A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
29 April 1988
Judge
Justice Sabyasachi Mukherji
Neutral citation
1988 INSC 123
Reported in
[1988] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 1
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Acts & sections
Article 136 Constitution, Article 134 Constitution, Section 161 IPC, Article 21 Constitution, Article 142 Constitution, Section 109 IPC, Section 120B IPC, Section 406 CrPC
Subject
Criminal, Family

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Full judgment

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK & ANR. APRIL 29, 1988

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[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, RANGANATH MISRA, G.L. OZA, B.C .. RAY, S. NATARAJAN, M.N. VENKATACHALIAH AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 13, 14, 21, 32 Prosecution of appellant for offences under sections 161 and 165 I. P. C.-Trial under Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 to be h.eld by Special Judge only- C Supreme Court in its judgment directing trial to be held by High Court Judge-Validity of Supreme Court Judgment-Whether infringement of fundamental right of accused involved-Whether procedure established by law violated-Power to create or enlarge jurisdiction-Legislative in character. Articles 32, 134, 136, 137, 139, 141 and 142-Powers of review-. Nature and scope of-Whether Supreme Court can review its directions if they result in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen-Whether Supreme Court can issue writ of certiorari to quash judicial order passed by another Bench-Whether a larger Bench can overrule or recall a decision of a smaller Bench. Articles 140, 141, 142 and 145: Jurisdiction-Want of-Can be established only by a superior court-No decision can be impeached collatterally by any inferior court-Superior court can. always correct errors by petition or ex debito justitiae-Judgments per incuriamEffect of.

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Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952: Sections 6 & 70ffences under Act to be tried only by Special Judge-Order of Supreme Court transferring and direding trial by High Court JudgeWhether legally authorised-Non-substante clause ins. 7( 1)-Effect of. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Sections 374, 406 & 407Transfer of case-Power of transfer postulates that Court to which transfer or withdrawal is sought is competent to exercise jurisdiction over case-Intra state transfer is within jurisdiction of the appropriate High Court.

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Practice and Procedure: Judgment of Supreme Coun-Directions issued in proceedings inter partes-Found bad in law or violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and principles of natural justice-Whether immune from correction even though they cause prejudice and do injury. Criminal Trial-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Sec. 223Whether an accused can demand as of a right trial with co-accused. Interpretation of statutes-Words to be given normal meaning with reference to context-Golden rule of interpretation-When to be resorted to.

Legal Maxims: Actus curiae neminem gravabid-Coram nonjudice-Per curiam-Ex debito justitiae-Nunc-Pro-tunc-Applicability of.

The appellant was the Chief Minister of Maharashtra between D ·June 9, 1980 and January 12, 1982, when he resigned that office in deference to the judgment of High Court in a writ petition tiled against him, but continued as an MLA.

On August 9, 1982, respondent No. t, a member of a political party tiled a complaint before a Special Judge against the appellant and others for offences under ss. 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and also under ss. 384 and 420 read with ss. 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The Special Judge issued process to the appellant. Later, the Special Judge over-ruled the objection of the appellant to take cognizance of the offences on a private complaint, and to issue process, in the absence of notification under s. 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, specifying as to which of the three special Judges of the area should try such cases. Against this, the appellant filed a revision application in the High Court, which dismissed it subsequently. The appellant's Special Leave Petition against this was dismissed by the Supreme Court which held that the complaint tiled by respondent No. 1 was clearly maintainable and cognizance was properly taken of it. During the pendency of the revision application in the High Court, the State Government notified the SpeCial Judge to try the off-

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A.R. ANTULAY ,._ R.S. NAYAK

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ences specified nnder s. 6(1) of the Act and appointed another Special Jndge, who discharged the appellant, holding that a member of the Legislative Assembly was a public servant and there was no valid sanetion for prosecuting the appellant. Against this order of discharge, respondent No. 1 flied a Criminal Revision Application in the High Court, which was subsequently withdrawn to this Court.

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On an appeal filed by respondent No. 1 directly under Article 136 of the Constitution against the order of discharge, the Supreme Court held on 16.2.1984, that a member of the Legislative Assembly was not a public servant, and set aside the order of the Special Judge. The Court observed that though nearly 2'/z years had rolled by since prosecution against the accused, who was Chief Minister of a State, was launched and his character and integrity came under cloud, the case had not moved an inch further and that an expeditious trial was primarily in the interest of the accused and mandate of Article 21. It further observed that expeditious disposal of a criminal case was in the interest of both the prosecution and the accused. It, therefore, suo motu wit;,. drew this special case and another one filed against the appellant by . another person and transferred them to the High Court, with the request to the Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a sitting Jtidge of the High Court, who should proceed to expeditiously dispose of the cases, preferably by holding trial from day to day.

Pursuant to the directions of this Court dated February 16, 1984 the Chief Justice of the High Court assigned the cases to one of the Judges of that Court. The appellant appeared before him and raised an objection that the case mold be tried only by a Special Judge appointed by the Government under the !952 Act. The Judge rejected this and other objections holding that he was bound by the order of the Supreme Court.

Special .Leave Petitions as well as a writ petition filed by the appelhnt against the aforesaid decision were di•missed by this Court on April 17, 1984, holding that the Judge was perfectly justified, and indeed it was his duty to follow the decision of this Court which was G binding on him. It also observed that the writ petition challenging the validity of the order and jndgment of this Court as nullity or otherwise could not be entertained, and that the dismissal of the writ petition ' would not prejudice the petitioner's right to approach this Court, with an appropriate review petition or any other application, '1-'hich he IT'"1•i

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Thereafter, the cases were transferred to another Special Judge, who framed 21 charges and declined to frame 22 other charges prvposed by respondent No. 1. This Court allowed respondent No. I's appeal by special leave except in regard to three draft charges under s. 384 IPC, and requested the High Court to nominate another Judge to try the cases.

The Judge, to whom the cases were transferred, framed 79 charges against the appellant, and refused to proceed against the other named conspirators.

Against the aforesaid order, the appellant filed a Special Leave Petition before this Court questioning the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to try the case in violation of the appellant's fundamental rights ·conferred by Articles 14 and 21 and the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1952. The appellant also filed a Special Leave Petilion against the decision of the Judge, holding that none of the '79 charges framed agaist the accused required sanction under s. 197(1) of the Cr. P.C., and a writ petition challenging a portion of s. 197(1) as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

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This Court granted special leave in the Special Leave Petition questioning the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to try the case and stayed further proceedings in the High Court. It also issued notice in the other Special Leave Petition and the writ petition, and directed these to be tagged on to the appeal. An application filed by respondent No. I for revocation of the Special Leave was dismissed and the appeal was referred to a Bench of seven Judges. The other Special Leave Petition and the writ petition were delinked, to be heard after the disposal of the appeal. In the appeal, two questions arose, namely, (1) whether the direC·· lions given by this Court on 16th February, 1984, withdrawing th<' special cases pending in the Court of Special Judge and transferring the same to the High Court with the request to the Chief Justice to assign these cases to a sitting Judge of that High Court in breach of s. 7(1) of' the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 which mandated that the offences, as in this case, should be tried only by a Special Judge, thereby denying at least one right of appeal to the appellant was violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and whether such directions were ~ at all valid or legal 311d (2) if.such directions were not at all valid or legal in view of the Court's order of April 17, 1984, whether the present

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

appeal was sustainable or the grounds therein justiciable in these proceedings. In other words, whether the said directions in a proceeding inter parties were binding even if bad in law or violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and as such, immune from correction by this Court even though they caused prejudice and injury.

