Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India & Anr.
Landmark judgment · Tax & GST — Offshore share transfer not taxable in India under the law as it then stood.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 20 January 2012
- Judge
- Justice S.H. Kapadia
- Neutral citation
- 2012 INSC 45
- Reported in
- [2012] 1 S.C.R. 573
- Result
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Acts & sections
- Section 9 Income Tax Act, Section 5 Income Tax Act, Section 201 Income Tax Act
- Subject
- Tax & GST
Full judgment
[2012] 1 S.C.R. 573 VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V.
v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 733 of 2012) JANUARY 20, 2012
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[S.H. KAPADIA, CJI, K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.] Income Tax Act, 1961:
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s.45 read with ss. 195, 201 and 201(1A) - Capital gains - Offshore transaction - Territorial tax jurisdiction of Indian tax authorities - Transaction between VIH and HTIL (both companies incorporated outside India) with regard to sale and purchase of the entire share capital of CGP, also a D company incorporated outside India - Revenue seeking to tax the capital gains arising from the sale of share capital of CGP on the basis that CGP held the underlying Indian assets - Held: Indian tax authorities had no territorial jurisdiction to tax the said offshore transaction - Applying the look at test, E in order to ascertain the true nature and character of the transaction, the Offshore Transaction in the instant case, is a bonafide structured FD/ investment into India which fell outside India's territorial tax jurisdiction and, as such, not taxable The said Offshore Transaction evidences participative investment and not a sham or tax avoidant preordained F transaction. s.9(1)(i) - Income deemed to accrue or arise in India Expression, 'transfer of a capital asset situate in India" - Held: s.9(1)(i) cannot by a process of interpretation be extended to G cover indirect transfers of capital assets/property situate in India - The legislature has not used the words indirect transfer in s.9(1)(i) - Similarly, the words 'underlying asset' do not find place in s. 9(1 )(i) - Further, "transfer" should be of
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A an asset in respect of which it is possible to compute a capital gain in accordance with the provisions of the Act - A legal fiction has a limited scope - It cannot be expanded by giving purposive interpretation - The question of providing "look through" in the statute or in the treaty is a matter of policy B It is to be expressly provided for in the statute or in the treaty - Similarly, limitation of benefits has to be expressly provided for in the treaty - Such clauses cannot be read into the Section by interpretation - Therefore, s. 9(1 )(i) is not a "look through" provision - Interpretation of Statutes.
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s. 195 - Deduction of tax at source - Scope and applicability of - Held: The payment in question must have an element of income embedded in it which is chargeable to tax in India - If the sum paid or credited by the payer is not chargeable to tax then no obligation to deduct the tax would D arise - Shareholding in companies incorporated outside India (CGP) is property located outside India - Where such shares become subject matter of offshore transfer between two nonresidents, there is no liability for capital gains tax - Jn such a case, question of deduction of TAS would not arise - The E instant case concerns the transaction of "outright sale" between two non-residents of a capital asset (share) outside India - Further, the said transaction was entered into on principal to principal basis - Therefore, no liability to deduct TAS arose -Further, in the case of transfer of the Structure F in its entirety, one has to look at it holistically as one Single Consolidated Bargain which took place between two foreign companies outside India for which a Jump sum price was paid - Acquisition of CGP share which gave V/H an indirect control over three genres of companies evidences a straightforward G share sale and not an asset sale - The case does not involve sale of assets on itemized basis - There was no split up of Jump sum payment, asset-wise, as claimed by Revenue - There was no assignment of price for each right, considered by Revenue to be a "capital asset" in the transaction - Tax H presence must be construed in the context, and in a manner
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
that brings the non-resident assessee under the jurisdiction of the Indian tax authorities - In the instant case, Revenue has failed to establish any connection with s.9(1)(i) - Under the circumstances, s. 195 is not applicable.
ss. 163(1)(c) read with ss. 161 and 9(1)(i) - "Agent" in relation to a non-resident - Held: s. 161 makes a representative assessee liable only if the eventualities stipulated ins. 161 are satisfied - In the instant case, Revenue has invoked s. 163(1)(c) - Both ss. 163(1)(c) and 9(1 )(i) state that income should be deemed to accrue or arise in India Both these Sections have to be read together - On facts of C the instant case, s. 163(1)(c) is not attracted as there is no transfer of a capital asset situated in India - Consequently, 'VIH' cannot be proceeded against even u/s 163 of the Act as a representative assessee. D Taxation: Tax avoidance - Offshore transaction - Held: When it comes to taxation of a Holding Structure, at the threshold, the burden is on the Revenue to allege and establish abuse, in the sense of tax avoidance in the creation and/or use of such structure(s) - It is the task of the Revenue/court to ascertain the legal nature of the transaction and while doing so it has to look at the entire transaction as a whole and not to adopt a dissecting approach - Every strategic foreign direct investmf!nt coming to India, as an investment destination, should be seen in a holistic manner - While doing so, the Revenue/courts should keep in mind: the concept of participation in investment, the duration of time during which the Holding Structure exists; the period of business operations in India; the generation of taxable revenues in India; the timing of the exit; the continuity of business on such exit Onus will be on the Revenue to identify the scheme and its dominant purpose - Besides, there is a conceptual difference between pre-ordained transaction which is created for tax avoidance purposes, on the one hand, and a transaction
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which evidences investment to participate in India - In the instant case, the sale of shares is relevant and not the sale of assets, item-wise - The Revenue has adopted a dissecting approach at the Department level -It cannot be said that the structure was created or used as a sham or tax avoidant - In such a case, where the structure has existed for a considerable length of time generating taxable revenues right from 1994 and the transaction satisfies all the parameters of "participation in investment", the court need not go into the questions such as de facto control vs. legal control, legal rights vs. practical rights, etc. Companies Act, 1956:
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Transfer of shares of a company - Situs of shares. - Held: Situs of the shares would be where the company is incorporated and where its shares can be transferred - In the instant case, transfer of CGP share was recorded in the Cayman Islands, where the register of members of CGP is maintained - In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the situs of CGP share was situated in the place (India) where the underlying assets stood situated.
ss. 2(47) and 4 - 'Holding company' and 'Subsidiary' Held: A company is a separate legal persona and the fact that all its shares are owned by one person or by the parent F company has nothing to do with its separate legal existence - The difference is between having the power and having a persuasive position - The decisive criteria is whether the parent company's management has such steering interference with the subsidiary's core activities that subsidiary can no longer be regarded to perform those activities on the G authority of its own executive directors - In the instant case, HTIL, as a Group holding company, had no legal right to direct its downstream companies in the matter of voting, nomination of directors and management rights - Principle of lifting the corporate veil - Doctrine of substance over form H - Concept of beneficial ownership - Concept of alter ego.
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. Legislation:
Need for legislation - Tax statutes - Held: FD/ flows towards location with a strong governance infrastructure which includes enactment of laws and how well the legal system works - Certainty and stability form the basic foundation of 8 any fiscal system - Tax policy certainty is crucial for taxpayers (including foreign investors) to make rational economic choices in the most efficient manner - Legal doctrines like "Limitation of Benefits" and "look through" are matters of policy - It is for the Government of the day to have them C incorporated in the Treaties and in the laws so as to avoid conflicting views - Investors should know where they stand It also helps the tax administration in enforcing the provisions of the taxing laws.
On 11.2.2007, VIH, and HTIL, both companies D incorporated outside India, entered into an Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Share and Loans (SPA) under which HTIL agreed to procure for VIH the sale of the entire share capital of CGP (a company resident for tax purposes in the Cayman Islands) which it held through E HTIHL. HTIHL was a wholly owned subsidiary (indirect) of HTIL. The completion of the acquisition took place on 8.5.2007. Indian Tax Authorities (Revenue) sought to tax the capital gains arising from the sale of the share capital of CGP on the basis that CGP, whilst not a. tax resident F in India, held the underlying Indian assets. The stand of · the Revenue was that by the said transaction the stated aim of VIH was "acquisition of 67% controlling interest in "HEL", which was a company resident for tax purposes in India. On the other hand, the case of VIH was G that it had agreed to acquire companies which in turn controlled a 67% interest, but not controlling interest, in HEL. On 31.5.2010, an order was passed u/ss 201.(1) and 201 (1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act), declaring that the "Revenue" had jurisdiction to tax the transaction, H
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against which VIH filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court. Aggrieved, VIH filed the appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court
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HELD: Per S.H. Kapadia, CJI (for himself and for Swatanter Kumar, J.):
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1.1. The majority judgment in McDowell held that "tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the framework of law". Thus, it cannot be said that all tax planning is illegal/illegitimate/impermissible. In cases of treaty shopping and/or tax avoidance, there is no conflict between McDowell and Azadi Bachao or between McDowell and Mathuram Agrawal. [Para 64] [641-G; 642-D]
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McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. CTO 1985 (3) SCR 791 (1985) 3 SCC 230; Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Ando/an 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 222 (2004) 10 SCC 1; and Mathuram E Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 195 (1999) 8 SCC 667 - referred to.
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International Tax Aspects of Holding Structures: 1.2. It is fairly well settled that for tax treaty purposes F a subsidiary and its parent are also totally separate and distinct tax payers. However, the fact that a parent company exercises shareholder's influence on its subsidiaries does not generally imply that the subsidiaries are to be deemed residents of the State in G which the parent company resides. [Para 66-67] [643-BC; 643-D] 1.3.·Where the subsidiary's executive directors' competences are transferred to other persons/bodies or H where the subsidiary's executive directors' decision
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
making has become fully subordinate to the Holding A Company with the consequence that the subsidiary's executive directors are no more than puppets then the turning point in respect of the subsidiary's place of residence comes about. Similarly, if an actual controlling Non-Resident Enterprise (NRE) makes an indirect transfer B through "abuse of organisation form/legal form and without reasonable business purpose" which results in tax avoidance or avoidance of withholding tax, then the Revenue may disregard the form of the arrangement or the impugned action through use of Non-Resident c Holding Company, re-characterize the equity transfer according to its economic substance and impose the tax on the actual controlling Non-Resident Enterprise. [Para 67] [643-F-H; 644-A-B] 1.4. Whether a transaction is used principally as a D colourable device for the distribution of earnings, profits and gains is determined by a review of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction: It is in such cases that the principle of lifting the corporate veil or the doctrine of substance over form or the concept of E beneficial ownership or the concept of alter ego arises. There are many other circumstances, where separate existence of different companies, that are part of the same group, will be totally or partly ignored as a device or a conduit (in the pejorative sense). [Para 67] [644-B-C] F Salomon v. Salomon (1897) A.C. 22 - referred to.
1.5. In the instant case, the Court is concerned with the concept of GAAR. India already has a judicial anti·avoidance rule. When it comes to taxation of a Holding G Structure, at the threshold, the burden is on the Revenue to allege and establish abuse, in the sense of tax avoidance in the creation and/or use of such structure(s). In the application of a judicial anti-avoidance rule, the Revenue may invoke the "substance over form" principle H
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or "piercing the corporate veil" test only after it is able to establish on the basis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction that the impugned transaction is a sham or tax avoidant. [Para 68] [644-GH; 645-A-D]
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1.6. In view of the "look at" principle enunciated in Ramsay, the Revenue or the court must look at a document or a transaction in a context to which it properly belongs to. It is the task of the Revenue/court to ascertain the legal nature of the transaction and while C doing so it has to look at the entire transaction as a whole and not to adopt a dissecting approach. The Revenue cannot start with the question as to whether the impugned transaction is a tax deferment/saving device but it should apply the "look at" test to ascertain its true D legal nature.In the instant case, the Revenue has adopted a dissecting approach at the Department level. [Para 60 and 68] [640-F-H; 645-F-G]
The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. His Grace the Duke of Westminster 1935 All E.R. 259 and WT. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1981) 1 All E.R. 865; Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dawson (1984) 1 All E.R. 530; Craven (Inspector of Taxes) v. White (Stephen) (1988) 3 All. E.R. 495; and Craven (Inspector of Taxes) v. White (Stephen) (1988) 3 All. E.R. 495 - referred to.
1.7. Every strategic foreign direct investment coming to India, as an investment destination, should be seen in a holistic manner. The onus will be on the Revenue to identify the scheme and its dominant purpose. The G corporate business purpose of a transaction is evidence of the fact that the impugned transaction is not undertaken as a colourable or artificial device. The stronger the evidence of a device, the stronger the corporate business purpose must exist to overcome the H · evidence of a device.[Para 68] [646-A-D]
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF !NOIA & ANR. Section 9(1 )(i) is not a look through provision:
2.1. Section 9(1)(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 gathers in one place various types of income and directs that income falling under each of the sub-clauses shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. Broadly, there are four items of income. The income dealt with in each sub- 8 clause is distinct and independent of the other and the requirements to bring income within each sub-clause, are separately noted. Therefore, it is not necessary that the income falling in one category under any one of the subclauses should also satisfy the requirements of the other C sub-clauses to bring it within the expression "income deemed to accrue or arise in India" in s.9(1 )(i). In the instant case, the last sub-clause of s.9(1 )(i), which refers to income arising from "transfer of a capital asset situate in India", is relevant. The fiction created by s.9(1 )(i) applies D to the assessment of income of non-residents. In the case of a non-resident, unless the place of accrual of income is within India, he cannot be subjected to tax. Any income that accrues or arises to a non-resident, directly or indirectly, outside India is fictionally deemed to accrue E or arise in India· if such income accrues or arises as a sequel to the transfer of a capital asset situate in India. Once the factum of such transfer is established by the Revenue, then the income of the non-resident arising or accruing from such transfer is made liable to be taxed by F reason of s.5(2)(b) of the Act. This fiction comes into play only when the income is not charged to tax on the basis of receipt in India, as receipt of income in India by itself attracts tax whether the recipient is a resident or nonresident.Thus, the income accruing or arising to a non- G resident outside India on transfer of a capital asset situate in India is fictionally deemed to accrue or arise in India, which income is made liable to be taxed by reason of s.5(2)(b) of the Act. This is the main purpose behind enactment of s.9(1)(i) of the Act. [Para 71] [647-F-H; 648- H A-H]
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2.2. The language of the section, when it is unambiguous and admits of no doubt regarding its interpretation, has to be given effect to, particularly when a legal fiction is embedded in that section. A legal fiction has a limited scope. It cannot be expanded by giving B purposive interpretation particularly if the result of such interpretation is to transform the concept of chargeability which is also there in s.9(1 )(i), when one reads s.9(1 )(i) with s.5(2)(b) of the Act. [Para 71) [649-A-C] C
2.3. Section 9(1 )(i) cannot by a process of interpretation be extended to cover indirect transfers of capital assets/property situate in India. To do so, would amount to changing the content and ambit of s.9(1 )(i). The Court cannot re-write s.9(1)(i). The legislature has not used the words indirect transfer in s.9(1)(i). If the word D indirect is read into s.9(1)(i), it would render the express statutory requirement of the 4th sub-clause in s.9(1 )(i) nugatory. This is because s.9(1 )(i) applies to transfers of a capital asset situate in India. This is one of the elements in the 4th sub-clause of s.9(1 )(i) and if indirect transfer of E a capital asset is read into s.9(1)(i) then the words capital asset situate in India would be rendered nugatory. [Para 71) [649-C-F] 2.4. Similarly, the words 'underlying asset' do not find place in s.9(1 )(i). Further, "transfer" should be of an asset in respect of which it is possible to compute a capital gain in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Moreover, even s.163(1)(c) is wide enough to cover the income whether received directly or indirectly. Thus, the G words directly or indirectly in s.9(1 )(i) go with the income and not with the transfer of a capital asset (property). [Para 71) [649-F-H]
2.5. Lastly, the Direct Tax Code (OTC) Bill, 2010 proposes taxation of offshore share transactions. This H proposal indicates in a way that indirect transfers are not
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
covered by the existing s.9(1 )(i) of the Act. In fact, the OTC A Bill, 2009 expressly stated that income accruing even from indirect transfer of a capital asset situate in India would be deemed to accrue in India. Thes.e proposals, therefore, show that in the existing s.9(1 )(i) the word indirect cannot be read on the basis of purposive B construction. The question of providing "look through" in the statute or in the treaty is a matter of policy. It is to be expressly provided for in the statute or in the treaty. Similarly, limitation of benefits has to be expressly provided for in the treaty. Such clauses cannot be read c into the Section by interpretation. Therefore, s.9(1 )(i) is not a "look through" provision. [Para 71) [649-H; 650-A-D] Transfer of HTIL's property rights by Extinquishment? 3.1. In the instant case, the Court is concerned with D the sale of shares and not the sale of assets, item-wise. The facts of this case show sale of the entire investment made by HTIL, through a Top company, viz. CGP, in the Hutchison Structure. In this case, the Court needs to apply the "look at" test, and the task of the Revenue is E to ascertain the legal nature of the transaction and, while doing so, it has to look at the entire transaction holistically and not to adopt a dissecting approach. [Para 73) [652-A-D] 3.2. Besides, there is a conceptual difference F between preordained transaction which is created for tax avoidance purposes, on the one hand, and a transaction which evidences investment to participate in India. In order to find out the nature of the transaction one has to take into account the factors, namely, duration of time G during which the holding structure existed, the period of business operations in India, generation of taxable - revenue in India during the period of business operations in India, the timing of the exit, the continuity of business on such exit, etc. Applying these tests to the facts of the H
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instant case, it is evident that the Hutchison structure has been in place since 1994. It operated during the period 1994 to 11.02.2007. It has paid income tax ranging from Rs. 3 crore to Rs. 250 crore per annum during the period 2002-03 to 2006-07. Even after 11.02.2007, taxes are being B paid by VIH ranging from Rs.394 crore to Rs. 962 crore per annum during the period 2007-08 to 2010-11 (these figures are apart from indirect taxes which also run in crores). Moreover, the SPA indicates "continuity" of the telecom business on the exit of its predecessor, namely, c HTIL. Thus, it cannot be said that the structure was created or used as a sham or tax avoidant. [Para 73] [652D-H] 3.3. If one applies the look at test, without invoking the dissecting approach, then, extinguishment took place D because of the transfer of the CGP share and not by virtue of various clauses of SPA. In such a case, where the structure has existed for a considerable length of time generating taxable revenues right from 1994 and where the court is satisfied that the transaction satisfies all the E parameters of "participation in investment", the court need not go into the questions such as de facto control vs. legal control, legal rights vs. practical rights, etc. [Para 73] [653-A-C] 3.4. However, if HTIL did not possess a legal right to F appoint directors onto the board of HEL and as such did not have "property right" in HEL, the question of such a right getting "extinguished" will not arise. A legal right is an enforceable right. Enforceable by a legal process. A company is a separate legal persona and the fact that all G its shares are owned by one person or by the parent company has nothing to do with its separate legal existence. The fact that the parent company exercises share holder's influence on its subsidiaries cannot obliterate the decision-making power or authority of its H (subsidiary's) directors. The difference is between having
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
the power and having a persuasive position. The decisive criteria is whether the parent company's management has such steering interference with the subsidiary's core activities that subsidiary can no longer be regarded to perform those activities on the authority of its own executive directors. Therefore, though it may be advantageous for a parent and subsidiary companies to work as a group, each subsidiary has to protect its own separate commercial interests. [Para 74-75] [653-D-F-G; 654-E-G; 655-E] 3.5. On the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the right of HTIL, if at all it is a right, to direct a downstream subsidiary as to the manner in which it should vote would fall in the category of a persuasive position/influence rather than having a power over the subsidiary. [Para 75] [655-E-F] 3.6. In this case, the Court is concerned with the expression "capital asset" in the income tax law. Applying the test of enforceability, influence/ persuasion cannot be construed as a right in the legal sense. [Para 76] [656-E] 3.7. Further, the concept of "de facto" control, which existed in the Hutchison structure, conveys a state of being in control without any legal right to such state. This aspect is important while construing the words "capital asset" under the income tax law. Enforceability is an important aspect of a legal right. Applying these tests, on the facts of the case and that too in the light of the ownership structure of Hutchison, this Court holds that HTIL, as a Group holding company, had no legal right to direct its downstream companies in the matter of voting, nomination of directors and management rights. [Para . 76] [656-F -G] 3.8. Exit is an important right of an investor in every strategic investment. The present case concerns transfer
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A of investment in entirety. Exit coupled with continuity of business is one of the tell-tale important circumstance which indicates the commercial/business substance of the transaction. Thus, the need for SPA arose to re-adjust the outstanding loans between the companies; to provide B for standstill arrangements in the interregnum between the date of signing of the SPA on 11.02.2007 and its completion on 8.05.2007; to provide for a seamless transfer and to provide for fundamental terms of price, indemnities, warranties etc. [Para 75] [654-H; 655-A-C]
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3.9. As regards continuance of the 2006 Shareholders/Framework Agreements by S.PA, one needs to keep in mind two relevant concepts, viz., participative and protective rights. This is a case of HTIL exercising its exit right under the holding structure and continuance of the telecom business operations in India by VIH by acquisition of shares. A minority investor has what is called as a "participative" right, which is a subset of "protective rights". This "exit right" comes under "protective rights". On examination of the Hutchison E structure in its entirety, it becomes evident that both, participative and protective rights, were provided for in the Shareholders/ Framework Agreements of 2006 in favour of Centrino, NOC and SMMS which enabled them to participate, directly or indirectly, in the operations of F HEL. Even without the execution of SPA, such rights existed in the above agreements. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that such rights flowed from the SPA. [Para 76] [656-G-H; 657-A-G] G
3.1 O. It is impossible for the acquirer to visualize all events that may take place between the date of execution of the SPA and completion of acquisition. Therefore, there is a provision for standstill in the SPA and so also the provision for transition. But, from that, it does not follow that without SPA, transition could not ensue. H Moreover, the very object of the SPA is to cover the
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF !NOIA & ANR.
