Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
Landmark judgment · Criminal law — Key PMLA provisions on arrest, attachment and bail conditions upheld.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 27 July 2022
- Judge
- Justice A.M. Khanwilkar
- Neutral citation
- 2022 INSC 757
- Reported in
- [2022] 6 S.C.R. 382
- Result
- Reference answered
- Acts & sections
- Section 50 PMLA, Section 3 PMLA, Section 44 PMLA, Article 21 Constitution, Section 41A CrPC, Section 161 CrPC, Section 2 CrPC, Section 167 CrPC
- Subject
- Criminal, Service
Full judgment
[2022]REPORTS 6 S.C.R. 382 SUPREME COURT
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. (Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4634 of 2014)
JULY 27, 2022 [A. M. KHANWILKAR, DINESH MAHESHWARI AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.2(1), Clause (na) – Expression “proceedings” therein – Held: The expression “proceedings” occurring in Clause (na) of s.2(1) is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of ED, the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.2(1), Clause (na) –Expression “investigation” therein – Held: The expression “investigation” in Clause (na) of s.2(1) does not limit itself to the matter of investigation concerning the offence under the Act and is interchangeable with the function of “inquiry” to be undertaken by the Authorities under the Act. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.2(1), Clause (u), Explanation – Held: Explanation inserted to Clause (u) of s.2(1) does not travel beyond the main provision predicating tracking and reaching upto the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.3 – Ambit of – Held: s.3 has a wider reach and captures every process and activity, direct or indirect, in dealing with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy – Explanation inserted to s.3 by way of amendment of 2019 does not expand the purport of s.3 but is only clarificatory in nature – The expression “and” occurring in s.3 has to be construed as “or”, to give full play to the said provision so as to include “every” process or activity indulged into by anyone – The interpretation suggested, that only upon
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
projecting or claiming the property in question as untainted property that the offence of s.3 would be complete, is rejected.
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Prosecution on notional basis or assumption – If permissible – Held: The Authorities under the Act cannot prosecute any person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.5 – Validity of – Held: s.5 is constitutionally valid – It provides for a balancing arrangement to secure the interests of the person as also ensures that the proceeds of crime remain available to be dealt with in the manner provided by the Act. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.8(4) – Challenge to the validity of sub-section (4) of s.8 – Held: Is rejected subject to s.8 being invoked and operated in accordance with the meaning assigned to it – Direction u/s.8(4) for taking possession of the property in question before a formal order of confiscation is passed merely on the basis of confirmation of provisional attachment order, should be an exception and not a rule – That issue will have to be considered on case-to-case basis. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.17 – Challenge to deletion of proviso to sub-section (1) of s.17 – Rejected – Held: There are stringent safeguards provided in s.17 and Rules framed thereunder – Moreover, the pre-condition in the proviso to Rule 3(2) of the 2005 Rules cannot be read into s.17 after its amendment.
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.18 – Challenge to deletion of proviso to sub-section (1) of s.18 – Rejected – Held: Safeguards are provided in s.18 – Amended provision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.19 – Challenge to the constitutional validity of s.19 – Rejected – Held: There are stringent safeguards provided in s.19 – The provision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness.
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Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.24 – Validity – Held: s.24 has reasonable nexus with the purposes and objects sought to be achieved by the Act and cannot be regarded as manifestly arbitrary or unconstitutional. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.44 – Proviso in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of s.44 – Held: Is to be regarded as directory in nature and this provision is also read down to mean that the Special Court may exercise judicial discretion on case-tocase basis. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.44 – Challenge to – Held: No merit in the challenge to s.44 being arbitrary or unconstitutional – However, the eventualities referred to in this section shall be dealt with by the Court concerned and by the Authority concerned in accordance with the interpretation given. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.45(1) – Release on bail – Twin conditions in s.45(1) – Held: Reasons which weighed with this Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah case for declaring the twin conditions in s.45(1), as it stood at the relevant time, as unconstitutional in no way obliterated the provision from the statute book – It was open to the Parliament to cure the defect noted by this Court so as to revive the same provision in the existing form. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.45 – Validity – The provision in the form of s.45, as applicable post amendment of 2018, is reasonable and has direct nexus with the purposes and objects sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act and does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.45 – Applicability – Prayer for bail – Held: As regards the prayer for grant of bail, irrespective of the nature of proceedings, including those under s.438 CrPC or even upon invoking the jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts, the underlying principles and rigours of s.45 may apply – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.438. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Invocation of s.436A CrPC – Permissibility – Held: Beneficial provision of s.436A CrPC could be invoked by the accused arrested for offence punishable under the Act – CrPC – s.436A.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.50 – Process envisaged by s.50 – Held: Is in the nature of an inquiry against the proceeds of crime and is not “investigation” in strict sense of the term for initiating prosecution.
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.48 – Authorities under the Act (referred to in s.48) – Held: They are not police officers as such. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Statements recorded by Authorities under the Act – Held: They are not hit by Art.20(3) or Art.21 of the Constitution – Constitution of India, 1950 – Arts. 20(3) and 21.
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.63 – Validity – Held: s.63 providing for punishment regarding false information or failure to give information does not suffer from any vice of arbitrariness. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Schedule to the Act – Inclusion or exclusion of any particular offence – Held: The inclusion or exclusion of any particular offence in the Schedule to the Act is a matter of legislative policy –The nature or class of any predicate offence has no bearing on the validity of the Schedule or any prescription thereunder. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.48 – Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) – Held: ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR under CrPC – ECIR is an internal document of the Enforcement Directorate (ED) – Fact that FIR in respect of scheduled offence has not been recorded does not come in the way of the Authorities referred to in s.48 to commence inquiry/ investigation for initiating “civil action” of “provisional attachment” of property being proceeds of crime – FIR. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) – Held: Supply of a copy of ECIR in every case to the person concerned is not mandatory, it is enough if Enforcement Directorate (ED) at the time of arrest, discloses the grounds of such arrest – However, when the arrested person is produced before the Special Court, it is open to the Special Court to look into the relevant records presented by the authorised
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representative of ED for answering the issue of need for his/her continued detention in connection with the offence of moneylaundering. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Enforcement Directorate (ED) Manual – Held: Even when ED manual is not to be published being an internal departmental document issued for the guidance of the Authorities (ED officials), the department ought to explore the desirability of placing information on its website which may broadly outline the scope of the authority of the functionaries under the Act and measures to be adopted by them as also the options/ remedies available to the person concerned before the Authority and before the Special Court. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Vacancies in Appellate Tribunal – Executive to take corrective measures in this regard expeditiously.
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Argument about proportionality of punishment with reference to the nature of scheduled offence – Held: Is wholly unfounded. Answering issues regarding the validity and interpretation of the provisions of the 2002 Act, the Court
HELD:
(i) The question as to whether some of the amendments to the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 could not have been enacted by the Parliament by way of a Finance Act has not been examined in this judgment. The same is left open for being examined along with or after the decision of the Larger Bench (seven Judges) of this Court in the case of Rojer Mathew. (ii) The expression “proceedings” occurring in Clause (na) of Section 2(1) of the 2002 Act is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of ED, the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court. (iii) The expression “investigation” in Clause (na) of Section 2(1) of the 2002 Act does not limit itself to the matter of
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
investigation concerning the offence under the Act and is interchangeable with the function of “inquiry” to be undertaken by the Authorities under the Act.
(iv) The Explanation inserted to Clause (u) of Section 2(1) of the 2002 Act does not travel beyond the main provision predicating tracking and reaching upto the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. (v) (a) Section 3 of the 2002 Act has a wider reach and captures every process and activity, direct or indirect, in dealing with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy. The Explanation inserted to Section 3 by way of amendment of 2019 does not expand the purport of Section 3 but is only clarificatory in nature. It clarifies the word “and” preceding the expression projecting or claiming as “or”; and being a clarificatory amendment, it would make no difference even if it is introduced by way of Finance Act or otherwise. (b) Independent of the above, the expression “and” occurring in Section 3 has to be construed as “or”, to give full play to the said provision so as to include “every” process or activity indulged into by anyone. Projecting or claiming the property as untainted property would constitute an offence of money-laundering on its own, being an independent process or activity. (c) The interpretation suggested by the petitioners, that only upon projecting or claiming the property in question as untainted property that the offence of Section 3 would be complete, stands rejected. (d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes the offence of money-laundering. The Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial including
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by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. If the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of moneylaundering against him or any one claiming such property being the property linked to stated scheduled offence through him. (vi) Section 5 of the 2002 Act is constitutionally valid. It provides for a balancing arrangement to secure the interests of the person as also ensures that the proceeds of crime remain available to be dealt with in the manner provided by the 2002 Act. The procedural safeguards as delineated are effective measures to protect the interests of person concerned. (vii) The challenge to the validity of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the 2002 Act is also rejected subject to Section 8 being invoked and operated in accordance with the meaning assigned to it. (viii) The challenge to deletion of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the 2002 Act stands rejected. There are stringent safeguards provided in Section 17 and Rules framed thereunder. Moreover, the pre-condition in the proviso to Rule 3(2) of the 2005 Rules cannot be read into Section 17 after its amendment. The Central Government may take necessary corrective steps to obviate confusion caused in that regard. (ix) The challenge to deletion of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the 2002 Act also stands rejected. There are similar safeguards provided in Section 18. The amended provision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness. (x) The challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the 2002 Act is also rejected. There are stringent safeguards provided in Section 19. The provision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness.
(xi) Section 24 of the 2002 Act has reasonable nexus with the purposes and objects sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act and cannot be regarded as manifestly arbitrary or unconstitutional. (xii) (a) The proviso in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 44 of the 2002 Act is to be regarded as directory in nature
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
and this provision is also read down to mean that the Special Court may exercise judicial discretion on case-to-case basis.
(b) There is no merit in the challenge to Section 44 being arbitrary or unconstitutional. However, the eventualities referred to in this section shall be dealt with by the Court concerned and by the Authority concerned in accordance with the interpretation given. (xiii) (a) The reasons which weighed with this Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah for declaring the twin conditions in Section 45(1) of the 2002 Act, as it stood at the relevant time, as unconstitutional in no way obliterated the provision from the statute book; and it was open to the Parliament to cure the defect noted by this Court so as to revive the same provision in the existing form. (b) This Court is unable to agree with the observations in Nikesh Tarachand Shah distinguishing the enunciation of the Constitution Bench decision in Kartar Singh; and other observations suggestive of doubting the perception of Parliament in regard to the seriousness of the offence of money-laundering, including about it posing serious threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the country. (c) The provision in the form of Section 45 of the 2002 Act, as applicable post amendment of 2018, is reasonable and has direct nexus with the purposes and objects sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act and does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. (d) As regards the prayer for grant of bail, irrespective of the nature of proceedings, including those under Section 438 of the 1973 Code or even upon invoking the jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts, the underlying principles and rigours of Section 45 may apply. (xiv) The beneficial provision of Section 436A of the 1973 Code could be invoked by the accused arrested for offence punishable under the 2002 Act. (xv) (a) The process envisaged by Section 50 of the 2002 Act is in the nature of an inquiry against the proceeds of crime
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and is not “investigation” in strict sense of the term for initiating prosecution; and the Authorities under the 2002 Act (referred to in Section 48), are not police officers as such. (b) The statements recorded by the Authorities under the 2002 Act are not hit by Article 20(3) or Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (xvi) Section 63 of the 2002 Act providing for punishment regarding false information or failure to give information does not suffer from any vice of arbitrariness.
(xvii) The inclusion or exclusion of any particular offence in the Schedule to the 2002 Act is a matter of legislative policy; and the nature or class of any predicate offence has no bearing on the validity of the Schedule or any prescription thereunder. (xviii) (a) In view of special mechanism envisaged by the 2002 Act, ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR under the 1973 Code. ECIR is an internal document of the ED and the fact that FIR in respect of scheduled offence has not been recorded does not come in the way of the Authorities referred to in Section 48 to commence inquiry/investigation for initiating “civil action” of “provisional attachment” of property being proceeds of crime. (b) Supply of a copy of ECIR in every case to the person concerned is not mandatory, it is enough if ED at the time of arrest, discloses the grounds of such arrest. (c) However, when the arrested person is produced before the Special Court, it is open to the Special Court to look into the relevant records presented by the authorised representative of ED for answering the issue of need for his/her continued detention in connection with the offence of money-laundering. (xix) Even when ED manual is not to be published being an internal departmental document issued for the guidance of the Authorities (ED officials), the department ought to explore the desirability of placing information on its website which may broadly outline the scope of the authority of the functionaries under the Act and measures to be adopted by them as also the options/ remedies available to the person concerned before the Authority and before the Special Court.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(xx)The petitioners are justified in expressing serious concern bordering on causing injustice owing to the vacancies in the Appellate Tribunal. It is deemed necessary to impress upon the executive to take corrective measures in this regard expeditiously.
(xxi) The argument about proportionality of punishment with reference to the nature of scheduled offence is wholly unfounded and stands rejected.[Para 187][719-B-H; 720-A-H; 721-A-H; 722A-H; 723-A-C]
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of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR 1961 SC 1808 : [1962] 3 SCR 10; M.P. Sharma & Ors. v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi & Ors. [1954] SCR 1077; Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur v. Ramdev Tobacco Company (1991) 2 SCC 119 : [1991] 1 SCR 126; Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh (1978) 1 SCC 240 : [1978] 2 SCR 371; Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 294 : [2005] 3 SCR 345; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2008) 16 SCC 417 : [2008] 10 SCR 379; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 571 : [2010] 2 SCR 979; Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 409 : [2007] 12 SCR 1100; D. K. Basu v. State of W. B. (1997) 1 SCC 416 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284; Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan & Anr. (1994) 3 SCC 440 : [1994] 1 SCR 445; Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1956 SC 479 : [1956] SCR 267; Collector of Malabar & Anr. v. Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee AIR 1957 SC 688 : [1957] SCR 970; G.J. Fernandes v. The State of Mysore & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1753 : [1967] 3 SCR 636; Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1986) 3 SCC 615 : [1986] 3 SCR 518; Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 682 : [2014] 6 SCR 873; Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 728 : [1955] 1 SCR 707; Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 8; Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : [2010] 9 SCR 1039; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2021) 10 SCC 773; Ayya alias Ayub v. State of U.P. & Anr., (1989) 1 SCC 374 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 967; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 : (2021) SCC Online SC 50; Krishna Lal Chawla & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2021) 5 SCC 435; Shayara Bano v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 9 SCR 797; Joseph Shine v.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 : [2018] 11 SCR 765; Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf (1976) 1 SCC 128 : [1976] 1 SCR 277; Satnam Singh & Ors. v. Punjab & Haryana High Court and Ors. (1997) 3 SCC 353 : [1997] 1 SCR 1038; Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India & Ors. (2020) 3 SCC 637; Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2021) 2 SCC 427; Kiran Prakash Kulkarni v. The Enforcement Directorate and Anr. Order dated 11.4.2019 in S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 1698 of 2019; Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited and Ors. (2020) 6 SCC 1 : [2019] 16 SCR 1; Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King Emperor, (1924) SCC OnLine PC 49 : AIR 1925 PC 1; Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 298 : [1991] 3 SCR 812; Mahipal Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2014) 11 SCC 282 : [2014] 4 SCR 529; Tech Mahindra Limited v. Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Hyderabad & Ors. [WP No. 17525/2014 decided on 22.12.2014 by High Court of Andhra Pradesh]; Gadi Nagavekata Satyanarayana v. Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement (2017) SCC Online ATPMLA 2; Arun Kumar Mishra v. Directorate of Enforcement (2015) SCC OnLine Del 8658; M/s. Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement (2015) SCC OnLine Del 8659; M/s. Mahanivesh Oils & Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement (2016) SCC OnLine Del 475; Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 737 : [2014] 11 SCR 1009 ; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (1978) 4 SCC 494 : [1979] 1 SCR 392; Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 277 : [1983] 2 SCR 690; Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab alias Abu Mujahid v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 9 SCC 1 : [2012] 8 SCR 295; Nahar Singh Yadav & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2011) 1 SCC 307 : [2010] 13 SCR 851; Hanumant Govind Nargundkar & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343 : [1952] SCR 1091; Himanshu Singh Sabharwal v. State
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of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2008) 3 SCC 602 : [2008] 4 SCR 783; State of Maharashtra v. Chief Information Commissioner & Anr., (2018) SCC OnLine Bom 1199; Vineet Narain & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., (1998) 1 SCC 226 : [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595 ; Shashikant v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 630 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 474; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2014) 14 SCC 295 : [2013] 14 SCR 983; State of Jharkhand through SP, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Lalu Prasad Yadav alias Lalu Prasad, (2017) 8 SCC 1 : [2017] 3 SCR 630; State of Rajasthan, Jaipur v. Balchandalia Baliay (1977) 4 SCC 308 : [1978] 1 SCR 535; Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : [2011] 13 SCR 309; State of Kerela v. Raneef (2011) 1 SCC 784 : [2011] 1 SCR 590; Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal [1969] 2 SCR 461 : AIR 1970 SC 940; Balkishan A. Devidayal v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 4 SCC 600 : [1981] 1 SCR 175; Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah & Anr. v. D.K. Guha & Ors. (1973) 1 SCC 696 : [1973] 3 SCR 438; Poolpandi & Ors. v. Superintendent, Central Excise and Ors. (1992) 3 SCC 259 : [1992] 3 SCR 247; State of Gujarat v. Shyamlal Mohanlal Choksi AIR 1965 SC 1251 : [1965] 2 SCR 457; Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay AIR 1951 SC 128 : [1951] SCR 228; Ritesh Agarwal & Anr. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Ors. (2008) 8 SCC 205 : [2008] 8 SCR 553; Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2011) 4 SCC 441 : [2011] 5 SCR 691; Varinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2014) 3 SCC 151 : [2014] 1 SCR 496; Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited (2015) 1 SCC 1 : [2014] 12 SCR 1037; Bihta Co-operative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. & Anr. v. Bank of Bihar & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 389 : [1967] 1 SCR 848; Dattatraya Govind Mahajan & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (1977) 2 SCC 548 : [1977] 2 SCR 790; S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. V. R. Pattabiraman &
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 591 : [1985] 2 SCR 643; Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639; Hardev Motor Transport v. State of M.P. & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 613 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 766; Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, ILR 2017 Kar 1846; Ajay Kumar Gupta & Ors. v. Adjudicating Authority (PMLA) & Ors. (2017) 2 LW (Cri) 252; State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi & Anr. (1972) 2 SCC 890 : [1973] 1 SCR 1004; Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar v. Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790 : [1981] 3 SCR 419; Smt. Maya Rani Punj (Smt.) v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi (1986) 1 SCC 445 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 827; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr. AIR 1988 SC 1531 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 (para 59) : (1988) 2 SCC 602 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1; Directorate of Enforcement v. Surajpal & Ors. (2018) SCC OnLine Del 10472; Inspector of Police, CBI v. Assistant Directorate, Directorate of Enforcement (PMLA) & Anr. (2019) SCC OnLine Ker 4546; Sou. Vijaya Alias Baby v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 8 SCC 296 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 340; State of Karnataka v. Madesha & Ors. (2007) 7 SCC 35 : [2007] 8 SCR 757; In Re Kuttayan alias Nambi Thevar AIR 1960 Mad 9; Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 187 : [2008] 14 SCR 419; Rohitash Kumar & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30 : [2012] 13 SCR 47; Abdullah Ali Balsharaf & Anr. v. Directorate of Enforcement & Ors. (2019) SCC Online Del 6428; Seema Garg v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) SCC Online P&H 738; A. Kamarunnisa Ghori v. The Chairperson, Prevention of Money Laundering, Union of India, 2012 (4) CTC 608 : 2012 Writ LR 719; Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1019 : [1963] 1 Suppl. SCR 912; G. Mohan Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2021) SCC OnLine SC 440; State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad & Anr. (1974) 4 SCC 656 : [1974] 3 SCR 760; State of
