Union of India and Another v. Tulsiram Patel and Others

Landmark judgment · Service law — When an inquiry can be dispensed with under Article 311(2).

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
11 July 1985
Judge
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud
Neutral citation
1985 INSC 155
Reported in
[1985] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 131
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Article 311 Constitution, Section 332 IPC, Section 2 Industrial Disputes Act, Section 22 Industrial Disputes Act, Article 33 Constitution, Article 226 Constitution
Subject
Criminal, Labour

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Full judgment

UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

. v. TULSIRAM PATEL AND OTHERS JULY 11, 1985

[Y.v. CHANDRACHUD,CJ.' v.D. TUIZAPURKAR, R.S. PATHAK, D.P. MADON AND M.P. THAKKAR, JJ. J

Constitution of India Articles 14,21,309,310,311. Central Civil Services (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules 1965 Rules 19, 22,23, 25, 27(2),29, 29A.

C

Central Industrial Security Force Rules 1969 Rules 37 ,42, 42A, 47(2) and 49. Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) · 14, 17, 20, 22(2), 25, 25A.

Rules

1968, Rules

Doctrine of Pleasure-Scope of in Art.311 - Whether an exception to Art.310(1) . . ,. . Laws made under Art.309 whether to be subject>"to Ar,t.310(1) · .fJ.ind 311 and Part III. ·~

Art. 311(2) second proviso - Principle of natural justicewhetµer. excluded- Mala fide action of disciplinary authority Whetti~r.'r~an. be assailed - . Conduct of government servant must justify \disinissal or removal or reduction in rank - Condition precedent. t<f applicability of the provision - Approach of the disciplinaty''"authority - The situations when it is not reasonably practicable to·.'ll6ld. inquiry - What are - Reasons to be recorded in writing for riot holding the inquiry - Communication of reasons to the aggrieved -.g<?ye~ent servant - Necessity of - Remedies available to the aggrieved governmeilt servant. 'Security of State;.•. ~ What is - How affected - When not expedient to hold inqUiry in· interest of 'security of state' -

subjective satisfaction -of-P~esident or Governor - What is. Though pre-decisional ·hearing excluded post decisional departmental hearing available·. - Judicial review open on grounds of mala f ides or non-application of mind.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Government

(1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

servant convicted for causing grevious head

injury - Punishment of complusory retirement- Whether proper and justified. Railway employees - Participating in all-India strike - En masse dismissal of participants - Whether proper and justified.

Members of CISF - Creating riotous situation - Break down of discipline in the force - Members becoming security risk - Dismissal - Whether proper and justified.

C

Member of State Police Force - Creating violent public disorder ~ Inciting others members to do so - Dismissal wl1ether proper and justified. Natural Justice - Principles of Natural Justice - What: are - Origin of principle - .'audi alteram partem' - When can be excluded - Post decisional hearing whether sufficient compliance of the rule.

Statutory Interpretation ·whether mandatory or directory

Provision of Constitution 'expressum facit cessare

tacitum' - maxim - external aids to interpretation - use of -

mandatory

constitutional

prohibition · strict

construction of

"""'Whether necessary.

WORDS AND PHRASES - MEANING OF '~ts of the appropriate legislature' - Art. 309. 'Except as expressly provided by this Constitution' - Art. 310(1). i.

'Not expedient' 'Security of State' ' - 'Reasonably practtcable' - 'This clause shall not apply' - Art. 311(2). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Subordinate legislation - Executive

instructions whether

have forC~ of statutory rule.

Article 311 of the Constitution confers certain safeguards upon persons employed in civil capacities under the Union of India or. a State. The f_irst safeguard (which is given by clause (l) of Article 311) is that such person cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The second safeguard (which is given by clause (2) of

U.Q.l, v. TULSIRAM

Article 311 is that he cannot be diomianed reoioved or reduced in rank except after an·l.nquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him a."ld· given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of tho•e charges. 'rhe second safeguard is, Mowever, not available when a person in dismissed, removed or reduced in rank in any of the three c.eses set out in clauses (a.) to (c) mentioned in the second proviso to Article 311(2). Under clause (a), such person can be dismissed, removed or reduced in . rank without any inquiry on the ground of conduct which has led to his convictiOn on a criminal charge. Under cla11Be (b), any of the three penalties can be imposed where the authority empowered to impose any of the penalties is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably _practicable to hold such inquiry. tinder clauae ·( c) , any of the aforesaid penalties can be imposed wher•> the Preside.nt, or the Governor of a State, as the case may b•i, is satisfied that in the interest of the &ccurity of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. All the Government servants in the above Appeals and Writ Petitions had been either dismissed or removed from service without holding any inquiry.' They had not been informed of the charges against them nor given any opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The penalty of difll!lisll'11 or removal, as the case may be, had been imposed upon them under one or. the other of. the three clauses of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or under. silrJ.lar provisions in rules '""de under the proviso to Article 309 or in rules made under an A!;t referable to Article 309, for instance, Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipl.tne and Appeal) !Jules 1968, and Rule 37 of the Central Industrial Security Force &ules, 1969, or under such a rule read with one of the clauses of the secoru:! proviso to Article 311(2). The affected government servants u.lailed the aiorasaid order in writ petitions under Article 226 in different High Courts, and some of these writ petitions were allowed on the basis of this Court's decision in Divisional llol::SODal. Officer, Southern ll8illray & .Anr. v. T.1.. a.a11appan [1976] l s.c.&. 783, and a few were diBlllissed.

Appeals by Special Leave agiinst those judgments were filed, and in three •uch appeals it was noticed by a three Judge Bench of this Court that there . was a conflict between

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c:.a.

a.al.lappan's Case and another three Judge Bench in H.Gofiala Krishna llaidn v. state of lllldhya Pradeah [1968] l s.c.a. 355 and directed that the papers in the three appeals be placed before the Hon 'ble Chief Justice for reference to a lsrger Bench. These appeals were thus referred to the Constitution Bench and all other similar Appeals and Writ Petitions were also plsced before the Constitution Bench for disposal. The arguments advanced on behalf of the government servants on the pleasure doctrine and the second proviso to Article 311 (2) were

C

1. The pleasure doctrine in England is a part of the special prerogative of the Crown and had been inherited by India from England and should, therefore, be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in favour of government servants. 2. The second proviso which withdraws from government · servants the safeguards provided by clause. (2) of Article 311 must be also similady construed, otherwise great hardship would result to government servants as they could be arbitrarily thr"""' out of employment, and they and their dependents would be Left without any means of subsistence. 3. There are several stages before a government servant •:an be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank namely, serving upon him of a show-cause notice or a charge-sheet, giving him inspection of documents, examination of witnesses, arguments and imposition of penalty. An inquiry starts only after a show cause notice is issued and served. A show cause notice is thus preparatory to the holding of an inquiry and even if the entire inquiry is dispensed with, the giving of a show cause notice and taking of the explanation of the government servant with · respect thereto are not excluded.

4. It is not obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to dispense with the whole of the inquiry. Depending upon the circumstances of the case, the disciplinary authority r.an dispense with only a part of the inquiry.

5. Imposition of penalty is not a part of the inquiry and once an inquiry is dispensed with, whether in whole or in patt, it is obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to give an opportunity to the government servant to make a representatl.on with respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him.

u.0.1. v. TULSIRAM

6. Article 311 is subject to Article 14. Principles of natural justice SDd the audi alteram partem rule are part of Article 14, SDd therefore, a show cause notice asking for the explanation of the government servant' with respect to the charges against him as also a notice to show cause with respect to the proposed penalty are' required to be given by Article 14 SDd not giving such notices or either of them renders the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank invalid. On behalf of

the Union of India it was submitted that:

1. The second proviso is unambiguous SDd 111USt be construed according to its terms.

2. Where the second proviso of clause' (2) of Article 311 is made inapplicable, there is no scope for holding any partial inquiry. ,3. The very contents of the three clauses of the ,second proviso show that it is not necessary or not practicable or not expedient that any partial inquiry could be or should be held, depending upon which clause applies.

4. Article 14 does not govern or control Article 311. The Constitution lllUSt be read as a whole. Article 311(2) embodies the principle of natural justice including the ~ alteram partem , rule. Once the application of clause (2) is expressly excluded by the Constitution itself, there can be no question of making applicable what baa been so excluded by seeking recourse to Article 14. 5. Considerations of sympathy for the government servants who may be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank are irrelevant to the construction of the second proviso. The doctrine of tenure at pleasure in Article 310 SDd the safeguards given to a government servant under clauses (1) SDd (2) of Article 311 as also the withdrawal of the safeguard under clause ( 2) by the second proviso are all enacted in public interest and where public interest conflicts with private interest, the latter lllUSt yield to the former.

Allowing the Appeals of the Union of India and dismissing the Writ Petitions SDd Transferred Cases of the employees. HELD : (Per Chmdracbad,CJ. V.D. Tulzapurbr, R.S. Pathak & D.P. lladao J.J. - K.P. Dvdrkar ,J. dissenting)

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

I. The Pleuure Doct:riDe ill the Dniti!d ltingrkn 'f,

1. :The pleasure doctrine relates to the tenure of a government servant, thst is, his right to continue to hold •>ffice. All public officers and servants of the Crown in the IJnited Kingdom hold their appointments at the pleasure of the era.ill and their services can be terminated at will without assigniug any cause. [166 F]

2. ·The pleasure doctrine is not base.d upon any special prerogative of the Crown but is based on public policy and is in public interest and for public good. The basis of the p1'"'8ure doctrine is thst the public is vitally interested in the efficiency and integrity of civil services and, therefore, public policy requires •. public interest needs and public good dmnands thst civil servants who are inefficient, dishonest or corrupt or hsve become a security risk should not contim:.e in seit'Vice. [166 G] I 3; In the United Kingdom, Parliament is sovereign mid can make any law whatever and the courts hsve no power to declare it void. The pleasure doctrine is therefore subject to .what •oay be expressly provided otherwise by legislation. [167 A-168 BJ

'•·

Balabury' a Lan of Engl and. Fourth J!dn, Volm!e 8 para

1106;1162. ': '~

Shenton V• Saith, L.R. [1895) A.C. 229 J.C., Dwm v. the Queeea, L.R. [1896] Q.B.D. 116; a.c. (1895-96) 73 L.T.R. 695 and sub namiDe Dunn v. llegen·in [1895-99] All E.R. Rep. 907., Gould

v. Stuart:, L.R. [1896] A.C. 575,578-9 J.C., Challfah ~Alilrlul v. ~toJ:DerGeneral of Ceylon referred to.

(1970]

A.C. 1111,1118 (P.C.)

I• II. The Pleasure Docttine in lDdia

f

1. · In India the pleasure doctrinP. has re<:eiv'ed Constitutional 88DCtion by being enacted in Article 310(1) c>f the Constitution of India. Under Article 310(1} except as exp10essly provided .in the Constitution, every person who is s member of a defence service or of a civil service of the Union of India or of an all-Iiidia service or holds any post connected with defe11Ce or any civil post under the Union of India holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a state holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the :State.

(186 H, 187 E)

I

u.o.r. v. TULSIRAM

2, In India, unlike in the United Kingdcm, the pl.eaaure doctrine is DOt subject to any law llllde by Puliament or a State Legislature but is subject to only what ia ezpresaly provided in the Constitution. · In India, therefore, the exception&· to the pleasure doctrine can only be those which are expressly provided . in the Constitution. [187 E]

3. Several exceptions to the ezpreasly provided in the Constitution.

pleasure

doctrine

are

4. Article 311, beixig an express proviaion of the Constitution, is ·an exception to the pleasure doctrine contained in Article 310(1) of. the Constitution. Clauee& (1) and (2) of Article 311 restrict the oper&tion .of the pleaaure doctrine so far as civil. servants are concerned by conferring upon civil servants the safeguards provided in those clauses~ [179 DJ

5• Under clause (l) of Article 311 no civil servant can be dismissed or removed ·fJ::om service by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed· [179 E J

6. Uruier clause (2) of Article 311 DO civil servant can be dismissed or removed from service or reduced.in.rank except after an inquiry in llhich be hu been informed of the charges .againat him and given a reasonsble opportunity· of beixig heard in respect of such chsrges. As a result of the """"'dment made by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, in clause (2) of Article 311 it 18 now DOt ueceasary to give to a civil aenant an opportunity of making a representation . with respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him. (179 F,181 EJ 7. An order of compulsory :retirement from service illlpoaed upon a civil servant by way of penalty amounts to "removal• from

service and attracts the provisions of Article 311. [180 E, 197 BJ 8. Restrictions on the operation of the pleaaure doctrine contained in lesislation made by Parliament in the· United lllilgdom and in clauses (l) and (2) of Article 311 in India are based on public policy and in public interest and for public good in asmueh as they give to civil servants a feelillg of security of

are

tenure. (182 E-FJ 9. The safeguard provided to civil servants by clause (2) of Article 311 is taken away w1ien· any of the three clauses of the second proviso (originally the only proviso to Article 311(2)) becomes applicable. (162 DJ

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 S.C:.R.

10. It is incorrect to say that the pleasure doctrine 1.s a prerogative of the British crown which has been inherited by India and transposed into its Constitution, adapted to suit the Consti.tutional set up of the Republic of India. Authoritative judicial dicta both in England and in India, have laid down that the pleasure doctrine and the protection afforded to civil servants by legislation in the United Kingdom, and by clauses ( l) and (2) of Article 311 in India are based .on public good. S:lmilariy, the withdrawal of the safeguard contained in clause (2) of Article 311 by the second proviso to that clause is also based on public policy and is in public interest and for public good. [191 C-E]

11. Neither Article 309 nor Article 310 nor Article 3U sets out the grounds for dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or for imposition of any other penalty upon a ci.vil servan.t. These Articles also do not specify what the other penalties ar•.• These matters are left to be dealt with by rules made under tht.. proviso to Article 309 or by Acts referable to that Article or:< rules made under such Acts. [191 G] '

12. The pleasure of the President or the Governor is not to be exercised by him personally. It ,is to be exercised by the appropriate authority specified in rules made under the proviso to Article 309 or by Acts referable to that Article or rules made under such Acts. Where, however, the President or the Governor, aa the case may be, exerci,es his pleasure under Article 310( l) , it is not required that such set of exercise of the pleasure under Article 310(1) must be an set of the President or the Governor himaelf but it must be an act of the President or the Governor in the Constitutional sense, that is, with the aid and· on the advice of the Council of Ministers. [193 E]

. .rth-Weat l'roat1er ProviDce V• Suraj llara1D Anmld, L.,R. [1947-48] 75 I.A., 343,352-3., State of Madhya Pndeab mad Otben V• smnlul Sillgb, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 302, 305-6., Sardad. Lal v. IJDioD of India and otbem, [1971] 3 s.c.R. 461, 465. ,l:amabmr Prasad mad Otben v. D>e State of Bihar mad -tber [1962] Su.pp. 3 s.c.R. 369.. G.K. Qaoae mad 81K1tber V• E.x. Joseph, [1963] Supp. l s.c.R. 789 referred to. III. Die IDquiry under Article 311(2)

l. Clause (2) of Article 311 gives a Constitutional man<l.ate to the principles of natural justice and the aud1 alteram E~

I

U.O.I. v. TULSIRAM

rule by providing that a civil servant shall not be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank until after an inquiry in which he has been,given a reasonable opportunity of~ beard in respect of those charges • .[234 EJ 2. The nature of this inquiry has been elaborately set out by this Court in a- Qiand v. 'lbe 1JDioo of India ad Others (1958J s.c.R. 1980, 1095-97 and even after the Constitution (Forty-second Am<mdment) Act, 1976, the inquiry required by clause (2) of Article 311 would be the same except that it would not be necessary to give to a civil servant an opportunity to make a representation with respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him. [235 BJ 3. Apart from Article 311 prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Forty-second Am<mdment) Act, 1976, it is not necessary either under the ordinacy law of the land or under industrial law to give a second f>pportunity to show cause against the penalty proposed to be imposed upon an employee. [243 HJ 4. If an inquiry held against a civil servant under Article 311(2) is unfair or biased or had been conducted in such a manner as not to give him a fair or ,reasonable opportunity to defend himself, the principles of natural justice would be violated; but in such a case the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank would be bad as contravening the express provisions of Article 311(2) and there is no scope for having recourse to Article 14 for the purpose of invalidating it« [235 CJ

IV. 'Die Secaad l'l<ov1ao to Article 311(2)

l. The language of the second proviso to Article 311(2) is plain and unambiguous. The keywords in the second proviso are "this clause shall not apply". There is no ambiguity in these words. Where a situation envisaged in MJY of the three clauses of the second proviso arises, the safeguard provided to a civil servant by clause (2) of Article 311 is taken away. [204 CJ 2. The second proviso to Article 311(2) becomes applicable in the three cases mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of that proviso, namely, (a) Where a pexson is dismiased or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; (b) Where the authority llllpOllered to dilllliae or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is eatiafied that for reason, to be recorded by that

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; and (c) Where the President or the Governor, 88 the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. [203 A-C] 3. The goveruing words of the second proviso to clause ( 2) ·of Article 311, namely, "this clause shall not apply", are maudatory and, not directory and are in the nature of a ConstituUonal prohibitory injunction restraining the disciplinary authority from holding an inqu.try under Article 311(2) or from giving any kind of , opportunity to the concerned civil servant in a case where one of the three clauses of the second proviso bec:omes applicable. There is thus no scope for introducing into the second proviso some kind of inquiry or opportunity to show cause by a process of inference or implication. The maxim ~~ facit cessare tacitum" ("when there is express mention of ce1<tain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded·) applies to the case. This well known maxim is a principle of logic and cOlllllOnsense and not merely a technical rule of construction. [213

H-214 A]

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

.

4. ,.The second proviso to Article 311(2) has been in the Constitution of India since the time the Constitution was originally enacted. It was not blindly or slavishly copied from section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. There was a considerable debate on this proviso in the Constituent Assembly. The majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly had fought for freedom and had suffered imprisonment in the cause of liberty and were therefore, not likely to introduce into our Constitution any provision from the earlier Government of India Acts which had been enacted purely for the benefit of a foreign imperialistic power. They retained, the second proviso 88 a matter of public policy and as being in the public interest and for public good. They further inserted clause ( c) in the second proviso dispensing with the inquiry under Article 311 (2) in a case where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry as also added a new clause, namely, clause (3), in Article 311 giving finality tc. the decision of the disciplinary authority that it is not reaso,nably practicable to hold the inquiry under Article 311(2). Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, did not contain any provision similar to clause ( c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or clause (3) of Article 311. [215 F-1!]

"

J.0.1, v.

TULSIRAM

liira Ial Katt.an Ial etc. V• State of o.P. and Another 2 s.c.R. 502, .ec-tssioaer of Incme Tax, H!ldras v. lladurai Mills eo. I.rd. (1973J 3 s.c.R. 662, a- a.and v. 'lbe llDion of India and Others [l958J s.c.&. 1080, Suxesh losby George v. 'I.be llDlversity of Kexala and Others (1969] l s.c.&. 317,326, Associated Cement Ccwpanh'B Ltd. v. t.c. Sbrivaatava and Others [1984] 3 S.C.R. 361,369 and B.Shpnkara Hao W and Others v. State of Mysore and aootber [1969] 3 s.c.&. 1,12, referred to.

(1973]

v. Article 14 and the Secowl Provi8o

l. The principles of natural justice are not the creation of Article 14 of the Con:stitution. Article 14 is not the begetter of the principles of natural justice 1"1t is their Constitutional guardian, [230 DJ

2. The principles of natural justice consist primarily of two main rules, ll81llely, "nemo judex .!.!!_ � sua" ("no man shall

be a judge in his own cause") and "audi alteram partem" ("hear the other side") • Tne corollary dedUCed"from the above two rulea and particularly the audi alteram parU!m rule was "qui aliquid statuerit � inaudita altera, adguum licet dixerit, � aeqUlllll fecerit" ("he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right will not have done what is right" or as is now apressed "justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done"). These two rules and their corollary are neither new nor were they tM discovery of English judges but were recognised in 11181Y 1 civilizations and over many centuries. [235 D, 237 G] Dr. Bonhaa's cue [1610] 8 eo. Rep. 113b,118, . British Rat.hay Doud V• Pick1n 1.R. (1974] A.C. 765, Drw y, Drw ad Lebam [1855] 2 Macq . 1,8, Jaes llaDIJ.r Sllitb v. lier Majesty the Queen [1977-78] 2 App. Case 614,623 J.C., Artbar Jolm Spvtwm V• Die P1-tead D.lstrict llollrcl of llorb 1.R. (1884-85] 10 App. Case 229,240, Viooet and aootber v. llumtt mid 8JK1tber [1885] 55 1,J, Q.B. 39,41, llgglrfns and another Vo Slletlmdt Local. Board of llealtb 1.R, (1890) 24 Q.ll.Do 712,716, liAlge V• llA1dldA ad otlms 1.R. [1963] 1 Q.B, 539,578, llmeka Glmdbi V• lmiOll of India [1978] 2 s.c.R. 621,676, re B.L (An Infmd:) 1.R. (1967) 2 Q.B. 617,630, F•f--t lllveal:Mats J.td, Vo SecntarJ of State for the IDvinJmml: [1976) 1 W.L.R. 1255,l26H6, lleglm v. Secretary of state for Ba• Affair• k parte Be snP.11 [1977] 1 w.1.a. 766, 784, Lffl1I ,, Beffll' 111111 others [1978) l w.1.a. 1061, 1076, !loc:l"D v. 1be worlleQ 1miGD 1.R. (1929) 1 Ch. 602,624, Willia

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

Green v. Isidore J. Blake and others [1948] I.R. 242, Hounslow London Borough Comrll v. Twlckenlym Garden DevelopJients Ltd. L.R. [1971] Ch. 233, KrriDgtcn and others. V• Kini.ster of Health L.R. (1935] l K.B. 249,280, llidge v. Bslclwin and others L.R.

[1964] A.C.

40,

on appeal from L.R.

[1963]

l Q.B. 539 and

Boswell's case [1606] 6 Co. Rep.48b, 52a, referred to.