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Allowing the appeal, and setting aside and quashing all the proceedings subsequent to the directions of the Court on 16.2.1984 and directing that the trial should proceed in accordance with law, i.e. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952.

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HELD:

Majority: Sabyasachi Mukharji, Oza and Natarajan, JJ. Per Sabyasachi Mukharji, J: I. Section 7(1) of the ·.Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 creates a condition which is sine qua non for the trial of offences under D s. 6(1) of the said Act. The condition is that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law, the said offences shall be triable by Special Judges only. The offences specified under s. 6(1) of the 1952 Act are those punishable under ss. 161, 162, 163, 164 and 165A of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5 of the Prevention ofCorruptionAct,1947. [44B-C,49H,A]

Gurcharan Das Chadha v. State of Rajasthan, [1966] 2 S.C.R. 678 referred to. '~

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Therefore, the order of this Court transferring the cases to the High Court on 16th February, 1984 was not authorised by law. This F Court, by its directions could not confer jurisdiction on the High Court to try any case, when it did not possess such jurisdiction under the scheme of the 1952 Act. [49A-B]

Kiran Singh and Others v. Chaman Paswan & Others, h955] I SCR 117 at 121 and M.L. Sethi R.P. Kapur, 19731SCR697 relied on. G

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2.1 The power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is. legislative in character, so also the power to confer a right of appeal or to take away a .. right of appeal. Parliament alone can do it by law. No Court, whether . ' superior or inferior or both combined can enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court or divest a person of his rights of revision and appeal. [SOE]

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M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, [1973[ sen 697 and Raia Soap Factory v. S.P. Shantaraj, 1965 2 sen 800 referred to. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. IO page at para 720 and Ammon Rubinstein's Jurisdiction and l/legality, [1965] Edn. pp. 16-50 referred to.

2.2 Want of jurisdiction can be established solely by supe1rior court and in practice, no decision can be impeached collaterally hy any inferior court, but the superior court can always correct its own error brought to its 'notice either hy way of petition or ex debito justitiae. [SOG]

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fiubinstein 's jurisiliction and //legality (1965 Edn,) referred to. 2.3 The distinction between an error wmch entails absence of jurisdiction and an error made within the jurisdiction is so tine that it is

rapidly being eroded. [69H, 70A]

Anismatic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commissioner, [1969'] I All E.R. 208 at 244 referred to.

This is not a case of collateral attack on judicial proceedings; it is a case where the Court having no court superior to it rectifies its own order. [69G) The impugned directions were void because power was not there for this Court to transfer a proceeding under the Act of 1952 from one Special Judge to the High Court. [69G)

The singling out of the appellant for a speedier trial by the Hii~h Court for an offence which the High Court had no jurisdiction to try under the Act of 1952 was unwarranted, unprecedented and directions given by this Court for the said purposes were not warranted. When that fact is brought to the notice of the court, it must remedy the situation. [SID-El

2.4 In rectifying the error, no personal inhibitions should debar this Court because no person should suffer by reason of any mistake of this Court. Here no rule of res judicata would apply to prevent this Court from entertaining the grievance and giving appropriate directions. [5IE-F)

Soni Vrajlal Jethaial v. Soni Jadavji and Govindji & Ors., AIR 1972 Gujarat 148 approved.

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In the earlier judgment, the points for setting aside the decision A did not include the question of withdrawal of the case from the Court of Special .Judge to the Supreme Court and transfer of it to the High Court. Unless a plea in qu.,,,1ion is taken it cannot operate as res judicata. [62G-H]

Shivshankar Prasad Shah and others v. Baikunth Nath Singh and others, [1969] l S.C.C. 718; Bikan Mahuri and others v. Mst. Bibi Walian and others, A.J.R. 1939 Patna 633; S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others, [1981] l S.C.C. 746; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621 at pages 674-681 and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and others, [1955] 2 SCR 603 at 623 referred to. 3.1 Section 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code was subject to over-riding mandate of s. 7(1) of the 1952 Act and, hence .it does not permit the High Court to withdraw a case for trial to itself from the Court of Special Judge. [60D-E]

3.2 Article 134(l)(b) of the Constitution does not recognise in. D every High Court power to withdraw for trial cases from any Court subordinate to its authority. At least this Article cannot be construed to mean that where power to withdraw is restricted, it can be widened by virtue of Article 134(l)(b) of the Constitution. [67B-C] 3.3 Where by a specific clause of a specific statute the power is given for trial by the Special Judge only and transfer can be from one such Judge to another Special Judge, there i• no warrant to suggest that the High Court has power to transfer such a case from a Judge under s. 6 of the Act of 1952 to itself. JI is not a case of exclusion of the superior Courts. [67C] ·

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Jn the facts of the·instant.case, the criminal revision application which was pending before the High Court even if it was deemed to be transferred to this Court under .Article 139A of the Constitution, it would not have vested this Court with power larger than what is contained in s. 407 of Criminal Procedure Code. Under s. 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the G High Court could not transfer to itself proceedings under ss. 6 and 7 of the said Act. This Court, by transferring the proceedings to itself. could not have acquired larger jurisdiction. The fact that the objection was not raised before this Court gave directions on 16tl) February, 1984 cannot amountto any waiver. [61F-G] '

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Ledgard v. Bull, 131 A 134, Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramaniya Sastri, 141A160 referred to.

3.4 The Parliament did not grant to the Court the jurisdiction to transfer a case to the High Court. However, as the superior Court is deemed to have a general jurisdiction, the law presumes that the Court acted within jurisdiction. [60G I

In the instant case, the presumption cannot be taken, firstly, be· cause the question of jurisdiction was not agitated before the Court; secondly, these directions were given per incuriam and thirdly, the superior Court alone can set aside an error in its directions when atten· tion is drawn to that error. This view is warranted only because of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. Here the trial of a citizen in a Special Court under special jurisdiction. is involved; hence the liberty of the snbject is involved. [608, 61A-B)

Kuchenmeister v. Home Office, [1958) I Q.B. 496; Attorney Genera! v. Herman James Sillam, [1864) 10 H.L.C. 703 and Issacs v. Robertson, [1984) 3 A.LR. 140 referred to. Jurisdiction and Illegality by Amnon Rubinstein, I1965) Edn. referred to.

4.1 Per incnriam are those decisions given in ignorance or forget· fulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or some authority bind· ing on the Court concerned so that in snch cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. lf a decision is given per in· curiam, the Court can ignore it. [52A·B, 53G]

Morelle v. Wakeling, [1955) I ALL ER 708; State of Orissa v. The Tit4ghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., [1985) 3 SCR 26 and Bengal Immunity ·Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1955) 2 SCR603, 623 referred to. In the instant case, when this Court gave directions on 16th February 1984, for disposal of the case against the appellant by the High Court, it was oblivious of the relevant provisions of the law and the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case, which is a binding prece· dent. [51G-HJ

4.2 A Full Bench or a Constitution Bench decision was binding ou H the Constitution Bench because it was a Bench of seven Judges. There is

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

a .hierarchy in this Court itself where larger Benches over-rule smaller Benches which is the crystallised rule of law. [52E, F]