situations which may arise during the transition and those A which are capable of being anticipated and dealt with. The rights and obligations created under the SPA had to be preserved. In any event, preservation of such rights with a view to continue business in India is not extinguishment. [Para 76] [657-G-H; 658-A-B; 660-A-B] B 3.11. This Court, therefore, holds that under the HTIL structure, as it existed in 1994, HTIL occupied only a persuasive position/influence over the downstream companies qua manner of voting, nomination of directors C and management rights; that, the minority shareholders/ investors had participative and protective rights (including RoFR/TARs, call and put options which provided for exit) which flowed from the CGP share; that, the entire investment was sold to the VIH through the investment vehicle (CGP). Consequently, there was no D extinguishment of rights as alleged by the Revenue. [Para Tl] [660-C-E] Role of CGP in the transaction: 4.1. It is incorrect to say that CGP stood inserted at a late stage in the transaction in order to bring in a tax-free entity (or to create a transaction to avoid tax) and thereby avoid capital gains. CGP was incorporated in 1998 in Cayman Islands. It was in the Hutchison structure from F 1998. The transaction in the instant case was of divestment and, therefore, the transaction of sale was structured at an appropriate tier, so that the buyer really acquired the same degree of control as was exercised by HTIL. VIH agreed to acquire companies and the companies it acquired controlled 67% interest in HEL. G CGP was an investment vehicle. It is through the acquisition of CGP that VIH proposed to indirectly acquire the rights and obligations of GSPL(lndian Company) in the Centrino and NOC Framework Agreements. The advantage of transferring the CGP share enabled VIH to H
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indirectly acquire the rights and obligations of GSPL in the Centrino and NOC Framework agreements. This was the reason for VIH to go by the CGP route. [Para 78 and 80] [660-F; 662-A-E]
4.2. The role of CGP in the transaction is evident from two documents: one is the Report of the KPMG dated 18.10.2010 in which it is stated that through the acquisition of CGP, VIH had indirectly acquired the rights and obligations of GSPL in the Centrino and NOC C Framework Agreements; and the second document is the Annual Report 2007 of HTIL. Under the caption "Overview", the Report observes that on 11.02.2007, HTIL entered into an agreement to sell its entire interests in CGP, a company which held through various subsidiaries, the.direct and indirect equity and loan D interests in HEL (renamed VEL) and its subsidiaries to VIH. This supports the fact that the sole purpose of CGP was not only to hold shares in subsidiary companies but also to enable a smooth transition of business, which is the basis of the SPA. Therefore, it cannot be said that the E intervened entity (CGP) had no business or commercial purpose. [para 81] [663-G-H; 664-A-D]
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4.3. As regards situs of the CGP share, under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, the situs of the shares F would be where the company is incorporated and where its shares can be transferred. In the instant case, it has been asserted by VIH that the transfer of the CGP share was recorded in the Cayman Islands, where the register of members of the CGP is maintained. This assertion has G neither been rebutted in the impugned order of the Department dated 31.05.2010 nor traversed in the pleadings filed by the Revenue nor controverted before this Court. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the situs of tne CGP share was situated in the place (India) where the underlying assets stood situated. [Para 82] H [664-G-H; 665-A-C]
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
Did VIH acquire 67% controlling interest in HEL (and not 42%/ 52% as sought to be propounded)? 5.1. The expression "control" is a mixed question of law and fact. On perusal of Hutchison structure, it is evident that HTIL had, through its 100% wholly owned subsidiaries, invested in 42.34% of HEL (i.e. direct interest). Similarly, HTIL had invested through its non100% wholly owned subsidiaries in 9.62% of HEL (through the pro rata route). Thus, on the basis of the shareholding test, HTIL could be said to have a 52% control over HEL. By the same test, it could be equally said that the balance 15% stakes in HEL remained with AS, AG and IDFC (Indian partners) who had through their respective group companies invested 15% in HEL through Tll and Omega and, consequently, HTIL had no control over 15% stakes in HEL. At this stage, it may be stated that. under the Hutchison structure shares of Plustech in the AG Group, shares of Scorpios in the AS Group and shares of SMMS came under the options held by GSPL. Pending exercise, options are not management rights. Till date GSPL has not exercised its rights under the Framework Agreement 2006 because of the sectoral cap of 74% which in turn restricts the right to vote. Therefore, the transaction in the instant case provides for a triggering event, viz. relaxation of the sectoral cap. Till such date, HTIL/VIH cannot be said to have a control over 15% stakes in HEL. It is for this reason that even FIPB gave its approval to the transaction by saying that VIH was acquiring or has acquired effective shareholding of 51.96% in HEL. [Para 83] [666-B-H] 5.2. Under the Company Law, the management control vests in the Board of Directors and not with the .shareholders of the company. The Term Sheet dated 15.3.2007 entered into between VIH and Essar stated that they shall have to nominate directors on the Board of
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A Directors of HEL in proportion to the aggregate beneficial shareholding held by members of the respective groups. Therefore, neither from Clause 5.2 of the Shareholders Agreement nor from the Term Sheet dated 15.03.2007, one could say that VIH had acquired 67% controlling interest B in HEL. [Para 84] [667-H; 668-A]
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5.3. As regards the question as to why VIH should pay consideration to HTIL based on an enterprise value of 67% of the share capital of HEL, it is important to note that valuation cannot be the basis of taxation. The basis of taxation is profits or income or receipt. In this case, the Court is not concerned with tax on income/ profit arising from business operations but with tax on transfer of rights (capital asset) and gains arising therefrom. In the latter case, the conditions on which the tax becomes payable under the Income Tax Act have to be seen. In the instant case, VIH paid for 67% of the enterprise value of HEL plus its downstream companies having operational licences. VIH agreed to acquire companies which in turn • controlled a 67% interest in HEL and its subsidiaries. Valuation is a matter of opinion. When the entire business or investment is sold, for valuation purposes, one may take into account the economic interest or realities. Risks as a discounting factor are also to be taken into consideration apart from loans, receivables, options, RoFR/ TAR, etc. In this case, Enterprise Value is made up of two parts, namely, the value of HEL, the value of CGP and the companies between CGP and HEL. [Para 85] [668B-G]
5.4. In the instant case, the Revenue cannot invoke G s.9 of the Income Tax Act on the value of the underlying asset or consequence of acquiring a share of CGP. The Valuation done was on the basis of enterprise value. The price paid as a percentage of the enterprise value had to be 67% not because the figure of 67% was available in H praesenti to VIH, but on account of the fact that the
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
competing Indian bidders would have had de facto access to the entire 67%, as they were not subject to the limitation of sectoral cap, and, therefore, would have immediately encashed the call options. The expression "equity interest" came from US GAAP. The difference between the 52% figure (control) and 67% (equity interest) arose on account of the difference in computation under the Indian and US GAAP. [Para 85] [668-G-H; 669-A-C; G-H]
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5.5. The instant case concerns an offshore transaction involving a structured investment. This case C concerns a straight forward share sale and not an asset sale. It concerns sale of an entire investment. A "sale" may take various forms. Accordingly, tax consequences will vary. The tax consequences of a share sale would be different from the tax consequences of an asset sale. A D slump sale would involve tax consequences which could be different from the tax consequences of sale of assets on itemized basis. "Control" is a mixed question of law and facts. Ownership of shares may, in certain situations, result in the assumption of an interest which has the E character of a controlling interest in the management of the company. A controlling interest is an incident of ownership of shares in a company, something which flows out of the holding of shares. A controlling interest is, therefore, not an identifiable or distinct capital asset F independent of the holding of shares. The control of a company resides in the voting power of its shareholders and shares represent an interest of a shareholder which is made up of various rights contained in the contract embedded in the Articles of Association. The right of a G shareholder may assume the character of a controlling interest where the extent of the shareholding enables the shareholder to control the management. Shares, and the rights which emanate from them, flow together and cannot be disser,ted. [Para 88] [670-E; 671-A-B]
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!RC v. Crossman [1936] 1 All ER 762 - referred to
5.6. VIH acquired Upstream shares with the intention that the congeries of rights, flowing from the CGP share, would give VIH an indirect control over the three genres of companies. Acquisition of the CGP share gave VIH an indirect control over the tier I Mauritius companies which owned shares in HEL totalling to 42.34%; CGP India (Ms), which in turn held shares in Tll and Omega and which on a pro rata basis (the FOi principle), totalled up to 9.62% in HEL and an indirect control over Hutchison TeleServices (India) Holdings Ltd. (Ms), which in turn owned shares in GSPL, which held call and put options. It is significant to note that till date options have remained unencashed with GSPL. Therefore, even if it be assumed that the options under the Framework Agreements 2006 could be considered to be property rights, there has been no transfer or assignment of options by GSPL till date. Even if it be assumed that the options constituted capital assets, even then s.9(1)(i) of the Act was not applicable as these options have not been transferred till date. [Para 88] [671-C-H]
5.7. Call and put options were not transferred by SPA dated 11.02.2007 or under any other document whatsoever. Moreover, if, on principle, it is accepted that the transfer of the CGP share did not lead to the transfer of a capital asset in India, even if it resulted in a transfer of indirect control over 42.34% (52%) of shares in HEL, then surely the transfer of indirect control over GSPL which held options (contractual rights), would not make the transfer of the CGP share taxable in India. Acquisition G of the CGP.share which gave VIH an indirect control over three genres of companies evidences a straightforward shNe sale and not an asset sale. It is also significant to note that 67% of the economic value of HEL is not 67% of the equity capital. Further, Essar has 33% stakes in H DEL out of which 22% was held by Essar Mauritius. Thus,
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
VIH did not acquire 67% of equity capital of HEL, as held by the High Court. [Para 88] [671-H; 672-A-C, F-H] 5.8. This case does not involve sale of assets on itemized basis. Applying the look at test, the entire Hutchison structure, as it existed, ought to have been looked at holistically. This case concerns investment into India by a holding company (parent company), HTIL through a maze of subsidiaries. CGP was treated in the Hutchison structure as an investment vehicle. As a general rule, in a case where a transaction involves transfer of shares lock, stock and barrel, such a transaction cannot be broken up into separate individual components, assets or rights such as right to vote, right to participate in company meetings, management rights, controlling rights, control premium, brand licences and so on as shares constitute a bundle of rights. [Para 88] [672-H; 673-A-D]
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Charanjit Lal v. Union of India 1950 SCR 869 : AIR
1951 SC 41- relied on. Venkatesh (minor) v. CIT 243 ITR 367 (Mad) and Smt. Maharani Ushadevi v. CIT 131 ITR 445 (MP) -referred to.
5.9. The entire transaction has to be examined holistically. The transaction in question should be looked at as an entire package. The items like, control premium, non-compete agreement, consultancy support, customer base, brand licences, operating licences etc. were all an integral part of the Holding Subsidiary Structure which existed for almost 13 years, generating huge revenues. Merely because at the time of exit, capital gains tax becomes not payable or exigible to tax would not make the entire "share sale" (investment) a sham or a tax avoidant. The payment of US$ 11.08 bn was for purchase of the entire investment made by HTIL in India. The payment was for the entire package. The parties to the
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transaction have not agreed upon a separate price for the CGP share. Thus, it was not open to the Revenue to split the payment and consider a part of such payments for each of the above items. The essential character of the transaction as an alienation cannot be altered by the form B of the consideration, the payment of the consideration in instalments .or on the basis that the payment is related to a contingency ('options', in this case), particularly when the transaction does not contemplate such a split up. Where the parties have agreed for a lump sum C consideration without placing separate values for each of the above items which go to make up the entire investment in participation, merely because certain values are indicated in the correspondence with FIPB which had raised the query, would not mean that the parties had agreed for the price payable for each of the above items. The transaction remained a contract of outright sale of the entire investment for a lump sum consideration. [Para 88] [673-E; 674-A-8]
CIT (Central), Calcutta v. Mugneeram Bangur and Company (Land Deptt.), (1965) 57 ITR 299 (SC) - referred
to. Commentary on Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital dated 28.01.2003 - referred to.
5.10. Thus, the Court needs to "look at" the entire Ownership Structure set up by Hutchison as a single consolidated bargain and interpret the transactional documents, while examining the Offshore Transaction of the nature involved in this case, in that light. [Para 88] G [674-E] 6.1. Section 195 of the Act casts an obligation on the payer to deduct tax at source ("TAS") from payments made to non-residents which payments are chargeable H to tax. Such payment(s) must have an element of income
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
embedded in it which is chargeable to tax in India. If the sum paid or credited by the payer is not chargeable to tax then no obligation to deduct the tax would arise. Shareholding in companies incorporated outside India (CGP) is property located outside India. Where such shares become subject matter of offshore transfer between two non-residents, there is no liability for capital gains tax. In such a case, question of deduction of TAS would not arise. The object of s.195 is to ensure that the tax due from non-resident persons is secured at the earliest point of time so that there is no difficulty in collection of tax subsequently at the time of regular assessment. The instant case concerns the transaction of "outright sale" between two non-residents of a capital asset (share) outside India. Further, the said transaction was entered into on principal to principal basis. Therefore, no liability to deduct TAS arose. [Para 89] [674F-H; 675-A-D] 6.2. In the case of transfer of the Structure in its entirety, one has to look at it holistically as one Single Consolidated Bargain which took place between two foreign companies outside India for which a lump sum price was paid of US$ 11.08 bn. Under the transaction, there was no split up of payment of US$ 11.08 bn. It is the Revenue which has split the consolidated payment and it is the Revenue which wants to assign a value to the rights to control premium, right to non-compete, right to consultancy support etc. For FDI purposes, the FIPB had asked VIH for the basis of fixing the price of US$ 11.08 bn. But here also, there was no split up of lump sum payment, asset-wise as claimed by the Revenue. There was no assignment of price for each right, considered by the Revenue to be a "capital asset" in the transaction. In the absence of PE, profits were not attributable to Indian operations. [Para 89] [675-E-H; 676-A]
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6.3. Moreover, tax presence has to be viewed in the context of the transaction that is subjected to tax and not with reference to an entirely unrelated matter. The investment made by Vodafone Group companies in Bharti did not make all entities of that Group subject to the Indian Income Tax Act and the jurisdiction of the tax authorities. Tax presence must be construed in the context, and in a manner that brings the non-resident assessee under the jurisdiction of the Indian tax authorities. [Para 89] [676-A-
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6.4. Lastly, in the instant case, the Revenue has failed to establish any connection with s.9(1 )(i). Under the circumstances, s.195 is not applicable. [Para 89] [676-8-
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7.1. As regards the stand of the Revenue that VIH can be proceeded against as representative assessee u/s 163, it is significant to note that s.163 does not relate to deduction of tax. It relates to treatment of a purchaser of an asset as a representative assessee. A conjoint reading E of s.160(1)(i), s.161(1) and s.163 of the Act shows that, under given circumstances, certain persons can be treated as "representative assessee" on behalf of nonresident specified in s.9(1). This would include an agent of non-resident and also who is treated as an agent u/s F 163 of the Act which in turn deals with special cases where a person can be regarded as an agent. Once a person comes within any of the clauses of s.163(1), such a person would be the "agent" of the non-resident for the purposes of the Act. [Para 89] [676-C-F] G
7.2. However, merely because a person is an agent or is to be treated as an agent, would not lead to an automatic conclusion that he becomes liable to pay taxes on behalf of the non-resident. It would only mean that he is to be treated as a "representative assessee". Section H 161 makes a "representative assessee" liable only "as
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR .
.regards the income in respect of which he is a representative assessee". Section 161 makes a representative assessee liable only if the eventualities stipulated in the said Section are satisfied. This is the scope of ss. 9(1)(i), 160(1), 161(1) read with ss. 163(1) (a) to (d). In the instant case, the Department has invoked s.163(1 )(c). Both ss. 163(1 )(c) and 9(1 )(i) state that income should be deemed to accrue or arise in India. Both these Sections have to be read together. On facts of this case, this Court holds that s.163(1)(c) is not attracted as there is no transfer of a capital asset situated in India. Consequently, VIH cannot be proceeded against even u/ s 163 of the Act as a representative assessee. [Para 89] [676-F-H; 677-A-B] 8.1. Applying the look at test in order to ascertain the true nature and character of the transaction, this Court holds, that the Offshore Transaction in the instant case is a bonafide structured FOi investment into India which fell outside India's territorial tax jurisdiction, hence not taxable. The said Offshore Transaction evidences participative investmen.t and not a sham or tax avoidant preordained transaction. The said Offshore Transaction was between HTIL (a Cayman Islands company) and VIH (a company incorporated in Netherlands). The subject matter of the Transaction was the transfer of the CGP (a company incorporated in Cayman Islands). Consequently, the Indian Tax Authority had no territorial tax jurisdiction to tax the said Offshore Transaction. [Para 90] [677-D-E] 8.2. FOi flows towards location with a strong governance infrastructure which includes enactment of laws and how well the legal system works. Certainty is integral to rule of law. Certainty and stability form the basic foundation of any fiscal system. Tax policy certainty is crucial for taxpayers (including foreign investors) to make rational economic choices in the most efficient
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manner. Legal doctrines like "Limitation of Benefits" and "look through" are matters of policy. It is for the Government of the day to have them incorporated in the Treaties and in the laws so as to avoid conflicting views. Investors should know where they stand. It also helps B the tax administration in enforcing the provisions of the taxing laws. [Para 91] [677-G-H; 678-A]
8.3. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The Revenue is directed to return the sum of Rs.2,500 crores, which came to be deposited by the C appellant in terms of the interim order, with interest at the rate of 4%. The interest shall be calculated from the date of withdrawal by the Revenue from the Registry of the Supreme Court up to the date of payment. [Para 92] [678C-E] D Per K.S. Radhakrishnan. J. (Concurring}: CORPORATE STRUCTURE/GENERAL PRINCIPLES (National and lntrnational):
1.1. Overseas companies are companies incorporated outside India and neither the Companies Act nor the Income Tax Act enacted in India has any control over them. They are governed by the laws in the countries F where they are established. On incorporation, the corporate property belongs to the company and members have no direct proprietary rights to it but merely to their "shares" in the undertaking and these shares constitute items of property which are freely transferable in the G absence of any express provision to the contrary. [para 43 and 49] [702-E-F; 705-B-C] 1.2. Domestic investments are made in the home country and meant to stay as it were, but when the transnational investment is made overseas away from the H natural residence of the investing company, provisions
VODAFONE JNTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
are usually made for exit route to facilitate an exit as and when necessary for good business and commercial reasons, which is generally foreign to judicial review. (para 45] (703-E-F] 1.3. Multi-national companies, for corporate governance, may develop corporate structures, affiliate subsidiaries, joint ventures for operational efficiency, tax avoidance, mitigate risks etc. Revenue/courts can always examine whether those corporate structures are genuine and set up legally for a sound and veritable commercial purpose. Burden is entirely on the Revenue to show that the incorporation, consolidation, restructuring etc. has been effected to achieve a fraudulent, dishonest purpose, so as to defeat the law. [para 43 and 46] (702-E; 703-G-H] 1.4. Section 2(47) of the Indian Companies Act 1956 defines "subsidiary company" or "subsidiary", a subsidiary company within the meaning of s. 4 of the Act. The holding company does not own the assets of the subsidiary and, in law, the management of the business of the subsidiary also vests in its Board of Directors. Holding company and subsidiary company are considered as separate legal entities, and subsidiary are allowed decentralized management. But, the business of a subsidiary is not the business of the holding company. Parent company of a WOS is not responsible legally for the unlawful activities of the subsidiary save in exceptional circumstances, such as a company is a sham or the agent of the shareholder, the parent company is regarded as a shareholder. [para 56, 58,
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59 and 61] (708-D-E; 709-D-E; 710-A-B; F-G] Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT 1955 SCR 876 =AIR 1955 SC 74; Carew and Company Ltd. v. Union of India 1976 ( 1 ) SCR 379 = (1975) 2 SCC 791; and Carrasco Investments Ltd. v. Special Director, Enforcement (1994) 79 Comp Case
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631 (Delhi) - referred to.
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Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley, (1908-10) All
ER Rep 833- referred to. 1.5. Shareholders' Agreement (SHA) is a private contract between the shareholders compared to Articles of Association of the Company, which is a public document. Being a private document it binds parties thereof and not the other remaining shareholders in the company. Shareholders can enter into any agreement in the best interest of the company, prvided that the provisions in the SHA do not go contrary to the Articles C of Association. The essential purpose of the SHA is to make provisions for proper and effective internal management of the company. [para 62 and 64] [710-H; 711-A-B; 712-A-B]
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V. B. Rangaraj v. V. B. Gopalakrishnan and Ors. 1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 1 (1992) 1SCC160; and Gherulal Parekh v. Mahadeo Das Maiya (1959) SCR Supp (2) 406; S. P. Jain v. Kalinga Cables Ltd. (1965) 2 SCR 720;Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India (1950) 1 SCR 869 : AIR 1951 E SC 41; Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Company (1954) SCR 674: AIR 1954 SC 119; and /RC v. V. T Bibby & Sons (1946) 14 ITR (Supp)
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7 - referred to. 1.6. Shares of any member in a company is a movable F property and can be transferred in the manner provided by the Articles of Association of the Company. Control, is an interest arising from holding a particular number of shares and the same cannot be separately acquired or transferred. Controlling interest forms an inalienable part G of the share itself and the same cannot be treated separately unless otherwise provided by the statute. Controlling interest, therefore, is not an identifiable or distinct capital asset independent of holding of shares and the nature of the transaction has to be ascertained
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
from the terms of the contract and the surrounding circumstances. Controlling interest is inherently contractual right and not property right and cannot be considered as transfer of property and hence a capital asset unless the Statute stipulates otherwise. Acquisition of shares may carry the acquisition of controlling interest, which is purely a commercial concept and tax is levied on the transaction, not on its effect. [para 67, 73 and 74) [715-A-B; 717-C-H; 718-A-B)
Lifting the Corporate veil-Tax Laws:
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1.7. Once the transaction is shown to be fraudulent, sham, circuitous or a device designed to defeat the interests of the shareholders, investors, parties to the contract and also for tax evasion, the court can always lift the corporate veil and examine the substance of the transaction. Lifting the corporate veil doctrine can, therefore, be applied in tax matters even in the absence of any statutory authorisation to that effect. Principle is also being applied in cases of holding company subsidiary relationship - where in spite of being separate legal personalities, if the facts reveal that they indulge in dubious methods for tax evasion. [para 75-76) [718-C-D; 719-8) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai, AIR 1967 SCR 934 1967 SC 819; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Limited and Others 1985 (3) Suppl. SCR 909 (1986) 1 SCC 264; Juggilal Kampa/pat v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. , (1969) 1 SCR 988 :
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United States v. Bestfoods 524 US 51 (1998); and Adams v. Cape Industries Pie. (1991) 1 All ER 929- referred
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· A Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion: 2. The expressions tax avoidance and tax evasion are being used in different context by the Courts. Many of the offshore companies use the facilities of Offshore B Financial Centres situate in Mauritius, Cayman Islands etc. Many of these offshore holdings and arrangements are undertaken for sound commercial and legitimate tax planning reasons, without any intent to conceal income or assets from the home country tax jurisdiction and India C has always encouraged such arrangements, unless it is fraudulent or fictitious. [para 50 and 76] [706-A-C; 719-C-
D] /RC v. Burmah Oil Co Ltd. (1982) 54 TC 200; /RC v. Plummer (1979) 3 All ER 775; Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd. D v. Stokes (1992) 1 AC 655; Floor v. Davis (1978) 2 All ER 1079 : (1978) Ch 295; Inland Revenue Commissioner v. McGuckian (1997) BTC 346; MacNiven v. Westmore/and Investments Limited (2003) 1 AC 311; Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Limited v. Mawson (2005) AC 685 (HL).; E Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Scottish Provident Institution 2004 [1] WLR 3172- referred to.
Limitation of Benefit Clause (LOB): 3.1. Unlike lndo-US Treaty, lndo Mauritius Treaty F does not contain any limitation of Benefit (LOB) clause, nor does it restrict the benefit to companies whose shareholders are non-citizens/residents of Mauritius, or where the beneficial interest is owned by non-citizens/ residents of Mauritius, in the event where there is no G justification in prohibiting the residents of a third nation from incorporating companies in Mauritius and deriving benefit under the treaty. No presumption can be drawn that the Union of India or the Tax Department is unaware that the quantum of both FDI and Fii do not originate from H Mauritius but from other global investors situate outside
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
Mauritius. [para 95] [731-B-E] 3.2. In the absence of LOB Clause and the presence of Circular No. 789 dated 13.4.2000 and TRC certificate, on the residence and beneficial interest/ownership, tax department cannot at the time of sale/disinvestment/exit from such FDI, d.eny benefits to such Mauritius companies of the Treaty by stating that FDI was only routed through a Mauritius company, by a company/ principal resident in a third country. Setting up of a WOS Mauritius subsidiary/SPV by Principals/genuine substantial long term FDI in India from/through Mauritius, pursuant to the DTAA and Circular No. 789 can never be considered to be set up for tax evasion. (para 97] [732D-H] TRC Whether conclusive: 3.3. LOB and look through provisions cannot be read into a t11x treaty. However, DTAA and Circular No. 789 would not preclude the Income Tax Department from denying the tax treaty benefits, if it is established, on facts, that the Mauritius company has been interposed as the owner of the shares in India, at the time of disposal of the shares to a third party, solely with a view to avoid tax without any commercial substance. Tax Department, in such a situation, notwithstanding the fact that the Mauritian company is required to be treated as the beneficial owner of the shares under Circular No. 789 and the Treaty is entitled to look at the entire transaction of sale as a whole and if it is established that the Mauritian company has been interposed as a device, it is open to the Tax Department to discard the device and take into consideration the real transaction between the parties, and the transaction may be subjected to tax. Thus, TRC does not prevent enquiry into a tax fraud. Nothing prevents the Revenue from looking into special
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A agreements, contracts or arrangements made or effected by Indian resident or the role of the OCB in the entire transaction. [para 98] [733-B-E] 3.4. No court will recognise sham transaction or a colourable device or adoption of a dubious method to evade tax, but, at the same time, it cannot be said that the lndo-Mauritian Treaty will recognise FDI and Fii only if it originates from Mauritius, not the investors from third countries, incorporating company in Mauritius. Facts, clearly show that almost the entire FDI and Fii made in C India from Mauritius under DTAA does not originate from that country, but has been made by Mauritius Companies I SPV, which are owned by companies/individuals of third countries providing funds for making FDI by such companies/individuals not from Mauritius, but from third D countries. [para 99] [733-F-H; 734-A-B] 3.5. Mauritius and India have also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) laying down the rules for information, exchange between the two E countries which provides for the two signatory authorities to assist each other in the detection of fraudulent market practices, including the insider dealing and market manipulation in the areas of securities transactions and derivative dealings. The object and F purpose of the MOU is to track down transactions tainted by fraud and financial crime, not to target the bona fide legitimate transactions. Mauritius has also enacted stringent "Know Your Clients" (KYC) regulations and Anti-Money Laundering laws which seek to avoid G abusive use of treaty. Thus, there is no reason to import the "abuse of rights doctrine" (abus de droit) to India. [para 100-101] [734-C-E] A Holding Aps. (8 ITRL) - held inapplicable.
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
Round Tripping: 3.6. Large amounts can be routed back to India using TRC as a defence, but CJnce it is established that such an investment is black money or capital that is hidden, it is nothing but circular movement of capital known as Round Tripping; then TRC can be ipnored, since the transaction is fraudulent and against national interest. [para 105] [736-E] 3.7. Adequate legislative measures have to be taken to plug the loopholes, all the same, a genuine corporate structure set up· for purely commercial purpose and indulging in genuine investment be recognized. [para 106] [736-F-G] 3.8. However, if the fraud is detected by the Court of Law, it can pierce the corporate structure since fraud unravels everything, even a statutory provision, if it is a stumbling block, because legislature never intends to guard fraud. Certainly TRC certificate though can be accepted as a conclusive evidence for accepting status oi residents as well as beneficial ownership for applying the tax treaty, it can be ignored if the treaty is abused for the fraudulent purpose of evasion of tax. [para 106] [736G-H; 737-A] 4.1. Revenue cannot tax a subject without a statute to support and in the course it is acknowledged that every tax payer is entitled to arrange his affairs so that his taxes shall be as low as possible and that he is not bound to choose that pattern which will replenish the treasury. It cannot be said that the ratio laid down in McDowell is contrary to what has been laid down in Azadi Bachao Ando/an; and, therefore, calls for no reconsideration by a larger branch. [para 117] [740-F-G] Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Ando/an 2003 (4) Suppl.