3. Article 14 applies not only to discriminatory class legislation but also to arbitrary or dlscriminatory State action. Violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination, and where discrimination is the result of a State action, it is a violation of Article 14. Therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justic:e by a State action is a violation of Article 14. [229 F-G) 4. The principles of natural justice apply both to quasijudicial as well as administrative inquiries entailing civil conaequences. [233 H-234 A)

•

5. It is well established both in England .and in India that the principles of natural justice y~eld to and change with the exigenciea of different situations which are not alike. They are neither cast in s rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible and can be adapted, modified or excluded by statute and statutory rules as also by the Constitution of the tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such tribunal is governed. [235 D-F) 6. If legislation and the necessities of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice including , the audi alteram partem rule, !. fortiorari so can a provision of the Constitution such as the second proviso to Article 311(2). [238

BJ

\

7. The audi alteram partem rule having been excluded by a Constitutional provision, namely, the second proviso to Article 311(2), there is no scope for reintroducing it by a side-door to provide once again the same inquiry which the Constitutional provision has expressly prohibited. [238 DJ 8. A right of making a representation after an action is taken against a person has been held by this Court to be a sufficient compliance with the requirements of natural justice. In t_he case of a civil servant to whom the provisions of the second proviso to Article 311(2) have been applied, he has the

t

~

~ •

U.Q.I. v. TULSIRAM

right of a departmental appeal in which he can show that the charges made against him are not true, and an appeal is a wider and more effective remedy than a right of making a representation. [234 CJ 9. The majority view in A.K.Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950J S.C.R. 88 namely, that particular Articles governing certain F~ntal Rights operate exclusively without having any inter-relation with any other Article in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights was disapproved and held to be not correct in Kustom Cawasji Cooper v. Union of ludia [1970J 3 $.C.R. 530, its burial service was read in Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Jleogal and Others (1974] 2 s.c.R. 1, Haradhan Saba and another v. lbe State of West Bengal and Others [1975J 1 s.c.R. 832 and its funeral oration was delivered in Maneka Gandhi's case, [1978J 2 s.c.R. 64 and it is to be hoped that the ghost of that majority

C

view does not at some future time rise from its grave and stand,

clanking its chains, seeking to block the onward march of our country to progress, prosperity and the establishment of a Welfare State. [240 H-241 Aj

·•

10. R.C. Cooper's case and the other cases which followed it do not, however apply where a Fundamental Right, including the audi alteram partem rule comprehended within the guarantee of Article 14, is excluded by the Constitution. Express exclusionary provisions contained in the Constitution are .Article 31A (1), Article 3lli, Article 31C, Article 22 (5) and the second proviso to. ArticJ_e 311(2) as regards the audi 'alteram partem rule, namely, affording an opportunity of a hearing to a civil servant before imposing the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank upon him. [241 BJ 11. The principles of natural justice must be' confined within their proper limits and not allowed to run wild. The concept of natural justice is a magnificant thorough bred on which this nation gallops forwards towards its proclaimed and destined goal of "JUSTICE, social, economic and_ political". This throughbred must not be allowed to turn into a wild and. unruly house, carrering off were it listst unsaddli% its rider, and bursting

into fields where the sign "no passaran" is put up. [242 DJ In re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979 J z s.c.R. 476, State of Andhra Pradesh and llnother v. Nalla Kaja Reddy and Others [1967J 3 s.c.R. 28, E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another [1974] 2 s.c.R. 348, Ajay llasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Sehnmlrdi and others etc. [1981] 2 s.C.R. 79, Boniest Holst Ltd. V• Secretary of State for Trade and Others L.ll. [1978] 1 Ch.201, A.K. Kraipalt and others etc. v. Union of India and ocbers [1970] 1 s.c.ll. 457, Union of India v. Col. J.B.Sinha and anotbet [1971] 1 $.C.R. 791, Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [1981] 2 s.C.R, 533, J. Mobapatra & Co. and another v. State of Orissa and another [1985] 1 s.c.R. 322, 334-5, Liberty Oil 1t1.11a and others v. Union of lnd1a and Otb2rs [1984] 3 S.C.C. 465, Rustam Cavasji Cooper V• Union of India [1970] 3 S.C,R. 530, A.L Gopalan · v. The State of lladras [1950] s.c.il. 88, SareNn Bath Satbr v. The State of West lleng!il and others [1974] l s.c.R.l, Barclban Saba and Anr. v. The State of ll'est Bengal & Om. [1975) l S.C,R• 832 and Klmdiram Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ora.

·•

[1975] 2 s.c.R. 532; VI•

[1985] sUPP;2 s.c.R.

Service Rules and Acts

1. Article 309 is expressly Wlde subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Rules made under the proviso to Article 309, Acts referable to that Article, and rules made under such Acts are, therefore, subject both to Article 310(1) as also to Article 311. If any such rule or Act impinges upon or restricts the operation of the pleasure doctrine embodies in Article 310(1) except as expressly provided in the Constitution or restricts or takes away the safeguards provided to civil servants by clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311, it would be void and unconstitutional as contravening the provisions of Article 310(1) or clause (1) or clause (2) of Article 311, as the case may be. Any such Act or rule which provides for dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a civil servant without holding an inquiry as contemplsted by clause (2) of Article 311 except in the three cases specified in the second proviso to that clause would therefore, be unconstitutional and void as contravening Article 311(2). [243 A-CJ 2. In the same way, for an Act or a rule to provide that in a case where the second proviso to Article 311(2) applies, any of the safeguards excluded by that proviso will be available to a civil servant would be void and unconstitutional as impinging upon the pleasure of the ?tesident or the ~vernor, as the case may be. [243 E]

3. A well-settled rule of construction of statutes is that where two interpretations are possible, one of which would preserve and save the constitutionality of the particular statutory provision while the other would render it unconstitutional

.. •

U.O.I. v. TULSIRAM

and void, the one which saves and preserves its constitutionality should be adopted and the other rejected. l243 F] 4. Where an Act or a rule provides that in a case in which the second proviso to Article 311(2) applies any of the safeguards excluded by that proviso will be available to a civil servant, the constitutionality of such provision would be preserved by interpreting it as being directory and not mandatory. The breach of such directory provision would not. h01oever, furnish any cause of action or ground of challenge to a civil servant because at the threshold such cause of action or ground of challenge would be barred by the second proviso to Article 311(2). [243 GJ 5, Service rules may reproduce the provisions of the second proviso to Article 311(2) and authorise the disciplinary authority to dispense with the inquiry as contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311 in the three cases mentioned in the second proviso to thst clause or any one or more of them. Such a provi- sion, however, is not valid and constitutional without reference to the second proviso to Article 311(2) and cannot be read apart ffom it. Thus, while the source of authority of a particular officer to act as a disciplinary authority and dispense with the inquiry is derived from the ·service rules, the source of his power to dispense with the inquiry is derived from the second proviso to Article 311(2) and not from any service rule. [243 F-G] 6• The omission to mention in an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank . the relevant clause of the second proviso or the relevant service rule will not have the effect of invalidating the order imposing such penalty, and the order must be read as having been made under the applicable clause of the second proviso to Article 311(2) read with the relevant service rule. [266 H-267 A]

7. Rule 37 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969, is clumsily worded and makes little sense. To provide that a member of the Central Industrial Security Force who has been convicted to rigorous imprisoment on a criminal charge "shall be G dismissed from service". and at the same time to provide that" only a notice shall be given to the party charged proposing the penality of dismissal for his having been convicted to rigorous imprisonment and asking him to explain as to why the proposed penalty of dismissal should not be imposed" is a contradiction in te:r:ms. To read these provisions as mandatory would be to render H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

them unconstitutionsl and void. These provisions must, therefore, be read as directory in order to preserve their constitutiona-

lity. [263 C-G]

8. Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, is identical with Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 196.8, and the interpretation of the said Rule 19 would be the same as that of the said Rule 14. [256 F-11] VII.

Cballoppan 's Case

1. The three-Judge Bench of this Court in Divisiooal l'ersoDnel Officer, Sou!=bern Railways and another v. T.11.. Clallsppan was in error in interpreting Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, by itself and not in conjunction with the second proviso to Article 311(2). [256 DJ

2. The Court in Cballappan's case also erred in holding that the addition of the words "the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such order thereon as it deems fit" in the said Rule 14 warranted an interpretation of the said Rule different frOlll that to be placed upon the second proviso to Article 311(2). [254 G] 3. The Court in Chcllappan's case also erred in holding that the addition of the words "the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such ordl!r thereon as it deems fit" in the said Rule 14 warranted an interpretation of the said Rule different f rOlll that to be placed upon the second proviso to Article 311(2). It also erred in the interpretation placed by it upon the word "consider" occuring in the above phrase in the said Rule 14 and in taking the view that a consideration of the circumstances of the case cannot be unilateral but must be afterhearing the delinquent civil servant would render this part of the said Rule 14 unconstitutional as restricting the full exclusionary operation of the second proviso to Article 311(2). [255 A-CJ 4. The word "consider" in its ordinary and natural sense is not capable of the meaning assigned to it in Clallspi>an 's cue. [255 GJ 5. The consideration of the circumstances under the said Rule 14 must, therefore, be ~~and· without affording to the concerned civil servant an opportunity of being heard. (255 HJ

U.O.l. v. TULSIRAM

6. The decision in Challappan's case never held the field for the judgment in that case was delivered on September 15, 1975 and hardly was that case reported when in the next group of appeals in which the same question was raised the matter was referred to a larger Bench by an order made on November 18, 1976. The reference was in view of the earlier decision of another three-Judge Bench in H. Gopala Krishna l!aidu v. State of lfadhya Pradesh. The correctness of Cballappan Case was, therefore, doubted from the very beginning. [256 EJ

VIII. IW!cutive Instructions

Executive Instructions stand on a lower footing than a statutory rule. Executive instructions which provide that in a case where the second proviso to Article 311(2) applies, any safeguard excluded by that proviso would be available to a civil servant would only be directory and not mandatory. [265 HJ IX. 'lhe Scope of the Second Proviso

l· The three clauses of the second proviso to Article 311 are not intended to be applied in normal and ordinary situations. The second proviso is an exception to the noraml rule and before any of the three clauses of that proviso is applied to the case of a civil servant, the conditions laid down in that clause 1D11St be satisfied. [204 F-205 CJ 2. Where a situation envisaged in one of the clauses of the second proviso to Article 311(2) exists, it is not mandatory that the punishment of dismissal, removal of reduction in rank should be imposed upon a civil servant. The disciplinary authority will first have to decided what punishment is warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. Such consideration would, however, be ~~and without hearing the concerned civil servant. If the disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that the punishment which is called for is that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, it 1D11St dispense with the inquiry and then decide for itself which of the aforesaid three penalties should be imposed. (205 A-BJ

x. Clause (a) of the Second Proviso 1. In a case where clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) applies the disciplinary authority is to take the conviction of the concerned civil servant as sufficient proof of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

misconduct on his part. It has thereafter to decide whether the conduct which had led to the civil servant's conviction on a criminal charge was such as to warrant the imposition of a penalty and, 1f so, what that penalty should be. For this purpose it must peruse the judgment of the criminal 'court and take into consideration all the facts and circumsr.,.nces of the caae and the various factors set out in Qmllappan's Case such as, the rm.tj_re conduct of the civil servant of the gravity of the offence committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likelv to · have on' tne administration, whether the offence for .,..ich he was convicted· was of . a technical or trivial nature, and the extenuating circumstances, 1f any, present in the case. This, however, has to be done by the disciplinary authority ~ ~ and without hearing the concerned civil servant. [267 C-E] 2. The penalty imposed upon the civil servant should not be arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the offence committed or one not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. [267 H]

3. Where a civil servant goes to the office of his superior officer whom he believes to be responsible for stopping his increment and hits him on the head with an iron rod, so that the superior officer falls down with a bleeding head, and the delinquent civil servant is tried and convicted under section 332 of the Indian Penal Code but the Magistrate, instead of sentencing him to imprisonment, applies to him the provisions of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and after such conviction the disciplinary authority, taking the abvoe facts ·into consideration, by way of punishment comiiulsorily retires the delinquent civil servant under clause (i) of section 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, it cannot be said that the punishment inflicted upon the civil servant was excessive or arbitraty. [267 F-G] XI. Clause (b) of l:be Secood Prov:lBo.

' There are two conditions precedent which lllllSt be l. satisfied before ciause (b) of the second' proviso to Article 311(2) can be applied. These conditions are. (i) there lllllSt exist a situation which makes the holding of an inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) not reasonably practicable, and (ii) the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it is not reasonsbly practicable to hold such inquiry. [269 D-E]

U.O.I. v. TULSIRAH

2. Whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not 1Dll8t be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. (269 FJ 3, It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b) of the second proviso. What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of' a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. [270 BJ 4, The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority and 1Dll8t be judged in the light of the circumstances then prevailing. The disciplinary authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of the prevailing situation that clause (3) of Article 311 m8kes the decision of the disciplinary authority on his question final. [270 CJ 5. It. is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be .reasonably practicable to.hold the inquiry.

Illustrative cases would be (a) Where.a civil .servant, particularly through or together with his associates, 8.o terrorizes, threatens or intimidates witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear .of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so, or [270 AJ (b) Where the civil servant by himself or together with or through others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer whu is the disciplinary authority or members of his . family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held, or [270 BJ (c) Where an atmosphere of violence or· .of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, it being 1.Dmat.erial whether the cooce"lM!d civil servant is or is not a party to bringing abour aucb a situation. In all these cases, it 1Dll8t be remembered that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. [270 <lJ

6. The disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily· or out of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[l985J SUPP.2 s.c.R.

ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the civil servant is weak and must fail. (270 CJ

7. The word "inquiry" in clause (b) of the second proviso includes a part of an inquiry. It is, therefore, not necessary that the situation which makes the holding of an inquiry not reaaonably practicable should exist before the inquiry is instituted againat the civil servant. Such a situation can also ccime into existence subsequently during the course of the inquiry, for instance, after the service of a charge-sheet upon the civil servant or after he has filed hie written statement thereto or even after evidence has been led in part. [271 D-E] 8. When at the comnencement of the inquiry or pendiug it, the civil servant abscards and cannot be served or will not participate in the inquiry it will not be reasonably practicable to afford to the civil servant and opportunity of a hesriug or further hearing. In such cases, the matter must proceed~~ and on the materials before the discplinary authority. (271 EJ 9. The recordiug of the reason for dispensiug with the inquiry is a condition precedent to the application of clauae (b) of the second proviso. ·This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writiug, the order dispensiug with the inquiry and the other of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. It is, however, not necessary that the reason should find a place in the final order but i t would be advisable to record it in the final order in order to avoid an allegation that the reason was not recorded in writing before passiug the final order but was subsequently fabricated. [271 GJ lQ, The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not contain details particulars but it cannot be vague or just a repetition of the language of clsuae (b) of the second proviso.

[272 CJ

ll. It is also not necessary to commmicate the reaaon for dispensing with the inquiry to the concerned civil servant but it would be better to do so in order to elilllinste the possibility of an allegation beiug made that the reason was subsequently fabricated. (272 BJ 12. The obligation to record the reason in writiug is provided in clause ( b) of the second proviso so that the

U.O.I v. TULSIRAM

superiors of the disciplina1y authority may be able to j\ldge whether such authority had exercised its power under clause (b) properly or not. [272 FJ

13. It is, however, better for the disciplinary authority to communicate to the concerned civil servant its reason for dispensing with the inquiry because such communication would eliminate the possibility of an allegation being made that the reason had been subsequently fabricated. It would also enable the civil servant to approach the High Court under Article 226 or, in a fit case, the Supreme Court under Article 32. [272 HJ

14. It WQuld be illogical to hold that administrative work carried out by senior officers should be paralysed by sending them to other stations to hold the inquiry just because a delinquent civil servant either by himself or along with or through others makes the holding of an inquiry by the designated disciplinary authority or inquiry officer not reasonably practicable. [ill CJ 15. In a case falling under clause (b) of the second proviso it is not necessary that the civil servant should be placed under suspension until such time as the situation improves and it becomes possible to hold the inquiry because in such cases neither public interest nor public good requires that salary or s•ibsistence allowance should be· continued to be paid out of the public exchequer to the concerned civil servant. In certain cases, the exigencies of a situation would require that prompt action should be taken and suspending a civil servant would not serve the purpose, and sometimes not taking prompt action might result in the trouble spreading and the situation worsening and at times becoming uncontrolable. Not taking prompt action may also be construed by the troubl~rs as a sign of weakness on the part of the authorities and thus encourage them to step up their activities or agitation. Where such prompt action is taken there is an element of deterrence in it but this is unavoidable and. a necessary concomitance of such an action. (273 DJ 16. If an inquiry into the charges against a civil servant is not reasonably practicable, i t stands to reason that an inquiry into the question whether the disciplinary inquiry should be dispensed with or not is equally not reasonably practicable. (273 DJ 17. In situations where a large group of members of the Central Industrial Security collectively indulge in several of acts of insubordination indiscipline and intimidation with the

C

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

COlllllOn object of coercing those in charge of the administratio~ of the Force and the Government to compel them to grant recognition to their Association and to concede their demands, it is not possible to particularise in the orders of dismissal the acts of each individual member who participated in the commission of these acts. The participation of each individual might be of a gre&ter or lesser degree but the acts of each individual contributed to the creation of a situation in which the security force itself had become a security risk. [291 C-E]

18. The quantum and extent of the penalty to be imposed in each case would depend upon the gravity of the situation and the extent to which the acts said to be committed by the pBrticular civil servants, even though not serious in themselves, in conjunction with acts committed by others, contributed to bringing about the situation. The fact, that at a particular centre certain civil servants were dismissed from service while at some other centres they were only removed from service does not mean that the penalties were arbitrarily imposed. [292 A-BJ

xn. Clause (c) of the Second Pi:oviao. The expression "security of the State" in clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) does not mean security of the entire country or a whole State but includes security of a part of a State; [275 E]

2. Security of the State cannot be confined to an armed rebellion or revolt for there are various ways in which the security of the· State can be affected such as by State secrets or infonnation relating to defence production or similar matters being. passed on to other countries, whether inimical or not to India, or by secret links with terrorists. [275 E] 3. The way in which the security of the State is affected may be either open or clandestine. [275 FJ

4. Disaffection in the armed forces or paramilitary forces or the p0lice force would affect the security of the State. The importance of the proper discharge of the duties by members of these Forces and the maintenance of discipline among them is emphasised in Article 33 of the Constitution. [275 GJ 5. Disaffection in any armed fo,ce or para-military force or police force is likely to spread because dis-satisfaction and

U.O. I. v • .TULSIRAM

disaffected members of such a Force spread dissatisfaction 'awl disaffection among other members of the Force and thus induce them not to discharge their duties properly and to commit acts of indiscipline, inaubordination or disobedience to the orders of their superiors. Such a situation cannot be a J>atter affecting only law and order or public order but is a matter vitally affecting the security of the State. [276 A-B]

6. The interest of the security of the State can be affected by actual,acts·or even by the likelihood of such acts taking place. [277 D] 7. In an inquiry into acts affecting the interest of the security of the State, several matters not fit or proper to be made public, including the source of information involving a c1vil servant in such aCts, would be disclosed and thus in such cases an inquiry into acts prejudicial to the interest of the seeurity of the State would as much prejudice the interest of the security of the State as those acts themselves would. [279 D]

8. The corulition for ·the application of clause (c) of the second proviso to Article . 311(2) is the satisfaction of the' President or the Governor, as the case may be, that it is not expedient in the interes't of the security of the State to hold a disciplinary inqUiry. [277 DJ 9. Such satisfaction is not required to be that of the President or the Governor personally but of the President or the Governi>r, as thecase may be, acting in the Constitutional sense. [278 A] State of Bajastban and Others et:c. et:c. v. llDioD of India et:c. et:c. '(1978] l s.• c.R. l, 82., referred to. 10. "Expedient" means "Advantageous, fit, proper suitable. Where, therefore, the President of the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that it will not be advantageous or fit or · proper or suitable or politic in the interest of the security of the State to hold an inquiry, he would be entitled to dispense with it under clause (c) of the second proviso. [217 F] ll. Under clause (c) of the second proviso the satisfaction reached by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, must necessarily be a subjective satisfaction because expediency invol~ matters of policy. [278 G]

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[l985J SUPP.2 s.c.R

12. Satisfaction of the President or the Governor under clause (c) of the second proviso may be arrived at 8s a result of secret information received by the Government about the brewing danger to the security of the State and like matters. There are other factors which are also required to be considered, weighed and balanced in order to reach the requisite satisfaction whether holding an inquiry would be expedient or not. If the requisite satisfaction has been reached as a result of secret information received by the Government, malting known such information uy very often result in disclosure of the source of such information and once lcnoW, the particulsr source would no more be available to the Government. The reason for the satisfaction reached by the President or the Governor under clause ( c) of the second proviso cannot, therefore, be required to be recorded in the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank nor can it be lll8de public. [279 E, 280 BJ 13. When a number of members of the Madhya Pradesh District Police Force and the Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Force, in order to obtain the release on bail of two of their colleagues who had been refused bail and remaned into judicial custody because of an incident which took place at the annual Mela attacked the police station at the Mela ground, ransacked it and forced the wireless operator to close dawn the wireless set and the situation became so dangerous that senior district and police officers had to approach the judicial Magistrate at night to get the two arrested· constables relea&ed on bail and, after discussion at a Cabinet meeting, a decision was taken and the advice of the Council of Ministers was tendered to the Governor of Madhya Pradesh who acc;epted it and issued orders of dismissal of these persons by applying clause ( c) of the second proviso to them it cannot- be said that the provisions of the said clause (c) were not properly applied. [295 E-296 CJ

14. Similarly, when after these members of the Madhya Pradesh District Police Force and the Madhya Pradesh Special Armed force were dismissed, some other members of theae Forces began carrying on an active propaganda against the Government, visiting various ·places in the State of Madhya Pra•!esh, holdill8 secret meetill8a, distributill8 leaflets and incitill8 the constabulary in these places to rise against the adminiatration as a body in protest against the action taken liy the Government and, on such information being received, there were also dismissed by applying clause (c) of the second proviso to them, it cannot be said that the said clause (c) was not properly applied. [296 F-297 BJ

u.o.r. v.

XIII. R

TULSIRAM

Un ..,.nehle to a Civil SenlmC

A.

A civil aervant who bas been dilllled lias , removed or reduced in rank by applying to bis case one of the clauees of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or SD awtlogous service rule has two rmedies available to him· These .remedies are;

(1) The appropriate departmental remedy provided for in the

R

relevant service rn1es, and (ii) if stiU disBBtisfied, invoking the court's ponr of jwlicial review. [216 A-II]

nv.

Deparmeotal. 1

11•.

Service rn1es generally provide for departmental rl!llll!die& bY way of SD appeal, revision and revie. in the case of discipli­

nary action taken sgainat a civil servant.

2. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of the first proviso to Rule 25(1) of the Railway Servants (Diacipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, provides that where an inquiry has not been held, the revising authority shall itself bold such iuquiry or indirect such iuquiry to be held. A railway servant baa therefore a right to delland in revision an inquiry into the charges sgainat him subject to a situation enviaaged in Rule 14 of the BBid Rulee not prevailing at tbat time . [248 G-;1] 3. Althougb a provision similar to sub-clause (ii) of clauee (c) of the first proviso to Rule 25(1) of the RailJrays .Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, does not exist in the rnles relating to appeals, having regard to the factors set out in Rule 22 (2) which are to be considered by the appellate authority in deciding an appeal, a provision similar to the said sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of the first proviso to Rules 25(1) should be read and imported into the provisions relating to appeals in the said Rules. [249 I>-F]

4. Even in a case where at the time of the hearing of the appeal or revision, as the case may be, a situation enviaeged by the second proviso to Article 311(2) exists, as the civil servants, if dismissed or removed, is not continuing in service and, if reduced in rank, is continuing in service with the reduced rank; the hearing of the appeal or revision, as the case may be, should be post,J>Oned for a resaonsble length of time to enable the situation to return to normal. (273 G]

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

5. An order imposing penalty passed by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, cannot be challenged in a departmental appeal or revision. [265 D] 6. A civil servant who has been dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by applying to his case one of the clauaes of the second proviso of Article 311(2) or of an analogous service rule has, therefore, the right in a departmental appeal or revision to a full and complete inquiry into the allegations made against him subject to a situation envisaged in the second proviso to Article 311(2) not existing at the time of the hearing of the appeal or revision application. Even in a case where such a situation exists, he has the right to have the hearing of the appeal or revision application postponed for a reasonable length of time for the situation to become normal. [273 F] .

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

'

7. In an appeal, revision or review by a civil servant who has been dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by applying to his case clause (a) of the second proviso or an analogous service rule, it is not open to the civil servant to contend that he was wrongly convicted by the criminal court. He can, however, contend that the penalty imposed upon him is to severe or excessive or was one not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. If he is in fact. not the civil servant who was actually convicted on a criminal charge, he can contend in appeal, _revision or review against such order of penalty that it was a case of mistaken identity. [264 E]

s .. A civil servant who has been dismissed ·or removed from service or reduced in rank by applying to his case clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or an analogous service rule can claim 'in appeal or revision that in inquiry should be held with respect to the charges on which such penalty has been imposed upon him unless a situation envisaged by the second pl'.oviso is prevailing at the hearing of the appeal or revision <'.pplication. Even in such a case the hearing of the appeal or revision application should be postponed for a reasonable length of time for the situation to return to norma).. [264 B] 9. In a case where a civil servant has been dismissed or

removed from service or reduced in rank by applying clause (b) of the second proviso or an analogous service rule to him, by reason of clause (3) of Article 311, it is not open to him contend in appeal, revision or review that the inquiry was wrongly dispensed with. [264 GJ .

•

U.O.I. v. TULSIRAM

10. In a case where a civil servant has been dismissed or removed from service or re.duced in rank by applying clause (c) of the second proviso or an analogous service rule to him, no appeal or revision will lie if the order of penalty was passed by the President or the Governor. If however, the inquiry has been dispensed with by the President or the Governor and the order of penalty haB been passed by the disciplinary authority (a position envisaged by clause (iii) of Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, and clause (iii) of Bule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965) a departmental appeal or revision will lie. In such an appeal ur revision, the civil servant can ask for an . inquiry to be held into his alleged conduct unless at the time of the hearing of the appeal or revision a situation to envisaged by the second proviso to Article 311(2) is prevailing. Even in such a situation the hearing of the appeal or revision application should be postponed for a reasonable length of time for the situation to become normal. The cl vil servant, however, cannot contend in such appeal or revision that the inquiry was wrongly dispensed with by the President or the Governor. [265 B-E)

xv.' Jnd1cfa1 Reviev.,,. l. Where a clause of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or an analogous service rule is applied on an extraneoua ground or a ground having no relation to the situation envisaged in such clause or rule, the action of the disciplinary authority in applying that clause or rule would be mala fide and, therefore, bad in law and the court in exercise Ofits power of judicial review would strike down both the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon. [273 C-D) 2 • Where a civil servant has been dismissed or reJ:>Oved from service or reduced in rank by applying clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or an analogous service rule and he invokes the court's power of judicial review, if the court finds that the penalty imposed by the impuged order is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the offence committed or was not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case or the reqcirements of the particular government service to which the concerned civil servant belonged, the court will strike down the impugned order. In such a case, it is; however, not necessary that the court should always order reinstatement. The court can instead substitute a penalty which in its opinion would be just and proper in the circumstances of the case. If

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

however, the court finds that he was not in fact the civil servant who was convicted, it will strike down the impugned order of penalty snd order his reinstatement. [267 G-268 A, 273 FJ

3. In the case of a civil servant who has been dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by applying clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or an analogoils service rule, the High Court under Article 226 of this Court under Article 32 will interfere on grounds well-..stablished in law for the exercise of its power of judicial review in matters where administrative discretion is exercised. [274 AJ

4. The finality given by clause (3) of Article 311 to the disciplinary authority's decision that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is not binding upon the court and the court would consider whether clause (b) of the second proviso or an analogous service rule had been properly applied or not. [274 BJ 5. In examining the relevancy of the reasons given for dispensing with the inquiry, the court will consider the circumstances which, according to the disciplinary authority, made it come to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. If the court finds that the reason are irrelevant, the order dispensing with the inqui:r:y and the order of penalty following upon it would be void and the court will strike them down. In considering· the relevancy of the reasons given by the disciplina:r:y authority, the court will not, however, sit in judgment over the reasons like a court of first appeal in order to decide whether or not the reasons are germane to clause (b) of the second proviso or an analogous service rule. The court llll1St put itself in the place of the disciplina:r:y authority snd consider what in the then prevailing situation a reasonable man acting in a reasonable manner would have done. It will judge the matter in the light of the then prevailing situation. Where two view are possible, the court will decline to interfere. [274 C-D] 6. Where it is alleged that clause (b) of the second proviso or an analogouei 'service rule was applied mala fide, the court will examine the charge of mala fides. A mere bare allegations of mala fides without any particulars of mala ~ will not, however, aioount to a plea of mala fides and ri!<juires to be ignored. [280 HJ 7. If the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry are

not

U.Q.I. v. TULSIRAM

colllllUllicated to the concerned civil servant and the matter C'!""'S to conrt, the court can direct the reasons to be produced and furnished to the clvil servant and if still no produced, a presumption should be drawn the reasons were not recorded in writing and the impugned order would then stand invalidated. Such presumption can, however, be rebutted by a satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the written reasons. [272 . H-273 A] 8. Where a civil servant is dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by applying clause (c) of the second proviso or an analogous service rule to his case, the satisfaction of the President or the Governor that it is not expedient in the interest of the security of the State to hold an· . inquiry being a subjective satisfaction would not be a fit matter for judicial review. [278 F] 9. It is not necessary for the court to decide the question whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor can be challenged on the ground that it has been reached mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds in a where all the materials including the advice of the Council of Ministers have been produced and such materials show that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor was neither reached mala fide nor was it based on any extraneous or irrelevant ground. [279 E]

case

10. By reason of the express provision of Article 74(2) and Article 163(3) of the Consti.tution the question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by the Ministers to the President or the Governor, as the case may be, cannot be inquired into by any court. (279 F]

n. Whether the court should order production of the materials upon which the advice Of the Council of Ministers to the President or the Governor, as the case may be, was based in order to determine whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor was arrived at mala fide or was based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant growldSwou~pend upon whether the doc.-nts fall within the class of privileged doc.-nts and whether in respect of them privilege has beeD. pi:operly claimed or not. !277 G-278 BJ In re Tuls:lraa Patel

160.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1965] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

The Respondent-Tulsiram Patel was a perimment allditor in the Regional Audit Office. Orders were issued for stopping his increment for one year, where-upon he went to the Regional Audit Officer demanded an explanation from him as to why he had stopped his increment, and not satisfied with the reply of the auditor officer struck him with an iron rod, wherupon the officer fell do-wn, his head bleeding. The Respondent was tried and convicted under Sec. 332 of . the Indian Penal Code bUt the ·Magistrate instead of sentencing the respondent to impriso;_,,t, invoked the provisions Sec. 4 of the Probation of Offend~rs Act, 1956 and released him for a period of one year on executing a bond of good behaviour. The Respondent's appeal against bis conviction was dismissed. [281 F-fl] The Controller General of Defence Accounts, the disciplinary authority, imposed upon the Respondent the penalty of compulsory reUrement under clause ( l) of Rule 19 of the Civil Service Rules. The respondent 's departmental appeal was dismissed. (262 A,D] The Respondent thereafter filed a Writ Petition, and the High Court relying upon a.allappan 's Case held that no opportunity had. been afforded to the Respondent before imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement on him and that the impugned order was ·defective inasmuch as it did not indicate the circunistances which were considered by the disciplinary authority · except the .fact of conviction of the Respondent. [282 E-F]

The appeal of the Union of India was allowed, the judgment and order appealed against were reversed and set aside and the writ petition filed by the Respondent in the High Court is dismissed. [284 A]

CISF llA1"D!RS

The respondents who were members of the CIS Force Unit at Bokaro Steel Plant and were disDiissed from service. The members of this CIS'F Unit at Bokaro had .formed an All-India association and one of ·the dismissed person was elected it General Secretary. Thereafter a country-wi.de · agitation was carried ou for recognition of the association. In June 1979 some of the members went to Delhi to meet the Home Miuister. A demonstration was staged and some of the demonstrators were arrested. At Bokaro Steel Plant the agitation which was going became aggravated and out of 1900 persons belonging to CISF Unit Bokaro, about 1000

t

u..o.:r:. v. TULSIRAA..

16i

persons participated in processions and. violent deaKxlstratiOllll• A They indulged in serveral acts of violence and created serious in- discipline. The agitation and the violent activity reecbed serious proportion ·in the last week ·of June 1979 with the result that the A:rJJJ:f bad to be called by the State Authorities on 23.6.1979, took up positions round the CISF Lines and called upon the agitators to give up charge of the Armoury. The agitators B refused and started firing at the Ar:JJJ:f, who. returned the fire, and the exchange· of ftre resulted in the instant death of one A:rJJJ:f Major. The offending CISF members were over powered, ·and arrested. (284 F-2.85 DJ The authorities were of the opinion; that having regard to · c the violent and disturbed situation which prevailed in the Bokaro Steel Plant, the collective ·action of violence, mass terror and intimidation and threats to the supervisory and loyal staff, any inquiry in accordance with Rules 34, 35 and 36 of CISF Rules 1969 or in accordance with the requirl!ments of Article 311(2) lllOUld be dangerous Counter-productive and would aggravate the existing D dangerous situation, the delinquent persorinel were diamiased in ei<ercise of the powers conferred bY sub-rule (b) of rule 37 of the CISF Rules 1969 read with clause (b) of the second proviso of clawie (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. [288 C-289 AJ The Cis Force bas been constitnted under the CISF Act for the better protection and sei:urity of industrial undertakings owned by the gl)vernment. The .CIS Force is an armed Force and the security duties to be performed by the CIS Force are of vital iiuportance to the industrial production of the country, [289 Jl,GJ

All the acts indulged in by the members of the Force virtually amounted to a 11111tiny and boll grave the situation was can be judged from the fact that the army. bad to be called 0ut and a pitched battle took place betweeo the army and the members of the Force. (291 AJ ·

.,

No person with any reason or sense of responsibility can say that in such s situation the holding of an inquiry was reasonable and practicable. [291 BJ The appellate authority under the Central Industrial Security Force Rules i969 was directed to dispose of as expeditiously as possible such appeals of the members of the Force as lllig)lt a.till be pending. Such of those members ·who bad

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[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

not filed any appeal, in view of their reliance on Cball.appan 's case, time was granted to them to file a departmental appeal, and the concerned authority was directed to condone the delay in the filing of the appeal and to dispose it of on merits.[291 H-292 CJ

KADllAY Sl!B.VICE llA1Tl!llS

Railway Servants were either dismissed or removed from serviCe by applying to their cases either clause (ii) of Rule 14 of the Railways Servants Rules or clause (ii) of Rule 14 read with clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2), as they were alleged to have been concerned in incidents which took place in the all-India strikes of railway employees. ,Many of these employees belonged to the all-India loco-running staff. The railway servants went on these strikes with the object of forcing the Government to meet their demands. (292 E-F] Railway service is a public utility service within the meaning of clause (a) of section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the proper running of the railway service is s vital to the country. Where, therefore, the railway employees went on an illegal strike without complying with the provisions of section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, and thereby cOlllllitted an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine under section 26(1) of the said Act, and the railway serviCllS were paralysed, loyal workers and superior officers assaulted and intimidated, the country held to ransom, the economy of the country and public interest and public good prejudicially affected, prompt and iDDediate action was called for in order to bring the situation to normal. In these circ.-cances, it cannot be said that an inquiry was reasonably practicable or that clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 was not properly applied. [294 C-F, 295 CJ IWllIA. PIWl!SH l'OLICI! Flll(:l!S llA1Tl!llS

Members of the M.P. District Police Force or M.P. Special Armed Force were dismissed by orders of the Governor of Madhya Pradesh by applying clause ( c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2)• [295 EJ An incident took place on January 18, 1981 at the annual Mela held at Gwalior in which one man was burnt all ve. Some persons including a constable from each of these two forces, were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. On January 20, 1981

• u.o.I. V• TULSIRAM [MADON,J.]

several members of these two Forces indulged in 'Violent demonstration and rioted at the Mela ground .demanding the release of their colleagues. They attacked the police station at the Mela Grounds, ransacked it and forced the operator to close down the wireless set. [296 DJ The police are the guardians of lav and order, and if theae guards tum law-breakers and create violent public disorder and incite others to do the saa, prompt and urgent action ~s necessary and the holding of an inquiry into the conduct of each indirldual member of the police force -Ud not be expedient in the interest of the security o.f the State. {297 A-BJ

(Nr x.r; Tblllibr J- cllil• attng) 'a..Jlappan • has been rightly decided. And there is no compulsion to overrule U - Eftll if the other point of view were to appear to be more 'attractive' it is neither a good nor a · aufficient ground to overrule •a..uappea•. The decision, does no more than enjoin in the context of Rule .14(1) (a) and tlterefore, u a logical corollary, also in the context of Rule 14 (a) (b) of the llaf.lways Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, that an mployee 1111St atleast be heard on one question of quantum of punis1-ct before he is dismissed or removed frOlll service without holcl1ng any inquiry. The ratio of the decision is so innocuous that there is hardly any need to overturn it· (299 F-G] Concurrence with the consequential orders being passed in thue cuea and association with the exposition of 1av in regard to the true meaning and content of the 'pleasure doctrine' and its illplications and impact is not possible. [300 BJ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6814 of 1981 etc. From .the Judgment and Orde dated 23.6.1982 of the Madhya ptadesh High Court in M.P: No. 1028 of 1981. L.N.Sinha, M.K.Ramanurthy, K.K.Vinugopal, V.M.Tarkunde, p;a. Mirdul, p;p:singh, R.N.P6ddar, Umesh Mishra, M.A.Krishnamoorty, Indira Sawhney, Kittu Bansilal, Chandan Malhotra, J -Rama1111rthy, R.Vaigai, H.K.PUri, V.K.Bahl, K;v:sreekumar, R.Sathish, s.s. Khanduja, Yashpal Dhingra, P:H.PArekh, p;K.Manohar, C.L. Sahu, A.K.Jha, T.G.N.Nayar, A.K.PAnda, S.K.Gambhir, S.Gambhir, Ashok Mahajan, Sunita Kriplani, C.V.Subba Rao, G.D.Gupta, Hemant Sharma, Inclu Malhotra and Jayshre for the appearing parties. R.K.Garg, S.N.Singh and K.M.K. Nair for the intervener. The following Judgments were delivered :

.A

SUPREME COURT REPoRTS

[1985) SUPP.2 s.c.R.

lllillON, J, The above Appeals by Special Leave granted by this Court and the above Writ Petitions filed either in this Court under .artilce 32 of the Constitution of India or in different High cOurts under Article 226 and transferred to this Court raise a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution and in particular of what is now, after the amendment. of cl.iuse (2) of Article · 311 by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, the second proviso to that clause. ·

1'be Genesis olO the Appeals aod Vd.t: PetitiODS

To ·understand what questions fall for determination by this Court in these Appeals and Writ Petitions, it is first. necessary to sketch briefly how they have come to be heard by .this Constitution Bench.

Article 311 of the Constitution cohfer.s certain safeguards upon persons employed in civil capacities under the Union of India or a State. The first safeguard (which is given by clause (l) of Article 311) is that such person cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he wail appointed. The second BSfeguard (which is given by clause (2) of Article 311) is that he cannot be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an iuquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being hearli in respect of those charges • The second safeguard is. hOYever. not available to him 'when he is, dismissed, removed · or reduced in rank in ' any of the three cases mentioned in the second proviso to Article ~11(2). These three cases are set out in clauses (a) to (c) of the second proviso. Under clause (a), such person can be d:Lsmissed, removed or reduced in rank without ,!Jw,y inquiry ·on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Under clause (b) ,, any of these three penalties can be imposed upon him where the authority empowered to impose any of these penalties is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authoirty in writing,it is not reasonably practicable. to hold such inquiry., Under clause (c), any of ·the above penalties can be imposed upi>n hini where the ·President or the Governor of a state, as the case may be, is ,saHsfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is hot ~ent to hold sueh :Lnq'uiry. , All the government servants in the above,#~· and- Writ. Petitions have been either · dismissed or removed' ftom service '..itl>Oo.ii holding any inquiry· have not. been 1ihf-O"-t.of die charges ~i: ·1;tiem nor. beeii· giveri~any·,,opportllnity ~f· being

n;ey.

u.o.r. v. TULSilWI [MADON, J.j

heard in respect of those charges.. The penalty of dismissal or removal, as the case may be, has been imposed upon them under one or the other of . the three clauses of the second proviso to Arti cle 311(2) or under similar provisions in rules made under the proviso to Article 309 .or in rules made under an Act referable. to Article 309, for instance, Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rule 1968, and Rule 37 of the Central Industrial Seeurity Force Rules, 1969, or under such a rule read with one of the clauses of the second proviso to Article 311(2).

Aggrieved by these orders of dismissal and rem.oval, several government servants filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution in different High Courts. Some of these writ petitions were allowed, mainly on the baSis of a decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Divisional Persoonel Officer, 5out:hezn Railway & Anr. V• T.R. Challappan, (1976] l s.c.R. 783, given on September 15, 1975, while a few were dismissed. Appeals by Special Leave against those judgments were filed in this Court. In three other similar appeals, namely, Civil Appeals Nos. ·1088,1089 and 1120 of 1975, another three-Judge Bench of this Court felt that there was a conflict between Challappan 's case and an earlier decision of another three-Judge Bench of this Court, mmely, M.Gopala Krishan lla.idu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968] 1 S.C.R. 355, and directed on November 18, 1976, that the ~pers in those three appeals be placed before the learned Chief Justice to enable him to refer those appeals to a larger Bench. The said appeals were thus referred to the Constitution Bench. Because of the said order all the above Appeals and Writ Petitions were also placed before this Constitution Bench. During the course of the hearing of all these matters by tliis Constitution Bench, the . said Civil Appeals Nos • 1088, 1089 and 1120 of 1975 were, however, got dismissed on March 29,1984, but the above Appeals and Writ Petitions were fully heard and are being disposed of by this Judgment.

C

Civi1 5"rvaots

Justice Oliver Welldell Holmes in his. book ''The Common I.aw"., consisting of lectures delivered by him while teaching law at Harvard and published just (/ne year· before he was appointed in 1882 .an Associate Justice of' the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, sai.d :

SUPRllME COURT RJWOR.TS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R. I

"The Law embodies the story of a nation's development :, through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of a mathematics. In order to know what it is we oust know what it, has been and what it tends to become."

It will not, therefore, be out of place to begin this Judgment with a brief historical sketch of the civil service in India as also of the law applicable. to civil servants and the chan&es which have taken place in it from time to time.

C

Ci.vil servants, that is, persons who are members of a civil service of the Union of India or an all-India Service or a civil service of a State or who hold a civil post under the Union or a State, occupy in law a special position. The ordinary law of master and servant does not apply to them. Under that law, whether the contract of service is for a fixed period or not. If it contains a provision for its tennination by notice, it can be so tenninsted. If there is no provision for giving a notice and the contract is not for a fixed period, the law implies an obligation to give a reasonable notice. Where no' notice in the first case or no reasonable notice in the s"econd case is given, the contract is wrongfully tenninated and such wrongful tennination will given rise to a claim for damages. This is subject to what may otherwise be provided in industrial and labour laws where such laws are applicable. The position of civil servants both in ~ngland and in India is, however, vastly different. lbe Civil Service in Kogl and

Our civil services are modelled upon the British pattern though in some respects there are important differences between the two• In England, except where otherwise provided by statute, all public officers and servants of the Crown hold their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown or durante bene placito ("during good pleasure." or "during · the pleasure of the appointor") as opposed to an office held. dum bene se gesserit ("during good conduct"), also called quadiu ~ bene gesserit ("as long as he shall behave himself well") • When a person holds office during the pleasure of the Crown, his appointment can be tenninsted at any time without assigning cause. The exercise of pleasure by the Crown can, however, ·be restricted by legislation enacted by Parliament because in the United Kingdom Parliament is sovereign and has the right· .to make or unmake any law whatever

U.O.I. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.J

and all that a court of law can do with an Act passed by Parliament is to interpret its meaning but not to set it aside or declare it void Blackstone in his Commentaries has thus described the unlimited legislative authority of Parliament(l Bl., Conm. PP• 160,161) :

"It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making confirming, enlarging, restraining abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal " this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must inall govermnents reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or ne1MDOdel the succession to the Crown; as was dot\e in the reign of Henry Vlll, and William Ill. It can alter the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances, in the reigns of king Henry Vlll and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the conatitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the act of union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do everything that is not naturaly impossible; and therefore some have no scrupled to call its power. by a figure rather. too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is, that what the Parliament doth, no aut;hority upon earth can undo."

Jean Louis De Lolme, the eighteenth-century Swiss conatitutionalist in his "Constitution de 1 'Angleterre" ("Constitution of Engl and"), which gave many on the continent their ideas of the British Conatitution, sU11111ed up the position of Parliament in the English constitutional law in the following apophthegm quoted in Dicey's Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (see 10th Edition, p.43) :

"It is ii fundamental principle with English lawyers, that Parliament can do everything but make -.ill a man, and a man a woman."

a

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

So far as the pleasure doctrine in England is concerned; Lord Di plock in Chel 11 ab l(odeeswaran v. Attorney-General of Ceylon, L.R. [1970j A.C. 1111,1118,P.c., has succinctly stated its position in English law as follows :

"It is now well established in British Constitutional theory, at any rate as it has developed since the eighteenth century, that any appointment as a Crown ·.. servant, however subordinate, is terminable at will unless it is expressly otherwise provided by legisla-

tion."