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Manipur & Ors. v. Surajkumar Okram & Ors. (2022) SCC OnLine SC 130; M.K. Ayoob & Ors. v. Superintendent, Customs Intelligence Unit, Cochin & Anr., 1984 Crl.L.J. 949; The Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue, Madras v. M.K.S. Abu Bucker, 1990 Cri.L.J 704; A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 500 : [1984] 2 SCR 914; Om Prakash & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. (2011) 14 SCC 1 : [2011] 14 SCR 240; Union of India v. Thamisharasi & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 190 : [1995] 3 SCR 905; Gorav Kathuria v. Union of India & Ors. (2016) SCC OnLine P&H 3428 D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284; Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors., (2020) SCC OnLine SC 683; Canon India Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs, (2021) SCC OnLine SC 200; Adjudicating Authority (PMLA) and Ors. v. Ajay Kumar Gupta and Ors. Criminal Appeal Nos. 391-392/2018; Attorney General for India & Ors. v. Amratlal Prajivandas & Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 54 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 1; Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., Bombay (1994) 6 SCC 86; The State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte & Anr. AIR 1961 SC 578 : [1961] 3 SCR 107; Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375 : [1959] 1 Suppl. SCR 274; Hira H. Advani etc. v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 662; R. Dineshkumar alias Deena v. State represented by Inspector of Police & Ors. (2015) 7 SCC 497 : [2015] 5 SCR 605; Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N. Shanmugham Chetty & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 707 : [1987] 2 SCR 1173; M/s. Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. (1988) 2 SCC 299 : [1988] 2 SCR 962; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (1991) 2 Suppl. SCC 18 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 365; Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha and Sons & Anr., (1991) 3 SCC 617 : [1991] 3 SCR 307; Forest Range Officer & Ors. v. P. Mohammed Ali & Ors., (1993) 3 Suppl. SCC 627 :
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[1993] 3 SCR 497; Commercial Taxation Officer, Udaipur v. Rajasthan Taxchem Ltd., (2007) 3 SCC 124 : [2007] 1 SCR 855; Associated Indem Mechanical (P) Ltd. v. W.B. Small Industries Development Corpn. Ltd., & Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 607 : [2007] 1 SCR 174; N.D.P. Namboodripad (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 4 SCC 502 : [2007] 3 SCR 769; Oswal Fats and Oils Limited v. Additional Commissioner (Administration), Bareilly Division, Bareilly & Ors. (2010) 4 SCC 728 : [2010] 5 SCR 927; Mamta Surgical Cotton Industries, Rajasthan v. Assistant Commissioner (Anti-Evasion), Bhilwara, Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 87 : [2014] 2 SCR 589; Rohit Tandon v. Directorate of Enforcement (2018) 11 SCC 46 : [2017] 13 SCR 156; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 : [1994] 2 SCR 375; R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jayalalitha & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 9 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 85; Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 221 : [2016] 3 SCR 865; Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., Bombay (II) (1994) 5 SCC 410 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 263; Joint Directors of Mines Safety v. M/s Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd. (1987) 3 SCC 208 : [1987] 2 SCR 800; Regina v. Oakes 1959 (2) QB 350; Ishwar Singh Bindra & Ors. v. The State of U.P. [1969] 1 SCR 219; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd. (2008) 4 SCC 755 : [2008] 4 SCR 822; Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2005) 3 SCC 551 : [2005] 1 SCR 1019; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438 : [2014] 5 SCR 119; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Anr. (2005) 2 SCC 436 : [2005] 1 SCR 494; Githa Hariharan & Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. (1999) 2 SCC 228 : [1999] 1 SCR 669; Rohtas v. State of Haryana & Anr. (1979) 4 SCC 229 : [1980] 1 SCR 151; Ajmer Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1987) 3 SCC 340 : [1987] 3 SCR 84; Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon & Ors. v. State of Gujarat (1988) 2 SCC 271 : [1988] 3 SCR 225; Central Bureau of Investigation v.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1996) 9 SCC 735 : [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 127; State (Union of India) v. Ram Saran (2003) 12 SCC 578 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 476; Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh (2) v. Union of India & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 1 : [2008] 14 SCR 889; Gautam Kundu v. Directorate of Enforcement (Prevention of Money-Laundering Act), Government of India (2015) 16 SCC 1 : [2015] 15 SCR 499; Union of India & Ors. v. Chandra Bhushan Yadav (2020) 2 SCC 747; Aswini Kumar Ghose & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr. AIR 1952 SC 369 : [1953] SCR 1; Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 94 : [ 2009] 3 SCR 735; Kishorebhai Khamanchand Goyal v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2003) 12 SCC 274 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 1; Innoventive Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank & Ors. (2018) 1 SCC 407 : [2017] 8 SCR 33; Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi & Ors. [1963] 2 Suppl. SCR 812; The South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. The Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum & Anr. [1964] 4 SCR 280; Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd. v. S.P. Kasture & Ors. AIR 1968 SC 565 : [1968] 1 SCR 661; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education & Anr. v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Seth & Ors. (1984) 4 SCC 27 : [1985] 1 SCR 29; Ethiopian Airlines v. Ganesh Narain Saboo (2011) 8 SCC 539 : [2011] 9 SCR 936; Bhagirath v. Delhi Administration, (1985) 2 SCC 580 : [1985] 3 SCR 743; Eastern Coalfields Limited v. Sanjay Transport Agency & Anr., (2009) 7 SCC 345 : [2009] 9 SCR 690; Hari Narayan Rai v. Union of India & Anr. (2010) SCC OnLine Jhar 475; Karam Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2015) SCC OnLine P&H 19739; Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Union of India & Ors. (2016) SCC OnLine Bom 9938; Vakamulla Chandrashekhar v. Enforcement Directorate & Anr. (2017) SCC OnLine Del 12810; Virbhadra Singh & Anr. v. Enforcement Directorate & Anr. (2017) SCC OnLine Del 8930; Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Union of India & Ors. vide order dated 01.12.2017 in W.P.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Crl.) No.2465/2017; Directorate of Enforcement v. Vakamulla Chandrashekhar Order dated 04.01.2018 in SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 36918/2017; Rajbhushan Omprakash Dixit v. Union of India & Anr., Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Rahul Modi & Anr. (2019) 5 SCC 266 : [2019] 5 SCR 91; K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 721 : [1997] 1 SCR 797; Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited & Anr. v. Assistant Director of Enforcement Directorate (2016) SCC OnLine Hyd 64; Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2004) 8 SCC 1 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 272; Commissioner of Income Tax I, Ahmedabad v. Gold Coin Health Food Private Limited (2008) 9 SCC 622 : [2008] 12 SCR 179; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhopal v. Shelly Products & Anr. (2003) 5 SCC 461 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 79; Gurcharan Singh v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (2008) 17 SCC 28; [2008] 5 SCR 856; Assistant Electrical Engineer v. Satyendra Rai & Anr. (2014) 4 SCC 513; State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan & Anr. (2018) 17 SCC 394 : [2018] 10 SCR 974; Union of India & Ors. v. Mudrika Singh (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1173; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 273 : [2014] 8 SCR 128; Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 305 : [2008] 14 SCR 179; Premium Granites & Anr. v. State of T.N. & Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 691 : [1994] 1 SCR 579; M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (1982) 1 SCC 31 : [1982] 2 SCR 31; Ahmed Noormohmed Bhatti v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 647 : [2005] 2 SCR 879; Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India & Ors. (2015) 2 SCC 33 : [ 2014] 7 SCR 569 ; A.K. Roy v. Union of India & Ors. (1982) 1 SCC 271 : [1982] 2 SCR 272; State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal & Anr. (1987) 2 SCC 364 : [1987] 2 SCR 677; Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2013) 7 SCC 439 : [2013] 3 SCR 547; Nimmagadda Prasad v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2013) 7 SCC 466 : [2013] 3 SCR 493;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
State of Bihar & Anr. v. Amit Kumar alias Bachcha Rai (2017) 13 SCC 751 : [2017] 4 SCR 503; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 1958 SC 731 : [1959] SCR 629; Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar & Anr. [1958] SCR 1226; Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1952 SC 123: [1952] SCR 435; Kedar Nath Bajoria & Anr. v. The State of West Bengal AIR 1953 SC 404 : [1954] SCR 30; Special Reference No.1 of 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380 : [1979] 2 SCR 476; Asbury Hospital v. Cass County 326 US 207 [1945]; Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India & Ors. [1950] SCR 869; The State of Bombay & Anr. v. F.N. Balsara [1951] SCR 682; Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Limited & Ors. v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. & Anr. (1992) 3 SCC 336; [1992] 3 SCR 409; Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd. & Anr. (1995) 1 SCC 501 : [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 369; M.R.F. Ltd. v. Inspector Kerala Govt. & Ors. (1998) 8 SCC 227 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 632; State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Anr. (1977) 4 SCC 471 : [1978] 1 SCR 641; State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. L. Abu Kavur Bai and Ors. (1984) 1 SCC 515 : [1984] 1 SCR 725; Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 294 : [2005] 3 SCR 345; Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549 : [2004] 2 SCR 1092; Supdt., Narcotics Control Bureau, Chennai v. R. Paulsamy (2000) 9 SCC 549; Union of India v. Gurcharan Singh (2003) 11 SCC 764; Union of India v. Abdulla (2004) 13 SCC 504; Narcotics Control Bureau v. Karma Phuntsok & Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 480; Chenna Boyanna Krishna Yadav v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2007) 1 SCC 242 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 381; N.R. Mon v. Mohd. Nasimuddin (2008) 6 SCC 721 : [2008] 8 SCR 1159; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah and Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 5 : [2008] 12 SCR 1083; Union of India v. Rattan Mallik alias Habul (2009) 2 SCC 624 : [2009] 1 SCR 533; The State of Maharashtra v.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Vishwanath Maranna Shetty (2012) 10 SCC 561 : [2012] 9 SCR 873; Union of India v. Niyazuddin Sk. & Anr. (2018) 13 SCC 738 : [2017] 6 SCR 513; Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab (2018) 13 SCC 813 : [2018] 3 SCR 739; National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1 : [2019] 5 SCR 1060; Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Nittin Johari & Anr. (2019) 9 SCC 165; Modern Dental College and Research Centre & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 353 : [2016] 3 SCR 579; Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas & Ors. v. The Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad & Anr. AIR 1963 SC 1742 : [1964] 2 SCR 608; Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors. (1969) 2 SCC 283 : [1970] 1 SCR 388; Bhubaneshwar Singh & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 77 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 639; Comorin Match Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N. (1996) 4 SCC 281 : [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 349; Indian Aluminium Co. & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 637; Bakhtawar Trust & Ors. v. M.D. Narayan & Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 298 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 1; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh (2009) 13 SCC 165 : [2009] 10 SCR 821; Goa Foundation & Anr. v. State of Goa & Anr. (2016) 6 SCC 602 : [2016] 1 SCR 1025; Cheviti Venkanna Yadav v. State of Telangana & Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 283 : [2016] 7 SCR 689; Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 613; M.P.V. Sundararamier & Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. [1958] SCR 1422; Jagannath, Etc. Etc. v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms & Ors. Etc. (1971) 2 SCC 893 : [1972] 1 SCR 105; Sushila Aggarwal & Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2020) 5 SCC 1 : [2020] 2 SCR 1; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 929; Hema Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2014) 4 SCC 453 : [2014] 1 SCR 465; Mohammed Dastagir v. The State of Madras AIR 1960 SC 756 : [1960] 3 SCR 116; Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
& Anr. AIR 1961 SC 9 : [1961] 3 SCR 592; K. Joseph Augusthi v. M.A. Narayanan AIR 1964 SC 1552 : [1964] SCR 137; Collector of Customs, Madras v. Kotumal Bhirumal Pihlajani & Ors. (1966) SCC OnLine Mad 145; Laxman Padma Bhagat v. The State (1964) SCC OnLine Bom 59; Calcutta Motor Cycle Co. v. Collector of Customs & Ors. (1955) SCC OnLine Cal 275; Harbansingh Sardar Lenasingh & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1972) 3 SCC 775; C. Sampath Kumar v. Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate, Madras (1997) 8 SCC 358 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 142; Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 119 : [1966] 1 SCR 134; Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla & Ors. (1998) 3 SCC 410 : [1998] 1 SCR 1153; Badaku Joti Svant v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1746 : [1966] 3 SCR 698; Illias v. The Collector of Customs, Madras AIR 1970 SC 1065; State of U.P. v. Durga Prasad (1975) 3 SCC 210 : [1975] 1 SCR 881; Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Ltd. AIR 1959 SC 763 : [1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 459; Lajpat Rai Sehgal & Ors. v. State 1983 (5) DRJ 1 : 23 (1983) DLT 314; Narain Singh v. The State 1986 (10) DRJ 109 : 30 (1986) DLT 118; Pareena Swarup v. Union of India (2008) 14 SCC 107 : [2008] 13 SCR 1217; Baleshwar Rai & Ors. v. The State of Bihar [1963] 2 SCR 433; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2019) 16 SCC 547 : [2019] 6 SCR 701; Narendra Singh & Anr. v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 : [2004] 3 SCR 1148; Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee (2001) 6 SCC 16 : [2001] 3 SCR 900; Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54 : [2008] 1 SCR 605; Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 4 SCC 375 : [2001] 2 SCR 644; P.N. Krishna Lal & Ors. v. Govt. of Kerala & Anr. (1995) 2 Suppl. SCC 187 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 526; Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) (2020) 10 SCC 120; Seema Silk & Sarees & Anr. v. Directorate of Enforcement & Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 580 : [2008]
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
8 SCR 201; Transport Co. & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1986) 2 SCC 486 : [1986] 1 SCR 939; Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 4 : [1979] 2 SCR 229; Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : [2002] 1 SCR 75; Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394 : [2008] 6 SCR 1116; P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2010) 2 SCC 398 : [2010] 2 SCR 78; Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : [2010] 11 SCR 669; Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2013) 11 SCC 476 : [2012] 10 SCR 1034; Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India & Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 665 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 472; State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61; M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. (2001) 1 SCC 691 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 584; Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. (2021) 7 SCC 369; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SCC 394; Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 : [2015] 5 SCR 435; Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Dundayya Gurushiddaiah Hiremath & Ors. (1991) 2 SCC 141 : [1991] 1 SCR 396; Gunwantlal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1972) 2 SCC 194 : [1973] 1 SCR 508; H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi [1955] 1 SCR 1150; Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja & Anr. (2003) 6 SCC 195 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 307; Manubhai Ratilal Patel through Ushaben v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 314 : [2012] 8 SCR 993; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. (1982) 1 SCC 561 : [1982] 3 SCR 121; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 : [1980] 3 SCR 383; Superintendent of Police, CBI & Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 : [2003] 3 SCR 485; Pooran Mal v. The Director of Inspection (Investigation), New Delhi & Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 345 : [1974] 2 SCR 704; R.S. Seth Gopikrishan Agarwal v. R.N. Sen, Assistant Collector of Customs & Ors. [1967]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2 SCR 340; State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172 : [1999] 3 SCR 977; Special Investigation Circle-B, Meerut v. Messrs Seth Brothers & Ors. Etc. (1969) 2 SCC 324 : [1970] 1 SCR 601; Dr. Partap Singh & Anr. v. Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act & Ors. (1985) 3 SCC 72 : [1985] 3 SCR 969; Union of India & Anr. v. Purushottam (2015) 3 SCC 779 : [2015] 1 SCR 849; Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. & Anr. v. Solanki Traders (2008) 2 SCC 302 : [2007] 12 SCR 409; Radha Mohan Lakhotia, Indian National and Citizen v. Deputy Director, PMLA, Directorate of Enforcement, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue (2010) SCC OnLine Bom 1116; B. Rama Raju v. Union of India & Ors. (2011) SCC OnLine AP 152; Alive Hospitality and Food Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors. (2013) SCC OnLine Guj 3909; K. Sowbaghya v. Union of India & Ors. (2016) SCC OnLine Kar 282; Usha Agarwal v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) SCC OnLine Sikk 146; J. Sekar v. Union of India & Ors. (2018) SCC OnLine Del 6523; Kamlapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal (1980) 2 SCC 91 : [1979] 2 SCR 717; Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra (1999) 1 SCC 759 : [1999] 1 SCR 117; State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 382 : [2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 712; Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer AIR 1956 SC 404 : [1956] SCR 199; State (Through Central Bureau of Investigation) v. Kalyan Singh (Former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh) & Ors. (2017) 7 SCC 444 : [2017] 6 SCR 946; Ram Jethmalani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 1; The Asst. Director Enforcement Directorate v. Dr. V.C. Mohan Criminal Appeal No.21 of 2022, decided on 4.1.2022; State rep. by the C.B.I. v. Anil Sharma, (1997) 7 SCC 187 : [2011] 8 SCR 725; P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2019) SCC OnLine Del 9703; Hussainara Khatoon & Ors.v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna (1980) 1 SCC 98 : [1979] 3 SCR 532; Supreme Court Legal Aid
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India & Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 731 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 386 – referred to.
Thakurain Balraj Kunwar & Anr. v. Rae Jagatpal Singh (1904) SCC OnLine PC 9 : (1904) 1 All LJ 384; Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors. AIR 1953 SC 148 : [1953] SCR 533; Chandroji Rao v. Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P., Nagpur (1970) 2 SCC 23 : [1971] 1 SCR 422; Board of Muslim Wakfs, Rajasthan v. Radha Kishan & Ors. (1979) 2 SCC 468 : [1979] 2 SCR 148; Tara Prasad Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1980) 4 SCC 179 : [1980] 3 SCR 1042; Sakshi v. Union of India & Ors. (2004) 5 SCC 518 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 723; Guntaiah & Ors. v. Hambamma & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 228 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 770; C. Gupta v. Glaxo-Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 171 : [2007] 7 SCR 800; D.R. Fraser & Co. Ltd. v. The Minister of National Revenue (1948) SCC OnLine PC 65 : AIR 1949 PC 120; Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2020) SCC OnLine SC 882; Ashok Munilal Jain & Anr. v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, (2018) 16 SCC 158; Divisional Forest Officer & Anr. v. G.V. Sudhakar Rao & Ors. (1985) 4 SCC 573 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 680; Biswanath Bhattacharya v. Union of India and Ors. (2014) 4 SCC 392 : [2014] 1 SCR 885; and Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2016) 3 SCC 183 : [2015] 14 SCR 1037 – held inapplicable. Attygalle & Anr. v. The King AIR 1936 PC 169; United States v. Anthony Salerno 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987); United States of America v. Renee Armstrong Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991); United States of America v. Paul Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006); United States of America v Roger Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2010); The Impact of Cuellar on Concealment Money Laundering Case Law, 18 J Bus L 255 (2015); Regina v. Cuthbertson & Ors. [1981] A.C. 470;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Elizabeth Warburton v. James Loveland (1831) 2 Dow & Cl 480; Bell, Attorney General v. Wolfish Schall v. Martin 467 US 253 (1984); Gifford v. Kelson (1943) 51 Man. R 120; R v. Ahmad, [2012] 2 All ER 1137; R v. James, [2012] 2 Cr App R (S) 253; Samuels v. McCurdy, Sheriff (1925) SCC OnLine US SC 42; Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. Henry A. Tranbarger 238 U.S. 67; Seaford Court Estates Ld. v. Asher [1949] 2 K.B. 481; The Georgia Railroad and Banking Company v. James M. Smith 128 US 174 (1888); and Commissioner of Stamp Duties v. Atwill & Ors. (1973) 1 All ER 576; Norton v. Shelby County 118 US 425 (1886) – referred to. Case Law Reference
[2017] 12 SCR 358
referred to
Para 1(a)
(2021) 10 SCC 598
referred to
Para 2(i)
[2017] 12 SCR 118
referred to
Para 2(i)
[2013] 14 SCR 713
referred to
Para 2(ii)
[1974] 2 SCR 348
referred to
Para 2(ii)
[1967] 2 SCR 703
referred to
Para 2(iii)
[1982] 1 SCR 629
referred to
Para 2(ix)
[2009] 7 SCR 946
referred to
Para 2(ix)
[2019] 12 SCR 172
referred to
Para 2(ix)
(2018) 16 SCC 158
held inapplicable Para 2(xii)
[1962] 3 SCR 338
referred to
Para 2(xiii)
[1964] 2 SCR 752
referred to
Para 2(xiv)
[1978] 3 SCR 608
referred to
Para (xvii)
[1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 875
referred to
Para 2(xvii)
[2015] 8 SCR 1
referred to
Para 2(xvii)
(2020) 7 SCC 722
referred to
Para 2(xvii)
[1981] 1 SCR 175
referred to
Para 2(xix)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [2010] 5 SCR 381
referred to
Para 2(xix)
[1962] 3 SCR 10
referred to
Para 2(xx)
[1954] SCR 1077
referred to
Para 2(xx)
[1991] 1 SCR 126
referred to
Para 2(xxii)
[1978] 2 SCR 371
referred to
Para 3
[2005] 3 SCR 345
referred to
Para 3
[2008] 10 SCR 379
referred to
Para 3
[2010] 2 SCR 979
referred to
Para 3
[2007] 12 SCR 1100
referred to
Para 3
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284
referred to
Para 3(i)
[1994] 1 SCR 445
referred to
Para 3(i)
[1956] SCR 267
referred to
Para 3(i)
[1957] SCR 970
referred to
Para 3(i)
[1967] 3 SCR 636
referred to
Para 3(i)
[1986] 3 SCR 518
referred to
Para 3(ii)
[2014] 6 SCR 873
referred to
Para 3(ii)
[1955] 1 SCR 707
referred to
Para 3(iii)
[1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 8
referred to
Para 3(iii)
[2010] 9 SCR 1039
referred to
Para 3(iii)
(2021) 10 SCC 773
referred to
Para 3(iii)
[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 967
referred to
Para 3(iii)
(2021) 3 SCC 713
referred to
Para 3(iii)
(2021) 5 SCC 435
referred to
Para 3(iii)
[2017] 9 SCR 797
referred to
Para 3(iii)
[2018] 11 SCR 765
referred to
Para 3(iii)
[1976] 1 SCR 277
referred to
Para 4(v)
[1997] 1 SCR 1038
referred to
Para 4(v)
(2020) 3 SCC 637
referred to
Para 4(vii)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2021) 2 SCC 427
referred to
Para 4(viii)
[2019] 16 SCR 1
referred to
Para 4(viii)
[1991] 3 SCR 812
referred to
Para 6(i)
[2014] 4 SCR 529
referred to
Para 6(i)
[2014] 11 SCR
referred to
Para 8
[1979] 1 SCR 392
referred to