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SCR 222 (2004) 10 SCC 1; McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. CTO 1985 (3) SCR 791 (1985) 3 SCC 230; CIT v. A. Raman and Co. (1968) 1 SCC 10, CIT v. B. M. Kharwar (1969) 1 SCR 651, Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v. CIT (1940) 8 ITR 522 (PC),
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Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax B and Excess Profits Tax, Bombay AIR 1959 SC 270; CIT v. Vadila/ Lal/ubhai (1973) 3 SCC 17 and Latilla v. /RC. 26 TC 107: (1943) AC 377; Sankar/al Balabhai v. /TO (1975) 100 ITR 97 (Guj.); and Mathuram Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 195 (1999) 8 SCC 667 -
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C referred to. CGP and its interposition: 4.2. Parties, it is trite, are free to choose whatever lawful arrangement which will suit their business and D commercial purpose, but the true nature of the transaction can be ascertained only by looking into the legal arrangement actually entered into and carried out lndisputedly, the contracts have to be read holistically to arrive at a conclusion as to the real nature of a E transaction. [para 118] [7 41-8-C] 4.3. One of the tests to examine the genuineness of the structure is the "timing test" that is timing of the incorporation of the entities or transfer of shares etc. Structures created for genuine business reasons are F those which are generally created or acquired at the time when investment is made, at the time where further investments are being made at the time of consolidation etc. [para 122) [7 42-E-F] 4.4. CGP was incorporated in the year 1998 and the same became part of the Hutchison Corporate structure in the year 2005. Facts would clearly indicate that the CGP held shares in Array and Hutchison Teleservices (India) Holdings Limited (MS), both incorporated in H Mauritius. HTIL, after acquiring the share of CGP (Cl) in G
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
the year 1994 which constituted approximately 42% direct interest in HEL, had put in place various FWAs, SHAs for arranging its affairs so that it can also have interest in the functioning of HEL along with Indian partners. [para 121] [742-C-D] 4.5. HTIL structure was created over a period of time and this was consolidated in 2004 to provide a working model by which HTIL could make best u~ of its investments and exercise control over and strategically influence the affairs of HEL. Consolidation operations of HEL were evidently done in the year 2005 not for tax purposes but for commercial reasons and the contention that CGP was inserted at a very late stage in order to bring a pre tax entity or to create a transaction that would avoid tax, cannot be accepted. [para 124] [743-A-B; E-F]
B
C
D
4.6. Sale of CGP share, for exiting from the Indian Telecommunication Sector cannot be considered as preordained transaction, with no commercial purpose, other than tax avoidance. Sale of CGP share was a genuine business transaction, not a fraudulent or dubious method to avoid capital gains tax. Once entry into the structure is honourable, exit from the structure can also be honourable. [para 123 and 126] [742-G-H; 744-E] Situs of CGP: 4.7. Situs of shares situates at the place where the company is incorporated and/ or the place where the share can be dealt with by way of transfer. CGP share is registered in Cayman Islands and materials placed on record would indicate that Cayman Islands law, unlike other laws does not recognise the multiplicity of registers. The facts in this case as well as the provisions of the Caymen Islands Act would clearly indicate that the CGP (Cl) share situates in Caymen Island. [para 127] [744-GH; 745-A-B]
G
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Brassard v. Smith [1925] AC 371, London and South American Investment Trust v. British Tobacco Co. (Australia) [1927] 1 Ch. 107. Erie Beach Co. v. Attorney-Genera/ for Ontario, 1930.AC 161 PC 10, R. v. Williams [1942] AC 541
- referred to. B
5.1. HTIL had the controlling interest in HEL before its exit from the Indian Telecom Sector. HTIL could, therefore, exercise its control over HEL, through the voting rights of its indirect subsidiary Array (Mauritius) which in turn controlled 42% shares through Mauritian C Subsidiaries in HEL. Mauritian subsidiaries controlled 42% voting rights in HEL and HTIL could not however exercise voting rights in HEL directly but only through indirect subsidiary CGP(M) which in turn held equity interest in Tll, an Indian company which held equity D interest in HEL. HTIL likewise through an indirect subsidiary HTl(M), which held equity interest in Omega an Indian company which held equity interest in HEL, could exercise only indirect voting rights in HEL. [para 129] [745-E; 746-C-D]
5.2. HTIL, by holding CGP share, got control over its WOS Hutchison Tele Services (India) Holdings Ltd (MS). HTSH(MS) was having control over its WOS 3GSPL, an Indian company which exercised voting rights in HEL. F HTIL, therefore, by holding CGP share, had 52% equity interest, direct 42% and approximately 10% (pro rata) indirect in HEL and not 67% as contended by the Revenue. [para 130] [746-E-F] 5.3. Vodafone on acquisition of CGP share got G controlling interest of 42% over HE.L/VEL through voting rights through eight Mauritian subsidiaries, the same was the position of HTIL as well. On acquiring CGP share, CGP has become a direct subsidiary of Vodafone, but both are legally independent entities. Voting rights,
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
controlling rights, right to manage etc., of Mauritian A Companies vested in those companies. HTIL has never sold nor did Vodafone purchase any shares of either Array or the Mauritian subsidiaries, but only CGP, the share of which situates in Cayman Islands. By purchasing the CGP share its situs will not shift either to B Mauritius or to India. [para 132] [749-C-G] 5.4. Vodafone on purchase of CGP share got controlling interest in the Mauritian Companies and the incident of transfer of CGP share cannot be considered to be two distinct and separate transactions, one shifting C of the share and another shifting of the controlling interest. Transfer of CGP share automatically results in host of consequences including transfer of controlling interest and that controlling interest as such cannot be dissected from CGP share. without legislative D intervention. Controlling interest of CGP over Array is an incident of holding majority shares and the control of Company vests in the voting power of its shareholders. [para 133] [749-H; 750-A-C]
5.5. Acquisition of shares, may carry the acquisition of controlling interest which is purely a commercial_ concept and tax can be levied only on the transaction and not on its effect. On transfer of CGP share, Vodafone gets controlling interest in its indirect subsidiaries which F are situated in Mauri"tius which have equity interests in Tll and Omega, Indian Companies which are independent legal entities. Controlling interest, which stood transferred to Vodafone from HTIL accompany the CGP share and cannot be dissected so as to be treated as transfer of controlling interest of Mauritian entities and G then that of Indian entities and ultimately that of HEL. Situs of CGP share, therefore, determines the transferability of the share and/or interest which flows out of that share including controlling interest. Ownership of shares carries other valuable rights like, right to receive H
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dividend, right to transmit the shares, right to vote, right to act as per one's wish, or to vote in a particular manner etc; and on transfer of shares those rights also sail along with them.Vodafone, on purchase of CGP share got all those rights, and the price paid by Vodafone is for all B those rights, in other words, control premium paid, not over and above the CGP share, but is the integral part of the price of the share. On transfer of CGP share situated in Cayman Islands, the entire rights, which accompany stood transferred not in India, but offshore and the facts c reveal that the offshore holdings and arrangements made by HTIL and Vodafone were for sound commercial and legitimate tax planning, not with the motive of evading tax. [para 133-135] [750-E-F-H; 751-A-F] 5.6. Vodafone, on purchase of CGP share also got D control over its WOS, l:ffSH(M) which is having control over its WOS, 3GSPL, an Indian Company which exercised voting rights in HEL. 3 GSPL has call and put options, which are contractual rights and do not sound in property and, therefore, cannot be, in the absence of E a statutory stipulation considered as capital assets. Even assuming so, they are in favour of 3 GSPL and continue to be so even after entry of Vodafone. [para 137] [752-D-
E]
6.1. In none of the Agreements HTIL or Vodafone figure as parties. SHAs between Mauritian entities (which were shareholders of the Indian operating Companies) and other shareholders in some of the other operating companies in India held shares in HEL related to the G management of the subsidiaries of AS, AG and IDFC and did not relate to the management of the affairs of HEL and HTIL was not a party to those agreements, and hence there was no question of assigning or relinquishing any right to Vodafone. [para 138] [752-F-G]
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR
6.2. Controlling right over Tll through Tll SHAs in the form of right to appoint two Directors with veto power to promote its interest in HEL and thereby held beneficial interest in 12.30% of share capital in the HEL are also contractual rights. [para 141] [754-8-C]
B 6.3. Various agreements including the provisions for assignments in the SPA, indicate that all loan agreements and assignments of loans took place outside India at face value and, hence, there is no question of transfer of any capital assets out of those transactions in India, attracting C capital gains tax. Right to preference shares or rights cannot be termed as transfer in terms of s.2(47) of the Act. Further, SPA contains a non-compete agreement which is a pure contractual agreement. An agreement for a noncompete clause executed offshore, by no principle of law can be termed as "property" so as to come within the D meaning of capital gains taxable in India in the absence of any legislation. [para 149-151] [758-G; 759-A-F] 6.4. On transfer of CGP share, HTIL had transferred only 42% equity interest it had in HEL and approximately 10% (pro-rata) to VIH, the transfer was off-shore, money was paid off-shore, parties were no-residents and hence there was no transfer of a capital asset situated in India. Loan agreements extended by virtue of transfer of CGP share were also off-shore and hence cannot be termed to be a transfer of asset situated in India. Rights and entitlements referred to also cannot be termed as capital assets, attr~cting capital gains tax and even after transfer of CGP share, all those rights and entitlements remained as such, by virtue of various FWAs, SHAs, in which neither HTIL nor VIH was a party. [para 154] [760-E-G]
G
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Grace Collins and Others 248 ITR 323 - referred to.
7.1. Section 9 of the Income Tax Act, 19.61 extends
B
c
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its provisions to certain incomes which shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. Under the general theory of nexus relevant for examining the territorial operation of the legislation, two principles that are generally accepted for imposition of tax are: (a) Source and (b) Residence. Section 5 of the Income Tax Act specifies the principle on which tax can be levied. Section 5(1) prescribes "residence" as a primary basis for imposition of tax and makes the global income of the resident liable to tax. Section 5(2) is the source based rule in relation to residents and is confined to: income that has been received in India; and income that has accrued or arisen in India or income that is deemed to accrue or arise in India. [para 160) [763-D-E]
7.2. Section 9 on a plain reading would show, it refers D to a property that yields an income and that property should have the situs in India and it is the income that arises through or from that property which is taxable. Section 9, therefore, covers only income arising from a transfer of a capital asset situated in India and it does not E purport to cover income arising from the indirect transfer of capital asset in lndia.[para 165] [767 -G-H] 7.3. Source in relation to an income has been construed to be where the transaction of sale takes place F and not where the item of value, which was the subject of the transaction, was acquired or derived from. HTIL and Vodafone are off-shore companies and since the sale took place outside India, applying the source test, the source is also outside India, unless legislation ropes in G such transactions. [para 167) [768-C) 7.4. Substantial territorial nexus between the income and the territory which seeks to tax that income, is of prime importance to levy tax. Expression used in s.9(1 )(i) is "source of income in India" which implies that income
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
arises from that source and there is no question of A income arising indirectly from a source in India. Expression used is "source of income in India" and not "from a source in India". Section 9 contains a "deeming provision" and in interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the B fiction is created, but in construing the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created, or beyond the language of section by which it is created. [para 168] [768-D-F] C.I. T. Bombay City II v. Shakuntala (1962) 2 SCR 871, C Mancheri Puthusseri Ahmed v. Kuthiravattam Estate Receiver
(1996) 6 sec 185 - relied on.
7.5. Power to impose tax is essentially a legislative function which finds in its expression Art. 265 of the D Constitution of India. Article 265 states that no tax shall be levied except by authority of law. Further, it is also well settled that the subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural E construction of its words. [para 169] [768-G-H; 769-A] Cape Brandy Syndicate v. !RC (1921) 1 KB 64, P. 71 (Rowlatt, J.) ; Ransom (Inspector of Tax) v. Higgs 1974 3 All ER 949 (HL), Ormond Investment Co. v. Betts (1928) All ER Rep 709 (HL) - referred to.
7 .6. An invitation to purposively construe ·s. 9 applying look through provision without legislative sanction, would be contrary to the ratio of Mathuram G Aggarwal. [para 170] [769-G] Mathuram Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1999 (4)
Suppl. SCR 195
=(1999) 8 SCC 667 - relied on.
7.7. Section 9(1)(i) covers only income arising or accruing directly or indirectly or through the transfer of H
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a capital asset situated in India. Section 9{1)(i) cannot by a process of "interpretation" or "construction" be extended to cover "indirect transfers" of capital assets/ property situate in India. [para 171] [769-H; 770-A]
7.8. On transfer of shares of a foreign company to a non-resident off-shore, there is no transfer of shares of the Indian Company, though held by the foreign company, in such a case it cannot be said that the transfer of shares of the foreign holding company, results in an C extinguishment of the foreign company control of the Indian company and it also does not constitute an extinguishment and transfer of an asset situate in India. Transfer of the foreign holding c:ompany's share offshore, cannot result in an extinguishment of the holding company right of control of the Indian company nor can D it be stated that the same constitutes extinguishment and transfer of an asset/ management and control of property situated in India. [para 172] [770-B-C]
7.9. The Legislature wherever wanted to tax the E income which arises indirectly from the assets, the same has been specifically provided so. On a comparison of ss. 64 and 9{1)(i) what is discernible is that the Legislature has not chosen to extend s.9(1 ){i) to "indirect transfers". Wherever "indirect transfers" are intended to be covered, F the Legislature has expressly provided so. The words "either directly or indirectly", textually or contextually, cannot be construed to govern the words that follow, but must govern the words that precede them, namely the words "all income accruing or arising". [para 173] [770G D-H] CIT v. Kothari (CM) (1964) 2 SCR 531 ;tshikawajmaHarima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. Director of Income Tax, Mumbai (2007) 3 SCC 481 and CIT v. R.D. Aggarwal (1965) 1 SCR 660 - referred to.
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
7.10. Section 9 has no "look through provision" and A such a provision cannot be brought through construction or interpretation of a word 'through' in s. 9. In any view, "look through provision" will not shift the situs of an asset from one country to another. Shifting of situs can be done only by express legislation. Section 9 B has no inbuilt "look through mechanism". [para 174] [771D-E] Federal Commission Of Taxation V. Lamesa Holdings av (LN) - (1998) 157 A.LR. 290 - referred to. 7.11. Capital gains are chargeable u/s 45 and their computation is to be in accordance with the provisions that follow s. 45 and there is no notion of indirect transfer in s.45. [para 175] [1.71-F]
c
7.12. Section 9(1 )(i), therefore, will not apply to the D transaction in question or on the rights and entitlements, stated to have transferred, as a fall out of the sale of CGP share, since the Revenue has failed to establish both the tests - Resident Test as well the Source Test. [para 176] [771-G] 8.1. Section 195 provides that any person responsible for making any payment to a non-resident which is chargeable to tax must deduct from such payment, the income tax at source. A reading of ss.191A, F 1948, 194C, 1940, 194E, 1941, 194J read with ss.11588A, 1941, 194J would show that the intention of Parliament was first to apply s.195 only to the residents who have a tax presence in India. It is all the more so, since the person responsible has to comply with various statutory requirements such as compliance of ss. 200(3), 203 and G 203A. [para 178 and 184] [772-8-C; 775-G-H; 776-A] 8.2. The expression "any person" looking at the context in which s.195 has been placed, would mean any person who is a resident in India. [para 185] [776-8]
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Ex Parle Blain, In re Sawers (1879) LR 12 ChD 522; Clark (Inspector of Taxes) v. Oceanic Contractors Inc. (1983) 1 ALL ER 133; Clark (Inspector of Taxes) v. Oceanic Contractors Inc. (1983) 1 ALL ER 133; and Agassi v. Robinson [2006] 1 WLR 2126 - referred to.
B
8.3. In the instant case, indisputedly, CGP share was transferred offshore. Both the companies were incorporat~d not in India but offshore. Both the companies have no income or fiscal assets in India, leave C aside the question of transferring, those fiscal assets in India. Tax presence has to be viewed in the context of transaction in question and not with reference to an entirely unrelated transaction. Section 195 would apply only if payments made from a resident to another nonresident and no( between two non-residents situated D outside India. In the instant case, the transaction was between two non-resident entities through a contract executed outside India. Consideration was also passed outside India. That transaction has no nexus with the underlying assets in India. In order to establish a nexus, E the legal nature of the transaction has to be examined and not the indirect transfer of rights and entitlements in India. Consequently, VIH is not legally obliged to respond to s. 163 notice which relates to the treatment of a purchaser of an asset as a representative assessee. [para 187] [777F E-H; 778-A] CIT v. Eli Lilly and Company (India) P Ltd. (2009) 15
sec 1 - held inapplicable. 8.4. It can,, therefore, not be said that the sale of CGP G share by HTIL to VIH would amount to transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of s.2(14) of the Indian Income Tax Act and the rights and entitlements that flow from FWAs, SHAs, Term Sheet, loan assignments, brand license etc. form integral part of CGP share attracting
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
capital gains tax. Consequently, the demand of nearly Rs.12,000 crores by way of capital gains tax lacks authority of law and, therefore, stands quashed. [para 188] [778-C-E]
Need for Legislation:
B
9. Lack of proper regulatory laws, leads to uncertainty and passing inconsistent ordE:rs by Courts, Tribunals and other forums, putting Revenue and tax payers at bay. It is often said that insufficient legislation in the countries where offshore financial centres operate gives opportunities for money laundering, tax evasion etc. and, hence, it is imperative that Indian Parliament would address all these issues with utmost urgency. Direct Tax Code Bill (OTC) 2010, proposed in India, envisages creation of an economically efficient, effective direct tax system, proposing GAAR. GAAR intends to prevent tax avoidance, what is inequitable and undesirable. [para 53 and 55] [707-C-D, H; 708-A-C] Seth Pushalal Mansinghka (P) Ltd. v. CIT (1967) 66 ITR 159 (SC); Assam Consolidated Tea Estates v. Income Tax Officer "A" Ward (1971) 81 ITR 699 Cal. and C./. T. West Bengal v. National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. (1969) 72 ITR 121 Cal. CIT v. Grace Collis (2001) 3 SCC 430; CIT v. National Insurance Company (1978) 113 ITR 37(Cal.) and Laxmi Insurance Company Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (1971) 80 ITR 575 (Delhi) - cited. /RC v. Duke of Westminster (1936) AC 1 (HL), W. T. Ramsay v. /RC (1982) AC 300 (HL), Craven v. White (1988) 3 All ER 495, Furniss v. Dawson (1984) 1 All ER 530 - cited
C
D
G
Case Law Reference: Per S.H. Kapadia, CJI. 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 222
referred to
para 57
B
c
D
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1985 (3) SCR 791
referred to
para 57
1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 195
referred to
para 57
1935 All E.R. 259
referred to
para 58
(1981) 1 All E.R. 865
referred to
para 58
(1984) 1 All E.R. 530
referred to
para 62
(1988) 3 All. E.R. 495
referred to
para 62
(1897) A.C. 22
referred to
para 68
1950 SCR 869
relied on
para 88
243 ITR 367 (Mad)
relied on
para 88
131 ITR 445 (MP)
relied en
para 88
(1965) 57 ITR 299 (SC)
referred to
para 88
(1967) 66 ITR 159 (SC)
cited
para 38
(1971) 81 ITR 699
cited
para 38
(1969) 72 ITR 121 Cal.
cited
para 38
(2001) 3 sec 430
cited
para 38
(1936) AC 1 (HL),
cited
para 38
(1982) AC 300 (HL),
cited
para 38
(1988) 3 All ER 495
cited
para 38
(1984) 1 All ER 530
cited
para 38
(1978) 113 ITR 37(Cal.)
cited
para 41
(1971) 80 ITR 575 (Delhi)
cited
para 41
(1908-10) All ER Rep 833
referred to para 56
1955 SCR 876
referred to para 56
Per Radhakrishnan, J.
G
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
1976 (1) SCR 379
referred to para 58
(1994) 79 Comp Case 631 (Delhi) referred to para 58 524 us 51 (1998)
referred to para 60
1991) 1 All ER 929
referred to para 60
1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 1
referred to para 63
(1959) SCR Supp (2) 406
referred to para 63
(1965) 2 SCR 720
referred to para 64
(1950) 1 SCR 869
referred to para 70
(1954) SCR 674
referred to para 70
(1946) 14 ITR (Supp) 7 at 9-10
referred to para 73
1967 SCR 934
relied on
para 75
1985 (3) Suppl. SCR 909
relied on
para 75
(1969) 1 SCR 988
relied on
para 75
(1982) 54 TC 200
referred to para 78
(1979) 3 All ER 775
referred to para 78
(1992) 1 AC 655
referred to para 81
(1978) 2 All ER 1079
referred to para 81
(1997) BTC 346
referred to para 84
(2003) 1 AC 311
referred to para 85
(2005) AC 685 (HL).
referred to para 88
2004 [1] WLR 3172
referred to para 89
(1968) 1 sec 10
referred to para 107
(1969) 1 SCR 651
referred to para 107
1940) 8 ITR 522 (PC),
referred to para 107
B
c
D
G
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c
D
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AIR 1959 SC 270
referred to para 107
(1973) 3 sec 11
referred to para 107
26 TC 107: (1943) AC 377
referred to para 107
AIR 1959 SC 270
referred to para 107
26 TC 107: (1943) AC 377
referred to para 107
(1975) 100 ITR 97 (Guj.)
referred to para 109
1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 195
referred to para 116
2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 222
referred to para 5 and 117
1985 (3) SCR 791
referred to para 5 and 117
1925] AC 371
referred to para 127
1927] 1 Ch. 107
referred to para 127
1930 AC 161 PC 10
referred to para 127
[1942] AC 541
referred to para 127
248 ITR 323
referred to para 157
(1962) 2 SCR 871
relied on
para 168
(1996) 6 sec 185
relied on
para 168
(1921) 1 KB 64, P. 71 (Rowlatt, J.)referred to para 169
G
1974 3 All ER 949 (HL),
referred to para 170
(1928) All ER Rep 709 (HL)
referred to para 170
1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 195
relied on
(1964) 2 SCR 531
referred to para 173
c2001i 3 sec 481
referred to para 173
para 171
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
(1965) 1 SCR 660
referred to
para 173
(1998) 157 A.LR. 290
referred to
para 174.
(1879) LR 12 ChD 522
referred to
para 185
(1983) 1 ALL ER 133
referred to
para 185
(2006] 1 WLR 2126
referred to
para 185
(2009) 15 sec 1
held inapplicablepara 186
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 733 of 2012. C From the Judgment and Order dated 08.09.2010 of the High Court of Bombay in WP in No. 1325 of 2010. Mohan Parasaran, ASG, Aspi Chinoy, Percy Pardiwala, K.V. Vishwanathan, Anuradha Dutt, Fereshte D. Sethna, Vijayalakshmi Menon, Ekta Kapil, Anish Kapur, Pawan Sharma, Kuber Dewan, Shwetha Bidhuri, Preeti Yadav, Pratyush Miglani, Gayatri Goswami, Kamaldeep Dayal, Rook Ray, Jaiver Shergill, Anadi Chopra, Kripa Pandit, Pavitra Kacholia, D.L. E Chidananda, G.C. Srivastava, Girish Dave, Gaurav Dhingra, Ritin Rai, Nakul Dewan, Arijit Prasad, C.S. Bhardwaj, B.V. Balaram Das, D.S. Mahra, Jayant Mehta, Mamta Tiwari, Sangeeta Mandal, Swati Sinha, Abhishek Kaushik, Rishabh Jain, N.B. Paonam, Zoheb Hossain (for Fox Mandal and Co.) F and Sumita Hazarika for the appearing parties. The Judgments of the Court was delivered by S.H. KAPADIA, CJI. 1. Leave granted. Introduction
G
2. This matter concerns a tax dispute involving the Vodafone Group with the Indian Tax Authorities [hereinafter referred to for short as "the Revenue"]. in relation to the acquisition by Vodafone International Holdings BV [for short H
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[2012] 1 S.C.R.
"VIH"], a company resident for tax purposes in the Netherlands, of the entire share capital of CGP Investments (Holdings) Ltd. [for short "CGP"], a company resident for tax purposes in the Cayman Islands ["Cl" for short] vide transaction dated 11.02.2007, whose stated aim, according to the Revenue, was "acquisition of 67% controlling interest in HEL", being a company resident for tax purposes in India which is disputed by the appellant saying that VI H agreed to acquire companies which in turn controlled a 67% interest, but not controlling interest, in Hutchison Essar Limited ("HEL" for short). According to the appellant, CGP held indirectly through other companies 52% shareholding interest in HEL as well as Options to acquire a further 15% shareholding interest in HEL, subject to relaxation of FOi Norms. In short, the Revenue seeks to tax the capital gains arising from the sale of the share capital of CGP on the basis that CGP, whilst not a tax resident in India, holds the underlying Indian assets.
Facts A.
G
Evolution of the Hutchison structure and the Transaction
3. The Hutchison Group, Hong Kong (HK) first invested into the telecom business in India in 1992 when the said Group invested in an Indian joint venture vehicle by the name Hutchison Max Telecom Limited (HMTL) - later renamed as HEL. 4. On 12.01.1998, CGP stood incorporated in Cayman Islands, with limited liability, as an "exempted company", its sole shareholder being Hutchison Telecommunications Limited, Hong Kong ["HTL" for short], which in September, 2004 stood transferred to HTI (BVI) Holdings Limited ["HTIHL (BVI)" for short] vide Board Resolution dated 17.09.2004. HTIHL (BVI) was the buyer of the CGP Share. HTIHL (BVI) was a wholly owned subsidiary (indirect) of. Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited (Cl) ["HTIL" for short].