In practice, however, a dismissal would take place only as the result of well-established disciplinary processes. In recent years, though the Crown still retains the right to dismiss at pleasure, the legal position of civil servants has radically changed as a result of legislation, and legally bindj.ng collective agreements can be entered into between the Crown ·and representative of its staff and those representatives can sue for breach df any conditions of service covered by these agreement. Further, , a civil servant can bring an action for unfair dismissal or• sue on his conditions of service. But just as an ordinary ·employee cannot insist on continuing in employment, so also a civil servant cannot insist on continuing in employment. The remedy.in both cases is to recover damages for wrongful dismissal. (See llalsbury's Lsws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 8, Paras 1106 and 1303). 'll1e Pre-<:cmstitution Civil Services in India

It is unnecessary to go back more than two centuries to traee the origin and development of the Civil Service in India. The East India Corupany sent out to India its own servants and so did the Crown, arui from the earliest times, under the various Charters given to the ·East India Company, the Crown could at its pleasure remove any person holding office, whether civil or ·military, under the East India Company. The Court of Directors of the EaSt India Company had also the power to remove or dismiss any of its officers or servants not appointed by the Crown. Section 35 of the Act of 1793 (33 Geo.IIi.c.52) made it lawful to and for a King's Majesty, his heirs and successors, by any writing or instrument under his or their sign manual, countersigned by the President of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of

U.Q.I. v. TULSil!AM (MADON, J.]

India, to remove.or recall any person holding anY office, employ,ment or cOllllllission, civil or military, under the East India Company; while section 36 of that Act provided that nothing contained in that Act should extend, or be construed to extend, to pre,clude or take away the power of the Court .of. Directors of the East India Company from removing or recalling anY of its officers or servants and that the. Court of Directors shall.and may at all t~s have full liberty· to remove, recall. or dismiss any of such officers · or servants at their will and· pleasure . in the like manner as if ·that Act had nol been passed. Similar . provisions were made in the Act. of .1833 (3 & 4 WilhIV, c.8~) by sections. 74 and 75 of that Act. .Section 74 made it lawful "for. His Maj.lsty by any Writing under His Sign Manual, countersigned· by the President of the said Board of Coumissioners, to remove or dismiss any person holding anY office, "!l'Ployment or COlllllission, civil or military, under the said Company in India, and to vacate any Appointment or ComnisSion·of any person to any such office or employment." Section 75 provided that nothing contained in that Act would take away the power of ;the Court of.Directors to remove or dismiss any of the officer.a or .servant;:s of the Company "but t;:hat .the said Court. shall and may. at all Times have. full Liberty tp ramive or dismiss any .of suCh officers. or servants st their will and pleasure ... By the end of the nineteenth century· a well-organized civil service had developed in India, the control over it being vested in . the executive, and the members of the "civil service of the Crown in India", were governed in the matter of their appointments as also the regular of the conditions of .their serv~ce, such as, classification methods of recruitment, pay and allowances, and discipline and conduct, by rules made by the executive. The Government of India Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Viet. ,c.106), which vested . 1n tlte Bdtish ..Crown the. territories under the government of East India . Company, repealed certain sections of the Government of India Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict.,c.95), in so far as they applied to or provided for the admission or appointment of persons· to the Civil Service· of the ~st India· Company and conferred upon the Secretary. of State in Council the power to '. make regulations for the admission of candidates .to the Civil Service of India as also with respect to other llliltters connected therewith. Three years later the Indian Civil Service so envisaged received statutory recognition by: tlte .enactment of tlte \Indian Civil Service Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Viet., c•54}.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

The above Acts were repealed by the Goverment of India Act of 1915 l5 & 6 Geo.V, c.61). Part VIII of the 1915 Act conferred upon the Secretary of State in Council, with the aid and advice of the Civil Service Coomissioners, the power' to make rulea for the Indian Civil Service examination. None of the above nor the Goverment of India (Amendment) Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. V,c.37) made any reference to the tenure-of members of the civil service in India. Thill was for the first time done by the Government of India Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. v, c.101), which introduced several amendments in the 1915 Act including the insertion of Part VIIA consisting of section 96 B to 96 E. Section 96 B pro'Vided as follows ·96 B. 1be civil aerv1ces in IDdia. -

( l) Subject to the pEOVisiana of this Act and of rules llllde tbenaader, every person in the civil service of the Crown in India holds office dud,ug 1118 Majesty's . ple•ntt, and may be employed in any manner required by a proper authority within the sc~pe of his duty but no person in that service may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and the Secretary of State in Council may (except so far as he may provide by rules to the contrary) reinstate any person in that sel!"Vice who has been dismissed.

If any such person appointed by the Secretary of State in Council thinks himself wronged by an order of an official superior in a governor's provinee, and on due application made to that superior does not receive the redress to which he may consider himself entitled, he may, without prejudice to any other right of redress, complain to the governor .of the province in order to obtain justice, and thegovemor is hereby directed to examine such complaint and require such action to be taken thereon as may appear to him to be just and equitable.

(2) The Secretary of State, in Council may make rules for regulating the classification of the civil services in India, the methods of their recruitmel!t,

•

u.0.1. v. TULSIRllM [MADON, J.j

their conditions of services, pay and allanocu, and discipline and conduct. Such rules may, to such extent and in respect of such matters as may be prescribed, delegate the power of making rules to the Governo~ral in Council or to local governments, or authorise the Indian legislsture or locsl legislstures to make 1sws regulsting the public services: Provided thst every person appointed before the commencement of the Government of India act, 1919, by the Secretary of State in Council to the civil service of the Crown in India shall retain all his existing or accruing rights, or shall receive suchcompensation, for the loss of any of them as the Secretary of State in Council may consider just and equitable. (3) The right to pensions and the scale and conditions of pensions of all persons in the civil service of the Crown in India appointed by the Secretary of State in Council shall be regulsted in accordance with the rules in force at the ttme of the passlng of the Government of India Act, 1919. Any such rules may be varied or added to by th& Secretary of State in Council and shall hsve effect as so varied or added to, but any such variation or addition shall not adversely affect the . pension of any member of the service appointed before the date thereof.

·-

Nothiog in this section or in any rule thereunder shall prejudice the rights to which any person may, or may hsve, become entitled under the provisions in relstion to pensions contained in the East India Annuity Funds Act, 1874. ( 4) For the. removal of doubts it is hereby declsred thst all· rules or other provisions in operation at the time of the passing of the Government of India Act, 1919, whether made by the Secretary of State in Council or by any other authority, relsting to the civil service of the Crown in lDdia, were duly made in accordance with the powers in thst behalf, and iu;e confirmed, but ·any such rules or provisions may be revoked, varied or added to by rules or lsws made uru!E.r this section."

' SUPREMK COURT llliPORTS

(1985J SUPP.2 S.C;R.

The Fundamental Rules, the Civil Service '(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules of i.930 and the Civil Se.rvice (Governors Provinces Claiisification) Rules are i11Stances of rules made under authority' conferred by section 96B. Section 96C provided for the establishment of a Public Service Connnission. Sub-section (l) of section 96U provided for a~ Auditor-General to be appointed by the Secretary of State in Council who·was to hold office during "His Majesty's. pleasure", and conferred upon the Secretary of State in Council the power to make rules providing for the Audito~neral' s pay, powers, duties and. conditiollS of employment. Sub-section (2) of section 96D provided that, subject to any rules lnade by the Secretary of State in Council, no officer could be added to or withdrawn from the public service and the emoluments of no post could be varied except after co11Sultation with such finance authority as wight be designated in therules being an authority of the Province or of the Government of India, according.as the post was or was ·not under the control of a local Government.' Under section 96>: rules under Part VIlA could not be made except.with the concurrence of the majority of votes at a meeting 'of the Council of India.

Thus, after the 1919 Act, the civil services of India contin~ed to be ~nder the co~trol of the Secretary of State ·in Council who was t~ regulate by rules the classificat'ion of the civil setvices, .the methods of recruitment, the co~ditions of services, pay and allowances, and discipline and conduct. Such rules could also provide for delegation of the rule-making power to the <.,;overnor-General in Council or the local Governments or authorize the · rndian Legislature or Local Legislatures to make laws regulating . the public services but only to the extent and in respect of.matters as were ·prescribed bY the rules. Thus, even the power of making rules as also the authority to the Indian Legislature and the Local Legislatures to enanct Acts regulating the public services was derived by delegation of power made by the Secretary of State in Council. I•

What is really material for the purposes of the present Appeals and Writ Petitions is that section 968 of the Government of India Act, 191~, for the first time expressly stated tnat every person in the civil se~vice of the Crown in India hel~ office "during His MaJesty's pleasure." This wa8:, however, made. subjec·t to three safeguai'ds, namely (1) a civil servant could not be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed;

·'

u.o.I. v. TULSlRt\M [MADON,J.J

(2) the· Secretary of Stai:e ·1n Council had· the :power, unless he provided to the contrary in the rules, ·to reinstate any person in · · service who had· been dismissed; and (3) if a civil servant appointed by the Secretary of State in Co\Jncil'thought himself wronged by an order of an official superior in a Governor's Province and on due application made to that superior did not receive the redress to which he considred himself entitled, he could, Without prejudice to any other right of redress, complain to ·the Governor of the

Province in order to obtain justice and the Governor

had to examine such complaint and

require· such ·action to be taken thereon as might appear to him to be just and equitable.

-

'

The position which prevailed with respect to the Civil ·services in India during the intervening period between the Government of India Act, 1919, and the Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo. V, c.42) was that the top echelons of the important services, especially those. working under the provincial Govern~ ments, consisted of what wel-e known as the ~·all India setvices· ,·" which governed a wide variety of departments. There were, in the ·first place, the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service, which provided the framework of the administrative machinery. In addition, there were the Indian Forest Service, the Indian Educational Service, the Indian-Agricultural· Service, the Indian Service of Engineers (consisting of an Irrigation Branch and a Roads and Buildings Branch), the Indian Veterinary Service, the Indian Forest Engineering Service and the Indian Medical Service (Civil). The initial appointments and conditions of service for all these services were made by the Secretary of -State and each officer executed a covenant with the Secretary of State containing the terms under which he was to serve. In addition to the all-India services there were the central services under the Government of-~ndia and the Provincial services in the Provinces; and lastly the subordinate services. (See Indian Statutory (Simon) Collllllission Report(l930), Vol.I,para· 290 ff.). During the years following the 1919 Act it was dedded that, as a consequence of the decision to effect progressive transfer of power to Governments in India, the nwnber of all-India services under 'the direct control of the Secretary of State should be progress! vely reduced espedally in those fields of administration that were transferred to ministerial control. It was now to

r

a

II

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

be left to the Provincial Governments to reorganize in gradual stages the higher cadres of their services in the transferred subjects, and recruitment and control of the Secretary of State in Council were accordingly discontinued. This policy resulted by the early thirties in the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police Service, the Ecclesiastical Service and the civil Qranch of the Indian Medical Service being retained by the Secretary of State and the rest being converted into Provincial services, safeguards ~ing provided to secure the rights and privileges ~uaranteed

to officers recruited earlier to the all-India services. (See Report of the Joint Select Collllllittee on. Indian Constitutional Reform, (1934), para 277.)

The above position received legislative re~ilgnition and sanction under the Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo. V, c.42), often cited with the year and chapter of the Act in pursuance of which it was reprinted, 'namely, the Government of India \Reprinting) Act, 1935 (26 Geo. V & 1 Edw, Vllt,c.l). Part X of the 1935 Act dealt with the services of the Crown in India. Chapter II cf Part X made provisions with respect of the civil services. Section 240 provided for the tenure of office of persons employed in civil capacities in India and conferred upon them certain statutory safeguards as regards dismissal or reduction in rank. Section 241 dealt with their recruitment and conditions of service. Under that section power to make apoiritments was vested in respect of central services in the GovernorGeneral and in respect of the Provincial servic~s in the respective Governors. In the same manner the power to regulate conditions of service of the ~embers of these services was conferred upon the Governor- General or the Governor, as the case may be. The Governor-General as also the Governor could authorize such person as he might direct to make appointmeqts and rules with respect to the conditions of service. Provision was also .made for enactment of Acts by appropriate Legislatures to regulate the conditio~ of service of persons in the civil services. It is unnecessary to look into the details of these provisions as the federal structure envisaged by the 1935 Act never came into existence as it was optional for the Indian States to join the proposed Federation and they did not give their consent thereto• Chapter 111 of Part X provided for the setting up of a Federal Public Service Commission and a Public Service Commission for each province·. A provision was also made for two or more Provin-' ces to agree to have a joint Public Service Connnission or for the Public Service COnmission of one of these Provinces to serve the needs of the· other provinces.

-

I

U.O.I. v. TULSIRAM [MADON,J.]

In the context of the present Appeals and Writ Petitions, it is section 240 of the 1935 Act which is relevant. Section 240 provided as follows :

"240. Tenure of office of perlions employed in civil capacities in India. B

( 1) Except as expressly provided by this Act, every

persons who is a member of a civil service of the Crown in India, or holds any civil post under the Crown in India bolds office during Bis Majesty's pleasure.

(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be d,ismissed from the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (3) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him :

Provided that this sub-section shall not be apply · (a) where a person ·is dismissed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where an authority l""POWered to dismiss a person or reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing cause. (4) Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the Crown in India holds office during His Majesty's pleasure, any contract under which a person, not being a member of a civil service of the Crown in India is appointed under this Act to hold such a post may, if the Governor--{;eneral, or, as the case may be, the Governor, deems it necessary in order to secure the service of a person having special qualifications, provide for the payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985) SUPP.2 s.c.R.

period that post is abolished or he is, for reasoru not connected with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate that post.·· While under the 1935 Act, as under the 1919 Act, every person who was a member of the civil service of the Crown in India or held any civil post under the Crown in india held office "during His Majesty's pleasure", greater safeguards were provided for him under the 1935 Act than under the 1919 Act. Those safeguards were : (1) under sub-section (2) of section 240, such a person could not be dismissed from service by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and

(2) under sub-section (3) of section 240, such a person could not be dismissed or reduced in rank until he had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to· be taken in regard to him.

The safeguard as regards a reasonable opportunity of showing cause provided for in section 240(3) did not exist in the 1919 Act. The proviso to sub-section(3) of section 240, however, took away this safeguard in the two cases set out in clauses (a) and (b) of the said proviso. These two cases were : (a) where a civil servant was dismissed or reduced in rank on ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge, and

(b) where an authority empowered to dismiss him or reduce him in rank was satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it was not reasonably practicable to give to that perSon an

opportunity of showing cause.

'!he Civil Services under the Constitution

Provisions with respect to services under the Union and the . itates are made in Part XIV of the Constitution of India. This Part consists of two Chapters, Chapter I delaing with services and Chapter II dealing with Public Servieoe Commissions for the H Union and the State. Article 308, as originally enacted, defined

'

j

<J.U;l.-v. TULSIRAM [MADON,J.]

the expression "'State" occurring in Part XIV as meaning, unless the context otherwise required, "a State specified in Part A or B

of the First Schedule." This Article was amended by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, which was passed in order to implement the scheme for reorganization of States.

The amended

Article 308 provides, "ln this Part, unless the context otherwise

requires, the expression 'State' does not include the State of

Janinu and Kashmir."

Article

309 provides for recruitment and

conditions of service of persons serving the Union oi: a State,

Article 310 for the tenure of office of such persons, and Article

311 for the mode of dismissal removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.

Article 312 deals with all-India services and inter alia provides that where the Council of State has declared by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present and

C

voting that it is necessary or expedient in the nstiorial interest

so to do, Parliament might by law·provide for the creation of one

or more all-India services comnon to the Union arid the States and subject

to

the

other

provisions of Chapter

I

regulate

the

recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to any

such service; and it further provides that the lndian Administra-

tive Service and the Indian Police Service shall be deemed to be

services created by Parliament under Article 312. Article 313 provides for the continuance in force, so far as consistent with the provisions

inmediately

of the Constitution,

before

the

comnencement

of all the laws in force

of

the Constitution

and

applicable to.any public service or any post which continued to

exist after the commencement of the Constitution as an all-India

service or as service or post under the Union or a State until

other provision was made in this behalf under the Constitution.

Under

clause

means

"any law, Ordinance,

(10) of Article 366 the expression "eXisting law"'

order, bye-law, rule or regulation

passed or made before the coumencement of this Constitution

by

any Legislature,· authority or person having power to make such a law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation."

Acts,

rules

and

regulations

applicable

to

different

Thus, all services

inmediately tiefore the commencement of the Con8titution continue to apply to such services in so far as they were consistent

with

the provisions of the Constitution until amended, varied, revoked or replaced by Acts, rules or regulations made in accordance with the'provisfons of the Constitution.

From what has been stated above it will be seen that the in the Gov�rmnent of provisiotts 'llitn respect to civil services lndia Act, 1935, were taken as the .basis for Chapter I of Part

XIV of the Constitution.

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[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

Articles 309,310 and 311 It is necessary for the purpose of these Appeals and Writ Petitions to set out in extenso the provisions of Articles 309, 310 and 311.

Articles 309 and 310 were amended by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, to omit from these Articles the refer~nce to the Rajpramukh. Articles 309 and 310, as so amended, read as follows : ' "309.Becruitment and CODditiOllS of service of perSODB serving the Union or a State. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the · recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and ·posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State:

Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and· for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions

of

service

of

persons

appointed,

to

suGh

services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act. "310. Tenure of office of persons serving the Union or a State. -

( 1) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution,

every person who is a member of a defence service or

of a civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union holds office during the

pleasure of the President, and every person who is

a

member of a civil service -of a State or holds any civil post under a state holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State.

u.o.r. v. TULSIRAM [MAOON,J.]

(2) Notwithstanding thst a person holding a civil post under the Union or a State holds office during the pleasure of the President or, as the case may be, of the Governor of the State any contract under which a person, not being a member of a defence service or of an all-India service or of a civil service of the Union or a State, is appointed under this Constitution to hold such a post may, if the President or the Governor, as the case may be, deems it necessary in order to secure the services of a person having speeial qualificatioIIS, provide for the payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed period thst post is abolished or .he is, for reasons not connected with any misconduct O!l his part, required to vacate that post." Article 311 as originally enacted was in the following terms

"311. Disllissal, removal or reduction in rauk of persons employed in Civil capacities under the Union or a State. ( 1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a Civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to thst by which he was appointed.

(2) No.such person as aforesaid shell be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a· reasonable opportunity of shoWing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him

Provided thst this clause shell not apply (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a crimi?"l charge;

(b) where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduee him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that author.ity in

writing it is not. reasonably practicable to ·give to thst person an opportunity of showing cause; or

Ii

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(c) where the President or Governor or Rsjpramukh, as the ca·se may be; is ·satisfied truit in the interest of the' security of the State it is not expedient to give to that person such, an opportunity. .. . '

-~,.

(3) If any questio~ arises .whether it is reasonably practicabie to give to ·any person ail opportunity of showing t:ause under clause ( 2).' the decision thereon of the authority· eoipowered to dismis's or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as "the case may be, shall be final'" · · ' · The words "or Rsjpr~"',in.tlauSe (c) of the ,proviso to Article 311(2) were omitted by tl:\e Constitution (Seventh' Amendment) Act, 1956. . . .. . . ., . ' By the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1~63. Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 311 were substituted b';i: ):he following clauses :

"(2) No.such per~on.as ·aforesaltl.snall be dismissed or removed or reduced in railk exi:ept' after ·a,; inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable. opportuni~y of . being heard in respect of those charges ·and where. ,it . is proposed, after such inqUiry, to impose.on him any s11ch penalty, until h<a has beeb. given a reasonable opportunity of making representatiprt on. the penalty ·proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry : Provided that this clallse shal not apply -

(a) where a person is dismiss~d· or removed or reduced in railk on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge ; or

(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or· to reduce, him· in rank is satisfied that for some reason,'to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is n9t reasonably practicable to hold such inqUicy. ; or ' (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is 'satisfied .. tliat in the interest of the

u.o.r. v. TULSIRAM [MAOON,J.]

security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.

(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in dause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank. shall be final. "

The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, made certain amendments in the substituted clause'(2) of Article 311 with effect from January 3, 1977. Article 311 as so amended reads as follows

"311. DiBllissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the llnioo. or a state.·(1) No persons who is a member of a civil

service of

the .Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or· holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by· an· authority subordinate. to that by which he was appointed.

(2) No such person,as aforesaid shall be dismissed

or

removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in

which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges : Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him a:..1y such penalty, such penalty may

be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it Shall net be necessary to give such person any opportu.nity of making representation

oh the penalty proposed :

Provided further that this clause shall ·not apply ta) where a person is -dismissed or rel])()ved or reauced in rank on ·the groulld of conduCt which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; ~r

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or

(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.

(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to

dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final."

From the original and amended Article 311 set out above it will be noticed that of the original Article 311 only clause (1) remains unaltered, while both the other clauses have become the subject of Constitutional amendments. No submission was founded by either party on the substitution of the present clause (3) for the original by the Constitution \Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, for the obvious reason that such substitution was made only in order to bring clause (3) in conformity with clause \2) as substituted :by the said Amendment Act.

A comparison of Article 311 of the Constitution with section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, shows that the safeguards provided to civil servants by Article 311 are very much the same as those under section 240 with this difference that . while Article 311 also affords safeguards against removal from service section 240 did not. Further, though the proviso to section 240( 3) is reproduced in what originally was the only proviso and is now the second proviso to Article 311 (2), an additional clause, namely, clause (c) has been added thereto. A provis:l,on similar to clause (3) of Article 311 was also absent from the Government of India Act, 1935. Thus, while on the one hand Article 311 enlarges the protection afforded to civil

servants, on the other hand it increases by one

the number

of

cases in which that protection can be withdrawn. With the above historical background and bearing in mind the provisions of the Constitution, it will be now convenient to turn to the submissions made at the Bar with respect to relevart~

u.o.r. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.)

the pleasure doctrine and the second proviso to Article 311(2) and test the correctness 9£ these submissiolls. 1be Second Proviso -

Iiival Snbn! ssicms

The arguments advanced on behalf of the government servants on the pleasure doctrine and the .second proviso to Article 3ll (2) may be sketched in broad outlined as under : (1) The pleasure doctrine in England is a part of the special prerogative of the Crown and has been inherited by India from Eng.land and ·should, therefore, be construed strictly, that is, strictly against the Government and liberally in favour of government servants. (2) The second proviso which withdraws from government servants the safeguards provided by clause (2) of Article 311 must be also similarly construed for, unless a liberal construction were placed upon it,

C

great hardship would result to government servants as

they could be arbitrarily thrown out of employment and they and their dependents would be left without any means of subsistence.

