Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu
Landmark judgment · Criminal law — Statements to NDPS officers under Section 67 are not admissible as confessions.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 29 October 2020
- Judge
- Justice R.F. Nariman
- Neutral citation
- 2020 INSC 620
- Reported in
- [2020] 12 S.C.R. 583
- Result
- Directions issued
- Acts & sections
- Section 25 Evidence Act, Section 67 NDPS Act, Section 173 CrPC, Section 36A NDPS Act, Section 53 NDPS Act, Section 161 CrPC, Section 190 CrPC, Section 162 CrPC
- Subject
- Criminal, Property & land
Full judgment
[2020] 12 S.C.R. 583
TOFAN SINGH
v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013 Etc.) OCTOBER 29, 2020
[R. F. NARIMAN, NAVIN SINHA AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.] Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985: ss. 42, 53 and 67 – Power under s. 67 – Extent, nature, purpose and scope of – Confession made under – Before the officers designated u/ss. 42 or 53 – Whether admissible as a substantive evidence – Held: Statement recorded under s. 67 cannot be admitted as a substantive evidence – To hold that such statement can be the basis to convict a person under the Act would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Arts. 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.
Evidence Act, 1872: s.25 – Officers invested with powers u/s. 53 of NDPS Act – Are ‘Police Officers’ within the meaning of s. 25 – Therefore, any confessional statement made to such officers, would be barred u/s. 25. s.25 – ‘Police Officers’ – s. 25 – Held: Expression ‘Police Officers’ in s.25 does not only mean a police officer who belongs to State Police force, but includes officers who may belong to other departments – Where limited powers of investigation are given to officers for some purpose other than the prevention and detection of crime, such persons cannot be said to be police officers – Where a person, not a police officer properly so called, if invested with all powers of investigation, which culminates in filing of police report, such person can be called police officer.
Interpretation of statutes: Marginal note – Is an important internal tool for indicating the meaning and purpose of a Section in a statute.
Words and Phrases: ‘Enquiry’ – Meaning of Expression ‘Custody’ – Meaning of – Distinction from the expression ‘arrest’. ‘Police Officer’ – Meaning in the context of s. 25 of Evidence
Act.
Answering the Reference, the Court PER R. F. NARIMAN, J (FOR HIMSELF AND NAVIN SINHA, J.)
HELD: 1.1. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) is to be construed in the backdrop of Article 20(3) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The fundamental rights contained in Articles 20(3) and 21 are given pride of place in the Constitution. By the 44 th Amendment to the Constitution, it is now provided that even in an Emergency, these rights cannot be suspended – see Article 359(1). The interpretation of a statute like the NDPS Act must be in conformity and in tune with the spirit of the broad fundamental right not to incriminate oneself, and the right to privacy. A delicate balance is maintained between the power of the State to maintain law and order, and the fundamental rights chapter which protects the liberty of the individual. Several safeguards are thus contained in the NDPS Act, which is of an extremely drastic and draconian nature. [Para 27][662-F-G] 1.2 Section 25 of Evidence Act, 1872 states that a confession made to any police officer, whatever his rank, cannot be relied upon against a person accused of any offence. “Police officer” is not defined in the Evidence Act or in any cognate criminal statute. Section 25 is to be viewed in contrast to section 24, given the situation in India of the use of torture and third-degree measures. Unlike section 24, any confession made to a police officer cannot be used as evidence against a person accused of an offence, the voluntariness or otherwise of the confession being irrelevant – it is conclusively presumed by the legislature that all such confessions made to police officers are tainted with the vice of coercion. [Para 29][664-B-D]
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
The ‘First Report of Her Majesty’s Commissioners Appointed to Consider the Reform of the Judicial Establishments, Judicial Procedure and Laws of India & C.’ (1856) – referred to.
1.3 The interpretation of the term “accused” in section 25 of the Evidence Act is materially different from that contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The scope of the section is not limited by time – it is immaterial that the person was not an accused at the time when the confessional statement was made. Thus, whereas a formal accusation is necessary for invoking the protection under Article 20(3), the same would be irrelevant for invoking the protection under section 25 of the Evidence Act. [Paras 31 and 33][665-B-C; 666-D] 1.4 Section 26 of the Evidence Act extends the protection to confessional statements made by persons while “in the custody” of a police-officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. “Custody” is not synonymous with “arrest” – custody could refer to a situation pre-arrest. In fact, section 46 of the CrPC speaks of “a submission to the custody by word or action”, which would, inter alia, refer to a voluntary appearance before a police officer without any formal arrest being made. [Para 34][666-D-F] State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Ors. [1963] 2 SCR 10; State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [1961] 1 SCR 14; K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1: [2017] 10 SCR 569 – followed. Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978) 2 SCC 424: [1978] 3 SCR 608; Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263; State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [1961] 1 SCR 14; Agnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar [1966] 1 SCR 134; State of Haryana and Ors. v. Dinesh Kumar (2008) 3 SCC 222: [2008] 1 SCR 281 – relied on.
M.P. Sharma and Ors. v. Satish Chandra [1954] SCR 1077 – stood overruled.
2.1 The interplay between the CrPC and the provisions of the NDPS Act is contained in several provisions. CrPC has been expressly excluded when it comes to suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under the NDPS Act – see Section 32A. Equally, nothing contained in section 360 of the CrPC or in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is to apply to a person convicted of an offence under the NDPS Act, subject to the exceptions that such person is under 18 years of age, and that that offence only be punishable under section 26 or 27 of the NDPS Act – see section 33. On the other hand, CrPC has been made expressly applicable by sections 34(2), 36B, 50(5) and 51 of NDPS Act. Equally, CrPC has been applied with necessary modifications under sections 36A(1)(b), 37(1)(b) and 53A of NDPS Act. Read with sections 4(2) and 5 of CrPC, the scheme of the NDPS Act seems to be that CrPC is generally followed, except where expressly excluded, or applied with modifications. [Paras 37 and 38][668-A-C; D-F] 2.2 Given the stringent nature of the NDPS Act, several sections provide safeguards so as to provide a balance between investigation and trial of offences under the Act, and the fundamental rights of the citizen. Several safeguards are contained in section 42. From this section it is clear that only when the concerned officer has “reason to believe” from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that an offence has been committed, that the concerned officer may, only between sunrise and sunset, enter, search, seize drugs and materials, and arrest any person who he believes has committed any offence. By the first proviso, this can be done only by an officer not below the rank of sub-inspector. Under sub-section (2) in addition, where the information in writing is given, the officer involved must send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior within seventy-two hours. It is important here to contrast “reason to believe” with the expression “reason to suspect”, which is contained in section 49 of the NDPS Act. [Paras 45 and 46][674-B; 675-E-H] A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala (2004) 11 SCC 576 : [2004] 3 SCR 44 – relied on.
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
2.3 Section 50 of the NDPS Act contains extremely important conditions under which a search of persons shall be conducted. Section 52(1)-(3) contains three separate safeguards, insofar as disposal of persons arrested and articles seized are concerned. Section 57 then speaks of a person making an arrest or seizure having to make a full report of all the particulars of such arrest or seizure to his immediate official superior within forty-eight hours. Equally, under section 57A, whenever any officer notified under section 53 makes an arrest or seizure under the Act, the officer shall make a report of the illegally acquired properties of such person to the jurisdictional competent authority within ninety days of the arrest or seizure. Section 58 more than any other provision, makes it clear that a person’s privacy is not to be trifled with, because if it is, the officer who trifles with it is himself punishable under the provision. Under section 63, which contains the procedure in making confiscations, the first proviso to sub-section (2) makes it clear that no order of confiscation of an article or thing shall be made until the expiry of one month from the date of seizure, or without hearing any person who may claim any right thereto and the evidence which he produces in respect of his claim. [Paras 47, 52, 53 and 54][676-D-E; 685-GH; 686-A-B, F-G]
State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 174 – followed.
Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (2011) 1 SCC 609 : [2010] 13 SCR 255 – referred to. 2.4 The NDPS Act is predominantly a penal statute. Given the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, together with the safeguards mentioned in the provisions, the statutes like the NDPS Act have to be construed bearing in mind the fact that the severer the punishment, the greater the care taken to see that the safeguards provided in the statute are scrupulously followed. [Para 55][686-H; 687-A]
State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172: [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 174 – followed.
Directorate of Revenue and Anr. v. Mohammed Nisar Holia (2008) 2 SCC 370; Union of India v. Bal Mukund (2009) 12 SCC 161: [2009] 5 SCR 205 – relied on. 3.1 The marginal note to section 67 NDPS Act indicates that it refers only to the power to “call for information, etc.” A marginal note is an important internal tool for indicating the meaning and purpose of a section in a statute, as it indicates the “drift” of the provision. [Para 59]]689-F] K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Anr. (1981) 4 SCC 173 : [1982] 1 SCR 629 – relied on. 3.2 It is only an officer referred to in section 42 of NDPS Act who may use the powers given under section 67 in order to make an “enquiry” in connection with the contravention of any provision of this Act. The word “enquiry” has been used in section 67 to differentiate it from “inquiry” as used in section 53A, which is during the course of investigation of offences. The notifications issued under the Act soon after the Act came into force, specifically speak of the powers conferred under section 42(1) read with section 67. This is an important executive reading of the NDPS Act, which makes it clear that the powers to be exercised under section 67 are to be exercised in conjunction with the powers that are delineated in section 42(1). [Para 60][690-B-D] Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Assn. Ltd. (1979) 4 SCC 565: [1979] 3 SCR 373 – referred to.
3.3 The officer referred to in section 42 is given powers of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant, with the safeguards. The first safeguard is that such officer must have “reason to believe”, which is different from mere “reason to suspect”. It is for this reason that such officer must make an enquiry in connection with the contravention of the provisions of this Act, for otherwise, even without such enquiry, mere suspicion of the commission of an offence would be enough. It is in this enquiry that he has to call for “information” under sub-clause
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
(a), which “information” can be given by any person and taken down in writing, as is provided in section 42(1). Further, the information given must be for the purpose of “satisfying” himself that there has been a contravention of the provisions of this Act, which again goes back to the expression “reason to believe” in section 42. Therefore, it cannot be said that “enquiry” in section 67 is the same as “investigation”, which is referred to in section 53. [Para 61][691-C-F]
3.4 By virtue of section 2(xxix) of the NDPS Act, the definition u/s. 2(h) becomes applicable to the use of the expression “investigation” in section 53 of the NDPS Act. It is an inclusive definition, by which, “evidence” is collected by a police officer or a person authorised by the Magistrate. The “enquiry” that is made by a section 42 officer is so that such officer may gather “information” to satisfy himself that there is “reason to believe” that an offence has been committed in the first place. This becomes even clearer from section 52(3), whereunder every person arrested and article seized under sections 41 to 44 shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay either to the officer-incharge of the nearest police station, who must then proceed to “investigate” the case given to him, or to the officer empowered under section 53 of the NDPS Act, which officer then “investigates” the case in order to find out whether an offence has been committed under the Act. It is clear, therefore, that section 67 is at an antecedent stage to the “investigation”, which occurs after the concerned officer under section 42 has “reason to believe”, upon information gathered in an enquiry made in that behalf, that an offence has been committed. [Paras 63 and 64][692-C-G] 3.5 In section 67(c) of the NDPS Act, the expression used is “examine” any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. The “examination” of such person is again only for the purpose of gathering information so as to satisfy himself that there is “reason to believe” that an offence has been committed. This can, by no stretch of imagination, be equated to a “statement” under section 161 of the CrPC. [Para 65][692-GH]
Sahoo v. State of U.P. [1965] 3 SCR 86 – held not applicable. 3.6 Equating confession u/s. 67 as statement u/s. 161 Cr. P.C. flies in the face of the fundamental rights contained in Articles 20(3) and 21, as well as the scheme of the NDPS Act, together with the safeguards. First and foremost, a police officer, properly so-called, may be authorised to call for information etc. under section 67, as he is an officer referred to in section 42(1). Yet, while “investigating” an offence under the NDPS Act i.e. subsequent to the collection of information etc. under section 67, the same police officer will be bound by sections 160-164 of the CrPC, together with all the safeguards mentioned therein – firstly, that the person examined shall be bound to answer truly all questions relating to such case put to him, other than questions which would tend to incriminate him; secondly, the police officer is to reduce this statement into writing and maintain a separate and true record of this statement; thirdly, the statement made may be recorded by audio-video electronic means to ensure its genuineness; and fourthly, a statement made by a woman can only be made to a woman police officer or any woman officer. Even after all these safeguards are met, no such statement can be used at any inquiry or trial, except for the purpose of contradicting such witness in cross-examination. [Para 66][693B-E] Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [1959] Supp (2) SCR 875 – followed.
3.7 If a confessional statement made under section 67 is considered sufficient as substantive evidence to convict an accused under the NDPS Act, section 53A would be rendered otiose. Sections 53 and 53A of the NDPS Act, when read together, would make it clear that section 53A is in the nature of an exception to sections 161, 162 and 172 of the CrPC. This is for the reason that section 53(1), when it invests certain officers or classes of officers with the power of an officer in charge of a police station for investigation of offences under the NDPS Act, refers to Chapter XII of the CrPC, of which sections 161, 162 and 172 are a part. First and foremost, under section 162(1) of the CrPC,
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
statements that are made in the course of investigation are not required to be signed by the person making them – under section 53A they can be signed by the person before an officer empowered under section 53. Secondly, it is only in two circumstances [under section 53A(1)(a) and (b)] that such a statement is made relevant for the purpose of proving an offence against the accused: it is only if the person who made the statement is dead, cannot be found, is incapable of giving evidence; or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or whose presence cannot be obtained without delay or expense which the court considers unreasonable, that such statement becomes relevant. Otherwise, if the person who made such a statement is examined as a witness, and the court thinks that in the interest of justice such statement should be made relevant and does so, then again, such statement may become relevant. None of this would be necessary if a confessional statement made under section 67 – not being bound by any of these constraints – would be sufficient to convict the accused. [Para 72][697-D-H; 698-A-B]
H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi [1955] 1 SCR 1150 – relied on. Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) 2020 SCC OnLine SC 700 – distinguished.
Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627: [2018] 9 SCR 1006; State v. V. Jayapaul (2004) 5 SCC 223 – referred to. 3.8 An officer-in-charge of a police station, when he investigates an offence, begins by gathering information, in the course of which he may collect evidence relating to the commission of the offence, which would include search and seizure of things in the course of investigation, to be produced at the trial. Under the scheme of the NDPS Act, it is possible that the same officer who is authorised under section 42 is also authorised under section 53. The Notifications S.O. 822 (E) and S.O. 823 (E) dated 14.11.1985 issued by Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) indicate that officers of and above the rank of Inspector in the Departments of Central Excise, Customs,
Revenue Intelligence, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau and Narcotics Control Bureau were authorised to act under both sections 42 and 53. These notifications dated 14.11.1985 were superseded by Notifications S.O. 3901 (E) and S.O. 3899 (E) issued by the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) on 30.10.2019. Even the new Notifications dated 30.10.2019 indicate that the powers under sections 42 and 53 of the NDPS Act are invested in officers of and above the rank of inspectors in the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, Central Bureau of Narcotics, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau and of and above the rank of Junior Intelligence Officer in Narcotics Control Bureau. [Paras 78, 80 and 81][702-C-E, G; 703-B-C; 704-C] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 201 – relied on.
4.1 Where limited powers of investigation are given to officers primarily or predominantly for some purpose other than the prevention and detection of crime, such persons cannot be said to be police officers under section 25 of the Evidence Act. A “police officer” does not have to be a police officer in the narrow sense of being a person who is a police officer so designated attached to a police station. Where a person who is not a police officer properly so-called is invested with all powers of investigation, which culminates in the filing of a police report, such officers can be said to be police officers within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as when they prevent and detect crime, they are in a position to extort confessions, and thus are able to achieve their object through a shortcut method of extracting involuntary confessions. [Para 126][732-E-H] 4.2 There is distinction between the investigative powers of officers who are designated in statutes primarily meant for revenue or railway purposes, as against officers who are designated under section 53 of the NDPS Act: first, that section 53 is located in a statute which contains provisions for the prevention, detection and punishment of crimes of a very serious nature. Even if the NDPS Act is to be construed as a statute which regulates and exercises control over narcotic drugs and
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
psychotropic substances, the prevention, detection and punishment of crimes related thereto cannot be said to be ancillary to such object, but is the single most important and effective means of achieving such object. This is unlike the revenue statutes where the main object was the due realisation of customs duties and the consequent ancillary checking of smuggling of goods (as in the Land Customs Act, 1924, the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and the Customs Act, 1962); the levy and collection of excise duties (as in the Central Excise Act, 1944); or as in the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession Act), 1966, the better protection and security of Railway property. Second, unlike the revenue statutes and the Railway Act, all the offences to be investigated by the officers under the NDPS Act are cognizable. Third, that section 53 of the NDPS Act, unlike the aforesaid statutes, does not prescribe any limitation upon the powers of the officer to investigate an offence under the Act, and therefore, it is clear that all the investigative powers vested in an officer in charge of a police station under the CrPC – including the power to file a charge-sheet – are vested in these officers when dealing with an offence under the NDPS Act. This is wholly distinct from the limited powers vested in officers under the aforementioned revenue and railway statutes for ancillary purposes, which were in aid of the dominant object of the statutes in question, not primarily concerned with the prevention and detection of crime, unlike the NDPS Act. Also, importantly, none of those statutes recognised the power of the State police force to investigate offences under those Acts together with the officers mentioned in those Acts, as is the case in the NDPS Act. No question of manifest arbitrariness or discrimination on the application of Article 14 of the Constitution of India would therefore arise in those cases, unlike cases which arise under the NDPS Act. [Para 132][736-G-H; 737-A-D; F-G]
4.3 When sections 53 and 53A are seen together in the context of a statute which deals with prevention and detection of crimes of a very serious nature, it becomes clear that these sections cannot be construed in the same manner as sections contained in revenue statutes and railway protection statutes. [Para 133][737-H; 738-A]
4.4 It is clear that the designated officer under section 53, invested with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station, is to forward a police report stating the particulars that are mentioned in section 173(2) CrPC. Because of the special provision contained in section 36A(1) of the NDPS Act, this police report is not forwarded to a Magistrate, but only to a Special Court under section 36A(1)(d). The non obstante clause contained in section 36A(1) makes it clear that the drill of section 36A of NDPS Act is to be followed notwithstanding anything contained in section 2(d) of the CrPC. It is obvious that section 36A(1)(d) is inconsistent with section 2(d) and section 190 of the CrPC and therefore, any complaint that has to be made can only be made under section 36A(1)(d) of NDPS Act to a Special Court, and not to a Magistrate under section 190 CrPC [Para 137][741-B-E] 4.5. It cannot be said that the procedure under section 190 Cr. P.C. has been replaced only in part, the police report and complaint procedure under section 190 not being displaced by section 36A(1)(d). Section 36A(1)(d) specifies a scheme which is completely different from that contained in the CrPC. Whereas under section 190 of the CrPC it is the Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence, under section 36A(1)(d) it is only a Special Court that takes cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. Secondly, the “complaint” referred to in section 36A(1)(d) is not a private complaint that is referred to in section 190(1)(a) of the CrPC, but can only be by an authorised officer. Thirdly, section 190(1)(c) of the CrPC is conspicuous by its absence in section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act – the Special Court cannot, upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon its own knowledge, take cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. Further, a Special Court under section 36A is deemed to be a Court of Session, for the applicability of the CrPC, under section 36C of the NDPS Act. A Court of Session under section 193 of the CrPC cannot take cognizance as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate. However, under section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act, a Special Court may take cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act without the accused being committed to it for trial. It
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
is obvious, therefore, that in view of section 36A(1)(d), nothing contained in section 190 of the CrPC can be said to apply to a Special Court taking cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. [Para 137][741-E-H; 742-A-B]
4.6. Also, the officer designated under section 53 by the Central Government or State Government to investigate offences under the NDPS Act, need not be the same as the officer authorised by the Central Government or State Government under section 36A(1)(d) to make a complaint before the Special Court. As a matter of fact, if the Central Government is to invest an officer with the power of an officer in charge of a police station under sub-section (1) of section 53, it can only do so after consultation with the State Government, which requirement is conspicuous by its absence when the Central Government authorises an officer under section 36A(1)(d). Also, both section 53(1) and (2) refer to officers who belong to particular departments of Government. Section 36A(1)(d) does not restrict the officer that can be appointed for the purpose of making a complaint to only an officer belonging to a department of the Central/State Government. There can also be a situation where officers have been designated under section 53 by the Government, but not so designated under section 36A(1)(d). It cannot be that in the absence of the designation of an officer under section 36A(1)(d), the culmination of an investigation by a designated officer under section 53 ends up by being an exercise in futility. [Para 138][742C-F] 4.7 Section 59 of the NDPS Act is an important pointer to when cognizance of an offence can take place only on a complaint, and not by way of a police report. By section 59(3), both in the case of an offence under section 59(1) [which is punishable for a term which may extend to one year] or in the case of an offence under section 59(2) [which is punishable for a term which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to 20 years], no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under section 59(1) or (2), except on a complaint in writing made with the previous sanction of the Central Government, or, as the case may be, the State Government. Thus, under section 59, in either case i.e. in a case where the trial takes place by a Magistrate for an offence
under section 59(1), or by the Special Court for an offence under section 59(2), cognizance cannot be taken either by the Magistrate or the Special Court, except on a complaint in writing. This provision is in terms markedly different from section 36A(1)(d), which provides two separate procedures for taking cognizance of offences made out under the NDPS Act. [Para 143][744-E-H] 4.8 It cannot be said that the “complaint” referred to in section 36A(1)(d) refers only to section 59 of the NDPS Act. A complaint can be made by a designated officer qua offences which arise under the NDPS Act – it is not circumscribed by a provision which requires previous sanction for an offence committed under section 58, as that would do violence to the plain language of section 36A(1)(d). It is always open, therefore, to the designated officer, designated this time for the purpose of filing a complaint under section 36A(1)(d), to do so before the Special Court, which is a separate procedure provided for under the special statute, in addition to the procedure to be followed under section 53. [Para 144][745-B-D] 4.9 It cannot be said that the power contained in section 53(1) is only a truncated power to investigate which does not culminate in a police report being filed because Section 53 does not use the expression “deemed”. The officer who is designated under section 53 can, by a legal fiction, be deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station, or can be given the powers of an officer in charge of a police station to investigate the offences under the NDPS Act. Whether he is deemed as an officer in charge of a police station, or given such powers, are only different sides of the same coin – the aforesaid officer is not, in either circumstance, a police officer who belongs to the police force of the State. To concede that a deeming fiction would give full powers of investigation, including the filing of a final report, to the designated officer, as against the powers of an officer in charge of a police station being given to a designated officer having only limited powers to investigate, does not stand to reason, and would be contrary to the express language and intendment of section 53(1). [Para 145][745-D-G]
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
4.10 When it is clear that the expression “police officers” does not only mean a police officer who belongs to the State police force, but includes officers who may belong to other departments, such as the Department of Excise who are otherwise invested with all powers of investigation so as to attract the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, it is not correct to say that police officers or policemen who belong to the police force are recognised in the NDPS Act as being separate and distinct from the officers of the Department of Narcotics, etc. If the distinction between police officer as narrowly defined and the officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau is something that is to be stressed, then any interpretation which would whittle down the fundamental rights of an accused based solely on the designation of a particular officer, would fall foul of Article 14, as the classification between the two types of officers would have no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question, which is the prevention and detection of crime. [Para 146][745-G-H; 746A-C]
4.11 Section 32 of POTA and section 15 of TADA are exceptions to section 25 of the Evidence Act in terms, unlike the provisions of the NDPS Act. Both these Acts, vide section 32 and section 15 respectively, have non-obstante clauses by which the Evidence Act has to give way to the provisions of these Acts. Pertinently, confessional statements made before police officers under the provisions of the POTA and TADA are made “admissible” in the trial of such person. This is distinct from the evidentiary value of statements made under the NDPS Act, where section 53A states that, in the circumstances mentioned therein, statements made by a person before any officer empowered under section 53 shall merely be “relevant” for the purpose of proving the truth of any facts contained in the said statement. Therefore, statements made before the officer under section 53, even when “relevant” under section 53A, cannot, without corroborating evidence, be the basis for the conviction of an accused. Also, when confessional statements are used under the TADA and POTA, they are used with several safeguards which are contained in these sections themselves. Additional safeguards/guidelines were issued by the Court in *kartar Singh case in respect of TADA
cases to ensure that the confession obtained in the course of investigation by a police officer “is not tainted with any vice but is in strict conformity with the well-recognised and accepted aesthetic principles and fundamental fairness”. Insofar as POTA is concerned, procedural safeguards while recording confessions have been discussed in ** Navjot Sandhu case. Thus, to arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated under section 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India. [Paras 149 and 150 - 152][749-A-E; 750FG; 753-G-H; 754-A] *Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569: [1994] 2 SCR 375; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 417: [2008] 10 SCR 379; Nirmal Singh Pehlwan v. Inspector, Customs (2011) 12 SCC 298: [2011] 9 SCR 446 – relied on. **State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600: [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79 – referred to.