Para 8
[1983] 2 SCR 690
referred to
Para 8
[2012] 8 SCR 295
referred to
Para 8
[2010] 13 SCR 851
referred to
Para 8(i)
[1952] SCR 1091
referred to
Para 8(ii)
[2008] 4 SCR 783
referred to
Para 8(ii)
[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595
referred to
Para 8(iii)
[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 474
referred to
Para 8(iii)
[2013] 14 SCR 983
referred to
Para 8(iii)
[2017] 3 SCR 630
referred to
Para 8(iii)
[1978] 1 SCR 535
referred to
Para 8(iv)
[2011] 13 SCR 309
referred to
Para 8(iv)
[2011] 1 SCR 590
referred to
Para 8(iv)
[1969] 2 SCR 461
referred to
Para 9
[1981] 1 SCR 175
referred to
Para 9
[1973] 3 SCR 438
referred to
Para 9(i)
[1992] 3 SCR 247
referred to
Para 9(i)
[1965] 2 SCR 457
referred to
Para 9(i)
[1951] SCR 228
referred to
Para 10 (i)
[2008] 8 SCR 553
referred to
Para10(i)
[2011] 5 SCR 691
referred to
Para10(i)
[2014] 1 SCR 496
referred to
Para10(i)
[2014] 12 SCR 1037
referred to
Para 10(i)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [1967] 1 SCR 848
referred to
Para 10(ii)
[1977] 2 SCR 790
referred to
Para 10(ii)
[1985] 2 SCR 643
referred to
Para 10(ii)
(2002) 9 SCC 639
referred to
Para 10(ii)
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 766
referred to
Para 10(ii)
[1973] 1 SCR 1004
referred to
Para 10(iii)
[1981] 3 SCR 419
referred to
Para 10(iii)
[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 827
referred to
Para 10(iii)
[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 11
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 340
referred to
Para 11(ii)
[2007] 8 SCR 757
referred to
Para 11(ii)
[2008] 14 SCR 419
referred to
Para 12(i)
[2012] 13 SCR 47
referred to
Para 12(i)
[1963] 1 Suppl. SCR 912
referred to
Para 13
[1974] 3 SCR 760
referred to
Para 13
[1984] 2 SCR 914
referred to
Para 14(i)
[2011] 14 SCR 240
referred to
Para 14(i)
[1995] 3 SCR 905
referred to
Para 14(iii)
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284
referred to
Para 14(iv)
[1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 14(v)
(1994) 6 SCC 86
referred to
Para 15
[1961] 3 SCR 107
referred to
Para 15
[1959] 1 Suppl. SCR 274
referred to
Para 15
(1969) 2 SCC 662
referred to
Para 15
[2015] 5 SCR 605
referred to
Para 15 15
[1987] 2 SCR 1173
referred to
Para 16(xxxiv)
[1988] 2 SCR 962
referred to
Para 16(xxxv)
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 365
referred to
Para 16(xxxv)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] 3 SCR 307
referred to
Para 16(xxxv)
[1993] 3 SCR 497
referred to
Para 16(xxxv)
[2007] 1 SCR 855
referred to
Para 16(xxxv)
[2007] 1 SCR 174
referred to
Para 16(xxxv)
[2007] 3 SCR 769
referred to
Para 16(xxxv)
[2010] 5 SCR 927
referred to
Para 16(xxxv)
[2014] 2 SCR 589
referred to
Para 16(xxxv)
[2017] 13 SCR 156
referred to
Para 16(xxxvi)
[1994] 2 SCR 375
referred to
Para 16(xxxvii)
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 85
referred to
Para 16(xxxvii)
[2016] 3 SCR 865
referred to
Para 16(xxxvii)
[1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 263
referred to
Para 16(xxxviii)
[1987] 2 SCR 800
referred to
Para 16(xxxviii)
[1969] 1 SCR 219
referred to
Para 16(xxxviii)
[2008] 4 SCR 822
referred to
Para 16(xxxviii)
[2005] 1 SCR 1019
referred to
Para 16(xxxix)
[2014] 5 SCR 119
referred to
Para 16(xxxix)
[2005] 1 SCR 494
referred to
Para 16(xxxix)
[1999] 1 SCR 669
referred to
Para 16(xxxix)
[1980] 1 SCR 151
referred to
Para 16(xli)
[1987] 3 SCR 84
referred to
Para 16(xli)
[1988] 3 SCR 225
referred to
Para 16(xli)
[1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 127
referred to
Para 16(xli)
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 476
referred to
Para 16(xli)
[2008] 14 SCR 889
referred to
Para 16(xli)
[2015] 15 SCR 499
referred to
Para 16(xli)
(2020) 2 SCC 747
referred to
Para 16(xli)
[1953] SCR 1
referred to
Para 16(xlii)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [2009] 3 SCR 735
referred to
Para 16(xlii)
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 16(xliii)
[2017] 8 SCR 33
referred to
Para 16(xliv)
[1963] 2 Suppl. SCR 812
referred to
Para 16(xliv)
[1964] 4 SCR 280
referred to
Para 16(xliv)
[1968] 1 SCR 661
referred to
Para 16(xliv)
[1985] 1 SCR 29
referred to
Para 16(xliv)
[2011] 9 SCR 936
referred to
Para 16(xliv)
[1985] 3 SCR 743
referred to
Para 16 (xlvii)
[2009] 9 SCR 690
referred to
Para 16 (xlvii)
[2019] 5 SCR 91
referred to
Para 16(xlvii)
[1997] 1 SCR 797
referred to
Para 16(xlix)
[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 272
referred to
Para 16(li)
[2008] 12 SCR 179
referred to
Para 16(li)
[2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 79
referred to
Para 16 (lii)
[2008] 5 SCR 856
referred to
Para 16 (lii)
(2014) 4 SCC 513
referred to
Para 16 (lii)
[2018] 10 SCR 974
referred to
Para 16 (lii)
[2014] 8 SCR 128
referred to
Para 16(lv)
[2008] 14 SCR 179
referred to
Para 16(lix)
[1994] 1 SCR 579
referred to
Para 16(lx)
[1982] 2 SCR 31
referred to
Para 16(lx)
[2005] 2 SCR 879
referred to
Para 16(lx)
[ 2014] 7 SCR 569
referred to
Para 16(lx)
[1982] 2 SCR 272
referred to
Para 16(lxiii)
[1987] 2 SCR 677
referred to
Para 16(lxiii)
[2013] 3 SCR 547
referred to
Para 16(lxiii)
[2013] 3 SCR 493
referred to
Para 16(lxiii)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 4 SCR 503
referred to
Para 16(lxiii)
[1959] SCR 629
referred to
Para 16(lxiii)
[1958] SCR 1226
referred to
Para 16(lxiv)
[1952] SCR 435
referred to
Para 16(lxvii)
[1954] SCR 30
referred to
Para 16(lxvii)
[1979] 2 SCR 476
referred to
Para 16(lxvii)
[1950] SCR 869
referred to
Para 16(lxviii)
[1951] SCR 682
referred to
Para 16(lxviii)
[1992] 3 SCR 409
referred to
Para 16(lxix)
[1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 369
referred to
Para 16(lxix)
[1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 632
referred to
Para 16(lxix)
[1978] 1 SCR 641
referred to
Para 16(lxix)
[1984] 1 SCR 725
referred to
Para 16(lxix)
[2005] 3 SCR 345
referred to
Para 16(lxx)
[2004] 2 SCR 1092
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
(2000) 9 SCC 549
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
(2004) 13 SCC 504
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
(2005) 12 SCC 480
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
[2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 381
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
[2008] 8 SCR 1159
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
[2008] 12 SCR 1083
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
[2009] 1 SCR 533
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
[2012] 9 SCR 873
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
[2017] 6 SCR 513
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
[2018] 3 SCR 739
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
[2019] 5 SCR 1060
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
(2019) 9 SCC 165
referred to
Para 16(lxxi)
[2016] 3 SCR 579
referred to
Para 16(lxxii)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [1964] 2 SCR 608
referred to
Para 16(lxxiv)
[1970] 1 SCR 388
referred to
Para 16(lxxiv)
[1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 639
referred to
Para 16(lxxiv)
[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 349
referred to
Para 16(lxxiv)
(1996) 7 SCC 637
referred to
Para 16(lxxiv)
[2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 16(lxxiv)
[2009] 10 SCR 821
referred to
Para 16(lxxiv)
[2016] 1 SCR 1025
referred to
Para 16(lxxiv)
[ 2016] 7 SCR 689
referred to
Para 16(lxxiv)
[1955] 1 SCR 613
referred to
Para 16(lxxv)
[1958] SCR 1422
referred to
Para 16(lxxv)
[1972] 1 SCR 105
referred to
Para 16(lxxv)
[2020] 2 SCR 1
referred to
Para 16(lxxvii)
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 929
referred to
Para 16(lxxvii)
[2014] 1 SCR 465
referred to
Para 6(lxxix)
[1960] 3 SCR 116
referred to
Para 17(i)
[1961] 3 SCR 592
referred to
Para 17(i)
[1964] 7 SCR 137
referred to
Para 17(i)
(1972) 3 SCC 775
referred to
Para 17(ii)
[1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 142
referred to
Para 17(iv)
[1966] 1 SCR 134
referred to
Para 17(v)
[1998] 1 SCR 1153
referred to
Para 17(v)
[1966] 3 SCR 698
referred to
Para 17(ix)
AIR 1970 SC 1065
referred to
Para 17(ix)
[1975] 1 SCR 881
referred to
Para 17(ix)
[1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 459
referred to
Para 17(xi)
[2008] 13 SCR 1217
referred to
Para 17(xii)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963] 2 SCR 433
referred to
Para 17(xiv)
[2019] 6 SCR 701
referred to
Para 17(xiv)
[2004] 3 SCR 1148
referred to
Para 17(xxiv)
[2001] 3 SCR 900
referred to
Para 17(xxiv)
[2008] 1 SCR 605
referred to
Para 17(xxiv)
[2001] 2 SCR 644
referred to
Para 17(xxiv)
[1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 526
referred to
Para 17(xxiv)
(2020) 10 SCC 120
referred to
Para 17(xxiv)
[2008] 8 SCR 201
referred to
Para 17(xxv)
[1986] 1 SCR 939
referred to
Para 17(xxv)
[1979] 2 SCR 229
referred to
Para 17(xxvii)
[2002] 1 SCR 75
referred to
Para 17(xxvii)
[2008] 6 SCR 1116
referred to
Para 17(xxvii)
[2010] 2 SCR 78
referred to
Para 17(xxvii)
[2010] 11 SCR 669
referred to
Para 17(xxvii)
[2012] 10 SCR 1034
referred to
Para 17(xxvii)
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 472
referred to
Para 17(xxviii)
AIR 1958 SC 61
referred to
Para 17(xxx)
[2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 584
referred to
Para 17(xxx)
(2021) 7 SCC 369
referred to
Para 17(xxxii)
AIR 1953 SCC 394
referred to
Para 17(xxxiii)
[2015] 5 SCR 435
referred to
Para 17(xxxv)
[1991] 1 SCR 396
referred to
Para 17(xxxv)
[1973] 1 SCR 508
referred to
Para 17(xxxvi)
[1955] 1 SCR 1150
referred to
Para 17(xxxvii)
[2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 307
referred to
Para 17(xxxvii)
[2012] 8 SCR 993
referred to
Para 17(xxxvii)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [1982] 3 SCR 121
referred to
Para 17(xxxvii)
[1980] 3 SCR 383
referred to
Para 17 (xxxix)
[2003] 3 SCR 485
referred to
Para 17 (xxxix)
[1974] 2 SCR 704
referred to
Para 17(xl)
[1967] 2 SCR 340
referred to
Para 17(xli)
[1999] 3 SCR 977
referred to
Para 17(xlii)
[1970] 1 SCR 601
referred to
Para 17(xliv)
[1985] 3 SCR 969
referred to
Para 17(xliv)
[2015] 1 SCR 849
referred to
Para 17(xlvi)
[2007] 12 SCR 409
referred to
Para17(liii)
[2014] 1 SCR 885
held inapplicable
Para 17(lxi)
[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 680
held inapplicable
Para 17(lxi)
[1953] SCR 533
held inapplicable
Para 17(lxi)
[2015] 14 SCR 1037
held inapplicable
Para 17(lxi)
[1979] 2 SCR 717
referred to
Para 17(lxvi)
[1999] 1 SCR 117
referred to
Para 38
[1971] 1 SCR 422
held inapplicable
Para 49
[1979] 2 SCR 148
held inapplicable
Para 49
[1980] 3 SCR 1042
held inapplicable
Para 49
[ 2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 723
held inapplicable
Para 49
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 770
held inapplicable
Para 49
[2007] 7 SCR 800
held inapplicable
Para 49
[2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 712
referred to
Para 95
[1956] SCR 199
referred to
Para 95
[2017] 6 SCR 946
referred to
Para 111
(2011) 8 SCC 1
referred to
Para129
[2011] 8 SCR 725
referred to
Para 138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 SCR 532
referred to
Para 143
[1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 386
referred to
Para 143
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4634 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2014 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Application No. 1132 of 2012. With
SLP(C) NOS. 28394, 28922, 29273 OF 2011, SLP(CRL.) DIARY NO. 41063 OF 2015, SLP(CRL.) NOS. 9987, 10018, 10019 OF 2015, SLP(CRL.) NO. 993 OF 2016, T.P. (CRL.) NOS. 150, 151-157 OF 2016, WP(CRL.) NO. 152 OF 2016, SLP(CRL.) NO. 11839 OF 2019, SLP(CRL.) NOS. 2890, 5487 OF 2017, CRL. APPEAL NOS. 1269, 1270 OF 2017, 1271-1272 OF 2017, WP(CRL.) NO. 202 OF 2017, SLP(CRL.) DIARY NOS. 9360, 9365, 17000, 17462, 20250, 22529 OF 2018, SLP(CRL.) NOS. 1534, 1701-1703, 1705, 2971, 4078, 5444, 6922, 7408, 8156, 11049 OF 2018, CRL. APPEAL NOS. 223, 391-392, 793794, 1114, 1115, 1210 OF 2018, WP (CRL.) NOS. 26, 33, 75, 117, 173, 175, 184, 226, 251, 309, 333, 336 OF 2018, TRANSFERRED CASE (CRIMINAL) NOS. 3, 4, 5 OF 2018, TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1583 OF 2018, SLP(CRL.) NOS. 244, 3647, 4322-4324, 4546, 5153, 5350, 6834, 8111, 8174, 9541, 9652, 10627 OF 2019, W.P. (CRL.) NOS. 9 , 16, 49, 118, 119, 122, 127, 139, 147, 173, 205, 212, 217, 239, 244, 253, 261, 263, 266, 267, 272, 273, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 298, 299, 300, 303, 305, 306, 308, 309, 313, 326, 346, 365, 367 OF 2019, SLP(CRL.) NOS. 647, 260, 618, 1732, 2023, 2814, 3366, 3474, 5536, 6128, 6172, 6303, 6456, 6660 OF 2020, W.P. (CRL.) NOS. 5, 9, 28, 35, 36, 39, 49, 52, 60, 61, 89, 90, 91, 93, 124, 137, 140, 142, 145, 169, 184, 221, 223, 228, 239, 240, 259, 267, 285, 286, 311, 329, 366, 380, 385, 387, 404, 410, 411, 429 OF 2020, W.P. (C) NO. 1401 OF 2020, SLP(CRL.) DIARY NOS. 8626, 31616, 11605 OF 2021, SLP(CRL.) NOS. 609, 734, 1031, 1072, 1073, 1107, 1355, 1440, 1403, 1586, 1855, 1920, 2050-2054, 2237, 2250, 2435, 2818, 3228, 3274, 3439, 3514, 3629, 3769, 3813, 3921, 4024, 4834, 5156, 5174, 5252, 5457, 5652, 5696-5697, 6189, 6338, 6847, 7021-7023, 8429 OF 2021, SLP(C) NOS. 8764-8767, 20310 OF 2021, TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 435 OF 2021, WP (C) No. 56 OF 2021, WP (CRIMINAL) NOS. 4, 6, 11, 18, 19, 21, 27, 33, 40, 47, 66, 69, 144, 179, 199, 207, 239, 263, 268, 282, 301, 323, 359, 370, 303, 305, 453, 454, 475, 520, 532 OF OF 2021.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Tushar Mehta, SG, Suryaprakash V. Raju, Aman Lekhi, K M Nataraj, S.V. Raju, Ms.Aishwarya Bhati, Jayant Kr. Sud, Vikramjit Banerjee, S. V. Raju, Sanjay Jain, ASGs, B.K. Satija, Samar Vijay Singh, Ms.Ruchi Kohli, Vishal Mahajan, AAGs, Kapil Sibal, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sidharth Luthra, Mukul Rohatgi, Vivek Reddy, Vikram Chaudhari, Suryanarayana Singh, A. Mariarputham, Maninder Singh, S.B. Upadhyay, S. Niranjan Reddy, Siddharth Aggarwal, Pramod K. Dubey, Jagmohan Bansal, Amit K Desai, Dr.Menaka Guruswamy, Aabad Ponda, Mahesh Jethmalani, Vikas Singh, N. Hariharan, Sr. Advs., Mahesh Agarwal, Anshuman Srivastava, Prasouk Jawin, Ms.Rabiya Thakur, Nishant Rao, E.C. Agrawala, Arshdeep Singh Khurana, Prateek Chadha, Adit S. Pujari, Amit Bhandari, Akshat Gupta, Ms.Madhavi Agrawal, Ms.Ambika Mathur, Shreedhar Kale, Raghav Tankha, Harsh Mittal, Mrs. Shally Bhasin, Balaji Subramanian, Ms.Ishani Banerjee, SCV Vimal Pani, Ms.L Maheswari, A. Lakshminarayanan, Tarun Dua, Anant Garg, Asif Ahmad, Adityaa Raju, Suhaan Mukerji, Shri Singh, Aditya Dewan, Vishal Prasad, Ms.Chitralekha Das, Nikhil Parikshith, Dewang Singh Chauhan, Abhishek Manchanda, Chirag Madan, Ms.Shubhangini Jain, Sayandeep Pahari, Ms.Padma Venkataraman, M/S. Plr Chambers And Co., Pratik Reddy, Victor Das, Ms.Anwesha Padhi, Mohit Rai, Atul Agarwal, Sourabh Kumar Mishra, Kumar Dushyant Singh, Keshavam Chaudhari, Amit K. Nain, Harshit Sethi, Rishi Sehgal, Ms.Ria Khanna, Devanshu Yadav, Kapil Dahiya, Raktim Gogoi, Varun Shekhar, Kartikeya Singh, Samarth Shandilya, Gautam Awasthi, Ms.Anzu K. Varkey, Nikhil Jain, Hemant Shah, Sangram S. Saron, Vinod Kumar Jain, Satya Prakash, Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Avadh Bihari Kaushik, Anand Dilip Dagga, Rajat Nair, Sairica Raju, Ms.Sharadha Deshmukh, Neela Kedar Gokhale, Ritwiz Rishabh, Sharath Nambiyar, A k Sharma, Ms.Nisha Bagchi, Binu Tamta, Arvind Kumar Sharma, K.M. Nataraj, Ms.Zoheb Hussain, Ms.Sairica Raju, Ms.Shradha Deshmukh, Ms.Neela Kedar Gokhale, Sharath Nambiar, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Anshuman Singh, Ankit Bhatia, Arpit Goel, Om Prakash Shukla, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Kanu Agarwal, Zoheb Hossain, Ms. Aastha Mehta, Ms.Deepanwita Priyanka, Ms.Archana Pathak Dave, Sughosh Subramanium, Ms.Swarupama Chaturvedi, B. V. Balaram Das, G.S Makker, Avneesh Arputham, M/S. Arputham Aruna And Co, Syed Abdul Haseeb, Adit Khorana, Mayank Pandey, Deepbali Datta, Rajan Kr. Chourasia, Ms.Deepabali
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Duttai, M.K. Maroria, B. Vinodh Kanna, Vansaja Shukla, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Ms.Monika Gusain, Varun Shankar, Lakshman RS, Atharva Koppal, Divyanshu Jain, Arnav Narain, Pawan R. Upadhyay, Mrs. Sharmila Upadhyay, Ms.Anisha Upadhyay, Sarvjit Pratap Singh, Gaurav Prakash Pathak, Nishant Kumar, Raghenth Basant, Yogesh Raavi, Anirudh Reddy, Ms. Liz Mathew, Shishir Mathur, Shohit Chaudhry, Mukul Singh, D.L. Chidnanad, Amit Sharma, Ms.Rukhimini Bobde, A.K. Sharma, Vivek Jain, Ms.Suchitra Kumbhat, Prithveesh MK, Gurpreet S. Parwanda, Nishanth Patil, Ms.Malvika Kala, Adarsh Aggarwal, Ajay Aggarwal, Aman Garg, Mohinder Singh, Suresh Jhunthra, Rajan Narain, Ms.Deepabali Datta, S. Hari Haran, Ms.Sairica S Raju, Naveen Malhotra, S. Mahesh Sahasranaman, Gopalkrishna Shenoy, Ms.Prapti Allagh, Prateek K Chadha, Ms.Ayushi Rajput, Ms.Radhika Dhanotia, Yash S. Vijay, Shaffi Mather, Parmatma Singh, Mayank Jain, Madhur Jain, Ms. Neha Sharma, Ms.Binu Tamta, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, Neeraj Kumar Sharma, Subhash Jadhav, Chandan Singh Shekhawat, Pranav Sarthi, Ms.Natabrata Bhattacharya, Ms. Awantika Manohar, Ms.Natasha Vinayak, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Rajiv Shankar Dvivedi, Rishabh Jain, Sushant Kr. Sarkar, Ms.Arti Dvivedi, Saurabh Mishra, Sunil Fernandes, Swaroop Anand, Ms.Nupur Kumar, Prastut Dalvi, Nagendra R. Naik, Pai Amit, Ms.Pankhuri Bhardwaj, Ms.Bhavana Duhoon, Ms. Christi Jain, Hitesh Jain, Ms.Gunjan Mangla, Chadan Singh Shekhawat, Nikhil Ahuja, Tawanji Shukla, Ms. Malvika Kapila, Ms. Anjali Jha, Ms.Anjali Jha Manish, Priyadarshi Manish, Ms.Divyanshee Singh, Shivam Sharma, Raj Kishor Choudhary, Varun Raghavan, Shakeel Ahmed, Ms.Malvika Raghavan, Satish Pandey, Salim Ansari, Rajesh Pandey, Akbar Ali, Vikas Gupta, S. K. Verma, Narender Hooda, Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, Ms. Preeti Singh, Mrs. Malbika Sarkar, Devanshu Yadav, Dr. G.K. Sarkar, Prashant Srivatav, Ayush Choudhary, Sameer Pandey, Omar Ahmed, Malak Manish Bhatt, Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Aditya Gupta, Jaspal Singh, Vijay Aggarwal, Mudit Jain, Yugant Sharma, Ms. Astha Sharma, Ms. Mantika Haryani, Ajit Sharma, Prithvees MK, Nishanth Patil, Ms. Shubhika Saluja, Vivek Jain, Zulfiquar Memom, Mrinal Bharti, Parvez Memom, Chirag Naik, Ms.Vaijayanti Sharma, Nirvikar Singh, Manish Shekhari, Palash Bhatkoti, Nitin Sharma, Karan Bharihoke, Kunal Verma, E. M. S. Anam, Vishnu Shanker, Ms. Ranjana Roy Gawai, Ms. Vasudha Sen, Ujjawal Jain, Ms. Divya Roy, Sunil Kumar Jain, Fuzail Ahmad Ayyubi,
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Irshad Ahmad, Shailesh Madiyal, Sudhanshu Prakash, Vaibhav Sabhrawal, Ms.Rakhi M., Ms.Neha Jain, Sruthi Iyer, Neha Jain, Ms.Kanishka Prasad, Abbula kalam, Ibad Mushtaq, Ms.Akanksha Rai, Pawan Upadhyay, S. S. Sastry, Rajender Vats, Vipul Srivastav, M/S. Unuc Legal Llp, M/S. Ap & J Chambers, Bharadwaj S., Ranjit Kumar Sharma, Mrs. Priya Puri, Arshdeep, Sharad Puri, Ranjay Dubey, Yati Sharma, G.Sivabalamurugan, Aljo K. Joseph, Ranjan Kumar, Mrs. Shelna K., Nikilesh Ramachandran, Manish Pratap Singh, Ms. Mahima Bhardwaj, Vivek Narayan Sharma, Tushar Kumar, Rajeev Kumar Jha, Pranshu Kaushal, Shubham Awasthi, Ajay Singh, Braj K. Mishara, Vijay Kumar, Arun Raghavender, Ms.Bharti Tyagi, Shantanu M. Adkar, R. Lakshmishankar, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Ms.Bina Madhavan, Sanjay Indukuri, R. Narayan Kumar, Ms.Akansha Mehra, M/S. Lawyer’s S Knit & Co., Akshay Nagarajan, Rishi Malhotra, Ms.Sonia Dube, Shatadru Chakraborty, Ms.Kanchan Yadav, Surbhi Anand, M/S. Legal Options, Tanveer Ahmed Mir, Arjun Singh Bhati, Dhruv Gupta, Vaibhav Suri, Prabhav Ralli, Ms.Urja Pandey, Amit Gupta, Akhilesh Dubey, Dharmesh Joshi, Uttam Dubey, Hari Sankar Mahaptra, Bhavini Sribastava, M/S. Mitter & Mitter Co., Gursharan S. Virk, Nakul Mohta, Ms. Misha Rohatgi, Devansh Shrivastava, Johnson Subba, Deepak Prakash, Abhishek A. Rastogi, Pratushpava Saha, Mahir Chablani, Rohit Ghosh, Ms.Kanika Sharma, M/S. Khaitan & Co., M. T. George, Ms.Susy, Johns George, Ms. Rashi Bansal, Shekhar G Devasa, Manish Tiwari, Shashi Bhushan Nagar, Ramesh Jadhav, M/S. Devasa & Co., Namit Saxena, Awnish Maithani, Ms.Arushi Dhawan, M.K. Subramanian, Vinodh Kanna B., Ritesh Patil, Shamik Shirishbhai Sanjanwala, Ms.Diksha Rai, Ankit Agarwal, Prateek Bhardwaj, Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, Polanki Gowtham, Shaik Mohamad Haneef, T. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy, K.V. Girish Chowdary, Ms. Rajeswari Mukherjee, Devendra Kumar Singh, Karunakar Mahalik, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Syed Ahmed Saud, Daanish Ahmad Syed, Mohd. Parvez Dabas, Uzmi Jameel Husain, Aqib Baig, Mohd. Shahib, Sunil Sarogi, M/S. Shakil Ahmad Syed, Dr.Sujay Kantawala, Azmat Hayat Amanullah, Nishant Awana, Sagar Chauhan, Ms.Nitya Sharma, Devansh Malhotra, Sujit Sahoo, Aditya Talpade, Divyesh Pratap Singh, Ms.Srishti Singh, Gautam Talukdar, A.P. Singh, Shreyansh Rathi, M/S. M. V. Kini & Associates, Sarvesh Singh Baghel, Mukhtar Alam, Ms.Natasha, B. Krishna Prasad, Balaji Srinivasan, M B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
R S Raju, Mrs. Lakshmi Rao, Prateek Yadav, Mohammad Shahrukh, Ms.Pallavi Sengupta, Ms.Garima Jain, Ms.Aakriti Priya, Suhail Ahmed, V. Shyamohan, Ms.Jaspreet Gogia, Ms.Mandakini Singh, Karanvir Gogia, Ms.Shivangi Singhal, Ms.Ashima Mandla, O. P. Gaggar, Ashoka Kumar Thakur, Imran Khan, Anil K. Chopra, Shreeyash U. Lalit, Mahesh Kumar, Vishal Sharma, Ms.Devika Khanna, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Chirag M. Shroff, Amandeep Mehta, Gaurav Malhotra, Samir Ali Khan, Rahul Chitnis, Sachin Patil, Aaditya A. Pande, Geo Joseph, Ms.Shwetal Shepal, V. N. Raghupathy, Nishe Rajen Shonker, Ms.Anu K. Joy, Alim Anvar, Akash Kakade, Somanatha Padhan, Swetab Kumar, Sukhada Kakade, Dr.Monika Gusain, Dinesh Kumar Sabharwal, Sameer Bhatnagar, Syed Mehdi Imam, V. Vasudevan, Aswathi M.K., Birj Kant Mishra, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S.K. Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms.Maneesha Kongovi, R. Sudhinder, Ms.Prerana Amitabh, Shivabhushan Hatti, Shashank Dixit, R Gopalakrishan, V. Vasudev, Awasthi M.K., Gautam Khazanchi, Anshuman Sinha, Vijay Pande, Ms.Jaikriti S Jadeja, Ms.Pragya Sharma, Vinay Prakash, Amit, Maneesh Saxena, Vipin Kumar Saxena, Ms.Kajal Rani, Ms. Natasha Dalmia, Anand Varma, Mayank Jain, Madhur Jain, A. Selvin Raja, Dhruv Gupta, Prabhav Ralli, Ms.Kartika Sharma, Shreyansh Agrawal, Ms.Rooh-eHina Dua, Rajive Bhalla, Rajiv Malhotra, Yajur Bhalla, Deepak Samota, Sumeir Ahuja, Shubham Bhalla, V. Purushothaman Reddy, Ms.Misha Rohatgi Mohta, Johnson Subba, Somanath Padhan, Swetab Kumar, Rishabh Jain, Jyoti Kumar Singh, Saurabh Mishra, Sachin Jolly, Akshay Anand, Ms.Maneesha Kongovi, R Sudhinder, Ms.Prerana Amitabh, Shivabhushan Hatti, R Gopalakrishnan, Vishal Gosain, Nagarkatti Kartik Uday, Ms.Deepika Kalia, Ms.Adya Rajkotia Luthra, Sandeep Sharma, Sunny Choudhary, E. C. Agrawala, Raj Kamal, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Ms.Kartika Sharma, Arav Pandit, Shreyansh Agrawal, Ms.Roohe Hina Dua, Wills Mathews, Mathen Joseph, Devendra Kumar Tiwari, Paul John Edison, Rakesh Garg, Ashish Gopal Garg, Ms.Shweta Garg, Navanjay Mahapatra, S.A. Haseeb, Adit Khorana, Ankur Chawla, V.K.Biju, Ms.Ria Sachthey, Chetanya Singh, Amlendu Kumar Akhilesh Kumar Jha, Abhay Pratap Singh, Shaji George, Ms.Vijay Laxmi, T. G. Narayanan Nair, Ms. Shweta Garg, G. Prakash, D.Kumanan, Narender Kumar Verma, Pranav Sachdeva, K. Paari Vendhan, Ms. Uma Devi. M, Advs. for the appearing parties.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. Table of Contents
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
PREFACE 1. In the present batch of petition(s)/appeal(s)/case(s), we are called upon to deal with the pleas concerning validity and interpretation of certain provisions of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 1 and the procedure followed by the Enforcement Directorate2 while inquiring into/investigating offences under the PMLA, being violative of the constitutional mandate. (a) It is relevant to mention at the outset that after the decision of this Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India & Anr. 3, the Parliament amended Section 45 of the 2002 Act vide Act 13 of 2018, so as to remove the defect noted in the said decision and to revive the effect of twin conditions specified in Section 45 to offences under the 2002 Act. This amendment came to be challenged before different High Courts including this Court by way of writ petitions. In some cases where relief of bail was prayed, the efficacy of amended Section 45 of the 2002 Act was put in issue and answered by the concerned High Court. Those decision(s) have been assailed before this Court and the same is forming part of this batch of cases. At the same time, separate writ petitions have been filed to challenge several other provisions of the 2002 Act and all those cases have been tagged and heard together as overlapping issues have been raised by the parties. (b) We have various other civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, special leave petitions, transferred petitions and transferred cases before us, raising similar questions of law pertaining to constitutional validity and interpretation of certain provisions of the other statutes including the Customs Act, 19624, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 20175, the Companies Act, 20136, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19887, the Indian Penal Code, 18608 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19739 which are also under challenge. However, we are confining ourselves only with challenge to the provisions of PMLA.
For short, “PMLA” or “the 2002 Act” For short, “ED” (2018) 11 SCC 1 For short, “1962 Act” or “the Customs Act” For short, “CGST Act” For short, “Companies Act” For short, “PC Act” For short, “IPC” For short, “Cr.P.C. or “the 1973 Code”
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
(c) As aforementioned, besides challenge to constitutional validity and interpretation of provisions under the PMLA, there are special leave petitions filed against various orders of High Courts/subordinate Courts across the country, whereby prayer for grant of bail/quashing/discharge stood rejected, as also, special leave petitions concerned with issues other than constitutional validity and interpretation. Union of India has also filed appeals/special leave petitions; and there are few transfer petitions filed under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of India.