(3) There are several stages before a government servant can be dismissed or removed .or reduced in rank, namely, serving upon him of a show cause notice or a

charge-sheet, giving him inspection of documents, examination of witnesses, arguments and imposition of penalty. An inquiry starts only after a show cause notice is issued and served upon a government servant.

'·

A show cause notice is thus preparatory to the holding of an inquiry and even if the entire inquiry is dispensed with, the giving of a show cause notice and asking for the explanation of the government servant with respect there to are not excluded.

(4) It is not obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to dispense with the whole of the inquiry. Depending upon the circumstances of the case, the disciplinary authority can dispense with only a part of the inquiry.

'184

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[1985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.

(5) Imposition of penalty is not a part of the inquiry and once an inquiry is dispensed with, whether in whole or in part, it is obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to give an opportunity' to the government servant to make a respresentation with respect to the ,, penalty proposed to be imposed. upon him·

I

(6) Article 311.is subject to.Article 14. Principles of natural justice and the audi alteram partem rule .are part of Article 14 and, therefore, a show cause notice· asking for ~he explanation of the government . servant with respect tv the charges against him as also a notice to show cause with respect to the propo5P.d penalty are required to be given by Article 14 and the not giving of such notices or either of them renders the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank .invalid., , The .submissions on ·behalf of the Union of India can be thus S'-'irized

lJ

( l) The second provis~ must be c.ons trued according to its terms. It is unambiguous and does not admit of ' any such interpretation as canvassed for on behalf of the govet'Illllent servants.

(2) Where under the seco!ld proviso, clause (2) of Article 311 is made inapplicable, there is no scope for holding any partial inquiry. ( 3) In any event, the very contents of the three ·clauses of the second proviso ahow that i t is not necessary or not practicable or not expedient that any partial inquiry"could be or should be held, depending upon which clause applles •, (4) Ait~cle .14 does nOt govern or control Article 311. The Constitution must be read as a whole. Article 311(2) embodies the principles of natural justice including the audi alter1jIII partei:i rule. It thus expressly states .what is requiced under Article 14 as . a result of the interpretation placed upon it by recent decisions of this Court. Once the application of clause(2) is expressly excluded by the Constit~tion

\l.O.l.

''·

TU!SIRAM

iMAOON, J.]

itself, there can be no question of making applicable what has . been so exduded by seeking recourse to Article 14.

(5) Consideration of sympathy for the gove1nment ser­

vants wllo may re dismissed or removed or reduced in

rank are irrelevant .�o the construction of the second

proviso•

The. doctrine of tenure at pleasure in Arti­ cle 31Q and the Safeguards given to a government ser­ vant under clauses (I) and (2) of Article 311 as also the withdrawal of the.· safeguard under clause (2) by

the. second proviso are all enacted in public interest

and

where

public .'interest

confli�ts

with

. interest, the latter DRJSt yield to the former.

private

'lbe Pleasure Doctrine.

P

1'he conc.e t of civil service is .not now or of recent origin. Governments - whether monsrchial, dictatorial or republican have to function; and for carrying on the administration and the varied functions of the government a large number of persons are

required and have always been required, whether they are consti­ t.uted in the form of .a ·civil service or not. Every kingdom and country of the world throughout history had a group of persons who helped the ruler to administer the land, whether according to

lllOdem notioxu; � may call that group a civil service or not, because it is not possible for one man: by himself to rule and

govern.the land and look after and supeJCVise all the details or administration. As it was· throughout history, so it has .been in

England and in India.

In England, all public officers a'ld. servants of the Crown hold their appointments at t})e pleasure of ·the Crown and their

services can be terminated at· will without assigning any cause. lly the expression "the pleasure· doc.trine" is conveyed this right of the Crown.

This right is, however,. subject to what may be

provided otherwise by legislation passed by Parliament because in

the Uni.ted Kingdom, Parilament has. legislative sovereignty.

The Foundations of modern European civil services were laid

in Prussia in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and

by Napoleon's develvf'll"Ilt of highly organized hierarchy (a IDC'del

copied by many countries in the nineteenth century); and they are

the basis of lllOdem European ·

servants

Were

�

O iginally

civil services.

In England civil

the !llOna!Ch 1 S personal

Sel"�SDtS Slid

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[1985] SUPl'.2 s.c.R.

members of the King Is household. Clive Is creation from 1765 of a civil service to govern such parts of India as were under the dominion of the East India Company and Macaulay's repoft on recruitment to the Indian Civil Service provided the inspiraUon for the report of 1~54 on the organization of the permanent civil service iri Britain which recoumended recruitment by open competitive examination, the selection of higher civil servants on the basis of general intellectual attaimnent, and the establishment of a Civil Service Commission to ensure proper recruitment. In .the United Kingdom, until about the middle of No~r· 1981, the Civil Service Department, which was set up in r!l68 with

C

the Prime Minister, as Minister for the Civil Service; tis its Head, looked after the management and personnel functions in connection with the Civil Service which were until then being looked after by the Treasury. These functions included the organization and conduct of the Civil Service and the remuneration, conditions of service, expenses and allowances of persons serving in it; mode of recruitment of persons to the Civil Service; the pay and allowances of, and the charges payable l>y, members of the armed forces; with certain exceptions, superannu- ' ·

ation and injury payments, compensation for loss of employipent or loss or diminution of emolwnentS or pension rights applicable to

civil servants and others in the public sector and to members of the armed forces; the exercise by other persons and bodies of powers to determine, subject to the minister's sanction, the pay or conditions of service of members of public bodies ( exuudl.ng judicial bodies), or the mDDbers, pay or conditions of s1'rvice of staff employed by such bodies or by the holders of ceTtairi nonjudicial · offices; and the appointment or employment ._and the remuneration, conditions of service, personal expen.Ses · or allowances of judges and judicial staff (See Halsbury's L&ws of ~lljlland, Fourth Edition, Volume 8, para 1162J• The Permanent Secretary to the Civil Service Department was the Head of the Home Civil Service and gave advice to the Prim"e Minister as to civil service appointments, decorations, etc. The

Civil Service Departments was abolished on November 12,. 1981, .and its functions, instead of reverting to the Treasury, were divided between the Treasury and the newly created Management •. and .. Personnel Office. ·· ' ' .. · In India, the pleasure doctrine has received constitutional sanction by being enacted in Aricle 310(1). Unlike in the. United Kingdom in India it is not subject to any law made by Parliament

U.Q.I. v. TULSIRAl1 [MADON,J.]

but i•· subject only Constituti<in.

to what

is

expressly

provided by

t:he

The pleasure doctrine relates to the tenure of a government servant. "Tenure" means "manner, conditions or term of holding something"· according to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, and "terms of holding; title; authority" according to the Oxford English Dictionary. It, ther_efore, means the period for which an incl.Ullbent of office holds it. It is for ttJ.s reason that the statement of law relating to the pleasure doctrine in England' is given in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Voltlne 8, Para 1106, under the heading "Tenure of office". ., The first time that a st<ftute relating to the government of India provided that civil servants hold office during His Majes.ty's pleasure .was the. Government of India Act of 1919 in section "96B of that Act. The marginal note to section 96B did not, however, refer to the tenure 'of civil servants but stated· "The Civil Services of India". This was because section 96B in addition to dealing with the·tenure of civil servants also dealt with ·matters relating to their recruitment, conditions of service, pay, allowances, , pensions, etc. The ina.rginal note to section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, however, was "Tenup' of office of persons employed in civil capacities in India". The marginal note to Article 310 of the Constitution also refers to "tenure" and states "Tenure of office or persons serving the Union or a State". Thus, it is the tenure of government servants which Article 310(1) makes subject to the pleasure of the President or the Governor of a State, except as expressly provided by the Constitution.

· While it was vehemently contended on behalf of the governmant servants that the pleasure .doctrine is a relic of the feudal age·-· a part of· the special prerogative of the Crown - which was imposed .upon India by an Imperial power and thus is an anachronism in this democratic, socialist age and must, therefore, be confined within the narrowest limits, it was submitted on behalf of the Union of India that this doctrine was a matter of public policy, ·aru1 it was in public interest and for public good that the· tight . to dismiss at pleasure a government servant who has made himself unfit to continue in office, albeit subject to certain safeguards, should exist and be exercisable in the Constitutional sense by the Crown in England and by the President or the Governor of a State in India.· It is not possible to accept the arguments advanced on behalf of the government servants for

.

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all tile authoritative judicial dicta ar.e

[1985]

SUPP.2 s.c.R.

the

contrary.

to

As

pointed out by Lord Hobhouse in Shenton v. Smith, L.R.[1895j A•C. 229 J .c.,

the pleasure doctrine is

i:hat

difficulty

the

which

would

founded upon the principle otherwise

be

experienced

dismissing those whose continuance in office

is

detrimental ·to

in

the State would be such as seriously to impede .the working of the

In � v. The �. L.R. [1896) Q.B.D. 116; [1895-90] 73 L•T.K. 695 and sub .-iiie � v. Begem in [ i895 99 J All t:.l{. Rep. 907, the Court of Appeal in England held

public service. s.c.

-

that it was an implied term of every contract of service that servants

of

the

Crown,

civil

as

well

as

military,

except

in

special case where it is otherwise provided by law, hold their offices only during the pleasure of the Crown.

C

In that case Lord

Herschell observed (pages 119-120) : "lt seems to me that it is the public interest which has

led

to

the

term

which

I

have

menti.oned

being

imported into contracts for employment in the·service

The cases citect shew that, such employ­ for the good of the public, it is essential for the public good that it should be capable of being detenained at the pleasure of the Crown, except in certain exceptional cases where it bas been deemed to be more for the public good that some restrictioos should be imposed on the ix-r of the Crow to dismiss it's s�rvants. of the Crown.

Ulellt being

.

•

(Emphasis supplied)

In the same case Kay, L.J., said (page 120) "It

seems

to

me that the continued

employment

civil servant might in many cases be •as

of a

deterimental

to the interests of the State as the continued employ­

ment of a military officer." In this case as reported in the Law Times Reports series the . judgments of the three learned Judges who decided the case (Lord Esher,

same,

M.R.,

being

the third

judge),

though

are �iven in very different language

tracted above do not appear in that report.

in

substance

the

and the passages ex­

The

report of the

case in the All England Law Reports Reprint series is with �ery minor variations the same as 'the report in- the Times Law Reports series but somewhat abrid�ed.

This

is

bec'1use the

All England

Law Keports Keprint series is a revised and annotated rt:p rint a selection from the Law Times J\eporb

tor

tile

years

lti43

of to

I

•

u.u.I. v. TULSIRAM [MADON,J. J

1935. The report from which the above extracts are given is the one in the Law Reports series published · by the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting which was established in 1865 and which report is, therefore, more authoritative.· In Gould v. Stuart,L.R. [1896] A.C. 575,578-9 .J.C.; the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council further held that wt.ere by regulations a civil service is established prescribing · qualifications for its members ~ :..i tposing some restriction on the power to dismiss them, such regulations should be deemed to be made for the public good. . The position that the pleasure doctrine is not based upon any special prerogative of the Crown but upon public policy has been accepted . by this Court in 'lbe States of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya,. [1961] 2 s.c.R. 679, 696 and Hoti· Kam Deka etc. v. General llanager, N.E.r. Railways; llaligaon, Pandu etc., [1964] 5 s.c.R.683,734-5. This Court has also accepted the.·principle that ·society has an interest in· the due discharge of their duties by government servants. In Bosban Lal Tandon V• Union of llldiB., (1968] l S.C.R• 185, Ramaswami, J., speaking for the Court said (at page 195) : , . "It is true that the origin of Government service is· contractual. There is ~n offer and acceptance in every case •. But once appointed to· his post· or. office the Govermnent servant acquires· a status and his rights and obligations are no loger de.termined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may ·be.framed and altered unilaterally by the. Government. In other words, ·the ·legal· position of a ~t:. servant. is 1111re ooe. of· status. that of contract. 'lbe Ball-mark of .status is the attaclmient to a legal relatiooahf p of rights and duties imposed by the .public law and' not by mere .agreement of the parties. The emolument of - .the Government servant and his terms of service ..are governed ·by statute .or Statutory rules .which may .. be unilaterally .altered by the Government without the·consent of the employee. It is true that Article 311 imposes constitutional .restrictions upon the power of removal .granted. to the President and the Governor uner Article 310. But it is obvious that. the relationsh~p between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of serVice between a maste:t" · and servant. .The legal relationship is something entirely different, some. thing in the nature of status. It is much more than a

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[1985] SUPP:2 s.c.R.

purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into .between the parties. 'nle duties of status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society bas an interest. In the language of · jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerend." (Emphasis supplied) Ministers frame policies and legislatures enact laws and lay down the mode in which such policies are to be carried out and the object of the legislation achieved. In many cases, in a Welfare State such as ours, such policies and statutes are intended to bring a1bout socio-economic reforms and the uplift of the poor and disadvantaged classes. From the nature of things the task of efficiently and effectively implementing these policies and enactments, however, rests with the civil services. The public is, therE?fore ; vi tally interested in the efficiency and integrity, of such services. Government servants are after all paid · from the public exchequer to which everyone contributes either by way of direct or indirect taxes. Those who are paid by the public and are charged with public and administration for public goc•d 111JSt, therefore, in their turn bring to the discharge of their duties a sence of responsibility. The efficiency of public ad•dnistration does not depend only .upon the top echelons of these "ervices. It depends as 1D.1ch upon all the other members of such services, even on those in the 11Xlst subordinate posts. For installce, railways do not run because of the members of the Railway !bard or the General Managers of different railways or the heads of different departments of the railway administration. They run also because of engine-drivers, fireman, signalmen, booking c:lerks and those holding hundred other similar posts. Similarly, it is not the administrative heads who alone can set to the pro>per functioning of the post and telegraphs service. For a service to run efficiently there 1111st, therefore, be a collective sens" of responsibility. But for a government servant to discharge his duties faithfully and conscientiously, ~e nrust have a feeling of security of tenure. Under our Constitution this is provided for by the Acts and rules made under Article 309 as also by the safeguards in respect of the punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank provided in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. It is, however, as 1111ch in public interest and for public good that government servants who are inefficient, dishonest or corrupt or have become a security risk

I

U.Q.I. v. TUISIRAM [MADON, J.]

should not continue in service and that the protection afforded to them by the Acts and rules made under Article 309 and by Article 311 be not abused by them to the detriment of public interest and public good. When.a situation as envisaged in· one of the three clauses of the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 arises and the reievant clause is properly applied and the disciplinary inquiry dis"pensed with, the concerned govermnent

servant cannot be heard to complain that he is deprived of his livdihood. The livelihood of an individual is a matter of great concern to him and his family but hi.a livelihood is a matter of

his_private :i.nterest and where such livelihood is provided by the public exchequer and the taking away of such livelihood is in the public interest and for public good, the former must yield to the latter. 1hese consequences

follow

not

because

the

C

pleasure

doctrine is a special prerogative of the British Crown which has been inherited by India and transposed into our Constitution adapted to suit the Constitutonal set up of our Republic but· because public policy requires, public interest needs and public; good demands that there should be such.a doctrine.

It is thus clear that the pleasure doctrine embodied . in Article 310 (1), the protection afforded to civil servants by clauses (1) ana (2) of Article 311 and the withdrawal of the protection under clause (2) of Article 311 by the second proviso thereto are all provided in the Constitution on the ground of public policy and in the public interest and are for public good.

The Scope of the Pleasure Doctrine. ,, ··.·-,.., While under section 96B(l) of the Government of India Act of 1919 the holding of office in the civil service of· the Crown in India during His Majesty's pleasure was ·"Subject to the provisions of this Act and the .rules made thereunder", under section 240(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the holding of such office during His Majesty's pleasure was "Except as expressly provided by this Act". Similarly, the pleasure doctrine as enacted in Article 310(1) is not an absolute one and is not untrammelled or free of all fetters, but operates "Except as expressly provided by this (',onstitution." The constitutional restrictions on the exercise of pleasure under. Article 310(1) other than those contained in Article 311 will be considered later but what is innnediately relevant is the group of Articles consisting of Articles 309, 310 .and 311. These three Articl"s are interlinked and form an integrated whole .. There is an organic and thematic

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[1985] SUPP.2 S.C.R.

unity running through them and it is now necessary to see the interplay of these three Articles. These Articles occur in Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution. Part XIV is entitled "Services under the Union and the States" and Chapter I thereof is entitled "Services". While Article 309 deals with the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State, Article 310 deals

with the tenure of office or members of the defence services and

of civil services of the Union and the States and Article 311 provides certain safeguards to persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State but not to members of the defence services" The first thing which is required to be noticed about Article 309 is that it itself makes no provision for recruitment

or conditions of service of goverrnnent servants but confers power upon the appropriate Legislature to make laws and upon the President and the Governor of a State to make rules in respect of these matters. The passing of these Acts and the framing of

these rules are, however, made "Subject to the provisions of this

Constitution." This phrase which preceeds and qualifies the power conferred by Article 309 is significantly different from the qualifying phrase in Article 310(1) which is "Except as expressly provided by this Constitution". Wi.th reference to the words ''conditions of service" occurring in section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the conditions of service of the subordinate ranks of the

various police forces in India were to be determined Py or under Acts relating to those forces, the Judicial Connnittee of the Privy Council held in North-vest Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand, L.R. [1947-48] 75 I.A., 342, 352-3, that this expression included proVisions which prescribed the circumstances under which the employer would be ~ntitled to terminate the service of an employee, whether such provisions were constitutional or statutory. In State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Sbardul Singll, [1970] 3 S.C.K. 302, 305-6, this Court held that tl)e expression "condi-

tions of service" means all those conditions which regulate the holding o.f a post by a person right from the time of his appointment until his retirement and even beyond it in matters like pension etc. and would include the right to dismiss such personll from service. Thus, as pointed out in Sardari Lal v. Union of India & Ors., [1971] 3 s.C.R. 461, 465, a law can be

•

u.o.I; v. TULSIRAll [MADON, J. J

made by the appropriate Legislature or a rule by the appropriate executiveuruler Article 309 prescribing the procedure and the authority by whom disciplinary action can be taken againat a government servant. Thus the functions with respect to the' civil service which in England until 1968 were being performed by the Treasury and thereafter by the Civil Service Department and from mid-November 1981 are bei;:ig performed partly by the Treaaury and

partly 'by the Management & personnel Office are in. India under

Article 309 of the Constitution to be performed with respect to not only persons employed in civil capacities but with respect to all-persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State by.authorities appointed under or specified in Acts made under Article ·309 or rules made under such Acts or made under the proviso to that Article. As

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the making of such laws and the framing of such rules

are subject to the ·provisions of the Constitution, if any such

Act or rule, violates any of the provisions of the Conatitution, it would be void· Thus,. as held in lloti llam Deka 's case (supra), i f any such Act or rule trespasses upon the rights guaranteed to goverruneni: servants by Article 311, it would be void. Similarly,

such Acts and rules _cannot abridge or restri,ct the pleasure of

the President or the Governor of a State exercisable under Article 310(1) further than what the Constitution has expressly done• In .the same way, such Act or rule would be void if it violates any ·Fundamental Right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Two instances of this may be given by way of illustration. In Kameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. 'lhe State of B1bar & Anr·, (1962] Supp. 3 s.c.R. 369, Rule 4A of the Bihar Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956, insofar as it prohibited any form of demonstration was struck down by this Court as being violative of sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (1) of Article 19. In G.K.Gbose awl another v. E.X •.Joseph, [1963] Supp. l s.c.R. 789, this court struck down Rule 4A of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, on the ground that it violated sub-clause (c) of clause (l) of Article 19 of the Constitution and that portion of Rule 4A which prohibited participation.in any demonatration as being violative of Sub-Clauses (a) and (b) of clause (1) of Article 19. Further, the application of . article 309 is exclUded by certain provisions of the Conatitution itself which empower authorities other than those specified in Article 309 to make appointments or to make rules relating to the conditiona of

service of certain classes of public service, such as, Article

146(1) with respect- to the officers and servants of the Supreme _H_

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1985] SU~P.2 s.c.R.

Court, Article 148(5) with respect to persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department, Article 229 with respect to the offic.ers and servants of the High Court, and Article 324(5) with rnspect of Election Commissioners and Regional Connnissianers. Whkh would be the appropriate Legislature to enact laws or -the apprllpriate authority to frame rules would depend upon the

C

provisior.s of the Constitution with respect to legislative competence and the division of legislative powers. Thus, for instance, under Entry 70 in List I of the Seventh Shedule to the Constl.tution, Union Public Services, all-India Services and Union Pulic Service Conunission are subjects which fall within the exclusive legislat:lve field of Parliament, while under· Entry 41 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, State Public Services aod State Public Service Conmission fall within the exclusive legislative field of the State Legislatures. The rules framed by the Presi.dent or the Governor of a St.ate must also, therefore, conform to these legislative powers. It is, however,

not nece,ssary that the Act of a.'1 appropriate Legislature should . specifically deal with a particular service. It is sufficient if it is au Act as contemplated by Article 309 by which provision is made regulating the recruitment and conditions in a service (see llam Pal Cbaturvedi v. State of Rajastban and others.), [1970] 2 s.c.R. 0•59,564. It was at one time thought that the right of a government servant to recover arrears of salary fell within the ambit of the pleasure·· doctrine and a servant of the Crown, therefore, cannot

sue for his salary, it being a bounty of the Crown and not a contractual debt. Thl.s was so stated in the judgment of Lord Blackburn in the Court of Session (the supreme civil court of Scotland) in the case of Mulveniia v. The lldlliralty., [1926] s.c. (i.e. Sessions Cases) 842. ·Relying heavily upon this decision, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in High Conmissioner for India and High Comnissioner for Pakistan v.

I.K. Lall., L.R.