5. Thus, the officers who are invested with powers under section 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act. A statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. [Para 155][754-C-F] Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 409: [1990] 2 SCR 63; Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India (2008) 4 SCC 668: [2008] 1 SCR 350 – overruled. State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram [1962] 3 SCR 338; Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar [1964] 2 SCR 752; Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore [1966] 3 SCR 698;
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal [1969] 2 SCR 461; Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras [1969] 2 SCR 613; State of U.P. v. Durga Prasad (1975) 3 SCC 210: [1975] 1 SCR 881; Balkishan A. Devidayal v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 4 SCC 600: [1981] 1 SCR 175; State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing and Anr. (1997) 6 SCC 514: [1997] 2 Suppl. SCR 234; Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1346; John Thomas v. Dr. K. Jagadeesan (2001) 6 SCC 30: [2001] 3 SCR 934 ; Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2013) 16 SCC 31: [2013] 9 SCR 962; Abdul Rashid v. State of Bihar (2001) 9 SCC 578; D.K. Basu v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 416: [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284 – referred to.
PER INDIRA BANERJEE, J. (DISSENTING) 1.1 The scheme of the NDPS Act makes it patently clear that it essentially makes provisions, as are deemed necessary, for preventing and combating the abuse of and illicit trade and trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. [Para 43][766-B] 1.2 However, despite an elaborate statutory framework, the NDPS Act is not being effectively implemented. Illicit business in and consumption of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is endangering the social and economic stability of India and the developing countries, adversely affecting the health of the people, causing malnutrition related ailments, causing a spurt in crimes and increase in the spread of communicable diseases such as AIDS (Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome), caused by sharing of needles for administration of narcotic drugs. The lure of money, vulnerability of adolescents, poverty and other facets of socio-economic deprivations aggravate this menace and provide sustenance to the racketeers involved in this flourishing illicit business. [Paras 47 and 48][768-A-D]
1.3 Socio-economic crimes i.e. “white collar crimes” affect the health and material welfare of the community as a whole, as against that of an individual victim, and are, by and large,
committed not by disadvantaged low class people, but by very affluent and immensely powerful people, who often exploit the less advantaged, to execute their nefarious designs. Such crimes have to be dealt with firmly and cannot be equated with other crimes, committed by individual offenders against individual victims. [Para 50][769-G-H; 770-A] Article “Narcotic Aggression and Operation Counter Attack” by the Mainstream dated March 7, 1992; The Law Commission of India, in its 155th Report on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – referred to. 2.1 It is a well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed innocent, unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, except where the statute, on existence of certain circumstances, casts a reverse burden on the accused, to dispel the presumption of guilt, as in the case of Section 304B of the Penal Code and many other statutes, particularly those dealing with socio economic offences. The Legislature may, in public interest, create an offence of strict liability where mens rea is not necessary. There are presumptive provision in the NDPS Act, such as Sections 35, 54 and 66. Under Section 54 of the NDPS Act presumption of commission of an offence may, inter alia, be drawn from the possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, or any apparatus for manufacture or preparation thereof. The presumption is rebuttable. [Para 52][770-C-E] 2.2. The punishments prescribed for many of the offences under the NDPS Act are very severe. When a statute has drastic penal provisions, the authorities investigating the crime under such law, have a greater duty of care, and the investigation must not only be thorough, but also of a very high standard. [Para 53][770-F; 771-B] 2.3 There are inbuilt safeguards in the NDPS Act to protect a person accused of an offence under the said Act, from unnecessary harassment, or malicious or wrongful prosecution. Section 58 provides for punishment of any person, authorized under Section 42 or 43 or 44 for vexatious entry, search, seizure, or arrest. [Para 54][771-C-D]
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2.4 The condition precedent for exercise of power under Sections 41(2), 42(1), 43 or 44 is “reason to believe” and not just reason to “suspect” that the circumstances specified in the aforesaid provisions for action thereunder exist. The use of the words “reason to believe” in Sections 41, 42, 43 and 48 is in contradistinction with use of the phrase “Reason to Suspect”, in Section 49 of the NDPS Act. [Para 59][773-D-E]
A. S. Krishnan and Ors. v. State of Kerala (2004) 11 SCC 576: [2004] 3 SCR 44; Income Tax Officer, I Ward, District VI, Calcutta and Ors. v. Lakhmani Mewal Das (1976) 3 SCC 757: [1976] 3 SCR 956 – relied on. 2.5 The NDPS Act is a complete code. The NDPS Act specifically makes some provisions of the Cr.P.C applicable to proceedings under the NDPS Act. The Act is very specific on which of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. are to apply to proceedings under the NDPS Act. [Para 68][775-G-H] 2.6 Section 5 specifically provides that nothing in the Cr.P.C shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special law in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred by any other law. The NDPS Act being a special enactment, nothing in the Cr.P.C can affect any investigation or inquiry under the NDPS Act, in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the NDPS Act. [Para 73][779-D-E] 2.7 Section 2(xxix) of the NDPS Act does not make the provisions of the Cr.P.C. applicable to any investigation or enquiry under the NDPS Act. The said Section only provides that words and expressions used in the NDPS Act, and not defined, but defined in the Cr.P.C. have the meanings assigned in the Cr.P.C., unless the context otherwise requires. [Para 74][779-E] 2.8 Section 53 enables the Central Government or the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to invest any officer of the Departments mentioned in the said Section, or any other Department of the Government, with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station for the investigation of offences under the said Act. If the provisions of the Cr.P.C were
to apply to investigations under the NDPS Act, it would not have been necessary to invest any officer under the NDPS Act with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station, for the purpose of investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act, by notification in the Official Gazette. The provisions of Section 50(5) and 51 of the NDPS Act would also not have been necessary. [Paras 76 and 77][780-B-D] 2.9 There does not appear to be any bar in Section 53 or anywhere else in the NDPS Act, to officers empowered under Sections 41(2) or 42, also being invested under Section 53, with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station for investigation of offences under Section 53 of the NDPS Act. [Para 78][780-E] 2.10 There does not appear to be any provision in Chapter V or elsewhere in the NDPS Act, which can reasonably be construed to render an officer under Section, 41(2) or 42(1) of the NDPS Act ‘functus officio’ once the entry, search, seizure or arrest has been made. [Para 79][780-G] 2.11 Section 53A of the NDPS Act is ex facie contradictory to Section 162 of the Cr.P.C, which provides that no statement made to a police officer, in course of an investigation under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it, or used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial in respect of the offences under investigation, except inter alia to confront him if he gives evidence as a witness. Section 53A covers any statement made and signed by any person, before any officer empowered under Section 53 for the investigation of offences, during the course of any proceedings by such officer, under the NDPS Act, be it an inquiry or investigation. This provision makes it abundantly clear that the principles embodied in Sections 161/162 of the Cr.P.C have no application to any inquiry or other proceeding under the NDPS Act, which would include an investigation. [Paras 81 and 82][781-F-H; 782-AB] State of Delhi v. Shri Ram Lohia AIR 1960 SC 490; George v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1998) 4 SCC 605 :
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
[1998] 2 SCR 303 ; Munshi Prasad and Ors. v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 351 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 25 – held inapplicable.
2.12 The NDPS Act, being a special statute, and in any case a later Central Act, the provisions of the NDPS Act would prevail, in case of any inconsistency between the NDPS Act and the Evidence Act. [Para 85][782-D-E] 2.13 The Evidence Act would however apply to a trial under the NDPS Act in other respects, unless a contrary intention appears from any specific provision of the NDPS Act. The previous statement of a witness, even if admissible in evidence cannot be used against the w itness unless the witness is confronted with the previous statement and given an opportunity to explain. However, certain documents not otherwise admissible under the Evidence Act, unless proved by evidence, may be admissible under Section 52A(4) of the NDPS Act, subject to the fulfilment of the conditions of that section. [Para 86][782-G; 783A]
Murli and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 9 SCC 417: [2009] 13 SCR 378 – referred to. 2.14 Legislature has in its wisdom used the expression “investigation of the offence” in Section 53, and the term “inquiry” in Section 67. Even though in common parlance “inquiry” and “investigation” are used interchangeably, “investigation” in Section 53 and “inquiry” in Section 67 cannot be construed to mean the same. When different words are used in the same statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. A construction deriving support from differing phraseology in different sections of a statute, may be negatived if it leads to unreasonable or irrational results. Accordingly Section 53A refers to a statement before any officer empowered under Section 53 for the investigation of offences during the course of any inquiry or proceeding by such officer. [Paras 90 - 93][784-G-H; 785-CE]
T.A. Krishnaswamy v. State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 1022 : [1966] SCR 31 – relied on.
Kanhaiyalal Vishindas Gidwani v. Arun Dattatreya Mehta (2001) 1 SCC 78 – referred to. 2.15 The NDPS Act does not define the expression “investigation” or the expression “inquiry”. However, Section 2(xxix) of the NDPS Act provides that the words and expressions used in the Act and not defined but defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. The definition of the terms ‘inquiry’ and ‘investigation’ as contained in Sections 2(g) and 2(h) of the Cr.P.C. [Paras 94 and 95][785-E-F] 2.16 The meaning of a word or expression used in a statute can be construed and understood as per its definition, unless the “context otherwise requires”. The definition of inquiry in Section 2(g) of the Cr.P.C. does not help to interpret the word inquiry in Section 67 of the NDPS Act or in any other provision of Chapter V thereof, since an inquiry under Chapter V of the NDPS Act is not by any Magistrate or Court. It is well settled that a word not specifically defined in a statute may be interpreted as per its ordinary meaning, which may be ascertained by reference to a dictionary. As per the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Eleventh Edition) the word investigate means ‘carry out a systematic or formal enquiry into an incident or allegation as to establish the truth’. Investigation, is the act of investigating. The word “enquire” is, as per the same dictionary, to ask for information. It also means “investigate”. Enquiry is the act of asking for information. It is an official investigation. Words and phrases in a statute have to be construed in the context in which they have been used. The statute has to be read as a whole. [Paras 96 and 97][786-A-D] Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Eleventh Edition) – referred to.
2.17 Having regard to the meaning of the expressions investigate/investigation and enquire/enquiry given in the Oxford Dictionary, the use of the expressions in Central Excise Act, 1944, Customs Act, 1962, Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 and Cr. P.C. and having regard to the language and tenor of
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Sections 53, 53A, and Section 67 of the NDPS Act, the expression “inquiry” may reasonably be construed as a generic expression, which could include the investigation of an offence. An inquiry as contemplated in Section 67 is the collection of information generally, to find out if there has been any contravention of the NDPS Act, whereas investigation is the probing of an offence under the NDPS Act and collection of materials to find out the truth of the case sought to be made out against an accused offender. However investigation may follow an enquiry or be part of an enquiry. This is evident from a reading of the NDPS Act as a whole. [Para 100][787-B-D]
2.18 An officer empowered under Section 53 with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station for the investigation of an offence, also has the power to make an inquiry. This is clear from the language used in Section 53A(1) of the NDPS Act. The officer empowered under Section 53, with the power of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station, can obviously make an inquiry within the meaning of Section 67 to find out whether there has been any contravention of the NDPS Act. A statement made before such an officer in course of any inquiry or other proceeding, which is taken down in writing and signed by the person making it, may in certain circumstances, be relevant for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under the NDPS Act, the truth of the facts it contains. [Para 102][787F-H; 788-A] 2.19 The power of an officer to investigate is not derived from Section 53. It is an enabling provision, which empowers the Central/State Government to invest an officer with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station, for the purpose of investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act. The power to invest an officer with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station flows from Section 53. The authority to investigate into an offence is implicit in the wider power to make an inquiry in connection with the contravention of any provision of the NDPS Act. [Para 103][788-B-C]
2.20 An enquiry may be carried out by an officer referred to in Section 42 of the NDPS Act, if empowered in this behalf.
This is clear from Section 67. The same officer can also investigate an offence under the NDPS Act, if he is also invested under Section 53, with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station, for the purpose of investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act. The power of an authorized officer referred to in Section 42, to make an inquiry is not derived from Section 67. Section 67 empowers an authorized officer, referred to in Section 42, to do the following acts during the course of an enquiry: “(a) call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder; (b) require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the enquiry; (c) examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.” [Paras 104-106][788D-E; F-H] 2.21 Investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act, is a part of an inquiry under Chapter V of the said Act. Investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act can be carried out by the same officer empowered under Section 42, who triggered the proceedings under Chapter V of the NDPS Act and carried out search, seizure and/or arrest, if that officer is also invested under Section 53 of the NDPS Act, with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station, for the purpose of investigation. [Para 107][789-A-B] Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) (2020) SCC Online SC 700 – followed.
