failed to make the return or to meet tl1e demand (1) [1954] S.C.R. 1122, 1126.

(2) 74 I.A. 50.

2 S.C.R.

and in order to escape from such serious consequences threatened without authority of law, and infringing fundamental rights, relief by way of a writ of mandamus was clearly the appropriate relief. In Mohd. Yasin v. The Town Area Committee( 1 ), it was held by this Court that a licence fee on a business not only takes away the property of the licensee but also operates as a restriction on his fundamental right to carry on his business and therefore if the imposition of a licence fee is without authority of law it can be challenged by way of an application under article 32, a fortiori also under article 226. These observations have apposite application to the circumstances of the present case. Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Act having been declared ultra vires, any imposition of sales tax on the appellant in Madhya Pradesh is without the authority of law, and that being so a threat by the State by using the coercive machinery of the impugned Act to realize it from the appellant is a sufficient infringement of his fundamental right under article 19( 1)(g) and it was clearly entitled to relief under article 226 of the Constitution. The contention that because remedy under the impugned Act was available to the appellant it was disentitled to relief under article 226 stands negatived by the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.( ), above referred to. There it was held , · ~t the principle that a court will not issue a prerogative writ when an adequate alternative remedy was available could not apply where a party came to the court with an allegation that his fundamental right had been infringed and sought relief under article 226. Moreover, the remedy provided by the Act is of an onerous and burdensomr character. Before the appellant can avail of it he has to deposit the whole amount of the tax. Such a provision can hardly be described as w adequate alternative remedy". This sufficiently disposes of that contention and I am of the opinion that the High Court was in error when -- it held that there was no warrant for issuing a writ (I) [1952} S.C.R. 572.

(2) tJ'l53] S.C.R. !069.

The Bengal

Immuniry Compa'!Y Limiud

The State of Bihar and others Bhagwati].

[1955]

under article 226 of the Constitution on the facts disclosed in the appellant's petition, The Bengal lmmunif:Y On the merits Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing for Compa1iy Limited the appellant urged :Thi State of Bilzar ( 1) That article 286 put a fetter on State Legisand others lature and the explanation did not confer any BhagwatiJ. power on any State Legislature tv levy any taxes but was meant to explain only clause l(a), i.e., what was an outside sale or .purchase and that it did not remove any restrictions or fetters and did not convert any inter-State sale or purchase into an intra-State or • local or domestic tran'Saction; (2) That article 286(2) in Part XII was meant to implement the supremacy of Parliament with regard to inter-State trade or commerce and it put an embargo on the power of State Legislature to levy any tax on sale or purchase with respect to interState trade or commerce and that it was only when the embargo was lifted by appropriate Parliamentary legislation that State Legislature could levy any tax on sales or purchases in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; and (3) That legislative competence of a State Legislature was derived from article 246 read with the lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, that under article 245(2) only Parliament ·was given the power t(} enact legislation with extra-territorial operation and the State Legislatures had no such power, and that the combined effect of article 246 (3) and article 245 read' with Item 54 of List II was that the State Legislature wa~ only competent to make laws imposing tax on sale or purchase of gOods for the whole or part of that State. · The determination of these questions involves a: construction of the provisions of article 286( 1) and (2) of the Constitution and their trUe scope and effect_ These provi~ions read as follows :"Article 286. (1) No law of a State shall impose,. or . authorise the imposition of, a tax on thr> sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes. place(a) outside the State; or

...

l

2 S.C.R.

(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India. Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be <leemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been <lelivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State. (2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or pur-chase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes pbce in the course of inter-State trade or commerce : Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which w:is being lawfully le.vied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day of March, 1951". They are enacted in Part XII of the Constitution which relates to finance, property, contracts and suits and fall under the caption of 'Miscellaneous Financial Provisions'. Their main purpose is to lay down the restnct10ns on State Legislatures to enact laws imposing or authorising the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods. Article 286(1) lays down such restrictions where such sale or purchase takes place-( a) outside the State, or (b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India. Article 286(2) lays down such restrictions where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade . or commerce. Article 286(1) is hedged in with the explanation and article 286(2) is hedged in with the exception "in · so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide" and the proviso under which the President might direct that any tax which was being lawfully

The Bengal

Immunity Company Limiteif

The State ef Bihar and olhtrs Bhagwati J.

The Bengal Immunity

Company Limited

The Stat< •f Billar and other1

Bhagwati].

[1955]

levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution mav, notwithstanding the provisions of article 286(2), continue to be levied until the .31st March 1951. Except for these special dispensations the restrictions laid down by article 286(1) and (2) prevail and the true scope and extent of these restrictions would have to be culled out of the terms m which these provisions are couched. These provisions came to be considered by this Court in two cases, ( 1) The State of Bombay and Another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and others(') and (2) State of Trat/ancore-Cochin and Others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory and Others( 1 ). The first of these cases was concerned with the constitutionality of the Bombay Sales Tax Act XXIV of 1952. The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952 ultra vires the State Legislature and had issued a writ in the nature of mandamus against the State of Bombay and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, directing them to forbear and desist from enforcing the provisions of the said Act against the respondents. The main ground of attack in the High Court had been that the Act purported to tax sales and purchases of goOds regardless of restrictions imposed on the State legislative power by article 286 of the Constitution and in that connection the provisions of article 286(1) and (2) came to be considered by this Court. The majority judgment of this Court delivered by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. with which Mukhcrica, J. and Ghulam Hasan, J. concurred held that article 286(l)(a) of the (',onstitution read with the explanation thereto and construed in the light of article 301 ap.d 304 prohibits the taxation of sales or purchases involving interStatc elements by all States except the State in which the gOOds arc delivered for the purpose of consumption therein. The latter State is left free to tax such sales or purchases. and it derives this power not .by virtue of article 286(1) but under artic~ 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II. The majority judgment (I) [1953] S;C.R. 1069. ' , (2) gQU] s.c.R. 51.

2 S.C.R.

SUI'REME COURT REPORTS

differed from the view which was taken by me that the Explanation does not deprive the State in which the property in the goods passed of this taxing power and that consequently both the State in which the property in the goods passes and the State in which the goods are delivered for consumption have the power to tax and characterised it as not correct. The majority judgment also held that clause (2) of article 286 does not affect the power of the State in which the delivery of goods is made to tax inter-State sales or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation to clause ( 1). The effect of the Explanation is ·that such transactions are saved from the ban imposed by article 286(2). Bose, J. and myself agreed that article 286(2) could not be construed in the light of article 304(1) as the two articles dealt with different matters. Bose, J. however held that the basic idea underlying article 286 is to prohibit taxation in the case of inter-State trade and commerce until the ban under dause (2) of the said article is lifted by Parliament and always in the case of imports and exports. When the ban is lifted, the Explanation to clause (I) of article 286 comes into play to determine the situs of the sale. This Explanation does not govern clause (2) of article 286 and as it can only apply to transactic 1s which in truth and in fact take place in the course of inter-State trade and commerce, there is no need to call it in aid until the ban is removed. The ma.jority judgment as well as Bose, J. recognised that the provisions of article 286(1) and (2) had been enacted in order to prevent multiple taxation which used to be levied by the States before the commencement of the Constirution having resort to the nex4s theory. They however did not discard that theory altogether and were of the opinion that it was sufficient to invest the State Legislature with jurisdiction to impose a tax on sale or purchase of goods, if any of the essential ingredients of sale had taken place within its territory. They did not accept the transfer of ownership in the goods or 'the passing of property therein as the sole criterion determining the situs of the sale and thus investing the State within

TM Bengal Immunity Company Limited Tiu State ef Bihar and others Bhagwati].