[1947-48J 75 I.A. 225, 243-4, though it held that Lall's dismissal was contrary to section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, negatived his calim for arrears of pay. In The State of Bibar ,,. Abdul Majid, [1954j s.c.R. 786, a Constitution Bench of this Court pointed out that the attention of the Judicial .Conmittee was not drawn to section 60 and the other relevant

provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908,

and

that

the

. rule of English law that a Crown servant cannot maintain a suit

against the Crown for recovery

of

arrears

of

Salary did not

u.o.r. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.]

prevail in India as it had been negatived by the provisions of statutory law in India. It may be mentioned that in its subsequent decision in Chelliah Kodeeswaran V• Al:toruey-General of Ceylon in appeal from the Supreme Court' for Ceylon, the Judicial Colllllittee held that Lord Blackburn's reasoning in Mulveona 's case had not been concurred· in by the other two members· of the Scottish Court of Session, namely, Lord Sands and Lord Ashmore, and had not been subsequently treated in Scotland as correctly laying down the law and that it was defective and the conclusion reached by Lord Blackburn was contrary to authority and was wrong. It further pointed out that there W<:!-S a current of aut_hority for a hundred years before 1926 (that being the year in which Mulvenoa's case was decided) to the effect that the arrears of salary of a civil ·servant of the Crown; as distinguished .from

a member of the armed services, constituted a deb~ recoverable by a petition of right. According to the Privy Council, as the relevant and prestigious authorities to the contrary, did not appear to have been cited before the Judicial Committee in I.all's case, this part of the judgment is that case must be 'regardej as

given per incuriam. As seen earlier, in India for the first time a fetter was imposed upon the pleasure of the Crown to terminate the service of any of its servant by secton 96B of the Government of India Act, 1919, but that was only with respect to the authority which could dismiss him. In that section the holding of office "during His Majesty's pleasure" was made subject to both the provisions of that Act and the rules made thereunder. Under the Government of India Act 1935, the reference to the rules to be made under the Act was omi.tted and the tenure of office of a civil servant was to be "during His Majesty's pleasure except as expressly provided" by that Act. Article 310(1) adopts the ·same phraseology as in section 240 of the 1935 Act. Under it also the hold. ing of an office is during the pleasure of the President or the Governor ;'Except as expressly provided by this Constitution!'. Therefore the only fetter which is Placed on the exercise of such pleasure is when it is expressly so provided in- the Constitution itself, that is, when there is an express proviso_ in that be.half in the. Constitution. Express provisions in that behalf are to be found _in the case of certain Constitutional functionaries in respect. of whose tenure special provision is ma.de "in the Constitution as, for instance, in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 with respect to Judges of the Supreme Court, Article 218 with respect to Judges of the High Court, Article 148(1) with respect to the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, Article 324(1/

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[1985] SUPP.2 S.C;R.

with respect to the Chief Election Commissioner, and Article 324(5) with respect to the Election Commissioners and Regional Conmissioners.

Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 impooe restrictions upon the exercise by the President or the Governor of a State of his pleasure under Article 310(1). These are express provisions with respect to termination of service by dismissal or removal as also with respecct to reduction in ran.1< of a civl.l servant and thus come within the ambit of the expression "Except as expressly provided by this Constitution" qualifying Article 310(1). Article 311 is thus an exception to Article 310 and was described in Parabottia Lal lllingra v. Union of india, [1958] s.c.R. 820,829, as operating as a proviso to Article 310(1) though set out. in a separate Article. Article 309 is, however, not such an exception. It does not lay down any express provision which would derogate from the amplitude of the exercise of pleasure under Article 310(1). It merely ·confers upon the appropriate Legislature or executive the power to make laws and frame rules but this power is made subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, Article 309 is subject to Article 310(1) and any provision restricting the exercise of the pleasure of the President or Governor in an Act or rule made or frame under Article · 309 not being an express provision of the Constitution, cannot fall within the expression "'Except as expressly provided by this Constitution"' occurring in Article 310(1) and would be in conflict with Article 310(1) and must be held to be unconstitutional. Clauses (l) and (2) of Article 311 expressly restrict the manner in which a Government servant can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank and unless an Act made or rule framed under Article 309 also conforms to these restrictions, it would be void· The restriction placed by ·clauses (l) and (2) of Article 311 are two : (l) with respect to the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a government servant provided for in clause (l) of Article 311; and (2) with respect to the procedure for dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a government servant provided for in c1Ause(2). The second proviso to Article 311(2), which is the central point of controversy in these Appeals and Writ Petitions, lifts the restriction imposed by Article 311(2) in the cases specified in the three clauses of that proviso.

None of these three Articles (namely, Articles 309,310 and 311) sets out the grounds for dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a government servant or for imposition of any other penalty upon him or states what those other· penalties are.

U.O.I. v. TUU>IRAM [MADON, J.]

These are matters which are left to be dealt with by Acts and rules made under Article 309. There are two classes of penalties in servi.ce jurisprudence, usmely, minor penalties and major penalties. Amongst mi.nor penalties are censure, with holding of promotion and with holding of increments of pay. Amongst major penalties are dismissal or removal from service, compulsory retirement and reduction in rank. Minor penalties do not affect the tenure of a government servant but the penalty of dismissal or removal does because these two penalties bring to an end the service of a government servant. It is also now well established that compulsory retirement by way of penalty amounts to removal from service. So this penalty also affects the tenure of a government servant. Reduction in rank does not terminate the employment of a government servant, and it would, therefore, be difficult to say that it affects the tenure of a government servant. It may however, be argued that it does bring to an end the holding of office in a particular rank and from that point of view it affects the government servant's tenure in the rank from which he is reduced. It is ullllecessary to decide this point because Article 311(2) expressly gives protection as against the penalty of reduction in rank .also.

&ercise of Pleasure A question which arises in this coIU1ection is whether the pleasure of the President or the Governor under Article 310(1) is to be exercised by the Preside~t or the Governor personally or it can be exercised by a delegate or some other authority empowered under the Constitution or by an Act o.r Rules made undet" Article 309. This question came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in llahu Baa Upadhya 's caae. The majority of the Court (speaking through Subba Rao, J., as he then was) stated (at page 701) the conclusions it had reached in the form of seveo propositions. These propositions are : (1) In India every person who is a member of a oublic service described in Article 310 of the Constitution holds office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, subject to the express provisions therein. ( 2) The power to dismiss a pOblic servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Article 154 and, therefore, cannot be delegated by the Governor to a subordinate officer, and can be exercised by him only in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.

ll

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[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

(3) This tenure is subject to the limitations or qualificatiens mentioned in Article 311 of the Constitution. (4) The Parliament or the Legislatures of States cannot make a law abrogating or modifying this tenure so as to impinge upon the overriding power conferred u~n the President or the Goovernor under Article 310, as qualified by Article 311. (5) The Parliament or the Legislatures of States can of service of such a member which includes proceedings by way of disciplinary action, without affecting the powers of the President or the Governor under Article 310 of the Constitution read with Article 310 of the Constitution read with Article 311 thereof.

make a law regulating the conditions

(6) The Parliament and the Legislatures also can make a law laying down and regulating the scope and content of the doctrine of'reasonable opportunity' embodies in Article 311 of the Constitution; but the said law would be subject to judicial review. (7) If a statute could be made by Legislatures within the foregoing permissible limits the rules made by an authority in exercise of the power confet;red thereunder· would likewise be efficacious within the said limits; · The question came t be reconsidered by a larger Bench of Seven Judges in Moti Rall Ileka's case. While referring to the judgment of the majority in Babu Ram Upadbya 's case the Court observed as follows (ai pp.731-2) :

."What the said Judgment has held is that while Article 310 .provides for a tenure at pleasure of the President

or the Governor, Article 309 enables the legislature

oi:' the executive·, as the case may be, to make any law ol: r:ule in ·regard inter alia, to conditions of service

.wi:thout impinging upon theoverriding power recognised under Article 310• Ill other words, in exercising the pmier conferred by Article 309, the extent of the · plli1tsure recognised by Article 310 cannot be affected, oi... im.Paireci..

In fact, while stating the conclusions

u.0.1. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.]

in· the form of propositions, the said judgment has observed that the Parliament or the Legislature can make a law regulating the conditions of service without affecting the powers of the President or the Governor under Article 310 read with Article 311. It has also been stated at the same place that the power to dismiss a public ser,ant at plesure is outside the scope of Article 154 and, therefore, cannot be delegated by the Governor to a subordinate officer and can be exercised by him only in the manner·prescribed by the Corultitution. In the context, it would be clear that this latter observation is not intended to lay down that a law cannot be made under Arcicle 309 or a Rule. cannot be framed under the proviso to the said Article prescribing the procedure by which, and . the authority by whom, the said pleasure can be exercised. This observation which is mentioned as . proposition number(2) must be read along with the subsequent propositions specitied as (3),(4),(5) & (6). The only point made is that whatever is done under Article 309 must·be subeject to the pleaaure prescribed by Article 310." While we are on this point we may es well advert to the decision of this Court in Sardari Lal v. Union of India & Ors. In that case it was held that where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, if satisfied, makes an order under clause (c) of What ·ts now the second proviso to Article 311(2) that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry for ·dismissal or removal or reduction in rank of. an officer the satisfaction of the President or the Governor must be his personal satisfaction. The correctness of this view was COl)8idered by a sevP.n Judge Bench of this Court in Shmeber SiDgb & Anr. V• State of Punjab, [1975] l S.C.R. 814, It was categorically stated in that case(at page 835) that the majority view in llahu Baa llpadhya's case was no longer. goods law after the decision in Motl Dalla 's csse. Referring to these two cases the Court observed (at pages 834-5)) : "This Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Babu llaa Upadhya [1961] 2 s.c.R. 679 held that the power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure, subject to the provision of Article 311, is not an executive power under Article 154 but a Constitutional power and is net capable of being delegated to officers subordinate

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to him. The effect of the judgment in Babu Bam Upadhya's case(supra) was that the Governor couid not delegate his pleasure to any officer nor could any law provide for the exercise of that pleasure by an office with the result that plesure by any officer with the

binding on every officer though they were subject to the overriding pleasure of the Governor. This would mean that the officer was bound by the Rules but the Governor was not.

re.sult that statutory rules governl.ng dismissal are

Iri Babu Ram Upadhya 's case( supra} the majority view stated seven propositions at page 701 of the report. Proposition No. 2 is that the power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Article 154 and therefore cannot be, delegated by the Governor to a subordinate officer and can be exercised by him only in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. Propositions No. 3 and 4 are these. The· tenure of a public servant is subject to the limitations or qualifications mentioned in Article 311 of the Constitution. The Parliament or the Legislatures of States cannot make a law abrogating or modifying this tenure so as to impinge upon the overriding power conferred upon the President or the Governor under Article 310 as qualified by Article 311. Proposition No. 5 is that the Parliament or the Legislatures of States can make a law regulating· the conditions of service of such a member which includes proceedings by way of disciplinary action, without affecting the poliers of the President or ~he Governor under Article ~10 of the Constitution read with Article 311. Proposition No. 6 is that the Parliament and the Legislatures also can make a law laying down and regulating the scope and content of the.doctrine of 'reasonable opportunity' embodied in Article 311, but the said law would be subject to judicial review.

All these propositions were reviewed by the majority opinion of this Court in lloti llalll lleka's case (supra} and this Court restated that proposition No. 2 must be read along with the subsequent propositions specified ;iS propositions No. 3,4,5 and 6. The ruling in Moti Ilam Deka' s case (supra) is that a law can be

framed ·prescribing the procedure by which and the

u.o.I. v. TULSIR/IM [MADON, J · 1

audiority by' whom. the said pleasure can be exercised. lbe pleasure of the President or the Governor to di w;;f ss can therefore not only be delegated but is also subject to Article 311. The true position as laid down in Motl Ram lleka's case (supra) is that Article~ 310 and 311 nrust no doubt be read together but once the true scope and effect of Article 311 is determined the scope of Article 310(1) nrust be limited .in the s&nse that in regard to cases falling under Article 311(2) the pleasure mentioned in Article 310(2) 1111St be exercised in ·accordance with the requireuents of

Article 311.

lbe majority view in Babu Ram Upadhya' s case (supra) is no longer good law after the declSiou in lloti Ram Deka's case (supra). The theory that only the President or the Governor is personally to exercise pleasure of dismissing· or removing a public servant is repelled by express words on Article 311 that no person who is a member of the civil service o' holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The words 'dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he' was appointed' indicate that the pleasure of the President or the Governor is aercised by such office>"s OD whom the President: or the Governor confers. or delegates pcllff!r•" (Emphasis supplied) The Court then stated its conclusion as follows (at page 836) : "For the foregoing reasons we hold that the President or the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of .Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head in the case of the .Union and the Chief Minister at the head in the case of State in all matters which vest in the executive ·whether those functions are executive or legislati_ve in character. Neither the President nor the GoVernor is to exercise the executive functions personally."

The position, therefore, is that the pleasure of the President or the Governor -is not required. to be exercised- by either of

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[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

them personally, and that is indeed obvious from the language of Art.icle 311. Under clause (1), of that Article a govermnent servant cannot be dismissed or removed by an authoriy subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The question of an authority equal or superior in rank to the appointing authority cannot arise if the power to dismiss or remove is to be exercised by the President or the Gnvernor personally. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 equally makes this clear when the power to dispense with an inquiry is conferred by it upon the authority empowered to ~ismiss, remove or reduce in rank a goverrnnent servant in a case where such authority i~ satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasoP.ably practicable. to hold such inquiry, because if it was the personal satisfaction of the President or the Governor, the question of the satisfaction of any authority empowered to di&ini.ss or remove or reduce in rank a government servant would

not arise. Thus, though under Article 310(1) the tenure of a U

government · servant is at the pleasure of the President or the Governor, the exercise of such pleasure can be either by the

President or the Governor acting with the aid and on the advice of the Council of Ministers or by the authority specified in Acts made under Article 309 or in rules made under such Acts or made under the proviso to Article 309; and in the case of clause (c) of t.he second proviso to Article 311(2), the inquiry to be dispenced with not en the personal satisfaction of the President or the GOvernor but on his satisfaction arrived at with the aid and on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The &!cood Proviso to Article 311(2)

Clause (2) of Article 311 gives a constitutional mandate to the principles of natural justice and audi alteram partem rule by providing' that a person employed in a civil capacity under the Union or a State shall not be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank until after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and has been given a reason-

able opportunity of being heard in respect of thos~ charges. To

this extent, the pleasure doctrine enacted in Article 310(1) is

abridged because Article 311(2) is a express provision of Constitution.

the

This safeguard provided for a government servant

by clause (2)of Article 311 is,

however,

taken away when

the

second proviso to that clause becomes applicable. The safeguard

provided .by clause(l) of Article 311, however, remains intact and continues to be available to the government servant. The second

u.o.r. v. TULSIRAM LMAOON, J. J

proviso to Article 311(2) becomes applicable in the three cases mentioned in clauses (a) to (c)· of thst proviso. These cases are

(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which hss led to his

conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied thst for some reason, to be recorded by thst authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; and ( c )where the President or the Governor, as the .case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.

The Construction to be placed upon the second proviso and the scope and effect of thst proviso were much debated at the Bar. In Hira Lal Hattan Lal etc. v. State of U.P. · & Anr., [1973] Z S.C.R.SOZ this Court observed (at page 512) ; "In construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. All that we have to see at the very .outset is whst does thst provision say1 If the provision is unambiguous and i f from thst provision, the legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only when the legilsature intention is not clear. Ordinarily a proviso to a section is intended to take out a part of the main section for speci8.l treatment. It is not expected to enlarge the scope of the main section. · But cases have arisen in which this Court has held thst despite the fact thst a ~ro­ -vison is called proviSo, it is really a separate provision and the so called proviso hss substantially altered the main $ection." In Comnissiooer of Inccme Tax, lladras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd., [1973] 3 s.c.R. 662, this Court said (at page 669) :

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"A proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly and properly construed without attributing to it that effect. Further, if the language of the enacting part of the statute is plain and unambiguous and does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it, one cannot derive those provisions by implication from a proviso." The language of the second proviso is plan and unambiguous. The keywords in the second proviso. are "this clause shall not apply". By "this clause" is meant clause(2). As clnuse(2) requires an inquiry to be held against a government servant, the only meaning attributable to these words is that this inquiry shall not be held. There is no scope for any ambiguity in these words and there is no reason to given them any meaning different from the plain and ordinary meanJ,ng which they bear. The resultant effect of these words is that when a s~tuation eavisaged in any of the three clauses of the proviso arises and that clause becomes applicable, the safegusrd provided to a government servant by clause (2) is taken away. As pointed out earlier, this provision is as much in public interest and for public good and a matter of public policy as the pleasure doctrine and the safegusrds with respect to security of tenure contained in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. Before, however, any clause of the second proviso can come into play the condition laid down in it 11USt be saisfied" The condition for the application of each of these clauses is different. In.the case of clause (a) a government servant must be guilty of conduct deserving the penalty of dismi.ssal, removal or reduction in rank which conduct has led to him being convicted on a criminal. charge. In the case of clause (b) the disciplinary authority must be satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. In the case of clause ( c) the President or the Governor of a State, as the case 'may be, must be satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an inquiry. When these conditions can be said to be fulfilled will be discussed later while dealing separately with each of the three clauses. The paramount thing, hwever, to bear in mind is that the second proviso will apply only where the conduct of a government servant is such as he deserves the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. If the conduct is sueh as to deserve a punishment different from those mentioned above, the second proviso cannot come into play at all,

U.Q.I. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.]

because Article 311 (2) is itself confined only to these three penalties. Therefore, before denying a government servant his constitutional right to an inquiry, the first consideration.would be whether the conduct of the concerned government servant is such as justifies the penalty of disnmissal, removal or reduction in rank. Once that conclusion is reached and the condition specified in the relevant clause of the second proviso is satisfied, that proviso becomes applicable and the government servant is not entitled to an inquiry. The extent to which a government servant can be denied his right to an inquiry formed the subject-matter of considerable debate at the Bar and we, therefore, now turn to the question whether under <the second proviso to Article 311(2) even though the inquiry is dispensed with, some opportunity at least should not be afforded to the government servant to that he is not left wholly without protection. As most of the arguments on this Part of the case were coDJnOn to all the three.clauses of the second proviso, it will be convenient at this stage to deal at one place with all the arguments on this part of the case, leaving aside to be separately dealt with the other arguments pertaining only to a particular clause of the second proviso.

'Die Enent of Denial of Opportunicy uoder the Second Proviso

-

It was submitted on behalf of the government servants that an inquiry consists of several stages and, therefore, even where by the application of the second proviso the full inquiry is dispensed with, there is ·nothing to prevent the disciplinary authority from holding at least a minimal inquiry liecause no prejudice can because by doing so. It was further submitted that even though the three clauses of the second proviso are different in their content, it was feasible in the case of each of the three clauses to give to the government servant an opportunity of showing cause against the penalty proposed to be imposed so as to enable him to convince the disciplinary authority that the nature of the misconduct attributed to him did not call for his dism!ssal, r~val or reduction in rank. For instance, in a case falling under clause (a) the government servant can point out that the offence of which he was convicted was a trivial or a technical one in respect of which the criminal court had taken a lenient view and had sentenced him to pay a nominal fine or had given him the benefit of probation. Support for this submission was derived from Cballappan's case. It was further submitted that apart from the opportunity to show cause against the proposed penalty it was also feasible to give a further opportunity in the case of each of the three clauses though such opportunity in each_

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[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

case may not be identical. Thus, it was argued that the chargesheet or at least a notice informing the govermuent servant of .the charges against him and calling for his explanation thereto was always feasible. I.t was further argued that though under clause (a) of the second proviso an inquiry into the conduct which led to the conviction of the government servant on a criminal charge would not be necessary, such a notice would enable him to point out that it was a case of mistaken identity and he was not the person who had been convicted but was an altogether different individual. It was urged that there could be no practical difficulty in serving such charge-sheet to the

concerned govermnent servant because even if he were sentenced to

imprisonment, the charge-sheet or notice with respect to the proposed penalty cim always be sent to the jail in which he is serving' his sentence. So far as clause (b) is concerned, it was argued that even though it may not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, the explanation of the government servant can at least be asked for· with respect to the charges made against him so that he would have an opportunity of showing in his written reply that he was not guilty of any of those charges. It was also argued that assuming such government servant was absconding, the notice could be sent by registered post to his last known address .or ps.sted there. Similar arguments as in case of clause (b) were advanced with respect to clause (c). It was submitted that the disciplinary authority could never make up its mind whether to dismiss or remove or reduce in· rank a government servant unless such minimal opportunity at least was afforded to the government servant. Support for these contentions was sought to be derived from (l) the language of Article 311(2) and the implications flowing therefrOIIi, (2) the principle of natural justice including the audi alteram partem rule comprehended in Article 14, and (3) the lariguage certain rules mode either'under Acts referable to the Article 309 or made under the proviso to that Aiticle. We will consider the contentions with respect to each of these basis separately. So far as Article 311(2) was c.oncerned, it was said that the language of tbe second proviso did not negative every single opportunity which could be afforded to a government servant under different situations though the nature of such opportunity may be different depending upon the circumstances of the case. It was further submitted that the object of the Article 311(2) was that no government servant should be condemned unheard and dismissed or removed or reduced in rank without affording him at least some chance of either showing his innocence or convincing

..•

"

U.O.I. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.)

the disciplinary authoirty that the proposed penalty was too drastic and was uncalled for in his case and a lesser penalty should, therefore, be imposed upon him. These arguments, though. attractive at the first blush, do not bear scrutiny. The language of the second proviso to Article 311(2) read in ·the light of the interpretation placed upon clause (2) of Article 311 as orginally enacted and the legislative history of that clause wholly rule out .the giving of any opportunity. While construing Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and the phrase "a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the acfon proposed to be taken in regard to him" occurring in sub-section (3) of section 240 of the Govermnent of India Act, 1935, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Lall 'a case stated as follows (at page 242-3) :

•

"\

"... sub-s. 3 of s. 240. was not· intended to be, and wss not, a repr-0duction of pile 55, which was left unaffected as an administrative rule. ·Rule 55 is concerned that the civil servant shall be . informed 'of the grounds .on which it is proposed to take action, ' and to afford him an adequate opportunity of def ending himself against charges which have to be reduced to writing; this is in marked contrast to the statutory provision of 'a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him·' In the opinion of their Lordships, no action is proposed within the meaning of the sub-section until a definite conclusion has been come to on the charges, and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on. Before that stage, the charges are unproved -and the suggested punishments are . merely hypothetical. It is.on that stage being reached that the statute gives the civil servants the opportunity for which sub-s.3 makes provision. Their .Lordships would only add that they see no difficulty in the statutory opportunity being reasonably afforded at more that one stage. If the civil servant has been through an inquiry under· rule 55, it Would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out, but that would not exhaust bis statutory right, and he would still be entitled to represent .ag8illst the punishment proposed as the result of the findings of the inquiry. On this v.iew of the proper cOnstruction of .sub-s.3 of s.240, it is

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not disputed that the respondent has not been given the opportunity to which he is entitled thereunder, and the purported removal of the respondent on August 10,1940, did not conform to the mandatory requirements of sub-s.3 of s.240, and was void and inoperative."