2.22 The language and tenor of Section 67 or Sections 41/ 42 does not support the contention that an inquiry can only be made by an officer referred to in Section 42, who is duly authorized, before exercise of the powers of entry, search, seizure or arrest, or at the stage of entry, search, seizure and arrest, but not afterwards. The exercise of power under Sections 41/42 of the NDPS Act does not necessarily have to be preceded by an inquiry. If an inquiry were to be restricted to the stage prior to the exercise of the power of entry, search, seizure and arrest or to the stage of making an entry, search, seizure or arrest, the NDPS Act would have specifically provided so. There is no such provision, either express or implied. It is not permissible to read
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
into Sections 41, 42 etc the words “after an inquiry” which do not exist in those provisions. Nor is it permissible to read the words “before or at the time of entry, search, seizure or arrest” after the words “during the course of any enquiry” in Section 67. [Para 110][789-G-H; 790-A-C]
2.23 The power conferred by Section 67 on an officer referred to in Section 42, duly authorised by the Central/State Government in this behalf, to call for information, require production of any document or thing or to examine any person, etc. is exercisable in course of any inquiry. The power could be exercised at any stage of the enquiry, before a complaint is filed. The powers can be exercised prior to or after exercise of powers under Sections 41/42 and would include the stage of investigation of an offence by an officer referred to in Section 42, if he is also invested with powers under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. [Para 111][790-C-D]
2.24. An officer referred to in Section 42 of the NDPS Act, if not invested with powers under Section 53 of the said Act, derives the power to call for information, require production of documents and things and to examine persons from Section 67 of the NDPS Act. The powers of investigation of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station include such powers. An officer invested with powers under Section 53 can also make an enquiry. This is clear from the use of the words “A statement made and signed by a person before any officer empowered under Section 53 for the investigation of offences, during the course of any inquiry or proceedings by such officer, shall be relevant...” in Section 53A(1). The benefit of Section 53A(1) would not be available in the case of a similar statement made before an officer empowered under Section 42, but not under Section 53 of the NDPS Act. [Para 112][790-E-G]
2.25 If, after an inquiry or investigation, a complaint is filed, and the Special Court takes cognizance of the offence, any statements, documents or other things obtained in the inquiry/ investigation may be tendered and proved by the prosecution in the trial against the offender unless the statement and/or document and/or thing has been obtained by any promise, inducement, coercion, threat, or intimidation. The question of
whether any statement has been obtained by promise, coercion, threat etc. and/or whether any particular officer, is authorized under Section 42 or invested with powers under Section 53 are matters of trial. The Prosecution has to establish the charges against the offender, in accordance with law, at the trial. [Para 113][790-G-H; 791-A] 2.26 The provisions of the Cr.P.C. only apply to all warrants issued and searches and seizures made under the NDPS Act, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the NDPS Act, as provided in Section 51 of the NDPS Act and to the search of a person, without complying with the requirement to take the person to be searched, to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, as provided in Section 50(5) of the NDPS Act. Of course, the principles of Section 163 of the Cr.P.C. are implicit in the provisions of the NDPS Act relating to inquiry and investigation though the said Section may not apply to such inquiry or investigation. This is because the bar of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India has to be read into every statute in spirit and substance. There can be no question of obtaining any statement by any inducement, promise or threat. [Para 117][800H; 801-A-B] 2.27 The NDPS Act is a complete code. A comparison of the various provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C with those of Chapter V of the NDPS Act also makes it clear that the provisions in Chapter V of the NDPS Act are independent of, and not controlled by the provisions of the Cr.P.C except as provided in Sections 50(5) and 51 of the NDPS Act. There are differences between the procedure of inquiry/investigation under Chapter V of the NDPS Act and the procedure of investigation and/or enquiry under the Cr.P.C. [Para 118][801-C-D] 2.28 Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act provides that “a Special Court may, upon perusal of police report of the facts constituting an offence under the NDPS Act or upon complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in his behalf, take cognizance of that offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial”. Section 36A (1)(d) is similar to Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. A
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
complaint, as defined in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., means any allegation made to a Magistrate orally or in writing, to enable the Magistrate to take action under the Cr.P.C. A complaint need not be on a Police Report. However, as per the Explanation to Section 2(d), a report of a police officer, which discloses a cognizable offence is to be deemed to be a complaint and the police officer who made the complaint, shall be deemed to be the complainant. [Paras 120 and 121][803-A-D]
2.29 Section 36A(1)(d) enables the police to file a report, before the Special Court, of facts constituting an offence under the NDPS Act, which, as per the definition of police report in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., means a report forwarded under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. Such a police report is deemed to be a complaint. Such police report can be filed after an investigation under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. There is no provision in the NDPS Act, which makes it incumbent upon the concerned officers who make any inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act, to prepare or file any report. [Para 124][803-F-H] 2.30 If the police investigate any offence under the NDPS Act and submit a report before the Special Court, all the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. would have to be complied with, including in particular Sections 161, 162, 163, 164 and 173. A statement before the police can neither be signed nor relied upon for any purpose in a Court of law, except for the purpose specified in the said section, that is, inter alia to confront the person making the statement in cross examination in the trial. [Para 125][804A-B] 2.31 The Legislature has in its wisdom differentiated between a police report, which is deemed to be a complaint, and a complaint made by an officer of the Central or State Government, authorized in this behalf. It is not for this Court to question the wisdom of the Legislature. The fact that the Special Court may take cognizance of an offence, upon a complaint made by an officer of the Central or State Government, authorized in this behalf, and not a report, as required in case of the police, also shows that an inquiry or investigation under the NDPS Act is not to be treated in the same way, as a police investigation into an offence. [Para 126][804-C-D]
2.32 The expression “police” is ordinarily understood to mean that executive civil force of the State, entrusted with the duty of maintenance of public order, and also the prevention and detection of crime. The expression “police” or “police officer” is not defined either in the Evidence Act 1872 or in the Cr.P.C. Police officers are governed inter alia by the Police Act 1861, enacted to make the police an effective instrument for the prevention and detection of crime. [Paras 128 and 129][804-FH] 2.33 The police officers have enormous powers. The powers of a police officer are far greater than those of an officer under the NDPS Act invested with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station for the limited purpose of investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act. The extensive powers of the police, of investigation of all kinds of offences, powers to maintain law and order, remove obstruction and even arrest without warrant on mere suspicion, give room to police officers to harass a person accused or even suspected of committing an offence in a myriad of ways. The police are, therefore, in a dominating position to be able to elicit statements by intimidation, by coercion, or by threats either direct or veiled. The powers of NDPS officers being restricted to prevention and detection of crimes under the NDPS Act and no other crime, they do not have the kind of scope that the police have, to exert pressure to extract tailored statements. [Para 139][808-F-H; 809-A] 2.34 The provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to any inquiry or investigation or other proceeding under the NDPS Act, except to the extent expressly provided by the NDPS Act, in view of Section 4(2) read with Section 5 of the Cr.P.C. [Para 140][809-AB] 2.35 Officers under the NDPS Act, invested under Section 53 with the powers of an Officer in Charge of a Police Station, for the purpose of investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act, do not exercise all the powers of police officers. They do not have the power to file a police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C which might be deemed a complaint. There is no provision in the NDPS Act which requires any officer investigating an offence
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
under the said Act or otherwise making an inquiry under the said Act to file a report. [Para 143][809-D-F]
2.36. Officers under the NDPS Act not being police officers, Sections 161/162 of the Cr.P.C have no application to any statement made before any officer under the NDPS Act, in the course of any inquiry or other proceedings under the NDPS Act. [Para 144][809-F-G] 2.37 In any case, Section 53A is clearly contrary to and thus overrides Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. While Section 162(1) of the Cr.P.C. provides that no statement made by any person to a police officer, when reduced to writing shall be signed by the person making it, or used for any purpose, save as provided in the proviso to the said section, that is, to confront the person making the statement, if he gives evidence as a witness, Section 53A(1) provides that “a statement made and signed by a person before any officer empowered under Section 53 for the investigation of offences, during the course of any inquiry or proceedings by such officer, shall be relevant for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under this Act” in certain circumstances specified in the said section. [Para 145][809-G-H; 810-A-B] 2.38 The statements made in any inquiry or investigation may be recorded in writing and even signed by the person making it. In the absence of any provision similar to Section 162, in the NDPS Act, a statement made before an officer under the NDPS Act in the course of any inquiry, investigation or other proceedings, may be tendered in evidence and proved in a trial for prosecution of an offence under the NDPS Act in accordance with law. A statement confessional in nature is in the genre of extra judicial confessions. [Para 146][810-B-C] 3.1 A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if it appears to the Court that the confessions may have been elicited by any inducement, threat or promise from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person reasonable grounds, for supposing that by making the confession, he would gain any advantage or avoid any disadvantage in respect of proceedings against him. [Para 148][810-F-G]
State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180: [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 445; Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 2 SCC 205 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 408 – referred to. 3.2 It is one thing to say that a piece of evidence is inadmissible and another thing to assess two or more pieces of evidence on their probative value. A confession before a Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.PC may have higher probative value than other confessions. However, on that parameter alone other confessions for example, extra judicial confession cannot be rendered inadmissible in law. [Para 151][813-D-E] 3.3 Whether the officer concerned is duly empowered and/ or authorised to make an enquiry/investigation, whether any statement or document has improperly been procured, etc. are factors which would have to be examined by the Court on a case to case basis. Having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, the Court may not base conviction solely on a statement made in an inquiry which is confessional, in the absence of other materials with which the statement can be linked. It is for the Special Court to weigh the statement and assess its evidentiary value, having regard to all relevant factors. All statements and documents tendered in evidence have to be proved at the trial in accordance with law. [Para 153][813-F-H; 814-A] 3.4 The officers under the NDPS Act are drawn from different Government Departments and are not necessarily police officers as such. The NDPS Act also specifically differentiates police officers from other officers entrusted with powers under the NDPS Act, which is evident, inter alia, from Sections 41(2), 42(1), 52(3)(a), 53(1) and (2), 55, 68T of NDPS Act. [Para 175][826-A-B] 3.5 The NDPS Act may loosely have been described as a penal statute in some judgments of this Court in the sense that the NDPS Act contains stringent penal provisions including punishment of imprisonment of twenty years and even death sentence in certain exceptional cases of offence repeated after earlier conviction. [Para 183][827-G-H]
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1746:[1966] SCR 698; Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 940: [1969] SCR 461; Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras AIR 1970 SC 1065: [1969] SCR 613 – followed.
State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram AIR 1962 SC 276: [1962] SCR 338; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Durga Prasad (1975) 3 SCC 210 : [1975] 1 SCR 881 ; Balkishan A Devidayal vs State of Maharashtra (1980) 4 SCC 600 : [1981] 1 SCR 175 ; Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India and Ors. (1990) 2 SCC 409 : [1990] 2 SCR 63; Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India (2008) 4 SCC 668 : [2008] 1 SCR 350 ; Pon Adithan v. Deputy Director, Narcotics Control Bureau, Madras (1999) 6 SCC 1 : [1999] 3 SCR 897 – relied on.
Amin Sharif v. Emperor AIR 1934 Cal 580 ; Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed and Another v. Emperor AIR 1927 Bom 4 ; Radha Kishun Marwari v. King-Emperor AIR 1932 Patna 293 ; Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 828 : [1964] SCR 752 ; Abdul Rashid v. State of Bihar (2001) 9 SCC 578 – referred to.
4.1 Constitution Benches are constituted to resolve a constitutional issue, harmonize conflicting views and settle the law. A Constitution Bench decision might only be reconsidered by a Constitution Bench of a larger strength and that too in exceptional and compelling circumstances. An interpretation which has held the field for over fifty years should not be upset for the asking. A Change in the legal position which has held the field through judicial precedents over a length of time can only be considered when such change is absolutely imperative. [Para 185][828-C-D]
‘Constitutional Supremacy – A Revisit’ by V. Sudhish Pai - referred to.
4.2 The dominant object of the NDPS Act is to control and regulate operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances, to provide for forfeiture of property derived from or used in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Convention on Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and for matters connected therewith. On the other hand, the dominant object of a penal statute is to provide for punishment of a range of intentional acts and omissions of different types, enumerated in the statute. The Penal Code is a typical penal statute. Statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012, which mainly provide for punishment of specific offences are also penal statutes. [Paras 186 and 187][828E-G] 5. Penal statutes enacted to deal with a social evil should liberally be construed to give effect to the object for which the statute has been enacted. [Para 188][828-G-H]
Rajindere Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477: [2015] 2 SCR 835; M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala AIR 1963 SC 1116 : [1963] Suppl. SCR 724 – followed. Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement (2005) 4 SCC 530 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 49 ; Balram Kumawat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24 ; Reema Aggrawal v. Anupam (2004) 3 SCC 199 : [2004] 1 SCR 378 ; Rajindere Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477: [2015] 2 SCR 835 – relied on. Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 ALL ER 155 (CA) – referred to. 6.1 It cannot, however, be said that the NDPS Act, being a penal statute, in contradistinction to the Customs Act and the Central Excise Act, whose dominant object is to protect the revenue of the State, judicial interpretation of powers of investigation under those Acts, which are almost identical to the powers of investigation of an officer under the NDPS Act, would not be relevant to investigation under the NDPS Act. [Para 193][832-D-F]
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
6.2 It is true that an enquiry under the Central Excise Act, 1944 or the Customs Act 1962 is a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 198 of the Penal Code, by virtue of Section 14(4) of the Central Excise Act and Section 108(4) of the Customs Act, which are identical provisions and read “Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860)” Section 40(4) of FERA and Section 9(4) of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession Act) 1966 are also identical to and/or verbatim reproductions of Section 14(4) of the Central Excise Act and Section 108(4) of the Customs Act. [Para 209][858-E-G]
6.3 An offence punishable with imprisonment under the Central Excise Act, the Customs Act, the FERA, the Railway Property (unlawful possession) Act or any other similar enactment is triable by the Court of competent jurisdiction. Investigation into offences under these Acts termed as inquiry, are held by departmental officials duly authorized to enable the concerned authorities to decide whether a complaint should be filed before the Competent Court. If the information gathered and/or materials obtained so warrant, a complaint is filed. [Paras 211 and 212][859E-G] 6.4 An inquiry under the Central Excise Act by any Central Excise Officer, empowered by the Central Government, or under the Customs Act, by any officer of customs empowered by general or special order of the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner of Customs or under the FERA by an Enforcement Officer or under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act 1961 by an officer of the Railway Protection Force is not the same as a proceeding in a Court of Law or Tribunal. Such an inquiry is preliminary to trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction. It is akin to an enquiry conducted by a public servant under any other law with penal provisions including an enquiry under the NDPS Act. [Para 213][859-G-H; 860-A] 6.5 Investigation under these Acts have been given the status of judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the IPC, unlike investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act. The only difference is that the person making a
statement in an investigation under any of these Acts, is burdened with the consequences of giving false evidence in any other judicial proceedings including proceedings in a Court of Law, punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years and also fine [Section 193 IPC] or of intentional insult or interruption to a public servant at any stage of a “judicial proceeding” punishable with imprisonment which might extend to six months or with fine or both [Section 228 IPC]. [Para 214][860-B-D] 6.6. Since investigation under the Acts referred to above, namely the Central Excise Act, the Customs Act, the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act has been given the status of judicial proceedings to deter persons from making false statements or otherwise intentionally hampering the investigation, the Legislature has deemed it appropriate to use the expression “shall have power to summon any person whose presence he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document”. [Para 215][860-D-E] 6.7 The so called ‘evidence’ in the inquiry is not the same as evidence in a trial. Documents would still have to be tendered and proved at the time of trial. Whether any documents and/or statements obtained in course of investigation would at all be admissible in evidence at the trial and if so, the extent to which they would be relevant, would be decided by the Court trying the offence, having regard to the applicable law. [Para 216][860-F-G] 6.8 It is true that an Inquiry or investigation under the NDPS Act is not a judicial proceeding, just as an Inquiry or investigation by the police under the Cr.P.C. is not a judicial proceeding. However, a casual observation in a judgment of this Court, that “a police officer never acts judicially” in the context of an analysis of the reasons for inclusion of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, under which no confession to a police officer is to be proved as against a person accused of any offence, cannot be construed to lay down the proposition of law, that a confessional statement made to an officer in course of an enquiry before that officer cannot be tendered or proved in evidence, if the enquiry is not a judicial proceeding. Nor can such an observation be construed as a
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
reverse proposition that all confessions in an enquiry before an officer, who is not police officer, but deemed to be a police officer for all purposes, with all the powers of a police officer including the power akin to Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C, can be tendered and proved in evidence, only because the enquiry is a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 or 228 of the IPC, in the sense that a person intentionally giving false evidence in such proceeding, or intentionally insulting or causing interruption to a person holding such an enquiry is punishable with imprisonment. [Para 217][860-H; 861-A-D]
6.9 The fact that the provisions of Chapter V of the NDPS Act, which confer powers of entry, search, seizure, arrest, investigation and inquiry on certain officers, do not expressly use the phrase “collect evidence” is not really material to the issue of whether such officers are police officers to attract the bar of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. [Para 219][861-F] 6.10 It is difficult to appreciate how the fact that an inquiry under the Central Excise Act or the Customs Act or the FERA or any other Act which might be deemed to be a judicial proceeding to attract the penal provisions of Sections 193 and 228 of IPC, should make any difference to the admissibility in evidence, of the statements made in an enquiry under the NDPS Act. [Para 222][862-B-C] 6.11 It is true that all offences under the NDPS Act are cognizable under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Some of the offences under the Central Excise Act and the Customs Act are also cognizable. Even though offences under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act are not cognizable, Section 6 of the said Act empowers any superior officer or member of the Railway Protection Force to arrest any person concerned with an offence under the said Act, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant. [Para 223][862-C-E] 6.12 Section 25 of the Evidence Act does not differentiate between evidence in a trial for non cognizable offence and evidence in a trial for cognizable offence. The admissibility of evidence does not depend on whether an offence is ‘cognizable’
or non-cognizable’. The mere fact that an offence was cognizable, enabling the police to arrest without warrant, should not make any difference to the admissibility or the probative value of the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial of the offence. [Para 224][862-F-G]
6.13 Some of the offences under the Central Excise Act and the Customs Act are also cognizable. It may also be pertinent to point out that while all offences under the NDPS Act including those punishable with imprisonment up to one year are cognizable, offences in the Railway Property (Unlawful possession) Act 1966, punishable with imprisonment of seven years, have been made non cognizable. [Para 225][862-G-H; 863-A]
6.14 There can be no doubt that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act to ensure fair trial of the accused must be enforced. However, over-emphasis on the principles of natural justice in drug-trafficking cases can be a major hindrance to the apprehension of offenders. In offences under the NDPS Act, substantial compliance should be treated as sufficient for the procedural requirements, because such offences adversely affect the entire society. [Para 226][863-A-C] Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal and Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 305 : [2008] 14 SCR 179 ; K. I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (H.Q.) Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 721 : [1997] 1 SCR 797 ; N. J. Sukhawani v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 522 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 778 – referred to. 7.1 There can be no doubt at all, that the right to a fair trial, encompassing fair procedure is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is too late in the day to contend otherwise. The safeguards provided in a statute, are always scrupulously to be adhered to, more so when the punishment is very severe. However, each case has to be decided taking into account all relevant factors, particularly, the evidence against the accused. [Para 51][770-B-C] 7.2 While the right to a fair trial by an impartial Court and/ or Tribunal is a human right under the UDHR and an essential
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
concomitant of the fundamental rights, at the same time, the fairness of trial has to be seen not only from the point of view of the accused, but also from the point of view of the victim and the society. A crime under the NDPS Act is a crime against society and not just an individual or a group of individuals. While the safeguards in the NDPS Act must scrupulously be adhered to prevent injustice to an accused, the Court should be vigilant to ensure that guilty offenders do not go scot free by reason of over emphasis on technicalities. Substantial justice must be done. Every piece of evidence should be objectively scrutinized, evaluated and considered to arrive at a final decision. [Para 233][867-B-E]
7.3 Article 20(3) of the Constitution gives protection to a person: (i) accused of an offence (ii) against compulsion “to be a witness” and (iii) against himself. Compulsion is an essential ingredient of the bar of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Article 20(3) does not bar the admission of a statement, confessional in effect, which is made without any inducement, threat or promise, even though it may have subsequently been retracted. The Article also does not debar the accused from voluntarily offering himself to be examined as a witness. The constitutional protection against compulsion to be a witness is available only to persons “accused of an offence”, and not persons other than the accused. It is a protection against compulsion to be a witness and it is a protection against compulsion resulting in giving evidence against himself. [Paras 234 and 235][867-E-G] Balkishan A Devidayal vs State of Maharashtra (1980) 4 SCC 600 : [1981] 1 SCR 175 ; Nandini Satpathy v. P.L.Dani and Anr. (1978) 2 SCC 424 : [1978] 3 SCR 608 – relied on. 7.4 Compulsion may be in many forms. It may be physical or mental. However, mental compulsion takes place when the mind has been so conditioned by some extraneous process, as to render the making of the statement involuntary and therefore, extorted. Statements obtained by continuous and prolonged interrogation for hours at a stretch in unhealthy, unhygienic, uncomfortable and inconvenient conditions, without proper food,
drinking water, washroom facilities etc. may not be accepted as voluntary. [Para 238][868-D-F] State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR 1961 SC 1808 : [1962] SCR 10 ; Poolpandi and Ors. v. Superintendent Central Excise and Ors. AIR 1992 SC 1795 : [1992] 3 SCR 247 – relied on. 7.5 The immunity under Article 20(3) does not extend to compulsory production of documents or material objects or to compulsion to give specimen writing, specimen signature, thumb impression, finger prints or blood samples. However, compulsion regarding documents attracts the bar of Article 20(3) if the documents convey personal knowledge of the accused relating to the charge. [Para 239][868-F-G]
Mohamed Dastagir v. State of Madras AIR 1960 SC 756 : [1960] SCR 116 ; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad 1961 SC 1808 ; Sampath Kumar v. Enforcement Office, Enforcement Directorate, Madras 1997 8 SCC 358 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 142 – relied on.
7.6 There can be no doubt that any confession made under compulsion to any person whether or not a police officer would attract Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Any confession made under compulsion would also be hit by Section 24 of the Evidence Act. Confession under compulsion is no evidence in the eye of law. [Para 241][869-C-D]
7.7 A confessional statement, if not obtained by compulsion, as judicially explained, would be hit by Sections 25 and 26 only if such statement is made to a police officer (Section 25 of the Evidence Act) or while in the custody of a police officer and not in the presence of a Magistrate (Section 26 of the Evidence Act). Section 25 would only apply to a police officer or an officer who exercises all the powers of a police officer including the power of filing a police report under Section 173 of the Cr.PC. An officer under the NDPS Act does not have the power to file a police report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. [Para 242][869-D-F]
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1746 : [1966] SCR 698 ; Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 940: [1969] SCR 461 – followed.
7.8 A confessional statement does not automatically result in the conviction of an accused offender. Such statements have to be tendered and proved in accordance with the law. The evidentiary value of the statement which is confessional in nature has to be weighed and assessed by the Court at the trial. [Para 243][869-F-G] K. S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569 ; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 : [1978] 2 SCR 621 - referred to. 8.1 A Statute is an edict of the legislature and has to be construed according to “the intent of those that make it”. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the Court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature. It is to be presumed that in enacting a post constitutional law the legislative intent could not have been to violate any fundamental right. [Paras 244 and 245][870-A-B] Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamp, U.P. AIR 1968 SC 102 : [1967] SCR 920 – relied on. 8.2 In ascertaining the intention of the legislature the Court is to examine two aspects, the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute and the purpose and object or the reason and spirit pervading through the statute. Legislative intention, that is the true legal meaning of an enactment, is deduced by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment, in the light of any discernible purposes or object of the enactment. When any question arises as to the meaning of any provision in a statute, it is proper to read that provision in the context of the intention of the legislature. The intention of the Legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. [Paras 246 and 247][870-C-E]
8.3 A statute or any statutory provision must be construed and interpreted in a manner that makes the statute effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat and/or in other words, the principle that courts while pronouncing on the constitutionality of a statute starts with the presumption in favour of constitutionality and prefer a construction which keeps the statute within the competence of the legislature. [Para 248][870-E-F] 8.4 Thus when a statute is vague, the Court will give such an interpretation that keeps the statute in conformity with the fundamental rights. Similarly, if a statute is capable of two interpretations one of which violates the fundamental rights and the other of which protects the fundamental rights the court would opt for the latter. [Para 249][870-F-G] 8.5 When a statutory provision is clear and there is no ambiguity, this Court cannot alter that provision by its interpretation. To do so, would be to legislate, which this Court is not competent to do. If a provision is free from ambiguity or vagueness, and is clear, but violative of a fundamental right, the Court will have to strike the same down. Any omission in a statute cannot be filled in by Court as to do that would amount to the legislation and not construction. The Court cannot fill in casus omissus and language permitting Court should avoid creating casus omissus where there is none. In the interpretation of statute the Courts must always presume that legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. [Para 250][870-G-H; 871A-B] 9.1 There is no doubt that the NDPS Act contains severe penal provisions. There can also be no dispute with the proposition that when harsh provisions, lead to a severe sentence, a balance has to be struck between the need of the law and enforcement thereof on the one hand and the protection of a citizen from oppression and injustice. The requirements of Section 42 and 43 have to be complied with strictly and in letter and spirit. [Para 252][871-C-E]
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Directorate of Revenue and Another v. Mohammed Nisar Holia (2008) 2 SCC 370 : [2007] 12 SCR 906 – relied on.