State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 11952] SCR 284; Nattulal v. Radhe Lal, 11975] 1SCR127; Union of India and Anr. v. K.S. Subramaniam, [1977] 1 SCR 87 at p. 92; State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, 11977) 1 SCR 462 at 473; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 26 page 297, para 578 and page 300, relevant notes on 8.11 and 15; Dias on Jurisprudence, 5th Edu. pages 128 and 130; Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. 11944) 2 AER 293 at 300; Moore v. Hewitt 1947 2 AER 270 at 272A; Penny v. Nicholas, 1950 2 AER 92A and Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State of Maharashtra, 11985) 2 SCR 8 referred to. It was manifest to the Bench that exclusive jurisdiction created under s. 7(1) of the 1952 Act read with s. 6 of the said Act, when brought to the notice of the Court, precluded the exercise of power under s. 407 of the Code. There was no argument, no submission and no decision on this appeal at all. There was no prayer in the appeal which was pending before this Court for such directions. (590-E] The order of this Court was clearly per inctiriam. The Court was not .called upon to and did not, decide the express limitation on the power conferred by s. 407 of the Code, which includes offences by public servants mentioned in the 1952 Act to he over-ridden in the manner sought to be followed as a consequential direction of this Court. This Court did not have jurisdiction to transfer the case to itself. That will he evident from an analysis of different provisions of the Code as well as the 1952 Act. [SOC-DJ Therefore, in view of the clear provisions of s. 7(2) of the Act of 1952 and Articles· 14 and 21 of the Constitution these directions were legally wro.;g. l52C]

4.3 Though the previous statute is referred to In the other judgment delivered on the same date, in connection with other contentions. s. 7(1) was not referred to in respect of the impugned directions. Hence G these observations were indubitably per incuriam.l66Al · .

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Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd; 11975] 3 All E.R. 801 at 821 referred to. _5 .. This Court is not powerless to correct its error which has the

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effect of depriving a citizen of his fundQmental rights and more so, the right to life and liberty. It can do so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any proceeding pending before it without insisting on the , formalities ofa review application. [54A-B] Powers of review can be exercised in a petition filed under Article 136 or Article 32 or under any other provision or the Constitution if the Coort is $3tlsfied that its directions have resulted in the deprivation or the fundamental rights of a citizen or any legal right orthe petitioner. [54B-C]

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The Supreme Court has the power to review either under Article 137 or suo motu the directions given by this Court. [62E]

Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad, [1963] Suppl. 1SCR885; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, [1966) 3 S.C.R. 744 and Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P., [1963) 1 S.C.R. 778; Kaila8h Nath v. State of U.P. AIR 1957 (SC) 790; P.S.R. Sadhananatham v. Arunachalam, 11980] 2 S.C.R. 873; Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, [1986) 2 S.C.C. 401; Asrumati Devi. v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot and others, [1953) S.C.R. 1159; Satyadhyan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi arid another, [1960) 3 S.C.R. 590; Sukhrani (dead) by L.Rs. and others v. Hari Shanker and others, [1979) 3 S.C.R. 671 and Bejoy Gopal Mukherji v. Pratul Chandra Ghose, [1953) S.C.R. 930 referred to.

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6. It is also well settled that an elementary rule of justice is that no party should suffer by mistake of the Court. [63B]

Sastri Yagnapurushadji and others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya and another, [1966) 3S.C.R. 242; Jang Singh v. Brijlal [1964) 2 S.C.R. 145; Bhajahari Mondalv. The State of West Bengal, [1959) S.C.R. 127(i at 1284-1286 and Asgarali N. Singaporawal/e v. The State of Bombay 1957 S.C.R. 678 at692 referred to. It was a mistake of so great a magnitude that it deprives a man by being treated differently of his fundamental right for defending himself in a criminal trial in accordance with law. Therefore, when the attention of the Court is drawn, the Court has always the power and the obligation to correct it ex debito justitiae and treat the second application by its inherent power, as a power of review to correct the original mistake. [56C-D) The directions have been issued without observing the principle of

audi alteram par/em, [530]

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This Court is not debarred from re-opening this question and giving proper directions and correcting the error in the present appeal. [53C]

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The appellant should not suffer on account of the direction of this Court based upon an error leading to conferment of jurisdiction. [53B]

7. The principle of finality on which Article 145(e) proceeds applies to both judgments and orders made by the Supreme Court. But directions given per incuriam in violation of certain constitutional limitations and in derogation of tbe principles of natural justice can always be remedied by the court ex debite justitiae. l68F-G] In the instant case, this Court is correcting an irregularity commitled by the Court not on construction or misconstruction of a statute but on non-perception of certain provisions and certain authorities which would amount to derogation of the constitutional rights of the citizen. [69C-D]

Issacs v. Robertson, [1984] 3 A.E.R. 140 and Re Recal Communications Ltd. Case, [1980] 2 A.E.R. 634 referred to.

8. No prejudice need be proved for enforcing the fundamental rights. Violation of a fundamental right itself renders the impugned action void. So also, the violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity. [59H]

9.1 Four valuable rights of the appellant have been taken away by the impugned directions.

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The right to be tried by a Special Judge in accordance with the procedure established by law and enacted by Parliament.

ii) The right of revision to the High Court under s. 9 of the

Criminal Law Amendment Act. iii) The right of first appeal to the High Court under the same

section.

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iv) The right to move the Supreme Court under Article 136 thereafter by way of a second appeal, if necessary.

., The right of the appellant under Article 14 regarding equality

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before the law and equal protection of law bas been violated. The appel­ lant bas alSI) a right not to be singled out for special treatment by a Special Court created for him alone. This right is implicit in the dght to equality. [60A-C, 62A-B]

State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284 relied

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on. The appellant has a fUrther right under Article 21 of the Cons­ titution-a right to trial by a Special Judge under s. 7(1) of the 1952 Act which is the procedure established by law made by the Parliament and a further right to move the High Court by way of revision or first appeal under s. 9 of the said Act. He has also a right not to suffer any order passed behind his back by a Court in violation of the basic principles of natural justice. Directions having been given in this case without hear­ ing the appellant, though the order was passed in the presence of the counsel for the appellant, these are bad. [62B-D] It is proper for this Court to act ex debito justitiae, In favour of the fundamental rights of the appellant. [62E]

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Nawabkhan Abbas Khan v. The State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 SCR 427 referred to.

9 .2 There was prejudice to the accused in being singled out as a special class of accused for a special dispensation withoot any room for any appeal as of right and without power of revision to the High Court. [67GI

Romesh Chandra Arora v. The State, [1960] I SCR 924 at 927

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9.3 The trial even of person holding public office though to be made speedily must be done in accordance with the procedure estab­ lished by law. The provisions of s. 6 read with s. 7 of the Act of 1952 in the facts and circumstances of this case is the procedure established by law, and any deviation even by a judicial direction will be negation of the rule oflaw. (680-E] By judicial direction, the rights and previliges of the accused have been curtailed without any justification in law. [68B] '

State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284 relied on.

A.R. ANTULA Y v. R.S. NAY AK

Re: Special Courts Bill, [1978] 1979 2 SCR 476 referred to.

9.4 The right of appeal under s. 374 of the Cr. P.C. is conf'med only to cases decided by the High Court in its Letters Patent jurisdiction which in terms is 'extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction' under clause 27 of Letters Patent. [63F]

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Kavasji Pestonji Dalal v. Rustomji Sorabji Jamadar & Anr., AIR 1949 Born. 42, Sunil Chandra Roy & Anr. v. The State AIR 1954 Cal. 305; Sasadhar Acharjya & Anr. v. Sir Charles Tegart & Ors., [1935] Cal. Weekly Notes 1089; Peoples Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sardul Singh Caveeshgar & Ors., AIR 1961 Punj. 87 and P.P. Front, New Delhi v. K.K. Bir/a, [1984] Cr. L.J. 545 referred to.

9.5 By the time the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 was framed, Article 21 had not been interpreted so as to include one right of appeal both on facts and law. [64C] 10. Words should normally be given their ordinary meaning bearing in mind the context. It is only where the literal meaning is not clear that one resorts to the golden rule of interpretation or the mischief rule of interpretation. [66C]

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Sussex Peerage Claim, [1844] 11 CI. & Fin. 85 at 143 referred to.