[19551

whose territories the sale had thus taken place as the only State entitled to impose the tax on sale or purchase of goods. I howe'l'.er held that under the general law relating to sale of goods a sale must- be re'The State of Bihar garded as having taken place in the State in which and otherJ · the property in the goods sold has passed to the purBhagwati]. chaser, and that the State is entitled to tax the sale or purchase as having taken place inside the State. The Explanation to article 286(1) does not take away the right which the State in which the property in the goods passed has to tax the sale or purchase but only deems such purchase or sale, by a legal fiction, to have taken place in the State in which the delivery of the goods has been made for consumption therein so as to enable the latter State also, to tax the sale or purchase in question. The Explanation only lifts the ban imposed by clause ( 1) (a) on taxation of sales or purchases which take place outside the State, to the extent of the transactions mentioned in the Explanation to enable the delivery State also to tax them. l also held that the general provision enacted in article 286(2) against the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce should give way to the special provision which is enacted in the Explanation to article 286( 1) (a) enabling the delivery State to tax such sale or purchase in the limited class ·of cases covered by the Explanation, the transactions covered by the Explanation being thus lifted out of the category of transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and assimilated to transactions of sale or purchase which take place inside the State and thus invested with the character of an intra-State sale or purchase so far as the delivery State is concerned. There was thus a divergence between the learned Judges as regards the true scope and effect of the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) read with article 286(2) and even though the same conclusion was reached by the majority Judges and myself we reached the same on different grounds. The interpretation put on article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation thereto therefore was that the delivery State is left free to tax such The Bengal Immuniry Company Limited

...

2 S.C.R.

sales or purchases as fall within the terms of the Explanation and article 286(2) does not affect the power of such a State to tax inter-State trade or commerce of the kind mentioned in the Explanation. The Explanation saves such transactions from the ban imposed by article 286(2). It may be noted that though there was a consensus of opinion that article 286(1) was designed to avoid the multiple taxation of a sale or purchase by various States having resort to the nexus theory there was divergence of opinion as regards the real purpose of the Explanation as also the construction of the non-obstante clause and the true concept of consumption as embodied therein. According to the majority view the Explanation explained what is an outside sale by defining what is an inside sale. Bose, J. was of the opinion that the purpose of the Explanation is to explain what is not outside the State and therefore what is inside. l was of the view that what is otherwise a sale or purchase which takes place outside the State is deemed to have taken place inside the delivery State and the only purpose of the Explanation is to introduce a. legal fiction whereby the delivery State is also entitled to tax the transaction of sale or purchase along with the State in which the transfer of ownership has taken place or the property in the goods has passed. The non-obstante clause also was differently interpreted. I took the the view that the non-obstante clause is incorporated in the Explanation to state what according to the Constitution makers ls the basic idea of fixing the situs or the location of the sale or purchase in the place where the transfer of ownership takes place or the property in the goods passes and to indicate that notwithstanding that fact a sale or purch::.se which falls within the category mentioned in the Explanation is nevertheless to be deemed to have taken place inside the delivery . State. The majority judgment stated that the non-obstante clause is inserted in the Explanation simply with a view to make it clear beyond all possible doubt that it is immaterial where the property in the goods passes as it might otherwise

The Bengal .lmmunilJI Company Limited g;

The State :f Bihar and others Bhagwati].

!955 Ti.. Bengal ImmuniJy Company I imited

The State of Bihar and others Bhagwati].

[1955]

be regarded as indicative of the place of sale. Bose, J. stated that the object of the Explanation is to fix the location of a sale or purchase by means of a fiction, but he disagreed with the view expressed by me that the non-obstante clause enunciates the general 1<1w on this poi_nt. He stated that there was no general law which fixed the situs of a sale, not even the Sale of Goods <\ct, that what the general law does is to determine the place where the property passes in the absence of a special agreement, but the place where the property passes is not necessarily the place where the sale takes place, nor has that ever been regarded as the determining factor. As regards the concept of consumption the majority were of the view that it should be understood as having reference not merely to the individual importer or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to consumers in general within the State. Bose, J. construed that word to mean the usual use made of an article for the purposes of trade and commerce. I adopted the Dictionary meaning of the term and held that the Explanation covers only those cases where as a direct result of the sale or purchase goods are delivered for consumption in the delivery State by the consumer and it is only that limited class of transactions which are covered by the Explanation and which are liable to tax by the delivery State. I did not accept the contention that . the words "for the purpose of consumption" must · be accepted in a comprehensive sense as having reference to immediate as well as ultimate consumption within the State" and excluding only resales out of the State. In regard to article 286(2) all the judges were agreed that transactions of sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce are within the restriction and no State can tax such transactions, except in the two excepted cases, viz., (1) except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide and (2) provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on sale or purchase of goods which was being levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitu-

2 S.C.R.

tion shall continue to be levied until the 31st March 1951. The Explanation to article 286(1)(a) though it is specifically stated to be for the purposes of sub. clause (a) was construed by me as an exception or proviso to article 286(2), thus enabling the delivery State to tax the transactions of sale or purchase taking place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The majority Judges differed from this view and held that the Explanation converts the interState transaction into aJil intra-State one and therefore there is no scope at all for the operation of article 286(2) in cases covered by the Explanation. Bose, J. was of the view that the article 286(2) bans the delivery State also from taxing such transactions, because if the transactions were in the course of inter-State trade or commerce the Explanation merely shifts the point from A to B but this shifting is of no consequence at all, because both the points are caught in the vortex of inter-State trade and commerce. It is only when the Parliament otherwise provides or the President gives the directions within the meaning of the proviso that this ban is lifted and the Explanation is there to settle a matter of considerable controversy regarding the situs of a sale. The argument that on this construction being put on the Explanation to article 286(1) and on article 286(2) the Explanation would become nugatory though accepted by me was rejected by Bose, J. by pointing out that once th~ Parliament by law otherwise provided or the President by order gave the direction within the meaning of the proviso the Explanation would come into operation and would determine the situs of the sale thus· enabling the appropriate State to impose a tax on such transaction of sale or purchase. The second case concerned itself with the construction of article 286(1) (b) in connection with the Sales Tax levied by the State of Travancore-Cochin upon certain dealers in cashew nuts within its territory under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1124 M.E. (Act No. XVIII of 1124 M.E.) and the question for the consideration of the Court was whether certain sales and purchases could

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be said to be in the course of the impor"t of the goods

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into or the export of the goods out of the territorv of India. The High Court had put a very wide construction on the words of ;irticle 2il6(1) (h) and held :.Int the clause is not restricted to the point of time at which goods are imported into or exported from India and the series of transactions which necess~rily precede export or succeed import of goods will come within the purview of this clause. There was a divergence of opinion between Pataniali Sastri, C.J., ~.fok­ herjea, J., Bose, J, and Ghulam Hasan, J, on the one side and S. R Das, J. on the other so far as the construction of the words "in the course of" was concerned. But apart from this construction of article 286(l)(b) S. R. Das, J. who was not a party to the earlier decision hereinbefore referred to put on record his views on the construction of article 286(1) (a), the Explanation thereto and article 286(2) expressing his disagreement with the interpretation which the majority judgement in that case had put up on the same. He agreed that the Provincial Legislatures purporting to act under Entry 48 in List II of the Se\1enth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, had enacted the Sales Tax Acts imposing tax on sales or purchases of goods on the basis of one or more of the ingredients of sale having wme connection with the Province and that this practice had resulted in the imposition of multiple taxes on a single transaction of sale or purchase thereby raising the price of rhe commodity concerned to the serious detriment to the consumer, that this evil had to be curbed and that is what has been done by clause (I) (a) of article 286. He however was "of the opinion that in imposing the ban that no law "of a State shall impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State, the Constitution proceeds on the footing that a sale or purchase has a location or situs. He further held that the 11rm-obstante clause in the Explanation also clearly implies that the framers of the Constitution adopted the view that a sale or purchase has a situs and further that it ordinarily takes place at the place

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TM SlaJ1 of Biluu and

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2. S.C.R.

where the property in the goods passes. In effect, to therefore, the Constitution, by this Explanation clause ( 1) (a), acknowledges that under the general law the sale or purchase of the kind therein mentioned may not really take place in the delivery State, but nevertheless requires it to be treated as if it did. That is to say, the Explanation creates a legal fiction. So far he agreed with me, but he differed from me in holding that the only effect of this assignment of a fictional location to a particular kind of sale or purchase in a particular State' is to attract the ban of clause (1) (a) and to take away the taxing power of .all other States in relation to such a sale or purchase even though the other ingredients which go towards the making up of a sale or purcha~e are to be found within these States or even if under the general law the property in the ~ods passes in any of those States. The purpose of the Explanation ends there and cannot be stretched or extended beyond that purpose. He therefore held that the effect of clause (l)(a) read in the light of the Explanation is not to permit both States, viz.. the State where the property passes under the general law as well as the State in which, by force of the Explanation, the sale or purchase is .deemed to take place. to tax such sale or purchase, because in that event it will stultify the very purpose of that clause and it will fail to prevent the imposition of multiple taxes which it is obviously designed to prevent. In his opinion clause ( 1)(a) in terms only takes away the taxing power of all States with respect to as sale or purchase which, by reason of the fiction introduced by the Explanation, is to be deemed to take place outside their respective territories and the purpose of the Explanation is only to explain the scope of clause ( 1) (a). The Explanation is neither an exception nor a proviso. It is not its purpose nor does it purport, substantively and proprio vigore, to confer any power on any State, not even on the delivery State, to impose any tax. Whether the delivery State can tax the sale or purchase of the kind mentioned in the Explanation · will depend on other provisions of the Constitution. Neither clause (1) (a) nor

Thi Bengal

lmmuniJY

Com/Jal!Y Limited y;

TktStaliof Bihar and ot1"'s Bhagwati ].