9.2 There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the power of search, seizure and arrest is founded upon the competent officer duly empowered having “reason to believe”, which might be based on personal knowledge, or secret information provided by an informant whose name need not be disclosed. [Para 253][871-E-F] 9.3 An inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act does not culminate in any report. The inquiry is in the nature of a preliminary inquiry which may lead to the filing of a complaint in the Special Court. The Prosecution has to prove its case before the Special Court which would examine, analyze, assess and weigh the evidence on record. Suspicion can in no circumstances be a substitute for evidence. The severer the punishment for the offence, the stricter is the degree of proof. All the safeguards provided in the NDPS Act must be scrupulously followed. [Para 256][872-B-D] State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172 : [1999] 3 SCR 977 ; Ritesh Chakaravarty v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2006) 12 SCC 321 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 772 – relied on. 10.1 The proposition of law laid down by the Constitution Benches is that, the test to determine whether an officer is deemed to be a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act is, whether such officer has all the powers of a police officer including the power to file a report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, the question of whether in reality or substance there is any difference between a complaint under Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act filed by an authorized officer of the Central Government or the State Government and a police report filed under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C, cannot be decided by this Bench of three-Judges in view of three five-Judge Constitution Bench judgments which are binding on this Bench. [Paras 263 and 264][873-D-F]
10.2 The question of whether an investigating officer invested with the powers of Officer in Charge of a police station for the purpose of investigation of an offence under a special Act like the NDPS Act is empowered to file a police report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C cannot also be reopened by this Bench, in view of five-Judge Constitution Bench judgments. [Para 265][873-F-G] 10.3 A statute may expressly make Section 173 of the Cr.P.C applicable to inquiries and investigations under that statute. However, in the case of a statute like the NDPS Act, where the provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to any inquiry/investigation, except as provided therein, it cannot be held that the officer has all the powers of a police officer to file a report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. The NDPS Act does not even contain any provision for filing a report in a Court of law which is akin to a police report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. [Para 267][874-B-C] 10.4 As per the norms of judicial discipline and propriety, a Bench of lesser strength cannot revisit the proposition laid down by at least three Constitution Benches, that an officer can be deemed to be a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act only if the officer is empowered to exercise all the powers of a police officer including the power to file a report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. [Para 268][874-D-E] 10.5 Therefore, the provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to an inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act except to the limited extent provided in Section 50(5) and 51. Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has not been made applicable to the NDPS Act. [Para 270][874-F-G] 11. The Judgment of this Court in *Raj Kumar Karwal case which has reaffirmed the verdict of three Constitution Benches does not require reconsideration. Nor does **Kanhaiyalal case require reconsideration. [Para 271][874-G-H] *Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 409 : [1990] 2 SCR 63 ; **Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India (2008) 4 SCC 668 : [2008] 1 SCR 350 – relied on.
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Noor Aga v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2008) 16 SCC 417 : [2008] 10 SCR 379 – referred to.
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TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.06.2012 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 2010. With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1750 of 2009, 2214 of 2009, 827 of 2010, 835 of 2011, 836 of 2011, 344 of 2013, 1826 of 2013, 433 of 2014, 77 of 2015, 90 of 2017, 91 of 2017, Special Leave Petition (Crl.) 6338 of 2015 & 1202 of 2017 . Aman Lekhi, ASG, Saurabh Mishra, AAG, Sushil Kumar Jain, Anand Grover, S. Nagamuthu, A. K. Srivastava, R. Balasubramanian, Sr. Advs., Puneet Jain, Ms. Christi Jain, Harsh Jain, Harshit Khanduja, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Mrs. Kanchan Kaur Dhodi, Uday Gupta, Ms. Shivani M. Lal, Hiren Dasan, M. K. Tripathi, Chand Qureshi, Mohan Pandey,Sanjay Jain, Vinay Arora, Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, Ranjan Kumar, Nachiketa Joshi, Ms. Sucheta Joshi, Ms. Himadri Haksar, Abhishek Singh, Shreshth Arya, Amit Bhalla, Satbir Singh Pillania, Tripati Tandon, Sandiv Kalia, Somvir Deswal, Ms. Reena Rao, Arun Kumar Singh, Nand Ram, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Prabu Ramasubramanian, Raghunatha Sethupathy, Karuppaiah Meyyappan, Hardik Gautam, K. Paari Vendhan, Kuldip Singh, Shreeyash, Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Ms. Ranjana Narayan, Harish Pandey, Akshay Amritanshu, Ritwiz Ribhav, B. Krishna Prasad, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Vibhu Shankar Mishra, Ms. Suhashini Sen, B. V. Balaram Das, Manish Vashishtha, Ms. Liz Mathew, C. K. Sasi, Saurabh Kirpal, Sanjay Agarwal, Ashish Batra, Amit K. Nain, Arjun Garg, Shrutika Garg, John Mathew, Vinod Kumar, Advs. for the appearing parties.
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
R. F. NARIMAN, J.* 1. These Appeals and Special Leave Petitions arise by virtue of a reference order of a Division Bench of this Court reported as Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2013) 16 SCC 31. The facts in that appeal have been set out in that judgment in some detail, and need not be repeated by us. After hearing arguments from both sides, the Court recorded that the Appellant in Criminal Appeal No.152 of 2013 had challenged his conviction primarily on three grounds, as follows:
“24.1. The conviction is based solely on the purported confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act which has no evidentiary value inasmuch as:
(a) The statement was given to and recorded by an officer who is to be treated as “police officer” and is thus, hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. (b) No such confessional statement could be recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. This provision empowers to call for information and not to record such confessional statements. Thus, the statement recorded under this provision is akin to the statement under Section 161 CrPC. (c) In any case, the said statement having been retracted, it could not have been the basis of conviction and could be used only to corroborate other evidence.” 2. Under the caption “Evidentiary value of statement under section 67 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act”)”, the Court noted the decisions of Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 409 and Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India (2008) 4 SCC 668, as also certain other judgments, most notably Abdul Rashid v. State of Bihar (2001) 9 SCC 578 and Noor Aga v. State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 417, and thereafter came to the conclusion that the NDPS Act, being a penal statute, is in contradistinction to the Customs Act, 1962 and the Central Excise Act, 1944, whose dominant object is to protect the revenue of the State, and that therefore, judgments rendered in the context of those Acts may not be apposite when considering the NDPS Act– see paragraph 33. After then considering a number of other *Ed. Note : Judgment delivered by R. F. Nariman, J. (for himself and Navin Sinha, J.)
judgments, the referral order states that a re-look into the ratio of Raj Kumar Karwal (supra) and Kanhaiyalal (supra)would be necessary, and has referred the matter to a larger Bench thus: “41. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the matter needs to be referred to a larger Bench for reconsideration of the issue as to whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act would qualify as police officer or not. 42. In this context, the other related issue viz. whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer under Section 67 of the Act can be treated as confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as police officer also needs to be referred to the larger Bench, inasmuch as it is intermixed with a facet of the 1st issue as to whether such a statement is to be treated as statement under Section 161 of the Code or it partakes the character of statement under Section 164 of the Code. 43. As far as this second related issue is concerned we would also like to point out that Mr Jain argued that the provisions of Section 67 of the Act cannot be interpreted in the manner in which the provisions of Section 108 of the Customs Act or Section 14 of the Excise Act had been interpreted by a number of judgments and there is a qualitative difference between the two sets of provisions. Insofar as Section 108 of the Customs Act is concerned, it gives power to the custom officer to summon persons “to give evidence” and produce documents. Identical power is conferred upon the Central Excise Officer under Section 14 of the Act. However, the wording to Section 67 of the NDPS Act is altogether different. This difference has been pointed out by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Shahid Khan v. Director of Revenue Intelligence [2001 Cri LJ 3183 (AP)].” 3. Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos. 152 of 2013; 836 of 2011; 433 of 2014; 77 of 2015 and 1202 of 2017, outlined six issues before us, which really boil down to two issues, namely: “1. Whether an officer “empowered under Section 42 of the NDPS Act” and/or “the officer empowered under Section 53 of the NDPS Act” are “Police Officers” and therefore statements recorded by such officers would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act; and
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2. What is the extent, nature, purpose and scope of the power conferred under Section 67 of the NDPS Act available to and exercisable by an officer under section 42 thereof, and whether power under Section 67 is a power to record confession capable of being used as substantive evidence to convict an accused?”
4. Shri Jain took us through the provisions of the NDPS Act which, according to him, is a special Act, and a complete code on the subject it covers. He referred to how the NDPS Act sometimes overrides the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”); sometimes says that it is applicable; and sometimes states that it is made applicable with necessary modifications. According to Shri Jain, section 41(2) and section 42 of the NDPS Act refer to a ‘First Information Report’ being lodged by the officers referred to therein. As the source of information is required to be kept a secret under section 68 of the NDPS Act, the officer receiving information under these provisions is therefore treated as an informant. The tasks assigned to officers under section 42 of the NDPS Act are four in number, namely, entry, search, seizure or arrest. As opposed to this, section 53 of the NDPS Act invests the designated officers with all the powers of an ‘officer-in-charge of a police station’ for the process of investigation, which would then begin after information collected by a section 42 officer is handed over to the officer designated under section 53, and end with a final report being submitted under section 173 of the CrPC to the Special Court under section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act. According to the learned Senior Advocate, section 67 is to be read only with section 42, and is a power to call for information so that the “reason to believe” mentioned in section 42 can then be made out, without proceeding further under the NDPS Act. Thus, “reason to believe”, which is at a higher threshold than “reason to suspect” – which phrase has been used in section 49 of the NDPS Act –is a condition precedent to the officer thereafter moving forward. Shri Jain argued that the reason to believe must be formed before the officer acts, and that therefore, section 67 operates at a stage antecedent to the exercise of the powers of the officer designated under section 42. He then went on to argue that these provisions must be construed strictly in favour of the subject, inasmuch as they impinge upon the fundamental right to privacy, recently recognised by this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1. He also argued that the NDPS Act therefore incorporates a legislative balance between powers of
investigation and the obligation to uphold privacy rights of the individual. He then went on to argue that the “information” under section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be equated with “evidence”, which is only evidence before a court, as per the definition of “evidence” under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”). He cited judgments to show that even witness statements made under section 164 of the CrPC are not substantive evidence. He then contrasted section 67 of the NDPS Act with the power of officers under revenue acts to record evidence, such as section 108 of the Customs Act 1962, and section 14 of the Central Excise Act 1944. He then went on to state that as none of the safeguards contained in sections 161-164 of the CrPC are contained in the NDPS Act when the person is examined under section 67, obviously statements made to officers under section 67 cannot amount to substantive evidence on the basis of which conviction can then take place. An important argument was that it would be highly incongruous if an officer of the police department, empowered under section 42 and exercising the same powers under section 67, records a confessional statement which would be hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act, whereas officers exercising the same powers under the NDPS Act, who are not regular policemen, would be able to record confessional statements, and bypass all constitutional and statutory safeguards. Shri Jain contended that as the provisions of the NDPS Act are extremely stringent, they must be strictly construed, and safeguards provided must be scrupulously followed. According to him, arbitrary power conferred under section 67 upon an officer above the rank of peon, sepoy or constable, but denied to a senior officer under section 53, would be ex facie contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution. On the other hand, section 53 statutorily confers powers on the named officer of an officer-in-charge of a police station for the investigation of the offences under the NDPS Act. This, according to the learned counsel, would contain the entire gamut of powers contained in sections 160-173 of the CrPC, including the power to then file a charge-sheet before the Special Court under section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act. The learned counsel argued that section 53A of the NDPS Act shows that confessional statements that are made under section 161 of the CrPC, which are otherwise hit by section 162 of the CrPC, are made relevant only in the two contingencies mentioned under section 53A of the NDPS Act, being exceptions to the general rule stated in section 162 of the CrPC. He contended, therefore, that section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used to bypass section 53A therein and render it
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otiose. He stressed the fact that all offences under the NDPS Act are cognizable offences, unlike under revenue statutes like the Customs Act, 1962 and Central Excise Act, 1944, and then argued that the “complaint” that is referred to in section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act has only reference to a complaint filed under section 59(3) therein. He also pointed out the anomalies of granting to the concerned officer under section 53 all the powers of the officer-in-charge of a police station, which, unless it ends up in the form of a final report, would leave things hanging. Thus, if the concerned officer finds that there is no sufficient evidence, and that the accused should be released, section 169 of the CrPC would apply. In the absence of section 169 of the CrPC, as has been contended by the other side, there is no procedure for discharge of the accused if evidence against him is found to be wanting. In a without-prejudice argument that complaints under the NDPS Act can be made outside of section 59(3), Shri Jainstressed the fact that there is in reality and substance no difference between the “complaint” under the NDPS Act and the charge-sheet under the CrPC, as investigation has already been carried out even before the complaint under the NDPS Act is made. He therefore argued that both Raj Kumar Karwal (supra) and Kanhaiyalal (supra) require to be overruled by us, as they erroneously applied earlier judgments which concerned themselves with revenue statutes, and not penal statutes like the NDPS Act. He then referred us to Article 20(3) of the Constitution, and section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cited a plethora of case law to drive home the point that in this country, as coercive methods are used against persons during the course of investigation, all confessions made to a police officer, whether made during the course of investigation or even before, cannot be relied upon as evidence in a trial. He then referred to several judgments of this Court to state that the expression “police officer” is not defined, and the functional test therefore must apply, namely, that a person who is given the same functions as a police officer under the CrPC, particularly in the course of investigating an offence under the Act, must be regarded as a police officer for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act. In the course of his submissions, he referred to a number of judgments of this Court, and most particularly, the judgments of State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram (1962) 3 SCR 338; Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (1964) 2 SCR 752; Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore (1966) 3 SCR 698; Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal (1969) 2 SCR 461; Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras (1969) 2 SCR 613; and
Balkishan A. Devidayal v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 4 SCC 600. He also provided a useful chart of the difference in the provisions contained in the NDPS Act and the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966, the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the Customs Act, 1962.
5. Shri Puneet Jain supplemented these arguments with reference to a recent judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) 2020 SCC OnLine SC 700, and stated that as some discordant notes are to be found in that judgment, it may be referred to a larger Bench. In any case, he argued that the comments made in that judgment about investigation starting from the section 42 stage itself were only in the context of the complainant and the investigator being the same, in which case, if prejudice was caused, the trial may be vitiated in terms of the judgment.
6. Shri Anand Grover, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 2017, followed in the wake of the two Jains, père et fils. The learned Senior Advocate stressed the various provisions of the NDPS Act which showed that it was extremely stringent, in that it had minimum sentences for even possession of what is regarded as a “commercial quantity” of a drug or psychotropic substance, being a minimum sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 10 years, going up to 20 years.This, coupled with various presumptions raised against the accused, and stringent bail conditions, all made the NDPS Act a very stringent measure of legislation, which, the more stringent it is, must contain necessary safeguards against arbitrary search, seizure and arrest, or else it would fall foul of the fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution. He argued that the NDPS Act was penal in nature, andcontained regulatory provisions as well, but given the fact that we are concerned only with the penal provisions, could be distinguished from the revenue statutes whose dominant object is the collection of revenue, and not the punishment of crime. He stressed the fact that the “enquiry” under section 67 of the NDPS Act is not a judicial enquiry, but only a preliminary fact-finding exercise before a”reason to believe” is formed under section 42, which could then lead to investigation of an offence under the Act. He also referred to section 50 of the NDPS Act, and stated that given a higher protection as to conditions under which a search of person may be conducted, it would be inconceivable to then conclude that under section 67, confessional statements can be recorded without
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
more, subject to no safeguards whatsoever, on which convictions can then be based. He relied strongly on State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172 and its aftermath Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (2011) 1 SCC 609 to argue that even after sub-sections (5) and (6) were added to section 50 of the NDPS Act, they did not dilute what was contained in section 50(1)-(4), and could only be used in emergent and urgent situations. He referred to statutes like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (“TADA”), and stated that where under certain limited circumstances exceptions were made to section 25 of the Evidence Act, they were hedged in with a number of safeguards, as were laid down by this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569. According to him, therefore, “police officer” needs to be construed functionally to include special police officers under the NDPS Act, in the context of confessions made, with reference to section 25 of the Evidence Act. He joined Shri Jain in asking for an overruling of Raj Kumar Karwal (supra) and Kanhaiyalal (supra).
7. Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1826 of 2013, referred to sections 41 to 43 of the NDPS Act, and emphasised the fact that no powers to “investigate” any offences are vested in the officers mentioned in these sections. He then referred to section 36 of the CrPC, and said that the scheme followed in the NDPS Act could be assimilated to section 36, in that, police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station. He emphasised the fact that section 25 of the Evidence Act only applies to confessions made against the maker, as against statements recorded under section 161 of the CrPC, which are completely barred from being received in evidence under section 162 of the CrPC, save and except for purposes of contradiction. He argued that a confessional statement made to a section 41 or section 42 officerwas also hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. He added that the special procedure in section 36A of the NDPS Act applies only qua offences punishable for a term of more than three years, and where offences under the Act are punishable for terms up to three years, they are to be tried by a Magistrate under the CrPC. Obviously, officers under section 53 of the NDPS Act would investigate an offence under the Act that is punishable for a term up to three years, and file a police
report, as no complaint procedure,being the procedure under section 36A of the NDPS Act, would then apply. According to him, this would show that investigation does culminate in a police report for offences punishable for a term up to three years, as a result of which section 36A(1)(d) has to be read as providing two methods of approaching a Special Court – one, by way of a police report, and the other, by way of a complaint to the Special Court. 8. Shri Uday Gupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 344 of 2013, supplemented the arguments of his predecessors, and stressed the fact that the “enquiry” under section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot possibly be governed by the definition of “inquiry” under section 2(g) of the CrPC, as that “inquiry” relates only to inquiries conducted by a Magistrate or Court. Hence, the expression “enquiry” under section 67 must be given its ordinary meaning, which would indicate that it is only a preliminary fact-finding enquiry that is referred to. He relied strongly on the Directorate of Law Enforcement Handbook, in which the Directorate made it clear that when statements are recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act by the police, these would amount to statements under section 161 of the CrPC. He contended that if this is so, it would be extremely anomalous to have statements recorded under section 67 by officers other than the police – mentioned under sections 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act, which are not statements made under section 161 of the CrPC – being admissible in evidence, on which a conviction of an accused can then be based. 9. Shri Gupta was followed by Shri Sanjay Jain, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1750 of 2009, who supplemented the arguments of his predecessors by referring to section 53A, and notifications made under section 53, of the NDPS Act. He reiterated that officers under section 42 and officers under section 53 of the NDPS Act perform different functions, and that a section 53 officer, being empowered to “investigate”, most certainly has the power to file a police report before the Special Court. 10. Shri Aman Lekhi, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, took us through the NDPS Act, and said, that read as a whole, it is a balanced statute which protected both the investigation of crime, as well as the citizen, in that several safeguards were contained therein. He was at pains to point out that it was not his case that a confession recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act,
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
without more, would be sufficient to convict a person accused of an offence under the Act. According to him, this could only be done if section 24 of the Evidence Act was met, and the Court was satisfied that the confession so recorded was both voluntary and truthful. In any case, he asserted that the safeguards that have been pointed out in D.K. Basu v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 416 at 435, 436, have now largely been incorporated in Chapter V of the CrPC, which safeguards would also operate qua confessions recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act. According to him, section 67 on its plain language does not refer to the “information” spoken of in section 42, as it uses the expression “require” any person to produce or deliver a document, as opposed to information “called for” from such persons.He also argued, based on judgments of this Court, that confessions, if properly recorded, are the best form of evidence, as these are facts known to the accused, about which he then voluntarily deposes. He also argued that section 190 of the CrPC is not completely displaced by section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act, in that the requirement of the filing of a complaint and/or a police report contained in section 190 continues to apply, in support of the decision in Raj Kumar Karwal (supra). He then referred in detail to Badku Joti Savant (supra), and stated that this judgment was not considered in the reference order, and that finally, the only test that is laid down by several Constitution Bench judgments to determine whether a person is or is not a “police officer” is whether such person is given the right to file a report under section 173 of the CrPC. He made it clear that section 53 of the NDPS Act did not deem the officers named therein to be police officers – they were only given certain powers of investigation, which did not ultimately lead to filing of a charge-sheet under section 173 of the CrPC. What was clear was that only a “complaint” could be filed by such officers under section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act – the police report being only filed by the police force as constituted under the Police Act, 1861. He disagreed vehemently with the submission of Shri Jain that the “complaint” under section 36A(1)(d) would refer only to the complaint under section 59(3) of the NDPS Act, and referred to section 2(xxix) of the NDPS Act to refer to the definition of “complaint” under section 2(d) of the CrPC, which is used in the same sense as in the CrPC. He then pointed out several provisions in the NDPS Act, where the word “police” or “police officer” is used in contrast to the other persons or officers who are part of the narcotics and other setups. According to him, in any case,section 53A makes an
inroad into section 25 of the Evidence Act. Equally, according to him, the majority judgment in Raja Ram Jaiswal (supra) is per incuriam, inasmuch as it does not consider several provisions of the CrPC, and therefore, arrives at the wrong test to determine as to who can be said to be a “police officer” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. In any case, he argued that the officers mentioned in sections 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act cannot be tarnished with the same brush as the regular police, as there is nothing to show that these officers use thirddegree measures to extort confessions. He then referred to the language of section 67 of the NDPS Act, in which, according to him, the expression “enquiry” is nothing but an investigation, and the expression”examine” is the same expression used in section 161 of the CrPC, which therefore should be accorded evidentiary value, as no safeguards as provided under section 162 of the CrPC are mentioned qua statements made under section 67 of the NDPS Act. He also argued that investigation begins from the stage of collection of material under section 67, and for this relied strongly upon the recent Constitution Bench judgment in Mukesh Singh (supra). According to him, therefore, the reference order itself being flawed, there ought to have been no reference at all, and that the judgments in Raj Kumar Karwal (supra) and Kanhaiyalal (supra) do not need reconsideration. Later judgments such as Noor Aga (supra) ought to be overruled by us, inasmuch as they are contrary to several Constitution Bench judgments of this Court. 11. Shri Saurabh Mishra, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh in SLP (Crl.) 1202 of 2017, largely reiterated the submissions of learned ASG, adding that when section 67 of the NDPS Act is used to record the confession of an accused, section 164 of the CrPC will not apply, but only section 24 of the Evidence Act makes such confessions relevant, if the conditions laid down in the section apply. He also reiterated that a statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be assimilated to a statement under section 161 of the CrPC, for the reasons outlined by the learned ASG. 12. Shri Aniruddha Mayee, learned counsel appearing for the State of Gujarat in Criminal Appeal No. 2214 of 2009; 344 of 2013; and 1750 of 2009, adopted the submissions of Shri Aman Lekhi, learned ASG.