VODAFONE iNTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDiA & ANR [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
5. In March, 2004, HTIL stood incorporated and listed on Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges in September, 2004. 6. In February, 2005, consolidation of HMTL (later on HEL) got effected. Consequently, all operating companies below HEL got held by one holding company, i.e., HMTL/HEL. This was with the approval of RBI and FIPB. The ownership of the said holding company, i.e., HMTL/HEL was consolidated into the tier I companies all based in Mauritius. Telecom Investments India Private Limited ["Tll" for short], lnduslnd Telecom Network Ltd. ["ITNL" for short] and Usha Martin Telematics Limited ["UMTL" for short] were the other shareholders, other than Hutchison and Essar, in HMTL/HEL. They were Indian tier I companies above HMTL/HEL. The consolidation was first mooted as early as July, 2003.
B
C
D 7. On 28.10.2005, VIH agreed to acquire 5.61% shareholding in Bharti Televentures Ltd. (now Bharti Airtel Ltd.). On the same day, Vodafone Mauritius Limited (subsidiary of VIH) agreed to acquire 4.39% shareholding in Bharti Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. which indirectly held shares in Bharti Televentures Ltd. (now Bharti Airtel Ltd.). 8. On 3.11.2005, Press Note 5 was issued by the Government of India enhancing the FDI ceiling from 49% to 74% in telecom sector. Under this Press Note, proportionate foreign component held in any Indian company was also to be counted towards the ceiling of 74%. 9. On 1.03.2006, Til Framework and Shareholders Agreements stood executed under which the shareholding of HEL was restructured through "Tll", an Indian company, in which Analjit Singh (AS) and Asim Ghosh (AG), acquired shares through their Group companies, with the credit support provided by HTIL. In consideration of the credit support, parties entered into Framework Agreements under which a Call Option was given to 3 Global Services Private Limited ["GSPL" for short],
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a subsidiary of HTIL, to buy from Goldspot Mercantile Company Private Limited ["Goldspot" for short] (an AG company) and Scorpios Beverages Private Limited r·scorpios" for short] (an AS company) their entire shareholding in Tll. Additionally, a Subscription Right was also provided allowing GSPL a right B to subscribe to the shares of Centrino Trading Company Private Limited ["Centrino" for short] and ND Callus Info Services Private Limited ["NOC" for short]. GSPL was an Indian company under a Mauritius subsidiary of CGP which stood indirectly held by HTIL. These agreements also contained clauses which imposed restrictions to transfer downstream interests, termination rights, subject to objection from any party, etc.
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10. The shareholding of HEL again underwent a change on 7.08.2006 through execution of 2006 IDFC Framework D Agreement with the Hinduja Group exiting and its shareholding being acquired by SMMS Investments Private Limited ["SMMS" for short], an Indian company. Hereto, the investors (as described in the Framework Agreement) were prepared to invest in ITNL provided that HTIL and GSPL procured financial E assistance for them and in consideration whereof GSPL would have Call Option to buy entire equity shares of SMMS. Hereto, in the Framework Agreement there were provisions imposing restrictions on Share Transfer, Change of Control etc. On 17.08.2006, a Shareholders Agreement stood executed which F dealt with governance of ITNL: 11. On 22.12.2006, an Open Offer was made by Vodafone Group Pie. on behalf of Vodafone Group to Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., a non-binding bid for US $11.055 bn being the G enterprise value for HTJL's 67% interest in HEL. 12. On 22.12.2006, a press release was issued by HTIL in Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges that it had been approached by various potentiaily interested parties regarding a possible sale of "its equity interests" (not controliing interest) H in HEL. That, till date no agreement stood entered into by HTIL
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA. CJI.]
with any party.
13. On 25.12.2006, an offer comes from Essar Group to· purchase HTIL's 66.99% shareholding at the highest offer price received by HTIL. Essar further stated that any sale by HTIL would require its consent as it claimed to be a co-promoter of B HEL. 14. On 31.01.2007, a meeting of the Board of Directors of VIH was held approving the submission of a binding offer for 67% of HTIL's interest at 100% enterprise value of US $17.5 bn by way of acquisition by VIH of one share (which was the C entire shareholding) in CGP, an indirect Cayman Islands subsidiary of HTIL. The said approval was subject to: (i)
(ii)
reaching an agreement with Bharti that allowed VIH to make a bid on Hutch; and
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entering into an appropriate partnership arrangement to satisfy FOi Rules in India.
15. On 6.02.2007, HTIL calls for a binding offer from Vodafone Group for its aggregate interests in 66.98% of the issued share capital of HEL controlled by companies owned, directly or indirectly, by HTIL together with inter-related loans.
16. On 9.02.2007, Vodafone Group makes a revised offer on behalf of VIH to HTIL. The said revised offer was of US F $10.708 bn for 66.98% interest [at the enterprise value of US $18.250 bn] and for US $1.084 bn loans given by the .Hutch Group. The offer further confirmed that in consultation with HTIL, the consideration payable may be reduced to take account of the various amounts which would be payable directly to certain existing legal local partners in order to extinguish HTIL's G previous obligations to them. The offer further confirmed that VIH had come to arrangements with HTIL's existing local partners [AG, AS and Infrastructure Development Finance Company Limited (IDFC)] to maintain the local Indian shareholdings in accordance with t/1e Indian FD/ H
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A requirements. The offer also expressed VIH's willingness to offer Essar the same financial terms in HEL which stood offered to HTIL. B
17. On the same day, i.e., 9.02.2007, Bharti conveys its no objection to the proposal made by Vodafone Group to purchase a direct or indirect interest in HEL from the Hutchison Group and/ or Essar Group.
18. On 10.02.2007, a re-revised offer was submitted by Vodafone valuing HEL at an enterprise value of US $18.80 bn C and offering US $11.076 bn for HTIL's interest in HEL. 19. On 11.02.2007, a Tax Due Diligence Report was submitted by Ernst & Young. The relevant observation from the said Report reads as follows: D
"The target structure now also includes a Cayman company, CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited, CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited was not originally within the target group. After our due diligence had commenced the seller proposed that CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited should be added to the target group and made available certain limited information about the company. Although we have reviewed this information, it is not sufficient for us to be able to comment on any tax risks associated with the company."
20. On 11.02.2007, UBS Limited (Financial Advisors to VIH) submitted a financial report setting out the methodology for valuation of HTIL's 67% effective interest in HEL through the acquisition of 100% of CGP. G
21. On 11.02.2007, VIH and HTIL entered into an Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Share and Loans ("SPA" for short), under which HTIL agreed to procure the sale of the entire share capital of CGP which it held through HTIHL (BVI) for VIH. Further, HTIL also agreed to procure the assignment H of Loans owed by CGP and Array Holdings Limited ["Array" for
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
short] (a 100% subsidiary of CGP) to HTI (BVI) Finance Ltd. A (a direct subsidiary of HTIL). As part of its obligations, HTIL undertook to procure that each Wider Group Company would not terminate or modify any rights under any of. its Framework Agreements or exercise any of their Options under any such agreement. HTIL also provided several warranties to VIH as set B out in Schedule 4 to SPA which included that HTIL was the sole beneficial owner of CGP share. 22. On 11.02.2007, a Side Letter was sent by HTIL to VIH inter alia stating that out of the purchase consideration, up to C US $80 million could be paid to some of its existing partners. By the said Side Letter, HTIL agreed to procure that Hutchison Telecommunications (India) Ltd. (Ms) ["HTIL Mauritius" for short], Omega Telecom Holdings Private Limited ["Omega" for short] and GSPL would enter into IDFC Transaction Agreement prior to the completion of the acquisition pursuant to SPA, which D completion ultimately took place on 8.05.2007. 23. On 12.02.2007, Vodafone makes public announcement to Securities and Exchange Commission ["SEC" for short], Washington and on London Stock Exchange which contained two assertions saying that Vodafone had agreed to acquire a controlling interest in HEL via its subsidiary VIH and, second, that Vodafone had agreed to acquire companies that control a 67% interest in HEL. 24. On the same day, HTIL makes an announcement on HK Stock Exchange stating that it had agreed to sell its entire direct and indirect equity and loan interests held through subsidiaries, in HEL to VIH.
25. On 20.02.2007, VIH applied for approval to FIPB. This G application was made pursuant to Press Note 1 which applied to the acquisition of an indirect interest in HEL by VIH from HTIL. It was stated that "CGP owns directly and indirectly through its subsidiaries an aggregate of 42.34% of the issued share capital of HEL and a further indirect interests in 9.62% H
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of the issued share capital of HEL". That, the transaction would result in VIH acquiring an indirect controlling interest of 51.96% in HEL, a company competing with Bharti, hence, approval of FIPB became necessary. It is to be noted that on 20.02.2007, VIH held 5.61 % stake (directly) in Bharti. 26. On the same day, i.e., 20.02.2007, in compliance of Clause 5.2 of SPA, an Offer Letter was issued by Vodafone Group Pie on behalf of VIH to Essar for purchase of its entire shareholding (33%) in HEL. 27. On 2.03.2007, AG wrote to HEL, confirming that he, through his 100% Indian companies, owned 23.97% of a joint venture company-Tl!, which in turn owned 19.54% of HEL and, accordingly, his indirect interest in HEL worked out to 4.68%. That, he had full and unrestricted voting rights in companies owned by him. That, he had received credit support for his investments, but primary liability was with his companies. 28. A similar letter was addressed by AS on 5.03.2007 to FIPB. It may be noted that in January, 2006, post dilution of FDI cap, HTIL had to shed its stake to comply with 26% local shareholding guideline. Consequently, AS acquired 7.577% of HEL through his companies. 29. On 6.03.2007, Essar objects with FIPB to HTIL's proposed sale saying that HEL is a joint venture Indian company between Essar and Hutchison Group since May, 2000. That, Bharti is also an Indian company in the "same field" as HEL. Bharti was a direct competitor of HEL in India. According to Essar, the effect of the transaction between HTIL and VIH would be that Vodafone with an indirect controlling interest in HEL and in Bharti violated Press Note 1, particularly, absent consent from Essar. However, vide letter dated 14.03.2007, Essar gave its consent to the sale. Accordingly, its objection stood withdrawn. 30. On 14.03.2007, FIPB wrote to HEL seeking
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
clarification regarding a statement by HTIL before US SEC stating that HTIL Group would continue to hold an aggregate interest of 42.34% of HEL and an additional indirect interest through JVCs [Tll and Omega] being non-wholly owned subsidiaries of HTIL which held an aggregate of 19.54% of HEL, which added up to 61.88%, whereas in the communication to FIPB dated 6.03.2007, the direct and indirect FDI held by HTIL was stated to be 51.96%. 31. By letter of the same date from HEL to FIPB, it was pointed out that HTIL was a company listed on NY SE. Accordingly, it had to file Statements in accordance with US SEC. That, under US GAAP, HTIL had to consolidate the assets and liabilities of companies even though not majority owned or controlled by HTIL, because of a US accounting standard that required HTIL to consolidate an entity whereby HTIL had "risk or reward". Therefore, this accounting consolidation required that even though HTIL held no shares nor management rights still they had to be computed in the computation of the holding in terms of the Listing Norms. It is the said accounting consolidation which led to the reporting of additional 19.54% in HEL, which leads to combined holding of 61.88%. On the other hand, under Indian GAAP, the interest as of March, 2006 was 42.34% + 7.28% (rounded up to 49.62%). After the additional purchase of 2.34% from Hindujas in August 2006, the aggregate HTIL direct and indirect FDI stood at 51.96%. In short, due to the difference in the US GAAP and the Indian GAAP the Declarations varied. The combined holding for US GAAP purposes was 61.88% whereas for Indian GAAP purposes it was 51.96%. Thus, according to HEL, the Indian GAAP number reflected the true equity ownership and control position. 32. By letter dated 9.03.2007, addressed by FIPB to HEL, several queries were raised. One of the questions FIPB had asked was "as to which entity was entitled trt appoint the directors to the Board of Directors of HEL on behalf of TllL
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A which owns 19.54% of HEL?" In answer, vide letter dated 14.03.2007, HEL informed FIPB that under the Articles of HEL the directors were appointed by its shareholders in accordance with the provisions of the Indian company law. However, in practice the directors of HEL have been appointed pro rata to B their respective shareholdings which resulted in 4 directors being appointed from the Essar Group, 6 directors from HTIL Group and 2 directors from Tll. In practice, the directors appointed by Tll to the Board of HEL were AS and AG. One more clarification was sought by FIPB from HEL on the credit support received by AG for his investment in HEL. In answer to the said query, HEL submitted that the credit support for AG Group in respect of 4.68% stake in HEL through the Asim Ghosh investment entities, was a standby letter of credit issued by Rabobank Hong Kong in favour of Rabo India Finance Pvt. Ltd. which in turn has made a Rupee loan facility available to Centrino, one of the companies in AG Group.
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33. By letter dated 14.03.2007 addressed by VIH to FIPB, it stood confirmed that VIH's effective shareholding in HEL would be 51.96%. That, following completion of the acquisition E HTIL's shares in HEL the ownership of HEL was to be as follows:
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(i)
VIH would own 42% direct interest in HEL through its acquisition of 100% CGP (Cl).
(ii)
Through CGP (Cl), VIH would also own 37.25% in Tll which in turn owns 19.54% in HEL and 38% (45.79%) in Omega which in turn owns 5.11% in HEL (i.e. pro-rata route).
(iii)
These investments combined would give VIH a controlling interest of 52% in HEL.
(iv)
In addition, HTIL's existing Indian partners AG, AS aiid IDFC (i.e. SMMS), who between them held a 15% interest in HEL (i.e. option route), agreed to
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
(v)
retain their shareholdings with full control, including voting rights and dividend rights. In other words, none of the Indian partners exited and, consequently, there was no change of control.
The Essar Group would continue to own 33% of HEL.
B
34. On 15.03.2007, a Settlement Agreement was signed between HTIL and Essar Group. Under the said Agreement, HTIL agreed to pay US $415 mn to Essar for the following: (a)
acceptance of the SPA;
(b)
for waiving rights or claims in respect of management and conduct of affairs of HEL;
(c)
for giving up Right of First Refusal (RoFR), Tag Along Rights (TARs) and shareholders rights under Agreement dated 2.05.2000; and
(d)
for giving up its objections before FIPB.
35. Vide Settlement Agreement, HTIL agreed to dispose of its direct and indirect equity, loan and other interests and rights, in and related to HEL, to VIH. These other rights and interests have been enumerated in the Order of the Revenue dated 31.05.2010 as follows :
1.
Right to equity interest (direct and indirect) in HEL.
2.
Right to do telecom business in India
3.
Right to jointly own and avail the telecom licences in India
4.
Right to use the Hutch brand in India
5.
Right to appoint/reniove directors from the Board of HEL and its subsidiaries
6.
Right to exercise control over the management and
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affairs of the business of HEL (Management Rights) 7.
Right to take part in all the investment, management and financial dP.cisions of HEL
8.
Right over the assigned loans and advances utilized for the business in India
9.
Right of subscribing at par value in certain Indian companies
10.
Right to exercise call option at the price agreed in Indian companies
11.
Right to control premium
12.
Right to non-compete against HTIL within the territory of India
13.
Right to consultancy support in the use of Oracle license for the Indian business
14.
Other intangible rights (right of customer base, goodwill etc.)
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36. On 15.03.2007, a Term Sheet Agreement between VIH
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and Essar Teleholdings Limited, an Indian company which held 11 % in HEL, and Essar Communications Limited, a Mauritius company which held 22% in HEL, was entered into for regulating the affairs of HEL and the relationship of the shareholders of HEL. In the recitals, it was stated that VIH had agreed to acquire the entire indirect shareholding of HTIL in HEL, including all rights, contractual or otherwise, to acquire directly or indirectly shares in HEL owned by others which shares shall, for the purpose of the Term Sheet, be considered to be part of the holding acquired by VIH. The Term Sheet governed the relationship between Essar and VIH as shareholders of HEL including VIH's right as a shareholder of HEL:
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
(a)
to nominate 8 directors out of 12 to the Board of A Directors;
(b)
nominee of Vodafone had to be there to constitute the quorum for the Board of Directors;
(c)
to get a RoFR over the shares held by Essar in HEL;
(d)
should Vodafone Group shareholder sell its shares in HEL to an outsider, Essar had a TAR in respect of Essar's shareholding in HEL.
B
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37. On 15.03.2007, a Put Option Agreement was signed between VIH and Essar Group requiring VIH to buy from Essar Group Shareholders all the Option Shares held by them. 38. By letter dated 17.03.2007, HTIL confirmed in writing to AS that it had no beneficial, or legal or any other right in AS's Tll interest or HEL interest. 39. On 19.03.2007, a letter was addressed by FIPB to VIH asking VIH to clarify as to under what circumstances VIH agreed to pay US $11.08 bn for acquiring 67% of HEL when the actual acquisition is only 51.96%. This query presupposes that even according to FJPB the actual acquisition was only 51.96% (52% approx.).
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40. On the same day, VIH replied that VIH has agreed to acquire from HTIL, interests in HEL which included 52% equity F shareholding for US $11.08 bn. That, the price included a control premium, use and rights to the Hutch Brand in India, a non-compete agreement with the Hutch Group, the value of nonvoting non-convertible preference shares, various Joans obligations and the entitlement to acquire a further 15% indirect G interest in HEL as set out in the letter dated 14.03.2007 addressed to FIPB (see page 6117 of SLP Vol. 26). According to the said Jetter dated 19.03.2007, all the above elements together equated to 67% of the economic value of
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41. Vide Agreement dated 21.03.2007, VIH diluted its stake in Bharti by 5.61 %. 42. In reply to the queries raised by FIPB regarding break up of valuation, VIH confirmed as follows:
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Vanous assets and liabilities of CGP included its rights and entitlements, including swbscription rights, call options to acquire in future a further 62.75% of Tll, call options to acquire in future a further 54.21 % of Omega which together would give a further 15.03% proportionate indirect equity ownership of HEL, control premium, use and rights to Hutch brand in India and a non-compete agreement with HTIL. No individual price was assigned to any of the above items. That, under IFRS, consolidation included Tll and Omega and, consequently, the accounts under IFRS showed the total shareholding in HEL as 67% (approx.). Thus, arrangements relating to Options stood valued as assets of CGP. In global basis valuation, assets of CGP consisted of: its downstream holdings, intangibles and arrangement relating to Options, i.e. Bundle of Rights acquired by VIH. This reply was in the letter dated 27.03.2007 in which it was further stated that HTIL had conducted an auction for sale of its interests in HEL in which HTIL had asked each bidder to name its price with reference to the enterprise value of HEL. As a consequence of the transaction, Vodafone will effectively step into the shoes of HTIL including all the rights in respect of its Indian investments that HTIL enjoyed. Lastly, the Indian joint venture partners would remain invested in HEL as the transaction did not involve the Indian investors selling any of their respective stakes. 43. On 5.04.2007, HEL wrote to the Joint Director of Income Tax (International Taxation) stating that HEL had no tax liabilities accruing out of the subject transaction. 44. Pursuant to the resolution passed by the Board of Directors of CGP on 30.04.2007, it was decided that on acquisition loans owed by CGP to HTI (BVI) Finance Ltd. would
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF iNDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJ!.]
be assigned to VIH; the existing Directors of CGP would resign; A Erik de Rijk would become the only Director uf CGP. A similar resolution was passed on the same day by the Board of Directors of Array. 45. On 7.05.2007, FIPB gave its approval to the B transaction, subject to compliance with the applicable laws and regulations in India. 46. On 8.05.2007, consequent upon the Board Resolutions passed by CGP and its downstream companies, the follo':"'ing steps were taken: C (i)
resignation of all the directors of Hutch Group;
(ii)
appointment of new directors of Vodafone Group;
(iii)
. resolutions passed by Tll, Jaykay Finholding (India) Private Limited, UMT Investments Ltd., UMTL, Omega (Indian incorporated holding companies) accepting the resignation of HTIL's nominee directors and appointing VIH's nominee directors;
(iv)
same steps were taken by HEL and its E subsidiaries;
(v)
sending of a Side Letter by HTIL to VIH relating to completion meehanics;
(vi)
computation of net amount payable by VIH to HTIL F including retention of a certain amount out of US $11.08 bn paid on 8.05.2007 towards expenses to operationalize the Option Agreements and adjustments for breach (if any) of warranties, etc.;
(vii)
assignment of loans given by HT! (BVI) Finance Ltd. G to CGP and Array in favour of VIH;
(viii) cancellation of share certificate of HTIHL (BVI) and entering the name of VIH in the Register of Members of CGP;
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(ix)
execution of Tax Deed of Covenant indemnifying VIH in respect of tax or transfer pricing liabilities payable by Wider Group (CGP, GSPL, Mauritius holding companies, Indian operating companies).
(x)
a Business Transfer Agreement between GSPL and a subsidiary of HWP Investments Holdings (India) Ltd. (Ms) for sale of Call Centre earlier owned by GSPL;
. (xi)
payment of US $10.85 bn by VIH to HTIL (Cl).
47. On 5.06.2007, under the Omega Agreement, it was agreed that in view of the SPA there would be a consequent change of control in HTIL Mauritius, which holds 45.79% in Omega, and that India Development Fund ("IDF" for short), IDFC and SSKI Corporate Finance Private Limited ("SSKI" for short) would, instead of exercising Put Option and Cashless Option under 2006 IDFC Framework Agreement, exercise the same in pursuance of Omega Agreement. That, under the Omega Agreement, GSPL waived its right to exercise the Call Option under the 2006 IDFC Framework Agreement. 48. On 6.06.2007, a Framework Agreement was entered into among IDF, IDFC, SMMS, IDFC PE, HTIL Mauritius, GSPL, Omega and VIH by which GSPL had a Call Option to buy !he entire equity shares of SMMS. Consequently, on 7.06.2007, a Shareholders Agreement was executed by which the shareholding pattern of Omega changed with SMMS having 61.6% and HTIL Mauritius having 38.4%. 49. On 27.06.2007, HTIL declared a special dividend of HK $6.75 per share, on account of the gains made by sale of HTIL's entire interest in HEL. 50. On 5.07.2007, a Framework Agreement was entered into among AG, AG Mercantile Company Private Limited, Plustech Mercantile Co. (P) Ltd ["Plustech" for short], GSPL,
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
Nadal Trading Company Private Limited ["Nadal" for short] and VIH. Under clause 4.4, GSPL had an unconditional right to purchase all shares of AG in AG Mercantile Company Pvt. Ltd. at any time and in consideration for such ca// option, GSPL agreed to pay to AG an amount of US $6.3 mn annually. 51. On the same day, i.e., 5.07.2007, a Framework Agreement was entered into among AS, his wife, Scorpios, MVH, GSPL, NOC and VIH. Under clause 4.4 GSPL had an unconditional right to purchase all shares of AS and his wife held in Scorpios at any time and in consideration for the ca// option GSPL agreed to pay AS and his wife an amount of US$ 10.2 mn per annum. 52. On 5.07.2007, Tll Shareholders Agreement was entered into among Nadal, NOC, CGP India Investments Limited ["CGP India" for short], Tll and VIH to regulate the affairs of Tll. Under clause 3.1, NOC had 38.78% shareholding in Tll, CGP India had 37.85% and Nadal had 23.57%. 53. It is not necessary to go into the earlier round of litigation. Suffice it to state that on 31.05.2010, an Order was passed by the Department under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("the Act" for short] declaring that Indian Tax Authorities had jurisdiction to tax the transaction against which VIH filed Writ Petition No. 1325 of 2010 before the Bombay High Court which was dismissed on 8.09.2010 vide the impugned judgment [reported in 329 ITR 126], hence, this Civil Appeal.
B.
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Ownership Structure
54. In order to understand the above issue, we reproduce below the Ownership Structure Chart as on 11.02.2007. The Chart speaks for itself. 55. To sum up, CGP held 42.34% in HEL through 100% wholly owned subsidiaries [Mauritius companies], 9.62% indirectly through Tll and Omega [i.e. pro rata route], and 15.03% through GSPL route.
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i.
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VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
56. To explain the GSPL route briefly, it may be mentioned A that on 11.02.2007 AG Group of companies held 23.97% in Tll, AS Group of companies held 38.78% in Tll whereas SMMS held 54.21 % in Omega. Consequently, holding of AG in HEL through Tll stood at 4.68% whereas holding of AS in HEL through Tll stood at 7.577% and holding of SMMS in HEL through Omega B stood at 2.77%, which adds up to 15.03% in HEL. These holdings of AG, AS and SMMS came under the Option Route. In this connection, it may be mentioned that GSPL is an Indian company indirectly owned by CGP. It held Call Options and Subscription Options to be exercised in future under circumstances spelt out in Tll and IDFC Framework Agreements (keeping in mind the sectoral cap of 74%).
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Correctness of Azadi Bachao case - Re: Tax Avoidance/ Evasion
D
57. Before us, it was contended on behalf of the Revenue that Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Ando/an (2004) 10 SCC 1 needs to be overruled insofar as it departs from McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. CTO (1985) 3 SCC 230 principle for the following : i) Para 46 of McDowell judgment has been missed E which reads as under: "on this aspect Chinnappa Reddy, J. has proposed a separate opinion with which we agree". [i.e. Westminster principle is dead]. ii) That, Azadi Bachao failed to read paras 41-45 and 46 of McDowell in entirety. If so read, the only conclusion one could draw is that four learned judges F speaking through Misra, J. agreed with the observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. as to how in certain circumstances tax avoidance should be brought within the tax net. iii) That, subsequent to McDowell, another matter came before the Constitution Bench of five Judges in Mathuram Agrawal v. State G of Madhya Pradesh (1999) 8 SCC 667, in which Westminster principle was quoted which has not been noticed by Azadi Bachao.