195~

1,,.,,...,,,

TM&ltrJ

C.mpanJ Limited

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Bhagwoli J.

[1955]

the Explanation has any bearing on that question. So far as the purpose and design of clause (2) are concerned he was of the opinion that clause (2) places yet another ban on the taxing power of the State under Entry 54 read with article 246(3), in addition to the ban imposed by clause (l)(a). A sale or purchase contemplated by the Explanation to clause ( l) (a) undoubtedly partakes of the nature of a sale or purchase made in the course of inter-State trade and, therefore, no State, whether it is the State in which the property in the goods passes under the general law or the State where the goods are delivered as mentioned in the Explanation, can impose a tax on such sale or purchase, unless and until Parliament lifts this ban. He differed from the view taken by me that the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) must be regarded not only as having authorised the delivery State to impose the tax on the sale or purchase covered by the Explanation, but having also exempted it from the ban imposed by clause (2). He also differed from the majority view that what was an inter-State transaction within the ban of article 286(2) is converted into an intra-State or -local or domestic transaction by virtue of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a). He saw no warrant for the argument that the fiction embodied in the Explanation for this definitely expressed purpose, can be legitimately used for the entirely foreign purpose of destroying the inter-State character of the ttansaction and converting it into an intra-State sale or purchase for all purposes. Such metamorphosis is completely beyond the purpose and purview of clause (!)(a) and the Explanation thereto. After expressing himself as above, he made the following observations which are very apposite to the appeal before us :"To accede to this argument will mean that the Sales Tax Officer of the delivery State will have jurisdiction to call upon dealers outside that State to submit returns of their turn over in respect of goods delivered by them to dealers in that State under transactions of sale made by them with dealers within that State. Thus a dealer in, say, Pepsu who

2. S.C.R.

delivers gOods to a dealer ir., say, Travancore-Cochin will become subject to the jurisdiction of the ·1ast mentioned State and will have to file returns of their turn over and support the same by producing their books of account there. I cannot imagine that our Constitution makers intended to produce this anomalous result. On the contrary, it appears to me that they enacted clauses (l)(a) and (2) for the very purpose of preventing this anomaly. I repeat that it is not permissible, on principle or on authority, to extend the fiction of the Explanatioh beyond its imme<liate and avowed purpose which I have explained above. In my judgment, until Parliament otherwise provides, all sales or purchases which take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce are.. by clause (2) of article 286, made immune from taxation by the law of any State, irrespective of the place where the sales or purchases ma1 take place, . either under the general law or by virtue of the fiction intro<luced by the Explanation to clause (l)(a). If a particular inter-State sale or purchase takes place outside. a State, either under the general law or by virtue of the fiction created by the Explanation, it is exempted from taxation by the law of that State both under clause (l)(a) and clause (2). If such inter-State sale or purchase takes place within a particular State, either under the general law or by reason of the Explanation, it is still exempt from taxation even by the law of that State under clause (2), just as a sale or purchase which takes place within a State, either under the general law or by reason of the Explanation, cannot be taxed by the. law of that State, if such sale or purchase takes place in the course of import or export within .the meaning of clause (l)(b)".. It may be observed that the contentions urged before us by the Appellant are in conformity with the above observations of S.R. Das, J. Normally speaking the construction put by the majority judgment on the article 286(1), the Explanation thereto and article 286(i) of the Constitution in the Bombay Sales Tax appeal would be the law bind-

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c.,"ompatt.1, Limited

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Bhagwali J.

[ 19551

ing on all parties and in the judgment just referrc<l to in the Travancore-Cochin Sales Tax Appeal S. R. Das, r. rightly expressed that decision to be binding on him so long as it stands. The Appellant has however sought to urge before us that that decision was erroneous and has attempted to persuade us to reconsider the same and put a construction on article 286(1)(a), the Explanation thereto and article 286(2) which is different from that. adopted by the Majority Judges in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal. The question therefore arises whether we arc entitled to reconsider that decision. The House of Lords in England has always considered itself bound by its previous decisions. These <lecisions, as distinguished from the opinions which arc delivered bv the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as ad ~ice to the Crown, arc pronounced in the form of judgments and are binding on the House a' precedents. The question whether the House had the power to reconsider the previous decisions of its own and if it thought the decisions wrong to overrule or depart from them in subsequent cases was considi:red in Street Tramways v. London County Council(') Earl of Halsbury, L.C. who delivered the judgment of the House observed at page 379 :"A decision of this House once given upon a point of law is conclusive upon this House afterwards, and that it is impossible to raise that question again as if it was res integra and could be reargued, and so the House be asked to reverse its own decision. That is a principle which has been, I believe, without any real decision to the contrary, established now for some centuries, and I am therefore of opinion that in this case it is not competent for ·us to rehear and for a,unsel to reargue a question which has been recently decided". The reason of the rule was thus stated at page 380 :"Of course I do not deny that cases of individual hardship may arise, and there may be a current of opinion in the profession that such and such a judgment was erroneous; but what is that occasional (I} (1898] App<al Cases 375.

2 S.C.R.

,-

interference with what is perhaps abstract justice as compared with the inconvenience-the disastrous inconvenience-of having each question subject to being reargued and the dealings of mankind rendered doubtful by reason of different decisions, so that in truth and in fact there would be no real final Court of Appeal?' My Lords, "interest rei publicae" that there should be "finis litittm" at some time, and there could be no "finis litium" if it were possible to suggest in each case that it might be reargued, because it is "not an ordinary case," whatever they may mean". and the conclusion was thus recorded at page 381 :"Under these circumstances it appears to me that your Lordships would do well to act upon that which has been universally assumed in the profession, so far as I know, to be the principie, namely, that a decision of this House upon a question of law is conclusive, and that nothing but an Act of Parliament can set right that which is alleged to be wrong 111 a judgment of this House". The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the other hand has held that it is free to. differ from its own dt:cisions or from. those of tht: House of Lords. The power of the Privy Council to rt:consider its own decisions was discussed in In re Compensation to Civil Servants( 1 ). In that case :\11 earlier decision of the Board in Wigg v. Attorney-General o.f the Irish Free State(2) was attempted to be reviewed and after discussing the case-law on the point the Board came to the conclusion that the Privv Council is not bound in law and without examination to follow the decision in a prior appeal whether they considered it to be right or wrong although the Privy Council would hesitate long before disturbing a solemn decision bv a previous .Board, which raised an identical or even a similar issue for &termination. While laying down this principle the Board discussed the earlier cases and in particular the case of Ridsdale v. Clifton( 8 ) which was followed in Tooth v. Power(4) and Read v. Bishop of Lincoln( 5 ) and the proposition was thus laid (1) A.l.R. 1929 P.C. 84. (3) [ 1877] 2 P.D. 276.

(2) A.I.R. 1928 P.C.'!39.

(4) [1891] A.C. 284. (5) [89 ] A.C. 644.

The Btngal

Immunity°!! Company Limited

.,,.

The State of Bihtir

and othws. Bhagwati ].