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
13. Having heard wide-ranging arguments of counsel on both sides, it is first necessary to give a Constitutional backdrop to the points that arise in this case.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE NDPS ACT 14. The first most important constitutional protection provided in the fundamental rights chapter so far as these cases are concerned is provided by Article 20(3), which is the well-known right against selfincrimination. Article 20(3) reads as follows: “(3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” 15. In an early judgment of this Court, M.P. Sharma and Ors. v. Satish Chandra 1954 SCR 1077, an eight-Judge Bench of this Court set out Article 20(3), and then went into the historical origin of this Article in English law. In an important passage, the Court held: “In view of the above background, there is no inherent reason to construe the ambit of this fundamental right as comprising a very wide range. Nor would it be legitimate to confine it to the barely literal meaning of the words used, since it is a recognised doctrine that when appropriate a constitutional provision has to be liberally construed, so as to advance the intendment thereof and to prevent its circumvention. Analysing the terms in which this right has been declared in our Constitution, it may be said to consist of the following components. (1) It is a right pertaining to a person “accused of an offence”; (2) It is a protection against “compulsion to be a witness”; and (3) It is a protection against such compulsion resulting in his giving evidence “against himself”.”
(at page 1086) xxx xxxxxx Broadly stated the guarantee in Article 20(3) is against “testimonial compulsion”.It is suggested that this is confined to the oral evidence of a person standing his trial for an offence when called to the witness-stand. We can see no reason to confine the content of the constitutional guarantee to this barely literal import. So to limit it would be to rob the guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the substance for the sound as stated in certain
American decisions. The phrase used in Article 20(3) is “to be a witness”. A person can “be a witness” not merely by giving oral evidence but also by producing documents or making intelligible gestures as in the case of a dumb witness (See Section 119 of the Evidence Act) or the like. “To be a witness” is nothing more than “to furnish evidence” and such evidence can be furnished through the lips or by production of a thing or of a document or in other modes. So far as production of documents is concerned, no doubt Section 139 of the Evidence Act says that a person producing a document on summons is not a witness. But that section is meant to regulate the right of cross-examination. It is not a guide to the connotation of the word “witness”, which must be understood in its natural sense i.e. as referring to a person who furnishes evidence. Indeed, every positive volitional act, which furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures the positive volitional evidentiary acts of the person, as opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part. Nor is there any reason to think that the protection in respect of the evidence so procured is confined to what transpires at the trial in the court room. The phrase used in Article 20(3) is “to be a witness” and not to “appear as a witness”: It follows that the protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related, to the phrase “to be a witness” is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. It is available therefore to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in prosecution. Whether it is available to other persons in other situations does not call for decision in this case. Considered in this light, the guarantee under Article 20(3) would be available in the present cases to these petitioners against whom a first information report has been recorded as accused therein. It would extend to any compulsory process for production of evidentiary documents which are reasonably likely to support a prosecution against them. (at pages 1087-1088)
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16. The Court then went on to state that there was no “fundamental right to privacy” under the Indian Constitution, like the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, about which more shall be said a little later. What is important, however, is the fact that even in this early judgment, a mere literal reading was not given to Article 20(3). The Court recognised that a person can be said to be a witness not merely by giving oral evidence, but also by producing documents – evidence being furnished through the lips of a person or by production of a thing or of a document or in other modes. It is important to stress that the protection was afforded to a person formally accused of an offence on the basis of a statement that may be compulsorily taken from him even before evidence is given in a court.
17. An eleven-Judge Bench was then constituted in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Ors. (1963) 2 SCR 10, as certain doubts were raised on some of the propositions contained in the eightJudge Bench decision of M.P. Sharma (supra). In this case, there were three appeals before the Court, one of which involved proof of handwritten evidence, another of which involved comparison of handwriting under section 73 of the Evidence Act, and the third of which involved section 27 of the Evidence Act. After hearing arguments on both sides, the Court first concluded that M.P. Sharma (supra) was correctly decided insofar as it stated that the guarantee under Article 20(3) extended to testimony by a witness given in or out of courts, which included statements which incriminated the maker. However, the Court went on to state that “furnishing evidence” would exclude thumb-impressions or writing specimens, for the reason that the taking of impressions of parts of the body often becomes necessary for the investigation of a crime (see page 29). Incriminating information must therefore include statements based on personal knowledge. The Court then went on to consider whether section 27 of the Evidence Act would fall foul of Article 20(3), having already been upheld when a constitutional challenge under Article 14 had been repelled by the Court in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1961) 1 SCR 14. The Court held that if self-incriminatory information is given under compulsion, then the provisions of section 27 of the Evidence Act would not apply so as to allow the prosecution to place reliance on the object recovered as a result of the statement made (see pages 3334). In the result, the Court held:
“(1) An accused person cannot be said to have been compelled to be a witness against himself simply because he made a statement while in police custody, without anything more. In other words, the mere fact of being in police custody at the time when the statement in question was made would not, by itself, as a proposition of law, lend itself to the inference that the accused was compelled to make the statement, though that fact, in conjunction with other circumstances disclosed in evidence in a particular case, would be a relevant consideration in an enquiry whether or not the accused person had been compelled to make the impugned statement. (2) The mere questioning of an accused person by a police officer, resulting in a voluntary statement, which may ultimately turn out to be incriminatory, is not “compulsion”.
(3) “To be a witness” is not equivalent to “furnishing evidence” in its widest significance; that is to say, as including not merely making of oral or written statements but also production of documents or giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
(4) Giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing parts of the body by way of identification are not included in the expression “to be a witness”. (5) “To be a witness” means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement in writing, made or given in court or otherwise.
(6) “To be a witness” in its ordinary grammatical sense means giving oral testimony in court. Case law has gone beyond this strict literal interpretation of the expression which may now bear a wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in court or out of court by a person accused of an offence, orally or in writing. (7) To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It is not enough that he should become an accused, any time after the statement has been made.” (at pages 36-37)
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18. It is important to note that conclusions (1) and (2) were made in the context of repelling a challenge to section 27 of the Evidence Act. M.P. Sharma (supra), so far as it held that a person is accused the moment there is a formal accusation against him, by way of an FIR or otherwise, and that statements made by such person outside court, whether oral or on personal knowledge of documents produced, is protected by Article 20(3), remained untouched.
19. It is also important to note that in Balkishan A. Devidayal (supra), these judgments were referred to, and the Court then concluded: “70. To sum up, only a person against whom a formal accusation of the commission of an offence has been made can be a person “accused of an offence” within the meaning of Article 20(3). Such formal accusation may be specifically made against him in an FIR or a formal complaint or any other formal document or notice served on that person, which ordinarily results in his prosecution in court. In the instant case no such formal accusation had been made against the appellant when his statement(s) in question were recorded by the RPF officer.” 20. We now come to the judgment of this Court in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978) 2 SCC 424. This case referred to the inter-play between Article 20(3) and section 161 of the CrPC as follows: “21. Back to the constitutional quintessence invigorating the ban on self-incrimination. The area covered by Article 20(3) and Section 161(2) is substantially the same. So much so, we are inclined to the view, terminological expansion apart, that Section 161(2) of the CrPC is a parliamentary gloss on the constitutional clause. The learned Advocate-General argued that Article 20(3), unlike Section 161(1), did not operate at the anterior stages before the case came to court and the accused’s incriminating utterance, previously recorded, was attempted to be introduced. He relied on some passages in American decisions but, in our understanding, those passages do not so circumscribe and, on the other hand, the landmark Miranda [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)] ruling did extend the embargo to police investigation also. Moreover, Article 20(3), which is our provision, warrants no such truncation. Such a narrow meaning may emasculate a necessary protection. There are only two primary queries involved in this
clause that seals the lips into permissible silence: (i) Is the person called upon to testify “accused of any offence”? (ii) Is he being compelled to be witness against himself? A constitutional provision receives its full semantic range and so it follows that a wider connotation must be imparted to the expressions “accused of any offence” and “to be witness against himself”. The learned Advocate-General, influenced by American decisions rightly agreed that in expression Section 161(2) of the Code might cover not merely accusations already registered in police stations but those which are likely to be the basis for exposing a person to a criminal charge. Indeed, this wider construction, if applicable to Article 20(3), approximates the constitutional clause to the explicit statement of the prohibition in Section 161(2). This latter provision meaningfully uses the expression “expose himself to a criminal charge”. Obviously, these words mean, not only cases where the person is already exposed to a criminal charge but also instances which will imminently expose him to criminal charges. In Article 20(3), the expression “accused of any offence” must mean formally accused in praesenti not in futuro — not even imminently as decisions now stand. The expression “to be witness against himself” means more than the court process. Any giving of evidence, any furnishing of information, if likely to have an incriminating impact, answers the description of being witness against oneself. Not being limited to the forensic stage by express words in Article 20(3), we have to construe the expression to apply to every stage where furnishing of information and collection of materials takes place. That is to say, even the investigation at the police level is embraced by Article 20(3). This is precisely what Section 161(2) means. That sub-section relates to oral examination by police officers and grants immunity at that stage. Briefly, the Constitution and the Code are co-terminus in the protective area. While the Code may be changed, the Constitution is more enduring. Therefore, we have to base our conclusion not merely upon Section 161(2) but on the more fundamental protection, although equal in ambit, contained in Article 20(3). xxx xxxxxx 57. We hold that Section 161 enables the police to examine the accused during investigation. The prohibitive sweep of Article 20(3)
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goes back to the stage of police interrogation — not, as contended, commencing in court only. In our judgment, the provisions of Article 20(3) and Section 161(1) substantially cover the same area, so far as police investigations are concerned. The ban on selfaccusation and the right to silence, while one investigation or trial is under way, goes beyond that case and protects the accused in regard to other offences pending or imminent, which may deter him from voluntary disclosure of criminatory matter. We are disposed to read “compelled testimony” as evidence procured not merely by physical threats or violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like — not legal penalty for violation. So, the legal perils following upon refusal to answer, or answer truthfully, cannot be regarded as compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). The prospect of prosecution may lead to legal tension in the exercise of a constitutional right, but then, a stance of silence is running a calculated risk. On the other hand, if there is any mode of pressure, subtle or crude, mental or physical, direct or indirect, but sufficiently substantial, applied by the policeman for obtaining information from an accused strongly suggestive of guilt, it becomes “compelled testimony”, violative of Article 20(3).
58. A police officer is clearly a person in authority. Insistence on answering is a form of pressure especially in the atmosphere of the police station unless certain safeguards erasing duress are adhered to. Frequent threats of prosecution if there is failure to answer may take on the complexion of undue pressure violating Article 20(3). Legal penalty may by itself not amount to duress but the manner of mentioning it to the victim of interrogation may introduce an element of tension and tone of command perilously hovering near compulsion.
59. We have explained elaborately and summed up, in substance, what is self-incrimination or tendency to expose oneself to a criminal charge. It is less than “relevant” and more than “confessional”. Irrelevance is impermissible but relevance is licit but when relevant questions are loaded with guilty inference in the event of an answer being supplied, the tendency to incriminate springs into existence. We hold further that the accused person
cannot be forced to answer questions merely because the answers thereto are not implicative when viewed in isolation and confined to that particular case. He is entitled to keep his mouth shut if the answer sought has a reasonable prospect of exposing him to guilt in some other accusation actual or imminent, even though the investigation under way is not with reference to that. We have already explained that in determining the incriminatory character of an answer the accused is entitled to consider — and the Court while adjudging will take note of — the setting, the totality of circumstances, the equation, personal and social, which have a bearing on making an answer substantially innocent but in effect guilty in import. However, fanciful claims, unreasonable apprehensions and vague possibilities cannot be the hiding ground for an accused person. He is bound to answer where there is no clear tendency to criminate.” 21. In Kartar Singh (supra), the majority judgment referred to Article 20(3) in the following terms: “205. In our Constitution as well as procedural law and law of Evidence, there are certain guarantees protecting the right and liberty of a person in a criminal proceeding and safeguards in making use of any statement made by him. Article 20(3) of the Constitution declares that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”. 206. Article 20(3) of our Constitution embodies the principle of protection against compulsion of self-incrimination which is one of the fundamental canons of the British System of Criminal Jurisprudence and which has been adopted by the American System and incorporated in the Federal Acts. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America provides, “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising … nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…”. 207. The above principle is recognised to a substantial extent in the criminal administration of justice in our country by incorporating various statutory provisions. One of the components of the guarantee contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution is that it is
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] a protection against compulsion resulting in the accused of any offence giving evidence against himself. There are a number of outstanding decisions of this Court in explaining the intendment of Article 20(3). We feel that it would suffice if mere reference is made to some of the judgments, those being: (1) M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi [1954 SCR 1077], (2) Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry [(1961) 1 SCR 417], (3) State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad [(1962) 3 SCR 10], and (4) Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani [(1978) 2 SCC 424]. 208. Article 22(1) and (2) confer certain rights upon a person who has been arrested. Coming to the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 161 empowers a police officer making an investigation to examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case and to reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course of such examination. Section 162 which speaks of the use of the statement so recorded, states that no statement recorded by a police officer, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it and that the statement shall not be used for any purpose save as provided in the Code and the provisions of the Evidence Act. The ban imposed by Section 162 applies to all the statements whether confessional or otherwise, made to a police officer by any person whether accused or not during the course of the investigation under Chapter XII of the Code. But the statement given by an accused can be used in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act in case the accused examines himself as a witness for the defence by availing Section 315(1) of the Code corresponding to Section 342-A of the old Code and to give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges made against him or any person charged together with him at the same trial. 209. There is a clear embargo in making use of this statement of an accused given to a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, according to which, no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence and under Section 26 according to which no confession made by any person whilst he is in custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved
as against such person. The only exception is given under Section 27 which serves as a proviso to Section 26. Section 27 contemplates that only so much of information whether amounts to confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, in consequence of that information received from a person accused of any offence while in custody of the police can be proved as against the accused. 210. In the context of the matter under discussion, two more provisions also may be referred to — namely Sections 24 and 30 of the Evidence Act and Section 164 of the Code.
211. Section 24 of the Evidence Act makes a confession, caused to be made before any authority by an accused by any inducement, threat or promise, irrelevant in a criminal proceeding. Section 30 of the Evidence Act is to the effect that if a confession made by one or more persons, affecting himself and some others jointly tried for the same offence is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession as against such other persons as well as the maker of the confession. The explanation to the section reads that “offence” as used in this section includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit, the offence. 212. Section 164 of the Code speaks of recording of confessions and statements by Magistrates specified in that section by complying with the legal formalities and observing the statutory conditions including the appendage of a Certificate by the Magistrate recording the confession as contemplated under subsections (2) to (6) thereof. 213. Though in the old Code, there was a specific embargo on a police officer recording any statement or confession made to him in the course of an investigation embodied in the main sub-section (1) of Section 164 itself, in the present Code the legal bar is now brought by a separate proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 164 which reads: “Provided that no confession shall be recorded by a police officer on whom any power of a Magistrate has been conferred under any law for the time being in force.”
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] This is a new provision but conveys the same meaning as embodied in the main sub-section (1) of Section 164 of the old Code. 214. Thus, an accused or a person accused of any offence is protected by the constitutional provisions as well as the statutory provisions to the extent that no self-incriminating statement made by an accused to the police officer while he is in custody, could be used against such maker. The submission of the Additional Solicitor General that while a confession by an accused before a specified officer either under the Railway Protection Force Act or Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act or Customs Act or Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is made admissible, the special procedure prescribed under this Act making a confession of a person indicted under the TADA Act given to a police officer admissible cannot be questioned, is misnomer because all the officials empowered to record statements under those special Acts are not police officers as per the judicial pronouncements of this Court as well the High Courts which principle holds the field till date. See (1) State of U.P. v. Durga Prasad [(1975) 3 SCC 210] , (2) Balkishan A. Devidayal v. State of Maharashtra [(1980) 4 SCC 600] , (3) Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of W.B. [Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of W.B., (1969) 2 SCR 46], (4) Poolpandi v. Superintendent, Central Excise [(1992) 3 SCC 259], (5) Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan [(1994) 3 SCC 440], and (6) Ekambaram v. State of T.N. [1972 MLW (Cri) 261] We feel that it is not necessary to cite any more decisions and swell this judgment.” 22. Ramaswamy, J. concurring in part, but dissenting on the constitutional validity of sections 9(7) and 15 of the TADA, also referred to Article 20(3) as follows: “377. Custodial interrogation exposes the suspect to the risk of abuse of his person or dignity as well as distortion or manipulation of his self-incrimination in the crime. No one should be subjected to physical violence of the person as well as to torture. Infringement thereof undermines the peoples’ faith in the efficacy of criminal justice system. Interrogation in police lock-up are often done under conditions of pressure and tension and the suspect could be exposed to great strain even if he is innocent, while the culprit in custody to hide or suppress may be doubly susceptible to
confusion and manipulation. A delicate balance has, therefore, to be maintained to protect the innocent from conviction and the need of the society to see the offender punished. Equally everyone has right against self-incrimination and a right to be silent under Article 20(3) which implies his freedom from police or anybody else. But when the police interrogates a suspect, they abuse their authority having unbridled opportunity to exploit his moral position and authority inducing the captive to confess against his better judgment. The very fact that the person in authority puts the questions and exerts pressure on the captive to comply (sic). Silence on the part of the frightened captive seems to his ears to call for vengeance and induces a belief that confession holds out a chance to avoid torture or to get bail or a promise of lesser punishment. The resourceful investigator adopts all successful tactics to elicit confession as is discussed below. xxx xxxxxx
396. In the State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad [(1962) 3 SCR 10] a Bench of 11 Judges, per majority, interpreting Article 20(3) held on “testimonial compulsion” that, “[w]e can see no reason to confine the content of the constitutional guarantee to this barely literal import. So to limit it would be to rob the guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the substance for the sound as stated in certain American decisions.” Indeed every positive act which furnishes evidence is testimony and testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures positive oral evidence. The acts of the person, of course, is neither negative attitude of silence or submission on his part, nor is there any reason to think that the protection in respect of the evidence procured is confined to what transpires at the trial in the court room. The phrase used in Article 20(3) is to be a witness and not to appear as a witness. It follows that the protection accorded to an accused insofar as it is related to the phrase “to be a witness” is not merely in respect of the testimonial compulsion in the court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. The guarantee was, therefore, held to include not only oral testimony given in a court or out of court, but also statements in writing which incriminated the maker when figuring as accused person. In Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani it was further held that
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compelled testimony must be read as evidence procured not merely by physical threat or violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like — not legal penalty for violation.”