(d) Instead of dealing with facts and issues in each case, we will be confining ourselves to examining the challenge to the relevant provisions of PMLA, being question of law raised by parties.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PRIVATE PARTIES 2. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the private parties/petitioners in the concerned matter(s) submitted that the procedure followed by the ED in registering the Enforcement Case Information Report10 is opaque, arbitrary and violative of the constitutional rights of an accused. It was submitted that the procedure being followed under the PMLA is draconian as it violates the basic tenets of the criminal justice system and the rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution of India, in particular Articles 14, 20 and 21 thereof. (i) A question was raised as to whether there can be a procedure in law, where penal proceedings can be started against an individual, without informing him of the charges? It was contended that as per present situation, the ED can arrest an individual on the basis of an ECIR without informing him of its contents, which is per se arbitrary and violative of the constitutional rights of an accused. The right of an accused to get a copy of the First Information Report10A at an early stage and also the right to know the allegations as an inherent part of Article 21. Reference was made to Youth Bar Association of India vs. Union of India & Anr.11 in support of this plea. Further, as per law, the agencies investigating crimes need to provide a list of all the documents and materials seized to the accused in order to be consistent with the
For short, “ECIR” For short, “FIR” (2016) 9 SCC 473 (Para 11.1); and Court on its Own Motion vs. State, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4309 (Paras 39 & 54) 10A
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principles of transparency and openness12. It was also submitted that under the Cr.P.C., every FIR registered by an officer under Section 154 thereof is to be forwarded to the jurisdictional Magistrate. However, this procedure is not being followed in ECIR cases. Further, violation of Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. was also alleged and it was submitted that this has led to non-compliance with the procedure prescribed under the law (Cr.P.C.) and the law laid down by this Court in catena of decisions. It was vehemently argued that in some cases the ECIR is voluntarily provided, while in others it is not, which is completely arbitrary and discriminatory. (ii) It was argued that as per definition of Section 3 of the PMLA, the accused can either directly or indirectly commit money-laundering if he is connected by way of any process or activity with the proceeds of crime and has projected or claimed such proceeds as untainted property. In light of this, it was suggested that the investigation may shed some light on such alleged proceeds of crime, for which, facts must first be collected and there should be a definitive determination whether such proceeds of crime have actually been generated from the scheduled offence. Thus, there must be at least a prima facie quantification to ensure that the threshold of the PMLA is met and it cannot be urged that the ECIR is an internal document. Therefore, in the absence of adherence to the requirements of the Cr.P.C. and the procedure established by law, these are being violated blatantly13. (iii) An anomalous situation is created where based on such ECIR, the ED can summon accused persons and seek details of financial transactions. The accused is summoned under Section 50 of the PMLA to make such statements which are treated as admissible in evidence. Throughout the process, the accused might well be unaware of the allegations against him. It is clear that Cr.P.C. has separate provisions for summoning of the accused under Section 41A and for witnesses under Section 160. The same distinction is absent under the PMLA. Further, Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. is not being followed by the ED and, as such, there are no governing principles of investigation, no legal criteria Criminal Trials Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies and Deficiencies, In re, vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., (2021) 10 SCC 598 (Para 11); also see: Nitya Dharmananda & Anr. vs. Gopal Sheelum Reddy & Anr., (2018) 2 SCC 93 (Para 8). Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (2014) 2 SCC 1 (Para 120.1)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
and guiding principles which are required to be followed. As such, the initiation of investigation by the ED, which can potentially curtail the liberty of the individual, would suffer from the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution of India14.
(iv) Mr. Sibal, while referring to the definition of “moneylaundering” under Section 3 of the PMLA, submitted that the ED must satisfy itself that the proceeds of crime have been projected as untainted property for the registration of an ECIR or the application of the PMLA. It has been vehemently argued that the offence of money-laundering requires the proceeds of crime to be mandatorily ‘projected or claimed’ as ‘untainted property’. Meaning thereby that Section 3 is applicable only to the generation of proceeds of crime, such proceeds being projected or claimed as untainted property. It is stated that the pertinent condition of ‘and’ projecting or claiming cannot be ousted and made or interpreted to be ‘or’ by the Explanation that has been brought about by way of the amendment made vide Finance (No.2) Act, 2019. It has been submitted that such an act would also be unconstitutional, as being enlarging the ambit of a principal section by way of adding an Explanation. (v) It is also stated that the general practice is that the ED registers an ECIR immediately upon an FIR of a predicate offence being registered. The cause of action being entirely different from the predicate offence, as such, can lead to a situation where there is no difference between the predicate offence and money-laundering. In support of the said argument, reliance was placed on the Article 3 of the Vienna Convention15, where words like “conversion or transfer of property”, “for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions”, have been used. It is urged that what was sought to be criminalised was not the mere acquisition and use of proceeds of crime, but it was the conversion or transfer for the purpose of either concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property to evade the legal consequences of one’s actions. Reference was also made to the Preamble of the PMLA which
E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (1974) 4 SCC 3; also see: S.G. Jaisinghani vs. Union of India and Ors, (1967) 2 SCR 703 and Nikesh Tarachand Shah, (supra at Footnote No.3) (Paras 21-23). United Nations adopted and signed the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (hereinafter referred to as “Vienna Convention” or “the 1988 Convention” or “the UN Drugs Convention”, as the case may be)
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refers to India’s global commitments to combat the menace of moneylaundering. Learned counsel has then referred to the definition of “moneylaundering” as per the Prevention of Money-Laundering Bill, 199916 to show how upon reference to the Select Committee of the Rajya Sabha, certain observations were made and, hence, the amendment was effected, wherein the words “and projecting it as untainted property” were added to the definition which was finally passed in the form of PMLA. We have reproduced the relevant sections/provisions hereinbelow at the appropriate place. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Nikesh Tarachand Shah17. (vi) The safeguard provided by Section 173 of the Cr.P.C., it is argued, was present in the original enactment of 2002 (PMLA). The same has now supposedly been whittled down by various amendments over the years. It has been submitted that by way of amendments in 2009, proviso have been added to Sections 5 and 17, which have diluted certain safeguards. Further, it is submitted that the safeguard under Section 17(1) has been totally done away with in the amendment made in 2019. To further this argument, it has been suggested that the filing of chargesheet in respect of a predicate offence was impliedly there in Section 19 of the PMLA, since there is a requirement which cannot be fulfilled sans an investigation, to record reasons to believe that ‘any person has been guilty of an offence punishable under this Act’. In respect of Section 50, it is urged that though there is no threshold mentioned in the Act, yet the persons concerned should be summoned only after the registration of the ECIR. It is, thus, submitted that any attempt to prosecute under the PMLA without prima facie recordings would be inconsistent with the Act itself and violative of the fundamental rights. (vii) It is urged that the derivate Act cannot be more onerous than the original. It is suggested that the proceeds of crime and the predicate offence are entwined inextricably. Further, the punishment for generation of the proceeds of crime cannot be disproportionate to the punishment for the underlying predicate offence. The same analogy ought to apply to the procedural protections, such as those provided under Section 41A of the Cr.P.C., which otherwise would be foul of the constitutional protections under Article 21.
For short, “1999 Bill” Supra at Footnote No.3 (Para 11)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
(viii) Learned counsel has also challenged the aspect of the Schedule being overbroad and inconsistent with the PMLA and the predicate offences. It is argued that even in the Statements of Objects and Reasons of the 1999 Bill, it has been stated that the Act was brought in to curb the laundering stemming from trade in narcotics and drug related crimes. Reference is also made to the various conventions that are part of the jurisprudence behind the PMLA18. It was to be seen in light of organised crime, unlike its application today to less heinous crimes such as theft. It is submitted that there was no intention or purpose to cover offences under the PMLA so widely. It is also submitted that there are certain offences which are less severe and heinous than moneylaundering itself and that the inclusion of such offences in the Schedule does not have a rational nexus with the objects and reasons of the PMLA and the same is unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
(ix) It has been submitted that the PMLA cannot be a standalone statute. To bolster this claim, reliance has been placed on speeches made by Ministers in the Parliament. Further reliance has been placed on K.P. Varghese vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulum & Anr.19, Union of India & Anr. vs. Martin Lottery Agencies Limited 20 and P. Chidambaram vs. Directorate of Enforcement21. (x) Our attention is also drawn to the provisions which have now been replaced in the statute. Prior to 2013 amendment, Section 8(5) of the PMLA was to the following effect: -
“8. Adjudication— …. (5) Whereon conclusion of a trial for any scheduled offence, the person concerned is acquitted, the attachment of the
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (for short, “Vienna Convention”); Basle Statement of Principles, 1989; Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, 1990; Political Declaration and Global Program of Action adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 23.02.1990; and Resolution passed at the UN Special Session on countering World Drug Problem Together – 8th to 10th June 1998. (1981) 4 SCC 173 (Para 8) (2009) 12 SCC 209 (Para 38) (2019) 9 SCC 24 (Para 25)
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property or retention of the seized property or record under subsection (3) and net income, if any, shall cease to have effect.” However, vide amendment in 2013, the words ‘trial for any scheduled offence’ were replaced with the words ‘trial of an offence under this Act’. It is urged that for the property to qualify as proceeds of crime, it must be connected in some way with the activity related to the scheduled offence. Meaning thereby that if there is no scheduled offence, there can be no property derived directly or indirectly; thus, an irrefutable conclusion that a scheduled offence is a pre-requisite for generation of proceeds of crime. (xi) It is further argued that an Explanation has been added to Section 44(1)(d) of the PMLA by way of Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019, which posits that a trial under the PMLA can proceed independent of the trial of scheduled offence. It is submitted that the Explanation is being given a mischievous interpretation when it ought to be read plainly and simply. It is stated that the Explanation relates only to the Special Court and not the trial of the scheduled offence. It is submitted that a Special Court can never convict a person under the PMLA without returning a finding that a scheduled offence has been committed. (xii) It is submitted that the application of Cr.P.C. is necessary since it is a procedure established by law and there cannot be an investigation outside the purview of Section 154 or 155 of the Cr.P.C. Reference is made to the constitutional safeguards of reasonability and fairness. It is submitted that the Act itself, under Section 65, provides for the applicability of the Cr.P.C.22 It is pointed out that several safeguards, procedural in nature are being violated. To illustrate a few - non registration of FIR, lack of a case diary, restricted access to the ECIR, violation of Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., Section 41A of the Cr.P.C., lack of magisterial permission under Section 155 of the Cr.P.C. Such unguided use of power to investigate and prosecute any person violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. (xiii) Another argument raised by the learned counsel is that the ED officers are police officers. It is submitted that the determination of the same depends on: (1) what is the object and purpose of the special statute and (2) the nature of power exercised by such officers? The first Ashok Munilal Jain & Anr. vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, (2018) 16 SCC 158 (Paras 3-5)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
argument in this regard is that if it can be shown that in order to achieve the objectives of the special statute - preventive and detection steps to curb crime are permitted and coercive powers are vested, then such an officer is a police officer. Further, such an officer is covered within the ambit of Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 187223. In support of the test to gauge the objective of the statute, reference has been made to State of Punjab vs. Barkat Ram24, wherein it was held —a customs officer is not a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the 1872 Act. It is also stated that police officers had to be construed not in a narrow way but in a wide and popular sense. Reference is made to Sections 17 and 18 of the Police Act, 1861 25, whereunder an appointment of special police officers can be made. Thus, it is stated that it is not necessary to be enrolled under the 1861 Act, but if one is invested with the same powers i.e., the powers for prevention and detection of crime, one will be a police officer. Then, the PMLA is distinguished from the 1962 Act, Sea Customs Act, 187826, Central Excise Act, 194427 and the CGST Act. The dissenting opinion of Subba Rao, J. in Barkat Ram28 is also relied upon. Thereafter, it is stated that PMLA, being a purely penal statute, one needs to look at the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1999 Bill and the Financial Action Task Force29 recommendations.
(xiv) Reliance was also placed on Raja Ram Jaiswal vs. State of Bihar30. Further, it has been stated that even in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu31, the case of Raja Ram Jaiswal32 has been relied upon and it is concluded that when a person is vested with the powers of investigation, he is said to be a police officer, as he prevents and detects crime. Further, the powers under Section 50 of the PMLA for the purpose of investigation are in consonance with what has been
For short, “the 1872 Act” or “the Evidence Act” (1962) 3 SCR 338; Also see: Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 882 (Para 88) For short, “1861 Act” For short, “1878 Act” or “the Sea Customs Act” For short, “1944 Act” or “the Central Excise Act” Supra at Footnote No.24 For short, “FATF” – an inter-governmental body, which is the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. AIR 1964 SC 828 2020 SCC OnLine SC 882 (Para 88) (also at Footnote No.24) Supra at Footnote No.30
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held in Tofan Singh33 and establishes a direct relationship with the prohibition under Section 25 of the 1872 Act. Another crucial point raised is that most statutes where officers have not passed the muster of ‘police officers’ in the eyes of law, contain the term “enquiry” in contrast with the term “investigation” used in Section 50 of the PMLA. A parallel has also been drawn between the definition of “investigation” under the PMLA in Section 2(1)(na) and Section 2(h) of the Cr.P.C. Further, it is urged that the test of power to file ‘chargesheet’ is not determinative of being a police officer. (xv) It is then urged that Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA stipulates that cognizance can be taken only on a complaint being made by the Authority under the PMLA. Whereas, in originally enacted Section 44(1)(b), both the conditions i.e., ‘filing of a police report’, as well as, ‘a complaint made by an authority’ were covered. Learned counsel also reminisces of the speech of the then Finance Minister on the Prevention of Money-Laundering (Amendment) Bill, 200534 in the Lok Sabha on 06.05.2005. However, it was also conceded that the amendment of Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA removed the words, “upon perusal of police report of the facts which constitute an offence under this Act or”. Next amendment made was insertion of Section 45(1A) and Section 73(2)(ua), by which the right of police officers to investigate the offence under Section 3 was restricted unless authorised by the Central Government by way of a general or special authorisation. Further amendment was deletion of Section 45(1)(a) of the PMLA, making the offence of money-laundering under the PMLA a non-cognizable offence. Further, it is submitted that amendment to Section 44(1)(b) has been made as a consequence for making the offence under the PMLA noncognizable. It is stated that even today if investigation is done by a police officer or another, he can only file a complaint and not a police report. Therefore, the above-mentioned test is irrelevant and inapplicable. Absurdity that arises is due to two investigations being conducted, one by a police officer and the other by the authorities specified under Section 48. An additional point has been raised that the difference between a complaint under the PMLA and a chargesheet under the Cr.P.C. is only a nomenclature norm and they are essentially the same thing. Thus, basing the determination of whether one is a police officer or not, on the nomenclature, is not proper.
Supra at Footnote No.31 (also at Footnote No.24) For short, “2005 Amendment Bill”
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
(xvi) In respect of interpretation and constitutionality of Section 50 of the PMLA, our attention is drawn to Section 50(2) which pertains to recording of statement of a person summoned during the course of an investigation. In that, Section 50(3) posits that such person needs to state the truth. Further, he has to sign such statement and suffer the consequences for incorrect version under Section 63(2)(b); and the threat of penalty under Section 63(2) or arrest under Section 19.
(xvii) It is urged that in comparison to the constitutional law, the Cr.P.C. and the 1872 Act, the provisions under the PMLA are draconian and, thus, violative of Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution. Our attention is drawn to Section 160 of the Cr.P.C. when person is summoned as a witness or under Section 41A as an accused or a suspect. In either case, the statement is recorded as per Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Safeguards have been inserted by this Court in Nandini Satpathy vs. P.L. Dani & Anr.35, while also the protection under Section 161(2) is relied on. Thus, based on Sections 161 and 162, it is submitted that such evidence is inadmissible in the trial of an offence, unless it is used only for the purpose of contradiction as stipulated in Section 145 of the 1872 Act. Further, it is stated that proof of contradiction is materially different from and does not amount to the proof of the matter asserted36 and can only be used to cast doubt or discredit the testimony of the witness who is testifying before Court37. The legislative intent behind Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. is also relied upon, as has been held in Tahsildar Singh & Anr. vs. State of U.P.38. (xviii) It is, therefore, urged that the current practice of the ED is such that it violates all these statutory and constitutional protections by implicating an accused by procuring signed statements under threat of legal penalty. The protection under Section 25 of the 1872 Act is also pressed into service.
(xix) To make good the point, learned counsel proceeded to delineate the legislative history of Section 25 of the 1872 Act. He referred
(1978) 2 SCC 424 Tahsildar Singh & Anr. vs. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 (paras 16-17, 42); Also see: V.K. Mishra & Anr. vs. State of Uttarakhand & Anr., (2015) 9 SCC 588 (paras 1520) Somasundaram alias Somu vs. State represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, (2020) 7 SCC 722 (para 24) AIR 1959 SC 1012 (also at Footnote No.36)
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to the first report of the Law Commission of India and the Cr.P.C., which was based on gross abuse of power by police officers for extracting confessions.39 Further, this protection was transplanted into the 1872 Act40, where on the presumption that a confession made to a police officer was obtained through force or coercion was fortified41. It was pointed out that recommendations of three Law Commissions – 14th, 48th and 69th which advocated for allowance of such confessions to be admissible, were vehemently rejected in the 185th Law Commission Report. Thus, relying on Raja Ram Jaiswal42 where a substantial link between Section 25 of the 1872 Act, police officer and confession has been settled. Therefore, the present situation where prosecution can be mounted under Section 63 for failing to give such confessions is said to be contrary to procedure established by law interlinked with the right to a fair trial under Article 21. Reliance has also been placed on Selvi & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka43, the 180th Law Commission Report and Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. as being subsidiaries of right against selfincrimination and right to silence, not being read against him. (xx) Learned counsel then delineated on the preconditions for protection of Article 20(3). First, the person standing in the character of an accused, as laid down in State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad44, has been referred to. In this regard, it is submitted that the term may be given a wide connotation and an inclusion in the FIR, ECIR, chargesheet or complaint is not necessary and can be availed even by suspects at the time of interrogation. It is urged that both the position of law stands clarified in Nandini Satpathy45 and Selvi46 — even to the extent where answering certain questions can incriminate a person in other offences or where links are furnished in chain of evidence required for prosecution. It is then urged that the expression ‘shall be compelled’ is not restricted to physical state, but also mental state of mind and it is argued that nevertheless a broad interpretation must be given to the circumstances in which a person can be so compelled for recording of statement. Additionally, the term ‘to be a witness’ would take within its fold ‘to 185th Law Commission Report on the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (2003) See also: Barkat Ram (supra at Footnote No.24) Balkishan A. Devidayal vs. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 4 SCC 600 (para 14) Supra at Footnote No.30 (2010) 7 SCC 263 (paras 87-89) AIR 1961 SC 1808 Supra at Footnote No.35 Supra at Footnote No.43
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
appear as a witness’ and it is said that it must encompass protection even outside Court in investigations conducted by authorities such as the ED47. It was also argued that this protection should extend beyond statements that are confession, such as incriminating statements which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence against the person.
(xxi) It is submitted that the test which this Court ought to consider for determination of the vires of Section 50 of the PMLA is: whether a police officer is in a position to compel a person to render a confession giving incriminating statement against himself under threat of legal sanction and arrest? It is further pointed out that the ED as a matter of course records statement even when the accused person is in custody. In some circumstances, a person is not even informed of the capacity in which he/she is being summoned. What makes it worse is the fact that the ED claims the non-application of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. It does not register FIR and keeps the ECIR as an internal document. All the above-mentioned circumstances are said to render the questioning by the ED, which might not be restricted to the offence of money-laundering alone, as a testimonial compulsion48. Hence, advocating the protection of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, it is submitted that all safeguards and protections are rendered illusionary.
(xxii) Finally, an argument is raised that Section 50 of the PMLA is much worse than Section 67 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 198549. Further, the NDPS Act is the underlying reason for the PMLA and this Court in Tofan Singh50, in no uncertain terms, has given protection in respect of confessional statement even in the NDPS Act. The much harder and harsher punishment of death in the NDPS Act is also contrasted against the PMLA. It is also submitted that constitutional safeguards cannot be undermined by the usage of the term ‘judicial proceedings’. The term has been defined in Section 2(i) of the Cr.P.C. which includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence
M.P. Sharma & Ors. vs. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi & Ors., (1954) SCR 1077 (para 10). Even the applicability of Prevention of Money-Laundering (Forms, Search and Seizure or Freezing and the Manner of Forwarding the Reasons and Material to the Adjudicating Authority, Impounding and Custody of Records and the Period of Retention) Rules, 2005. For short, “NDPS Act” Supra at Footnote No.31 (also at Footnote No.24)
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is or may be legally ‘taken on oath’ 51. Section 50(1) has been distinguished for being in respect of only Section 13 of the PMLA. It is also submitted that the enforcement authority is not deemed to be a civil Court; it can be easily concluded that an investigation done by the enforcement authority is not a judicial proceeding and Section 50 of the PMLA falls foul of the constitutional safeguards. (xxiii) Pertinently, arguments have also been advanced in respect of the implication of laws relating to money bills and their application to the Amendment Acts to the PMLA. However, at the outset, we had mentioned that this issue is not a part of the ongoing discourse in this matter and we refrain from referring to the arguments raised in that regard. 3. Next submissions were advanced by Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsel on the same lines. He argued that the current procedure envisaged under the PMLA is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The procedure established by law has to be in the form of a statute or delegated legislation and pass the muster of the constitutional protections.52 The Cr.P.C. has several safeguards in respect of arrested investigation; they are also rooted in the Cr.P.C. of 1898. They are reflective of the constitutional protections. The manual, circulars, guidelines of the ED are executive in nature and as such, cannot be used for the curtailment of an individual liberty. Under the PMLA, there is no visible sign of these protections against police’s power of search and arrest; it is in stark contrast with the constitutional protections given also the reverse presumption against innocence at stage of bail under Section 45 of the PMLA. Further, the destruction of the presumption of innocence under Sections 22, 23 and 45 cannot even meet the test at the precomplaint and pre-cognizance stage53 and the accused cannot escape the rigors of custody as per Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. As such, these conditions of reverse burden are in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Presumption of innocence even in the pre-constitutional era has been a part of the right to a fair trial.54 After the Constitution
Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur vs. Ramdev Tobacco Company, (1991) 2 SCC 119 (para 6) Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240 (paras 1, 2, 10) Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2005) 5 SCC 294 (paras 10, 11 and 21). Attygalle & Anr. vs. The King, AIR 1936 PC 169
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
came into existence, it has formed a part of a human right and procedure established by law.55 Lack of oversight in an investigation under the PMLA is said to be in gross violation of justice, fairness and reasonableness. It is also pointed out that while the predicate offence might be investigated, protected under the garb of the Cr.P.C., the nonapplication of such safeguards under the PMLA is wholly unjustified. 56 The procedure as envisaged under the PMLA, especially under Section 17, vests the executive with the supervisory power in an investigation. The same is anathema to the rule of law and the magisterial supervision of an investigation is an integral part and is a necessity for ensuring free and fair investigation.57
(i) It is further submitted that not supplying of the ECIR to the accused is in gross violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, the ECIR being equivalent to an FIR instituted by the ED. It contains the grounds of arrest, details of the offences; and as such, without the knowledge of the ingredients of such a document the ability of the accused to defend himself at the stage of bail cannot be fully realized. It may also hamper the ability to prepare for the trial at a later stage58. Further, it is submitted that even under the 1962 Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 197359, Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. has been held to be applicable and also found to be a human right60. Further, it is argued that there is no rational basis for a search or a seizure to be reported to the Adjudicating Authority, as they have no control. Further, the PMLA has two sets of processes for attachment and confiscation which is subject to final determination. Hence, lack of judicial oversight is irrational, as attachment is a step-in aid for final adjudication. In absence of safeguards and supply of ECIR, a fair investigation is not a statutory obligation. This is contrary to the Constitution and the Cr.P.C. Further, it is submitted that personal liberty under Article 21 cannot be curtailed as the ED manuals, circulars and guidelines are administrative directions and cannot be regarded as law under Article 13 of the Constitution. Such restrictions on personal liberty based on administrative directions are neither reasonable
Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (2008) 16 SCC 417 State of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 571 (Para 68) Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 409 (paras 15-17) Youth Bar Association of India (supra at Footnote No.11); Also see: D.K. Basu vs. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416 For short, “FERA” Directorate of Enforcement vs. Deepak Mahajan & Anr., (1994) 3 SCC 440
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restrictions nor law under Articles 13 and 19(2) of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed on a plethora of cases, such as Bidi Supply Co. vs. Union of India & Ors.61, Collector of Malabar & Anr. vs. Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee62, G.J. Fernandes vs. The State of Mysore & Ors.63 and Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors.64 to show that the inapplicability of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. cannot be countenanced. (ii) It is also argued that the PMLA has inadequate safeguards for guaranteeing a fair investigation. For, there are no safeguards akin to Sections 41 to 41D, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 55A, 58, 60A of the Cr.P.C. Under Chapters V and VII of the PMLA, safeguards are limited to Sections 16 to 19 and 50. The onerous bail conditions under Section 45 are in the nature of jurisdiction of suspicion that is preventive detention under Article 22(3) to 22(7), which in itself has various safeguards which are absent in the PMLA. Further, post 2019 amendment, making moneylaundering a cognizable and non-bailable offence, there are no more checks and balances present against the exercise of discretion by the ED. Magisterial oversight has been revoked; also, supervision envisaged under Section 17 is that of the executive which is against the rule of law and right of fair trial65. It is also stated that under the current scheme, an accused will be subject to two different procedures which is under the predicate offence and under the PMLA. To illustrate, Sections 410 and 411 of the IPC are scheduled offences overlapping with Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA. However, the safeguards provided are nowhere uniform. The same is unreasonable and manifestly arbitrary66. It is also to be noted that the PMLA does not expressly exclude the application of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. and as such, ambiguity must be interpreted in a way that protects fundamental rights of the people67. (iii) The next leg of the argument is to the effect that subsequent amendment cannot revive Section 45, which was struck down as
AIR 1956 SC 479 (para 9) AIR 1957 SC 688 (paras 8,9) AIR 1967 SC 1753 (para 12) (1986) 3 SCC 615 (paras 9, 10, 13-19) Sakiri Vasu (supra at Footnote No.57) (paras 15-17) Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 682 (paras 49, 70). Tofan Singh (supra at Footnote Nos. 24 and 31) (para 4.10)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
unconstitutional by the decision in Nikesh Tarachand Shah68. The same could have not been revived by the 2018 and 2019 amendments. A provision or a statute held to be unconstitutional must be considered stillborn and void, and it cannot be brought back to life by a subsequent amendment that seeks to remove the constitutional objection. It must be imperatively re-enacted69. Further, even in arguendo, the twin conditions are manifestly arbitrary as it is against the basic criminal law jurisprudence of the right of presumption of innocence. This right has been recognized under International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 70, as well as, by this Court in Babu vs. State of Kerala71. It is also contended that subjecting an accused person not arrested during investigation to onerous bail conditions under Section 45 is contrary to the decision of this Court72. It was urged that even other statutes have such twin conditions for bail such as Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 73, the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 199974 and the NDPS Act. However, it is pointed out that it has been held that such onerous conditions were necessary only in certain kinds of cases - for example, terrorist offences, which are clearly a distinct and incompatible offence in the face of PMLA. Further, it is argued that even under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 196775, the Court has to examine only whether the allegation is prima facie true while granting bail, but in case of PMLA, the Court has to reach a finding that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty before granting bail. Thus, as soon as charges are framed, a person is disentitled to apply for bail as prima facie case is made out, which helps in achieving the purpose of preventive detention without procedure established by law76. Further, these deep restrictive conditions even under the UAPA and the NDPS Act are restricted only to parts of these Acts and not to the whole of them. However, the same is not the case under the PMLA, as it is
Supra at Footnote No.3 Saghir Ahmad vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 728 (para 23); Also see: Deep Chand vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (1959) Supp. 2 SCR 8 (para 21) For short, “ICCPR” (2010) 9 SCC 189 (paras 27 and 28) Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2021) 10 SCC 773 and clarificatory order dated 16.12.2021 in MA No. 1849/2021 For short, “TADA Act” For short, “MCOCA” For short, “UAPA” Ayya alias Ayub vs. State of U.P. & Anr., (1989) 1 SCC 374 (paras 11-17)
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applicable to all predicate offences. Such an approach ignores crucial distinctions such as nature, gravity and punishment of different offences in the Schedule of PMLA and treats unequals as equals. This is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is also placed on United States vs. Anthony Salerno77, where restrictive bail provisions are permitted in pre-trial detention because of the presence of detailed procedural safeguards. Still, it is argued, that such restrictive bail provisions cannot oust the ability of Constitutional Court to grant bail on the ground of violation of Part III of the Constitution78. Further, it has been held that Magistrate must ensure that frivolous prosecution is weeded out. Provisions such as Sections 21, 22, 23 and 45 of the PMLA reverse the burden and curtail the jurisdiction of the trial Court arbitrarily in violation of the findings of this Court79. Thus, various counts that have been argued herein point out that the PMLA suffers from manifest arbitrariness in light of Shayara Bano vs. Union of India & Ors.80 and Joseph Shine vs. Union of India81. 4. Next in line for submissions on behalf of private parties is Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel. He firstly argued the point of burden of proof under Section 24 of the PMLA. He has pointed out that prior to amendment, the entire burden of proof right from investigation till the judgment was on the accused. Even though this has changed post 2013 amendment and some balance has been restored, it has not fully cured this section of its unconstitutional nature. He has gone into the legislative history of the Act and stated that originally the presumption was raised even prior to the trial and state of charge, this was diluted by the amendment of 2013 thereafter the presumption would only apply after the framing of charges. (i) Learned senior counsel submits that the wording of Section 24 refers to formal framing of charges under Section 211 of the Cr.P.C. For this submission, he relies on the speech of the Minister introducing the amendment in the Parliament. It has been stated that presumption is raised in relation to the fact of money-laundering. Such a presumption cannot be raised in relation to an essential ingredient of an offence. The
107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987) Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 : 2021 SCC Online SC 50 (para 18) Krishna Lal Chawla & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2021) 5 SCC 435 (2017) 9 SCC 1 (paras 87, 101) (2019) 3 SCC 39 (paras 61, 103, 105)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
commission of an offence, as such, cannot be presumed. In reference to Section 4 of the 1872 Act, distinction between sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 24 is highlighted, wherein the former states - ‘shall presume’ and the latter states - ‘may presume’.