[1955]

-

down in the last mentioned case :"In the present case their Lordships cannot but adopt the view expreS&Cd in Ridsdale v. Clifton(') as eom,...,~ to the effect of previous decisions. Whilst fully senTM Sia qf SW. sible of the weight to be attached to such decisions, their · Lordships are at the same time bound to examine BM,...ii ]. the reasons upon which the decisions rest, and 'to give effect fo their own view of the law". The same principle was reiterated by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Ontario and Others v. Canada Temperance Federation and Others( 2 ). The Board was there concemea with the consideration of a constitutional question. An earlier decision of the Board in Russell v. Reg( 8 ) had upheld the validity of the impugned statute. That decision had stood unreversed for 63 years and had moreover received express approval of the Board in subsequent cases between 1883 and 1937. It was contended that the case had been wrongly decided and ought to be overruled and their Lords.hips repelled that contention :-·· "Their Lordships do not doubt that in tendering humble advice to His Majesty they are not absolutely bound by previous decisions of the Board. as is the House of Lords by its own judgments. Jn ecclesiastical appeals, for instance, on more than one occasion, the Board has tendered a\lvice contrary to that given in a previous case, which further historical research has shown to have been wrong. But on constitutional questions it must be seldom indeed that the Board would depart from a previous decision which it may be assumed will have been acted upon both by governments and subjects. In the present case the decision now sought to be overruled has stood for over sixty years: the Act has been put into operation for varying periods in many places in the Dominion; under its ,provisions business must have been closed, lines and imprisonments for breaches of the Act have been imposed and suffered. Time and again the occasion has arisen when the Board could have overruled. the decision had it thought it wrong. Accordingly, in T!w&ngol 1,,...,.;1

-"'

(I) (1877] 2 P.D. 276. (2) A.I.R.1946 P.C. · (3l [1882] 7 A.c. 8:9.

I

2 S.C.R.

the opinion of their Lordships, the decision must be regarded as firmly embedded in the constitutional law of Canada and it is impossible now to depart from

it" It is therefore settled law so far as England is concerned that their Lordships of the Privy Council do not consider themselves bound in law and without examination to follow their decision in a prior appeal whether they consider it to be right or wrong but feel themselves bound to examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest and to give effect 'to their own view of the law. We here are the highest Court of the land and would derive considerable assistance from th.e µractice of the Privy Council set out above. The High Court of Australia is· the highest Court of Appeal in the Commonwealth and concerns itself inter a/ia with deciding constitutional questions. The question whether it is bound by its previous decisions came up for consideration in the Tramways Case (No. J) (1) and the High Court held that it was not bound by its previous decision but would only review a previous decision when that decision was manifestly wrong. Griffith, C.J. in this connection made the following observations at page 58 :"In my opinion it is impossible to maintain as an abstract proposition that the Court is either legally or technically bound by previous llecisions. Indeed, it mav in a proper case be its duty to disregard them. But the rule should be applied with great caution, and only when the previous decision is manifestly wrong ...... Otherwise there would he grave danger of a want of continuity in the interpretation of the law'·. Barton, f. observed at page 69 :"In conclusion, I would say that I have never thought that it was not open to this Court to review its previous decisions upon good cause. The question is not whether the Court can do so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need for continuity and consistency in judicial decisions. Changes in the number of appointed Justices can, I take it, never of (I) 18 C.L.R. 54.

Tu Bengal Immunity

Comflilny Limilld V•

Thi StaU of Bihar -4 oth111

Bhagwati J.

T/,. Bmgal Immunil7 Company Limikd v; T/,. Stole of B;har ad otkMr

_

Bhagwati ].

[1955J

themselves furnish a reason for review. That the prior decision was that of little more than half their number might be urged with greater fairness, but it cannot be urged against an earlier case. . . . . . . . . . But the Court can always listen to argument as to whether it ought to review a particular decision, and the strongest reason for an overruling is that a decision is manifestly wrong, and its maintenance is injurious to the public interest". Powers, J. at page 86 referred to an earlier decision given by him in the case of The Australian Agricultural Co. v. Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of AtlStralasia(') :"I am at all times prepared to consider the review of any decision of this Court, by a Full Bench called to consider that question, and to reverse any decision if it is shown to be clearly wrong, subject to the well known considerations to be applied to the particular case in question at the time, according to the well known judicial policy of British, Australian and American Courts, and I think of all Courts of Appeal in English-speaking communities"-except the House of Lords... . . . . . . . "I decline even to consider a questioa of reversing a decision of this Court casually, or even seriously, raised by counsel, not clearly urgent, and not raised before as full a bench as is available. If we do not show some respect to oui· own Court's decisions, no counsel will feel safe in advising the public, and it will create uncertainty and confusion" ........... . . . . . . . "Under those circumstances I think it would have to be shown that the decision was clearly wrong, and, as it has been followed by this Court in other cases, that it would be in the interests of the public to reverse it". This_ question came for consideration again by the High Court of Australia in The Amalgamated Society of Enginurs v. The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited and Others (2) and the majority judgment stated at p. 142:"It is therefore, in the circumstances, the manifest duty of this Court to turn its earnest attention (1) 17 C.L.R. 261, "9c.

(2) <8 C.L.R. 129.

'

2 S.C.R.

to the provmons of the Constitution itself. That instrument is the political compact of the whole of the people of Australia, enacted into binding _law by the Imperial Parliament, and it is the chief and special duty of this Court faithfully to expound and give effect to it according to its own terms, finding the intention from the words of the compact, and upholding it throughout precisely as framed. In doing this, . we follow, not merely previous instances in this Court and other Courts in Australia, but also the precedent of the Privy Council in Read v. Bishop of Lincoln(1), where the Lord Chancellor, speaking for the Judicial Committee in relation to reviewing its own prior decision, said: "Whilst fully sensible of the weight to be attached to such decisions, their Lordships are at the same time bound to examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest, and to give effect to their own view of the law". The ground upon which the Privy Council came to that conclusion we refer to, but need not repeat, adding, however that as the Commonwealth and State Parliaments and Executives arc themselves bound by the declarations of this Court as to their powers inter se, our responsibility is so much the greater to give the true eftect to the relevant constitutional provisions. In doing this, to use the language of Lord Macnaughten in Vacher & Som Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors( 2 ), "a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the Court, and !ts only d}Ity, is to expound the language of the Act m accordance with the settled rules of construction"." Higgins, J. at page 160 added:"But the decision is now directly impugned by the claimant ; and it is our duty to reconsider the subject, and to obey the Constitution and the Act rather than any decision of this Court, if the decision be shown to have been mistaken". The High Court of Australia has therefore considered

itself free to review its own decisions just as much (l) [1892JA.C. 644.

(2) [1913] A.C. 107, 118.

lmmuttity Company Limilld The Sla11 of Bi/Jlw ONfllfwl

Bhagwati· ].

Tht Bengal

Immunity Company Limiletl Vo

T/1' Stale of Bi/ia' and oth#s

Bhagwati ].

[1955]

as the Judicial Committee ,pf the Privy Council, examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest and to give effect to its own views of the law, in other words to reconsider the subject and to obey the Constitution and the Act rather than any decision of the Court if the decision be shown to have been mistaken. Our Constitution has drawn freely inter ali11 upon the Constitution of the United States and it would be helpful to consider what is the position in the United States in regard to the re-consideration of its previous decisions by the Supreme Court. There have been numerous decisions of. the Supreme Court in which the Court has departed from the doctrine of stare decisis and has either refused to allow or overruled its previous decisions. In Hertz v. Woodman(') Mr. Justice Lurton observed:"The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decisions, is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which again is called upon to consider a qu~s­ tion once decided". Mr. Justice Brandies while delivering his dissenting opinion in Waslzington v. Dawson & Co.( 2) rims expressed himself with regard to the proprietv upon the part of the Supreme Court of departing from its earlier doctrines if it has coipe to consider those doctrine as erroneous :"The doctrine of stare decisis should not deter us from overruling that case and those which follow it. The decisions are recent ones. They have not been acquiesced in. They have not created a rule of property around which vested interests have clustered. They affect solely matters of a transitory nature. On the other hand, they affect seriously the live; of men, women, and children, and the general welfare. Star~ decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal, inexorable command. The instances (1) 218

u.s. 205.