23. Sahai, J. in a separate opinion, concurring in part, but dissenting on the constitutional validity of section 15, referred to Article 20(3) as follows:
“456. A confession is an admission of guilt. The person making it states something against himself, therefore it should be made in surroundings which are free from suspicion. Otherwise it violates the constitutional guarantee under Article 20(3) that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The word ‘offence’ used in the article should be given its ordinary meaning. It applies as much to an offence committed under TADA as under any other Act. The word, ‘compelled’ ordinarily means ‘by force’. This may take place positively and negatively. When one forces one to act in a manner desired by him it is compelling him to do that thing. Same may take place when one is prevented from doing a particular thing unless he agrees to do as desired. In either case it is compulsion. A confession made by an accused or obtained by him under coercion suffers from infirmity unless it is made freely and voluntarily. No civilised democratic country has accepted confession made by an accused before a police officer as voluntary and above suspicion, therefore, admissible in evidence. One of the established rule or norms accepted everywhere is that custodial confession is presumed to be tainted. The mere fact that the Legislature was competent to make the law, as the offence under TADA is one which did not fall in any State entry, did not mean that the Legislature was empowered to curtail or erode a person of his fundamental rights. Making a provision which has the effect of forcing a person to admit his guilt amounts to denial of the liberty. The class of offences dealt by TADA may be different than other offences but the offender under TADA is as much entitled to protection of Articles 20 and 21 as any other. The difference in nature of offence or the legislative competence to enact a law did not affect the fundamental rights guaranteed by Chapter III. If
the construction as suggested by the learned Additional Solicitor General is accepted it shall result in taking the law back once again to the days of Gopalan [A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27] . Section 15 cannot be held to be valid merely because it is as a result of law made by a body which has been found entitled to make the law. The law must still be fair and just as held by this Court. A law which entitles a police officer to record confession and makes it admissible is thus violative of both Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.” 24. A recent judgment in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263 dealt with the constitutional validity of narco-analysis tests as follows:
“179. We now return to the operative question of whether the results obtained through polygraph examination and the BEAP test should be treated as testimonial responses. Ordinarily evidence is classified into three broad categories, namely, oral testimony, documents and material evidence. The protective scope of Article 20(3) read with Section 161(2) CrPC guards against the compulsory extraction of oral testimony, even at the stage of investigation. With respect to the production of documents, the applicability of Article 20(3) is decided by the trial Judge but parties are obliged to produce documents in the first place. However, the compulsory extraction of material (or physical) evidence lies outside the protective scope of Article 20(3). Furthermore, even testimony in oral or written form can be required under compulsion if it is to be used for the purpose of identification or comparison with materials and information that is already in the possession of investigators.
180. We have already stated that the narcoanalysis test includes substantial reliance on verbal statements by the test subject and hence its involuntary administration offends the “right against selfincrimination”. The crucial test laid down in Kathi Kalu Oghad is that of
“imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts, by means of oral statements or statements in writing by a person who has personal knowledge of the facts to be communicated to a court or to a person holding an enquiry or investigation” (ibid. at SCR p. 30.).
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] The difficulty arises since the majority opinion in that case appears to confine the understanding of “personal testimony” to the conveyance of personal knowledge through oral statements or statements in writing. The results obtained from polygraph examination or a BEAP test are not in the nature of oral or written statements. Instead, inferences are drawn from the measurement of physiological responses recorded during the performance of these tests. It could also be argued that tests such as polygraph examination and the BEAP test do not involve a “positive volitional act” on part of the test subject and hence their results should not be treated as testimony. However, this does not entail that the results of these two tests should be likened to physical evidence and thereby excluded from the protective scope of Article 20(3). 181. We must refer back to the substance of the decision in Kathi Kalu Oghad which equated a testimonial act with the imparting of knowledge by a person who has personal knowledge of the facts that are in issue. It has been recognised in other decisions that such personal knowledge about relevant facts can also be communicated through means other than oral or written statements. For example in M.P. Sharma case, it was noted that “…evidence can be furnished through the lips or by production of a thing or of a document or in other modes.” (ibid. at SCR p. 1087) Furthermore, common sense dictates that certain communicative gestures such as pointing or nodding can also convey personal knowledge about a relevant fact, without offering a verbal response. It is quite foreseeable that such a communicative gesture may by itself expose a person to “criminal charges or penalties” or furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed for prosecution. 182. We must also highlight that there is nothing to show that the learned Judges in Kathi Kalu Oghad had contemplated the impugned techniques while discussing the scope of the phrase “to be a witness” for the purpose of Article 20(3). At that time, the transmission of knowledge through means other than speech or writing was not something that could have been easily conceived of. Techniques such as polygraph examination were fairly obscure and were the subject of experimentation in some western nations while the BEAP technique was developed several years later.
Just as the interpretation of statutes has to be often re-examined in light of scientific advancements, we should also be willing to re-examine judicial observations with a progressive lens. 183. An explicit reference to the lie detector tests was of course made by the US Supreme Court in Schmerber [384 US 757 (1965)] decision, wherein Brennan, J. had observed at US p. 764: (L Ed p. 916) “…To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.” 184. Even though the actual process of undergoing a polygraph examination or a BEAP test is not the same as that of making an oral or written statement, the consequences are similar. By making inferences from the results of these tests, the examiner is able to derive knowledge from the subject’s mind which otherwise would not have become available to the investigators. These two tests are different from medical examination and the analysis of bodily substances such as blood, semen and hair samples, since the test subject’s physiological responses are directly correlated to mental faculties. Through lie detection or gauging a subject’s familiarity with the stimuli, personal knowledge is conveyed in respect of a relevant fact. It is also significant that unlike the case of documents, the investigators cannot possibly have any prior knowledge of the test subject’s thoughts and memories, either in the actual or constructive sense. Therefore, even if a highly strained analogy were to be made between the results obtained from the impugned tests and the production of documents, the weight of precedents leans towards restrictions on the extraction of “personal knowledge” through such means. 185. During the administration of a polygraph test or a BEAP test, the subject makes a mental effort which is accompanied by certain physiological responses. The measurement of these responses then becomes the basis of the transmission of knowledge to the investigators. This knowledge may aid an ongoing investigation or lead to the discovery of fresh evidence which could then be used to prosecute the test subject. In any case, the compulsory administration of the impugned tests impedes the
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] subject’s right to choose between remaining silent and offering substantive information. The requirement of a “positive volitional act” becomes irrelevant since the subject is compelled to convey personal knowledge irrespective of his/her own volition.
xxx xxxxxx 189. In light of the preceding discussion, we are of the view that the results obtained from tests such as polygraph examination and the BEAP test should also be treated as “personal testimony”, since they are a means for “imparting personal knowledge about relevant facts”. Hence, our conclusion is that the results obtained through the involuntary administration of either of the impugned tests (i.e. the narcoanalysis technique, polygraph examination and the BEAP test) come within the scope of “testimonial compulsion”, thereby attracting the protective shield of Article 20(3).
xxx xxxxxx 262. In our considered opinion, the compulsory administration of the impugned techniques violates the “right against selfincrimination”. This is because the underlying rationale of the said right is to ensure the reliability as well as voluntariness of statements that are admitted as evidence. This Court has recognised that the protective scope of Article 20(3) extends to the investigative stage in criminal cases and when read with Section 161(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 it protects accused persons, suspects as well as witnesses who are examined during an investigation. The test results cannot be admitted in evidence if they have been obtained through the use of compulsion. Article 20(3) protects an individual’s choice between speaking and remaining silent, irrespective of whether the subsequent testimony proves to be inculpatory or exculpatory. Article 20(3) aims to prevent the forcible “conveyance of personal knowledge that is relevant to the facts in issue”. The results obtained from each of the impugned tests bear a “testimonial” character and they cannot be categorised as material evidence. 263. We are also of the view that forcing an individual to undergo any of the impugned techniques violates the standard of “substantive due process” which is required for restraining personal liberty. Such a violation will occur irrespective of whether these
techniques are forcibly administered during the course of an investigation or for any other purpose since the test results could also expose a person to adverse consequences of a non-penal nature. The impugned techniques cannot be read into the statutory provisions which enable medical examination during investigation in criminal cases i.e. the Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A and 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Such an expansive interpretation is not feasible in light of the rule of “ejusdem generis” and the considerations which govern the interpretation of statutes in relation to scientific advancements. We have also elaborated how the compulsory administration of any of these techniques is an unjustified intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual. It would also amount to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” with regard to the language of evolving international human rights norms. Furthermore, placing reliance on the results gathered from these techniques comes into conflict with the “right to fair trial”. Invocations of a compelling public interest cannot justify the dilution of constitutional rights such as the “right against self-incrimination”. 264. In light of these conclusions, we hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, we do leave room for the voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.” 25. Equally important is the right to privacy which has been recognised by a number of decisions of this Court, and now firmly grounded in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), several judgments were referred to; and M.P. Sharma (supra), where it was held that no such right was recognised in the Constitution of India, was overruled. Thus, in the judgment of Chandrachud, J., it was stated:
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] “26.M.P. Sharma [1954 SCR 1077] was a case where a law prescribing a search to obtain documents for investigating into offences was challenged as being contrary to the guarantee against self-incrimination in Article 20(3). The Court repelled the argument that a search for documents compelled a person accused of an offence to be witness against himself. Unlike a notice to produce documents, which is addressed to a person and whose compliance would constitute a testimonial act, a search warrant and a seizure which follows are not testimonial acts of a person to whom the warrant is addressed, within the meaning of Article 20(3). The Court having held this, the controversy in M.P. Sharma would rest at that. The observations in M.P. Sharma to the effect that the Constitution makers had not thought it fit to subject the regulatory power of search and seizure to constitutional limitations by recognising a fundamental right to privacy (like the US Fourth Amendment), and that there was no justification to import it into a “totally different fundamental right” are at the highest, stray observations. 27. The decision in M.P. Sharma held that in the absence of a provision like the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, a right to privacy cannot be read into the Indian Constitution. The decision in M.P. Sharma did not decide whether a constitutional right to privacy is protected by other provisions contained in the fundamental rights including among them, the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Hence the decision cannot be construed to specifically exclude the protection of privacy under the framework of protected guarantees including those in Articles 19 or 21. The absence of an express constitutional guarantee of privacy still begs the question whether privacy is an element of liberty and, as an integral part of human dignity, is comprehended within the protection of life as well.
xxx xxxxxx 100. M.P. Sharma dealt with a challenge to a search on the ground that the statutory provision which authorised it, violated the guarantee against self-incrimination in Article 20(3). In the absence of a specific provision like the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution in the Indian Constitution, the Court answered the challenge by its ruling that an individual who is subject to a search
during the course of which material is seized does not make a voluntary testimonial statement of the nature that would attract Article 20(3). The Court distinguished a compulsory search from a voluntary statement of disclosure in pursuance of a notice issued by an authority to produce documents. It was the former category that was held to be involved in a compulsive search, which the Court held would not attract the guarantee against selfincrimination. The judgment, however, proceeded further to hold that in the absence of the right to privacy having been enumerated in the Constitution, a provision like the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution could not be read into our own. The observation in regard to the absence of the right to privacy in our Constitution was strictly speaking, not necessary for the decision of the Court in M.P. Sharma and the observation itself is no more than a passing observation. Moreover, the decision does not adjudicate upon whether privacy could be a constitutionally protected right under any other provision such as Article 21 or under Article 19. xxx xxxxxx
316. The judgment in M.P. Sharma holds essentially that in the absence of a provision similar to the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, the right to privacy cannot be read into the provisions of Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. The judgment does not specifically adjudicate on whether a right to privacy would arise from any of the other provisions of the rights guaranteed by Part III including Article 21 and Article 19. The observation that privacy is not a right guaranteed by the Indian Constitution is not reflective of the correct position. M.P. Sharma is overruled to the extent to which it indicates to the contrary.” 26. The judgment of Nariman, J. held as follows:
“442. The importance of Semayne case [77 ER 194] is that it decided that every man’s home is his castle and fortress for his defence against injury and violence, as well as for his repose. William Pitt, the Elder, put it thus: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter, the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.”
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] A century and a half later, pretty much the same thing was said in Huckle v. Money [Huckle v. Money 95 ER 768] in which it was held that Magistrates cannot exercise arbitrary powers which violated the Magna Carta (signed by King John, conceding certain rights to his barons in 1215), and if they did, exemplary damages must be given for the same. It was stated that: (ER p. 769)
“… To enter a man’s house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour….” 443. This statement of the law was echoed in Entick v. Carrington [Entick v. Carrington 95 ER 807] in which Lord Camden held that an illegal search warrant was “subversive of all the comforts of society” and the issuance of such a warrant for the seizure of all of a man’s papers, and not only those alleged to be criminal in nature, was “contrary to the genius of the law of England”. A few years later, in Da Costa v. Jones [Da Costa v. Jones 98 ER 1331] , Lord Mansfield upheld the privacy of a third person when such privacy was the subject-matter of a wager, which was injurious to the reputation of such third person. The wager in that case was as to whether a certain Chevalier D’eon was a cheat and imposter in that he was actually a woman. Such wager which violated the privacy of a third person was held to be injurious to the reputation of the third person for which damages were awarded to the third person. These early judgments did much to uphold the inviolability of the person of a citizen. xxx xxxxxx 456. The first thing that strikes one on reading the aforesaid passage is that the Court (in M.P. Sharma) resisted the invitation to read the US Fourth Amendment into the US Fifth Amendment; in short it refused to read or import the Fourth Amendment into the Indian equivalent of that part of the Fifth Amendment which is the same as Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. Also, the fundamental right to privacy, stated to be analogous to the Fourth Amendment, was held to be something which could not be read into Article 20(3).
457. The second interesting thing to be noted about these observations is that there is no broad ratio in the said judgment that a fundamental right to privacy is not available in Part III of the Constitution. The observation is confined to Article 20(3). Further, it is clear that the actual finding in the aforesaid case had to do with the law which had developed in this Court as well as the US and the UK on Article 20(3) which, on the facts of the case, was held not to be violated. Also we must not forget that this was an early judgment of the Court, delivered in the Gopalan era, which did not have the benefit of R.C. Cooper or Maneka Gandhi. Quite apart from this, it is clear that by the time this judgment was delivered, India was already a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12 of which states: “12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” xxx xxxxxx
468. It will be seen that different smaller Benches of this Court were not unduly perturbed by the observations contained in M.P. Sharma as it was an early judgment of this Court delivered in the Gopalan era which had been eroded by later judgments dealing with the interrelation between fundamental rights and the development of the fundamental right to privacy as being part of the liberty and dignity of the individual. 469. Therefore, given the fact that this judgment dealt only with Article 20(3) and not with other fundamental rights; given the fact that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights containing the right to privacy was not pointed out to the Court; given the fact that it was delivered in an era when fundamental rights had to be read disjunctively in watertight compartments; and given the fact that Article 21 as we know it today only sprung into life in the post Maneka Gandhi era, we are of the view that this judgment is completely out of harm’s way insofar as the grounding of the right to privacy in the fundamental rights chapter is concerned. xxx xxxxxx
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] 472. The majority judgment in Kharak Singh [Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332] then went on to refer to the Preamble to the Constitution, and stated that Article 21 contained the cherished human value of dignity of the individual as the means of ensuring his full development and evolution. A passage was then quoted from Wolf v. Colorado [Wolf v. Colorado 338 US 25 (1949)] to the effect that the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police is basic to a free society. The Court then went on to quote the US Fourth Amendment which guarantees the rights of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Though the Indian Constitution did not expressly confer a like guarantee, the majority held that nonetheless an unauthorised intrusion into a person’s home would violate the English Common Law maxim which asserts that every man’s house is his castle. In this view of Article 21, Regulation 236(b) was struck down.
xxx xxxxxx 475. If the passage in the judgment dealing with domiciliary visits at night and striking it down is contrasted with the later passage upholding the other clauses of Regulation 236 extracted above, it becomes clear that it cannot be said with any degree of clarity that the majority judgment upholds the right to privacy as being contained in the fundamental rights chapter or otherwise. As the majority judgment contradicts itself on this vital aspect, it would be correct to say that it cannot be given much value as a binding precedent. In any case, we are of the view that the majority judgment is good law when it speaks of Article 21 being designed to assure the dignity of the individual as a most cherished human value which ensures the means of full development and evolution of a human being. The majority judgment is also correct in pointing out that Article 21 interdicts unauthorised intrusion into a person’s home. Where the majority judgment goes wrong is in holding that fundamental rights are in watertight compartments and in holding that the right to privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution. It can be seen, therefore, that the majority judgment is like the proverbial curate’s egg—good only in parts. Strangely enough when the good parts alone are seen, there is no real
difference between Subba Rao, J.’s approach in the dissenting judgment and the majority judgment. This then answers the major part of the reference to this nine-Judge Bench in that we hereby declare that neither the eight-Judge nor the six-Judge Bench can be read to come in the way of reading the fundamental right to privacy into Part III of the Constitution. xxx xxxxxx 521. In the Indian context, a fundamental right to privacy would cover at least the following three aspects:
• Privacy that involves the person i.e. when there is some invasion by the State of a person’s rights relatable to his physical body, such as the right to move freely • Informational privacy which does not deal with a person’s body but deals with a person’s mind, and therefore recognises that an individual may have control over the dissemination of material that is personal to him. Unauthorised use of such information may, therefore lead to infringement of this right; and • The privacy of choice, which protects an individual’s autonomy over fundamental personal choices.
For instance, we can ground physical privacy or privacy relating to the body in Articles 19(1)(d) and (e) read with Article 21; ground personal information privacy under Article 21; and the privacy of choice in Articles 19(1)(a) to (c), 20(3), 21 and 25. The argument based on “privacy” being a vague and nebulous concept need not, therefore, detain us.” 27. The NDPS Act is to be construed in the backdrop of Article 20(3) and Article 21, Parliament being aware of the fundamental rights of the citizen and the judgments of this Court interpreting them, as a result of which a delicate balance is maintained between the power of the State to maintain law and order, and the fundamental rights chapter which protects the liberty of the individual. Several safeguards are thus contained in the NDPS Act, which is of an extremely drastic and draconian nature, as has been contended by the counsel for the Appellants before us. Also, the fundamental rights contained in Articles 20(3) and 21 are given pride of place in the Constitution. After the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution was done away with by the 44th Amendment, it is now provided that even in an Emergency, these rights cannot be
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
suspended – see Article 359(1). The interpretation of a statute like the NDPS Act must needs be in conformity and in tune with the spirit of the broad fundamental right not to incriminate oneself, and the right to privacy, as has been found in the recent judgments of this Court.
CONFESSIONS UNDER SECTION 25 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT
28. At this juncture, it is important to set out sections 24 to 27 of the Evidence Act: “24. Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding.––A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. 25. Confession to police-officer not to be proved.––No confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. 26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him.––No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. Explanation.––In this section “Magistrate” does not include the head of a village discharging magisterial functions in the Presidency of Fort St. George or elsewhere, unless such headman is a Magistrate exercising the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 (10 of 1882). 27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.––Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered inconsequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much
of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” 29. Section 25 was originally in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861 (Act 25 of 1861), and was brought into the Evidence Act of 1872. Section 25 states that a confession made to any police officer, whatever his rank, cannot be relied upon against a person accused of any offence. “Police officer” is not defined in the Evidence Act or in any cognate criminal statute. As to what, therefore, “police officer” means, has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court, which will be adverted to later.For the time being, section 25 is to be viewed in contrast tosection 24, given the situation in India of the use of torture and third-degree measures. Unlike section 24, any confession made to a police officer cannot be used as evidence against a person accused of an offence, the voluntariness or otherwise of the confession being irrelevant – it is conclusively presumed by the legislature that all such confessions made to police officers are tainted with the vice of coercion. 30. The ‘First Report Of Her Majesty’s Commissioners Appointed To Consider The Reform Of The Judicial Establishments, Judicial Procedure And Laws Of India&c.’ (1856) which formed the basis for section 25 of the Evidence Act, stated as follows: “Then follow other provisions for preventing any species of compulsion ormaltreatment with a view to extort or confession or procedure information. But weare informed, and this information is corroborated by evidence we have examined,that, in spite of this qualification, confessions are frequently extorted or fabricated. Apolice officer, on receiving intimation of the occurrence of a dacoity or other offenceof a serious character, failing to discover the perpetrators of the offence, oftenendeavours to secure himself against any charge of supinates or neglect by getting upa case against parties whose circumstances or characters are such as are likely toobtain credit for an accusation of the kind against them. This is not infrequently doneby extorting or fabricating false confession, and when this step is once taken, there isof course impunity for real offenders, and a great encouragement to crime. The darogah is henceforth committed to the direction he has given to the case; and it is hisobject to prevent a discovery of the truth, and the apprehension of the guilty parties,Who, as far as the police are concerned, are now perfectly safe. We are
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
persuadedthat any provision to correct the exercise of this power by the police will be futile; andwe accordingly propose to remedy the evil, as far as possible, by the adoption of arule prohibiting any examination whatever of any accused party by the police, theresult of which is to constitute a written document.”