(ii) It is urged that post amendment also there is no requirement for the prosecution to prove any facts once the charges are framed. The entire burden of disproving the case, as set out in the complaint, inverts onto the accused. It is, hence, contrary to the requirement of proof of foundational facts, as is seen in other legislations. Such an inversion is not present in any other statute. It is stated that even in the NDPS Act, where no requirement of foundational facts was provided, this Court has read such necessity into the Act. As for sub-section (b), it is pointed out that the ‘may presume’ provision eliminates the safeguards of sub-section (a) and provides no guidance as to when a presumption is to be invoked. The learned counsel also points the discrepancy that the word ‘authority’ appearing in Section 24, which also appears in Section 48, is distinctive in nature and that Section 24 absurdly allows an investigator to presume the commission of an offence. This is clearly arbitrary and de hors logic. In light of the same, the constitutional vires of the section are challenged or a reading down to fulfil the constitutional mandate is pressed for. (iii) The next point of attack for Dr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel is the constitutionality of Sections 17 and 18. The absence of safeguards in lieu of searches and seizures is canvassed. It has been pointed out that such searches or seizures can take place even without an FIR having been registered or a complaint being filed before a competent Court. Foremost, the legislative history of these two Sections is pointed out. It is shown that originally the search and seizure was to be conducted after the filing of a chargesheet or complaint in the predicate offence. Thereafter, the protection was diluted by the 2009 amendment, wherein it was provided that the search and seizure operations would take place only after forwarding a report to the Magistrate under Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. It was only in 2019 that these final safeguards were also completely removed by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019. The effect, it is argued, is such that the ED has unfettered powers to commit searches and seizures without any investigation having been done in the predicate offence, and sometimes even without an FIR being registered. There are no prerequisites or safeguards as the ED can now simply walk into
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a premises. Even for non-cognizable offences, the ED need not wait for the filing of a complaint before a Court. In this way, in the absence of any credible information to investigate, the ED cannot be allowed to use such uncanalized power. The magisterial oversight cannot be replaced by the limited oversight of the Adjudicating Authority, as they have no real control over the ED, especially in case of criminal investigations. Thus, it is submitted that such lack of effective checks and balances is unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. (iv) Our attention is also drawn to the Prevention of MoneyLaundering (Forms, Search and Seizure or Freezing and the Manner of Forwarding the Reasons and Material to the Adjudicating Authority, Impounding and Custody of Records and the Period of Retention) Rules, 200582, and it is prayed that this Court must clarify that these rules are not ultra vires Sections 17 and 18 of the PMLA. Pertinently, they relate to the provisions of Cr.P.C. being applicable to searches under the Act. (v) Next leg of submissions challenges the vires of the second proviso of Section 5(1), as it allows for attachment independent of the existence of a predicate offence, given that such property might not even be proceeds of crime. Though an emergency procedure, no threshold had to be met and the first proviso has no application. It is also submitted that the proviso cannot travel beyond the scope of the main provision. Our attention is drawn to the legislative history; it is stated that the PMLA did not originally contain the second proviso. Attachment was only to be done after filing of chargesheet in the predicate offence. For the first time, in 2009, this proviso was added, to avoid frustration of the proceedings. It is submitted that this proviso has no anchor to either the scheduled offence or the proceeds of crime. It is at the mere satisfaction of the officer. In this way, it is submitted, attachment of property of any person can be made, with no fetters. Our attention is also drawn to the use of word ‘any’ for person and property and its distinction from the term ‘proceeds of crime’, having a direct nexus with the ambit of the main Section. It is argued that it is not to be mixed with any offence but only scheduled offences. The ED is alleged to employ this language in attaching property purchased much before the commission of scheduled offences, to the extent not having any nexus. It is submitted that there has to be a link between the second proviso to
For short, “Seizure Rules, 2005”
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
the proceeds of crime and scheduled offence being investigated under a specific ECIR before the ED.83
(vi) Submissions with respect to Section 8 of the PMLA maintain that Section 8(4) allows the ED to take possession of the attached property at the stage of confirmation of provisional attachment made by the Adjudicating Authority. It is submitted that this deprivation of a person’s right to property at such an early stage without the due process of law, is unconstitutional. Further the period of attachment under Section 8(3)(a) of the PMLA is also arbitrary and unreasonable. To make good the point, the relevant legislative history is pointed out. The original enactment where provisional attachment would continue during the pendency of proceedings related to ‘any scheduled offence’. Thereafter in 2012, the same was changed to ‘any offence under the PMLA’, followed by 2018 amendment – ‘a period of ninety days during investigation of the offence or during pendency of proceedings under the PMLA’, and finally by 2019 amendment the increase from ‘ninety days’ to ‘three hundred and sixty-five days’. We are also taken through the elaborate process of attachment of property. Thereby, it is highlighted that the ED can take possession of property after a single adjudicatory process, wherein there is no oversight over the ED. It is stated that such alienation of property without any proceedings having been brought before the Court is undoubtedly an unconstitutional act. As for Section 8(3)(a) clarification is sought in light of the confusion that it allows for a continuation of the confirmed provisional attachment for three hundred and sixty-five days or during the pendency of proceedings under the PMLA. This might lead to a reading where the ED has a period of three hundred and sixtyfive days to file its complaint. (vii) Learned counsel then referred to the Prevention of MoneyLaundering (Taking Possession of Attached or Frozen Properties Confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 201384 wherein specific challenge is raised against Rules 4(4), 5(3), 5(4) and 5(6). The main ground of challenge is disproportionality, similar to the attachment issue, transfer of attached shares and mutual funds, depressing of value of property, eviction of owners of a movable property, possession of productive assets along with gross income, all monetary benefit is stated
Dwarka Prasad vs. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128, Also see: Satnam Singh & Ors. vs. Punjab & Haryana High Court and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 353 For short, “Taking Possession Rules, 2013”
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to be arbitrary, reasonable, absurd and disproportionate. Herein, it is highlighted that various anomalies may crop up, such as taking of the shares and the ED becoming the majority shareholder in corporations, attachment of properties worth far more than the value of proceeds of crime. Under Section 2(1)(zb), the expression “value” is defined as fair market value on the date of acquisition and not fair market value on date of attachment. Arguably, property bought years ago is thereby undervalued by the ED. Attachment of immovable property and eviction in case of unregistered leases is also challenged. To challenge this disproportionate imposition and restrictions, reliance is placed on Shayara Bano85and Anuradha Bhasin vs. Union of India & Ors.86. (viii) It is then urged by the learned counsel that Section 45(1) of the PMLA, reverses the presumption of innocence at the stage of bail as an accused. According to him, the accused at this stage can never show that he is not guilty. It is also maintained that these are disproportionate and excessive conditions for a bail. Reference is also made to Nikesh Tarachand Shah87 to the limited extent that the 2018 amendment has not removed invalidity, pointed out in the aforesaid judgment of this Court. It is also stated that regardless of the amendment, the twin condition is in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution by virtue of the nature of the offence under PMLA. It is stated that presumption of innocence is a cardinal principle of Indian criminal jurisprudence. 88 Reference is also made to Kiran Prakash Kulkarni vs. The Enforcement Directorate and Anr.89 Arguments have also been raised against an amendment through a Money Bill being violative of Article 110 of the Constitution. The need for interpretation by Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Limited and Ors.90 has also been asserted. The 2018 amendment is also challenged by referring to the notes on Clauses of the Finance Bill, 2018. It is also pointed out that similar amendments were proposed for the 1962 Act in the year 2012 and, yet, the same were dropped at the insistence of members of the Parliament 91.
Supra at Footnote No.80 (paras 101-102) 2020 (3) SCC 637 Supra at Footnote No.3 Arnab Manoranjan Goswami vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2021) 2 SCC 427 (para 70) Order dated 11.4.2019 in S.L.P. (Criminal) No.1698 of 2019 (2020) 6 SCC 1 Speech of Shri. Arun Jaitley dated 26.3.2012 in the Rajya Sabha
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
(ix) Further, given the maximum punishment of seven (7) years under PMLA, it was argued that it is disproportionate when comparing the same to other offences under the IPC which are far more serious in nature and are punishable with death. In light of the same, it is highly questionable as to how such an onerous condition can be imposed on an accused. It is also pointed out that several scheduled offences are bailable. Further, the anomaly that at the time of arrest under Section 19 no documents are provided in certain cases, has also been highlighted. It was also stated that it is a near impossibility to get bail as under the UAPA, TADA Act, or the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 200292.
5. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel was next to argue on behalf of private parties. He urged that the Explanation to Section 44 is contrary to Section 3 read with Section 2(1)(u), hence, the same is unsustainable and arbitrary in the eyes of law. Special emphasis was laid on the expression “shall not be dependent upon any order by the Trial Court in the scheduled offence”. It was argued that both trials may be tried by the same Court. In such a case, Section 3 offence cannot be given pre-eminence, as that would run contrary to Section 3 and would be manifestly arbitrary, given the fact that an acquittal in the scheduled offence cannot lead to one being found guilty for the derivative offence of money-laundering. A direct link between the proceeds of crime and Section 3 offence was also highlighted. It was submitted that the Special Court cannot continue with the trial for Section 3 offence once acquittal in the predicate offence takes place. Section 44 unmistakably provides for the Special Court trial of money-laundering. It was pointed out that it is normal that if one is acquitted for the predicate offence, the moneylaundering procedure could still go on. This is contrary to the definition under Section 3, which states that money-laundering is inextricably linked to the predicate offence. (i) It was also pointed out that the usual practice is of filing an ECIR on the same day or right after the FIR has been filed by replicating it almost verbatim. Canvassing for proper procedure and investigation before filing of the ECIR and initiation of the process under the PMLA, reference was also made to other Acts, such as Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators Act, 197693, FERA or Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 197494 and the
For short, “POTA” For short, “SAFEMA” For short, “COFEPOSA”
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1962 Act, being Acts which would not subsist alone or by themselves without the predicate offences95. (ii) It was also argued that often the ED widens the investigation beyond what is contained in the chargesheet. This is contrary to the intentions of the Act. The true meaning of the definition under Section 3 of the PMLA was proposed to be divided into three components of predicate offence, proceeds of crime and projecting/claiming as untainted. It was conceded that even abetment would form a part of the offence and as a consequence, whoever attempts, assists, abets, incites - are all covered by the same. For predicate offence and Section 3, it was stated that if the former is gone, the latter cannot subsist. (iii) Next argument raised pertained to the ambit and meaning of Section 3. It was submitted that mere possession or concealment of proceeds of crime will not constitute money-laundering and this was bolstered by the phrase ‘projecting or claiming as untainted property’. The “and” was stated to be a watertight compartment. The Finance Minister’s 2012 Rajya Sabha Speech was also relied upon to showcase how “and projecting” was an essential element. 6. Mr. Amit Desai, learned senior counsel also advanced submissions on behalf of private parties. He also took us through the history of money-laundering, starting from the Conventions to the FATF and UN General Assembly Resolution96, which led to the 1999 Bill to help combat and prevent money-laundering. He relies on the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act97, followed by the initial ambit of Sections 2(1)(p), 2(1)(u) and 3, which were amended by the 2013 amendment. It is stated that the Act presupposes the commission of a crime which is the predicate offence; hence the questions to be answered by this Court are related to retrospectivity. Firstly - whether authorities can proceed against an accused when commission of the predicate
Barendra Kumar Ghosh vs. The King Emperor, 1924 SCC OnLine PC 49 : AIR 1925 PC 1 Special Session of the United Nations held for ‘Countering World Drug Problem Together’ held in June 1998. “objective was to enact a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money laundering and connected activities confiscation of proceeds of crime, setting up of agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money-laundering, etc”. It was also indicated that the proposed Act was “an Act to prevent moneylaundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived from, or involved in, money-laundering and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
offence predates the addition of the said offences to the Schedule of the PMLA? Secondly - whether the authorities can proceed against the properties obtained or projected prior to the commission of an offence under this Act? Thirdly - whether authorities can proceed when the predicate offence and the projecting predate the commencement of this Act? Fourthly - whether jurisdiction subsists under the Act when no cognizance has been taken, the accused has been discharged or acquitted or the offence compounded? Lastly, learned counsel also challenges the rigors of the twin conditions for being incongruent with general bail provisions under Sections 437 and 439 of the Cr.P.C. as being ultra vires.
(i) Learned counsel refers to one of the cases in this batch, wherein the properties sought to be acquired by the ED were obtained by the petitioner prior to 2009, while the commission of offence was in 2013 and Section 13 of the PC Act was inserted into the PMLA Schedule for the first time in 2009. This, it is maintained cannot fit into the term “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u), the same having been done prior to 2009. It has also been submitted that for the determination of money-laundering under Section 3 or any other provision of the Act, the relevant time has to be the time of the commission of the scheduled offence. The rationale being that only the presence of a scheduled offence can lead to the generation of proceeds of crime and, hence, in return the offence of money-laundering can be committed. Thus, in a way it is suggested that the starting point for a conviction for Section 3 might be the commission of a scheduled offence. The argument in respect of the protections provided by the Constitution under Article 20(1), as per which ingredients for an offence must exist on the day the crime is committed or detected, have also been impressed in opposition of any retrospective or retroactive application of the Act. To bolster the arguments, reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.98, Mahipal Singh vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.99, Tech Mahindra Limited vs. Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Hyderabad & Ors. 100, and Gadi Nagavekata Satyanarayana vs. Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement101 and that of Delhi High Court in Arun Kumar Mishra
(1991) 4 SCC 298 (also at Footnote No.131) (2014) 11 SCC 282 WP No. 17525/2014 decided on 22.12.2014 by High Court of Andhra Pradesh 2017 SCC Online ATPMLA 2
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vs. Directorate of Enforcement102, M/s. Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. vs. Directorate of Enforcement103 and M/s. Mahanivesh Oils & Foods Pvt. Ltd. vs. Directorate of Enforcement104. (ii) The argument that to qualify for the offence of moneylaundering, the essential ingredient of ‘projection’ or ‘claiming’ it as ‘untainted property’ is imperative, has also been pressed into service. It is also urged that proceeds of crime can only be generated from the commission of a predicate offence and the commencement of investigation arises only if a predicate offence has generated such proceeds of crime only subsequent to the inclusion of the predicate offence to the Schedule of the PMLA. Another point that has been highlighted is that the projecting, if done prior to the date of inclusion of the offence to the Schedule, the same cannot be continuing and as such, is stated to be stillborn for the purposes of the PMLA. (iii) It is urged that for the purposes of bail, it is settled law that offences punishable for less than seven years allows a person to be set free on bail. As such, the liberty as enunciated by Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be defeated by such an Act. Thus, Section 45(2) of the PMLA is contrary to general principles of bail and the Constitution of India. It is also pointed out that Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. imposing similar conditions as Section 45(2) restricts it to offences punishable with either life imprisonment or death. Under no condition can it be said that the bail conditions under the PMLA, imposing maximum seven years, are reasonable. Without prejudice to the aforementioned argument, it was stated that Section 45(2) could only be applicable to bail applications before the Special Court and the special powers under Section 439 Cr.P.C. It was submitted that in light of the same, special powers be given to the Special Court under the PMLA, as these provisions, draconian in nature, were contemplated only in Acts, such as TADA Act, POTA, MCOCA & NDPS Act, since securing the presence was difficult in all of the above. Further, unless Section 3 was to be restricted to organised crime syndicate, which was in fact the real intent, the bail provisions are liable to be struck down.
2015 SCC OnLine Del 8658 2015 SCC OnLine Del 8659. The decision was assailed by ED before this Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 18478/2015, wherein an order of Status-quo came to be passed. 2016 SCC OnLine Del 475. The judgement however was challenged by ED in LPA before the Division Bench wherein it was held that the same shall not be treated as precedent.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
7. Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, learned senior counsel contends that it is essential to first understand as to whether money-laundering is a standalone offence or dependent on the scheduled offence? He points out that the ED has maintained the former stance. It has been pointed out that this view has been rejected by the High Courts of Delhi, Allahabad and Telangana. On the contrary, the High Courts of Madras and Bombay have accepted such a view. It has been added that the ED’s contention is based on the Explanation added to Section 44(1)(d) by the 2019 amendment. Concededly, though there are certain exemptions in Section 8(7), it is contended, that the same are only for special circumstances. Learned counsel then refers to the sequence of conducting the matters and points out Sections 43(2) and 44(1), whereby the Special Court can try the scheduled offence, as well as, the money-laundering offence. He points out that due to different findings of different High Courts, certain questions have arisen as to the sequence of conducting the said two cases. The High Courts of Jharkhand and Kerala have taken a view that both matters can be tried simultaneously; there is no necessity to hold back the trial of money-laundering until the scheduled offence has been tried. It has been submitted that the High Court of Kerala finds that the offence of money-laundering is dependent on the scheduled offence. The High Court for the State Telangana, on the other hand, finds money-laundering completely independent of the scheduled offence. To drive the point home, attention is drawn towards Section 212 of the IPC, where the High Courts have taken a view that unless the original offence is proved, the person harbouring the accused cannot be sentenced. However, it is also pointed out that Section 212 can be tried simultaneously with the original offence.
(i) Additionally, it has been submitted that Section 2(1)(u) and Section 3 of the PMLA have been given a very expansive meaning, whereby people who do not have knowledge or have not participated, being totally unrelated third parties, are also being roped in to the investigations. The culpability has to be maintained. Wrong interpretation is given to proceeds of crime to be any property even obtained or derived indirectly. Persons who have not committed the scheduled offence deriving certain indirect benefits, even without knowledge, based on Section 24 presumption are held to be guilty of laundering money.
(ii) Further, the question of retrospectivity has also been addressed, whereby after the 2019 amendment, money-laundering is now said to be
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a continuing offence connected with the proceeds of crime. It is urged that the ED contends that prosecution or attachment can take place irrespective of whether the alleged offence was committed even prior to enactment in 2002, irrespective of the addition of the predicate offence in the PMLA Schedule. It is submitted that there are various amendments which are substantive in nature, being given retrospective effect, such as Sections 2(1)(u), 3, 8, 24, 44, etc. It has also been brought to our notice that prior to the 2013 amendment in the context of Section 8, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the Madras High Court and the High Court of Gujarat have held that attachment causes civil consequences of confiscation. Meaning that in case a scheduled offence is committed prior to the enactment of the PMLA or inclusion of certain offences in its Schedule, attachment or confiscation can go on. However, since then, the amendment has brought about a new legal question. Today, the line between civil and criminal consequences has changed, since Section 8 now is dependent upon one being held guilty for money-laundering. Hence, it cannot be applied retrospectively for predicate offences or scheduled offences committed prior to the PMLA enactment. Reference has also been made to the finding of the Hyderabad High Court where Section 8(5) being quasi criminal, has been found to be prospective. 8. Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, learned senior counsel urged that substantive due process has replaced procedure established by law105. Learned counsel has also pointed out aspects of substantive due process and the procedure of mandatory open Court review. In the context of right of accused during interrogation, it was submitted that this Court dealt with ‘due process’ rights in the Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab alias Abu Mujahid vs. State of Maharashtra106, where the use of Miranda rights has been rejected. Learned counsel has also gone into the facts of the case, where it is stated that there has been a six year long pre-trial procedure in both the predicate offence and laundering offence with limited right of participation and a reverse burden of proof. (i) It has also been argued that Section 50 infringes upon the right to liberty of a person summoned under the Act and violates the right against self-incrimination. The non-compliance with Section 53 is Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq vs. Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 737 (para 28); Also see: Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration & Ors., (1978) 4 SCC 494; Mithu vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 277. (2012) 9 SCC 1
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
penalized through Section 63 of the PMLA. The learned counsel has adopted the arguments made by other learned counsel in reference to Tofan Singh107. It is argued that the use of the term “any person” without exclusion of the accused under Section 50 is in violation of the due process. No safeguards provided under the Cr.P.C. and the 1872 Act are extended to person proceeded for PMLA offence. It is stated that the stage at which a person is guaranteed the constitutional right under Article 20(3), cannot be made malleable through legislation. It is stated that even though the PMLA is a complaint-based procedure, by way of Section 50, one cannot ignore the pre-complaint stage. As such, Section 50 must be rendered unconstitutional. Further, it is argued that the ED practice is a perverse incentive structure for constitutional infringement where an accused is trapped and sweeping interrogations are conducted aimed at justifying the summons issued. In respect of Section 44(1)(d), it is stated that the right to a fair trial is taken away and this provision irreversibly prejudices the accused in the trial adjudicating the predicate offence.108
(ii) Further, the Explanation to Section 44(1)(d) requires the two trials to be conducted before the Special Court, but as separate trials, is said to render the requirement of a fair trial impossible. To bolster this ground, it is said that when a judge receives evidence under Section 50 of the PMLA in case of money-laundering, he cannot remain an independent authority when deciding the predicate offence based on the material placed before him. Thus, this paradoxical provision forms a complete absurdity for a judge dealing with two different sets of rights for the same accused regarding the connected facts. That is for every predicate offence which would have otherwise been tried by a Magistrate, the investigation by the ED will tend to influence the mind of the judge109. Further, reliance has also been placed on Suo Motu Writ (Crl.) No. 1 of 2017 in Re: To issue certain guidelines regarding inadequacies and deficiencies in criminal trials110. The Court has incorporated the Draft Rules of Criminal Practice, 2021 which have been circulated for adoption
Supra at Footnote No. 31 (also at Footnote No. 24) Nahar Singh Yadav & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 1 SCC 307 Hanumant Govind Nargundkar & Anr. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343 (para 10) Criminal Trials Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies and Deficiencies, In re, vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., (supra at Footnote No.12)
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by all High Courts. It is also argued that Section 44 takes away the right of appeal from the predicate offences triable by the Magistrate’s Court111. (iii) It is urged that the PMLA creates an overbroad frame with no fetters on investigation. The refusal to provide a copy of the ECIR creating an opacity surrounding the usage of the ED Manual is also under challenge. Section 4(b)(v) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 112 is pressed into service to showcase that every public authority is obligated to publish within 120 days of enactment of the Act - the rules, regulations, instructions, manuals and records held by it or its employees for discharge of its functions. Contrary to the above-mentioned provisions, the ED Manual is said to be a mystery for the general public. Reference is also made to the decision of the Bombay High Court, wherein the Maharashtra Police was asked to provide a copy of the police manual in response to an RTI application113. It is submitted that such non-disclosure of the ED Manual is unsustainable in law. It makes the securing of pre-trial rights of an accused difficult. Even the CBI manual which is based on a statutory provision of the Cr.P.C., has been found by this Court to be necessary and to be adhered scrupulously by the CBI114.Similarly, other authorities, such as the Central Vigilance Commission, Income Tax authorities, authorities under the 1962 Act, police authorities, jail authorities, are all governed by manual published by them. Thus, it is only the ED which follows a distinct approach of non-disclosure. (iv) It has also been argued that the Schedule of the PMLA renders several bailable offences as non-bailable when this Court has repeatedly held that bail is the rule and jail is the exception115. Predicate offences which under their original act such as the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976116, are bailable but on the application of the PMLA,
Himanshu Singh Sabharwal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 602 For short, “RTI Act” State of Maharashtra vs. Chief Information Commissioner & Anr., 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1199 Vineet Narain & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr., (1998) 1 SCC 226; Also see: Shashikant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 630; Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2014) 14 SCC 295; and State of Jharkhand through SP, Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav alias Lalu Prasad, (2017) 8 SCC 1. State of Rajasthan, Jaipur vs. Balchand alia Baliay, (1977) 4 SCC 308; Also see: Sanjay Chandra vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40; State of Kerela vs. Raneef, (2011) 1 SCC 784 (para 15). For short, “1976 Act”
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
become non-bailable. The intention and provision of the underlying special Act, hence, becomes otiose by the overbroad provisions of the PMLA. In another breath, it is argued that the attachment procedure under the PMLA runs contrary to the provisions contained in the predicate offence. It is also perplexing, as the underlying statute itself contain the procedure to attach illegal proceeds of crime. Aid of the UAPA and Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992117 is taken to buttress that while under the predicate offence, attachment can take place only after the conviction, Section 5 of the PMLA enables attachment of property prior to conviction. This creates two different standards and two different criminal attachment proceedings for essentially the same offence. Even the Cr.P.C. provides for depriving criminals of the fruit of the crimes and allows for the true owner of the property to be restored with the position thereof by way of Section 452(5).