Cross: Statutory Interpretation, p. 36. In view of the specific language used in s. 7 of the 1952 Act, it is not necessary to consider whether the procedure for trial by Special Judges under the Code has stood repealed or not. The concept of repeal may have no application in this case. [66B]

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11. No man is above the law, but at the same time, no man can be denied his rights under the Constitution and 'the laws. He has a right to be dealt with in accordance with the law and not in derogation ofit. [71B]

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This Court, in its anxiety to facilitate the parties to have a speedy trial, gave direction on 16th February, 1984 without conscious awar_e.ness of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts under the 1952 Act and that being the only procedure established ·by law; there ·can' be no deviation from the terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. That is the only procedure under which it should have been guided. [71B-C]

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By reason of giving the impugned directions, this Court had also unintentionally caused the appellant the denial of rights undler Article 14 of the Constitution by denying him the equal protectfon of law by being singled out for a special procedure not provided for by law. [71C-D] When these factors are brought to the notice of this Court, evon if there are any technicalities, this Court should not feel shackled and decline to rectify that injustice; or otherwise, the injustice noticed will remain forever a blotonjustice. [710) 12.1 The basic fundamentals of the administration of justice 31re simple. No man should suffer because of the mistake of Court. No m21n should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or procedures are the hand-maids of justice and not the mistress of the justice. If a man has been wronged so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice that wrong must be remedied. [72B-C]

12.2 The maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit"-An act of the Court shall prejudice no man~is founded upon justice and good sense and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. [71E]

Alaxander Rodger v. The Comptoir Dlescompte De Paris Cham Reports, Vol. III 1869·71 p. 465 at 475 referred to. 13. Purity of public life is one of the cardinal principles which must be upheld as a matter of public policy. Allegations of legal infractions and criminal infractions must be investigated in accordance with law and procedure established under the Constitution. [73B] Even if the accused has been wronged, if he is allowed to be left in doubt that would cause more serious damage to him. Public confidenc" in public administration should not be eroded any further. One wrong cannot be remedied by another wrong. [73B I

The legal wrong that has been done to the appellant should be remedied and right should be done. In doing so, no more further injury should be caused to the public purpose. [73C I

The impugned directions were in deprival of the Constitutional H . rights and contrary to the expreSli provisions of the Criminal Law

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

Amendment Act, 1952, in violation of the principles of natural justice, and without precedent in the background of the Act of 1952. The directions defu1itely deprived the appellant of certain rights of appeal and revision and his rights under the Constitution. [69F]

Having regard to the enormity of the consequences of the error to the appellant and by reason of the fact that the directions were given suo motu, there is nothing which detracts the power of the Court to review its judgment ex debito justitiae in case injustice has been caused. No Court however high has jurisdiction to give an order unwarranted by the Constitutfon. [70A-Bl.

Ittavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey and others, [1964) 1 SCR 495 referred to.

Bhatia Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. D.C. Patel, [1953] SCR 18S at 190 distinguished. '~

\

Since this. Court infringed the Constitutional safeguards g~anted to a citizen or to an accused, in giving the directions and injustice results therefrom, it is just and proper for the Court to rectify and recall that injustice in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Therefore, all the proceedings in the matter subsequent to the directions of this Court on February 16, 1984, are set aside and quasbed·and the trial should proceed in accordance with law, that is to say, under the Act of 1952. [70C, 730-E)

R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, [1984) 2 SCR 495; A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another, [1984) 2 SCR 914; Abdul Rehman Antulay v. Union of India and others etc. [1984) 3 SCR 4112 at 483; Kai/ash Nath v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 790; Sukdas v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh Discretion to Disobey by Mortimer R. Kadish and Sanford H. Kadish pages 111 and 112 referred to.

Per Ranganath Misra, J. (Concurring)

,J

14. Section 7(1) has clearly provided that offences specified in sub-section (1) of s. 6 shall be triable by the Special Judge only and has taken away the power of the courts established under the Code of Criminal Procedure to try those offences. As long as s. 7 of the Amending Act of 1952 holds the field it was not open to any court including the Apex Court to act contrary to s. 7(1) of the Amending Act. [81E-F)

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I1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

1"'

State of West Bengalv. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284 referred

to.

15. The power to transfer a case conferred by the Constitution1 or by s. 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not specifically relate to the Special Court. Section 406 of the Code could be applied on lthe B principle that the Special Judge was a subordinate court for transforring a case from one Special Judge to another Special Judge because such a transfer would not contravene the mandate of s. 7(1) of the Amending Act of 1952. While that may be so, the provisions for transfer, do not authorise transfer of a case pending in the court of a Special Judge first to the Supreme Court and then to the High Court for tri•tl. This Court did not possess the power to transfer the proceedings from c the Special Judge to the High Court. [81G-H, 82A]

...

Raja Soap Factory v. S.P. Santharaj, [1965] 2 SCR 800 referred

to.

16. l It is the settled position in law that jurisdiction of courts comes solely from the law of the land and cannot be exercised otherwise. [77E]

16.2 Jurisdiction can be exercised only when provided for either in the Constitution or in the laws made by the Legislature. Jurisdictioni E is thus the authority or power of the court to deal with a matter ancl. make an order carrying binding force in the facts. [77G]

17; By the change of forum of trial· the accused has been prejudiced. By this process he misses a fi>rum of appeal because if the trial was handled by a Special.Judge, the first appeal would lie to the High Court and' a further appeal by special leave could come before this Court. If the matter is tried by the High Court there would be only one forum of appeal being this Court, whether as of right or hy way of special leave. [83H, 84A-B]

18. The transfer was a suo motu direction of the court. Since this particular aspect of the matter had not been argued and counsel did not have an opportunity of pointing out the legal bar against transfer, the Judges of this Court obviously did not take note of the special provisions in s. 7(1) of the 1952 Act. If this position had been appropriately placed, the direction for transfer from the court of exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court would not have been made by the Constitution Bench. It is i.s, apj,"Opriate to presume that this Court never intends to act contrary to law. [82E-F]

I

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

19. One of the well-known principles of law is that decision made· A by a competent court should be taken as final subject to further proceedings contemplated by the law of procedure. In the absence of- any further proceedings, the direction of the Constitution Bench on 16th' of February, 1984 became final and it is the obligation of everyone to implement the direction of the apex Court. Such an order of this Court should by all canons of judicial discipline be binding on this Court as B well and cannot be interfered with after attaining finality. [84C-D l

•

20.1 It is a well-settled position in.law that an act of the court should not injure any of the suitors. [84F] Alexander Rodger v. The Comptori D'Escompte De Paris, [1871] 3 PC 465 referted to.

20.2. Once it is found that the order of transfer by this Court was; not within jurisdiction by the direction of the transfer of the proceed'· ings made by this Court, the appellant should not suffer. [85B]

20.3 This being the apex Court, no litigant has any opportunity of approaching any higher forum to question its decisions. Once judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the Court to rectify the mistake by exercising inherent , powers. A mistake of the Court can be corrected by the Court itself E without. any fetters. In the present situation, the Court's inherent powers can be exercised to remedy the mistake. [87F, 88B-C] Gujarat v. Ram Prakash [1970] 2 SCR 875; Alexander Rodger v. The Comptori D'Escompte De Paris, [1871] 3 PC 465 and Krishna Deo v. Radha Kissan, [1953] SCR 136; Debi v. Habib ILR 35 All 331 and Murtaza v. Yasin, AIR 191PC857 referred to.