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Our Analysis
58. Before coming to lndo-Mauritius DTAA, we need to clear the doubts raised on behalf of the Revenue regarding the correctness of Azadi Bachao (supra) for the simple reason that certain tests laid down in the judgments of the English Courts subsequent to The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. His Grace the Duke of Westminster 1935 All E. R. 259 and W T Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1981) 1 All E.R. 865 help us to understand the scope of lndo-Mauritius DTAA. It needs to be clarified, that, McDowell dealt with two aspects. First, regarding validity of the Circular(s) issued by CBDT concerning lndo-Mauritius DT~IA. Second, on concept of tax avoidance/evasion. Before us, arguments were advanced on behalf of the Revenue only regarding the second aspect.
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59. The Westminster principle states that, "given that a document or transaction is genuine, the court cannot go behind it to some supposed underlying substance". The said principle has been reiterated in subsequent English Courts Judgments as "the cardinal principle".
60. Ramsay was a case of sale-lease back transaction in which gain was sought to be counteracted, so as to avoid tax, by establishing an allowable loss. The method chosen was to buy from a company a readymade s·cheme, whose object was F to create a neutral situation. The dec:reasing asset was to be sold so as to create an artificial loss and the increasing asset was to yield a gain which would be exe~mpt from tax. The Crown challenged the whole scheme saying that it was an artificial scheme and, therefore, fiscally in-effective. It was held that G Westminster did not compel the court to look at a document or a transaction, isolated from the context to which it properly belonged. It is the task of the Court to ascertain the legal nature of the transaction and while doing so it has to look at the entire transaction as a whole and not to adopt a dissecting approach. H In the present case, the Revenue has adopted a dissecting
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
approach at the Department level.
61. Ramsay did not discard Westminster but read it in the proper context by which "device" which was colourable in nature had to be ignored as fiscal nullity. Thus, Ramsay lays down the principle of statutory interpretation rather than an overarching anti-avoidance doctrine imposed upon tax laws.
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62. Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dawson (1984) 1 All E.R. 530 dealt with the case of interpositioning of a company to evade tax. On facts, it was held that the inserted step had no business purpose, except deferment of tax although it had a business effect. Dawson went beyond Ramsay. It reconstructed the transaction not on some fancied principle that anything done to defer the tax be ignored but on the premise that the inserted transaction did not constitute "disposal" under the relevant Finance Act. Thus, Dawson is an extension of D Ramsay principle.
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63. After Dawson, which empowered the Revenue to restructure the transaction in certain circumstances, the Revenue started rejecting every case of strategic investment/ tax planning undertaken years before the event saying that the insertion of the entity was effected with the sole intention of tax avoidance. In Craven (Inspector of Taxes) v. White (Stephen) (1988) 3 All. E.R. 495 it was held that the Revenue cannot start with the question as to whether the transaction was a tax deferment/saving device but that the Revenue should apply the look at test to ascertain its true legal nature. It observed that genuine strategic planl)ing had not been abandoned.
64. The majorit¥ j_udgment in McDowell held that "tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the framework of law" (para 45). In the latter part of para 45, it held that G "colo1Jrable device cannot be a part of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage the belief that it is honourable to avoid payn'\ent of tax by resorting to dubious methods". It is the E:bligation of every citizen to pay the taxes without resorting to su~terfuges. The above observations should be read with para H
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46 where the majority holds "on this aspect one of us, Chinnappa Reddy, J. has proposed a separate opinion with which we agree". The words "this aspect" express the majority's agreement with the judgment of Reddy, J. only in relation to tax evasion through the use of colourable devices and by resorting to dubious methods and subterfuges. Thus, it cannot be said that all tax planning is illegal/illegitimate/impermissible. Moreover, Reddy, J. himself says that he agrees with the majority. In the judgment of Reddy, J. there are repeated references to schemes and devices in contradistinction to "legitimate avoidance of tax liability" (paras 7-10, 17 & 18). In our view, although Chinnappa Reddy, J. makes a number of observations regarding the need to depart from the "Westminster" and tax avoidance - these are clearly only in the context of artificial and colourable devices. Reading McDowell, in the manner indicated hereinabove, in cases of treaty shopping and/or tax avoidance, them is no conflict between McDowell and Azadi Bachao or between McDowell and Mathuram Agrawal.
International Tax Aspects of Holding Structures
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65. In the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV espoused the theory of the legal fiction by saying that corporate bodies could not be ex-communicated because they only exist in abstract. This enunciation is the foundation of the separate entity principle. 66. The approach of both the corporate and tax laws, particularly in the matter of corporate taxation, generally is founded on the abovementioned separate entity principle, i.e., treat a company as a separate person. The Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, in the matter of corporate taxation, is founded on the principle of the independence of companies and other entities subject to income-tax. Companies and other entities are viewed as economic entities with legal independence vis-a-vis their shareholders/participants. It is fairly well accepted that a subsidiary and its parent are totally distinct tax payers.
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
Consequently, the entities subject to income-tax are taxed on A profits derived by them on standalone basis, irrespective of their actual degree of economic independence and regardless of whether profits are reserved or distributed to the shareholders/ participants. Furthermore, shareholders/ participants, that are subject to (personal or corporate) income- B tax, are generally taxed on profits derived in consideration of their shareholding/participations, such as capital gains. Now a days, it is fairly well settled that for tax treaty purposes a subsidiary and its parent are also totally separate and distinct tax payers. c 67. It is generally accepted that the group parent company is involved in giving principal guidance to group companies by providing general policy guidelines to group subsidiaries. However, the fact that a parent company exercises shareholder's influence on its subsidiaries does not generally D imply that the subsidiaries are to be deemed residents of the State in which the parent company resides. Further, if a comp-any is a parent company, that company's executive director(s) should lead the group and the company's shareholder's influence will generally be employed to that end. E This obviously implies a restriction on the autonomy of the subsidiary's executive directors. Such a restriction, which is the inevitable consequences of any group structure, is generally accepted, both in corporate and tax laws. However, where the subsidiary's executive directors' competences are transferred F to other persons/bodies or where the subsidiary's executive directors' decision making has become fully subordinate to the Holding Company with the consequence that the subsidiary's executive directors are no more than puppets then the turning point in respect of the subsidiary's place of residence comes G about. Similarly, if an actual controlling Non-Resident Enterprise (NRE) makes an indirect transfer through "abuse of organisation form/legal. form and without reasonable business purpose" which results in tax avoidance or avoidance of withholding tax, then the Revenue may disregard the form of the H
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arrangement or the impugned action through use of NonResident Holding Company, re-characterize the equity transfer according to its economic substance and impose the tax on the actual controlling Non-Resident Enterprise. Thus, whether a transaction is used principally as a colourable device for the distribution of earnings, profits and gains, is determined by a review of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. It is in the above cases that the principle of lifting the corporate veil or the doctrine of substance over form or the concept of beneficial ownership or the concept of alter ego arises. There are many circumstances, apart from the one given above, where separate existence of different companies, that are part of the same group, will be totally or partly ignored as a device or a conduit (in the pejorative sense). 68. The common law jurisdictions do invariably impose taxation against a corporation based on the legal principle that the corporation is "a person" that is separate from its members. It is the decision of the House of Lords in Salomon v. Salomon (1897) A.C. 22 that opened the door to the formation of a corporate group. If a "one man" corporation could be incorporated, then it would follow that one corporation could be a subsidiary of another. This legal principle is the basis of Holding Structures. It is a common practice in international law, which is the basis of international taxation, for foreign investors to invest in Indian companies through an interposed foreign holding or operating company, such as Cayman Islands or Mauritius based company for both tax and business purposes. In doing so, foreign investors are able to avoid the lengthy approval and registration procesSE!S required for a direct transfer (i.e., without a foreign holding or operating company) of an equity interest in a foreign invested Indian company. However, taxation of such Holding Structures very often gives rise to issues such as double taxation, tax deferrals and tax avoidance. In this case, we are conceirned with the concept of GAAR. In this case, we are not concerned with treaty-shopping but with the anti-avoidance rules. The concept of GAAR is not
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
new to India since India already has a judicial anti-avoidance A rule, like some other jurisdictions. Lack of clarity and absence of appropriate provisions in the statute and/or in the treaty regarding the circumstances in which judicial anti-avoidance rules would apply has generated litigation in India. Holding Structures are recognized in corporate as well as tax laws. B Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and Holding Companies have a place in legal structures in India, be it in company law, takeover code under SEBI or even under the income tax law. When it comes to taxation of a Holding Structure, at the threshold, the burden is on the Revenue to allege and establish c abuse, in the sense of tax avoidance in the creation and/or use of such structure(s). In the application of a judicial antiavoidance rule, the Revenue may invoke the "substance over form" principle or "piercing the corporate veil" test only after it is able to establish on the basis of the facts and circumstances D surrounding the transaction that the impugned transaction is a sham or tax avoidant. To give an example, if a structure is used for circular trading or round tripping or to pay bribes then such transactions, though having a legal form, should be discarded by applying the test of fiscal nullity. Similarly, in a case where E the Revenue finds that in a Holding Structure an entity which has no commercial/business substance has been interposed only to avoid tax then in such cases applying the test of fiscal nullity it would be open to the Revenue to discard such interpositioning of that entity. However, this has to be done at the threshold. In this connection, we may reiterate the "look at" F principle enunciated in Ramsay (supra) in which it was held that the Revenue or the Court must look at a document or a transaction in a context to which it properly belongs to. It is the task of the Revenue/Court to ascertain the legal nature of the transaction and while doing so it has to look at the entire G transaction as a whole and not to adopt a dissecting approach. The Revenue cannot start with the question as to whether the impugned transaction is a tax defermenVsaving device but that it should apply the "look at" test to ascertain its true legal nature [See Craven v. White (supra) which further observed that H
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genuine strategic tax planning has not been abandoned by any decision of the English Courts till date]. Applying the above tests, we are of the view that every strategic foreign direct investment coming to India, as an investment destination, should be seen in a holistic manner. While doing so, the Revenue/Courts should keep in mind the following factors: the concept of participation in investment, the duration of time during which the Holding Structure exists; the period of business operations in India; the generation of taxable revenues in India; the timing of the exit; the continuity of business on such exit. In short, the onus will be on the Revenue to identify the scheme and its dominant purpose. The corporate business purpose of a transaction is evidence of the fact that the impugned transaction is not undertaken as a colourable or artificial device. The stronger the evidence of a device, the stronger the corporate business purpose must exist to overcome the evidence of a device. Whether Section 9 is a "look through" provision as submitted on behalf of the Revenue?
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69. According to the Revenue, if its primary argument (namely, that HTIL has, under the SPA, directly extinguished its property rights in HEL and its subsidiaries) fails, even then in any event, income from the sale of CGP share would nonetheless fall within Section 9 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as that Section provides for a "look through". In this connection, it was submitted that the word "through" in Section 9 inter alia means "in consequence of'. It was, therefore, argued that if transfer of a capital asset situate in India happens "in consequence of' something which has taken place overseas (including transfer of a capital asset), then all income derived even indirectly from such transfer, even though abroad, becomes taxable in India. That. even if control over HEL were to get transferred in consequence of transfer of the CGP Share outside India, it would yet be covered by Section 9. 70. We find no merit in the above submission of the
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS BV. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
Revenue. At the outset, we quote hereinbelow the following Sections of the Income Tax Act, 1961:
Scope of total income. 5. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the total income of any previous year of a person who is a non-resident includes all income from whatever source derived which-
(a) is received or is deemed to be received in India in such year by or on behalf of such person ; or (b) accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to him in India during such year.
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Income deemed to accrue or arise in India. 9. (1) The following incomes shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India : (i) all income accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in India, or through or from any property in India, or through or from any asset or source of income in India, or through the transfer of a capital asset situate in India.
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71. Section 9(1 )(i) gathers in one place various types of income and directs that income falling under each of the sub- F clauses shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. Broadly there are four items of income. The income dealt with in each sub-clause is distinct and independent of the other and the requirements to bring income within each sub-clause, are separately noted. Hence, it is not necessary that income falling G in one category under any one of the sub-clauses should also satisfy the requirements of the other sub-clauses to bring it within the expression "income deemed to accrue or arise in India" in Section 9(1 )(i). In this case, we are concerned with the last sub-clause of Section 9(1 )(i) which refers to income arising H
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from "transfer of a capital asset situate in India". Thus, charge on capital gains arises on transfer of a capital asset situate in India during the previous year. The said sub-clause consists of three elements, namely, transfer, existence of a capital asset, and sitL:ation of such asset in India. All three elements should B exist in order to make the last sub-clause applicable. Therefore, if such a transfer does not exist in the previous year no charge is attracted. Further, Section 45 enacts that such income shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which transfer took place. Consequently, there is no room for doubt that such transfer should exist during the previous year in order to attract the said sub-clause. The fiction created by Section 9(1 )(i) applies to the assessment of income of non-residents. In the case of a resident, it is immaterial whether the place of accrual of income is within India or outside India, since, in either event, he is liable to be· charged to tax on such income. But, in the case of a non-resident, unless the place of accrual of income is within India, he cannot be subjected to tax. In other words, if any income accrues or arises to a non-resident, directly or indirectly, outside India is fictionally deemed to accrue or arise in India if such income accrues or arises as a sequel to the E transfer of a capital asset situate in India. Once the factum of such transfer is established by the Department, then the income of the non-resident arising or accruing from such transfer is made liable to be taxed by reason of Section 5(2)(b) of the Act. This fiction comes into play only when the income is not charged F to tax on the basis of receipt in India, as receipt of income in India by itself attracts tax whether the recipient is a resident or non-resident. This fiction is brought in by the legislature to avoid any possible argument on the part of the non-resident vendor that profit accrued or arose outside India by reason of the G contract to sell having been executed outside India. Thus, income accruing or arising to a non-resident outside India on transfer of a capital asset situate in India is fictionally deemed to accrue or arise in India, which income is made liable to be taxed by reason of Section 5(2)(b) of the Act. This is the main H purpose behind enactment of Section 9(1 )(i) of the Act. We
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VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
have to give effect to the language of the section when it is unambiguous and admits of no doubt regarding its interpretation, particularly when a legal fiction is embedded in that section. A legal fiction has a limited scope. A legal fiction cannot be expanded by giving purposive interpretation particularly if the result of such interpretation is to transform the concept of chargeability which js also there in Section 9(1)(i), particularly when one reads Section 9(1 )(i) with Section 5(2)(b) of the Act. What is contended on behalf of the Revenue is that under Section 9(1 )(i) it can "look through" the transfer of shares of a foreign company holding shares in an Indian company and treat the transfer of shares of the foreign company as equivalent to the transfer of the shares of the Indian company on the premise that Section 9(1 )(i) covers direct and indirect transfers of capital assets. For the above reasons, Section 9(1 )(i) cannot by a process of interpretation be extended to cover indirect transfers of capital assets/property situate in India. To do so, would amount to changing the content and ambit of . Section 9(1 )(i). We cannot re-write Section 9(1 )(i). The legislature has not used the words indirect transfer in Section 9(1 )(i). If the word indirect is read into Section 9(1 )(i), it would render the express statutory requirement of the 4th sub-clause in Section 9(1)(i) nugatory. This is because Section 9(1)(i) applies to transfers of a capital asset situate in India. This is one of the elements in the 4th sub-clause of Section 9(1 )(i) and if indirect transfer of a capital asset is read into Section 9(1 )(i) then the words capital asset situate in India would be rendered nugatory. Similarly, the words underlying asset do not find place in Section 9(1 )(i). Further, "transfer" should be of an asset in respect of which it is possible to compute a capital gain in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Moreover, even Section 163(1)(c) is wide enough to cover the income whether received directly or indirectly. Thus, the words directly or indirectly in Section 9(1 )(i) go with the income and not with the transfer of a capital asset (property). Lastly, it may be mentioned that the Direct Tax Code (OTC) Bill, 2010 proposes to tax income from transfer of shares of a foreign company by
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a non-resident, where at any time during 12 months preceding the transfer, the fair market value of the assets in India, owned directly or indirectly, by the company, represents at least 50% of the fciir market value of all assets owned by the company. Thus, the OTC Bill, 2010 proposes taxation of offshore share transactions. This proposal indicates in a way that indirect transfers are not covered by the existing Section 9(1 )(i) of the Act. In fact, the OTC Bill, 2009 expressly stated that income accruing even from indirect transfer of a capital asset situate in India would be deemed to accrue in India. These proposals, therefore, show that in the existing Section 9(1 )(i) the word indirect cannot be read on the basis of purposive construction. The question of providing "look through" in the statute or in the treaty is a matter of policy. It is to be expressly provided for in the statute or in the treaty. Similarly, limitation of benefits has to be expressly provided for in the treaty. Such clauses cannot be read into the Section by interpretation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Section 9(1 )(i) is not a "look through" provision. Transfer of HTIL's property rights by Extinguishment?
72. The primary argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue was that the SPA, commercially construed, evidences a transfer of HTIL's property rights by their extinguish men!. That, HTIL had, under the SPA, directly extinguished its rights of F control and management, which are property rights, over HEL and its subsidiaries and, consequent upon such extinguishment, there was a transfer of capital asset situated in India. In support, the following features of the SPA were highlighted: (i) the right of HTIL to direct a downstream subsidiary as to the manner in G which it should vote. According to the Revenue, this right was a property right and not a contractual right. It vested in HTIL as HTIL was a parent company, i.e., a 100% shareholder of the subsidiary; (ii) According to the Revenue, the 2006 Shareholders/ Framework Agreements had to be continued H upon transfer of control of HEL to VIH so that VIH could step
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
into the shoes of HTIL. According to the Revenue, such A continuance was ensured by payment of money to AS and AG by VIH failing which AS and AG could have walked out of those agreements which would have jeopardized VIH's control over 15% of the shares of HEL and, consequently, the stake of HTIL in Tll would have stood reduced io minority; (iii) Termination of B IDFC Framework Agreement of 2006 and its substitution by a fresh Framework Agreement dated 5.06.2007, as warranted by SPA; (iv) Termination of Term Sheet Agreement dated 5.07 .2003. According to the Revenue, that Term Sheet Agreement was given effect to by clause 5.2 of the SPA which c gave Essar the right to Tag Along with HTIL and exit from HEL. That, by a specific Settlement Agreement dated 15.03.2007 between HTIL and Essar, the said Term Sheet Agreement dated 5.07.2003 stood terminated. This, according to the Revenue, was necessary because the Term Sheet bound the D parties; (v) the SPA ignores legal entities interposed between HTIL and HEL enabling HTIL to directly nominate the Directors on the Board of HEL; (vi) Qua management rights, even if the legal owners of HEL's shares (Mauritius entities) could have been directed to vote by HTIL in a particular manner or to nominate a person as a Director, such rights existed dehors E the CGP share; (vii) Vide clause 6.2 of the SPA, HTIL was required to exercise voting rights in the specified situations on the diktat of VIH ignoring the legal owner of CGP share [HTIHL (BVI)]. Thus, according to the Revenue, HTIL ignored its subsidiaries and was exercising the voting rights qua the CGP F and the HEL shares directly, ignoring all the intermediate subsidiaries which are 100% held and which are nonoperational. According to the Revenue, extinguishment took place dehors the CGP share. It took place by virtue of various clauses of SPA as HTIL itself disregarded the corporate G structure it had set up; (viii) As a holder of 100% shares of downstream subsidiaries, HTIL possessed de facto control over such subsidiaries. Such de facto control was the. subject matter of the SPA.
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73. At the outset, we need to reiterate that in this case we are concerned with the sale of shares and not with the sale of assets, item-wise. The facts of this case show sale of the entire investment made by HTIL, through a Top company, viz. CGP, in the Hutchison Structure. In this case we need to apply the "look at" test. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has rightly observed that the arguments advanced on behalf of the Department vacillated. The reason for such vacillation was adoption of "dissecting approach" by the Department in the course of its arguments. Ramsay (supra) enunciated the look at test. According to that test, the task of the Revenue is to ascertain the legal nature of the transaction and, while doing so, it has to look at the entire transaction holistically and not to adopt a dissecting approach. One more aspect needs to be reiterated. There is a conceptual difference between preordained transaction which is created for tax avoidance purposes, on the one hand, and a transaction which evidences investment to participate in India. In order to find out whether a given transaction evidences a preordained transaction in the sense indicated above or investment to participate, one has to take into account the factors enumerated hereinabove, namely, duration of time during which the holding structure existed, the period of business operations in India, generation of taxable revenue in India during the period of business operations in India, the timing of the exit, the continuity of business on such exit, etc. Applying these tests to the facts of the present case, we find that the Hutchison structure has been in place since 1994. It operated during the period 1994 to 11.02.2007. It has paid income tax ranging from Rs. 3 crore to Rs. 250 crore per annum during the period 2002-03 to 200607. Even after 11.02.2007, taxes are being paid by VIH ranging from ·394 crore to Rs. 962 crore per annum during the period 2007-08 to 2010-11 (these figures are apart from indirect taxes which also run in crores). Moreover, the SPA indicates "continuity" of the telecom business on the exit of its predecessor. namely, HTIL. Thus, it cannot be said that the structure was created or used as a sham or tax avoidant. It
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF !NOIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
cannot be said that HTIL or VIH was a "fly by night" operator/ short time investor. If one applies the look at test discussed hereinabove, without invoking the dissecting approach, then, in our view, extinguishment took place because of the transfer of the CGP share and not by virtue of various clauses of SPA. In a case like the present one, where the structure has existed for a considerable length of time generating taxable revenues right from 1994 and where the court is satisfied that the transaction satisfies all the parameters of "participation in investment" then in such a case the court need not go into the questions such as de facto control vs. legal control, legal rights vs. practical rights, etc. 74. Be that as it may, did HTIL possess a legal right to appoint directors onto the board of HEL and as such had some "property right" in HEL? If not, the question of such a right . getting "extinguished" will not arise. A legal right is an enforceable right. Enforceable by a legal process. The question is what is the nature of the "control" that a parent company has over its subsidiary. It is not suggested that a parent company never has control over the subsidiary. For example, in a proper case of "lifting of corporate veil", it would be proper to say that the parent company and the subsidiary form one entity. But barring such cases, the legal position of any company incorporated abroad is that its powers. functions and responsibilities are governed by the law of its incorporation No multinational company can operate in a foreign jurisdiction save by operating independently as a "good local citizen". A company is a separate legal persona and the fact that all its shares are owned by one person or by the parent company has nothing to do with its separate legal existence. If the owned company is wound up, the liquidator, and not its parent company, would get hold of the assets of the subsidiary. In none of the authorities have the assets of the subsidiary been held to be those of the parent unless it is acting as an agent. Thus. even though a subsidiary may normally comply with the request of a parent company it is not just a puppet of the parent
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company. The difference is between having power or having a persuasive position. Though it may be advantageous for parent and subsidiary companies to work as a group, each subsidiary will look to see whether there are separate commercial interests which should be guarded. When there is a parent company with B subsidiaries, is it or is it not the law that the parent company has the "power" over the subsidiary. It depends on the facts of each case. For instance, take the case of a one-man company, where only one man is the shareholder perhaps holding 99% of the shares, his wife holding 1%. In those circumstances, his control over the company may be so c:omplete that it is his alter ego. But. in case of multinationals it is important to realise that their subsidiar!es have a great deal of autonomy in the country concerned except where subsidiaries are created or used as a sham. Of course, in many cases the courts do lift up a corner of the veil but that does not mean that they alter the legal position between the companies. The directors of the subsidiary under their Articles are the managers of the companies. If new directors are appointed even at the request of the parent company and even if such directors were removable by the parent company, such directors of the subsidiary will owe their E duty to their companies (subsidiaries). They are not to be dictated by the parent company 1f it is not in the interests of those companies (subsidiaries). The fact that the parent company exercises shareholder's influence on its subsidiaries cannot obliterate the decision-making power or authority of its F (subsidiary's) directors. They cannot be reduced to be puppets. The decisive criteria is whether the parent company's management has such steering interference with the subsidiary's core activities that subsidiary can no longer be regarded to perform those activities on the authority of its own G executive directors.