(2) 264 U.S. 219·

2S.C.R.

in which the court has disregarded its admonition arc many". The same learned Judge in a dissenting opinion in David Bttrnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Company (1) reitera1..!d the same position in the manner following:-"Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res iudicata, a universal, inexorable command". After quoting the passage from the judgment of Mr. Justice Lurton in Hertz v. Woodman (1 ) above cited the learned Judge proceeded:"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in mosr matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. ............. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. Tht: (',ourt bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function ........... . Recently, it overruled several leading cases, when it concluded that the States should not have been permitted to exercise powers of taxation which it had theretofore repeatedly sanctioned. In cases involving the Federal Constitution the position of this Court is unlike that of the highest court of England, where the policy of stare decisis was formulated and is strictly applied to all classes of cases. Parliament is free to correct any judicial error; and the remedy may be promptly invoked". It will be instructive at this juncture to note the following passages to be found in foot-note 3 at p. 825 in the report of this case (') :- · "Compare Taney, Ch. J. in Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 470; 12 L. Ed., 702, 780: After such opinions judicially delivered, I had supposed that question to be sc;.ttled, so far as any question upon the construction of the Constitution ought to be regarded (I) 285 U.S. 393.

(2) 218 U.S. 205.

(3) 76 L. Ed. 815.

Tht&11gal lmmunily ComjJally Limild

The Sta11 of Bihar . i o11r1rt Bhagwali J.

Tiu Blng,U Im~

Com~: Limited

TM Stat, of Bih"'

-

arJt! 9Jbns

B/uJgwati ].

[1955J

as closed by the decision of this Court. I <lo not, however object to the revision of it, and am quit<; willing that it be regarded her~aher as the law of this court,. that its opinion upon the co'.l,trnction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should hereafter depend' altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported". Compare Field;J. in Barden v. Northern P.R. Co. ( 1 ) : '"It is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations. Those doctrines only will eventually stand which bear the strictest examination and the test of experience".

In Mark Graves v. People of the State of New Yorlc(') Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:"But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it".

The same principle was reiterated in Smith v. Al/wright (3) :_:: "In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in constitutional questions. However, when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action this· Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to re-examine the basis of its constitutional decisions. This has long been accepted practice, and this practice has continued to this day". and in United States of America v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association (') iil the dissenting judgment of Stone, C.J. at p. 579:"This Court has never committed itself to any rule or policy that it will not "bow to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning" by overruling a mistaken precedent ............ This 1s (I 154 U. s. "BB, 3 '). (2) 306 U. S. 466, 4Si

l

(3 321 U.S. 649.

'-

(4) 312 U.S. 533.

2 S.C.R. espec~ally

the case when the meaning of the Consl:ltuaon is at issue and a mistaken construction is one which cannot be corrected by legislative action. To give blind adherence to :i rule or policy that no decision of this Court is to be overruled would be itself to overrule many decisions of the Court which do not accept that view. But the rule of stare decisis embodies a wise policy because it is often more important that a rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. This is especially so where as here, Congr<'."$s is not without regubtory power ........ The question then is not whether an earlier decision should ever be overruled, but whether a particular decision ought to be. And before overruling a precedent in any case it is the duty of the Court to make certain that more harm will not be done in rejecting than in retaining a rule of even dubious validity". The position has been thus summarised by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States--·.V oL I-Second Edition-at p. 74 :-"There are indeed good reasons why the doctrine of stare decisis should not be so rigidly applied to the constitutional as to other laws. In cases of purely private import, the chief desideratum is that the law remain certain, a!lll, therefore, where a rule has been judicially declared and private rights created there·· under, the courts will not, except in the clearest cases of error, depart from the doctrine of stare decisis. When, however, public interests are inv:>lved, and especially when the question is one of constitutional construction, the matter is otherwise. An error in the construction of a statute may easily be corrected by a legislative act, but a Constitution and particularly the Federal Constitution, may be changed only with great difficulty. Hence an error in its interpretation may for all practical purposes be corrected onlv bv the court's repudiating or modifying its f~rme~ decision". These then are the principles which should guide us in determining whether we should reconsider the earlier decisions of this Court. We are here not merely concerned with legislative enactments which it would

Tire Bengal Immunity Company Limiteil .v.

Tire State ef Bihar fllld others

Bhogwati J.

[19S5)

be within the competence of either the Union ~ lature or the State Legislatures to enact if our earlier Jmm:muy decisions were erroneous. We are concerned with the O.mpany Limited construction of the prov1S1ons of the Constitution Tht State of Bihar which it will be almost impossible to amend. The al•lh1rs Howie of Lords considered itself bound by its pRBhaKUJQli ]. vious decisions, because it felt that the Act of Parliament could set right an erroneous decision of th" House by enacting appropriate legislation. But the High Court of Australia as well as the Supreme Court of the United States felt themselves free to reconsider their earlier decisions because of the practical impossibility of correcting the erroneous decisions through legislative action. They considered it their bounden duty to construe the constitutional provisions and- be guided by the provisions of the Constitution itself and not bv what had been their earlier decisions on the questions of its construction. The only safeguard which they put on the exercise of such powers of reconsideration was that the earlier decision should be manifestly wrong or erroneous. We here also are concerned with the construction of the prov1S1ons of the Constitution which cannot he amended so easilv and if we come to the conclusion that the earlier · decision was manifestly wrong or erroneous and that public interest demanded that the same should be reconsidered · we should not have the slightest hesitation in doing so. We therefore approach the consideration of the earlier decision of this Court in the Bombay Sales. Tax Appeal bearing in mind the principles above enunciated. It will be necessary at the outset to take stock of the situation as it obtained before the enactment of article 286 of the Constitution. The Government of India Act, 1935 contained provisions in regard to the distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion and the Provincial Legislatures in sections 99 and 100. The Dominion Legislature was competent to make laws including laws having extra-territorial operation for the whole or any part of the Dominion and the Provincial Legislatures were competent to make laws for the Province or for any part thereof, The Bmf.al

...

r

2 S.C.R.

The legislative heads in respect of which the laws could be made by the respective Legislatures were enumerated in the lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Act and the demarcation between the powers of the Dominion Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures in that behalf was to be found in section 100. Entry 48 in List II of the said Schedule gave the power to the Provincial Legislatures in respect of "taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements". Even though the entry mentioned taxes on sale of goods · that head was construed to mean in reality a power to tax the transaction and the power to tax the transaction carried with it the power to tax either party thereto. The expression "taxes on sale" was therefore construed to include also a tax on purchases of goods, as the transaction resulted in change of ownership from one person to another and was from its very nature a bilateral transaction with a seller on the one hand and the purchaser . on the other. (Vide V. M. S. Md. & Co. v. State of Madras( 1 ) ). The same distribution of legislative powers obtained when the Constitution came to he enacted and article 245 provided that Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. Exclusive power to make laws with respect to the legislative heads enumerated in the Union List (List I) and the State List (List II) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution was given to Parliament and the State Legislatures respectively by article 246. Entry 54 of the State List gave the exclusive power to the State Legislatures with respect to taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers. What was implicit in the phraseology of Entry 48 of List II of the ~ev~nth Schedule to the Government of Indja Act was thus made explicit by the phraseology adopted in Entry 54 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Prima facie laws enacted by State Legislatures would have operation within the territories of the States. Primarily legislation of a country is territorial (I) A.LR. 1953 Ma<lra, 105. -84 S. C. i.ndia/59

The Btngal

lmmuniry Company Limited

T/16 Stal< of Bihar and others Bhagwati J.

TM Bengal

lmmuniry Company Limited

Thi State of Bihm and o'thm Bhagwati J.