~' I

20.4 The injustice done should be corrected by &pplying the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit, an act of the court shall prejudice no one. [SSH]

20.S To err is human. Courts including the apex one are no exception. To own up the mistake when judicial satisfaction is reached does not militate against its status or authority. Perhaps it would .enhance both. [S9B] 21. If a mistake is detected· and the apex Court is not able to·, H'

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

I1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

correct it with a view to doing justice for fear of being misunderstooid, the cause of justice is hound to suffer and for the apex Court the apprehension would not he a valid consideration. This Court, while administering justice, does not take into consideration as to who is before it, Every litigant is entitled to tbe same consideration and if an order is warranted in the interest of justice, the status or influence of the accused cannot stand in the way as a bar to the making of that order. [89F-G]

«.

22. Finality of the orders is tbe rule, By directing recall of an order, the well-settled propositions of law would not be set at naught. Such a situation may not recur in the ordinary course of judicial functioning and if there be one, certainly the Bench before which it comes would appropriately deal with it. No strait jacket formula can he laid down for judicial functioning particularly for the apex Court. The apprehension that the decision to recall the earlier decision may be used as a precedent to challenge judicial orders of this Court is perhaps misplaced because those who are familiar with the judicial functioning are aware of the limits and they would not seek support from this case as a precedent, This Court is sure that if precedent value is sought to b" derived out of this decision, the Court which is asked to use this as run instrument would be alive to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in which this order is being made. [87H, 90A-B] 23. Under the Rules of the Court a review petition was not to be heard in Court and was liable to be disposed of by circulation. In these circumstances, the petition of appeal could not be taken as a review petition. l87E] 24. Benches of this Court are not subordinate to larger Benches thereof and certiorari is, therefore, not admissible for quashing of the orders made on the judicial side of the Court. [SSC]

r

Naresh Chandra Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., I1966] 3 SCR 744 relied on.

Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad 1963 I SCR 885 referred to.

25. Apart from the fact that the petition of review had to be filed within 30 days-and here there has been inordinate delay-the petition for review had to be placed before the same Bench and now that two H of the learned judges of that Omstitution Bench are still available,

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A.R. ANTULA Y v. R.S. NAY AK

it must have gone only before a Bench of five with those two learned Judges. [87D-E}

11)..

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26. It is time to sound a note of caution. This Court. under its Rules of Business ordinarily sits in divisions and not a~ a whole one. Each Bench, whether small or large, exercises the powers vested in the Court and decisions rendered by the Benches irrespective of their size are considered as decisions of the Court. The practice has developed that a larger Bench is entitled to overrule the decision of a smaller Bench notwithstanding the fact that each of the decisions is that of the Court. That principle, however, would not apply in the present situation, and since this Court is sitting as a Bench of Seven this Court is not entitled to reverse the decision of the Constitution Bench. [89B-C] 27. Overruling when made by a larger Bench of an earlier decision of a smaller one is intended to take away the precedent value of the decision without affecting the binding effect of the decision in the particular case. [89C] In the instant case, the appellant is, therefore, not entitled to take advantage of the matter being before a larger Bench. In fact, if it is a case of exercise of inherent powers to rectify a mistake it wa8 open even to a live-Judge Bench to do that and it did not require a Bench larg!'_r than the Constitution Bench for that purpose. [89D]

PerOza, J. (Supplementing) 28. The jurisdiction to try a case could only be conferred by law enacted by the legislature and this Court could not confe_r jurisdiction if it does not exist in law. l90F] 29. No doubt a judgment or an order passed by this Court will not be open to a writ of certiorari even if an error is apparent. But at the same time, there should be no hesitation in correcting an error in exercise of inherent jurisdiction if it comes to the notice of the Court. [90D-E]

~.

..

In the instant case, it is this error which is sought to be corrected, although it is being cornctecJ after long lapse of time. l90Ff

Per Ray,]. (Concurring)

SUPREME COURTIREPORTS

[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

30. The Jurisdie1i11n ·or power to try and decide a cause is couferred on the courts by the Law of the Lands enacted by the Legislature or by the provisions of the Constitution and the conrf cannot confer a jurisdiction on itself which is not provided in the law and judicial order of this Court' is not Emenable to a writ of certiorari for correcting any error in the judgment. However, since the act of the court should not injure any of the suitors, the error in question is sought to be corrected. after a lapse of more than three years. [90H, 91A-B] Per Venkatachaliah, J. (Dissenting)

31.l The exclusiveness of jurisdiction of the special judge under s. 7(1) of 1952 Act depends on the construction to be placed on the c relevant sta_tutory-provision. lf on such a construction, however erroneous it may be, the court holds that the operation of s. 407 Cr. P.C. is not excluded, that interpretation will denude the plenitude of th'e exclusivity claimed for the forum. To say that the court usurped legislative powers and created a new jurisdiction and a new forum ignores the D> basic concept of functioning of courts. The power to interpret laws iB the domaiil.and function of courts. [1080-E] Thomas v. Collins, 323 (1945) US 516 referred to.

_ 31.2 The earlier decision proceeded on a construction ofs. 7(1) of the Act and s. 407 of Cr. P .C. This bench does not sit in appeal over what the five Judge Bench said and proclaim how wrong they were. This Bench is simply not entitled to embark, at a later stage, upon an investigation of the correctness of the very decision. The same bench can, of course, reconsider the matter under Article 137.

32.1 The expression "jurisdiction" or the power to determine is a verbal cast of many colours. 1Ji the case of a Tribunal, an error of law might become not merely an error in jurisdiction but might partake of the character of an error of jurisdiction. But, otherwise jurisdiction is a 'legal shelter', a power to bind despite a possible error in the decision. [102C]

32.2. In relation to the powers of superior courts, the familiar distinction between jurisdictional issues and adjudicatory issues appropriate to Tribunals oflimitedjurisdiction has no place. [102A] ·

32.3 Before a superior court there is no distinction in the quality of the decision-making-process respecting jurisdictional questions on the one hand and adjudicatory issues or issues pertaining to the merits, on the other. [102B]

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

32.4 The existence of jurisdiction does not depend on the correctness of its exercise. The aliihority to decide embodies.a privilege to bind despite error, a privilege .which is.inherent in and indispensable to.every judicial function. The characteristic attribute of a judicial act is that ·it binds whether it he right or it be wrong . .11020]

Mallikarjun v. Narhari, [1900] 27 I.A. 210 referred to. Anismatic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, I1969] 1 All ER 208 distinguished. 32.5 A finding of a superior court even on a question of its own jurisdiction, however grossly erroneous it may otherwise be, is not a nullity nor one which could at all be said to :have been reached without jurisdiction, susceptible to be ignored or to admit. of any collateralattack. Otherwise, the adjudications of superior courts would be heldup to ridicule and the remedies generally arising from and considered concomitants of such classification of judicial-errors would .be so seriously abused and expanded as to make a mockery of those foundational principles essential to the stability of administration of justice. [l02G, l03A] 32.6 The superior court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction and an error in that determination does not make it an error of jurisdiction. [103B]

Holdsworth (History of English Law) Vol. 6 page 239 and Rubinstein: Jurisdiction and Illegality referred to. -,

Re Racal Communications Ltd. [1980] 2 All ER 634 and Issac v. Robertson, [1984] 3 All ER 140 referred to.

32. 7 Superior courts apart, even the ordinary civil courts of the land have juriSdiction to decide quesuon8 of their jurisdiction. [JOSH]

own

It would be wholly erroneo.us to characterise the directions issued by the five Judge Bench as a nullity, amenable to bio ignored or so declared in a collateral attack. [l06E]

33. A judgment, inter-parties, is final and concludes the parties. [106F]

Re Hastings (No. 3) [1969] l All ER 698; Daryao v. State of UP, [1962] l SCR 574;-Trilok Chand v. H.B. Munshi, [1969] 2 SCR 824 and

.A

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[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

...