(at page 110)
31. It is important to emphasise that the interpretation of the term “accused” in section 25 of the Evidence Act is materially different from that contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The scope of the section is not limited by time – it is immaterial that the person was not an accused at the time when the confessional statement was made. This was felicitously put by this Court in Deoman Upadhyaya (supra) as follows: “By Section 24, in a criminal proceeding against a person, a confession made by him is inadmissible if it appears to the court to have been caused by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge and proceeding from a person in authority. By Section 25, there is an absolute ban against proof at the trial of a person accused of an offence, of a confession made to a police officer. The ban which is partial under Section 24 and complete under Section 25 applies equally whether or not the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was at the time of making the confession in custody. For the ban to be effective the person need not have been accused of an offence when he made the confession. The expression, “accused person” in Section 24 and the expression “a person accused of any offence” have the same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. As observed in Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor [LR 66 IA 66] by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, “Section 25 covers a confession made to a police officer before any investigation has begun or otherwise not in the course of an investigation”. The adjectival clause “accused of any offence” is therefore descriptive of the person against whom a confessional statement made by him is declared not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person at the time of making the statement for the applicability of the ban.” (at page 21)
32. Likewise, in Agnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar (1966) 1 SCR 134, the Court held: “Section 25 provides: “No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence”. The terms of Section 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression “accused of any offence” covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession.” (at page 137)
33. Thus, whereas a formal accusation is necessary for invoking the protection under Article 20(3), the same would be irrelevant for invoking the protection under section 25 of the Evidence Act. 34. Section 26 of the Evidence Act extends the protection to confessional statements made by persons while “in the custody” of a police-officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. “Custody” is not synonymous with “arrest”, as has been held in a number of judgments of this Court – custody could refer to a situation pre-arrest, as was the case in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Dinesh Kumar (2008) 3 SCC 222 (see paragraphs 27-29). In fact, section 46 of the CrPC speaks of “a submission to the custody by word or action”, which would, inter alia, refer to a voluntary appearance before a police officer without any formal arrest being made. PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE NDPS ACT 35. At this stage, it is important to notice that the NDPS Act has been held to be a complete code on the subject covered by it. In Noor Aga (supra), this Court held:
“2. Several questions of grave importance including the constitutional validity of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short “the Act”), the standard and extent of burden of proof on the prosecution vis-à-vis the accused are in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 9-6-2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] in Criminal Appeal No. 810-SB of 2000 whereby and whereunder an appeal filed by the applicant against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 7-6-2000 under Sections 22 and 23 of the Act had been dismissed.
xxx xxxxxx 75. The Act is a complete code by itself. The Customs Officers have been clothed with the powers of police officers under the Act. It does not, therefore, deal only with a matter of imposition of penalty or an order of confiscation of the properties under the Act, but also with the offences having serious consequences.
xxx xxxxxx
80. The constitutional mandate of equality of law and equal protection of law as adumbrated under Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be lost sight of. The courts, it is well settled, would avoid a construction which would attract the wrath of Article 14. They also cannot be oblivious of the law that the Act is a complete code in itself and, thus, the provisions of the 1962 Act cannot be applied to seek conviction thereunder.”
36. To similar effect, this Court in Mukesh Singh (supra) held: “85. From the aforesaid scheme and provisions of the NDPS Act, it appears that the NDPS Act is a complete code in itself. Section 41(1) authorises a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class or any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may issue a warrant for the arrest of any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under the NDPS Act, or for the search, whether by day or by night……Sub-section 2 of Section 41 authorises any such officer of gazetted rank of the Departments of Central Excise…… as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or any such officer of the Revenue…….police or any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order, if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken in writing that any person has committed an offence punishable under the NDPS Act, authorising any officer subordinate to him but superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or a constable to arrest such a person or search a building, conveyance or place whether
by day or by night or himself arrest such a person or search a building, conveyance or place.” 37. The interplay between the CrPC and the provisions of the NDPS Act is contained in several provisions. It will be noticed that the CrPC has been expressly excluded when it comes to suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under the NDPS Act – see section 32A. Equally, nothing contained in section 360 of the CrPC or in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is to apply to a person convicted of an offence under the NDPS Act, subject to the exceptions that such person is under 18 years of age, and that that offence only be punishable under section 26 or 27 of the NDPS Act – see section 33. 38. On the other hand, the CrPC has been made expressly applicable by the following sections of the NDPS Act:section 34(2), which refers to the form of a security bond; section 36B, which refers to the High Court’s powers in appeal and revision; section 50(5), which refers to searching a person without the intervention of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate; and section 51, which deals with warrants, arrests, searches and seizures made under the Act. Equally, the CrPC has been applied with necessary modifications under section 36A(1)(b), when it comes to authorising the detention of a person in custody for a period beyond fifteen days;section 37(1)(b), which contains additional conditions for the grant of bail in certain circumstances; and section 53A, which are exceptions engrafted upon statements made in writing under sections 161, 162 and 172 of the CrPC. Read with sections 4(2) and 5 of the CrPC, the scheme of the NDPS Act seems to be that the CrPC is generally followed, except where expressly excluded, or applied with modifications. 39. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for enacting the NDPS Act is important and states as follows: “The statutory control over narcotic drugs is exercised in India through a number of Central and State enactments. The principal Central Acts, namely the Opium Act, 1857, the Opium Act, 1878 and the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 were enacted a long time ago. With the passage of time and the developments in the field of illicit drug traffic and drug abuse at national and international level, many deficiencies in the existing laws have come to notice, some of which are indicated below:
(i)
(ii)
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
The scheme of penalties under the present Acts is not sufficiently deterrent to meet the challenge of well organized gangs of smugglers. The Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of 3 years with or without fine and 4 years imprisonment with or without fine for repeat offences. Further, no minimum punishment is prescribed in the present laws, as a result of which drug traffickers have been some times let off by the courts with nominal punishment. The country has for the last few years been increasingly facing the problem of transit traffic of drugs coming mainly from some of our neighbouring countries and destined mainly to Western countries.
The existing Central laws do not provide for investing the officers of a number of important Central enforcement agencies like Narcotics, Customs, Central Excise, etc., with the power of investigation of offences under the said laws.
(iii) Since the enactment of the aforesaid three Central Acts a vast body of international law in the field of narcotics control has evolved through various international treaties and protocols. The Government of India has been a party to these treaties and conventions which entail several obligations which are not covered or are only partly covered by the present Acts. (iv) During recent years new drugs of addiction which have come to be known as psychotropic substances have appeared on the scene and posed serious problems to national government. There is no comprehensive law to enable exercise of control over psychotropic substances in India in the manner as envisaged in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 to which India has also acceded. 2. In view of what has been stated above, there is an urgent need for the enactment of a comprehensive legislation on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which, inter alia, should consolidate and amend the existing laws relating to narcotic drugs, strengthen the existing controls over drug abuse, considerably enhance the penalties particularly for trafficking offences, make provisions for exercising effective control over psychotropic substances and make provisions for the implementation of international conventions
relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to which India has become a party. 3. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.” (emphasis supplied)
40. The very first thing that this Statement addresses is the woeful inadequacy of three old Acts, insofar as the scheme of penalties is concerned, which were not sufficiently deterrent to meet the challenge of well organised gangs of smugglers, together with the importance of investing, for the first time, the officers of central enforcement agencies with the power of investigation of offences under the new law. Undoubtedly, the NDPS Act is a comprehensive legislation which makes provisions for exercising control over narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, at the heart of which is the power vested in various officers to investigate offences under the Act, so as to prevent and punish the same against offenders being, inter alia,organised gangs of smugglers who indulge in what is considered by Parliament to be a menace to society. Also, the preamble to the NDPS Act states: “An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected therewith.” 41. This itself refers to the Act being a “stringent” measure to combat the menace of crimes relatable to drugs and psychotropic substances. Under Chapter IV, which deals with “Offences and Penalties”, sections 15-24 speak of various drugs and psychotropic substances, in which the golden thread running through these sections is that where the contravention involves “small quantity” as defined, there can be a rigorous imprisonment for a term that may extend to one year, or a fine that may extend to ten thousand rupees or both; where the contravention involves an intermediate quantity, i.e. between “small” and “commercial” quantity, with rigorous imprisonment that may extend to ten yearsand with fine that may extend to one lakh rupees; and where the contravention involves “commercial quantity” as defined, with rigorous imprisonment for a minimum of ten years but which may extend to twenty
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
years, and also be liable to a fine which shall not be less than one lakh, but which may extend to two lakhs – the court, for reasons to be recorded, is also given the power to impose a fine exceeding two lakhs. Under sections 28 and 29, punishments for attempts to commit offences, and for abetment and criminal conspiracy, are then set out. An extremely important section is section 30, where even preparation to commit an offence is made an offence1. Under section 31, where a person is already convicted of the commission of, or attempt to commit, or abetment of, or criminal conspiracy to commit, any of the offences punishable under the NDPS Act, and is subsequently convicted of the commission of, or attempt to commit, or abetment of, or criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under the NDPS Act, the punishment then goes to up to a term which may extend to one and one-half times the maximum term of imprisonment, and shall also be liable to a fine which shall extend to one and one-half times of the maximum amount of fine. In certain circumstances under section 31A, the death penalty is also awarded. Under section 32A, no sentence awarded under the NDPS Act, other than a sentence under section 27, shall be suspended, remitted or commuted. Equally, we have seen how under section 33, the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 does not apply where the offender is above 18, or if the offence is for offences other than those under sections 26 and 27 of the Act.
42. Several presumptions are also made under the NDPS Act in which the burden of proof is reversed, now being on the accused. They are all to be found in three sections – sections 35, 54 and 66. These sections state as follows:
“35. Presumption of culpable mental state.—(1) In any prosecution for an offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state of the accused, the court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. Explanation.—In this section “culpable mental state” includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and belief in, or reason to believe, a fact.
It may be remembered that in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC"), the only section where preparation is made an offence, is “preparation to commit dacoity”. See Section 399, IPC.
(2) For the purpose of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the court believes it to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability.” “54. Presumption from possession of illicit articles.—In trials under this Act, it may be presumed, unless and until the contrary is proved, that the accused has committed an offence under this Act in respect of— (a) any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance;
(b) any opium poppy, cannabis plant or coca plant growing on any land which he has cultivated; (c) any apparatus specially designed or any group of utensils specially adopted for the manufacture of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance; or
(d) any materials which have undergone any process towards the manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance, or any residue left of the materials from which any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance has been manufactured, for the possession of which he fails to account satisfactorily.” “66. Presumption as to documents in certain cases.—Where any document—
(i) is produced or furnished by any person or has been seized from the custody or control of any person, in either case, under this Act or under any other law, or
(ii) has been received from any place outside India (duly authenticated by such authority or person and in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government) in the course of investigation of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by a person, and such document is tendered in any prosecution under this Act in evidence against him, or against him and any other person who is tried jointly with him, the court shall—
(a) presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] handwriting of any particular person or which the court may reasonably assume to have been signed by, or to be in the handwriting of, any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting; and in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was executed or attested by the person by whom it purports to have been so executed or attested;
(b) admit the document in evidence, notwithstanding that it is not duly stamped, if such document is otherwise admissible in evidence; (c) in a case falling under clause (i), also presume, unless the contrary is proved, the truth of the contents of such document.” 43. Section 37(1) makes all offences under the Act cognizable and non-bailable, with stringent conditions for bail attached:
“37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless—
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.”
44. Under section 40, where a person is convicted of any of the offences punishable under the Act, the court may, in addition, publish at the expense of such person – in a newspaper or other manner – the factum of such conviction. The NDPS Act is said to be in addition to the Customs Act, 1962 and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, so that,
notwithstanding that offences may be made out under those Acts, offences under the NDPS Act will continue to be tried as such – see sections 79 and 80. 45. Given the stringent nature of the NDPS Act, several sections provide safeguards so as to provide a balance between investigation and trial of offences under the Act, and the fundamental rights of the citizen. Several safeguards are contained in section 42, which states as follows: “42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation.—(1) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intelligence or any other department of the Central Government including paramilitary forces or armed forces as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State Government, if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under this Act has been committed or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence or any illegally acquired property or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may between sunrise and sunset,— (a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or place;
(b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any obstacle to such entry; (c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or conveyance which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] commission of any offence punishable under this Act or furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act; and (d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under this Act: Provided that in respect of a holder of a licence for manufacture of manufactured drugs or psychotropic substances or controlled substances, granted under this Act or any rule or order made thereunder, such power shall be exercised by an officer not below the rank of sub-inspector: Provided further that if such officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed place at any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief. (2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto, he shall within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.” 46. From this section it is clear that only when the concerned officer has “reason to believe” from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that an offence has been committed, that the concerned officer may, only between sunrise and sunset, enter, search, seize drugs and materials, and arrest any person who he believes has committed any offence. By the first proviso, this can be done only by an officer not below the rank of sub-inspector. Under sub-section (2) in addition, where the information in writing is given, the officer involved must send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior within seventy-two hours. It is important here to contrast “reason to believe” with the expression “reason to suspect”, which is contained in section 49 of the NDPS Act. Thus, “reason to believe” has been construed by this Court in A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala (2004) 11 SCC 576as follows:
“9. Under IPC, guilt in respect of almost all the offences is fastened either on the ground of “intention” or “knowledge” or “reason to believe”. We are now concerned with the expressions “knowledge” and “reason to believe”. “Knowledge” is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. “Reason to believe” is another facet of the state of mind. “Reason to believe” is not the same thing as “suspicion” or “doubt” and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. “Reason to believe” is a higher level of state of mind. Likewise “knowledge” will be slightly on a higher plane than “reason to believe”. A person can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. Section 26 IPC explains the meaning of the words “reason to believe” thus: “26. ‘Reason to believe’.—A person is said to have ‘reason to believe’ a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise.”” 47. Section 50 of the NDPS Act contains extremely important conditions under which a search of persons shall be conducted. Section 50 states:
“50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted.—(1) When any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about to search any person under the provisions of section 41, section 42 or section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person without unnecessary delay to nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate. (2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred to in sub-section (1).
(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search be made. (4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female.
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] (5) When an officer duly authorised under section 42 has reason to believe that it is not possible to take the person to be searched to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate without the possibility of the person to be searched parting with possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance or article or document, he may, instead of taking such person to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, proceed to search the person as provided under section100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the officer shall record the reasons for such belief which necessitated such search and within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.”
48. In Baldev Singh (supra), this Court had held: “17. The trial court in those cases had acquitted the accused on the ground that the arrest, search and seizure were conducted in violation of some of the “relevant and mandatory” provisions of the NDPS Act. The High Court declined to grant appeal against the order of acquittal. The State of Punjab thereupon filed appeals by special leave in this Court. In some other cases, where the accused had been convicted, they also filed appeals by special leave questioning their conviction and sentence on the ground that their trials were illegal because of non-compliance with the safeguards provided under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. A twoJudge Bench speaking through K. Jayachandra Reddy, J. considered several provisions of the NDPS Act governing arrest, search and seizure and, in particular, the provisions of Sections 41, 42, 43, 44, 49, 50, 51, 52 and 57 of the NDPS Act as well as the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to search and seizure effected during investigation of a criminal case. Dealing with Section 50, it was held that in the context in which the right had been conferred, it must naturally be presumed that it is imperative on the part of the officer to inform the person to be searched of his right that if he so requires he shall be searched before a gazetted officer or Magistrate and on such request being made by him, to be taken before the gazetted officer or Magistrate for further proceedings. The reasoning given in Balbir Singh case [(1994) 3 SCC 299] was that to afford an opportunity to the
person to be searched “if he so requires to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate” he must be made aware of that right and that could be done only by the empowered officer by informing him of the existence of that right. The Court went on to hold that failure to inform the person to be searched of that right and if he so requires, failure to take him to the gazetted officer or the Magistrate, would mean non-compliance with the provisions of Section 50 which in turn would “affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial”. The following conclusions were arrived at by the two-Judge Bench in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh: “25. The questions considered above arise frequently before the trial courts. Therefore we find it necessary to set out our conclusions which are as follows: (1) If a police officer without any prior information as contemplated under the provisions of the NDPS Act makes a search or arrests a person in the normal course of investigation into an offence or suspected offences as provided under the provisions of CrPC and when such search is completed at that stage Section 50 of the NDPS Act would not be attracted and the question of complying with the requirements thereunder would not arise. If during such search or arrest there is a chance recovery of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance then the police officer, who is not empowered, should inform the empowered officer who should thereafter proceed in accordance with the provisions of the NDPS Act. If he happens to be an empowered officer also, then from that stage onwards, he should carry out the investigation in accordance with the other provisions of the NDPS Act. (2-A) Under Section 41(1) only an empowered Magistrate can issue warrant for the arrest or for the search in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV of the Act etc. when he has reason to believe that such offences have been committed or such substances are kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or place. When such warrant for arrest or for search is issued by a Magistrate who is not empowered, then such search or arrest if carried out would be illegal. Likewise only empowered officers or duly authorized officers as enumerated in Sections 41(2) and 42(1) can act under the provisions of the NDPS Act. If such
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] arrest or search is made under the provisions of the NDPS Act by anyone other than such officers, the same would be illegal. (2-B) Under Section 41(2) only the empowered officer can give the authorisation to his subordinate officer to carry out the arrest of a person or search as mentioned therein. If there is a contravention, that would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the conviction. (2-C) Under Section 42(1) the empowered officer if has a prior information given by any person, that should necessarily be taken down in writing. But if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge that offences under Chapter IV have been committed or materials which may furnish evidence of commission of such offences are concealed in any building etc. he may carry out the arrest or search without a warrant between sunrise and sunset and this provision does not mandate that he should record his reasons of belief. But under the proviso to Section 42(1) if such officer has to carry out such search between sunset and sunrise, he must record the grounds of his belief. To this extent these provisions are mandatory and contravention of the same would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial. (3) Under Section 42(2) such empowered officer who takes down any information in writing or records the grounds under proviso to Section 42(1) should forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior. If there is total non-compliance of this provision the same affects the prosecution case. To that extent it is mandatory. But if there is delay whether it was undue or whether the same has been explained or not, will be a question of fact in each case. (4-A) If a police officer, even if he happens to be an ‘empowered’ officer while effecting an arrest or search during normal investigation into offences purely under the provisions of CrPC fails to strictly comply with the provisions of Sections 100 and 165 CrPC including the requirement to record reasons, such failure would only amount to an irregularity. (4-B) If an empowered officer or an authorised officer under Section 41(2) of the Act carries out a search, he would be doing
so under the provisions of CrPC namely Sections 100 and 165 CrPC and if there is no strict compliance with the provisions of CrPC then such search would not per se be illegal and would not vitiate the trial. The effect of such failure has to be borne in mind by the courts while appreciating the evidence in the facts and circumstances of each case. (5) On prior information the empowered officer or authorised officer while acting under Sections 41(2) or 42 should comply with the provisions of Section 50 before the search of the person is made and such person should be informed that if he so requires, he shall be produced before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate as provided thereunder. It is obligatory on the part of such officer to inform the person to be searched. Failure to inform the person to be searched and if such person so requires, failure to take him to the gazetted officer or the Magistrate, would amount to non-compliance of Section 50 which is mandatory and thus it would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial. After being so informed whether such person opted for such a course or not would be a question of fact. (6) The provisions of Sections 52 and 57 which deal with the steps to be taken by the officers after making arrest or seizure under Sections 41 to 44 are by themselves not mandatory. If there is non-compliance or if there are lapses like delay etc. then the same has to be examined to see whether any prejudice has been caused to the accused and such failure will have a bearing on the appreciation of evidence regarding arrest or seizure as well as on merits of the case.” (emphasis in original) xxx xxxxxx
57. On the basis of the reasoning and discussion above, the following conclusions arise: (1) That when an empowered officer or a duly authorised officer acting on prior information is about to search a person, it is imperative for him to inform the concerned person of his right under Sub-section (1) of Section 50 of being taken to the nearest
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] Gazetted Officer or the nearest Magistrate for making the search. However, such information may not necessarily be in writing;
(2) That failure to inform the concerned person about the existence of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate would cause prejudice to an accused; (3) That a search made, by an empowered officer, on prior information, without informing the person of his right that, if he so requires, he shall be taken before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts, failure to conduct his search before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, may not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused, where the conviction has been recorded only on the basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from his person, during a search conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act; (4) That there is indeed need to protect society from criminals. The societal intent in safety will suffer if persons who commit crimes are let off because the evidence against them is to be treated as if it does not exist. The answer, therefore, is that the investigating agency must follow the procedure as envisaged by the statute scrupulously and the failure to do so must be viewed by the higher authorities seriously inviting action against the concerned official so that the laxity on the part of the investigating authority is curbed. In every case the end result is important but the means to achieve it must remain above board. The remedy cannot be worse than the disease itself. The legitimacy of judicial process may come under cloud if the court is seen to condone acts of lawlessness conducted by the investigating agency during search operations and may also undermine respect for law and may have the effect of unconscionably compromising the administration of justice. That cannot be permitted. An accused is entitled to a fair trial. A conviction resulting from an unfair trial is contrary to our concept of justice. The use of evidence collected in breach of the safeguards provided by Section 50 at the trial, would render the trial unfair. (5) That whether or not the safeguards provided in Section 50 have been duly observed would have to be determined by the Court on
the basis of evidence led at the trial. Finding on that issue, one way or the other, would be relevant for recording an order of conviction or acquittal. Without giving an opportunity to the prosecution to establish, at the trial, that the provisions of Section 50, and particularly the safeguards provided therein were duly complied with, it would not be permissible to cut-short a criminal trial; (6) That in the context in which the protection has been incorporated in Section 50 for the benefit of the person intended to be searched, we do not express any opinion whether the provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or directory, but, hold that failure to inform the concerned person of his right as emanating from Sub-section (1) of Section 50, may render the recovery of the contraband suspect and the conviction and sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law; (7) That an illicit article seized from the person of an accused during search conducted in violation of the safeguards provided in Section 50 of the Act cannot be used as evidence of proof of unlawful possession of the contraband on the accused though any other material recovered during that search may be relied upon by the prosecution, in other proceedings, against an accused, notwithstanding the recovery of that material during an illegal search; (8) A presumption under Section 54 of the Act can only be raised after the prosecution has established that the accused was found to be in possession of the contraband in a search conducted in accordance with the mandate of Section 50. An illegal search cannot entitle the prosecution to raise a presumption under Section 54 of the Act (9) That the judgment in Pooran Mal’s case cannot be understood to have laid down that an illicit article seized during a search of a person, on prior information, conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act, can by itself be used as evidence of unlawful possession of the illicit article on the person from whom the contraband has been seized during the illegal search; (10) That the judgment in Ali Mustaffa’s case correctly interprets and distinguishes the judgment in Pooran Mal’s case and the broad
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observations made in Pirthi Chand’s case and Jasbir Singh’s case are not in tune with the correct exposition of law as laid down in Pooran Mal’s case. The above conclusions are not a summary of our judgment and have to be read and considered in the light of the entire discussion contained in the earlier part.”