[1955]

and the general rule is "extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur". The laws of a nation apply to all. its subjects and to all things and acts within its territories. (See Maxwell on the Interpr~tation of Statutes-10th Edn. page 144). Craies' on Statute Law-5th Edn. at p. 174 contains the following citation from the speech of Lord Cranworth in Jefferys v. Boosey( 1 ) : "Prima facie the Legislature of this country must be taken to make laws for its QWn subjects exclusively". The same principle has been applied also to sales tax and it is stated in American Jurisprudence-Vol. 47, p. 202 Para. 5 under the caption "Territorial Jurisdic· tion" that :·"The general rule that a State may not ta.:i persons, property or interests which are not wichin its territorial jurisdiction is applicable to sales taxes". It would therefore appear that when the State Legislatures enacted laws in respect of taxes on sales or purchases of goods they would only have operation within the territories of the States and the sales or purchases of goods even though they are not specified in the relative entry to be "within the territories" of the States would prima facie ,be such as take place within the respective territories of the States. This po.wer to tax the sales or purchases of goods would again have to be construed with reference to the connotation of the term "sale" as it was understood in the legislative practice of the country at the time when the ·power was conferred. As was observed by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Croft v. Dunphy(') :"When a power is conferred to legislate on a particular topic it is important, in determil)ing the scope of the power, to have regard to what is ordi· narily treated as embraced within that topic in legislative practice and particularly in the legislative practice of the State which has conferred the power". The expression "Sale of goods" in Entry 48 in List (1) [1854] 4 H.L.C. 815, 955. (2) [1933] A.G. 156, 165.

2S.C.R.

II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 came to be construed by this Court in Sales Tax Officer v. Budh Prakash Jai Prakash(1) in relation to an attempt by the State of Uttar Pradesh to tax forward contracts of sale and this Court held :"There having existed at the time of the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, a welldefined and well-established distinction between a sale and an agreement to sell it would be proper to interpret the expression 'sale of goods' in Entry 48 in the sense in which it was used in: legislation both in England and India and to hold that it authorises the imposition of a tax only when there is a completed sale involving transfer of title". The expression "sale of goods" was construed in the light of the definition thereof to be found in section 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act (Act III of 1930) as also the corresponding provision of the English Sale of Goods Act and the relevant passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 15, Para 13 quoted therein. Section 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act runs as follows :" ( 1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price. There mav be a contract 9f sale between one part-owner and another. (3) Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer, the contract is called a sale, but where the transfer of the property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is called an agreement to sell. (4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses, or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred". The corresponding provision in section 1 of the English Sale of Goods Act is as follows :" ( 1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract (I) f1955] I S.C.R. 243.

Th6BmfJl Immunity Company Limiutl

Thi Stal4 of Bilutr 01ttl otll#rs Bhogwiiti J.

Ti.. Bengal

Immunity Company LimiUd

TM Statt ef Bihar and othPs Bhagwati ].

[1955]

whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration, called the price. There may be a contract of sale between one part-owner and another. (3) Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer the contract is called a sale; but where the transfer of the property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled the contract is called an agreement to. sell. ( 4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred". This being the legislative practice in India as well as in England at the time when the power to tax sales or purchases of goods was conferred on the State Legislatures the scope of that power would have been ordinarily determined by the definition of. the sale of goods to be found in these· respective Sales of Goods Acts and the State Legislatures would have had the power to tax sales or purchases of goods in which the property in the goods passed within the respective territories of the State,s. This was not a power to tax a seller or a purchaser in personam. It was a power to tax the sale or purchase of goods which took place within the territories of the State and was to be exercised in those cases where the property in the goods which were the subject matter of the sale or purchase passed within the territories of the State. This position however was not acceptable to the various States which wanted to enlarge the scope of their power to tax sales or purchases of goods. There was therefore an attempt made to analyse the concept of sale into its various ingredients and to fasten upon any one of the ingredients as conferring upon them the power to tax the sale or purchase of goods by having resort to the theory of territorial connection or nexus. As was observed by Bose, J. in The State of Bombay and

2 S.C.R.

Another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. & Others(') at p. 1101 :"The difficulty is apparent when one begins to split a sale into its component parts and analyse them. When this is done, a sale is found to consist of a number of ingredients which can be said to be essential in the sense that if any one of them is missing there is no sale. The following are some of them : ( 1) the existence of goods which form the subjectmatter of the sale, (2) the bargain or contract which, when executed, will result in the passing of the property in the goods for a price, (3) the payment, or promise of payment, of a price, ( 4) the passing of the title". Having analysed the concept of the sale thus into its essential ingredients the only essential condition which was considered necessary to be satisfied was the completion of the transaction of sale wheresoever it, may take place and the taxable event was taken to be any one of these essential ingredients provided it took place · within the territories of the State. Reliance was placed for this purpose on the decision of the Federal Court in In re The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 ( C. P. & Berar Act No. XIV of 1938) ( 2 ) where Their Lordships observed that :"Tax on sale of goods must necessarily be a tax imposed at the time of the sale of goods and must exclude other forms of transfer like mortgages, leases, etc." Similar observations were also to be found in the Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons(3) where it was ·stated that a tax on the sale of goods is a- tax levied on the occasion of the sale of goods and the liability to tax arises on the occasion of the sale. The sale was therefore ta~en to be the concrete event which gave rise to the power of the State to tax the sale of goods but was taken as not necessarily taking place within the territories of the taxing State, the only thing considered essential for the purpose being the (I) [1953] s.c.R. 1069.

(2) (1939] F.C.R. 18, 86. (3) [1942) F.C.R. 90, 101.

The Ben~al JmmlJllUy Company LimiUtl ~

The Stau of Bi/tar and olh#I

Bhagwati J.

Tl1' B'"$al Im"""!'!>'

Company Limited Y•

Th< Sia/< of Bihm and others

Bhagwati J.

[1955]

territorial connection or nexus between the taxing State and one or more of the necessary ingredients of sale analysed as above. The territorial connection or nexus theory was sought to be supported by reference to certain decisions of the High Court of Australia, e.g., The Wanganui Rangitikey Electric Power Board v. The Australian Mutual frovident Society(') where Dixon, J. observed : "So long as the statute selected some fact or circumstance which provided some relation or connection with New South Wales, and adopted this as the ground of its interference, the validity of an enactment reducing interest would not be open to challenge". and the dissenting judgment of Rich, J. in Broken Hill South Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.)( 2) which stated that :"I do not deny that once any connection with New South Wales appears the legislature of that State may make that connection the occasion or subject of the imposition of a liability. But the connection with New South Wales must lie a real one and the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that conn~ction".

These observations of the learned Judges of the High Court of Australia were referred to with approval by our Federal Court in Governor-General-in-Council v. Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd.(•). It was an income-tax case and the dispute related to the claim of the Indian Government to levy income-tax and super tax on the dividends paid to the assessee company (which was a joint stock company incorporated under the English Companies Act having its registered offices in the Isle of Man and its main offices in England) by nine sterling companies, the bulk of whose shares were held by the assesse~ company. These sterling companies were registered under the English Companies Act and were controlled in London where the Boards of Directors sat, the s~are registers were situate and dividends were declared. They however carried on the business (1) [1934] 50 C.L.R. 581, 60Q. \2) [l937] 56 C.L.R. 331, 361. (S) A.l.R. 1944 F.C. 51 s.c. 1944 F.C.R. 229.

<

2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS.

of manufacturing and selling tobacco and cigarettes in India and the business in India where all profits were made was managed by the local boards which were constituted by the Boards in London. The financial policies of these companies were controlled by the London Boards and in all important matters of busi· ness the London Boards were consulted and all the general meetings of the Companies were held in England. The dividends of these Companies were aho declared by them in England and paid by them in England to the assessee company in England. It was however held that the source of the dividends paid to the assessee company by the sterling companies was British Indian and when the attempt was to tax income and not the corpus and the question to be considered was the 'source' of that income it was legiti-· mate to take into account the place where the business from which the income was derived was in fact carried on and not to treat the situs of the shares in the eves of the law as concluding the matter. The Court ~as therefore of the opinion that the source of the dividends paid to the assessee company by the sterling companies was British Indian and that in making them liable to income-tax on that basis the Indian Legislature was not giving its law any extra-territorial operation. Spens, C.J. who delivered the judgment of the Court further quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Evatt, J. in Trustees. Executors & Agency Co. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation( 1 ) at p. 236 :"The Constitution requires that it must be possible to predicate of every valid law that it is for the peace, order and good government of the Dominion with respect to a granted subject, e.g., customs, taxation, external affairs. In such cases, the presence of non-territorial elements in the challenged law has to be considered upon a slightly different footing and those affirming its validity have to show not only that the Dominion has some real concern or interest in the matter, thi~g or circumstance dealt with by the legislation, but that the concern or interest is of such (I) [1933] 49 C.L.R. 220.