Shiv Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, [1987] I SCC 288 at 343 reli"d on.

I

34.1 All accused persons cannot claim to be tried by the same Judge. The discriminations Inherent in the choice of one of the concurrent jurisdictions are not brought about by an Inanimate statutory-rule or by executive fiat. The withdrawal of a case under s. 407 is made qy a conscious judicial act and is the result of judicial discernment. If the la.w permits the withdrawal of the trial to the High Court from a Special Judge, such a law enabling withdrawal would not, prima fade, be bad as violation of Article 14. lll4G-H, 115A]

34.2 No doubt, the fundamental right under Article 14 has a ve1ry c high place In constitutional scale of values. Before a person is depriv"d

ot his personal liberty, not only that the procedure established by la.w must strictly be complied with and not departed from to the disadvantage or detriment of the person but also that the procedure for sm:h .deprivation of personal liberty must be reasonable, fair and just. AriiD cle 21 imposes limitations upon the procedure and requires it to conform to such standards of reasonableness, fairness and justness as the Court acting as sentinel of fundamental rights would in the conte};t, consider necessary and requisite. The Court will be the arbiter of tlile question whether the procedure is reasonable, fair and just. [114D-F]

34.3 The five judge bench in the earlier case has held that such a transfer is permissible under law. That decision had assumed finality. The appeal to the principle in Anwar Ali's Sarcar's case, in such a context would be out of place. [USA]

State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284 distinguished. 35. That a trial by a Judge of the High Court makes for added re-assurance of justice, has been recognised in a number of judicial pronouncements. The argnment that a Judge of the High Court may not necessarily possess the statutory-qualifications requisite for behig appointed as a Special Judge appears to be specious. A judge of the High Court hears appeals arising from the decisions of the Special Judge and exercises a jurisdiction which includes powers c.,_.,xtensi ve with that of the trial court. [llSC-D]

36. The plea that transfer of the case to the High ConrN!lvolves H the elimination of the appellant's right of appeal to the High Court

1•

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

which he would otherwise have and that the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution as of right cannot be accepted in view of s. 374, Cr. P.C. which provides such an appeal, as of right, when the trial is held by the High Court. [117A-Bl 37. Directions for transfer were issued on 16.2.1984 in the open court in the presence of appellant's counsel at the time of pronouncement of the judgment and counsel had the right and the opportunity of making submission to the court as to the permissibility or otherwise of the transfer. After the directions were pronounced and before the order was signed, though there was opportunity for the appellant's counsel to make submission in regard to the alleged illegality or impropriety of the directions, appellant did not utilise the same. That apart, even after being told by two judicial orders that appellant, if aggrieved, may seek a review, he did not do so. Even the grounds urged in the many subsequent proceedings appellant took to get rid of the effect of the direction do not appear to include the grievance that he had no opportunity of being heard. [llSF, G-H, 116A-B]

••

Therefore, where a party having had an opportunity to raise a grievance in the earlier proceedings does not do so and makes it a technicality later, he cannot be heard to complain. [116B] Rules of natural justice embodies fairness in action. By all standards, they are great assurances of justice and fairness. But they should not be pushed to a breaking point. [l 16F]

">

R. v. Secretary of State for Home Deptt. ex-parte Mughal, [1973] 3 All ER 796, referred to.

38. I The circumstance that a decision is reached per-incurlam, merely serves to denude the decision of its precedent,value. Such a decision would not be binding as a judicial precedent. A co-ordinate bench can discharge with it and decline to follow it. A larger bench can over-rule such decision. When a previous decision is so overruled it does not happen nor has the overruling bench any jurisdiction so to do that the finality of the operative order, inter-parties, in the previous decision is over-turned. In this context the word 'decision' means only the reason for the previous order and not the operative-order in the previous decision, binding inter-parti'es. Even if a previous decision is over-

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

-.

ruled by a larger-bench, the efficacy and binding nature, of the adjudi· cation expressed in the operative order remains undisturbed inter· parties. [119B-D I 38.2 Even if the earlier decision of the five juitge bench is perincuriam the operative part of the order cannot be interfered with in the manner now sought to be done. That apart, the live judge bench gave its reason. The reason may or may not be sufficient. There is advertence to s. 7(1) of the 1952 Act and to exclusive jurisdiction created thereunder. There is also reference to s. 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [119D-E] 39. J An erroneous decision must be as binding as a correct one. It would be an unattainable ideal to require the binding effect of a judgment to depend on its being correct in the absolute, for the test of correctness would be resort to another Court the infallibility of which is again subject to a similar further investigation. [lOlD·El 39.2 However, motions to set aside the judgments are permitted where a judgment was rendered in Ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all, and was wrongly shown as served or in ignorance of the fact that a necessary-party had died and the estate was not represented, or where a judgment was obtained by fraud, and it tended to prejudice a non-party, as in the case of judgments in-rem such as for divorce, or jactitation or probate etc. even a person, not eo-nomine a party to the proceedings, or where a party has had no notice and a decree is made against him in which case, the party is said to become entitled to relief ex-debito justitiae, on proof of the fact that there was no service, since there is no trial at all and the judgment is for default. [llOC-F) Cases of such frank failure of natural justice are obvious cases where relief is granted as of right. [ll!A]

Where a person is not actually served out but is held erroneously, to have been served, he can agitate that grievance only in that forum or in any further proceeding therefrom. [I I IA]

Issac v. Robertson, [1984] 3 All ER 140 distinguished. Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh, 2 MIA 181, referred H to.

..

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

D.M. Gordan: Actions to set aside judgment, [1961] 77 Law Quarterly Review 358

·-

In the present case by the order dated 5.4.1984 a five judge bench set-out, what according to it was the legal basis and source of jurisdiction to order transfer. On 17.4.1984 appellant's writ petition challenging that transfer as a nullity was dismissed. These orders are not which appellant is entitled to have set aside ex-debito justitiae by another Bench. [llJC-D] 40. The pronouncements of every Division-Bench of this Court are pronouncements of the Court itself. A larger bench, merely on the strength of its numbers, cannot un-do the finality of the decisions of other division benches. [I08H] 41. l The power to alter a decision by review must be expressly conferred or necessarily inferred. The power of review and the limitations on the power under Article 137 are implict recognitions of what would;· otherwise, be final and irrevocable. No appeal could be made to the doctrine of inherent powers of the Court either. Inherent powers do not confer, or constitute a source of jurisdiction. They are to be exercised in aid of a jurisdiction that is already invested. [I20F-G]

!

41.2 If the decision suffers from an error, the only way to correct it, is to go in Review under Article 137 read with Order 40 Rule I framed under Article 145 before "as far as is practicable" the same judges. This is not a matter merely of some dispensable procedural 'form' but the requirement of substance. [109A]

>

In the instant case, the remedy of the appellant is recourse to Article IJ7, no where else. This is both in good sense and good law. [l20G]

C

Judicial proceedings of this Court are not subject to writ jurisdiction thereof. [ ll8H]

Naresh Sridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., [1966] 3 sec 744 followed ..