The very phrase "a reasonable opportunity of stowing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him" in subsection(3) of section 240 of the Government of India Act,1935, was repeated in clause (2) of Article 311 as originally enacted, that is in the said clauses prior too its amendment by the Constituton (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. Approving the construction placed by the Judicial Committee upon this phrase, this Court in Khan Chand v. 'lbe Union of India & Ors. [1958] s.c.R. 1080, held as follows (at page 1095-97) :

C

"It is true that the provision does not, in terms, refer to different stages at which opportunity is ,to be given to the officer concerned. All that it says is that the government ·servant must· be given a reason-

able opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. He must not only be given an opportunity but such opportunity must be a reasonable one. In order that the opportunity to show cause against the proposed action may be regarded as a reasonable one, it is quite obviously necessary that the government servant should.have the opportunity, to say, if that be his case, that he has not been guilty of any misconduct to merit any punishmen.t at all and also that the particular punishment proposed to be given is much more drastic and servere than he deserves. Both these pleas have a direct bearing on the question of punishment and may well be put forward in showing cause against the proposed punishment. If this is the correct meaning of the clause, as we think it is, what consequences follow?·

If it is open to the government servant under this provision to contend, if that be the fact, that he is

not guilty of any misconduct then how can he take that plea unless he is told what misconduct is alleged against him? If the opportunity to show cause is to be a reasonable one it is clear that he should be informed about the charge or charges levelled against him and the evidence by which it is sought to be established, for it is only then that he will be able

r'

u.o.r .. v. TULSIRAM [!:ADON, J.]

to put forward his defence. If the purpose of this provision is to give the government servant an oppor-

tunity to exonerate himself from the charge and if this opportunity is to be a reasonable one he should be allowed to show that the evidence against him is not worthy of credence or consideration and that he can only do if he is given a chance to cross-examine the witnesses called against him and to examine himself or any other witness in support of his defence. All this appears to us to be implicit in the language used in the clause, but this does not exhaust his rights. In addition to showing that he has not been guilty of any misconduct so as to lllt<rit any punishment, it is re.asonable that he should also have an opportunity to contend that the charges proved against him do not necessarily require the particular punishment proposed to be meted out to him. He may say for instance, that althoii.gh he has been guilty of some misconduct it is not of such a character as to merit the extreme punishments of .dismissal or even of removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments ought to be sufficient in his case.

To summarise : the reasonable opportunity envisages by the provision under consideration includes. E

(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and "the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by e.x.amin-

i"

ing himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence ; and filially (c) !'n opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent auth~rity, after the enquiry is over ,and after applying his. mind

to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved

against the government servant tentatively proposes to

inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to. the government servant.

In short the

substance of the protection provided by rules,

like

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rule 55 referred to above, was bodily lifted out of the rules and together with an additional opportunity embodied in s.240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 so as to give a statutory protection to the government servants and has now been incorporated in Article 311(2) so as to convert the protection into a constituional safeguard." While the Judicial Coomittee in Lall' s case held that two opportunities were required - one under rule 55 of the Civil ServiCes (Classification,,Control and Appeal) Rules to show cause against the charges of misconduct made against a government servant, and the other under sub-section ·(3) of section 240 of the Government of InJia Act, 1935, to shoW cause against the proposed penalty, this Court in Kbem a.an.I's case held that Article.311(2) bodily lifted the said rule 55 and the additional opportunity provided for in section 240(3) of the 1935 Act and incorp<lrated· these provisions in Article 311(2) so as to convert the protection afforded to governinent servants into a constitutional safeguard. This conclusion was reached by this Court even though Article 311(2) used the same language as section 240(3). The Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, substituted the whole of clause (2). The substituted clause specifically .provided for two opportunities to be given to a government servant :(1) to be informed of the charges against him and to be given a · reasonable opportunity of defending himself against those charges, and (2) a reasonable opportunity of making representation· on the penalty proposed where after such inquiry it was proposed to impose on him the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. No additional rights were, however, conferred upon government servants by the above amendment because it merely. declared the rights which a government servant already possessed under the original clause (2) of Article 311 as interpreted by this Court in 'lbea. Cland's case. This amendment, therefore, was

merely declaratory, but in a way it was also clarificstory ·because it restricted the right of representation on the proposed penalty to a representation only on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry. This clarification perhaps became necessary because, as pointed out'by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. 1be University of Kerala & Ors. [1969 J 1 s.c.R. 317, 326., there prevailed an erroneous imppression in certain quarters, evidently influenced by the provisions of the unamended Article 311(2) that every disciplinary proceeding llll.lSt consist of two. inquiries, one before issuing a show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter~ · This amendment, there. fore, made it expressly clear that the inquiry to be held against

u.o.i. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J. J

a government servant was to be one in which a charge-sheet or a show-cause notice was to .be issued to him informing him of the charges against him and giving him a resonable. opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and a further opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed on him but only on the basis of the evidence · adduced during such inquiry. The substituted cliuse, therefore, showed thst the issue of a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in respect of the charges framed against a government servant and a notice to show cause against the proposed penalty were part of the inqUiry contemplated by Article 311 (2). Even assllllling for the sake of argument that because Article 311(2), as substituted by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, spoke of "a reasonable oppol:tunity of making representation .on the penalty proposed" in a case "Where it is proposed, after such inquiry, ·to impose on him any such penalty", ·the show ·cause notice with respect to penalty was not a part of the inquiry, the opening· words of the proviso to claus.e (2) (now the second proviso to that clause) namely, "Provided further that this clause aball aot apply", would, Where any of the three clauses of the said .proviso applies, take away both the right to have an inquiry held in which the government servant would be entitled to a charge-sheet as also the right to make a representation on the proposed penalty. As mentioned above, the words "this clause shall not apply" are the keywords in the second proviso and govern each and every clause ·thereof and by reason of these words· not only the holding of an inquiry but all the provisions of clause (2) have been dispensed with.

a

I

~

The question which then arises is, "Whether the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, whic.h further amended the substituted clause (2) of Article 3il with effect from 1st January 19.77. has made any change 1n the law?" The ameodments made by this Act are that in clause (2) that portion which required a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty to be given to a government servant was deleted and in its place the first proviso was inserted, which expressly provides that it is not necessary to give to a delinquent government servant any opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty. lloes this affect· the opertion of· the original proviso which, by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, became the second proviso? Such obviously was not and could not have. been the intention ·of Parliament. The opening words of the second proviso remain the same except that the word 'further' was inserted after the word 'Provided', because the original proviso by reason of the insertion of another proviso before it became .

.B

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the second proviso. It souid be borne in mind that the showcause notice at the punislnnent stage was originally there as a result of the interpretation placed by the Judicial Committee in La.l's case and by this Court in Kbem Chand' s case upon the phrase "a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him". Clause (2) as substituted by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act merely reproduced the substance of what was held in Kliem Cband's c&se. The words which originally found a place in clause (2), "a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him", do not any more feature in clause (2). All that clause (2) now provides is an inquiry in which the government servant is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity · of being heard in respect of those charges. Clause (2) taken by itself even without the first proviso does not provide, expressly impliedly, for any opportunity to make a representation against the proposed penalty. After the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act this second opportunity formed a separate part of clause (2), which part was deleted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act. Thus, when the second proviso states in its opening words that "Provided further that this clause shall not apply" it means that whatever safeguards are to be found in clause (2) are wholly taken away in a case where any of the three clauses of the second proviso is attracted. In this connection, the following observations of this • Court in the Case of Suresh Koshy George V• 1be University of !Cerala &Ors.(at page 326-7) are pertinent : "There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quarters evidently influenced by .the provisions in Article 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that article that every disciplinary proceeding must consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of

the principles of natural

justice•

Law may or may not prescribe such a course."

In Associated Cement Calpaoies Ltd. v. T.C.Shrivastava & Ors., [1984] 3 S.C.R. 361,369, this Court held that "neither under the ordinary law of the land nor under industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary". Since a right to such opportunity does not exist in law, it follows that the only right which the government servant had to make a respresentation on the proposed penalty was to be found

~

u.0.1. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J. J

in clause (2) of Article 311 prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act. This right having been taken away by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, there is no provision of law under which a·govermnent servant can claim this right. As for the argument that in a case under clause (a) of the second proyiso a government servant could be worngly dismissed, removed or reduced in rank mistaking him for another with the same name unless he is given an opportunity of bringing to the notice of the disciplinary authority that he is not the individual who has been convicted, it can only be described as being too fanciful and far-fetched for though such a case of mistaken identity may be hypothetically possible, it is highly improbable. As in all other organizations, there is in government service an extremely active grapevi11e, both departmental and inter-departmental, which is constantly active, humming and buzzing with service news and office gossip, and it would indeed be strange if the· news that a member of a department was facing prosecution or had been convicted were to remain a secret for long. Assuming such a case occurs, the government servant is not without any remedy. He can prove in a departmental appeal which service rules provide for, ~ave in exceptional cases, that he has been wrongly mistaken for another. Similarly, it is not possible to accept the argument that unless a written explanation with respect to the charges is asked for from a government servant and his side of the case known, the penalty which would be imposed upon him, could be grossly out of proPQrtion to his actual misconduct. The disciplinary authorities are expected to act justly and fairly after taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case and if they act arbitrarily and impose a penalty which is unduly excessive, capricious or vindictive, it can be set aside in a departmental appeal. In any event, the remedy by way of judicial review is always open to a government servant. The position which emerges from the above discussion is that the keywords of the second proviso govern each and every clause of that proviso and leave no scope for any kind of opportunity to be given to a government servant. The phrase "this clause shall not apply" is mandatory and not directory. It is in .the nature of a Constitutional prohibitory injunction restraining the disciplinary authority from holding an inquiry under Article 311(2) or from giving any kind of opportunity to the concerned government servant• There is thus no scope for introducing into

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the second proviso some kind of inquiry or opportunity by a process of inference or implication. The maxim "expressum faclt cessare tacitum" ("when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded") applies to the case. A<i pointed out by this Court in B. Shankara Rao Badam & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Anr., [1969] 3 S.C.R. 1, 12, this well-known maxim is a principle of logic and common sense and no.t merely a technical rule of construction. The second proviso expressly mentions that clause (2) shall not apply where one of the clauses. of that proviso becomes· applicable. This express mention excludes everything that clause (2) contains and there can be no scope for once again introducing the opportunities provided by clause (2) or any one· of· them into the second proviso. · In Atkinson v. United States of America Government, L.R. (1971] A.C. 197, Lord Reid said (at page 232) :

"It is now well recognised that the court has power to· expand procedure laid down by. statute if that is ·necessary to prevent infringement of natural justice . and is not plainly contrary to the intention of· Parliament." Here, however, the attempt is not merely to do something contrary to the intention of "Parliament",. that is, in our case, the Constituent Assembli, but to do something contrary to an express prohibition contained in the Constitution. The conclusion which flows from the express language of the second proviso is·inevitable and .there is no escape from it. It may appear harsh but, as mentioned earlier, the second proviso has been inserted in the Constitution as a matter of public polfcy and in public interest and for public good just as the pleasure doctrine and the safeguards for a government servant provided in clause (1) and (2) of Article 311 have been. It is in public interest and for public good that government servant who has been convicted of a grave and serious offence or one rendering him unfit to continue in office should be summarily dismissed or removed from service instead of being allowed to continue in it at public expense and to public . detriment. It is equally in public interest and for public good that where his offence is such that he should not be permi ited to continue to hold the sa.., rank, that he should be reduced in rank. Equally, where a public servant by himself or in concert with others has brought about a situation in which it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry and his conduct is such as to justify his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, both public interest and · public good demand that such

u.o.r. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.]

penalty should forthwith·arul.swnmarily be imposed upon him; and similarly, where in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry, it is in the· public interest and for public good that where one of ·the three punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is called for ,it should be swnmarily imposed upon the concerned government servant. It was argued that in a case falling under clause (b) or (c), a government servant ought to be place under suspension until the situation improves or the danger to the security of the State has passed, as the case may be, and it becomes possible to hold an inquiry. This argument overlooks the fact that suspension involves the payment at least of subsistence allowance and ·such allowance is p&id at public expense, and that . neither public interst would be benefited nor public good served by placing such govenunent servant under suspension because it may take a considerable time for the situation .to improve or the danger to be over. Much as this may seem harsh and oppressive to a government servant, this Court must not forget that the object underlying the second proviso is public policy, · public interest and public good and the Court must, therefore, repel the· temptation to be carr.ied away by feelings of coomiseration and sympathy for those government servants who have been dismissed, removed or re_duced in rank by applying the second p_roviso. Sympathy and coomiseration cannot be allowed to out weigh c0nsiderations of. public policy, concern for public interest, regard for public good·and the premptory dictate of a· Constitutional ptohibition. The Court must bear· in mind that the second proviso has been in the Constitution since it was originally enacted. It was not blindly or slavishly copied from section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Article ·311 was article 282-B of the draft Constitution of India and the ·draft Aiticle 282-B was discussed and a considerable debate took place on it in the Constituent Assembly (see the ·official Report of the Constituent Assembly Debates, vol.1X, page 1099 to 1116). The greater part of this debate centred upon the proviso to clause . (2) of the draft article 282-B, which is now the second proviso to Articie 311. Further, the Court should also bear in mind that clause (c) of the second proviso and clause (3) of Article 311 did not feature ~n secion 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, but were new provisions conciously introduced by the Constituent Assembly in Article 311. Those who formed the Constituent Assembly were not ·the advocates of a despotic or dictatorial form of government. They were the persons who enacted into our Constitution the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. The majority of them had fought for freedom· and had suffered imprisonment in the cause of liberty

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and they, therfore, were not likely to introduce into our Consti tution any provision from the earlier Government of India Acts which had been intended purely for the benefit of a foreign imperialistic power. After all, it is not as if a government applied to him. There are two remedies open to him, servant is without any remedy when the se~ond proviso has been applied to him. There are two remedies open to him, namely, departmental appeal and judicial review. The scope and extent of these remedies will be considered later in the course of this judgment. Article 14 and the Seco1ld Proviso

The next question which false to be considered is, "Does Article 14 make any difference to the consequences which flow from the second proviso to Article 311(2)?" It ' was submitted on behalf of the government servants that Article 14 in which the principle of natural justice are comprehended permeates the entire Constitution and, therefore, Article 14 must be into the second proviso to Article 311(2) and according if not under that proviso read by itself, under it read with Article 14 a government servant is entitled to an opportunity both of showing cause against the charges made against him. as also against the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him, though such opportunity may not extend to the holding of a complete and elaborate inquiry as would be the case where clause (2) of Article 311 applies. According to learned Counsel this is what is required by the audi alteram partem rule which is one of the two main principles of natural justice. . In the alternative it was submitted that though an order may be valid and supportable under the second proviso to Article 311(2), it could none the less be void under Article 14 on the ground that the principles of natural justice have been wholly disregarded. These arguments are based upon an imperfect understanding of the principles of natural justice in their application in courts of law to the adjudication of causes before them and the function of Article 14 vis-a-vis the other provisions of the Consti.tution and particularly the second proviso to Article 311(2).

read

The principles of natural justice are not the creation of Article 14. Article 14 is not their begetter but their Constitutional guardian. Principles of natural justice trace their ancestry to ancient civilizations and centuries long past. Until about two centuries ago the term "natural justice" was often used interchangeably with "natural law" and at times it is still so used. The expression "natural law" has been variously defined.

U.Q.I. v. TULSIRAM [ll'JXJN, J.]

ln Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law (Second Edition, page 1221) it is defined as "rules derived from. God, reason or nature, as distinct from man-made law." Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition, page 9l5) states : "Tb.is expression, 'natural law' ,or jus naturale, was largely used in the philosophical speculations of the Roman jurists of the Antonine age, and was intended to denote a system of rules and principles for the guidance of human conduct which, independently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar to any one people, might be discovered by the rational intelligence of :man, and would be found to grow out of an conform to his nature, meaning by that word his whole mental, moral, and physical constitution. The point of departure for this conception was the stoic doctrine of a life ordered 'according to nature', which in its turn rested upon the purely supposititious existence, in primitive tl.mes, of a

'state of nature;' that is, a condition Of society in which men universally were governed solely by a rational and consistent obedience to the needs, impulses, and promptings of their true nature, such nature befng as yet undefaced by dishonesty, falsehood, or indulgenc~ of the baser passions. In ethics it consists in practical universal judgments which· man himself elicits. These express necessary and obligatory rules of human conduct which have been established by the author or human nature as essential to the divine purposes in the universe and have been promulgated by God solely through human reason".

There are certain basic values which man has cherished through tout the ages. But man looked about him and found the ways of men to be cruel and unjust and .so also their. laws and customs. He saw men flogged, tortued, mutilated, made slaves, and sentenced to row the galleys or toil in the darkness of the mines or to fight in an arena with wild an hungry beasts of the jungle or to die in other ways a cruel, horrible and lingering death. He found judges to pe venal and servile to those in power and the laws they administered to be capricious, changing with the whims of the ruler to suit his purpose. When, therefore, he found a system of law which did not so change, he praised it. Thus, the old Testament in the Book of Esther (I,19) speaks

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admiringly of legal system 'of the Achaemenid dynasty (the First Persian Empire) in which "a royal colllllandment" was "written among the laws of the Persians and the Medes, that ·it be not altered." Man saw citie• and towns sacked and pillaged, their populace dragged into captivity and condemned to slavery - the men to labour, the women and the girls to concubinage, and the young boys to be castrated into eunuchs - their only crime being that their ruler had the misfortune to be defeated in battle and to lose one· of his cities or towns to the enemy. Thus, there was neither hope nor help in man-made· laws or man-established customs for they were one-sided and oppressive, intended to benefit armed might and monied power and to subjugate ·the down-trodden poor and the helpless needy. If there was any help to be found or any hope to be discovered, it was only in a law based on justice and reason ·which transcended the laws and customs of men, a law made by some one greater and mightier than those men who made these laws and established these customs. Such a person could only be a divine being and such a law could only be "natural law" or "the law of nature" meaning thereby "certain rules of conduct supposed to .be so just that they are binding upon all mankind." It was not "the law .of nature " in the sense of "the law of the jungle"' where the lion devours the lamb and the tiger feeds upon the antelope because the lion is hungry and the tiger famished but a higher lal" of nature or "the natural law" where the lion and the lamb lie down together and the tiger frisks with the antelope. Most, H not all, jurists are agreed that "reason" and "the nature of man" constitute the fountain-head of natural law but there· is a considerable divergence of opinion amongst them as . also amongst philosophers about the nature and meaning of that law and its relation to positive law. Among the ancients Greeks the Sophists, Artistotle in his ·treatises on "Logic" and Ethics", and the Stoics developed different theories. The theo.ry propunded by Aristotle in his "Logic" adhered substantially to the point of view of the SophiSts, namely, that man is a natural creature but is also endowed With reason. Later, in his "EthiCs", Aristotle came to. distinguish between natural and legal or conventional justice and postulated that natural law had authority everywhere and WB;S discoverable by the u·se of reason. The ancient Romans were not given to philosophical speculati.ons or creative orignality in Art. They preferred to borrow these from the . Greeks.. The Romans were a hard-headed, pract1cal race of conquerors, administrat.ors and legis.lators. ROman jurists, there-· fore, used the concept of natural law, that is jus naturale (or ius naturale as the Romans wrote it because Roman alphabet had no

u.o.r. .v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.] letter "J" or "J" in it) to

introduce into the body of law those

parts of laws .and customs of foreigners, that is, non-Roman people with whom. they came if!. commercial contract or whom they

subJugated. The Rules which the Romans borrowed from these laws and customs were those which were capable of general application and they developed then into general legal principles, which came to form jus gentium or the law of nations. In doing so they acted upon the principle that any rule of law which was common to the nations (gentes) they knew of· must be basically in consonance with reason and, therefore, fundamentally just. They applied.jus · gentium to those to whom ius civile (civil law) did not apply, that is, in cases between foreigners or between a Roman Citizen

and a foreigner. On this basic formulation that what was common to all known nations must . be in con8onance with reason and justice, the Roman jurists and magistrates proceeded to the theory that any rule which instinctively commanded itself to the sense of justice and reason would be part of the jus gentium. The jus gentium of the Romans was different from what we call international law and should not be confused with it, for the

scope of the jus gentium was much wider than our international

law. Becau5e of the theory of its identity with justice and reason, the terin u jus gentium" came ~t times to be used ·for . aequitas, that ,is, equity as understood by the Romans, which was the bas.is of praetorian law or the power of. the praetors to grant remedies where non. existed under the .jus civile~ In the Dark

Ages the expression "natural law" acquired a theological base and the Fathers of the Church, particularly St. Ambrose, St. Augustine and St. Gregory, held the belief that it was the function of the Church to bring about the best possible approximation of human laws to Christian principles. As Europe emerged .

from the Dark Ages

in about . the ninth century,

Christianity

became substitued for reason as the supreme force· in the universe, and this led to the development of a theory of law in

which Christianity had the supreme spiritual and legal force and was superior to all other laws , with the Church as the authentic expositor of the law of nature. Gratian (Francisco Graziano) in the .twelfth century in his "Decretum" or "Concordies discordantium. canonum." consider the law of nature· as pal:-t of the law of

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God. According to St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-74), na·tural law was derived from the law of God which was supreme and such of it as was intelligible to men was revealed through Church law as the incorporaiion of divine wisdom. Thus, according to this Theory, natural law Was that part of divine law which revealed itself in natural rea$on, and man as a reasonable being applied this. part of divine law to human affairs. This theory, though it up.held

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the supreme authority of the Church, made some concession to the authority of the Emperor, that is, the Holy Roman Emperor. Dante ·in his "De MonarcW.a" championed the supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire aS-against the Church on the ground that the Emperor was the legitimate successor of the Roman people and was chosen by God to rule the world. The authority. of the law of nature or natural law was repeatedly sought support from during the centuries which saw the struggle for supremacy between the Popes and the General Councils of the Church and between the Popes and the Emperors and later in the struggle between the Catholics and the Protestants. Both sides in these conflicts found in natural law the interpretation of scriptural texts which supported their respective views and we.re, therefore, according to them, the true interpretation.

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Braction,

in the thitteenth century, however,

considered natural law as that which nature, that is, God, teaches to all animals, and though he tried to reconcile natural law with human law, he acknowledged the difficulty of doing so because he found rules of positive law which c 0uld hardly be so reconciled •.. Natural law was also seized upon as furnishing arguments in the struggle between the judges and Parliament for supremacy

which took place in the seventeenth century. Coke in Dr, Bonham's caae [161UJ 8 Co. Hep. 113b,ll8, said by way of obiter, "when an Act of Parliament is against cori:unon right or reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adJudge such Act to be void." There were later assertions to the same effect until the supremacy of Parliament and the legislation enacted by it became firmly established in 1688. However, in British Railways Board v. Pick.in sub nomine Pickin v. British Hallways Board, L.R. [1974] A.C. 765, the argument was once again advanced before the House of Lords that a court was entitled to disregard a provision in an Act of Parliament and a

distinction was sought be drawn for th.is purpose between a public Act and a private Act. Refferring to the arguments to this point, Lord Reid observed (at page 782) :

"In

earlier times many learned lawyers seem to have

believed that an Act of Parliainent could be disregarded in so far as it was contrary to the law of God or the law of nature of natural justice, but since the

supremacy of Parliament was finally demonstrated by the Revolution of 1688 any S1.\Ch , idea has become obsolete."

u.o.i. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.]