49. Immediately after this judgment, Parliament enacted subsections (5) and (6). Despite the enactment of these provisions, this Court in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja (supra) specifically held as follows:
“24. Although the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case [(1999) 6 SCC 172] did not decide in absolute terms the question whether or not Section 50 of the NDPS Act was directory or mandatory yet it was held that provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 50 make it imperative for the empowered officer to “inform” the person concerned (suspect) about the existence of his right that if he so requires, he shall be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate; failure to “inform” the suspect about the existence of his said right would cause prejudice to him, and in case he so opts, failure to conduct his search before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, may not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused, where the conviction has been recorded only on the basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from the person during a search conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The Court also noted that it was not necessary that the information required to be given under Section 50 should be in a prescribed form or in writing but it was mandatory that the suspect was made aware of the existence of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, if so required by him. We respectfully concur with these conclusions. Any other interpretation of the provision would make the valuable right conferred on the suspect illusory and a farce.
xxx xxxxxx 27. It can, thus, be seen that apart from the fact that in Karnail Singh [(2009) 8 SCC 539], the issue was regarding the scope and applicability of Section 42 of the NDPS Act in the matter of
conducting search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation, the said decision does not depart from the dictum laid down in Baldev Singh case [(1999) 6 SCC 172] insofar as the obligation of the empowered officer to inform the suspect of his right enshrined in sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is concerned. It is also plain from the said paragraph that the flexibility in procedural requirements in terms of the two newly inserted sub-sections can be resorted to only in emergent and urgent situations, contemplated in the provision, and not as a matter of course. Additionally, sub-section (6) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act makes it imperative and obligatory on the authorised officer to send a copy of the reasons recorded by him for his belief in terms of sub-section (5), to his immediate superior officer, within the stipulated time, which exercise would again be subjected to judicial scrutiny during the course of trial. xxx xxxxxx
29. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the firm opinion that the object with which the right under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act, by way of a safeguard, has been conferred on the suspect viz. to check the misuse of power, to avoid harm to innocent persons and to minimise the allegations of planting or foisting of false cases by the law enforcement agencies, it would be imperative on the part of the empowered officer to apprise the person intended to be searched of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate. We have no hesitation in holding that insofar as the obligation of the authorised officer under subsection (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is concerned, it is mandatory and requires strict compliance. Failure to comply with the provision would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction if the same is recorded only on the basis of the recovery of the illicit article from the person of the accused during such search. Thereafter, the suspect may or may not choose to exercise the right provided to him under the said provision. xxx xxxxxx
31. We are of the opinion that the concept of “substantial compliance” with the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act introduced and read into the mandate of the said section in Joseph Fernandez [(2000) 1 SCC 707] and Prabha Shankar
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] Dubey [(2004) 2 SCC 56] is neither borne out from the language of sub-section (1) of Section 50 nor is it in consonance with the dictum laid down in Baldev Singh case [(1999) 6 SCC 172]. Needless to add that the question whether or not the procedure prescribed has been followed and the requirement of Section 50 had been met, is a matter of trial. It would neither be possible nor feasible to lay down any absolute formula in that behalf.” 50. Thus, this extremely important safeguard continues, as has been originally enacted, subject only to the exceptions in sub-sections (5) and (6), which can only be used in urgent and emergent situations. This Court has clearly held that non-compliance of this provision would lead to the conviction of the accused being vitiated, and that “substantial” compliance with these provisions would not save the prosecution case.
51. Likewise, section 52 of the NDPS Act states as follows: “52. Disposal of persons arrested and articles seized.—(1) Any officer arresting a person under section 41, section 42, section 43 or section 44 shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. (2) Every person arrested and article seized under warrant issued under sub-section (1) of section 41 shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay to the Magistrate by whom the warrant was issued.
(3) Every person arrested and article seized under sub-section (2) of section 41, section 42, section 43 or section 44 shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay to— (a) the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station, or
(b) the officer empowered under section 53. (4) The authority or officer to whom any person or article is forwarded under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) shall, with all convenient despatch, take such measures as may be necessary for the disposal according to law of such person or article.”
52. Section 52(1)-(3) contains three separate safeguards, insofar as disposal of persons arrested and articles seized are concerned. 53. Section 57 then speaks of a person making an arrest or seizure having to make a full report of all the particulars of such arrest or seizure
to his immediate official superior within forty-eight hours. Equally, under section 57A, whenever any officer notified under section 53 makes an arrest or seizure under the Act, the officer shall make a report of the illegally acquired properties of such person to the jurisdictional competent authority within ninety days of the arrest or seizure. Section 58 is extremely important, and is set out hereinbelow: “58. Punishment for vexatious entry, search, seizure or arrest.—(1) Any person empowered under section 42 or section 43 or section 44 who—
(a) without reasonable ground of suspicion enters or searches, or causes to be entered or searched, any building, conveyance or place; (b) vexatiously and unnecessarily seizes the property of any person on the pretence of seizing or searching for any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or other article liable to be confiscated under this Act, or of seizing any document or other article liable to be seized under section 42, section 43 or section 44; or (c) vexatiously and unnecessarily detains, searches or arrests any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. (2) Any person wilfully and maliciously giving false information and so causing an arrest or a search being made under this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both.”
54. This, more than any other provision, makes it clear that a person’s privacy is not to be trifled with, because if it is, the officer who trifles with it is himself punishable under the provision. Under section 63, which contains the procedure in making confiscations, the first proviso to sub-section (2) makes it clear that no order of confiscation of an article or thing shall be made until the expiry of one month from the date of seizure, or without hearing any person who may claim any right thereto and the evidence which he produces in respect of his claim. 55. Given the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, together with the safeguards mentioned in the provisions discussed above, it is important to note that statutes like the NDPS Act have to be construed bearing in
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mind the fact that the severer the punishment, the greater the care taken to see that the safeguards provided in the statute are scrupulously followed. This was laid down in paragraph 28 of Baldev Singh (supra).That the NDPS Act is predominantly a penal statute is no longer res integra.In Directorate of Revenue and Anr. v. Mohammed Nisar Holia (2008) 2 SCC 370, this Court held:
“9. The NDPS Act is a penal statute. It invades the rights of an accused to a large extent. It raises a presumption of a culpable mental state. Ordinarily, even an accused may not be released on bail having regard to Section 37 of the Act. The court has the power to publish names, address and business, etc. of the offenders. Any document produced in evidence becomes admissible. A vast power of calling for information upon the authorities has been conferred by reason of Section 67 of the Act. 10. Interpretation and/or validity in regard to the power of search and seizure provided for under the said Act came up for consideration in Balbir Singh case [(1994) 3 SCC 299] wherein it was held: “10. It is thus clear that by a combined reading of Sections 41, 42, 43 and 51 of the NDPS Act and Section 4 CrPC regarding arrest and search under Sections 41, 42 and 43, the provisions of CrPC, namely, Sections 100 and 165 would be applicable to such arrest and search. Consequently the principles laid down by various courts as discussed above regarding the irregularities and illegalities in respect of arrest and search would equally be applicable to the arrest and search under the NDPS Act also depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 11. But there are certain other embargoes envisaged under Sections 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act. Only a Magistrate so empowered under Section 41 can issue a warrant for arrest and search where he has reason to believe that an offence under Chapter IV has been committed so on and so forth as mentioned therein. Under sub-section (2) only a gazetted officer or other officers mentioned and empowered therein can give an authorisation to a subordinate to arrest and search if such officer has reason to believe about the commission of an offence and after reducing the information, if any, into writing. Under Section 42 only officers mentioned therein and so empowered can make
the arrest or search as provided if they have reason to believe from personal knowledge or information. In both these provisions there are two important requirements. One is that the Magistrate or the officers mentioned therein firstly be empowered and they must have reason to believe that an offence under Chapter IV has been committed or that such arrest or search was necessary for other purposes mentioned in the provision. So far as the first requirement is concerned, it can be seen that the legislature intended that only certain Magistrates and certain officers of higher rank and empowered can act to effect the arrest or search. This is a safeguard provided having regard to the deterrent sentences contemplated and with a view that innocent persons are not harassed. Therefore if an arrest or search contemplated under these provisions of NDPS Act has to be carried out, the same can be done only by competent and empowered Magistrates or officers mentioned thereunder.” 11. Power to make search and seizure as also to arrest an accused is founded upon and subject to satisfaction of the officer as the term “reason to believe” has been used. Such belief may be founded upon secret information that may be orally conveyed by the informant. Draconian provision which may lead to a harsh sentence having regard to the doctrine of “due process” as adumbrated under Article 21 of the Constitution of India requires striking of balance between the need of law and enforcement thereof, on the one hand, and protection of citizen from oppression and injustice on the other. 12. This Court in Balbir Singh [(1994) 3 SCC 299] referring to Miranda v. State of Arizona [384 US 436 (1966)] while interpreting the provisions of the Act held that not only the provisions of Section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be attracted in the matter of search and seizure but the same must comply with right of the accused to be informed about the requirement to comply with the statutory provisions. xxx xxxxxx
16. It is not in dispute that the said Act prescribes stringent punishment. A balance, thus, must be struck in regard to the mode and manner in which the statutory requirements are to be complied with vis-à-vis the place of search and seizure.”
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56. Likewise, in Union of India v. Bal Mukund (2009) 12 SCC 161, this Court held:
“28. Where a statute confers such drastic powers and seeks to deprive a citizen of its liberty for not less than ten years, and making stringent provisions for grant of bail, scrupulous compliance with the statutory provisions must be insisted upon.”
57. With this pronouncement of the law in mind, let us now examine the two questions that have been referred to us. SCOPE OF SECTION 67 OF THE NDPS ACT 58. Section 67 of the NDPS Act is set out hereinbelow:
“67. Power to call for information, etc.—Any officer referred to in section 42 who is authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the contravention of any provision of this Act,—
(a) call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder; (b) require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the enquiry;
(c) examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.” 59. The marginal note to the section indicates that it refers only to the power to “call for information, etc.”. As has been held by this Court in K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Anr. (1981) 4 SCC 173, a marginal note is an important internal tool for indicating the meaning and purpose of a section in a statute, as it indicates the “drift” of the provision. The Court held as follows: “9. This interpretation of sub-section (2) is strongly supported by the marginal note to Section 52 which reads “Consideration for transfer in cases of understatement”. It is undoubtedly true that the marginal note to a section cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the section but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift of the section or, to use the words of Collins, M.R. in Bushel v. Hammond [(1904) 2 KB 563] to show what
the section is dealing with. It cannot control the interpretation of the words of a section particularly when the language of the section is clear and unambiguous but, being part of the statute, it prima facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the section (vide Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar [(1955) 2 SCR 603]).” 60. Secondly, it isonly an officer referred to in section 42 who may use the powers given under section 67 in order to make an “enquiry” in connection with the contravention of any provision of this Act. The word “enquiry” has been used in section 67 to differentiate it from “inquiry” as used in section 53A, which is during the course of investigation of offences2.As a matter of fact, the notifications issued under the Act soon after the Act came into force, which will be referred to later in the judgment, specifically speak of the powers conferred under section 42(1) read with section 67. This is an important executive reading of the NDPS Act, which makes it clear that the powers to be exercised under section 67 are to be exercised in conjunction with the powers that are delineated in section 42(1). Thus, in Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Assn. Ltd. (1979) 4 SCC 565, this Court referred to the principle of “contemporanea expositio” in the context of an executive interpretation of a statute, as follows: “9…The principle of contemporanea expositio (interpreting a statute or any other document by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority) can be invoked though the same will not always be decisive of the question of construction (Maxwell 12th ed.p.268). In Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 ed.) in para 219 (at pp. 393-395) it has been stated that administrative construction (i.e. contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is overturned; such a construction, commonly referred to as practical construction, although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight; it is highly persuasive. In Baleshwar In Lexico (a collaboration between Oxford University Press and Dictionary.com), it is stated that “the traditional distinction between the verbs enquire and inquire is that enquire is to be used for general senses of ‘ask’, while inquire is reserved for uses meaning ‘make a formal investigation’”. (see https://www.lexico.com/grammar/enquireor-inquire).
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass [ILR 35 Cal 701 at 713] the principle, which was reiterated in Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha [ILR 43 Cal 790] has been stated by Mookerjee, J., thus: “It is a well settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it...I do not suggest for a moment that such interpretation has by any means a controlling effect upon the courts; such interpretation may, if occasion arises, have to be disregarded for cogent and persuasive reasons, and in a clear case of error, a court would without hesitation refuse to follow such construction.” 61. The officer referred to in section 42 is given powers of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant, with the safeguards that have been pointed out hereinabove in this judgment.The first safeguard is that such officer must have “reason to believe”, which as has been noted, is different from mere “reason to suspect”.It is for this reason that such officer must make an enquiry in connection with the contravention of the provisions of this Act, for otherwise, even without such enquiry, mere suspicion of the commission of an offence would be enough. It is in this enquiry that he has to call for “information” under sub-clause (a), which “information” can be given by any person and taken down in writing, as is provided in section 42(1). Further, the information given must be for the purpose of “satisfying” himself that there has been a contravention of the provisions of this Act, which again goes back to the expression “reason to believe” in section 42.This being the case, it is a little difficult to accept Shri Lekhi’s argument that “enquiry” in section 67 is the same as “investigation”, which is referred to in section 53.Section 53 states: “53. Power to invest officers of certain departments with powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station.—(1) The Central Government, after consultation with the State Government, may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, invest any officer of the department of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intelligence or any other department of the Central Government including para-military forces or armed forces or any class of such officers with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station for the investigation of the offences under this Act.
(2) The State Government may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, invest any officer of the department of drugs control, revenue or excise or any other department or any class of such officers with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station for the investigation of offences under this Act.”
62. “Investigation” is defined under the CrPC in section 2(h) as follows:
“(h) “investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf;” 63. By virtue of section 2(xxix) of the NDPS Act, this definition becomes applicable to the use of the expression “investigation” in section 53 of the NDPS Act. It is important to notice that it is an inclusive definition, by which, “evidence” is collected by a police officer or a person authorised by the Magistrate.The “enquiry” that is made by a section 42 officer is so that such officer may gather “information” to satisfy himself that there is “reason to believe” that an offence has been committed in the first place. 64. This becomes even clearer when section 52(3) of the NDPS Act is read. Under section 52(3), every person arrested and article seized under sections 41 to 44 shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay either to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station, who must then proceed to “investigate” the case given to him, or to the officer empowered under section 53 of the NDPS Act, which officer then “investigates” the case in order to find out whether an offence has been committed under the Act.It is clear, therefore, thatsection 67 is at an antecedent stage to the “investigation”, which occurs after the concerned officer under section 42 has “reason to believe”, upon information gathered in an enquiry made in that behalf, that an offence has been committed. 65. Equally, when we come to section 67(c) of the NDPS Act, the expression used is “examine” any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. The “examination” of such person is again only for the purpose of gathering information so as to satisfy himself that there is “reason to believe” that an offence has been committed. This can, by no stretch of imagination, be equated to a “statement” under
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
section 161 of the CrPC, as is argued by Shri Lekhi, relying upon Sahoo v. State of U.P. (1965) 3 SCR 86 (at page 88), which would include the making of a confession, being a sub-species of “statement”.
66. The consequence of accepting Shri Lekhi’s argument flies in the face of the fundamental rights contained in Articles 20(3) and 21, as well as the scheme of the NDPS Act, together with the safeguards that have been set out by us hereinabove.First and foremost, even according to Shri Lekhi, a police officer, properly so-called, may be authorised to call for information etc. under section 67, as he is an officer referred to in section 42(1).Yet, while “investigating” an offence under the NDPS Act i.e. subsequent to the collection of information etc. under section 67, the same police officer will be bound by sections 160-164 of the CrPC, together with all the safeguards mentioned therein – firstly, that the person examined shall be bound to answer truly all questions relating to such case put to him, other than questions which would tend to incriminate him; secondly, the police officer is to reduce this statement into writing and maintain a separate and true record of this statement; thirdly, the statement made may be recorded by audio-video electronic means to ensure its genuineness; and fourthly, a statement made by a woman can only be made to a woman police officer or any woman officer.Even after all these safeguards are met, no such statement can be used at any inquiry or trial, except for the purpose of contradicting such witness in cross-examination.In Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P.,1959 Supp (2) SCR 875, Subba Rao J., speaking for four out of six learned Judges of this Court, had occasion to refer to the history of section 162 of the CrPC. After setting out this history in some detail, the learned Judge held: “It is, therefore, seen that the object of the legislature throughout has been to exclude the statement of a witness made before the police during the investigation from being made use of at the trial for any purpose, and the amendments made from time to time were only intended to make clear the said object and to dispel the cloud cast on such intention. The Act of 1898 for the first time introduced an exception enabling the said statement reduced to writing to be used for impeaching the credit of the witness in the manner provided by the Evidence Act. As the phraseology of the exception lent scope to defeat the purpose of the legislature, by the Amendment Act of 1923, the section was redrafted defining the limits of the exception with precision so as to confine it only to
contradict the witness in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. If one could guess the intention of the legislature in framing the section in the manner it did in 1923, it would be apparent that it was to protect the accused against the user of the statements of witnesses made before the police during investigation at the trial presumably on the assumption that the said statements were not made under circumstances inspiring confidence. Both the section and the proviso intended to serve primarily the same purpose i.e., the interest of the accused. (at pages 889 – 890)
xxx xxxxxx The object of the main section as the history of its legislation shows and the decided cases indicate is to impose a general bar against the use of statement made before the police and the enacting clause in clear terms says that no statement made by any person to a police officer or any record thereof, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose. The words are clear and unambiguous. The proviso engrafts an exception on the general prohibition and that is, the said statement in writing may be used to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. We have already noticed from the history of the section that the enacting clause was mainly intended to protect the interests of accused. At the state of investigation, statements of witnesses are taken in a haphazard manner. The police officer in the course of his investigation finds himself more often in the midst of an excited crowd and babel of voices raised all round. In such an atmosphere, unlike that in a court of law, he is expected to hear the statements of witnesses and record separately the statement of each one of them. Generally he records only a summary of the laments which appear to him to be relevant. These statements are, therefore only a summary of what a witness says and very often perfunctory. Indeed, in view of the aforesaid facts, there is a statutory prohibition against police officers taking the signature of the person making the statement, indicating thereby that the statement is not intended to be binding on the witness or an assurance by him that it is a correct statement. At the same time, it being the earliest record of the statement of a witness soon after the incident, any contradiction found therein
TOFAN SINGH v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] would be of immense help to an accused to discredit the testimony of a witness making the statement. The section was, therefore, conceived in an attempt to find a happy via media, namely, while it enacts an absolute bar against the statement made before a police officer being used for any purpose whatsoever, it enables the accused to rely upon it for a limited purpose of c