(v) The next point argued is in respect of the adjudicatory paralysis in the Appellate Tribunal. It is submitted that it is one of the only safeguards in this draconian law to provide an oversight to prevent abuse of mechanism of attachment. Even this oversight has been rendered redundant since there has been no appointment of a chairperson or members of the said Tribunal since 21.09.2019. Thus, making the Tribunal redundant. Further, it is stated that taking the possession at the stage when only a provisional attachment has been made, can cause great hardship and financial ruin, amounting to virtually declaring a person guilty and is avoidable. Further, certain official data has been brought to our attention to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the unconstitutional legislations, where raids have increased each financial year and, yet, since 2005 the number of convictions till 2015-16 has remained zero and, thereafter, reached a maximum of four in 2018-19. 9. Then, Mr. Aabad Ponda, learned senior counsel contended that without prejudice to all the submissions, Section 50(3) and Section 63(2)(a) and (c) of the PMLA, insofar as they relate to the accused persons, are ultra vires being violative of Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that under the current scheme of the Act, a scheduled offence requires a prior FIR. A person so named in the FIR would stand in the character of an accused person, and as such, he cannot be compelled to incriminate himself or produce documents incriminating himself under Section 50(3) of the PMLA. The next leg of
For short, “SEBI Act”
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the argument is to the extent that Section 63(2)(c), which mandatorily penalises person for disobedience of Section 50, cannot be applicable to an accused person given the constitutional protections of Articles 20(3) and 21, whereby he has the right to exercise his fundamental right to silence. We are also shown the analogous provisions similar to Section 50(3) and 50(4) of the PMLA in other statutes, such as Section 171A of the 1878 Act, inserted by Section 12 of the Sea Customs (Amendment) Act, 1955; Section 108 of the 1962 Act; Section 14 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944118 and Section 40 of the FERA. Learned counsel further argued and distinguished custom officers and other above referred officers from the ED officers to the effect that they only recover duty and do not investigate crimes like the ED officials. Even otherwise, it is to be noted that even though Section 50 of the PMLA may appear to be akin to summons issued under Section 18 of 1962 Act and other abovementioned statutes, however, there is a deep differentiation. For, when a person is summoned under the above-mentioned Acts, such as the 1962 Act, he is not in the shoes of an accused. He only becomes an accused once an FIR or complaint has been filed before a Magistrate. This, however, he states, is not the case under the PMLA. To drive home the point as to who stands in the character of an accused, reference has been made to certain Constitution Bench decisions of this Court, which have already been referred to by the previous learned counsel. To wit, Romesh Chandra Mehta vs. State of West Bengal119, Balkishan A. Devidayal vs. State of Maharashtra 120 and Selvi121. (i) Similarly, Mr. Ponda, learned senior counsel also relied on the decision in Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah & Anr. vs. D.K. Guha & Ors.122 and pointed out that even in cases of FERA, a person stands in the character of an accused in a separate FIR for the same transaction. He cannot be compelled to incriminate himself. He maintains that this is a case wherein the ED itself had investigated the accused under the FERA. It was found that even though ordinarily under the FERA a person is not an accused, however, in this particular case, an FIR had been registered against the said person and he, being an accused, could not be compelled
For short, “CESA 1944 Act” (1969) 2 SCR 461 : AIR 1970 SC 940 (1980) 4 SCC 600 (also at Footnote No.41) Supra at Footnote No.43 (1973) 1 SCC 696 (paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 17, 18-25)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
to answer questions that would incriminate him. The same plea has also been upheld in Poolpandi & Ors. vs. Superintendent, Central Excise and Ors.123. It was urged that an accused cannot be compelled to produce any incriminating documents which he does not want to produce. Reliance was placed on State of Gujarat vs. Shyamlal Mohanlal Choksi124. Moreover, it is reiterated that the protection against self-incrimination applies not only in Court proceedings, but also at the stage of investigation125.
(ii) Further, it was urged that Section 2(1)(na) of the PMLA defines “investigation”. As such, proceedings under Section 50 is clearly a part of investigation for the collection of evidence. The summons under Section 50(2) is to give evidence or produce records during the course of investigation under the Act, thus, protected by Article 20(3). Section 50(4) of the PMLA also stipulates that they are judicial proceedings, therefore, a person accused will be protected under Article 20(3). Section 63(2)(a) and 63(2)(c) inflict grave prejudice upon the accused, as he is liable to be further prosecuted for the failure to give information and provide documents which will incriminate him. Our attention is also drawn to the usual practice wherein persons are labelled as non-cooperative during the proceedings which are judicial in nature and used as a pretext to arrest or extend remand under the PMLA. It is a direct affront to fundamental rights and a travesty of justice. 10. Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, learned senior counsel, also appeared for the private parties. His main opposition is to the retrospective application of the PMLA. Certain questions are raised with respect to whether prosecution for money-laundering is permissible if the commission of scheduled offence and proceeds of crime takes place prior to the PMLA coming into force; and, similarly, in a situation when it is committed prior to the offence being made part of the Schedule of the PMLA. It is submitted that the prohibition against retrospective operation of substantial criminal statutes is a constitutional imperative which needs to be given its fullest interpretation in a purposive manner. He highlights the three
(1992) 3 SCC 259 AIR 1965 SC 1251 (and the Majority view from paras 23 onwards, relevant paras 32, 34 and 41) Relied on Kathi Kalu Oghad (supra at Footnote No. 44), Nandini Satpathy (supra at Footnote No.35), Selvi (supra at Footnote No.43) and Tofan Singh (supra at Footnote Nos.24 and 31)
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situations where interpretation is warranted. One, where transactions were concluded prior to the enforcement of PMLA; two, prior to the offences being added to the Schedule of the PMLA; and three, whether amendment is applied with retrospective effect couched in the guise of an Explanation introduced by the 2019 amendment.
(i) It is urged that no person can be convicted for criminal offence unless it has been specifically given retrospective effect, given the essential ingredient of ‘knowledge’ of the person for taking such an action and exposing himself to criminal liability. In line with the protection under Article 20(1) and the maxim of ‘nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis’126, judgments of this Court were relied to urge that the general rule is applicable when the purpose of the statute in question is to affect vested rights/impose new burdens/impair existing obligations127.
(ii) To make good the submission on retrospectivity, it is pointed out that as per the definition, money-laundering is dependent on proceeds of crime, which in turn depends on criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. As such, it is stated that no proceeds of crime can exist to be generated from a criminal activity unless the PMLA comes into force. That too, it has to be connected to the date when the Schedule has accepted the new predicate offence. It only means that property which is not “proceeds of crime”, cannot by virtue of PMLA, retrospectively characterised as such in a true sense. Further, prior to the enactment of the PMLA, there was no similar offence dealing in proceeds of crime or economic advantages derived from criminal offences. He points out that there were various enactments which dealt with the illegal fruits of criminal activity. Thus, the PMLA cannot be added to the list of disabilities in law to illegal monies in a retrospective manner. He was critical about many amendments taken place over the years and especially the fact that the true import of Section 3 is being expanded by a mere addition of an Explanation in 2019. As such the purport of the main, a much narrow
Keshavan Madhava Menon vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 (para 15) See : Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai (supra at Footnote No.98) (paras 8-10); Ritesh Agarwal & Anr. vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Ors., (2008) 8 SCC 205 (para 25]; Harjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2011) 4 SCC 441 (paras 13-14); Varinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (2014) 3 SCC 151 (para 10); and Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi vs. Vatika Township Private Limited, (2015) 1 SCC 1 (paras 27-31)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
provision, cannot be changed128. None of the amendments to Section 3 or changes in Schedule have a language bearing a retrospective effect. Section 3 amendment was only “for removal of doubts” in contrast with the amendment of Section 45 which was “deemed to have always meant”. Several judgments of the High Courts, pending adjudication before this Court, holding that the PMLA cannot be applied retrospectively, were also referred129.
(iii) Additionally, the impact of insertion of Clause (ii) of the Explanation to Section 3 vide the 2019 amendment, is also questioned. It is stated that a continuing offence is not defined in any statute. Some offences are described in a way that make it clear that the offending activity is a continuing one, some illustrations are in Section 281 in the Cantonments Act, 2006130; Section 36(1)(iii)(d) in the Pharmacy Act, 1948131 and Sections 162(1) & 220(3) in the Companies Act. Hence, a continuing offence is one which can be distinguished from an offence which is committed once and for all. It is submitted that it is an offence where until the obeying or compliance of rule or a requirement is effectuated, every subsequent non-compliance leads to the commission of the offence again and again132. In case of money-laundering, it is Bihta Co-operative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. & Anr. vs. Bank of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 389 (paras 5 & 7-8]; Dattatraya Govind Mahajan & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1977) 2 SCC 548 (para 9); S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. vs. V.R. Pattabiraman & Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 591 (paras 27 & 45-53); Jagan M. Seshadri vs. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639; and Hardev Motor Transport vs. State of M.P. & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 613 (para 31) Tech Mahindra Ltd. (supra at Footnote No.100) (Telangana & AP High Court, decided on 22.12.2014 – paras 12, 33, 65-67 & 68-71) read with Order dt. 08.12.2017 passed by this Court in SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 34143/2017; M/s. Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. (supra at Footnote No.103 – paras 20-22 & 29); Arun Kumar Mishra (supra at Footnote No. 102 – paras 19-21 & 27-28); Mahanivesh Oils & Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra at Footnote no. 104 – paras 25-27, 33-35, 37 & 38-39]; Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. vs. Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, ILR 2017 Kar 1846 (paras 5 & 10-12); Ajay Kumar Gupta & Ors. vs. Adjudicating Authority (PMLA) & Ors., (2017) 2 LW (Cri) 252 (paras 7, 10 & 13-22) and Madhu Koneru vs. The Director of Enforcement, Crl. Pet.No. 4130/2019, decided on 02.06.2021 by the High Court of Telangana (paras 31-32). For short, “2006 Act” For short, “1948 Act” State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi & Anr., (1972) 2 SCC 890 (para 5); Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar vs. Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790 (paras 11-17). [Note: observations on ‘continuing offence’ affirmed by this Court in Smt. Maya Rani Punj (Smt.) vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, (1986) 1 SCC 445 (paras 15-20)]
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urged that there is a clear starting point and an end point to the same, where the generation of proceeds of crime starts and ends in the integration of proceeds of crime into the financial bloodstream as untainted money. Thus, though it may take place over time but it cannot be considered as a continuing offence. Further, for the purpose of substantive interpretation, no reference can be made to the Explanation added by the 2019 amendment, since it is a mere explanation which cannot widen the ambit of the main section itself133. 11. Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, learned senior counsel was next in line to advance submissions on behalf of the private parties. He submitted that Section 44(1)(a) of the PMLA is unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. He contends that there is no nexus of the said Section with the object of the PMLA. This section does not contemplate a joint trial of the offence under Section 3 and the scheduled offence. Further, he interprets Section 44(1)(a) to mean that the Special Court can only try the scheduled offence, but not together; it has to be separately tried as per the provisions of the Cr.P.C. It is also said that the rationale behind this change is difficult to fathom. On the other hand, it is pointed out that the accused’s right of being tried as per the Cr.P.C., for scheduled offence is being violated, at least in respect of 37 out of 58 scheduled offences of the IPC noted in the Schedule to the 2002 Act, are triable exclusively by a Magistrate of the First Class or any Magistrate. In support of this argument, reliance has been placed on A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr.134. It is submitted that the present interpretation of this section leads to the violation of the right to be tried by a Magistrate First Class, the right of a first appeal to Sessions Court under Section 374(3) and the right of revision to the High Court under Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. from the appellate judgment of the Sessions Court. This leads to a rather oppressive interpretation where an accused who is not charged under the PMLA offence but only under the predicate offence is also tried by the Special Court. This is also hit by the fact that several of the scheduled offences within the PMLA are themselves part of special statutes which prescribe that they shall be tried by the Special Court established under those special statutes exclusively. For example, the PC Act, the NDPS Act and the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008135. Thus, in such a case the PMLA Special Court cannot have
M/s. Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. (supra at Footnote No.103) (para 37) AIR 1988 SC 1531 (para 59): (1988) 2 SCC 602 For short, “NIA Act”
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
power to try offences punishable under those Acts. The phrase ‘any scheduled offences’ as contemplated under Section 44(1)(a) of the PMLA is in a manifest conflict with these three statutes and, hence, liable to be struck down. Learned counsel also submits that the Section is a legal absurdity as to how a Special Court could try a scheduled offence before the commencement of the Act without which commencement of the Special Court has no existence. It is also stated the discretion to choose which issue or scheduled offence to try before the Special Court lies only with the authority authorised to file a complaint under the PMLA, which is a discretionary and unfettered arbitrary power.
(i) As regards Section 44(1)(c), it is urged that the same does not mandate disclosure of any reason for filing the application. Further, such an application can be moved at any stage of the proceedings for the inquiry or trial of a scheduled offence. Such a provision cannot be read to allow committal at a stage when the trial is over and only the judgment remains to be delivered. This tantamounts to authorising exercise of administrative fiat in respect of subject matter, which is in fact a quasijudicial act. Similarly, even the Magistrate is not obligated to state reasons while deciding the application and as such his order, if not reasoned, will be a nullity. The interpretation of the words ‘commit’ and ‘committed’ is said to be misconceived under Section 44(1)(c). It is urged that the use of the word ‘committal’ is inappropriate and the real intention of the present Section is a mere transfer of the case to the PMLA Special Court. As such, it is submitted that the case be sent to the Special Court which has already taken cognizance of the complaint under the PMLA and not any other Special Court. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Directorate of Enforcement vs. Surajpal & Ors.136 and on the other hand, the decision of the High Court of Kerala in Inspector of Police, CBI vs. Assistant Directorate, Directorate of Enforcement (PMLA) & Anr.137, wherein it is observed that it is not mandatory to make an application for committal to Special Court in every case and, similarly, not mandatory for the Court to allow every such application without application of mind and dehors the merits of the case. Hence, the conflict of view between the two High Courts needs to be resolved.
2018 SCC OnLine Del 10472 (Paras 15-16) 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 4546
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(ii) Referring to Section 45, it is argued that Sections 201 and 212 of the IPC provide for graded punishment or in line with the principle of an accessory after the fact. Attention has been drawn to a few cases to show that these Sections prescribe gradation of punishment depending on the nature of offence which the principal offender has committed 138. It is stated that Section 3 of the PMLA offence also is one kind of an accessory after the fact offence. It is also maintained that in certain cases the proceeds of crime or the scheduled offence may be committed by some person and the laundering might be done by a completely different person. In such a case, where money-laundering is not directly connected with the scheduled offence, the laundering is merely an accessory after the fact. He submits that even though the offence of money-laundering is a serious offence, however, the severest punishment is only seven years. Thus, twin conditions under Section 45 are grossly disproportionate and illogical for the crimes provided under the PMLA. It is also stated that the equation of the bail provisions under the PMLA cannot be made to the NDPS Act or UAPA. Further, even a serial murderer who may be liable for capital punishment is not subjected to such stringent condition, as under Section 45 of the PMLA. Irrespective of the deleterious impact on the economy of a country, it does not shock the conscience of the society as much as the conduct of the serial murderer. Reliance is also placed upon Nikesh Tarachand Shah139 in support of the argument that even if the amendment to Section 45 (which was struck down in the aforementioned case) saves the conditions from the vices on which it was struck down, the vice of Article 21 persists owing to the presumption of innocence having been turned on its head. It is also said that the current provision has no compelling State interest for tackling serious crime and we must be doubly sure to allow such attack on the fundamental right of personal liberty. (iii) As for Section 24 and the burden of proof which is reversed within this Act, it is stated that Section 24(a) applies only after charges have been framed by the Special Court. Section 24(b) refers to persons not charged with the offence of money-laundering under Section 3 and it is further contended that Section 24(a) and (b) have no application to proceedings for bail. Furthermore, it is stated that presumption of Sou. Vijaya Alias Baby vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 8 SCC 296 (Para 6); Also see: State of Karnataka vs. Madesha & Ors, (2007) 7 SCC 35 and In Re Kuttayan alias Nambi Thevar, AIR 1960 Mad 9 Supra at Footnote No.3
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innocence is a golden thread running through all criminal proceedings. This can apply only in cases of extremely serious offences on the ground of compelling State interest. It is submitted that in such a case where the maximum sentence is of seven years, such a provision is ultra vires Article 21 of the Constitution. It is argued that in special statutes like UAPA, MCOCA and the PC Act, the reverse burden of proof has only been upheld due to the compelling State interest, such as security and public order. Thus, it is agreed that in cases of narco terrorism, underworld, gangs the undoubted evils may prosper; hence, Section 24(a) can accordingly be read down so as to apply to cases of laundering where the predicate offence seeks to punish nefarious activities.
12. Mr. Abhimanyu Bhandari, learned counsel also argued on behalf of private parties. His foremost challenge is to the interpretation of Section 3, post addition of the Explanation vide the 2019 amendment. He has more or less reiterated the same arguments as advanced by the previous learned counsel that by way of Explanation, the ingredient of offence under Section 3 is sought to be altered by reading “and” as “or”. He has relied upon the reports and speeches of the Minister in the Parliament. Additionally, he has placed reliance on the Vienna Convention and United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000140, which state that money-laundering is only committed if the ‘use’ and/or ‘concealment’ is ‘for the purposes of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property’ or ‘helping any person who has been involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his/her action’141. Reliance is also placed on Nikesh Tarachand Shah142, wherein it has been held that it is the concealing or disguising by projecting tainted monies as untainted money and not their spending that is prohibited.
(i) Thus, exception is taken that the Explanation as added by the 2019 amendment has wholly changed the scope of the main provision which is the definition. It is contrary to the concerns of the Select Committee and subsequent to this Explanation, a person would now commit the offence of money-laundering the minute proceeds of crime are generated. A similarity is drawn with Section 1956 of the United States Code 143 where money-laundering is to conceal the illicit
For short, “Palermo Convention” or “the 2000 UN Convention” See Article 6 of the Palermo Convention Supra at Footnote No.3 Title 18 US Code S. 1956- Laundering of Monetary Instruments
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background of the source of the money. Further, reliance is also placed on American decisions where the Circuit Courts have held that it is not spending or using of proceeds of crime that amounts to the offence of money-laundering, but laundering of such proceeds of crime 144. Further, it has been stated that this Court in a catena of decisions, held that newly added Explanations must be read so as to harmonise and clear of ambiguity in the main Section and cannot be construed to widen the ambit of the previous state of the Section145. (ii) The next contention is regarding the definition of “proceeds of crime” and use of value thereof, defined under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA. It is argued that it can be categorised into three types namely: one - property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence; or, two the value of such property that is property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence; and third - where such property is taken on field outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad. (iii) It is submitted that by reason of the Explanation(s) added in 2019, it cannot be interpreted to include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. Further, the Explanation to the term “property”, also would now include property “used in the commission of an offence”. To this, reference is made to Articles 1 and 5 of the Vienna Convention and Article 12 of the Palermo Convention to show that if the criminal activity does not generate any proceeds, then there cannot be any ‘proceeds of crime’. Further, the ambit of property also is said to have been enlarged disproportionately. As such, proceeds of crime need to be generated from the scheduled offence alone and not any criminal activity. To demonstrate the vice, various illustrations were also pointed out to us. It is imperative that Courts can differentiate United States of America vs. Renee Armstrong Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991); United States of America vs. Paul Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006); United States of America v Roger Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2010); and Jennifer Wang, Yes, That is Money Laundering. Oh Wait, It’s Not: The Impact of Cuellar on Concealment Money Laundering Case Law, 18 J Bus L 255 (2015). Nagar Palika Nigam vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 187 and Rohitash Kumar & Ors. vs. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30.
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
between property being used to commit an offence and property derived from the commission of an offence, as is already accepted in other common law countries146. Thus, it is submitted that such an amendment by way of Explanation cannot expand the scope of a section. Reference is also made to the fact that attachment of property of an equivalent value where the actual proceeds are no longer available, is similar to other Acts, such as the UAPA, the NDPS Act, the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988147 and the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018148, all having similar definition of proceeds of crime. Objection is taken to term “property equivalent in value”, where properties are attached which have been derived from proceeds of crime even if they are different from the original form when the proceeds were generated149. Further, for the interpretation of ‘value thereof’, it is said that a broader interpretation would be contrary to Sections 8(5) and 8(6) of the PMLA. Hence, by way of illustration, where the original proceeds of crime are interchanged and mixed with legitimate money, it is argued that giving a broad interpretation to ‘value thereof’ would be unreasonable 150.
(iv) In respect of Section 8, it is argued that the true meaning of the words “take possession” of property under Section 8(4) should be constructive possession instead of physical possession since it is highly prejudicial for the accused during the pendency of the trial. Reliance is placed on a decision that has been stayed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court which had originally held it to be symbolic possession instead of actual151. It is urged that Article 300A is not only a constitutional right but also a human right. Further, confiscation is only subject to conviction and such disposition in all practical sense, leads to a confiscation prior to such conviction. Further, since there is no compensation in case a person is eventually acquitted, this would be a disproportionate action. As such, the argument that one needs to be restrained from selling or creating encumbrance is valid, the dispossession is not.
R v Ahmad, [2012] 2 All ER 1137; Also see: R v James, [2012] 2 Cr App R (S) 253 For short, “1988 Act” For short, “2018 Act” Abdullah Ali Balsharaf & Anr. vs. Directorate of Enforcement & Ors., 2019 SCC Online Del 6428; and Seema Garg vs. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2020 SCC Online P&H 738 Seema Garg (supra at Footnote No.149 above) A. Kamarunnisa Ghori vs. The Chairperson, Prevention of Money Laundering, Union of India, 2012 (4) CTC 608 : 2012 Writ LR 719
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13. Mr. N. Hariharan, learned senior counsel, who argued next, referred to Nikesh Tarachand Shah 152. Vide this decision, twin conditions in Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA, came to be struck down being violative of Articles 13(2), 14 and 21 of the Constitution. He submits that post Constitution laws declared unconstitutional for violation of Part III as void ab initio cannot be revived by amendments153, as such laws are void since inception. Further, he relied upon State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad & Anr.154, to contend that Section 45(1) cannot survive on the statute books155. Reference has also been made to G. Mohan Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.156. In his argument, two situations evolving from the decision of Nikesh Tarachand Shah157 have been put forth. One, where only the twin conditions were stuck down and the remaining provision remained untouched. Second, where classification based on Part A of the Schedule was also struck down in addition to striking down of the twin conditions. The second situation is said to be even more damaging given that the substitution by the Finance Act, 2018 is targeted only to this classification of Part-A of the Schedule, since the Court in the reported decision found this classification to be manifestly arbitrary, as it bore no rational relation to the object of the Act. Hence, the substitution by the Finance Act, 2018 cannot be justified, as the substitution of this pre-existing term cannot appear on the statute book due to the striking down. It also reminded that this submission was made without prejudice to the contention that the twin conditions themselves need to be enacted separately since they have been struck down. Further, even if the violation of Article 14 has been cured, such amendments cannot go on to cure the defect of violation of Article 21. 14. Mr. Vikram Chaudhari, learned senior counsel also representing private parties, raised a challenge against the twin conditions of Section 45(1) which were held unconstitutional in Nikesh Tarachand Shah158. Relying on the dictum of this Court in State of Manipur & Ors. vs.