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VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI]
transfer of investment in entirety. As stated above, exit coupled A with continuity of business is one of the important tell-tale circumstance which indicates the commercial/business substance of the transaction. Thus, the need for SPA arose to re-adjust the outstanding loans between the companies; to provide for standstill arrangements in the interregnum between B the date of signing of the SPA on 11.02.2007 and its completion on 8.05.2007; to provide for a seamless transfer and to provide for fundamental terms of price, indemnities, warranties etc. As regards the right of HTIL to direct a downstream subsidiary as to the manner in which it should vote is concerned, the legal c position is well settled, namely, that even though a subsidiary may normally comply with the request of a parent company, it is not just a puppet of the parent company. The difference is between having the power and having a persuasive position. A great deal depends on the facts of each case. Further, as D stated above, a company is a separate legal persona, and the fact that all the shares are owned by one person or a company has nothing to do with the existence of a separate company. Therefore, though it may be advantageous for a parent and subsidiary companies to work as a group, each subsidiary has to protect its own separate commercial interests. In our view, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the right of HTIL, if at all it is a right, to direct a downstream subsidiary as to the manner in which it should vote would fall in the category of a persuasive position/influence rather than having a power over the subsidiary. In this connection the following facts are relevant F 76. Under the Hutchison structure, the business was carried on by the Indian companies under the control of their Board of Directors, though HTIL, as the Group holding company of a set of companies, which controlled 42% plus 10% (pro rata) shares, did influence or was in a position to persuade the working of such Board of Directors of the Indian companies. In this connection, we need to have a relook at the ownership structure. It is not in dispute that 15% out of 67% stakes in HEL was held by AS, AG and IDFC companies. That was one of
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the main reasons for entering into separate Shareholders and Framework Agreements in 2006, when Hutchison structure existed, with AS, AG and IDFC. HTIL was not a party to the agreements with AS and AG, though it was a party to the agreement with IDFC. That, the ownership structure of B Hutchison clearly shows that AS, AG and SMMS (IDFC) group of companies, being Indian companies, possessed 15% control in HEL. Similarly, the term sheet with Essar dated 5.07.2003 gave Essar the RoFR and Right to Tag Along with HTIL and exit from HEL. Thus, if one keeps in mind the c . Hutchison structure in its entirety, HTIL as a Group holding company could have only persuaded its downstream companies to vote in a given manner as HTIL had no power nor authority under the said structure to direct any of its downstream companies to vote in a manner as directed by it (HTIL). Facts of this case show that both the parent and the subsidiary . companies worked as a group since 1994. That, as a practice, the subsidiaries did comply with the arrangement suggested by the Group holding company in the matter of voting, failing which the smooth working of HEL generating huge revenues was not possible. In this case, we are concerned with the E expression "capital asset" in the income tax law. Applying the test of enforceability, influence/ persuasion cannot be construed as a right in the legal sense. One more aspect needs to be highlighted. The concept of "de facto" control, which existed in the Hutchison structure, conveys a· state of being in control F without any legal right to such state. This aspect is important while construing the words "capital asset" under the income tax law. As stated earlier, enforceability is an important aspect of a legal right. Applying these tests, on the facts of this case and that too in the light of the ownership structure of Hutchison, we G hold that HTIL, as a Group holding company, had no legal right to direct its downstream companies in the matter of voting, nomination of directors and management rights. As regards continuance of the 2006 Shareholders/Framework Agreements by SPA is concerned, one ne.eds to keep in mind two relevant H concepts, viz., participative and protective rights. As stated, this
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
is a case of HTIL exercising its exit right under the holding A structure and continuance of the telecom business operations in India by VIH by acquisition of shares. In the Hutchison structure, exit was also provided for Essar, Centrino, NOC and SMMS through exercise of Put Option/TARs, subject to sectoral cap being relaxed in future. These exit rights in Essar, Centrino, B NOC and SMMS (IDFC) indicate that these companies were independent companies. Essar was a partner in HEL whereas Centrino, NOC and SMMS controlled 15% of shares of HEL (minority). A minority investor has what is called as a "participative" right, which is a subset of "protective rights". c These participative rights, given to a minority shareholder, enable the minority to overcome the presumption of consolidation of operations or assets by the controlling shareholder. These participative rights in certain instances restrict the powers of the shareholder with majority voting interest to control the operations or assets of the investee. At the same time, even the minority is entitled to exit. This "exit right" comes under "protective rights". On examination of the Hutchison structure in its entirety, we find that both, participative and protective rights, were provided for in the Shareholders/ E Framework Agreements of 2006 in favour of Centrino, NOC and SMMS which enabled them to participate, directly or indirectly, in the operations of HEL. Even without the execution of SPA, such rights existed in the above agreements. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that such rights flowed from the SPA. One more aspect needs to be mentioned. The Framework F Agreements define "change of control with respect to a shareholder" inter alia as substitution of limited or unlimited liability company, whether directly or indirectly, to direct the policies/ management of the respective shareholders, viz., Centrino, NOC, Omega. Thus, even without the SPA, upon G substitution of VIH in place of HTIL, on acquisition of CGP share, transition could have taken place. It is important to note that "tran3ition" is a wide concept. It is impossible for the acquirer to visualize all events that may take place between the date of execution of the SPA and completion of acquisition. H
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A Therefore, we have a provision for standstill in the SPA and so also the provision for transition. But, from that, it does not follow that without SPA, transition could not ensue. Therefore, in the SPA, we find provisions concerning Vendor's Obligations in relation to the conduct of business of HEL between the date of B execution of SPA and the closing date, protection of investment during the said period, agreement not to amend, terminate, vary or waive any rights under the Framework/ Shareholders Agreements during the said period, provisions regarding running of business during the said period, assignment of loans, c consequence of imposition of prohibition by way of injunction from any court, payment to be made by VIH to HTIL, giving of warranties by the Vendor, use of Hutch Brand, etc. The next point raised by the Revenue concerns termination of IDFC Framework Agreement of 2006 and its substitution by a fresh Framework Agreement dated 5.06.2007 in terms of the SPA. The submission of the Revenue before us was that the said Agreement dated 5.06.2007 (which is executed after the completion of acquisition by VIH on 8.05.2007) was necessary to assign the benefits of the earlier agreements of 2006 to VIH. E This is not correct. The shareholders of ITNL (renamed as Omega) were Array through HTIL Mauritius and SMMS (an Indian company). The original investors through SMMS (IDFC), an infrastructure holding company, held 54.21% of the share capital of Omega; that, under the 2006 Framework Agreement, the original investors were given Put Option by GSPL [an F Indian company under Hutchison Teleservices (India) Holdings Limited (Ms)] requiring GSPL to buy the equity share capital of SMMS; that on completion of acquisition on 8.05.2007 there was a change in control of HTIL Mauritius which held 45.79% in Omega and that changes also took place on 5.06.2007 G within the group of original investors with the exit of IDFC and SSKI. In view of the said changes in the parties, a revised Framework Agreement was executed on 6.06.2007, which again had cail and put option. Under the said Agreement dated 6.06.2007, the Investors once again agreed to grant call option H to GSPL to buy the shares of SMMS and to enter into a
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAf'ADIA, CJI.]
Shareholders Agreement to regulate the affairs of Omega. It A is important to note that even in the fresh agreement the call option remained with GSPL and that the said Agreement did not confer any rights on VIH. One more aspect needs to be mentioned. The conferment of call options on GSPL under the Framework Agreements of 2006 also had a linkage with intra- B group loans. CGP was an Investment vehicle. It is through the acquisition of CGP that VIH had indirectly acquired the rights and obligations of GSPL in the Centrino and NOC Framework Agreements of 2006 [see the report of KPMG dated 18.10.201 OJ and not through execution of the SPA. Lastly, as stated above, apart from providing for "standstill", an SPA has to provide for transition and all possible future eventualities. In the present case, the change in the investors, after completion of acquisition on 8.05.2007, under which SSKI and IDFC exited leaving behind IDF alone was a situation which was required to be addressed by execution of a fresh Framework Agreement under which the call option remained with GSPL. Therefore, the June, 2007 Agreements relied upon by the Revenue merely reiterated the rights of GSPL which rights existed even in the Hutchison structure as it stood in 2006. It was next contended E that the 2003 Term Sheet with Essar was given effect to by clause 5.2 of the SPA which gave Essar the Right to Tag Along with HTIL and exit from HEL. That, the Term Sheet of 5.07.2003 had legal effect because by a specific settlement dated 15.03.2007 between HTIL and Essar, the said Term Sheet stood terminated which was necessary because the Term Sheet F bound the parties in the first place. We find no merit in the above arguments of the Revenue. The 2003 Term Sheet was between HTIL, Essar and UMTL. Disputes arose between Essar and HTIL. Essar asserted RoFR. rights when bids were received by HTIL, which dispute ultimately came to be settled G on 15.03.2007, that is after the SPA dated 11.02.2007. The SPA did not create any rights. The RoFR/TARs existed in the Hutchison structure. Thus, even without SPA, within the Hutchison structure these rights existed. Moreover, the very object of the SPA is to cover the situations which may arise H
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during the transition and those which are capable of being anticipated and dealt with. Essar had 33% stakes in HEL. As stated, the Hutchison structure required the parent and the subsidiary to work together as a group. The said structure required the Indian partners to be kept in the. loop. Disputes B on existence of RoFR/ TARs had to be settled. They were settled on 15.03.2007. The rights and obligations created under the SPA had to be preserved. In any event, preservation of such rights with a view to continue business in India is not extinguishment.
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77. For the above reasons, we hold that under the HTIL structure, as it existed in 1994, HTIL occupied only a persuasive position/influence over the downstream companies qua manner of voting, nomination of directors and management rights. That, the minority shareholders/investors had participative and D protective rights (including RoFR/TARs, call and put options which provided for exit) which flowed from the CGP share. That, the entire investment was sold to the VIH through the investment vehicle (CGP). Consequently, there was no extinguishment of rights as alleged by the Revenue. Role of CGP in the transaction 78. The main contention of the Revenue was that CGP stood inserted at a late stage in the transaction in order to bring F in a tax-free entity (or to create a transaction to avoid tax) and thereby avoid capital gains. That, in December, 2006, HTIL explored the possibility of the sale of shares of the Mauritius entities and found that such transaction would be taxable as HTIL under that proposal had to be the prime mover behind any agreement with VIH - prime mover in the sense of being both G a seller of shares and the recipient of the sale proceeds therefrom. Consequently, HTIL moved upwards in the Hutchison structure and devised an artificial tax avoidance scheme of selling the CGP share when in fact what HTIL wanted was to sell its property rights in HEL. This, according to the Revenue,
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
was the reason for the CGP share being interposed in the transaction. We find no merit in these arguments.
79. When a business gets big enough, it does two things. First, it reconfigures itself into a corporate group by dividing itself into a multitude of commonly owned subsidiaries. Second, B it causes various entities in the said group to guarantee each other's debts. A typical large business corporation consists of sub-incorporates. Such division is legal. It is recognized by company law, laws of taxation, takeover codes etc. On top is a parent or a holding company. The parent is the public face of the business. The parent is the only group member that normally C discloses financial results. Below the parent company are the subsidiaries which hold operational assets of the business and which often have their own subordinate entities that can extend layers. If large firms are not divided into subsidiaries, creditors would have to monitor the enterprise in its entirety. Subsidiaries D reduce the amount of information that creditors need to gather. Subsidiaries also promote the benefits of specialization. Subsidiaries permit creditors to lend against only specified divisions of the firm. These are the efficiencies inbuilt in a holding structure. Subsidiaries are often created for tax or E regulatory reasons. They at times come into existence from mergers and acquisitions. As group members, subsidiaries work together to make the same or complementary goods and services and hence they are subject to the same market supply and demand conditions. They are financially inter-linked. One F such linkage is the intra-group loans and guarantees. Parent entities own equity stakes in their subsidiaries. Consequently, on many occasions, the parent suffers a loss whenever the rest of the group experiences a downturn. Such grouping is based on the principle of internal correlation. Courts have evolved G doctrines like piercing the corporate veil, substance over form etc. enabling taxation of underlying assets in cases of fraud, sham, tax avoidant, etc. However, genuine strategic tax planning is not ruled out.
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80. CGP was incorporated in 1998 in Cayman Islands. It was in the Hutchison structure from 1998. The transaction in the present case was of divestment and, therefore, the transaction of sale was structured at an appropriate tier, so that the buyer really acquired the same degree of control as was s hitherto exercised by HTIL. VIH agreed to acquire companies and the companies it acquired controlled 67% interest in HEL. CGP was an investment vehicle. As stated above, it is through the acquisition of CGP that VIH proposed to indirectly acquire the rights and obligations of GSPL in the Centrino and NOC c Framework Agreements. The report of Ernst & Young dated 11.02.2007 inter alia states that when they were asked to conduct due diligence by VIH, it was in relation to Array and its subsidiaries. The said report evidences that at the negotiation stage, parties had in mind the transfer of an upstream company rather than the transfer ofHEL directly. The transfer of Array had the advantage of transferring control over the entire shareholding held by downstream Mauritius companies (tier I companies), other than GSPL. On the other hand, the advantage of transferring the CGP share enabled VIH to indirectly acquire the rights and obligations of GSPL (Indian E company) in the Centrino and NOC Framework agreements. This was the reason for VIH to go by the CGP route. One of the arguments of the Revenue before us was that the Mauritius route was not available to HTIL for the reason indicated above. In this connection, it was urged that the legal owner of HEL F (Indian company) was not HTIL. Under the transaction, HTIL alone was the seller of the shares. VIH wanted to enter into an agreement only with HTIL so that if something goes wrong, VIH could look solely to HTIL being the. group holding company · (parent company). Further, funds were pumped into HEL by G HTIL. These funds were to be received back in the shape of a capital gain which could then be used to declare a special dividend to the shareholders of HTIL. We find no merit in this argument. Firstly, the tier I (Mauritius companies) were the indirect subsidiaries of HTIL who could have influenced the
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
former to sell the shares of Indian companies in which event the gains would have arisen to the Mauritius companies, who are not liable to pay capital gains tax under the ·Inda-Mauritius DTAA. That, nothing prevented the Mauritius companies from declaring dividend on gains made on the sale of shares. There is no tax on dividends in Mauritius. Thus, the Mauritius route was available but it was not opted for because that route would not have brought in the control over GSPL. Secondly, if the Mauritius companies had sold the shares of HEL, then the Mauritius companies would have continued to be the subsidiaries of HTIL, their accounts would have been consolidated in the hands of HTIL and HTIL would have accounted for the gains in exactly the same way as it has accounted for the gains in the hands of HTIHL (Cl) which was the nominated payee. Thus, in our view, two routes were available, namely, the CGP route and the Mauritius route. It was open to the parties to opt for any one of the two routes. Thirdly, as stated above, in the present case, the SPA was entered into inter alia for a smooth transition of business on divestment by HTIL. As stated, transfer of the CGP share enabled VIH to indirectly acquire the rights and obligations of GSPL in the Centrino and NOC Framework Agreements. Apart from the said rights and obligations under the Framework Agreements, GSPL also had a call centre business. VIH intended to take over from HTIL the telecom business. It had no intention to acquire the business of call centre. Moreover, the FDI norms applicable to the telecom business in India were different and distinct from the FDI norms applicable to the call centre business. Consequently, in order to avoid legal and regulatory objections from Government of India, the call centre business stood hived off. In our view, this step was an integral part of transition of business under SPA.
81. On the role of CGP in the transaction, two documents are required to be referred to. One is the Report of the KPMG dated 18.10.2010 in which it is stated that through the acquisition of CGP, VIH had indirectly acquired the rights and
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obligations of GSPL in the Centrino and NOC Framework Agreements. That, the said two agreements were put in place with a view to provide AG and AS with downside protection while preserving upside value in the growth of HEL. The second document is the Annual Report 2007 of HTIL. Under the caption "Overview", the Report observes that on 11.02.2007, HTIL entered into an agreement to sell its entire interests in CGP, a company which held through various subsidiaries, the direct and indirect equity and loan interests in HEL {renamed VEL) and its subsidiaries to VIH for a cash consideration of HK $86.6 bn. As a result of the said Transaction, the net debt of the Group which stood at HK $37,369 mn as on 31.12.2006 became a net cash balance of HK $25,591 mn as on 31.12.2007. This supports the fact that the sole purpose of CGP was not only to hold shares in subsidiary companies but also to enable a smooth transition of business, which is the basis of the SPA. Therefore, it cannot be said that the intervened entity {CGP) had no business or commercial purpose.
82. Before concluding, one more aspect needs to be addressed. It concerns situs of the CGP share. According to the Revenue, under the Companies Law of Cayman Islands, an exempted company was not entitled to conduct business in the Cayman Islands. CGP was an "exempted company". According to the ~evenue, since CGP was a mere holding company and since it could not conduct business in Cayman F Islands, the situs of the CGP share existed where the "underlying assets are situated", that is to say, India. That, since CGP as an exempted company conducts no business either in the . Cayman Islands or elsewhere and since its sole purpose is to hold shares in a subsidiary company situated outside the G Cayman Islands, the situs of the CGP share, in the present case, existed "where the underlying assets stood situated" {India). We firid no merit in these arguments. At the outset, we do not wish to pronounce authoritatively on the Companies Law of Cayman Islands. Be that as it may, under the Indian H Companies Act, 1956, the situs of the shares would be where
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
the company is incorporated and where its shares can be transferred. In the present case, it has been asserted by VIH that the transfer of the CGP share was recorded in the Cayman Islands, where the register of members of the CGP is maintained. This assertion has neither been rebutted in the impugned order of the Department dated 31.05.2010 nor traversed in the pleadings filed by the Revenue nor controverted before us. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to accept the arguments of the Revenue that the situs of the CGP share was situated in the place (India) where the underlying assets stood situated.
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Did VIH acquire 67% controlling interest in HEL (and not 42%/ 52% as sought to be propounded)? 83. According to the Revenue, the entire case ofVIH was that it had acquired only 42% (or, accounting for FIPB regulations, 52%) is belied by clause 5.2 of the Shareholders Agreement. In this connection, it was urged that 15% in HEL was held by AS/ AG/ IDFC because of the FDI cap of 74% and, consequently, vide clause 5.2 of the Shareholders Agreement between these entities and HTIL downstream subsidiaries, AS/ AG/IDFC were all reigned in by having to vote only in accordance with HTIL's dictates as HTIL had funded the purchase by these gentlemen of the HEL shares through financing of loans. Further, in the Term Sheet dated 15.03.2007, that is, between VIH and Essar, VIH had a right to nominate 8 directors (i.e. 67% of 12) and Essar had a right to nominate 4 directors which, according to the Revenue, evidences that VIH had acquired 67% interest in HEL and not 42%152%, as sought to be propounded by it. According to the Revenue, right from 22.12.2006 onwards when HTIL made its first public announcement, HTIL on innumerable occasions represented its direct and indirect "equity interest" in HEL to be 67% - the direct interest being 42.34% and indirect interest in the sense of shareholding belonging to Indian partners under its control, as 25%. Further, according to the Revenue, the purchase price
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paid by VIH was based on an enterprise value of 67% of the share capital of HEL; this would never have been so ifVIH was to buy only 42.34% of the share capital of HEL and that nobody would pay US $2.5 bn extra without control over 25% in HEL. We find no merit in the above submissions. At the outset, it may be stated that the expression "control" is a mixed question of law and fact. The basic argument of the Revenue is based on the equation of "equity interest" with the word "control". On perusal of Hutchison structure, we find that HTIL had, through its 100% wholly owned subsidiaries, invested in 42.34% of HEL (i.e. direct interest). Similarly, HTIL had invested through its non100% wholly owned subsidiaries in 9.62% of HEL (through the pro rata route). Thus, in the sense of shareholding, one can say that HTIL had an effective shareholding (direct and indirect interest) of 51.96% (approx. 52%) in HEL. On the basis of the shareholding test, HTIL could be said to have a 52% control over HEL. By the same test, it could be equally said that the balance 15% stakes in HEL remained with AS, AG and IDFC (Indian partners) who had through their respective group companies invested 15% in HEL through Tll and Omega and, consequently, HTIL had no control over 15% stakes in HEL. At this stage, we may state that under the Hutchison structure shares of Plustech in the AG Group, shares of Scorpios in 1he AS Group and shares of SMMS came under the options held by GSPL. Pending exercise, options are not management rights. At the highest, options could be treated as potential shares and till exercised they cannot provide right to vote or management or control. In the present case, till date GSPL has not exercised its rights under the Framework Agreement 2006 because of the sectoral cap of 74% which in turn restricts the right to vote. Therefore, the transaction in the present case provides for a triggering event, viz. relaxation of the sectoral cap. Till such date, HTILNIH cannot be said to have a control over 15% stakes in HEL. It is for this reason that even FIPB gave its approval to the transaction by saying that VIH was acquiring or has acquired effective shareholding of 51.96% in HEL.
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
84. As regards the Term Sheet dated 15.03.2007, it may A be stated that the said Term Sheet was entered into between VIH and Essar. It was executed after 11.02.2007 when SPA was executed. In the Term Sheet, it has been recited that the parties have agreed to enter into the Term Sheet in order to regulate the affairs of HEL and in order to regulate the B relationship of shareholders of HEL. It is also stated in the Term Sheet that VIH and Essar shall have to nominate directors on the Board of Directors of HEL in proportion to the aggregate beneficial shareholding held by members of the respective groups. That, initially VIH shall be entitled to nominate 8 c directors and Essar shall be entitled to nominate 4 directors out of a total Board of Directors of HEL (numbering 12). We must understand the background of this Term Sheet. Firstly, as stated the Term Sheet was entered into in order to regulate the affairs of HEL and to regulate the relationship of the D shareholders of HEL. It was necessary to enter into such an agreement for smooth running of the business post acquisition. Secondly, we find from the letter addressed by HEL to FIPB dated 14.03.2007 that Articles of Association of HEL did not grant any specific person or entity a right to appoint directors. The said directors were appointed by the shareholders of HEL E in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Company Law. The letter further states that in practice the directors were appointed pro rata to their respective shareholdings which resulted in 4 directors being appointed from Essar group, 6 directors being appointed by HTIL and 2 directors were F appointed by Tll. One such director was AS, the other director was AG. This was the practice even before the Term Sheet. The Term Sheet continues this practice by guaranteeing or assuring Essar that 4 directors would be appointed from its Group. The above facts indicate that the object of the SPA was G to continue the "practice" concerning nomination of directors on the Board of Directors of HEL which in law is different from a right or power to control and manage and which practice was given to keep the business going, i:iost acquisition. Under the Company Law, the management control vests in the Board of H
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Directors and not with the shareholders of the company. · Therefore, neither from Clause 5.2 of the Shareholders Agreement nor from the Term Sheet dated 15.03.2007, one could say that VIH had acquired 67% controlling interest in HEL. 85. As regards the question as to why VIH should pay consideration to HTIL based on an enterprise value of 67% of the share capital of HEL is concerned, it is important to note that valuation cannot be the basis of taxation. The basis of taxation is profits or income or receipt. In this case, we are not concerned with tax on income/ profit arising from business operations but with tax on transfer of rights (capital asset) and gains arising therefrom. In the latter case, we have to see the conditions on which the tax becomes payable under the Income Tax Act. Valuation may be a science, not law. In valuation, to arrive at the value one has to take into consideration the business realities, like the business model, the duration of its operations, concepts such as cash flow, the discounting factors, assets and liabilities, intangibles, etc. In the present case, VIH paid US $11.08 bn for 67% of the enterprise value of HEL plus its downstream companies having operational licences. It bought an upstream company with the intention that rights flowing from the CGP share would enable it to gain control over the cluster of Indian operations or operating companies which owned telecom licences, business assets, etc. VIH agreed to acquire companies which in turn controlled a 67% interest in HEL and its subsidiaries. Valuation is a matter of opinion. When the entire business or investment is sold, for valuation purposes, one may take into account the economic interest or realities. Risks as a discounting factor are also to be taken into consideration apart from loans, receivables, options, RoFR/ TAR, etc. In this case, Enterprise Value is made up of two parts, namely, the value of HEL, the value of CGP and the companies between CGP and HEL. In the present case, the Revenue cannot invoke Section 9 of the Income Tax Act on the value of the underlying asset or consequence of acquiring a share of CGP. In the present case, the Valuation do.ne was on the basis
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
of enterprise value. The price paid as a percentage of the A . enterprise value had to be 67% not because the figure of 67% was available in praesenti to VIH, but on account of the hct that the competing Indian bidders would have had de facto access to the entire 67%, as they were not subject to the limitation of sectoral cap, and, therefore, would have immediately encashed 8 the call options. The question still remains as to from where did this figure/ expression of 67% of equity interest come? The expression "equity interest" came from US GAAP. In this connection, we have examined the Notes to the Accounts annexed to the Annual Report 2006 of HTIL. According to Note C 1, the ordinary shares of HTIL stood listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as well as on the New York Stock Exchange. In Note No. 36, a list of principal subsidiaries of HTIL as on 31.12.2006 has been attached. This list shows the names of HEL (India) and some of its subsidiaries. In the said Annual Report, there is an annexure to the said Notes to the Accounts D under the caption "Information for US Investors". It refers to Variable Interest Entities (VIEs). According to the Annual Report, the Vodafone Group consisting of HTIL and its subsidiaries conducted its operations inter alia in India through entities in which HTIL did not have the voting control. Since HTIL E was listed on New York Stock Exchange, it had to follow for accounting and disclosure the rules prescribed by US GAAP. Now, in the present case, HTIL as a listed company was required to make disclosures of potential risk involved in the investment under the Hutchison structure. HTIL had furnished F Letters of Credit to Rabo Bank which in turn had funded AS and AG, who in turn had agreed to place the shares of Plustech and Scorpios under Options held by GSPL. Thus, giving of the Letters of Credit and placing the shares of Plustech and Scorpios under Options were required to be disclosed to the G US investors under the US GAAP, unlike Indian GAAP. Thus, the difference between the 52% figure (control) and 67% (equity interest) arose on account of the difference in computation under the Indian and US GAAP.
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A Approach of the High Court (acquisition of CGP share with "other rights and entitlements") 86. Applying the "nature and character of the transaction" test, the High Court came to the conclusion that the transfer of the CGP share was not adequate in itself to achieve the object 8 of consummating the transaction between HTIL and VIH. That, intrinsic to the transaction was a transfer of other "rights and entitlements" which rights and entitlements constituted in themselves "capital assets" within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. According to the High Court, VIH C acquired the CGP share with other rights and entitlements whereas, according to the appellant, whatever VIH obtained was through the CGP share (for short "High Court Approach'). 87. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the D Revenue has adopted the abovementioned f-ligh Court Approach as an alternative contention.