..,1

Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, UP, 11963] 1 SCR 885, referred to. Kadesh & Kadesh: Discretion to Disobey, [1973] edn. ;>. lll, referred to.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

42. The maxim Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabid had no application to conscious conclusions reached in a judicial decision. The maxim is not a source of a general power to reopen and rehear adjudication which have otherwise assumed finality. The maxim operates in a different and narrow area. The best illustration of the operation of the maxim is provided by the application of the rule of none-pro-tune. For instance, if owing to the delay in what the court should, otherwise, have !lone earlier bot did later, a party suffers owing to events occurring in the interrngnum, the Court has the power to remedy it. The area of operation of the maxim is, generally, pro<:edural. Errors in jndicial findings, either of facts or law or operative decisions consciously arrived at as a part of the judicial-exercise cannot be interfered with by resort to this maxim. I1208-C] 43. Those who do not put the teachings of experience and the lessons of logic out of consideration would tell what inspires confidence in the judiciary and what does not. Judicial vacillations fall in the latter category and undermine respect of the judiciary and judicial institutions, denuding thereby respect for law and the confidente in the evenhandedness in the administration of justice by Courts. Il20E]

This Court had, therefore, the jurisdiction and power to withdraw and transfer the cases from Special Judge to the High Court, and the directions for trial of the offences by a Special Judge are not void and these directions could not be challenged in a collateral attack. This Court had not created a new jurisdiction and usurped legislative power violating the basic tenet of doctrine of separation of powers. [99C-F, Jl4D, l06E] 44. An accused person cannot assert any right to a joint trial with his co-accused. Normally it is the right of the prosecution to decide whom it prosecutes. It can decline to array a person as a co-accused

and, instead examine him as a witness for the prosecution. What weight is to be attached to that evidence, as it may smack of the testimony of a guilty partner in crime, is a different matter. Prosecution can enter Nolle proseque against any accused-person. It can seek to withdra"'. a charge against an accused person. These propositions are too well settled to.require any further elaboration. [988-D] Choraria v. Maharashtra, [1969] 2 SCR 624, referred to.

..,....

In the instant case, the appellant cannot be heard to complain. Of the so called co-conspirators some have been examined already as pro-

<

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A.R. A°NTULAY "· R.S. NAYAK

secution witnesses; some others proposed to be so examined; an<l two others, had died in the interregnum. The appeal, on the point, has no substance and would require to be dismissed. [98G]

Per Ranganathan, J. (partly concurring/dissenting)

~.

45.1 The language of s. 7(1) of the 1952 Act places a definite hurdle in the way of construing s. 407 of the Cr. P.C. as overriding its provisions. fa view of non-obstante clause also, it cannot be held that the provisions of s. 407 of the 1973 Cr. P.C. will override, or even operate consistently with, the provisions of the 1952 Act. Similarly, the power of transfer contained in clause 29 of the Letters Patent of the High Court cannot be exercised in a mann~r not contemplated bys. 7(1) of the 1952 Act. [131D-E]

45.2 A power of transfer. postulates that the court to which transfer or withdrawal is sought is competent to exercise jurisdiction over the case. [130F]

'.

Raja Soap Factory v. Shantaraj, [1965] 2 SCR, relied on.

45.3 The power of transfer contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be availed of to transfer a criminal case from a Special Judge to any other criminal court or even to the High Court. The case can be transferred only from one special judge to another special judge; it cannot be transferred even to a High Court Judge except where a High Court Judge is appointed as a Special Judge. l130E-F]

Gurcharan Das Chadha v. State of Rajasthan, [1966] 2 SCR, referred to.

)

45.4 Not all the judges of the High Court (but only those elevated from the State subordinate judiciary) would fulfil the· qualifications · prescribed under s. 6(2) of the 1952 Act. Though there is nothing in ss. 6 and 7 read together to preclude altogether the appointment of a judge of the High Court fulfilling the above qualifications as a special judge such is not the (atleast not the normal) contemplation of the Act. The scheme of the Act, in particular the provisions contained in ss. 8(3A) and 9, militate against this concept. [126C, El

'ii

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I .J

Hence, in the instant case apart from the fact that no appointment of a High Court Judge, as a Special Judge, has .in fact been made, it is not possible to take the view that the statutory provisions permit the

f

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::?.;

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A conferment of a jurisdiction to try this case on a High Court Judge as a Special Judge. [I26F] 45.S The 1952 Act sought to expedite the trial of cases involving public servants by the creation of courts presided over by experienced special judges to be appointed by the State Government. Effect is only B being given to the express and specific words used in s. 7( I) and no question arises of any construction being encouraged that is repugnant to the Cr. P.C. or involves an implied repeal, pro tanto, of its provisions. [132D, E]

C

46.1 The word "jurisdiction is a verbal coat of many colours." It is used in a wide and broad sense while dealing with administrative or quasi-judicial tribunals and subordinate courts over which the superior courts exercise a power. of judicial review and superintendence. Then it is only a question of "how much latitude the court is prepared to allow" and "there is no yardstick to determine the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of the court." [ISSA-Bl

M.L. Sethi v. Kapur, [!973] I SCR 697, referred to.

46.2 The Superior Courts, with unlimited jurisdiction are always presumed to act with jurisdiction and unless it is clearly shown that any y particular order is patently one which could not, on any conceivable view of its jurisdiction, have been passed by such court, such an order can neither be ignored nor even recalled, annulled, revoked •lr set aside in subsequent proceedings by the same court. [158B-C]

Dhirendera Kumar v. Superintendent, [1955] 1 SCR 224; Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1955 S.C.R. 117; Anisminic Ltd. v. F Foreign Compensation Commissioner, [1969] 2 A.C. 147; Badri Prasad v. Nagarmal, '[1959] 1 Supp. S.C.R. 769; Surajmul Nagarmul v. Triton Insurance Co. Ltd., [1924] L.R. 52 I.A. 126; Balai Chandra Hazra v. Shewdhari Jadhav, [1978] 3 S.C.R. 147; Ledgard v. Bull, L.R. 13 I.A. 134; Meenakshi Naidu v. Subramaniya Sastri, L.R. 14 I.A. 140; Sukhrani v. Hari Shankar, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 671; 11.e: Recal CommuniG cations Ltd., [1980 I 2 AER 634 and Issacs v. Robertson, I1984] 3 AER 140, referred to. In the present case, the order passed is not one of patent lack of jurisdiction. Though the direction in the order dated 16.2.1984 cannot be justified by reference to Article 142 of the Constitution of s. 407 of H the 1973 Cr.P.C., that is not an incontrovertible position. It was

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

possible for another court to give a wider interpretation to these provisions and come to the conclnsion that such an order could be made nnder those provisions. If this Court had discussed the relevant provisions and specifically expressed snch a conclusion, it could not have been modified in subsequent proceedings by this Bench merely because it was inclined to hold differently. The mere fact that the direction was given, without an elaborate discussion, cannot render it vulnerable to such review. [158D-F) 47. Unless the earlier order is vitiated by a patent lack of jurisdiction or has resulted in grave injustice or has clearly abridged the fundamental rights of the appellant, this Court should not declare that an order passed by a five-Judge Bench is wrong, and annul it. The present case cannot be brought within the narrow range of exceptions which calls for such interference. [166E) The direction issued by this Court in the impugned order cannot be said to be based on a view which is manifestly incorrect, palpably absurd or patently without jurisdiction .. Whether it will be considered right or wrong by a different Bench having a second-look at the issue is a totally different thing. [167E]

..