Supra at Footnote No. 3 Deep Chand (supra at Footnote No.69); Saghir Ahmad (supra at Footnote No. 69) and Mahendra Lal Jaini vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1019 (1974) 4 SCC 656 Supra at Footnote No.154 2021 SCC OnLine SC 440 Supra at Footnote No. 3 Supra at Footnote No. 3
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Surajkumar Okram & Ors. 159 , he submitted that once held unconstitutional, a statute is obliterated entirely, as if it had never been passed, non-est for all purposes. He has also relied on his own interpretation of how Section 45(1) is to be read post Nikesh Tarachand Shah160. He has also pointed out that despite this decision an editorial error where bare acts, post the judgment, did not remove the offending (void) provision. It is, therefore, submitted that issue is not whether twin conditions under Section 45(1) would apply or not or of their constitutional validity, but would be as to their existence. He also referred to Clauses 204 and 205 of the Bill which amended Section 45 in 2018.161 The intention was to take steps to further delink the scheduled offence and moneylaundering offence, and to allow the Courts to apply lenient bail provisions, for sick and infirm. Further, the interpretation to the amendment sought by the State is said to be ill-founded and untenable since there is no reference to the pronouncement of Nikesh Tarachand Shah162 and was for the purpose of delinking the scheduled offence and moneylaundering.
(i) In respect of the procedure found in Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. for the purposes of investigation, he relied upon Ashok Munilal Jain & Anr. vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement 163, wherein it had been noted that Section 4(2) of the Cr.P.C. prescribes mandatory application even in respect to special statutes unless expressly barred 164. Thus, the dictum is that the provisions of the Cr.P.C. would be applicable to the extent in the absence of any contrary provision in the special Act
2022 SCC OnLine SC 130 Supra at Footnote No. 3 Which states that “(v) to amend section 45 of the Act relating to offences to be cognizable and non-bailable and to amend sub-section (1) of section 45 to substitute the words “punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than three years under Part A of the Schedule” by words “under this Act” so as to take a step further towards delinking the Scheduled offence and money laundering offence. Further, it seeks to amend the proviso in subsection (1) by inserting the words “or is accused either on his own or along with other co-accused of money laundering a sum of less than Rupees one crore”, after the words “sick or infirm” to allow the Court to apply lenient bail provisions in case of money laundering offence is not grave in nature.” (emphasis supplied) Supra at Footnote No. 3 (2018) 16 SCC 158 (also at Footnote No.22) M.K. Ayoob & Ors. vs. Superintendent, Customs Intelligence Unit, Cochin & Anr., 1984 Crl.L.J. 949; and The Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue, Madras vs. M.K.S. Abu Bucker, 1990 Cri.L.J 704.
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or any special provision excluding the jurisdiction or applicability of the Cr.P.C. The point of admissibility of statement made to customs officers and Section 25 of the 1872 Act is also touched again165. Relying upon Om Prakash & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr.166, it is argued that in the absence of a procedure to investigate irrespective of cognizability, no investigation can be permitted in law. And in respect of cognizable offence, the investigation cannot go on without recording information under Section 154 or 155 of the Cr.P.C., forwarding of report or FIR to competent Magistrate under Section 157 of Cr.P.C., maintaining a paginated case diary as under Section 172 of the Cr.P.C., as also, its production before the Magistrate, as provided by Section 167. (ii) A passing reference is also made to the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 167, whereby vide Section 6, the application of Section 155 Cr.P.C. was excluded, but in the case of PMLA, since there is no express departure from these provisions of the Cr.P.C., it being a non-cognizable offence, all these protections must come into play. In contradistinction, if it is found to be a cognizable offence, all protections including under Sections 154, 157, 167 and 172 Cr.P.C., will prevail. (iii) Reliance was also placed on Union of India vs. Thamisharasi & Ors. 168 with respect to the NDPS Act and the application of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. For our perusal, a comparative chart had been presented to show the various provisions of the Cr.P.C., which are not displaced in the PMLA. Thus, it is urged that safeguards of the Cr.P.C. were applicable being mandatory, to the extent of the Magistrate being a part of all stages of investigation, commencement and closure of investigation, maintenance of a case diary, adherence to Sections 154, 155 and 157, ability to pursue anticipatory bail, bail under Sections 437 and 439, inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 and Article 226 of the Constitution and other records or information which helps to curb fishing and roving enquiries. (iv) Reliance is placed on the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Gorav Kathuria vs. Union of India & Ors.169,
A.R. Antulay vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 500 (2011) 14 SCC 1 For short, “1966 Act” (1995) 4 SCC 190 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 3428
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
which has attained finality, as this Court has declined to interfere in the order of the High Court. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in D.K. Basu vs. State of W.B.170. It is urged that in a case under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940171 where police officers could no longer investigate, FIRs were made over to the Drug Inspectors. This is indicative of the correct procedure to be followed, unless otherwise provided, even investigation of offences under the special Acts will be governed by Cr.P.C. alone.172
(v) It is then argued that an umbilical cord connection exists between the scheduled offence and the money-laundering offence. The Explanation of Section 44 is to disconnect the link between the two, since the findings recorded in the trial of the scheduled offence would not have a bearing on the case under the PMLA. Again, reference is made to Nikesh Tarachand Shah173. It is urged that the proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) are relatable to a specific scheduled or predicate offence due to the insertion of the word ‘the’ instead of ‘any’ and, as such, the ambit cannot be broadened to ‘any’ scheduled or predicate offence174. He submits that certain conclusions are inevitable. Before the ED starts investigation, there must be some commencement under the scheduled or predicate offence. The trials for the specifically connected proceeds of crime and scheduled or predicate offence must be tried together. Finding showing no involvement of accused to the proceeds of crime or criminal activity must cease the proceedings under the PMLA. Non-compliance of Section 44(1)(c) will vitiate the PMLA proceedings. Further, it is submitted that the scope of money-laundering is limited to projecting and claiming as untainted property, that too relatable to the scheduled offence175. In light of the said argument, it is said that the projecting of such proceeds of crime as untainted can be termed as a standalone offence. In furtherance of same, certain facts of the case being Criminal Appeal Nos. 391-392/2018 titled Adjudicating Authority (PMLA) and Ors. vs. Ajay Kumar Gupta and Ors., were also referred
(1997) 1 SCC 416 (also at Footnote No.58) For short, “1940 Act” Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 683 Supra at Footnote No. 3 Canon India Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Customs, 2021 SCC OnLine SC Attorney General for India & Ors. vs. Amratlal Prajivandas & Ors., (1994) 5 SCC
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to, where the FIR and scheduled offence are both prior to the coming into force of the PMLA and, yet, an ECIR was filed in 2015 after a delay of about 10 years. 15. Mr. Akshay Nagarajan was the last learned counsel to argue on behalf of the private parties. He contended that even though the definitions under Section 3 read with Section 2(1)(u), two conjunctive parts, are meant to cover scheduled offences, they are being used to bring within its sweep even non-scheduled offences. He has contended that the present definition of Section 3 is wide enough to take within its sweep any non-scheduled offence due to the first part of the definition, “acquisition, use, concealment, possession is capable”. However, this contrast is impermissible in law176. To buttress this plea, provision of Section 71 of the IPC and Article 20(2) are invoked177. He has also submitted that for the purpose of Section 50(3), any statement recorded and deemed to be judicial proceeding, cannot be used in light of Section 132 of the 1872 Act178.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE UNION OF INDIA 16. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General led the arguments on behalf of the Union of India, followed by Mr. S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General.
(i) At the outset, it is submitted by the learned Solicitor General that as on date, around 4,700 cases are being investigated by the ED, which is a small number as compared to annual registration of the cases under the Money Laundering Act in UK (7,900), USA (1,532), China (4,691), Austria (1,036), Hongkong (1,823), Belgium (1,862), Russia (2,764). Further, only 2086 cases were taken up for investigation in last five years under the PMLA out of registration of approximately 33 lakh FIRs relating to predicate offences by police and other enforcement agencies. (ii) It is asserted that the validity of the PMLA shall have to be judged in the background of international development and obligation of
Sanjay Dutt vs. State through C.B.I., Bombay, (1994) 6 SCC 86 The State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 578; Also see: Thomas Dana vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375 Hira H. Advani etc. vs. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 662, Also see: R. Dineshkumar alias Deena vs. State represented by Inspector of Police & Ors., (2015) 7 SCC 497 (paragraphs 41-44)
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
India to prevent money-laundering, as money-laundering impacts not only the country in which the predicate offence takes place, but also the economy of other countries where “proceeds of crime” is laundered.
(iii) It is submitted that the object of the PMLA which affect the economic fabric of the nation, is to prevent money-laundering, regulate certain activities relatable to money-laundering, confiscate the “proceeds of crime” and the property derived therefrom and punish the offenders. The development of international consensus towards the offence of money-laundering has been highlighted. It is submitted that prior to 1988, there was no concept of “proceeds of crime” and the same was recognized for the first time in Regina vs. Cuthbertson & Ors.179 by the House of Lords. England was one of the first countries to take legislative action against proceeds of crime on the recommendations of the Hodgson Committee by enacting Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986 (later replaced by the Drug Trafficking Act, 1994) which empowered the Courts to confiscate the proceeds of drug trafficking. (iv) Later, the Vienna Convention imposed obligation on each participating country to criminalize offences related to drug trafficking and money-laundering180, to which India is a party. (v) It is submitted that the provisions of the Palermo Convention were delineated to ensure that participating countries should have appropriate legislation to prevent money-laundering and further, the Convention also placed obligation on the participating nations to utilize relevant international anti-money laundering initiatives in establishing their domestic regulatory and supervisory regimes. (vi) Further, it is submitted that on 31.10.2003, the UN General Assembly adopted United Nations Convention Against Corruption, whose Preamble recognized the importance of preventing, detecting and deterring international transfers of illicitly acquired assets, and strengthening international cooperation in asset recovery. The Convention mandated the participating States to conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts sought or maintained by politically exposed persons and their associates and to implement measures to monitor the movement of cash and other instruments across their borders so that a ‘paper trail’ be created which could assist law enforcement authorities in investigating the transfers of illicit assets.
[1981] A.C. 470 Article 3(1)(a)&(b) of the Vienna Convention, 1988
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(vii) Thus, relying on the international Conventions, the Union of India has submitted that it is the international obligations of the State to not only recognize the crime of money-laundering but also to take steps for preventing the same. (viii) To highlight the role played by the FATF in combating the menace of money-laundering, the respondent has traced the origin of FATF and stated its process of reviewing the compliance with its recommendations by every State and the consequences of noncompliance. It is submitted that the FATF was established by the Heads of State or Government of the seven major industrial nations (Group of Seven, G-7) joined by the President of the European Commission in a summit in Paris in July, 1989 which is famous for its ‘Forty Recommendations’ to combat money-laundering and, hence, carry out its own evaluation and enforcement on the issue of money-laundering across the world. Thus, it acts as a dedicated body dealing with this issue. It is submitted that FATF has recognized dynamic nature of moneylaundering and thus attempted to respond to the money-laundering techniques that are constantly evolving, by reviewing its recommendations. Further, the FATF has adopted its Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (“NCCT”) initiative in a report issued on 14.2.2020, according to which a 25 points criteria was recognized which is consistent with the Forty Recommendations of the FATF and which identified ‘detrimental rules and practices’ in the international effort to combat laundering. It thus established a review process to target delinquent countries and territories where the anti-laundering regime is ineffective in practice and to take steps against those countries. The steps which FATF may take against a non-compliant nation include ‘conditioning, restricting, targeting or even prohibiting financial transactions with non-cooperative jurisdictions’. (ix) It is submitted that the measures against money-laundering have evolved over the period of time. Further, FATF has taken preventive, regulatory and monitoring steps through keeping a watch on suspicious or doubtful transactions by amending its Forty Recommendations in 2003 and 2012. (x) It is further submitted that FATF assess the progress of its members in complying with the FATF recommendations through assessments performed annually by the individual members and through mutual evaluations which provides an in-depth description and analysis
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
of a country’s system for preventing criminal abuse of the financial system, as well as, by focused recommendations to the country to further strengthen its system.
(xi) It is submitted that upon evaluation, a country will be placed immediately into enhanced follow-up if it does not comply with the FATF technical and “big six” recommendations or has a low effectiveness outcome181. (xii) It is further submitted that jurisdictions under monitoring then, based on their commitments and compliances, are put in two types of list viz., grey list and black list, which serve as a signal to the global financial and banking system about heightened risks in transactions with the country in question which not only severely affect its international reputation but also impose economic challenges, such as impacting the bond/credit market of the country, impacting the banking and financial sector of the country, affecting cross-border capital flows, especially for the trade sector, documentary requirements for export and import payments, such as letters of credit may become more challenging to fulfil, potentially raising costs and hampering business for companies engaged in trade, adversely affecting the economy due to a lack of investment opportunities which may further deteriorate the financial health of the country and the country may also be deemed as a ‘high-risk country’. (xiii) Further, the learned Solicitor General has relied on a report by the International Monetary Fund182 (IMF) - Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Report on the Effectiveness of the Program to state the potential economic effects that may arise from such financial crimes, such as destabilizing capital inflows and outflows, loss of access to international financial markets as a result of deterioration in the country’s reputation, difficulty in supervising financial institutions, undermining of the stability of a country’s financial system and adverse effect on growth of the country. (xiv) The respondent has further relied on Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (2005)
(i) It has 8 or more Non-compliant NC/ Partially Compliant (PC) ratings for technical compliance; (ii) It is rated NC/PC on any one or more of R.3, 5, 10, 11 and 20 “big six” recommendations; or (iii) It has a low level of effectiveness for 4 or more of the 11 effectiveness outcomes. For short, “IMF”
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to state that nations are free to choose the definition of ‘predicate offences’ for money-laundering purposes from the list of offences given under the Convention, for example, by providing a list of those offences, a category offences, or by reference to offences that have a maximum term of imprisonment of one year or more (or, for states that have minimum thresholds for offences, those with imprisonment of a minimum of six months) and to take measures which are preventive in nature.
(xv) To illustrate the global development of the approach against money-laundering, 1991 Money Laundering Directive (‘First Directive’) adopted by the European Union is cited which imposed obligations on credit institutions and financial institutions in relation to customer identification and record-keeping, internal controls and training of staff and mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions. The Second Directive (2001) widened the number of institutions that fell within the scope of reporting obligations and also expanded the range of predicate offences for the purpose of money-laundering. EU Third Directive (2005) was directed to bring the EU legislation into line with the revisions to the FATF Recommendations and further expanded the range of institutions within its scope to include life insurance intermediaries and widened the definition of high value dealers to capture those who accept cash payments of €15,000 or more. A definition of ‘serious crimes’ was included that constituted ‘predicate offences’, including all offences punishable by a maximum sentence of one year or more, or a minimum sentence of six months or more (in jurisdictions where minimum sentences are applied), as well as other specified offences including serious fraud and corruption. It is submitted that the EU Fourth Directive on Money Laundering (2015) aimed to improve the regulatory European framework after taking into account new FATF recommendations published in 2012.
(xvi) It is further submitted that the purpose of December 1988 Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money-Laundering issued by the Basel Committee was to ensure that banks are not used to hide or launder funds acquired through criminal activities.
(xvii) To emphasize on the role of international cooperation to combat money-laundering, it has been stated that the Financial Intelligence Unit created by the Egmont Group, which is an international forum to combat money-laundering, should serve as a national centre for receiving,
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
analyzing and disseminating suspicious transaction reports, and should have access on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its functions as per the revised FATF Recommendations.
(xviii) The Union of India has further traced the origin of the term “money-laundering” and stated that the term arose in United States in 1920s, which was used by the American Police Officers with reference to the ownership and use of launderettes by mafia groups as the launderettes gave them a means of giving a legitimate appearance to money derived from criminal activities. The profits gained through these launderettes were thus termed ‘laundered’. Further, the term ‘moneylaundering’ was first used with a legal meaning in an American judgment of 1982 concerning the confiscation of laundered Columbian drug proceeds. (xix) It is further submitted that the goal of money-laundering is to conceal the predicate offences and to ensure that the criminals ‘enjoy’ their proceeds. Further, the money-laundering takes place through ‘a complex process often using the latest technology, of sanitizing money in such a manner that its true nature, source or use is concealed, thereby creating an apparent justification for controlling or possessing the laundered money’ in a number of intermediate steps. (xx) It is stated that the reasons for fighting money-laundering, firstly, is to enable law enforcement authorities to confiscate the proceeds of predicate criminal activities so as to undermine organized crime by taking away the incentive for these criminal activities relatable to offences. Secondly, to apprehend high level criminals as they themselves stay aloof from criminal activities but do come into contact with the proceeds of these activities, thereby creating a ‘paper trail’. Thirdly, to prevent criminals from destabilizing the national economy because of its corruptive influence on financial markets and the reduction of the public’s confidence in the international financial system and lastly to deter the money launderers from impacting the growth rate of the world economies. (xxi) It is stated that the principal sources of illegal proceeds are collar crimes (tax, fraud, corporate crimes, embezzlement and intellectual property crimes), drug related crimes and smuggling of goods, evasion of excise duties, corruption and bribery (and the embezzlement of public funds).
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(xxii) To show the global impact of money-laundering, it is submitted that the IMF and the FATF have estimated that the scale of money-laundering transactions is between 2% and 5% of the global GDP. It is also stated that the United Nations has recently put the figure of money-laundering at USD 2.1 trillion or 3.6% of global GDP. Thus, the operation of money-laundering has international dimension. It is submitted that measures being taken at the national level would be inadequate, which made it necessary to establish effective international co-operation mechanisms to allow national authorities to co-operate in the prevention and prosecution of money-laundering and in international ‘proceedshunting’.
(xxiii) Further, it is submitted that the measures to combat moneylaundering have evolved from post facto criminalization to preventive approach with its stress on the reporting obligations. The definition of “money-laundering” is now no more restricted to the elements of projection and untainted property.
(xxiv) It is stated that India, and its version of the PMLA, is ‘merely a cog in this international vehicle’ and as India is a signatory to these treaties, therefore, is bound legally and morally, to adopt the best global practices and respond to the changing needs of the times. It is, therefore, submitted that the constitutionality of the PMLA has to be adjudicated from the stand point of the country’s obligations and evolving responsibilities internationally.
(xxv) The learned Solicitor General invited our attention to the introduction to the PMLA. Making reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, he submits that the Act was enacted with the intent of establishing a strict and stringent framework to address the global menace of money-laundering. Refuting the private parties’ attempt to classify the Act as being a purely penal statute, he submits that the PMLA is an amorphous or hybrid statute, which has regulatory, preventive and penal aspects. Learned Solicitor General then walked us through the various provisions of the PMLA, and submitted that categorizing the Act as being merely penal in nature, would not only defeat the purpose of the Act, but would also be against the express provisions enshrined therein. (xxvi) It is further submitted by the Union of India that the PMLA is a complete Code in itself, and establishes a specific separate procedure
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to the extent necessary and to be followed in proceedings under the Act. Laying down a brief summary of the legislative scheme of the Act, the respondent submits that there has been a conscious legislative departure from conventional penal law in India. Considering the peculiar nature of money-laundering – which requires prevention, regulation and prosecution, a completely different scheme is framed by the Legislature. The new scheme introduced for dealing with the money-laundering is as a part of India’s global responsibility in international law. While complying with the mandate of FATF, the Legislature has very consciously ensured that the Act becomes compliant with the Constitution of India. Referring to the rules formulated under the PMLA, it is also submitted that the scheme of the Act and rules framed thereunder prescribe an elaborate procedure to ensure complete confidentiality, and place sufficient inbuilt checks and balances to prevent potential abuse.
(xxvii) The respondent then sheds some light on the offences being investigated by the Directorate of Enforcement. It is submitted that the number of cases taken up for investigation each year has risen from 111 cases in 2015-16 to 981 in 2020-21. Comparing the number of cases registered annually under money-laundering legislations, it is submitted that the low registration of cases in India is due to the robust mechanism for risk-based selection of cases for investigation. The ED is focusing its attention on cases involving high value of proceeds of crime and cases involving serious predicate offence involving terror financing, narcotics, corruption, offence involving national security, etc. To that effect, it is highlighted that attachment proceedings concerning some of the fugitives, who are facing action, were done and assets worth Rs.19,111.20 crores out of a total fraud of Rs.22,585.83 crores were attached. Furthermore, the investigation in 57 cases of terror and Naxal financing has resulted in identification of proceeds of crime worth over Rs.1,249 crores and attachment of proceeds of crime of Rs.982 crores (256 properties) and filing of 37 prosecution complaints and conviction of two terrorists under PMLA. Lastly, it is stated that the quantum of proceeds of crime involved in the bunch cases under the PMLA which are under consideration in these matters is Rs.67,104 crores.
(xxviii) Having laid down the basic scheme of the PMLA, learned Solicitor General proceeded to discuss the definition of “moneylaundering” as per Section 3 of the Act. Tracing its origin, it is submitted that the term “money-laundering” finds its initial definition in Article
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3.1(b)(i)(ii) and (c)(i) of the Vienna Convention. However, the Vienna Convention limited the predicate offences to drug trafficking offences, and, consequently, led to the adoption of an expansive definition covering the widest range of predicate offences under the Palermo Convention. Building upon the definitions contained in the Vienna Convention and the Palermo Convention, the FATF recommended member countries to expand the predicate offences to include serious crimes. The same was made binding on the member countries by way of Recommendation No. 1 and Recommendation No. 3 of the FATF. Subsequent to its enactment, the PMLA became subject to evaluation by the FATF based on the Forty Recommendations formulated by the FATF. In 2010, the FATF adopted the ‘Mutual Evaluation of the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Regime of India Report’183. As per Recommendation No. 1 of the Mutual Evaluation Report, the concealment, possession, disposition and use of proceeds of crime were not criminalized by PMLA, and India was, thus, held to be not fully compliant. Thus, with a view to address the legal deficiency as pointed out by FATF and to make it globally compliant, the Prevention of Money-Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2012 amended Section 3 to include these activities. In support of his argument, learned Solicitor General draws our attention to the Statement of Object and Reasons of Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Bill, 2011184, and the parliamentary debates surrounding the amendment. (xxix) Summing up the recommendations of the FATF, it is clarified by the learned Solicitor General that even in an act of mere concealment, mere possession or mere use of “proceeds of crime” or “activity” connected with the proceeds of crime, per se, is an offence. In other words, if a person conceals the proceeds of crime, keeps it in his possession or uses it, he is guilty of money-laundering irrespective of as to whether he is projecting it as untainted or not. This is for the simple reason that if a person conceals something (proceeds of crime), it is an act committed knowingly and, thus, the question of that person projecting that very thing either as tainted or untainted does not arise. (xxx) It is further explained that the anomaly resulting from an erroneous drafting was successfully explained during the 2013 review of FATF by categorically contending that all expressions following the
For short, “Mutual Evaluation Report” For short, “2011 Bill”
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term “including” are mere illustrative and independently constitute an offence of money-laundering without being dependent upon each other. Thus, so long as a person knowingly becomes a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, such a person is guilty of money-laundering.
(xxxi) In order to lend further credibility to the sanctity of the FATF Mutual Evaluation Report and the recommendations contained therein, the learned Solicitor General took us through the numerous amendments incorporated in the PMLA by way of the 2012 Amendment Act which was largely based on the recommendation of the FATF. Special emphasis is laid on the amendments carried out in Sections 5 and 8 of the Act pursuant to FATF recommendations. It is further submitted that apart from the PMLA, corresponding amendments to the UAPA, the NDPS Act and the Companies Act have been also made as a sequel to the FATF recommendation during the Mutual Evaluation of India.
(xxxii) Learned Solicitor General submitted that the interpretation put forth by the other side, would effectively result in granting the accused a license to commit the offence of money-laundering and thereafter either conceal the proceeds of crime, or keep them in his possession, or use them and thereby wriggle out of the legislative intent of preventing money-laundering by raising a plea that the same were never claimed/ projected as being untainted property. Reliance is placed on Seaford Court Estates Ld. vs. Asher185, to point out that principles of statutory interpretation dictate that any interpretation which leads to mischief should be avoided and the statute should be so construed that the legislative intent is not defeated. It is submitted that the limitations of traditional approach to crime and in fact, highlights the importance of the evolved approach of anti-money laundering laws in the nature of the PMLA. Thus, the definition of “money-laundering” as it exists, passes the muster, both under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. (xxxiii) It is further submitted that the Explanation to Section 3 inserted vide Finance (No.2) Act, 2019, is merely clarificatory in nature and elucidates the legislative intent behind the provision. Reliance is placed on the background/justification of the amendments to PMLA as contained in the debate on the Finance Bill, 2019186.
[1949] 2 K.B. 481. For short, “2019 Bill”
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(xxxiv) Strong emphasis is laid on the use of the word ‘any’ in the phrase ‘any process or activity’. A careful reading of Section 3 of the PMLA clearly provides that any process or activity which itself has a wider meaning also includes the process or activity of concealment, possession, acquisition, use and/or projecting, claiming it as untainted property. Placing reliance on Shri Balaganesan Metals vs. M.N. Shanmugham Chetty & Ors.187, it is submitted that all or every type/ species of process or activity connected with proceeds of crime shall be included while interpreting the nature of process or activities connected with the proceeds of crime. (xxxv) It is further submitted that all and any activities relating to proceeds of crime including solitary – possession, concealment, use or acquisition, constitute and offence of money-laundering, independent of the final projection. It is submitted that such an interpretation is necessary to effectively implement the Act in its true spirit. It is submitted that considering the definition prevailing in India, it is necessary that any and all of the activity or process occurring in the definition after the word ‘including’ is considered to be merely illustrative and not restrictive. Reliance is placed on catena of judgements188 to show that the use of the term ‘including’ is not restrictive, but rather further enlarges the scope of the definition. (xxxvi) Depending upon the facts of the case, he submits that it is quite likely that accused of money-laundering may fall in more than one of the above categories. Therefore, the focus of investigation should be on identification of all the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime including the specific processes and activities, which have been included as illustrations in Section 3. Reliance is placed on Rohit Tandon
(1987) 2 SCC 707 M/s. Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., (1988) 2 SCC 299; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 18; Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation vs. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha and Sons & Anr., (1991) 3 SCC 617; Forest Range Officer & Ors. vs. P. Mohammed Ali & Ors., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 627; Commercial Taxation Officer, Udaipur vs. Rajasthan Taxchem Ltd., (2007) 3 SCC 124; Associated Indem Mechanical (P) Ltd. vs. W.B. Small Industries Development Corpn. Ltd., & Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 607; N.D.P. Namboodripad (Dead) by LRs. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 4 SCC 502; Oswal Fats and Oils Limited vs. Additional Commissioner (Administration), Bareilly Division, Bareilly & Ors. (2010) 4 SCC 728; and Mamta Surgical Cotton Industries, Rajasthan vs. Assistant Commissioner (Anti-Evasion), Bhilwara, Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 87.