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88. We have to view the subject matter of the transaction, in this case, from a commercial and realistic perspective. The present case concerns an offshore transaction involving a structured investment. This case concerns "a share sale" and not an asset sale. It concerns sale of an entire investment. A "sale" may take various forms. Accordingly, tax consequences will vary. The tax consequences of a share sale would be different from the tax consequences of an asset sale. A slump sale would involve tax consequences which could be different from the tax consequences of sale of assets on itemized basis. "Control" is a mixed question of law and fact. Ownership of shares may, in certain situations, result in the assumption of an interest which has the character of a controlling interest in the management of the company. A controlling interest is an incident of ownership of shares in a company, something which flows out of the holding of shares. A controlling interest is, therefore, not an identifiable or distinct capital asset independent of the holding of shares. The control of a company resides in the voting power of its shareholders and shares
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
represent an interest of a shareholder which is made up of various rights contained in the contract embedded in the Articles of Association. The right of a shareholder may assume the character of a controlling interest where the extent of the shareholding enables the shareholder to control the management. Shares, and the rights which emanate from them, flow together and cannot be dissected. In the felicitous phrase of Lord MacMillan in /RC v. Crossman [1936] 1 All ER 762, shares in a company consist of a "congeries of rights and liabilities" which are a creature of the Companies Acts and the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company. Thus, control and management is a facet of the holding of shares. Applying the above principles governing shares and the rights of the shareholders to the facts of this case, we find that this case concerns a straightforward· share sale. VIH acquired Upstream shares with the intention that the congeries of rights, flowing from the CGP share, would give VIH an indirect control over the three genres of companies. If one looks at the chart indicating the Ownership Structure, one finds that the acquisition of the CGP share gave VIH an indirect control over the tier I Mauritius companies which owned shares in HEL totalling to 42.34%; CGP India (Ms), which in turn held shares in Tll and Omega and which on a pro rata basis (the FDI principle), totalled up to 9.62% in HEL and an indirect control over Hutchison Tele-Services (India) Holdings Ltd. (Ms), which in turn owned shares in GSPL, which held call and put options. Although the High Court has analysed the transactional documents in detail, it has miss~d out this aspect of the case. It has failed to notice that till date options have remained unencashed with GSPL. Therefore, even if it be assumed that the options under the Framework Agreements 2006 could be considered to be property rights, there has been no transfer or assignment of options by GSPL till today. Even if it be assumed that the High Court was right in holding that the options constituted capital assets even then Section 9(1 )(i) was not applicable as these options have not been transferred till date. Call and put options were not transferred vide SPA dated
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11.02.2007 or under any other document whatsoever. Moreover,
if, on principle, the High Court accepts that the transfer of the CGP share did not lead to the transfer of a capital asset in India, even if it resulted in a transfer of indirect control over 42.34% (52%) of shares in HEL, then surely the transfer of indirect control B over GSPL which held options (contractual rights), would not make the transfer of the CGP share taxable in India. Acquisition of the CGP share which gave VIH an indirect control over three genres of companies evidences a straightforward share sale ana not an asset sale. There is another fallacy in the impugned C judgment. On examination of the impugned judgment, we find a serious error committed by the High Court in appreciating the case of VIH before FIPB. On 19.03.2007, FIPB sought a clarification from VIH of the circumstances in which VIH agreed to pay US$ 11.08 bn for acquiring 67% of HEL when actual acquisition was of 51.96%. In its response dated 19.03.2007, VIH stated that it had agreed to acquire from HTIL for US$ 11.08 bn, interest in HEL which included a 52% equity shareholding. According to VIH, the price also included a control premium, use of Hutch brand in India, a non-compete E agreement, loan obligations and an entitlement to acquire, subject to the Indian FDI rules, a further 15% indirect interest in HEL. According to the said letter, the above elements together equated to 67% of the economic value of HEL. This sentence has been misconstrued by the High Court to say that F the above elements equated to 67% of the equity capital (See para 124). 67% of the economic value of HEL is not 67% of the equity capital. If VIH would have acquired 67% of the equity capital, as held by the High Court, the entire investment would have had breached the FDI norms which had imposed a sectoral cap of 74%. In this connection, it may further be stated G that Essar had 33% stakes in HEL out of which 22% was held by Essar Mauritius. Thus, VIH did not acquire 67% of the equity capital of HEL, as held by the High Court. This problem has arisen also because of the reason that this case deals with share sale and not asset sale. This case does not involve sale H of assets on itemized basis. The High Court ought to have
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VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
applied the look at test in which the entire Hutchison structure, as it existed, ought to have been looked at holistically. This case concerns investment into India by a holding company (parent company), HTIL through a maze of subsidiaries. When one applies the "nature and character of the transaction test", confusion arises if a dissecting approach of examining each individual asset is adopted. As stated, CGP was treated in the Hutchison structure as an investment vehicle. As a general rule, in a case where a transaction involves transfer of shares lock, stock and barrel, such a transaction cannot be broken up into separate individual components, assets or rights such as right to vote, right to participate in company meetings, management rights, controlling rights, control premium, brand licences and so on as shares constitute a bundle of rights. [See Charanjit Lal v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41, Venkatesh (minor) v. · CIT 243 ITR 367 (Mad) and Smt. Maharani Ushadevi v. CIT 131 ITR 445 (MP)] Further, the High Court has failed to examine the nature of the following items, namely, non-compete agreement, control premium, call and put options, consultancy support, customer base, brand licences etc. On facts, we are of the view that the High Court, in the present case, ought to have examined the entire transaction holistically. VIH has rightly contended that the transaction in question should be looked at as an entire package. The items mentioned hereinabove, like, control premium, non-compete agreement, consultancy support, customer base, brand licences, operating licences etc. were all an integral part of the Holding Subsidiary Structure which existed for almost 13 years, generating huge revenues, as indicated above. Merely because at the time of exit capital gains tax becomes not payable orexigible to tax would not make the entire "share sale" (investment) a sham or a tax avoidant. The High Court has failed to appreciate that the payment of US$ 11.08 bn was for purchase of the entire investment made by HTIL in India. The payment was for the entire package. The parties to the transaction have not agreed upon a separate price for the CGP share and for what the High Court calls as "other rights and entitlements" (including options, right to non-
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A compete, control premium, customer base etc.). Thus, it was not open to the Revenue to split the payment and consider a part of such payments for each of the above items. The essential character of the transaction as an alienation cannot be altered by the form of the consideration, the payment of the B consideration in instalments or on the basis that the payment is related to a contingency ('options', in this case), particularly when the transaction does not contemplate such a split up. Where the parties have agreed for a lump sum consideration without placing separate values for each of the above items c which go to make up the entire investment in participation, merely because certain values are indicated in the correspondence with FIPB which had raised the query, would not mean that the parties had agreed for the price payable for each of the above items. The transaction remained a contract of outright sale of the entire investment for a lump sum consideration [see: Commentary on Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital dated 28.01.2003 as also the judgment of this Court in the case of CIT (Central), Calcutta v. Mugneeram Bangur and Company (Land Deptt.), (1965) 57 ITR 299 (SC)]. Thus, we need to "look at" the entire Ownership Structure set E up by Hutchison as a single consolidated bargain and interpret the transactional documents, while examining the Offshore Transaction of the nature involved in this case, in that light. Scope and applicability of Sections 195 and 163 of IT Act
89. Section 195 casts an obligation on the payer to deduct tax at source ("TAS" for short) from payments made to nonresidents which payments are chargeable to tax. Such payment(s) must have an element of income embedded in it G which is chargeable to tax in India. If the sum paid or credited by the payer is not chargeable to tax then no obligation to deduct the tax would arise. Shareholding in companies incorporated outside India (CGP) is property located outside India. Where such shares become subject matter of offshore transfer between two non-residents, there is no liability for
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.)
capital gains tax. In such a case, question of deduction of TAS A would not arise. If in law the responsibility for payment is on a non-resident. the fact that the payment was made, under the instructions of the non-resident, to its Agent/Nominee in India or its PE/Branch Office will not absolve the payer of his liability under Section 195 to deduct TAS. Section 195(1) casts a duty B upon the payer of any income specified therein to a non-resident to deduct therefrom the TAS unless such payer is himself liable to pay income-tax thereon as an Agent of the payee. Section 201 says that if such person fails to so deduct TAS he shall be deemed to be an assessee-in-default in respect of the deductible amount of tax (Section 201 ). Liability to deduct tax is different from "assessment" under the Act. Thus, the person on whom the obligation to deduct TAS is cast is not the person who has earned the income. Assessment has to be done after liability to deduct TAS has arisen. The object of Section 195 is 0 to ensure that tax due from non-resident persons is secured at the earliest point of time so that there is no difficulty in collection of tax subsequently at the time of regular assessment. The present case concerf'\S the transaction of "outright sale" between two non-residents of a capital asset (share) outside E India. Further, the said transaction was entered into on principal to principal basis. Therefore, no liability to deduct TAS arose. Further, in the case of transfer of the Structure in its entirety, one has to look at it holistically as one Single Consolidated Bargain which took place between two foreign companies outside India for which a lump sum price was paid of US$ 11.08 F bn. Under the transaction, there was no split up of payment of US$ 11.08 bn. It is the Revenue which has split the consolidated payment and it is the Revenue which wants to assign a value to the rights to control premium, right to non-compete, right to consultancy support etc. For FOi purposes, the FIPB had asked G VIH for the basis of fixing the price of US$ 11.08 bn. But here also, there was no split up of lump sum payment, asset-wise as claimed by the Revenue. There was no assignment of price for each right, considered by the Revenue to be a "capital asset" in the transaction. In the absence of PE, profits were not H
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attributable to Indian operations. Moreover, tax presence has to be viewed in the context of the transaction that is subjected to tax and not with reference to an entirely unrelated matter. The investment made by Vodafone Group companies in Bharti did not make all entities of that Group subject to the Indian Income B Tax Act, 1961 and the jurisdiction of the tax authorities. Tax presence must be construed in the context, and in a manner that brings the non-resident assessee under the jurisdiction of the Indian tax authorities. Lastly, in the present case, the Revenue has failed to establish any connection with Section 9(1)(i). Under the circumstances, Section 195 is not applicable. Alternatively, the Revenue contended before us that VIH can be proceeded against as "representative assessee" under Section 163 of the Act. Section 163 does not relate to deduction of tax. It relates to treatment of a purchaser of an asset as a representative assessee. A conjoint reading of Section 160(1)(i), Section 161(1) and Section 163 of the Act shows that, under given circumstances, certain persons can be treated as "representative assessee" on behalf of non-resident specified in Section 9(1). This would include an agent of nonresident and also who is treated as an agent under Section 163 E of the Act which in turn deals with special cases where a person can be regarded as an agent. Once a person comes within any of the clauses of Section 163(1 ), such a person would be the "Agent" of the non-resident for the purposes of the Act. However, merely because a person is an agent or is to be F treated as an agent, would not lead to an automatic conclusion that he becomes liable to pay taxes on behalf of the nonresident. It would only mean that he is to be treated as a "representative assessee". Section 161 of the Act makes a "representative assessee" liable only "as regards the income G in respect of which he is a representative assessee" (See: Section 161). Section 161 of the Act makes a representative assessee liable only if the eventualities stipulated in Section 161 are satisfied. This is the scope of Sections 9(1)(i), 160(1), f61(1) read with Sections 163(1) (a) to (d). In the present case, H the Department has invoked Section 163(1 )(c). Both Sections
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VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS 8.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
163(1)(c) and Section 9(1)(i) state that income should be deemed to accrue or arise in India. Both these Sections have to be read together. On facts of this case, we hold that Section 163(1 )(c) is not attracted as there is no transfer of a capital asset situated in India. Thus, Section 163(1)(c) is not attracted. Consequently, VIH cannot be proceeded against even under Section 163 of the Act as a representative assessee. For the reasons given above, there is no necessity of examining the written submissions advanced on behalf ofVIH by Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi on Sections 191 and 201.
Summary of Findings 90. Applying the look at test in order to ascertain the true nature and character of the transaction, we hold, that the Offshore Transaction herein is a bonafide structured FDI investment into India which fell outside India's territorial tax jurisdiction, hence not taxable. The said Offshore Transaction evidences participative investment and not a sham or tax avoidant preordained transaction. The said Offshore Transaction was between HTIL (a Cayman Islands company) and VIH (a company incorporated in Netherlands). The subject matter of the Transaction was the transfer of the CGP (a company incorporated in Cayman Islands). Consequently, the Indian Tax Authority had no territorial tax jurisdiction to tax the said Offshore Transaction.
Conclusion 91. FDI flows towards location with a strong governance infrastructure which includes enactment of laws and how well the legal system works. Certainty is integral to rule of law. Certainty and stability form the basic foundation of any fiscal system. Tax policy certainty is crucial for taxpayers (including foreign investors) to make rational economic choices in the most efficient manner. Legal doctrines like "Limitation of Benefits" and "look through" are matters of policy. It is for the Government of the day to have them incorporated in the
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Treaties and in the laws so as to avoid conflicting views. Investors should know where they stand. It also helps the tax administration in enforcing the provisions of the taxing laws. As stated above, the Hutchison structure has existed since 1994. According to the details submitted on behalf of the appellant, B we find that from 2002-03 to 2010-11 the Group has contributed an amount of Rs. 20,242 crores towards direct and indirect taxes on its business operations in India. Order
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92. For the above reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 8.09.2010 in Writ Petition No. 1325 of 2010. Accordingly, the Civil Appeal stands allowed with no order as to costs. The Department is hereby directed to return the sum of Rs. 2,500 crores, which came to D be deposited by the appellant in terms of our interim order, with interest at the rate of 4% per annum within two months from today. The interest shall be calculated from the date of withdrawal by the Department from the Registry of the Supreme Court up to the date of payment. The Registry is directed to E return ihe Bank Guarantee given by the appellant within four weeks.
K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. The question involved in this case is of considerable public importance, especially on F Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which is indispensable for a growing economy like India. Foreign investments in India are generally routed through Offshore Finance Centres (OFC) also through the countries with whom India has entered into treaties. Overseas investments in Joint Ventures (JV) and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) have been recognised as important G avenues of global business in India. Potential users of off-shore finance are: international companies, individuals, investors and others and capital flows through FDI, Portfolio Debt Investment and Foreign Portfolio Equity Investment and so on. Demand for off-shore facilities has considerably increased owing to high
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF !NOIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.] growth rates of cross-border invest.ments and a number of rich global investors have come forward to use high technology and communication infrastructures. Removal of barriers to crossborder trade, the liberalisation of financial markets and new communication technologies have had positive effects on global economic growth and India has also been greatly benefited. 2. Several international organisations like UN, FATF, OECD, Council of Europe and the European Union offer finance, one way or the other, for setting up companies all over the world. Many countries have entered into treaties with several offshore companies for cross-border investments for mutual benefits. India has also entered into treaties with several countries for bilateral trade which has been statutorily recognised in this country. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Report on World Investment prospects survey 2009-11 states that India would continue to remain among the top five attractive destinations for foreign investors during the next two years. 3. Merger, Amalgamation, Acquisition, Joint Venture, Takeovers and Slump-sale of assets are few methods of crossborder re-organisations. Under the FOi Scheme, investment can be made by availing the benefit of treaties, or through tax havens by non-residents in the share/convertible debentures/ preference shares of an Indian company but the question which looms large is whether our Company Law, Tax Laws and Regulatory Laws have been updated so that there can be greater scrutiny of non-resident enterprises, ranging from foreign contractors and service providers, to finance investors. Case in hand is an eye-opener of what we lack in our regulatory laws and what measures we have to take to meet the various unprecedented situations, that too without sacrificing national interest. Certainty in law in dealing with such cross-border investment issues is of prime importance, which has been felt by many countries around the world and some have taken
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A adequate regulatory measures so that investors can arrange their affairs fruitfully and effectively. Steps taken by various countries to meet such situations may also guide us, a brief reference of which is being made in the later part of this judgment. B 4. We are, in the present case, concerned with a matter relating to cross-border investment and the legal issues emanate from that. Facts have been elaborately dealt with by the High Court in the impugned judgment and also in the leading C judgment of Lord Chief Justice, but reference to few facts is necessary to address and answer the core issues raised. On all major issues, I fully concur with the views expressed by the Lord Chief Justice in his erudite and scholarly judgment. 5. Part-I of this judgment deals with the facts, Part-II deals D with the general principles, Part-Ill deals with Inda-Mauritian Treaty, judgments in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Ando/an and Another (2004) 10 SCC 1 and McDowell and Company Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer (1985) 3 SCC 230, PartIV deals with CGP Interposition, situs etc, Part-V deals with E controlling interest of HTILNodafone and other rights and entitlements, Part-VI deals with the scope of Section 9, PartVII deals with Section 195 and other allied provisions and PartVIII is the conclusions.
Part- I
6. Hutchison Whampoa is a multi-sectional, multijurisdictional entity which consolidates on a group basis tetecom operations in various countries. Hutchison Group of G Companies (Hong Kong) had acquired interest in the Indian telecom business in the year 1992, when the group invested in Hutchison Max Telecom Limited (HTML) (later known a Hutchison Essar Limited (HEL), which acquired a cellular license in Mumbai circle in the year 1994 and commenced its H operation in the year 1995. Hutchison Group, with the
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. 681 UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.] commercial purpose of consolidating its interest in various A countries, incorporated CGP Investments Holding Limited (for short "CGP") in Cayman Islands as a WOS on 12.01.1998 as an Exempted Company for offshore investments. CGP held shares in two subsidiary companies, namely Array Holdings Limited (for short Array) and Hutchison Teleservices (India) E Holding Ltd. [for short HTIH(M)] both incorporated in Mauritius. CGP(lndia) Investment (for short CGPM) was incorporated in Mauritius in December 1997 for the purpose of investing in Telecom Investment (India) Pvt. Limited (for short Tll), an Indian Company. CGPM acquired interests in four Mauritian C Companies and entered into a Shareholders' Agreement (SHA) on 02.05.2000 with Essar Teleholdings Limited (ETH), CGPM, Mobilvest, CCII (Mauritius) Inc. and few others, to regulate shareholders' right inter se. Agreement highlighted the share holding pattern of each composition of Board of D Directors, quorum, restriction on transfer of ownership of shares, Right of First Refusal (ROFR), Tag Along Rights (TARs) etc. 7. HTIL, a part of Hutchison Whampoa Group, incorporated in Cayman Islands in the year 2004 was listed in Hong Kong E (HK) and New York (NY) Stock Exchanges. In the year 2005, as contemplated in the Term Sheet Agreement dated 05.07.2003, HTIL consolidated its Indian business operations through six companies in a single holding company HMTL, later renamed as Hutchison Essar Ltd. (HEL). On 03.11.2005, Press F Note 5 of 2005 series was issued by the Government of India enhancing the FOi ceiling from 49% to 74% in the Telecom Sector. On 28.10.2005, Vodafone International Holding BV (VIHBV) (Netherlands) had agreed to acquire 5.61 % of shareholding in Bharati Tele Ventures Limited (Bharati Airtel G Limited) and on the same day Vodafone Mauritius Limited (Subsidiary of VIHBV) had agreed to acquire 4.39% shareholding in Bharati Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (renamed Bharati lnfotel Ltd.), which indirectly held shares in Bharati Airtel Ltd.
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8. HEL shareholding was then restructured through Tll and an SHA was executed on 01.03.2006 between Centrino Trading Company Pvt. Ltd. (Centrino), an Asim Ghosh (Group) [for short (AG)], ND Callus Info Services Pvt. Ltd. (for short NOC), an Analjit Singh (Group) [for short (AS)], Telecom B Investment India Pvt.Ltd. [for short (Tll)], and CGP India (M). Further, two Framework Agreements (FWAs) were also entered into with respect to the restructuring. Credit facilities were given to the companies controlled by AG and AS. FWAs called, Centrino FWA and N.D . FWA were executed on C 01.03.2006. HTIL stood as a guarantor for Centrino, for an amount of' 4,898 billion advanced by Rabo Bank. HTIL had also stood as a guarantor for ND Callus, for an award of' 7.924 billion advanced by Rabo Bank. 9. Following the credit support given by HTIL to AG and AS so as to enable them to acquire shares in Tll, parties entered into separate agreements with 3 Global Services Pvt. Ltd. (India) [for short 3GSPL], a WOS of HTIL. FWAs also contained call option in favour of 3GSPL, a right to purchase E from Gold Spot (an AG company) and Scorpios (an AS company) their entire shareholding in Tll held through Plustech (an AG company) and MVH (an AS company) respectively. Subscription right was also provided allowing 3GSPL a right to subscribe 97.5% and 97% of the equity share capital F respectively at a pre-determined rate equal to the face value of the shares of Centrino and NOC respectively exercisable within a period of 1O years from the date of the agreements. Agreements also restricted AG companies and AS companies from transferring any downstream interests leading to the G shareholding in Tll.
10. HEL shareholding again underwent change with Hinduja Group exiting and its shareholding being acquired by an Indian company called SMMS Investments Private Limited (SMMS). SMMS was also a joint venture company formed by H India Development Fund (IDF) acting through IDFC Private
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.] Equity Company (IDFCPE), Infrastructure Development Finance Company Limited (IDFC) and SSKI Corporate Finance Pvt. Ltd. (SSKI) all the three companies were incorporated in India. Pursuant thereto, a FWA was entered into on 07.08.2006 between IDF (through IDFCPE), IDFC, SSKI, SMMS, HTIL (M), 3GSPL, Indus Ind Telecom Holding Pvt. Ltd. (ITNL) (later named as Omega Telecom Holding Pvt. Ltd. (Omega) and HTIL. 3GSPL, by that Agreement, had a call option and a right to purchase the entire equity shares of SMMS at a pre-determined price equal to ' 661,250,000 plus 15% compound interest. A SHA was also entered into on 17.08.2006 by SMMS, HTIL (M), HTIL(CI) and ITNL to regulate affairs of ITNL. Agreement referred to the presence of at least one of the directors nominated by HTIL in the Board of Directors of Omega. HTIL was only a confirming party to this Agreement since it was the parent company. 11. HTIL issued a press release on 22.12.2006 in the HK and NY Stock Exchanges announcing that it had been approached by various potentially interested parties regarding a possible sale of "its equity interest" in HEL in the Telecom Sector in India. HTIL had adopted those measures after
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procuring all assignments of Joans, facilitating FWAs, SHAs, transferring Hutch Branch, transferring Oracle License etc. 12. Vodafone Group Pie. came to know of the possible exit of Hutch from Indian telecom business and on behalf of Vodafone Group made a non-binding offer on 22.12.06, for a sum of US$ 11.055 million in cash for HTIL's shareholdings in HEL. The offer was valued at an "enterprise value" of US$ 16.5 billion. Vodafone then appointed on 02.01.2007 Ernst and Young LLP to conduct due diligence, and a Non-Disclosure (Confidentiality) Agreement dated 02.01.2007 was entered intt;i between HTIL and Vodafone. On 09.02.2007 Vodafone Group Pie. wrote a letter to HTIL making a "revised and binding offer'' on behalf of a member of Vodafone Group (Vodafone) for HTIL's shareholdings in HEL together with interrelated company
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loans. Bharati lnfotel Pvt. Limited on 09.02.2007 expressed its 'no objection' to the Chairman, Vodafone Mauritius Limited regarding proposed acquisition by Vodafone group of direct and I indirect interest in HEL from Hutchison or Essar group. Bharati Airtel also sent a similar letter to Vodafone.
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13. Vodafone Group Pie. on 10.02.2007 made a final binding offer of US$ 11.076 billion "in cash over HTIL's interest", based on an enterprise value of US$ 18.800 billion of HEL. Ernst and Young LLP, U.K. on 11.02.2007 issued due C diligence report in relation to operating companies in India namely HEL and subsidiaries and also the Mauritian and Cayman Island Companies. Report noticed that CGP(CI) was not within the target group and was later included at the instance of HTIL. On 11.02.2007, UBS Limited, U.K. issued fairness opinion in relation to the transaction for acquisition by Vodafone from HTIL of a 67% effective interest in HEL through the acquisition of 100% interest in CGP and granting an option by Vodafone to Indian Continent Investment Ltd. over a 5.6% stake in Bharati Airtel Limited. Bharati lnfotel and Bharati Airtel E conveyed their no-objection to the Vodafone purchasing direct or indirect interest in HEL. 14. Vodafone and HTIL then entered into a Share and Purchase Agreement (SPA) on 11.02.2007 whereunder HTIL had agreed to procure the transfer of share capital of CGP by
F HTIBVI, free from all encumbrances and together with all rights attaching or accruing together with assignments of loan interest. HTIL on 11.02.2007 issued a side letter to Vodafone inter alia stating that, out of the purchase consideration, up to US$80 million could be paid to some of its Indian Partners. G HTIL had also undertaken that Hutchison Telecommunication (India) Ltd. (HTM), Omega and 3GSPL, would enter into an agreed form "IDFC Transaction Agreement" as soon as practicable. On 11.02.2007, HTIL also sent a disclosure letter to Vodafone in terms of Clause 9.4 of SPA- Vendor warranties H relating to co11sents and approvals, wider group companies,
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS e.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.] material contracts, permits, litigation, arbitration and governmental proceedings to limit HTIL liability.