Rejecting the above argument, the House of Lords unani.Inously held that the function of the court was to consider and apply the enactments of Parliament, and accordingly, in the course of litigation, it was not lawful to impugn the validity of a statute by seeking to establish that Parliament, in passing it, was misled by fraud or otherwise,.nor might a litigant seek to establish a claim in equity by showing that the other party, by fradulently misleading Parliament, had inflicted damage on him; for any investigation into the manner in which Parliament had exercised its function would or might result in an adjudication by the courts, brir.ging about a conflict with Parliament. As a result of the infusion of new ideas during the Renaissance and the Reformation, the intellectual a~thority of reason again came to be substituted for the spiritual authority of divine law as the basis of natural law. 'this new or rather resuscitated basis of natural law was laid by Grotius (Huigh de Groot) in his "De jure belli ac Pacis" - the precursor or of oodem public international law.- - -

Reason as the theoretical basis for nstu~al law, however, once again suffered a reversal at the hand of David Hume. According to Hume, only knowledge obtained by mathematical reasoning was certain; knowledge obtained from other sciences being only probable. liis theory of justice was that it served both an ethical <wd a sociological function. He contended that public utility was the sole nrigin of legal justice and the sole foundation of its merit, and that for a legal system to be useful, it must adhere to its rules even though it may cause injustice in particular cases. He did not make a formal analysis of lew but distinguished equity or the general system of morality, the legal order, and law, as a body of precepts. Accordi!)g to him, the authority of civil law modified the rules of ~tural justice ·according_ to the particular convenience of each community.

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Black.stone, however, in his "Commentaries on the laws of England" had this to say about natural law :

"This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It ts bindin;; over all the glove in all countries, and ·at all times : no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this ; and . such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."

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In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a reaction against natural law as the basis of law. The French Revolution had enthroned reason as a goddess. The excesses of the French Revolution, however, led to a reaction against the theory that·reason was the basis of law. The utilitarian view was that the basis for law was the practical inquiry as to what would most conduce to the general benefit. The spirit of scientific inquiry which pre-dominated the nirteteenth and twentieth centu~ies could not favour ·.hypotheses -which were vague and unprovable. In the twentieth century' disillusionment with . the theory that good could come out of the power of the State and positive law has, however, Once again brought about a revival· of interest in natural law.

Apart from providing the subject-matter for philosophical dissertations and speculative theories on the origin and attributes of natural law, ~he concept of natural law has made invaluable contribution to the development of positive law. It helped D to transform the rigidity .of the jus civile.of the Romans into a more equitable system based on the theory of the jus gentium. It ·provided arguments to both sides in the struggle during the Middle Ages· between the Popes and the Emperors • It inspired in the eighteenth century the· movement for codification of law in order to fo~late ideas derives from th~ concept of natural law into detailed rules. England, the idea of natural law and natural justices has influenced its law in several respects. The origin and development of equity in England owed much to natural law. It also served as the basis for the recognition or rejection of a custom.. It was looked to for support in the struggle for supremacy which took place between the. judges and Parliament in the seventeenth' century. The concept of natural law and. natural F rights influenced the drafting of the Constitution of. the United States of America and many of the amendments made thereto as also the Constitutions .of its various States. It has provide a basis for much of modern international law and International Conventions, Covenants and Declarations. Above all, it has enriched positive law by. introudcing into it the principles of natural G justice, divested of all their philosophical, metaphysical and theological trappings and disassociated from their identifica• tion with,.or supposed deriation from, natural law.

Natural justice has .been variously 4efined by different judges. A few instances will suffice. In .Drew v. Drew and Leburo (1855] 2 Macq. l,8, Lord Craworth defined it as "universal justice". .In Ja.es Dunbar Smith v. lier Majesty '!he Queen

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U.O.I. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.J

[1877-78] 3 App. Cas. 614,623 J.C., Sir Robert P.Collier, speaking for the Judicial Connnittee of the Privy Council, used the phrase "the requirements of substantial Justice", while in Arthur John Spacmlnnan V• The Plumstead District Board of Works L.R. [1884~85] 10 App.Gas. 229,240, Earl of Selbome, L.C., preferred the phrase "the substantial requirements of justice". In Vionet arul another v. Barrett arul another [1885] 55 L.J. Q .B.39,41, Lord Esher, M.R., defined natural justice as "the ·natural sense of what is right and wrong". While, however, deciding Hopkins arul another v. Smethwick Local Board of Health L.R. [1890] 24 Q.li.D. 71<,716, Lord Esher, M.R., instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet arul another v. Barret and another chose· to define natural justice as "fundamental justice". In Ridge v. Ba1dvi.n and others L.R. [1963] l. Q.B. 539,578, Harman, L.J., in the Court of Appeal equated natural justice with "fair play of action", a phrase favoured by llhagwati, .J., in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of lodia [1978] 2 s.c.R. 621,676. In re. H.K.(An Infant) L.k. [1967 j 2 Q.B.617,630, Lord Parker, C.J., preferred to describe natural justice as "a duty to act fairly". In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the EnvirOillllellt [1976] l w.1.R. 1255,1265-66, Lord kussell of Killowen somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as "a fair crack of the whip". While Geoffrey Lane L.J., in Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex parte Hcsenball [ 19 77 ] l

W.L.R. 766,784, preferred the homely

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phrase "comm0n fairness".

As some juc!ges, for instance, Ormond, L.J., in Lewis v. Hefter and others [1978] l W.L.R. 1061°,1076, have foundthe phrase "natural justice" to be "a highly attractive and potent phrase'' 1 it may not be out of place, in order to set the balance right, tO reproduce a passage, full of robust cotmnon sense and biting Irony, from the judgment · of Maugham, J •• , in Maclean v. the Workers Union L.R. [1929 j l Ch. 602,624. That passage is as follows :

..

"Eminent judges have at times used the phr~Se 'the of natural justice'. The phrase is, of course, used only in a popular sense and must not be taken to mean that there is any Justice natural among men. Among most savages there is no such thing as justice in the modern sense. In ancient days, a person wronged executed his own justice. Amongst our own ancestors, down to the thirteenth century, manifest felony, such as that of a manslayer taken with his weapon, or ?. thief with the ..stolen goods, might be

principles

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punished by summary execution without any form of trial. Again every student has heard or compurgation and of or deal; and it is hardly necessary to observe that (for example) a system of or deal by water in which sinking was the sign of innocence and floating the sign of guilt, a system which lasted in this country for hundreds of years, has little to do with modern ideas of justice. It is unnecessary to give further illustrations. The truth is that justice is a very elaborate conception, the growth of many centuries of civilization; and even now the conception ' differs widely in countries usually described as , civilized." In the Supreme Court of Ireland, Black.J., in William Green v. lsidore J, Blake and others [1948] I.R. 242, after referring tc the above passage from the judgment of Maugham, J., proceeded to state (at page 268) : ,·

"I agree, but what then does it mean?

choose,

describe

as

'natural'

every

We may, if we

evolutionary

advance in our conception of justice. But for me,

natural Justice means no more that justice without any epithet. I take the essentials of justice to mean those desiderata which, in the existing stage of our mental and moral development, we regad as essential 1 in contra-distinction from the many extra pracautions,

helpful to justice, but not indispensable ~o it, which, by their rules of evidence and procedure, our Courts have made obligatory in actual trials before themselves. Many advanced peoples have legal systems which do not insist on all these extra precuations, yet we would hardly say that they disregard the essentials of justice."

Megarry, J., also found it necessary to sound a note of warning in Hounslow London Borough Council v. Twickenlvna Garden Develop-

ments Ltd, L.R. [1971] Ch. 233, wherein he said (at page 259) : "'1be principles of natural justice are of wide application and great importance, but they 111JSt be confined within proper limits and not allowed to run wild."

(Emphasis supplied)

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Some judges have been faced witt) the contention as Maugham,

L.J., was in ErriDgton and others v. Minister of Health L.R. [1935] 1 K.B. 249,280, that "the principles of natural justice are vague and difficult to ascertain". Referred to such contentions Lord Reid said in Ridge v. llalchir:l.n and otheJ;s L.R. [1964] A.C, 40, on appeal from L.R. [1963] l Q.B. 539, (at page 64-65) :

"In modern times opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. But I would regard these as tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured therefore it does not exist. The idea of negligence is equally insusceptible of exact difin1tion, but what a reasoable man ·-1.d regard as fair procedure in particular · cirCWEtances and what be would regard as neg1geoce in particular cirCU11Stances are equally capable of serv:ill{; as tests in law, and natural justice as it bas been interpreted in t.be courts in much more definite than that. It appars to me that one reason why the authorities on natural justice have been found difficult to reconcile is that insufficient attention has been paid to the great difference between various kinds of cases in which it has been sought to •:>ply the principle." (Emphasis supplied) How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial intepretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasijudicial and~admiriistrative processes. They cQnstitute the basic elements of ·a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all ·men. The first rule is "nemo judex in causa sua" or "n~ debet esse judex in propria caliSa" asStated in 12 Co. Rep. 114, that is, "no man shall be a judge in his own cause". COke used the form "aliouis ~ debt ~ judex in propria causa quia ~ potest ease judex ~ ~ (Co. Litt. 14la), that is, "no man ought to be a judge in his own cause, because he cannot act as a judge and at the same time be a party". The form nemo potest esse simul aC:tor et judex", that is, "no one can be. at once suito~ judge" Ts also at times us~d. The second rule - and

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that is the rule with which are concerned in these Appeals and Writ Petitions - is "aud~ alteram partem". that is, "hear the other side". At times and particularly in continental countries the form "audietur et altera ~ is used, meaning very Dnlch the samething. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely, "'qui alliquid statuerit parte inaudita 31.tera, aequum licet dixerit, baud aequum fecerit". that is, "he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may ·have said what is right, will not have done what is right" (see llosveil's case) [1606] 6 Co. Rep. 48b,52a, or, in other words, as it is now expressed, "justice should not cnly be done but should manifestly be seen to be done."

The above two rules and their corollary are neither new nor were they ,the discovery of English judges. They were recognized

in may civilizations and over many centuries. Roman law recogniz-

ed the need for a judge to be impartial and not to have a personal interest in the case before him (Digest V.1.17) and Tacitus in his "Dialogus" referred to this principle. Under Roman law a judge who heard a cause in which he 'had an interest was liable as on a quasi-delict to the party prejudiced thereby (Justinian's.Institutes IV, 5 pr.;as also Justinian's Codex III, 5, 1). Even the Kiganda tribesmen of Buganda have an old proverb which literally translated means "a monkey does not decide an affair of the forest (see "law and Justice ih Buganda" by E.S. Haydo, p.333). The requirement of hellring both sides before arriving at a decision was part of the judicial oath in Athens. It also formed the subject-matter of a proverb which was often referred' ~o or quoted by Greek playwrights, as for instance, by Aritophanes in his comedy "The Wasps" and Euripides in his tragedies "Heracleidae" and "Andromache", and by Greek orators, for instance, Demosthenes in his speech "De Corona". Among the Romans, Seneca in his tragedy ''Medea" referred to the injustice of coming to a decision without a full hearing. In fact, the corollary drawn in Bo.....U 's case is taken from a line in Seneca's ''Medea"• In the Gospel according to St. John(vii,51), Nicodemus asked the chief priests and the Pharisees, "Doth our law judge any man, before it hear him, and know what he doeth?" Even the p~overb and ~ongs of African tribesmen, fOr instance, of the Lozi tribe in Barotseland refer to this rule (see "The Judicia Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia" by Max Gluckman, p.102.) The two rules "_nemo judex in~ sua" and "audi alteram

u.o.r. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.]

partem" and their corollary that justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done have been recognized from early days in English courts. References to them are to be found in the Year Books - a title preferred to the alternative one of

'

"Books of Years and Terms" - which were a regular series>

with a few gaps, of law reports in Anglo-,norman or Norman-French or a mixture of English, Norman-French and French, which had then become the court language, from the 1270s to 1535 or, as printed after the invetion of the printing press, from 1290 to 1535, that is, from the time of Edward 11 to Henry VllI. The above principles of natural justice came to be firmly established over the course of centuries and have become a part of the law of the land. Both in England and in India they apply to civil as well as to criminal cases and to the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative powers. The expression "natural justice" is now so well understood in England that it has been used without any definition in statutes of Parliament, .for example, in section 3(10) of the ~'oreign Compensation Act, 1969, and section 6{13) of the Trade Union and Labour Reforms Act, 1974, which was later repealed by the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976. These rules of natural justice have been recognized and given effect to in maay countries and different systems of law. They

have

now

received

international

recognition

by

being

enshrined in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Hunian Rights adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations by Resolution 217A (Ill) of December 10,1948. Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which came into force on September 3, 1953, and Article 14. of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, which came into force on March 23, 1976. Article 14 does not set out in express terms ·either of the above two well-established rules of natural justice. The question which then arises is ''Whether the rules of natural justice form part of Article 14 and, if so, how?"

Article 14 of the Constitution provides as follows : "14. l!qualicy before law. - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory 6f India."

•

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[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

Article 14 thus contains an express Constitutional injunction

against the State as defined in Article 12 prohibiting the State from denying to any person(l) equality before the law, or (2) the equal protection of the laws. Neither of these two concepts are new. They are based upon Similar provisions in other Constitu-

tions. One instance is section 40(1) of the Constitution of Eire of 1937, which occurs in the Chapter entitled Fundamental Rights in that Constitution.

The Constitution of Eire begins on a

strong religious note.

It starts by stating :

"In the name af the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred.

We, the people of Eire, Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our.Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our' fathers through centuries of tiral, ..... ".

Section 40(1) of that Constitution provides as follows "All Citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law.

This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to dif ferences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social functions."

Anothe< instance is Article 3(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1948 which states ' "All persons shail be equal before the law."

Yet another

instance.is section 1. of the FOurteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America which reads :

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens

of the United States· and of the State wherein they

reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

•

u.0.1. v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.]

Constitution of some other countries also have similar provisions

but as these Constitutions have suffered political vicissitudes, it is unnecessary to refer to them. Provisions similar to Article 14 are to be f ouild in Internatio!\al Charters and Conventions. Thus, Article 7 of the UniVersal Declaration Hwnan Rights of 1948, provides as folllows

"All are equal before the law and are entitled without any diat.riminatioil to equal protection of the law ;, •• ii. '

Articie 14 is divided into two parts' in lu Re The spedai Courts Bill, 1978 [1979] 2 s.c.R. 476, Chandrachud, C.J., describe the two parts of Article i4 as follows (at page 534) :

;,The first part of attitle 14, which was adopted from the Irish Constitution, is a declaration of equality of the civil tights of all persons within the territo~ D ries of India:• It enshrines a basic principle· of republicanism• The second part, which is a cotoilary of the first iifid is based on the last clause of the· first section of the Fourteenth Amendinent of the American Constitution enjoins that equal protection shall be secured to ail suth per·son.s in the enjoyment E of their rights and liberties without discriminati6n of favoilrtfoni, it is a pledge bf the protection. of equal laws, tM.t is i laws tha·t operht;e alike~ on

a1i.

persons ltiidet iike cit'cumstances:1" Article i4 contains a: guarantee of equality before the iaw to all persons and a protection to them against discrimination by F any law. Sub-clause (a) of clause (3) of Article i3 defines law as follows .-;'lawi .:includes any Otdinance; otder"J bye....:faw,. tule; regulation,. rtotification, custom of usage having in the territory of india the force of' law".

What Article 14 forbids is disctiniination by iaw, that is; treating persons similarly circumstanced differentiy ·or treating those not similarly clrcumstanced in the sa:me: way or; as has been pithily put, treating equals as unequals and unequals as eq1ials' Article i4 prohibits hostile clasS~ifiC:ation . by" law and is· directed against discriminatory .class legislation. The pr'oposi- H td.oris deducible ftom dec_isions of this court on this point have

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[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

been i:;et :)ut::. .i.n tt1e for.m of thirteen propositions in the judgment

of ChBndcaclmd, C .J., i.r:> In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978.

The

f Lrst of. these propositions which describes the nature of the two

parts of Art,icle 14 has been extracted earlier. We are not concerned in these Appeals and Writ Petition!:) with the other

propositions set out in that judgment.

In early days, this Court

was concerned with discriminatory and hostile class legislation .and it was· to this aspect of Article 14 that its attention was

di~~cted. As fresh thinking began to take place on the scope an d:hJit of A~ti'cle 14, new d~mensiuns to this guarantee of equality

C

betore the· law and of the equal protection of the laws emerged and wer'2 recognized by this Court. It was realized that to treat one person. differently from another when there was no rational basis for 1 doing so would be a~bit~·ary and tl)us dicnninatory. Arbitrariness can take many forms _and shapes but:, whatever form or shape it takes, it is none the less discrimihation. It also became apparent that to treat a persons or a class of persons unfairly would be an arbitrary act amounting to discrimination

forbidden by Article 14.

Similarly, this Court, recognized that

to treat a· person in violation of the principles of natural justice would amount to arbitrary and discriminatory treatment

and would violate the guarantee given by Article 14. In State of Andhra Pradesh and another v. Nalla Raja Keddy and others [1967] 3 S.C.R. 28, Subba Rao, C.J., speaking for the Court, said (at page 46)

"Official arbitrariness

is more subversive of

the

doctrine of equality than statutory discrimination. In respect of a statutory discrimination one knows .where he stands, but the wand of official arbitrari.ness can be waved in all directions indiscriminately."

While considering Article 14 and Article 16, Bhagwati, J., in E.p. Boyappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another [1974] 2 s.C.R. 348; in a

passage which has become a ~classic said (at

page 386) "Article 14 is

the genus while Artkle 16 is a

_species, Article 16 gives effect to

the

doctrine

of

equality in all matters r~lating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding

U.Q.I, v. TULSIRAM [MADON, J.]

faith, to use the words cf Bose, J., 'a way of life', and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or

lexicographic approach. We caru<0t countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist" magnitude. l!quality is a dynamic coocept with many aspects and dillensions and it cannot be 'cribbed, cabined and confined' within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is qntitbetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn ..._1es; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute moarch. Where an act is arbitrary it: is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and coostitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it effects any .natter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Article 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action DllBt be based on vslent relevant principles applicable alike to. all similarly situate and it nust not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that 1'0Uld be denial of equality.. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous · and cutside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount of mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice : in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16." (Emphasis supplied)

Jl

C

Bhagwati, J., reaffirmed in Maneka Gandhi's case what he had said i.n Royappa's case in these weirds (at page 673-74) : "Now,the question immediately arises as to what is the requireuient of Article 14 : what is the content and

reach of the great equalising principle enuntiated in this article? There can '.le no doubt that it is .a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pilar on which rests securely the foundation of our

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning for, to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a · dynamic concept with many aspects and dl.mensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional ·and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in E.P;Royappa v. State of Tamll Nadu &Another namely, that 'from a positivistic 'point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch• Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicipt in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of , Article.' Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treat11ent. The principle of reasonableoeas, which legally as well as philOSOphically, is a ~tisl el.ellent of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding oumipresence '

[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

....... .

In the course of his judgment in the further sdd (at pages 676-7)

(Emphasis supplied) same

case

Bhagwati,

J.,

"Now, if this be the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice, there ""'" be Jio distinction between a quasi-judiCisl function. and an administrative function for this purpose.Th.e aim of both administratl.ve inquiry as well as quasi-judicial , inquiry is to arrive at a just decisia·n and if a rule · of natural justice is calculated to secure justice, or , to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It llllst lOglcally apply to both. On what principle can disti.nction be made between one and the other? Can it be said that the requirement of 'fair play in action' in any the iess in an administrative inquiry than in a quasi-judicial one? Sometimes an unjust decision fo administrative inquiry may have far 100re serious consequences than

u.o.I. "' TULSIRAM [MADON, J. j

a deeision iil a quasi ~judicial inquiry an.I hence the rules of natural jUstice DiUBt apply equally in ati ildministrat.ive iliquiry which entails cl.vii COllll8'-

quences." (Emphasis supplied)

In Ajay llasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehtawrdi and otliers ete• [l98lj :i 79, the same learned Judge, speaking for th<! Court·, said (at pages lOO-lOl) :

s.c.a.

"The true scope and ambit of Article l4 has been. the subject matter of numerous deeisions and it is not necessary to make any detailed reference· to them. It is .sufficient to state that the content· and reach of Article 14 inuSt not be confused with the doctrine of classification. Unfortunately, in the early stages of the evolution of. our constitutional law, Article 14 came to be identified with the doctrine of classification because the view taken was that that · Article forbids discrimination and there would be no discrimi~ nation where the classification.making the differentia fulfils two conditions, ruanely, (i) that the classi,fication . is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislative or executive action."

C

The principles of natural justice ha"t/e thus come to be recognized as being a part Of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subjett"'matter of that Article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus viOlatiou of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the resillt of state action, it is a violation of Article 14: therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violati.on of Artiele 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body men, not coming within the ,de,l':initioII

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[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

of "State", in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require

that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.

C

The rule of natural justice with which we are concerned in these Appeals and Writ Petitions, namely, the audi alteram partem rule, in its fullest amplitutle means that a person against whom an order to.his prejudice may. be passed should be informed of the allegations and charges against him, be given an opportunity of submittin& his explanation thereto, have the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decided against him, and to inspect the documents which are relied upon for the purpose of being used against him, to have the witnesses who are to give evidence against him examined in his presence and have the right to cross-examine them, and to lead his own evidence, both oral and documentary, in his defence. The process of a fair hearing need not, however, conform to the judicial process in a court of law, because judicial adjudication of causes involves a number of technical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessary and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing within the meaning of audi alteram ~rule in a quasi-judicial or administrative inquiry. If we IOOl<'at clause (2) of Article 311 in the light of what is stated above, it will be apparent that that clause is merely an express statement of the audi alteram partem rule which is implicitly made part of the guarnatee contained in Article 14 as a result of the interpretation placed upon that Article by recent decisions of this Court. Clauses (2) of Article 311 requires that before a government servant is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, an

inquiry must be held in which he is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The nature of the hearing to be given to a government servant under clauses (2) of Article 311 has been F elaborately set out by this Court in U - Qiaod 's case in the passsages from the jucigment extracted above. Tllough that case related to the original clause (2) of Article 3

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