The Bengal Im1nrmily Company Limited The State 1( Biha1 and olhtrs

T!it Bengal lmmrmity CtJmpany Limiled

Till Stau of BiM< and others Blwgwati ].

[1955]

a nature that the challenged law is truly one with respect to an enumerated subject-matter". Two more decisions of the Federal Court reiterating the same principle may be noted in this context : Wallace Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncometar, Bombay . City(') and A.H. Wadia v. Commissioner of Income-tar, Bombay( 2 ). In the former case the Court held that where the Imperial Parliament has conferred a power to legislate on a particular topic it i~ permissible and important in determining the scope and meaning of the power to have regard to what is ordinarily treated as embraced within that topic in the legislative practice of the United Kingdom. The general conception as to the scope of the legislative practice in the United Kiogdorn with regard to income-tax is that given a sufficient territorial connection between the person sought to be charged and the country seeking to tax him, - income-tax may properly extend to that person in respect of his foreign income. That general conception, both on a consideration of the British legislation and as a matter of construction of the Government of India Act, 1935, finds a place in the phrase "taxes on income" as used in that Act and the principle of sufficient territorial connection is implicit in the power conferred by the Act of 1935. The derivation from British India of the major portion of its income for a year gives to a company as respects that year a territorial connection sufficient to justify the company being treated as at home in British India for all purposes relating to taxation on its income for that year from whatever source it may be derived, and if it is so at home in British India it is a person properly subject to the jurisdiction of the Central Indian legislature. In the latter case the Court held that a law imposing a tax cannot be impugned on the ground that it is extra-territonal if there is a connection between the person who is subjected to the tax and the country which imposes that tax. The connection must however be a real one and the liability sought to be imposed . must be pertinent to that connection; but, if these conditions are satis(1) [19~8] F.C.R. I.

(2) (1948] F.C.R. 121.

F

2 S.C.R.

.

fied it is of no. importance on the question of validity that the liability imposed is, or may be, dispropor· tionate to the territorial connection. Kania, C.J. also observed at p. 141 :"As mentioned above, the aspect of it affecting persons who are beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal courts cannot be considered sufficient for the Court to hold it ultra vires. The municipal courts are bound to enforce the law. Whether after obtaining the opinion or decree the same is enforceable against the other side or not, is not a matter for the Court's consideration. The Court has only to see that the legislation is within the ambit of the powers of the Legislature". Having resort therefore to the territorial connection or the nexus cheory enunciated in the cases abm·c noted and . analysing the concept of sale into its necessary ingredients as above the various State Legislatures enacted laws in respect of taxes on sales or purchases of goods spreading their net as wide as they could having regard to the situation obtaining in their respective territories. A transaction of sale or purchase of goods thus came to be taxed by more States than one even though really there was only one transaction of sale or purchase of goods as between the seller and the purchaser. The consumer was the last person who ever counted in the scramble for taxes on sales or purchases of goods and even the free flow of inter-State trade and commerce was affected. The state of affairs was thus graphically described by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in his judgment in Bombay Sales Tax Appeal(1) at p. 1079 :"In exercise of the legislative power conferred upon them in substantially similar terms by the Government. of India Act 1935, the Provisional Legislatures enacted sales-tax laws for their respective Provinces, acting on the principle of territorial nexus referred to above; that is to say, they picked out one or more of the ingredients constituting a sale and made them the basis of their sales-tax legislation. Assam and Bengal made among other things the actual (J) fl953J s.c.R. 1069

Thi Benga. Immunity Company Limited

The Stau of Bihal

and otherl Bhogwati J.

The Ben{fal Immunity Company Limited

T ht State ?f Bihar and others Bhagwali ].

[1955)

existence of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxability. In Bihar the production or manufacture of the goods in the Province was made an additional ground. A net of Prothe widest range perhaps was laid in Central vinces and Berar where it was sufficient if the goods were actually 'found' in the Province at any time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made. Whether the territorial nexus put forward as the basis of the taxing power in each case would be sustained as sufficient was a matter of doubt not having been tested in a court of law. And such claims to taxing power led to multiple taxation of the same transaction by different Provinces and cumulation of the burden falling ultimately on the consuming public. This situation posed to the Constitution makers the problem of restricting the taxing power on sales or purchases involving inter-State elements, and alleviating the tax burden on the consumer". Apart from the States resorting to the territorial connection or nexus theory in the manner aforesaid the courts also appeared to lend their support to the theory and the High Court of Madras in particu Jar in two decisions, Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras(') and C. G. Naidu & Co. v. State of Madras( 2 ), gave its imprimatur to this theorv. In the former case the expression "sale · of goods" was understood m its popular sense as distinct from its legal sense and it was held that the sales tax could be levied if the transaction substantially took place within the State notwithstanding that the property did not pass within the State. In the latter case it was held that the power of the State to impose taxes was not conditioned on the subject-matter being whollv within its jurisdiction and the exercise of the power was valid if there was sufficient territorial connection with reference to the subject-matter. After discussing the American case law on the subject the Court came to the· conclusion that in respect of inter-State sales the State in which the contract was concluded wa,; the (1) A.I.R. 1953 Madras 91.

'(2} A.I.R. 1953 Madras 117.

2 S.C.R.

only State which had the power to impose a tax. This Court also in the majority judgment in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal(1) while summarising the position as it obtained before the enactment of the Constitution incidentally ei<:pressed its opinion in this behalf at p, 1078 as under :"As pointed out by the Privy Council in the Wallace Brothers case( ) in dealing with the competency of the Indian Legislature to impose tax on the income arising abroad to a non-resident foreign company, the constitutional validity of the relevant statutory pro';isions did not turn on the possession by thi:: legislature of extra-territorial powers but on the existence of a sufficient territorial connection between the taxing State and what it seeks to tax. In the case of sales-tax it is not necessary that the sale or purchase should take place within the territorial limits of the State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale like the agreement to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods, etc.. should have a territorial connection with the State. Broadly speaking local activities cf buying or selling carried on in the State in relation to local goods would be a sufficient basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, provided of course. such activities ultimatelv resulted in a concluded sale or purchase to be taxed".· In another case decided immediatelv thereafter Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras(3) this Court understood this expression of opinion in the majority judgment as laying down the principle of territorial connection or nexus :--· "It :idmits of no dispute that a Provincial Legislature could not pass a taxation statute which would be binding on anv other part of India outside the limits of the Province. but it would be quite ccmpetent to .enact a legislation imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the Province, provided that there was sufficient and a real territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing Province. This principle, which is based upon the decision of the Judicial Committee i!1 Wallace Brothers & Companv v. (I) [1'153] S.C.R. 1069.

(2) [1948] F.C.R. I.

(3) [1953] S.C.R. 677.

The Bengal •Immunity Comp1J11y Limilltl The State of Bih• and others BhagwaJi J.

The&IJgal

Immunity Company Limited

The Slate of Bihar and other,' Bha.11,WQti j.

[1955]

Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay( 1 ) has been held by this court to be applicable to sale tax legislation, in its recent decision in the· Bombay Sales Ta:r: Art case(2) and its propriety is beyond question. As :i matter of fact, the legislative practice in regard to sale tax· laws adopted by the Provincial Legislatures prior to the coming into force of the Constitution has been to authorise imposition of taxes on sales and purchases which were related in some manner with the taxing Province by reason of some of the ingredients of the transaction having taken place within the Province or by reason of the production or location of goods within it at the time when the transaction took place'°. It may be observed that in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal the question of the territorial connection or nexus was not directly in dispute and in Poppatlal's case(') referred to above it was taken as decided by this C->urt in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal that the theory of territorial connection or nexus was applicable to sales tax legislation. It is a moot point whether this theory of territorial connection or nexus which has been mainly applied .in income-tax cases is also appkable to sales ta:-r legislation, the 'pheres of an income-tax legislation and sales tax legislation being quite distinct. 'Vhereas in the case of income-tax legislation the tax is levied either on a person who is within the territory by exercising jurisdiction over him in personam or upon income which has accrued or arisen to him or· is deemed to have accrued or arisen to him or has been derived by him from sourcrs within the territory and it is therefore germane to enquirt whether any part of such income has accrued or arisen or has been derived from a source within the territory, in the case of sales-tax legislation it is the sale or purchase of goods which is the subject-matter of taxation and it cannot be predicated that the sale or purchase takes place at one or more places where the necessary ingredients of sale happen to be located. The theory of territorial connection or nexus was not put to the test at any time prior to the enactment of (I) [1948] F.C.R. J,

(2) [1953] S.C.R. IO!i9.