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vs. Directorate of Enforcement189, to bring forth the interplay between various aspects of Section 3 of the PMLA.
(xxxvii) The learned Solicitor General has also cited other authorities including the observations made by this Court in Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab190, R. Sai Bharathi vs. J. Jayalalitha & Ors.191 and Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Ors.192, to show that it is the sole prerogative of the Legislature to define a “crime”, and it is this definition that should be at the center of any challenge to a criminal provision. (xxxviii) It is urged that the ‘projection’ of proceeds of crime cannot be held as a mandatory requirement under Section 3 of the Act; otherwise, it will become impossible to punish a person for the offence of money-laundering who “knowingly assists” or who is “knowingly a party” or who is “actually involved” in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. It is, therefore, submitted that the correct interpretation of the word “and” should be “or” as it was always intended by the legislature. Further, it is stated that any interpretation contrary to this will render the provision meaningless. To bolster this argument, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Sanjay Dutt vs. State through C.B.I., Bombay (II)193. In that case the Court held that the word ‘and’ should be interpreted as ‘or’ and the words “arms and ammunition” should not be read conjunctively; otherwise, the object of the Act will be defeated. Therefore, on a similar line, it is argued that mere concealment or use or possession of the proceeds of crime would amount to an offence of money-laundering and any other interpretation of the Section would be contrary to the India’s international obligation and FATF recommendations. It is submitted that such interpretation of the word “and” would not amount to judicial legislation, as such exercise is only done to give effect to the legislative intent by correcting ‘faultiness of expression’194. He has relied on Joint Directors of Mines Safety vs. M/s Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd. 195 to contend that
(2018) 11 SCC 46 (1994) 3 SCC 569 (2004) 2 SCC 9 (2016) 7 SCC 221 (1994) 5 SCC 410 Regina vs. Oakes 1959 (2) QB 350, Ishwar Singh Bindra & Ors. vs. The State of U.P., (1969) 1 SCR 219 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Essar Power Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 755 (1987) 3 SCC 208
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the word “and” was interpreted as “or” by the Court to give effect to the legislative intent of the Mines Act, 1952196. (xxxix) Emphasis is also laid on the application of international law while interpreting domestic law and it is stated that the domestic Courts are under an obligation to give due regard to the international Conventions for construing domestic laws197. The learned Solicitor General has further placed reliance on People’s Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India & Anr.198 and Githa Hariharan & Anr. vs. Reserve Bank of India & Anr.199 to submit that the international Treaties and Conventions may be relied on by the domestic Courts so as to give effect to the international law, if such law is not inconsistent with any domestic law. (xl) While referring to Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C., it is urged that Cr.P.C is a generic procedural law with no universal application over any other special criminal or penal legislations. It is stated that the Legislature is competent to provide a different procedure than that of Cr.P.C, provided that the special procedure has adequate constitutional safeguards. Therefore, it is submitted that the Parliament has provided a distinct procedure under the PMLA which is also manifested from Sections 65 and 71 of the PMLA. It is stated that due to the peculiar nature of the offence of money-laundering, the Legislature in its wisdom has provided a special procedure for investigation and trial of the offence under the Act. However, it is submitted that where the application of Cr.P.C is not expressly or by necessary implication excluded, the provisions of Cr.P.C will apply in light of Section 65 of PMLA as well. (xli) It is argued that the PMLA is a complete Code in itself, which creates a new offence and provides separate machinery to the extent necessary for dealing with it. Therefore, the provisions of PMLA would override the provisions of the Cr.P.C. in relation to such express dispensation in view of Section 71 of this (PMLA) Act. In support of this argument, reliance is placed on Rohtas vs. State of Haryana & Anr.200, Ajmer Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.201, Usmanbhai
For short, “Mines Act” Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2005) 3 SCC 551 and National Legal Services Authority vs. Union of India & Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 438 (2005) 2 SCC 436 (1999) 2 SCC 228 (1979) 4 SCC 229 (1987) 3 SCC 340
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Dawoodbhai Memon & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat 202, Central Bureau of Investigation vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.203, State (Union of India) vs. Ram Saran204, Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh (2) vs. Union of India & Ors.205, Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.206, Gautam Kundu vs. Directorate of Enforcement (Prevention of Money-Laundering Act), Government of India 207 and Union of India & Ors. vs. Chandra Bhushan Yadav208.
(xlii) Next, it is argued that wording of Section 71 must be given effect to. It is asserted that the insertion of a non-obstante clause in a statute has the effect of overriding anything inconsistent or repugnant thereto209. It is stated that this Court in Deep Chand vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.210 laid down some tests for determining whether any inconsistency or repugnancy exists between two statutes. The Court held that it has to be seen whether the provisions are in direct conflict with each other; whether the legislative intent was to lay down an exhaustive Code on the subject matter and thereby replace the previous law and whether the two legislations operate in the same field.
(xliii) It is argued that when a statute has expressly provided a repealing section then the maxim ‘est exclusio alterius’ (the express intention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another) will apply, thereby application of existing statute is excluded in case of any inconsistency between the two211.
(xliv) Reliance has also been placed on Innoventive Industries Limited vs. ICICI Bank & Ors.212, wherein in respect of a similar provision in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016213, it was held that the provisions of the stated Code ought to be given primacy over other statutes. It is, therefore, submitted that the procedure under the
(1988) 2 SCC 271 (1996) 9 SCC 735 (2003) 12 SCC 578 (2009) 2 SCC 1 (2014) 2 SCC 1 (also at Footnote No.13) (2015) 16 SCC 1 (2020) 2 SCC 747 Aswini Kumar Ghose & Anr. vs. Arabinda Bose & Anr, AIR 1952 SC 369 and Central Bank of India vs. State of Kerala & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 94 (1959) Supp. 2 SCR 8 : AIR 1959 SC 648 (also at Footnote No.69) Kishorebhai Khamanchand Goyal vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2003) 12 SCC 274 (2018) 1 SCC 407 For short, “IBC”
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Cr.P.C to the extent of inconsistent proviso in PMLA, stands excluded by way of Section 71 of the Act by necessary implication. The doctrine of ‘generalia specialibus non derogant’, has also been invoked, which means that general law yields to special law. Reliance is placed on the decision of House of Lords in Elizabeth Warburton vs. James Loveland214. It is submitted that the said decision has been followed in Patna Improvement Trust vs. Smt. Lakshmi Devi & Ors.215, The South India Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. The Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum & Anr.216, Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. S.P. Kasture & Ors.217, Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education & Anr. vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Seth & Ors.218, Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon219 and Ethiopian Airlines vs. Ganesh Narain Saboo220. (xlv) It is then submitted that the controversies regarding offence under the Act being cognizable or non-cognizable is irrelevant because the definitions of the cognizable offence under Section 2(c) and noncognizable offence under Section 2(l) of the Cr.P.C. are clearly inapplicable in the case of ED officers who are not police officers 221, as these two definitions only apply to “police officer”. Secondly, the application of these two definitions is restricted to the offences mentioned under the First Schedule of the Cr.P.C. and the offence under the Act (PMLA) is clearly not an offence specified therein. It is submitted that even under Part II of the First Schedule, the offence under the Act would be cognizable. Further, the purpose of categorizing an offence on the basis of cognizable and non-cognizable offence is to indicate whether a police officer can arrest a person without warrant. The Act under Section 19 confers unequivocal power of arrest without warrant. Therefore, the question as to whether an offence of money-laundering is cognizable or non-cognizable, is irrelevant. (xlvi) It is submitted that from the very inception of the PMLA, the offences were made cognizable under Section 45 of the Act. However, the word ‘cognizable’ was causing unnecessary confusion, as
(1831) 2 Dow & Cl 480 1963 (Supp.) 2 SCR 812 (1964) 4 SCR 280 AIR 1968 SC 565 (1984) 4 SCC 27 Supra at Footnote No.202 (2011) 8 SCC 539
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
it seemed that offence being cognizable, the jurisdictional police officers are also empowered to investigate the offence and submit chargesheet after the investigation. Although such confusion had no basis as only the ED officers have been empowered to conduct investigation, who are not police officers under the Act, and after the investigation only a complaint could be filed by him before the Special Court. To remove this anomaly, the word ‘cognizable’ was deleted and the definition of investigation was inserted under Section 2(1)(na) of the Act. In this regard, the learned Solicitor General has cited relevant extracts of speech of then Finance Minister while introducing 2019 amendment.
(xlvii) It is submitted that the Legislature had no intention to make the offence under the PMLA to be non-cognizable which is manifest from the unamended marginal note222 of Sections 19 and 45 of the Act. It is further stated that Section 19 of the PMLA has a special purpose with regard to the peculiar nature of the offence. It is then submitted that the Legislature has deliberately avoided the provision of registration of FIR, supplying the copy of FIR to the Magistrate and requiring the authorities to obtain arrest warrant because due to the nature of offence, there are high chances that the accused may eliminate the traces of offence if he had any prior notice of the investigation. The same view has been taken by the Jharkhand High Court in Hari Narayan Rai vs. Union of India & Anr.223, Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Karam Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.224, Bombay High Court in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal vs. Union of India & Ors.225, Delhi High Court in Vakamulla Chandrashekhar vs. Enforcement Directorate & Anr. 226, Virbhadra Singh & Anr. vs. Enforcement Directorate & Anr.227, Moin Akhtar Qureshi vs. Union of India & Ors.228 and this Court in Directorate of Enforcement vs. Vakamulla Chandrashekhar229. However, in W.P. (Crl.) No. 363 of 2018 and Crl. M.A. No. 2151 of 2018 i.e., Rajbhushan Omprakash Dixit vs. Union
Romesh Chandra Mehta (supra at Footnote No.119) Bhagirath vs. Delhi Administration, (1985) 2 SCC 580 and Eastern Coalfields Limited vs. Sanjay Transport Agency & Anr., (2009) 7 SCC 345 2010 SCC OnLine Jhar 475 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 19739 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9938 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12810 2017 SCC OnLine Del 8930 vide order dated 01.12.2017 in W.P. (Crl.) No.2465/2017 Order dated 04.01.2018 in SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 36918/2017
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of India & Anr., the Division Bench of the High Court took a different view and referred the matter to a larger bench. It is submitted that the said order is contrary to the decisions of this Court in Serious Fraud Investigation Office vs. Rahul Modi & Anr.230 and of the High Courts. (xlviii) Further, the binary created by the private parties of an offence being cognizable or non-cognizable is immaterial in the case of PMLA, which is a Code in itself and provides a special procedure for investigation. It is argued that the compartmentalization of the offence under the Act is pointless because if the offence is held to be cognizable, then it will be mandatory to register an FIR. However, under the scheme of the PMLA, only an ECIR is registered, which cannot be equated with an FIR and it is only for administrative convenience for identification of each case. (xlix) It is argued that the decision of this Court in K.I. Pavunny vs. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin 231, squarely applies to the present case, wherein it had been held that Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C will not apply during the investigations under the 1962 Act. (l) It is submitted that various High Courts have already answered the question under consideration and held that the offence under the Act is cognizable, so far as power of arrest without warrant is concerned and the ECIR registered under the Act cannot be equated with an FIR. 232 Strong reliance has been placed upon the decisions in Virbhadra Singh233 and Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited & Anr. vs. Assistant Director of Enforcement Directorate234. (li) It is submitted that the nature of the amendment can only be inferred from the scheme of the Act prior to the amendment and subsequent to the amendment, and it is the substance rather than the form which determines the nature of the Act. To lend support to his submissions, learned Solicitor General has relied on Zile Singh vs. State
(2019) 5 SCC 266 (1997) 3 SCC 721 Karam Singh (supra at Footnote No.224) and Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal (supra at Footnote No.225) Supra at Footnote No.227 2016 SCC OnLine Hyd 64
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
of Haryana & Ors. 235 and Commissioner of Income Tax I, Ahmedabad vs. Gold Coin Health Food Private Limited236.
(lii) It is argued that the amendment of Section 45 only clarifies that the offence under the Act is cognizable in nature so far as the power of arrest without warrant is concerned. It is further submitted that the amendment being clarificatory in nature would operate retrospectively. To bolster this argument, reliance has been placed on Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhopal vs. Shelly Products & Anr.237, Gurcharan Singh vs. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 238, Assistant Electrical Engineer vs. Satyendra Rai & Anr. 239 , Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi vs. Vatika Township Private Limited 240 , State Bank of India vs. V. Ramakrishnan & Anr.241, and Union of India & Ors. vs. Mudrika Singh 242. (liii) It is then submitted that there are adequate safeguards under Section 19 of the PMLA, which makes the provision Constitutioncompliant. It is submitted that firstly, the power of arrest under Section 19 can be exercised only by a Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other police officer authorized in this behalf by the Central Government as opposed to Cr.P.C., where the power of arrest can be exercised by any police officer without a warrant even on the basis of reasonable suspicion, as per Section 41 of the Cr.P.C. The Director, who is the head of ED, is appointed by a neutral process mentioned under Section 25 of Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 243. Therefore, only persons of particular rank who are appointed by statute have the power to arrest any person under Section 19 of the PMLA. Secondly, there must be material in possession with the Authority before the power of arrest can be exercised as opposed to Cr.P.C which gives the power of arrest to any police officer and the officer can arrest any person merely on the basis of a complaint, credible information or
(2004) 8 SCC 1 (2008) 9 SCC 622 (2003) 5 SCC 461 (2008) 17 SCC 28 (2014) 4 SCC 513 (2015) 1 SCC 1 (also at Footnote No.127) (2018) 17 SCC 394 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1173 For short, “CVC Act”
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reasonable suspicion against such person. Thirdly, there should be reason to believe that the person being arrested is guilty of the offence punishable under PMLA in contrast to the provision in Cr.P.C., which mainly requires reasonable apprehension/suspicion of commission of offence. Also, such reasons to believe must be reduced in writing. Fifthly, as per the constitutional mandate of Article 22(1), the person arrested is required to be informed of the grounds of his arrest. It is submitted that the argument of the other side that the accused or arrested persons are not even informed of the case against them, is contrary to the plain language of the Act, as the Act itself mandates that the person arrested is to be informed of the ground of his arrest. Sixthly, the Authority arresting the person is required to forward a copy of the order of arrest and material in its possession to the Adjudicatory Authority in a sealed envelope, which is required to be retained for a period of ten (10) years as per the Prevention of Money Laundering [the Forms and Manner of Forwarding a Copy of Order of Arrest of a Person along with the Material to the Adjudicating Authority and its Period of Retention] Rules, 2005. Seventhly, it is stated that the person arrested is required to be produced before the Special Court or the Magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest. Thus, the competent Court can look at the material in possession of the Director and the reasons formed by him to believe that the person is guilty of the offence under the PMLA, so as to satisfy itself of the legality of his arrest. (liv) It is submitted that as there is nothing contrary in the PMLA to Section 167 of Cr.P.C., therefore, the provisions of remand under Section 167 Cr.P.C. would also apply and any further detention of the arrested person would only be allowed by the competent Court and, for the same reasons, Chapter V of the Cr.P.C. would also apply in case of arrest made under the PMLA. (lv) Further, it is submitted that the guidelines issued in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr.244 will have no application for the purpose of arrest under PMLA. The guidelines in the said decision were issued to avoid misuse of the provision of arrest, while in the case of the PMLA, there is already a higher threshold specified for arresting any person. Therefore, there is no possibility of arbitrary arrest under the PMLA. Whereas, since the decision to arrest is taken by high official
(2014) 8 SCC 273
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
after complying with threshold requirements in law, there will be presumption that he has acted bona fide.
(lvi) It is stated that considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the serving of notice to a person as prescribed under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. would materially interfere with fair investigation being done by high official bestowed with such responsibility and make the investigation redundant. (lvii) Further, it is submitted that the contention of the private parties that the power under Section 19 of PMLA can only be invoked after a complaint is filed, is devoid of any merits. It is submitted that in a complaint case under the PMLA, a complaint is similar to the police report filed under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C, which makes the arrest a part of investigation which would always be prior to filing of the complaint under Section 44 or further complaint as contemplated in Explanation in Section 44. Further, the proviso to Section 44(1)(b) which provides for filing of a closure report before the Special Court, if after investigation no offence of money-laundering is made out, makes it absolutely clear that the complaint is to be filed after the conclusion of investigation. (lviii) It is submitted that Section 19 of PMLA is pari materia to Section 35 of the FERA and Section 103 of the 1962 Act and their validity has been upheld by this Court. Reliance is placed on Romesh Chandra Mehta245 to urge that the filing of complaint, after the investigation, is not a necessary prerequisite before arresting the person. (lix) Reliance is then placed on the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Padam Narain Aggarwal & Ors.246, wherein the Court examined the power to arrest under Section 104 of 1962 Act. Relying on the decision, it was stated that the power to arrest is statutory in character and cannot be interfered with and can only be exercised on objective considerations free from whims, caprice or fancy of the officer. The law takes due care to ensure individual freedom and liberty by laying down norms and providing safeguards so that the authorities may not misuse such power. It is submitted that the requirement of “reason to believe” and “recording of such reasons in writing” prevent arbitrariness and makes the provision compliant with Article 14. This is reinforced from the fact that only 313 arrests have been made under the PMLA in 17 years of operations of the PMLA.
Supra at Footnote No.119 (2008) 13 SCC 305
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(lx) Canadian judgment in Gifford vs. Kelson247 was also relied on to state that “reason to believe” conveys conviction of the mind founded on evidence regarding the existence of a fact or the doing of an act, therefore, is of a higher standard than mere suspicion. Reliance has been further placed on Premium Granites & Anr. vs. State of T.N. & Ors.248 to urge that the requirement of giving reasons for exercise of the power by itself excludes chances of arbitrariness. The learned Solicitor General has further relied on the decision in M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors.249 to state that there is a presumption that the discretion will not be abused where the discretion is vested with a high-ranking officer. Lastly, reliance was placed on Ahmed Noormohmed Bhatti vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 250 and Manzoor Ali Khan vs. Union of India & Ors. 251 to urge that mere possibility of abuse by the authority, which is vested with the discretion to exercise the power, cannot be a ground to render the provision unconstitutional. (lxi) It is then submitted that the quantum of punishment cannot be the sole basis for determining the gravity of offence. The Legislature has several statutory mechanisms to bring about deterrence effect so as to prevent the commission of an offence and the quantum of punishment is only one such mechanism. It is further submitted that a stringent condition of bail is relatable to the object of creating a deterrent effect on persons who may commit the offence of money-laundering which is also manifest in the Preamble of the Act. To give effect to the international standards of preventing money-laundering prescribed by FATF and other international treaties, stringent bail conditions are necessary and the Legislature has provided enough safeguards under Section 19 so as to balance the rights of the accused and to protect the interest of the investigation as well. It is urged that the legislative policy of the country has consistently treated money-laundering as a serious offence affecting the microeconomic strength of the country. Further, it is stated that the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA are reasonable from the stand point of the accused and his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution, which provides an objective criteria and intelligible differentia,
(1943) 51 Man. R 120 (1994) 2 SCC 691 (1982) 1 SCC 31 (2005) 3 SCC 647 (2015) 2 SCC 33
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
hence, does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Further it is submitted that there are only some issues on which the international community is building consensus and money-laundering is one of them, others being terrorism, drug related offences and organized crime and the twin conditions are provided in all three categories of laws by the Legislature.
(lxii) Relying on international Conventions, such as Vienna Convention, Palermo Convention and FATF Recommendations, it is urged that the same concern has been expressed by the global community, which is reflected in all the above-mentioned Conventions. It is further submitted that Section 45 of the PMLA fulfils the mandate of international Conventions as the implementation of the PMLA is monitored internationally and is linked to India’s international obligations.
(lxiii) It is submitted that in furtherance of the legitimate State interest, departure from ordinary criminal procedure has been made under the PMLA. Reliance has been placed on A.K. Roy vs. Union of India & Ors.252 to urge that that ‘the liberty of the individual has to be subordinated, within reasonable bounds, to the good of the people’. Further, the twin conditions are not novel or draconian in nature as they are also present in other numerous special enactments for the welfare of the people and they not only provide deterrent effect but also tackle the offence of money-laundering. It is submitted that this Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah253 has not reckoned this crucial aspect. It is submitted that the length of punishment is not the only indicator of the gravity of the offence and private parties have wrongly argued that the twin conditions cannot be made applicable in a legislation which carry a punishment of only seven (7) years. Gravity of offence is to be judged on a totality of factors, especially keeping in mind the background in which the offence came to be recognized by the Legislature in the specific international context. To buttress this submission, the learned Solicitor General has relied on State of Gujarat vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal & Anr. 254 , Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy vs. Central Bureau of Investigation 255 , Nimmagadda Prasad vs. Central Bureau of Investigation256, Gautam Kundu257, and State of Bihar & Anr. vs.
(1982) 1 SCC 271 Supra at Footnote No. 3 (1987) 2 SCC 364 (2013) 7 SCC 439 (2013) 7 SCC 466 Supra at Footnote No.207
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Amit Kumar alias Bachcha Rai258. Further, reliance has been placed on Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors.259 to state that the seriousness of an offence and its impact on society is the subject matter of legislative wisdom and Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people.
(lxiv) It is submitted that persons involved in the offence of moneylaundering are influential, intelligent and resourceful and the crime is committed with full pre-meditation, which ensures that the offence is not detected and even if it is detected, investigation agency cannot trace the evidence. Further, it is stated that the offence is committed with the help of advanced technology so as to conceal the transaction, which makes the stringent bail conditions justified. Twin conditions of bail under Section 45 protect the interests of the accused as well as that of the prosecution. Reliance has been placed on Talab Haji Hussain vs. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar & Anr.260, to state that the fair trial must not only be fair to the accused but also be fair to the prosecution, so that a person guilty of the offence may not be acquitted.
(lxv) It is submitted that in case of offence of money-laundering, mere routine conditions which ensure presence of the accused during trial or protect the evidence, are not enough because of the trans-border nature of the offence of money-laundering and influence which may be exercised by the accused. An accused can anonymously remove the money trail using the technology, which is available today so as to make the investigation infructuous. Therefore, even deposit of the passport of the accused may not deter the accused from fleeing the course of justice or to eliminate the evidence. (lxvi) It is submitted that economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with different approach in the matter of bail. Further, the fact that the economic offences are considered as a different class of offences, recognizes the grave and serious nature of the offence with deep rooted conspiracy, as they involve huge loss of public funds, thus, affecting the economy of the country as a whole. It is submitted that the Court while granting bail must keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused,
(2017) 13 SCC 751 AIR 1958 SC 731 (1958) SCR 1226
VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with and the larger interests of the public/ State. It is submitted that granting or refusal to grant bail depends on the nature of offence, needs of investigation, status of the accused and other factors. The Legislature, being aware of the need of the day, is competent to provide a special procedure for grant of bail. It would be wrong to say that the Court has unfettered discretion in granting or refusal to grant the bail. It is true that the Court exercises discretion while granting or refusing bail, but that exercise of power has to be within the legislative framework. It is stated that the requirement of the Court being satisfied that the “accused is not guilty of an offence” is not a novel legislative device. Section 437 of Cr.P.C. also imposes a similar condition261. Moreover, the twin conditions have been provided for by the Parliament in numerous other enactments as well. It is submitted that the Parliament is competent to classify offences and offenders in different categories. The Parliament has classified the offence of money-laundering as a separate class of offence from ordinary criminal laws. The said classification was necessary because the PMLA was framed in a specific international context, providing for separate and special architecture for investigation.
(lxvii) The offence of money-laundering is a new offence created by the PMLA, which has a high threshold of arrest as given under Section 19, which itself justifies high threshold for grant of bail. Nature of the offence being peculiar, makes manner of investigation far more difficult than in ordinary penal offences. The PMLA is a complete Code in itself, which creates a separate machinery to tackle the social menace, having adequate safeguards. It is submitted that Legislature has on numerous occasions made departures from the ordinary penal and procedural laws as and when the situation arrived. The classification of the offence on
437. When bail may be taken in case of non- bailable offence.— (1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but— (i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; ….. (emphasis supplied)
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the basis of public policy and underlying purpose of the Act cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary. Therefore, the Parliament is fully competent to deal with special type of cases by providing a distinct and different procedure which in the circumstances, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Therefore, it is submitted that a different standard for bail can be provided in an offence which serves a special purpose. To buttress these submissions, reliance has been placed on Kathi Raning Rawat vs. State of Saurashtra262, Kedar Nath Bajoria & Anr. vs. The State of West Bengal 263, Special Reference No.1 of 1978264 and Kartar Singh 265. (lxviii) Further reliance has been placed on Asbury Hospital vs. Cass County266, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs. The Union of India & Ors.267 and The State of Bombay & Anr. vs. F.N. Balsara268 to urge that ‘the principle of equality does not mean that every law must hav