15. Vodafone on 12.02.2007 made a public announcement to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington (SEC), London Stock Exchange and HK Stock B Exchange stating that it had agreed to acquire a Controlling Interest in HEL for a cash consideration of US$ 11.1 billion. HTIL Chairman sent a letter to the Vice-Chairman of Essar Group on 14.02.2007 along with a copy of Press announcement made by HTIL, setting out the principal terms C of the intended sale of HTIL of its equity and loans in HEL, by way of sale of CGP share and loan assignment to VIHBV. 16. Vodafone on 20.02.2007 filed an application with Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) requesting it to take note of and grant approval under Press note no.1 to the D indirect acquisition by Vodafone of 51.96% stake in HEL through an overseas acquisition of the entire share capital of CGP from HTIL. HTIL made an announcement on HK Stock Exchange regarding the intended use of proceeds from sale of HTIL's interest in HEL viz., declaring a special dividend of E HK$ 6.75 per share, HK$ 13.9 billion to reduce debt and the remainder to be invested in telecommunication business, both for expansion and towards working capital and general policies. Reference was also made to the sale share and sale loans as being the entire issued share capital of CGP and the loans F owned by CGP/Array to an indirect WOS. AG on 02.03.2007 sent a letter to HEL confirming that he was the exclusive beneficial owner of his shares and was having full control over related voting rights. Further, it was also stated that AG had received credit support, but primary liability was with his G Companies. AS also sent a letter on 05.03.2007 to FIPB confirming that he was the exclusive beneficial owner of his shares and also of the credit support received. 17. Essar had filed objections with the FIPB on 06.03.2007
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to HTIL's proposed sale and on 14.03.2007, Essar withdrew its objections. 18. FIPB on 14.03.2007 sent a letter to HEL pointing out that in filing of HTIL before the U.S. SEC in Form 6K in the month of March 2006, it had been stated that HTIL Group would continue to hold an aggregate interest of 42.34% of HEL and an addition<1I indirect interest through JV companies being nonwholly owned subsidiaries of HTIL which hold an aggregate of 19.54% of HEL and, hence, the combined holding of HTIL Group would then be 61.88%. Reference was also made to the communication dated 06.03.2007 sent to the FIPB wherein it was stated that the direct and indirect FD/ by HTIL would be 51.96% and, hence, was asked to clarify that discrepancy. Similar letter dated 14.03.2007 was also received by Vodafone. On 14.03.2007, HEL wrote to FIPB stating that the discrepancy was because of the difference in U.S. GAAP and Indian GAAP declarations and that the combined holding for U.S. GAAP purposes was 61.88% and for Indian GAAP purposes was 51.98%. It was pointed out ·that Indian GAAP
E number accurately reflected the true equity ownership and control position. On 14.03.2007 itself, HEL wrote to FIPB confirming that 7.577% stake in HEL was held legally and beneficially by AS and his wife and 4.78% stake in HEL was held legally and beneficially by AG. Further, it was also pointed out that 2. 77% stake in HEL through Omega and F S.M.M.S. was legally and beneficially owned by IDFC Limited, IDFC Private Equity Limited and SSKI Corporate Finance Limited. Further, it was also pointed out that Articles of Association of HEL did not give any person or entity any right G to appoint directors, however, in practice six directors were from HTIL, four from Essar, two from Tll and Tll had appointed AG & AS. On credit support agreement, it was pointed out that no permission of any regulatory authority was required.
19. Vodafone also wrote to FIPB on 14.03.2007 confirming that VIHBV's effective shareholding in HEL would
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
be 51.96% i.e. Vodafone would own 42% direct interest in HEL A through its acquisition of 100% of CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited (CGPIL) and through CGPIL Vodafone would also own 37% in Tll which in turn owned 20% in HEL and 38% in Omega which in turn owned 5% in HEL. It was pointed out that both Tll and Omega were Indian companies and those investments B combined would give Vodafone a controlling interest of 52% ir. HEL. Further, it was pointed out that HT/L's Indian partners Ai:>, AS, IDFC who between them held a 15% interest in HEL on aggregate had agreed to retain their shareholding with full C control including voting rights and dividend rights. 20. HTIL, Essar Teleholding Limited (ETL), Essar Communication Limited (ECL), Essar Tele Investments Limited (ETIL), Essar Communications (India) Limited (ECIL) signed a settlement agreement on 15.03.2007 regarding Essar D Group's support for completion of the proposed transaction and covenant not to sue any Hutchison Group Company etc., in lieu of payment by HTIL of US$ 373.5 million after completion and a further US$ 41.5 million after second anniversary of completion. In that agreement, HTIL had agreed to dispose of E its direct and indirect equity, loan and other interests and rights in and related to HEL, to Vodafone pursuant to the SPA. HTIL had also agreed to pay US$ 415 million to Essar in return of its acceptance of the SPA between HTIL and Vodafone. On 15.03.2007 a Deed of Waiver was entered into between F Vodafone and HTIL, whereby Vodafone had waived some of the warranties set out in paragraphs 7.1 (a) and 7.1 (b) of Schedule 4 of the SPA and covenanted that till payment of HTIL under Clause 6.1 (a) of the Settlement Agreement of 30.05.2007, Vodafone should not bring any claim or action. On G 15.03.2007 a circular was issued by HTIL including the report of Somerley Limited on the Settlement Agreement between HTIL and Essar Group. 21. VIHBVI, Essar Tele Holdings Limited (ETH) and ECL entered into a Term Sheet Agreement on 15.03.2007 for
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A regulating the affairs of HEL and the relationship of its shareholders including setting out VIHBVl's right as a shareholder of HEL to nominate eight persons out of twelve to the board of directors, requiring Vodafone to nominate director to constitute a quorum for board meetings and get ROFR over B shares owned by Essar in HEL. Term Sheet also stated that Essar had a TAR in respect of Essa r's shareholding in HEL, should any Vodafone Group shareholding sell its share or part thereof in HEL to a person not in a Vodafone Group entity. VIHBV and Vodafone Group Plc.(as guarantor of VIHBV) had c entered into a 'Put Option' Agreement on 15.03.2007 with ETH, ECL (Mauritius), requiring VIHBV to purchase from Essar Group shareholders' all the option shares held by them. 22. The Joint Director of Income Tax (International Taxation), in the meanwhile, issued a notice dated 15.03.2007 under Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act calling for certain information regarding sale of stake of Hutchison group HK in HEL, to Vodafone Group Pie.
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23. HTIL, on 17.3.2007, wrote to AS confirming that HTIL has no beneficial or legal or other rights in AS's Tl/ interest or HEL interest. Vodafone received a letter dated 19.3.2007 from FIPB seeking clarifications on the circumstances under which Vodafone had agreed to pay consideration of US$ 11.08 billion for acquiring 67% of HEL when the actual acquisition was only 51.96% as per the application. Vodafone on 19.03.2007 wrote to FIPB stating that it had agreed to acquire from HTIL interest in HEL which included 52% equity shareholding for US$ 11. 08 billion which price included control premium, use and rights to Hutch brand in India, a non-compete agreement with Hutc/1 group, value of nonvoting, non-convertible preference shares, various loans obligations and entitlement and to acquire further 15% indirect interest in HEL, subject to Indian foreign investment rules, which together equated to about 67% of the economic value of HEL.
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.] 24. VIHBVI and Indian continent Investors Limiterl (ICIL) had entered into an SHA on 21.03.2007 whereby VIHBVI had to sell 106.470.268 shares in Bharati Airtel to ICIL for a cash consideration of US$ 1,626,930.881 (which was later amended on 09.05.2007)
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25. HEL on 22.3.2007 replied to the letter of 15.03.2007, issued by the Joint Director of Income Tax (International Taxation) furnishing requisite information relating to HEL clarifying that it was neither a party to the transaction nor would there be any transfer of shares of HEL. 26. HEL received a letter dated 23.3.2007 from the Additional Director Income Tax (International Taxation) intimating that both Vodafone and Hutchison Telecom Group announcements/press releases/declarations had revealed that HTIL had made substantive gains and consequently HEL was requested to impress upon HTIL/Hutchison Telecom Group to discharge their liability on gains, before they ceased operations in India. HEL attention was also drawn to Sections 195, 195(2) and 197 of the Act and stated that under Section 195 obligations were both on the payer and the payee. 27. Vodafone, in the meanwhile, wrote to FIPB on 27.03.2007 confirming that in determining the bid price of US$ 11.09 billion it had taken into account various assets and liabilities of CGP including: (a)
its 51.96% direct and indirect equity ownership of Hutch Essar;
(b)
Its ownership of redeemable preference shares in Tll and JKF;
(c)
Assumption of liabilities of various subsidiaries of CGP amounting to approximately US$630 million;
(d)
subject to Indian Foreign Investment Rules, its rights
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and entitlements, including subscription rights at par value and call options to acquire in future a further 62. 75% of Tll and call options to acquire a further 54.21% of Omega Telecom Holdings Pvt. Ltd, which together would give Vodafone a further 15.03% proportionate indirect equity ownership of Hutch Essar, various intangible features such as control premium, use and rights of Hutch branch in India, non compete agreement with HTIL.
C HEL on 5.4.2007 wrote to the Joint director of Income Tax stating that it has no liabilities accruing out of the transaction, also the department has no locus standi to invoke Section 195 in relation to non-resident entities regarding any purported tax obligations. On 09.04.2007 HTIL submitted FWAs, SHAs, Loan Agreement, Share-pledge Agreements, Guarantees, · Hypothecations, Press Announcements, Regulatory filing etc., charts of Tll and Omega Shareholding, note on terms of agreement relating to acquisition by AS, AG and IDFC, presentation by Goldman Sachs on fair market valuation and confirmation by Vodafone, factors leading to acquisition by AG E and AS and rationale for put/call options etc. 28. Vodafone on 09.04.2007 sent a letter to FIPB confirming I.hat valuation of N.D. Callus, Centrino, would occur as per Goldman Sach's presentation in Schedule 5 to HTIL's F letter of 09.04.2007 with a minimum value of US$ 266.25 million and US$164.51 million for the equity in N.D. Callus and Centrino respectively, which would form the basis of the future partnership with AS & AG. Vodafone also wrote a letter to FIPB setting out details of Vodafone Group's interest worldwide. On G 30.04.07 a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of CGP pertaining to loan agreement, resignation and appointment of directors, transfer of shares; all to take effect on completion of SPA Resolution also accorded approval of entering into a Deed of Assignment in respect of loans owed H to HTl(BVI) Finance Limited in the sums of US$
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.] 132,092.447.14 and US$ 28,972,505.70. Further resolution also accorded approval to the resignations of certain persons as Directors of the Company, to take effect on completion of SPA. Further, approval was also accorded to the appointment of Erik de Rjik as a sole director of CGP. Resolution also accorded approval to the transfer of CGP from HTI BVI to Vodafone. On 30.04.2007 a board of resolution was passed by the directors of Array for the assignment of loans and resignation of existing directors and appointment of new directors namely Erik de Rjik and two others. On 30.04.2007, the board of directors of HTI BVI approved the transfer documentation in relation to CGP share capital in pursuance of SPA and due execution thereof. On 04.05.2007 HTI BVI delivered the share transfer documentation to the lawyers in Caymen Islands to hold those along with a resolution passed by the board of directors of HTI BVI to facilitate delivery of instruments of transfer to Vodafone at closing of the transaction. 29. Vodafone on 07.05.2007 received a letter from FIPB conveying its approval to the transaction subject to compliance of observation of applicable laws and regulations in India. On 08.05.2007 a sum of US$10,854,229,859.05 was paid by Vodafone towards consideration for acquisition of share capital of CGP. On 08.05.2007 Vodafone's name was entered in the register of members of CGP kept in Caymen Islands and the share certificate No.002 of HTI BVI relating to CGP share capital was cancelled. On the same day a Tax Deed of Covenant was entered into between HTIL and Vodafone in pursuance of SPA indemnifying Vodafone in respect of taxation or transfer pricing liabilities payable or suffered by wider group companies (as defined by SPA i.e., CGP, 3 GSPL, Mauritian holding and Indian Companies) on or before completion, including reasonable costs associated with any tax demand. 30. HTIL also sent a side letter to SPA on 08.05.2007 to Vodafone highlighting the termination of the brand licences and brand support service agreements between HTIL and 3GSPL
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A and the Indian Operating Companies and stated that the net amount to be paid by Vodafone to HTIL would be US$ 10,854,229,859.05 and that Vodafone would retain US$ 351.8 million towards expenses incurred to operationalize the option agreements with AS and AG, out of the total consideration of B US$11,076,000,000. On 08.05.2007 loan assignment between HTI BVI Finance Limited, Array and Vodafone of Array debt in a sum of US$ 231, 111,427.41 was effected, whereby rights and benefits of HTI BVI Finance Limited to receive repayment was assigned in favour of Vodafone as part of the transaction c contemplated vide SPA. On the same day loan assignment between HTI BVI Finance Limited, CGP and Vodafone, of CGP debt in the sum of US$ 28,972,505.70 was effected, whereby rights and benefits of HTI BVI Finance Limited to receive the repayment was assigned in favour of Vodafone as part of the 0 transactions contemplated vide SPA. On 08.05.2007, business transfer agreement between 3GSPL and Hutchison Whampoa Properties (India) Limited, a WOS of HWP Investments Holdings (India) Limited, Mauritius, for the sale of business to 3GSPL of maintaining and operating a call centre as a going E concern on slump-sale-basis for a c:omposite price of ' 640 million. On 08.05.2007, as already stated, a Deed of Retention was executed between HTIL and Vodafone whereunder HTIL had agreed that out of the total consideration payable in terms of Clause 8.1 O(b) of the SPA, Vodafone would be entitled to F retain US$ 351.8 million by way of HTIL's contribution towards acquisition cost of options i.e., stake of ..:.s & AG. On 08.05.2007 Vodafone paid US$ 10,854,229,859.05 to HTIL. 31. Vodafone on 18.05.2007 sent a letter to FIPB confirming that VIHBV had no existing joint venture or G technology transfer/trade mark agreement in the same field as HEL except with Bharati as disclosed and since 20.02.2007 a member of Bharati Group had exercised the option to acquire a further 5.6% interest from Vodafone such that Vodafone's direct and indirect stake in Bharati Airtel would be reduced to H 4.39%.
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.] 32. An agreement (Omega Agreement) dated 05.06.2007 A was entered into between IDF, IDFC, IDFC Private Equity Fund II (IDFCPE), SMMS, HT India, 3GSPL, Omega, SSKI and VIHBV. Due to that Agreement IDF, IDFC and SSKI would instead of exercising the 'Pvt option' and 'cashless option' under 2006 IDFC FWA could exercise the same in pursuance B of the present Agreement. Further, 3GSPL had waived its right to exercise the 'call option' pursuant to 2006 IDFC FWA. On 06.06.2007 a FWA was entered into between IDF, IDFC, IDFCPE, SMMS, HT India, 3GSPL, Omega and VIHBV. By that Agreement 3GSPL had a 'call option' to purchase the equity C shares of SMMS. On 07.06.2007 a SHA was entered into between SMMS, HTIL(M), Omega and VIHBV to regulate the affairs of Omega. On 07.06.2007 a Termination Agreement was entered into between IDF, IDFC, SMMS, HTIL, 3GSPL, Omega and HTL terminating the 2006 IDFC FWA and the SHA D and waiving their respective rights and claims under those Agreements. On 27.06.2007 HTIL in their 2007 interim report declared a dividend of HK$ 6.75 per share on account of the gains made by the sale of its entire interest in HEL. On 04.07.2007 fresh certificates of incorporation was issued by the E Registrar of Companies in relation to Indian operating companies whereby the word "Hutchison" was substituted with word "Vodafone". 33. On 05.07.2007, a FWA was entered into between AG, F AG Mercantile Pvt. Limited, Plustech Mercantile Company Pvt.Ltd, 3GSPL, Nadal Trading Company Pvt. Ltd and Vodafone as a confirming party. In consideration for the unconditional 'call option', 3GSPL agreed to pay AG an amount of US$ 6.3 million annually. On the same day a FWA was G signed by AS and Neetu AS, Scorpio Beverages Pvt. Ltd.(SBP), M.V. Healthcare Services Pvt. Ltd, 3GSPL, N.D. Callus Info Services Pvt. Ltd and Vodafone, as a confirming party. In consideration for the 'call option' 3GSPL agreed to pay AS & Mrs. Neetu AS an amount of US$ 10.02 million annually. H
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Tll SHA was entered into on 05.07.2007 between Nadal, NOC, CGP (India), Tll and VIHBV to regulate the affairs of Tll. On 05.07.2007 Vodafone entered into a Consultancy Agreement with AS. Under that Agreement, AS was to be paid an amount of US$ 1,050,000 per annum and a one time payment of US$ B 1,30,00,000 was made to AS.
34. Vodafone sent a letter to Ff PB on 27.07.2007 enclosing undertakings of AS, AG and their companies as well as SMMS Group to the effect that they would not transfer the C shares to any foreign entity without requisite approvals.
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35. The Income Tax Department on 06.08.2007 issued a notice to VEL under Section 163 of the Income Tax Act to show cause why it should not be treated as a representative assessee of Vodafone. The notice was chatfenged by VEL in Writ Petition No.1942 of 2007 before the Bombay High Court. The Assistant Director of Income Tax (Intl.) Circle 2(2), Mumbai, issued a show cause notice to Vodafone under Section 201 (1) and 201 (1A) of the l.T. Act as to why Vodafone should not be treated a assessee-in-default for failure to withhold tax. Vodafone then fifed a Writ Petition 2550/2007 before the Bombay High Court for setting aside the notice dated 19.09.2007. Vodafone had also challenged the constitutional validity of the retrospective amendment made in 2008 to Section 201 and 191 of the l.T. Act. On 03.12.2008 the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition No.2550 of 2007 against which Vodafone filed SLP No.464/2009 before this Court and this Court on 23.01.2009 disposed of the SLP directing the Income Tax Authorities to determine the jurisdictional challenge raised by Vodafone as a preliminary issue. On 30.10.2009 a 2nd show cause notice was issued to Vodafone under Section 201 and 201(1A) by the Income Tax authorities. Vodafone replied to the show cause notice on 29.01.2010. On 31.05.2010 the Income Tax Department passed an order under Section 201 and 201(1A) of the l.T. Act upholding the jurisdiction of the Department to tax the transaction. A show
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J) cause notice was also issued under Section 163(1) of the 1.T. Act to Vodafone as to why it should not be treated as an agent I representative assessee of HTIL.
36. Vodafone then filed Writ Petition No.1325 of 2010 before the Bombay High Court on 07.06.2010 challenging the B order dated 31.05.2010 issued by the Income Tax Department on various grounds including the jurisdiction of the Tax Department to impose capital gains tax to overseas transactions. The Assistant Director of Income Tax had issued a letter on 04.06.2010 granting an opportunity to Vodafone to C address the Department on the question of quantification of liability under Section 201and201(1A) of the Income Tax Act. Notice was also challenged by Vodafone in the above writ petition by way of an amendment. The Bombay High Court dismissed the Writ Petition on 08.09.2010 against which the D present SLP has been filed. 37. The High Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Revenue to impose capital gains tax on Vodafone as a representative assessee after holding that the transaction between the parties attracted capital gains in India. Court came to the following conclusions:
(a)
Transactions between HTIL and Vodafone were fulfilled not merely by transferring a single share of CGP in Cayman Islands, but the commercial and F business understanding between the parties postulated that what was being transferred from HTIL to VIHBV was the "controlling interest" in HEL in India, which is an identifiable capital asset independent of CGP share. G
(b)
HTIL had put into place during the period when it was in the control of HEL a complex structure including the financing of Indian companies which in turn had holdings directly or indirectly in HEL and hence got controlling interest in HEL.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (c)
Vodafone on purchase of CGP got indirect interest in HEL, controlling right in certain indirect holding companies in HEL, controlling rights through shareholder agreements which included the right to appoint directors in certain indirect holding companies in HEL, interest in the form of preference share capital in indirect holding companies of HEL, rights to use Hutch brand in India, non-compete agreement with Hutch brand in India etc., which all constitute capital asset as per Section 2(14) of the l.T. Act.
(d)
The price paid by Vodafone to HTIL of US$ 11.08 billion factored in as part of the consideration of those diverse rights and entitlements and many of those entitlements are relatable to the transfer of CGP share and that the transactional documents are merely incidental or consequential to the transfer of CGP share but recognized independently the rights and entitlements of HTIL in relation to Indian business which are being transferred to VIHBV.
(e)
High Court held that the transfer of CGP share was not adequate in itself to achieve the object of consummating the transaction between HTIL and VIHBV and the rights and entitlements followed would amount to capital gains.
(f)
The Court also held that where an asset or source of income is situated in India, the income of which accrues or arises directly or indirectly through or from it shall be treated as income which is deemed to accrue or arise in India, hence, chargeable under Section 9(1)(i) or 163 of the l.T. Act.
(g)
Court directed the Assessing Officer to do apportionment of income between the income that
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VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J] has deemed to accrue or arise as a result of nexus with India and that which lies outside. High Court also concluded that the provisions of Section 195 can apply to a non-resident provided there is sufficient territorial connection or nexus between him and India. (h)
Vodafone, it was held, by virtue of its diverse agreements has nexus with Indian jurisdiction and, hence, the proceedings initiated under Section 201 for failure to withhold tax by Vodafone cannot be held to lack jurisdiction.
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38. Shri Harish Salve, learned senior counsel appearing for Vodafone explained in detail how Hutchison Corporate Structure was built up and the purpose, object and relevance of such vertical Transnational Structures in the international D context. Learned Senior counsel submitted that complex structures are designed not for avoiding tax but for good commercial reasons and Indian legal structure and foreign exchange laws recognize Overseas Corporate Bodies (OCB). Learned senior counsel also submitted that such Transnational E Structures also contain exit option to the investors. Senior counsel also pointed out that where regulatory provisions mandate investment into corporate structure such structures cannot be disregarded for tax purposes by lifting the corporate veil especially when there is no motive to avoid tax. Shri Salve F also submitted that Hutchison corporate structure was not designed to avoid tax and the transaction was not a colourable device to achieve that purpose. Senior counsel also submitted that source of income lies where the transaction is effected and not where the underlying asset is situated or economic interest G lies. Reference was made to judgment in Seth Pushalal Mahsinghka (P) Ltd. v. CIT (1967) 66 ITR 159 (SC). Learned counsel also pointed out that without any express legislation, off-shore transaction cannot be taxed in India. Reference was made to two judgments of the Calcutta High Court Assam H
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A . Consolidated Tea Estates v. Income Tax Officer "A" Ward
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(1971) 81 ITR 699 Cal. and C./. T. West Bengal v. National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. (1969) 72 ITR 121 Cal. Learned senior counsel ai;;o pointed out that when a transaction is between two foreign entities and not with an Indian entity, source of income cannot be traced back to India and nexus cannot be used to tax under Section 9. Further, it was also pointed out that language in Section 9 does not contain "look through provisions" and even the words "indirectly" or "through" appearing in Section 9 would not make a transaction of a nonresident taxable in India unless there is a transfer of capital asset situated in India. Learned Senior counsel also submitted that the Income Tax Department has committed an error in proceeding on a "moving theory of nexus" on the basis that economic interest and underlying asset are situated in India. It was pointed out that there cannot be transfer of controlling interest in a Company independent from transfer of shares and under the provisions of the Company Law. Acquisition of shares in a Company entitles the Board a right of "control" over the Company. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out the right to vote, right to appoint Board of Directors, and other management rights are incidental to the ownership of shares and there is no change of control in the eye of law but only in commercial terms. Mr. Salve emphasized that, in absence of the specific legislation, such transactions should not be taxed. On the situs of shares, learned senior counsel pointed out that the situs is determined depending upon the place where the asset is situated. Learned senior counsel also pointed out that on transfer of CGP, Vodafone got control over HEL and merely because Vodafone has presence or chargeable income in India, it cannot be inferred that it can be taxed in some other transactions. Further, it was also pointed out that there was no transfer of any capital asset from HTIL to Vodafone pursuant to Option Agreements, FWAs, executed by the various Indian subsidiaries. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that the definition of "transfer" under Section 2(47) which provides for
VODAFONE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.] "extinguishment" is attracted for a transfer of a legal right and A not a contractual right and there was no extinguishment of right by HTIL which gave rise to capital gains tax in India. Reference was made to judgment CIT v. Grace Collis (2001) 3 SCC 430. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the acquisition of "controlling interest" is a commercial concept and tax is levied B on transaction and not its effect. Learned senior counsel pointed out that to lift the corporate veil of a legally recognised corporate structure time and the stage of the transaction are very important and not the motive to save the tax. Reference was also made to several judgments of the English Courts viz, C /RC v. Duke of Westminster (1936) AC 1 (HL), W. T. Ramsay v. !RC (1982) AC 300 (HL), Craven v. White (1988) 3 All ER 495, Furniss v. Dawson (1984) 1 All ER 530 etc. Reference was also made to the judgment of this Court in McDowell, Azadi Bachao Ando/an cases (supra) and few other judgments. D Learned senior counsel point out that Azadi Bachao Andolan broadly reflects Indian jurisprudence and that generally Indian courts used to follow the principles laid down by English Courts on the issue of tax avoidance and tax evasion. Learned Senior counsel also submitted that Tax Residency Certificate (for short E TRC) issued by the Mauritian authorities has to be respected and in the absence of any Limitation on Benefit (LOB Clause), the benefit of the Inda-Mauritian Treaty is available to third parties who invest in India through Mauritius rout