(3) [1953] S.C.R. 6i7

2 S.C.R.

the Constitution and it is not necessary also for us to give a definite pronouncement on the subject. Suffice it to say that there was this evil which was rampant in the pre-Constitution period by reason of the various States fastening upon one or more ingredients of the sale and arrogating to themselves the power to tax sales or purchases of goods by reason of the territorial connection or nexus which they claimed to have with one or more of the ingredients of the sale provided however that a sale or purchase ultimately did take place either within their territories or anywhen: else. It was this evil amongst others which was sought to be remedied by the Constitution-makers when they came to enact article 286 of the Constitution. The Constitution-makers enacted several provisions in Part XIII relating to trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India with an eye towards India. as an economic unit and enacted in ahicle 301 that trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free and by article 302 they empowered the Parliament to impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest. Broad based on this conception of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India and also with a view inter alia to relieve the consumer of the burden of multiple taxation which he was subjected to by the various State Legislatures by having resort to the territorial connection or nexus theory as afort>said the Constitution-makers in article 286 enacted restrictions on the power of the State Legislatures in regard to the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods and these restrictions were fourfold :(I) State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place outside the State; (2) The State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of thr

Tk Bengal Immunity Company Limited

The State of Bihar and others Bhagwati ].

TheBmpl lmmuniry Company LimiUd

The Stau of Bihar and others Bhagwati J.

[1955]

import of the goods into or export of the goods out of the territory of India; ( 3) The State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce except in so far as the Parliament might by law otherwise provide; and ( 4) The State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as had been declared by Parliament by law as essential for the life of the community unless such law had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent. These were the four restrictions which were put upon the powers of the State Legislatures to impose a tax on the sales or purchases of goods and were imposed with different objectives in view. The first restriction was devised to achieve the objective of relieving the consumer of the burden of multiple taxation and put it out of the power of a State to tax the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place outside the State. The Sale of Goods Act contained several provisions which determined when a sale or purchase took place or in other words when the property in the goods sold passed from the seller to the purchaser. But it was silent in regard to the place where the sale or purchase took place. There was no rule of law enacted therem which determined the situs or location of such sale or purchase and resort was therefore had to the general law of the land for the purpose. The territorial connection or nexus rheory had an eye over the various ingredients of a sale or purchase and if anyone or more , of these ingredients fixed the situs or the location of 'the sale it would mean that a sale had more situses or locations than one. This state of affairs could not be allowed to continue any further having reg"d to the interests of the consumer and it was therefore thought necessary, when the State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place outside the State, also to determine when

2 S.C.R.

such sale or purchase could be said to take place outside the State. It was for this purpose that the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) was enacted and it was enacted for the express purpose therein mentioned, viz., "for the purposes of sub-clause (a)". The Explanation was thus enacted for the express purpose of determining what sales or purchases could be said to have taken place outside the State and the basic idea which was adopted therein was that under the general law relating to Sale of Goods property in the goods would by reason of such sale or purchase pass in a particular State which would therefore be the situs or location of such sale or purchase. But notwithstanding that fact the sale or purchase was deemed to have taken place in the. State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purposes of consumption in that State. The anti-thesis appears to have been between the State in which the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed and the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State and in the competition between these two States the Explanation provided that the sale or purchase in those circumstances shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goo<ls have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption therein. This Explanation was interpreted in various ways, one view being that it defined an outside sale and went no further :m(\ that the situs of the sale was determined for the limited purpose of telling the State what it could not tax by telling it that in the cases covered by the EXj'hnatinn in spite of the property in the goods having passed within its territories it was an outside sale qua that State. The other view was that besides fixing the situs of sale in this manner it also defined what was a sale or purchase which shall be deemed to inve taken place in the delivery State and thus fulfilled a double function of investing only the delivery State with the power to tax such sale or pur-

The Bengal Immunity Company limited The State of Biha' and oth.,s Bhagwati ,7.

Tht Btn..t:al Immunity Company Limited

The State of Bihar and olhtr.t Bhagwati ].

[1955]

cha;e to the exclusion of all other· States qua whom the sale or purchase was deemed to be an outside sale. The third view was that the Explanation was concerned with fixing the situs of sale in respe.:t of the delivery State only and did not affect the power of the State in which the property in the goods had passed to tax such sale or purchase which it enjoyed by reason of the fact that the property in the goods had passed within its territories. A fourth possible view was that the only State which could not tax such sale or purchase on the ground that the sale was outside the State was the State in which the property in the guu,ls had passed leaving open to the other States to tax such sales or purchases by having resort to the power which they possesml under article· 246(3) and Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Whatever be the correct view to take of this Explanation one fact remained that article 286 (l)(a) and the Explanation thereto were enacted with the one and only motive to relieve the consumer of the burden of multiple taxation to which he wos subjected by having .resort to the territorial connection or nexus theory and to replace the nexus theory by what may be described as the situs theory fixing the situs or the location of the sale or purchase a1~d putting a restriction on the taxing power of the States qua which it could be predicated that such sale or purchase took place outside the State, thus leaviqg only actually one State in which the goods have been delivere<l as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption therein free to tax the sale or purchase having resort to the powers vested in the State Legislature by article 246( 3) and Entr)' 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. If therefore the situs or location of the sale was laid down as the criterion of the taxing power of the State the non-obstante clause contained in the Explanation gave the clue as to what was in mind of the Constitution-makers when they substituted the situs theory in place of the nexus theory which theretofore prevailed. They took cognisance of the general law

2 S.C.R.

relating to the sale of goods under which the property in the goods passed by reason of such sale or pur- . Thi B1ngal lmmunii, chase. The conception of the transfer of ownership Compon;• Lirnitd of the goods by the seller to the purchase was thus of Bill• accepted by them as determining the situs or loca- Thi Stott and otliln tion of the sale or purchase and this conception had Bhtlgwoti ]. its roots in the relevant provisions of the Sale of Goods Acts both in India and in England and in spite of the fact that those provisions did not in terms say where the sale took place or the transfer of ownership came about or the property in the goods passed by reason of such sale or purchase, the general law relating to sale of goods was taken in the . Explanation to fix the situs or location of such sale or pur<:hase within the territories of a particular State and that event could only take place in one State and not in more .States than one. There could be onlv one situs or location of the sale or purchase and if that were so the State in whose territories such sale or purchase took place or in which the property in the goods passed by reason of such sale or purchase was the State which could claim the power to tax such sale or purchase by reason of its having taken place within its territory. It would therefore appear that the Constitution-makers had in enacting the Expla.nation the one and only motive of negativing the territorial connection or nexus theory and replacing it by the situs theory and fixing the situs or location of the sale or purchase withiri the State in which the property in the goods passed by reason of such sale or purchase. While doing so they also created a legal fiction whereby in the competition between what may be called the title State and the delivery State the delivery State was given the power to impose a tax on sale or purchase of goods where the goods had actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State. If the object to be achieved was the relief of the consumer from the burden of multiple taxation that object could only be achieved by subjecting him to taxation at the instance of one State only and not by more States than one and to that C'XtCtt the view

-·

~4 S. C. Jndia/59

The Bengal Immunity

C.mpany Limil•d y.

T111:s1ate of Bih.ar and otkws

[1955]

that both the title State and the delivery State woul<l be entitled to impose the tax on the sale or purchase falling within the Explanation was clearly erroneous, the only State which would be in a position to tax the sale or purcha

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