48.1 The powers of the Snpreme Court to transfer cases from one court to another are to be found in Article 139-A of the Constitution and s. 406 of the Cr.P.C. The provisions envisage either inter-state transfers of cases i.e. from a court in one State to a court in another State or the withdrawal of a case by the Supreme Court to itself. Intra-State transfer among courts subordinate to a High Court to inter-se or from a court subordinate to a High Court to the High Court is within the jurisdiction of the appropriate High Court. [133F-G]

48.2 The powers of the Supreme Court, in disposing of an appeal or revision, are circumscribed hy the scope of the proceedings before it. [l33H]

In the instant case, the question of_transfer was not put in issue before the Supreme Court. The Court was hearing an appeal from the order of discharge and connected matters. There was no issue or controversy or discussion before it as to the comparative merits of a frial before a special judge vis-a-vis one before the High Court. There was only an oral request said to have been made, admittedly after the judgment was announced. Wide as the powers under Article 141 are, they do not envisage an order of the type presently in question. [l34A, C-D)

K.M. Nanavati v. The State of Bombay, [1961] SCR 497 distinguished.

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[1988) Supp. I S.C.R.

48.3 If the provisions of the 1952 Act read with Article 139-A and ss. 406-407 of the Cr.P.C. do not permit the transfer of the case from a special judge to the High Court, that effect cannot be achieved indirectly. In the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court cannot issue the impugned direction in exercise of the powers under Article 142 or under s. 407 available to it as an appellate court. [134F)

Hariv. Emperor, AIR 1935 PC 122, referred to.

• The direction that the trial should be shifted to the High Court can hardly he described as a consequential or incidental order. Such a direction did not flow, as a necessary consequence of the conclusion of the court on the issues and points debated before it. Therefore, this Court was in error when it directed that the trial of the case should be before a High Court Judge, in consequence of which the appellant is being tried by a Court which has no jurisdiction-and which cannot he empowered by the Supreme Court-to try him. The continued trial before the High Court, therefore, infringes Article 21 of the Constitution. [135E-G] 49.1 Section 407 cannot be challenged under Article 14 as it is based on a reasonable classification having relation to the objects sought to be achieved. Though, in general, the trial of cases will be by courts having the normal jurisdiction over them, the exigencies of the situation may require that they be dealt with by some other court for various reasons. Likewise, the nature of a case, the nature of issues involved and other circumstances may render it more expedient, effective, expeditious or desirable that the case should he tried by a superior court or the High Court itself. [136E-F)

49.2 The power of transfer and withdrawal contained ins. 407 of the Cr.P.C. is one dictated by the requirements of justice and is, indeed, hut an aspect of the supervisory powers of a superior court over courts subordinate to it. [136FJ 49.3 A judicial discretion to transfer or withdraw is vested in the highest court of the State and is made exercisable only in the circumstances set out in the section. Such a power is not only necessary and desirable but indispensable in the cause of the administration of justice. The accused will continue to be tried by a or equal or superior jurisdiction. [136G] The accused will, therefore, suffer no prejudice by reason of the

·A

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

application of s. 407. Even if there is a differential treatment which causes prejudice, it is based on logical and acceptable considerations with a view to promote the interests of justice. The transfer or withdrawal of a case to another court or the High Court, in such circumst· ances, can hardly be said to result in hostile discrimination against the accused in such a case. [137 A-Bl ·

49.4 Only a power of transfer is being exercised by the Supreme Court which is sought to be traced back to the power of the High Court under s. 407. [137E]

State v. Anwar Ali fjarkar, [1952] SCR 284, distinguished. Kathi Raning Rawatv. The State of Saurashtra, [1952] 3 SCR 435, Re: Special Courts Bill, [1978] (1972) 2 SCR 476 and Shukla v. Delhi Administration, [1980] 3 SCR SOO, referred to. 50.1 Where a case is withdrawn and tried by the Court, the High Court will be conducting the trial in the exercise of its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction. Here though the ordinary original crimi· nal jurisdiction is vested in a subordinate criminal court or special judge, a case is withdrawn by the High Court to itself for trial. [139F, HJ

Madura Tirupparankundram etc. v. Nikhan Sahib, 35 C.W.N. 1088; Kavasji Pestonji v. Rustomji Sorabji, AIR 1949 Bombay 42; Sunil Chandra Roy arid another v. The State, AIR 1954 Calcutta 305; Peoples Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sardul Singh Caveeshar and others, AIR 1961 Punjab 87 and People's Patriotic Front v. K.K. Bir/a and others, [1984] Crl. L.J. 545, referred to. 50.2 In a withdrawn case, right of first appeal to the Supreme Court against the order passed hy the High Court will be available to the accused under s. 374 of the 1973 Cr. P.C., and the accused has the privilege of being tried in the first instance by the High Court itself with a right to approach the apex Court by way of appeal. The apprehension that the judgment in the trial by the High Court, will be final, with only a chance of obtaining special leave under Article 136 is totally un· founded. The Supreme Court will consider any petition presented under Article 136 in the light of the inbuilt requirements of Article 21 and dispose it of as if it were itself a petition of appeal from the judgment. Therefore an accused tried directly by the High Court by ·with· drawal of his case from a subordinate court, has a right of appeal to the Supreme Court under s. 374 of the Cr. P.C. The allegation of an in·

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~

··"

fringement of Article 21 in such cases is, therefore, unfounded. [140B-F]

Sadanathan v. Arunachalam, [1980l 2 SCR 673, distinguished.

50.3 The court to which the case has been transferred is a superior court and in fact the High Court. Howevet, the High Court Judge Is not a person to whom the trial of die case can be assigµed under s. 7(1) of the 1952 Act. The circumstance that a much superior forum is assigned to try ·a case than the one normally available cannot by Itself !>to treated as a "sufficient safeguard and a good substitute" for the normal forum and the rights available under the normal procedure. [131G-H]

Surajmal Mohta v. Vislnvanath Sastry, [195511 SCR, referred to.

50.4 The accused here loses his right of coming up in revision or appeal to the High Court from the interlocutory and final orders of the trial court, and the right of having two courts-a subordinate court and D the High Court-adjudicate upon his contentions before bringing the matter up in the Supreme Court. Though these are not such handicaps as violate the fundamental rights of such an accused, they are circumstances which create prejudice to the accused and may not be overlooked in adopting one construction of the statute in preference to the other. (132A-Bl

51.1 It is true that the audi altarem partem rule is a basic require· ment of the rule of law. But the degree of compliance with this rule and the extent of consequences flowing from failure to do so will vary from case to case. [168Bl

Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State, [1974] 3 SCR 427, referred to.

'

In the instant case the appellant had been given no chance of being heard before the impugned direction was given and it cannot be said whe!her the Bench would have acted in the same way even if he had been given such opportunity. However, in the circumstances of the case, this is not a fit case to interfere with the earlier order on that ground. [167ll, 168A]

51.2 The rules of natural justice must not be stretched too far. They should not be allowed to be exploited as a purely technical weapon to undo a decision which does not in reality cause substantial injustice and which, had the party been really aggrieved thereby, could have H been set right by immediate action. ll69CJ

.:..

R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Mughal, [1973] 3 All ER 796, referred to.

The direction of 16.2.1984 cannot he said to have Infringed the fundamental rights of the appellant or caused any miscarriage of justice. The appellant did know on 16.2.1984 that the judges were giving such a direction and yet he did not protest. Perhaps he did think B that being tried by a High Court Judge would be more beneficial to him, as indeed it was likely to be. That apart, several opportunities were '' available for the appellant to set this right. He did qot move bis little linger to obtain a variation of this direction from this Court. He is approach· ing the Court nearly after two years of his trial by the learned judge in the High Court. Volumes of testimony have been recorded and numer· ous exhibits have been admitted as evidence. Though the trial is only at the stage of the framing of charges, tl)e trial being according to the warrant procedure, a lot of evidence has already gone in and if tbe directions of this Court are re-called; it would wipe the slate clean. To take the entire matter back at this stage to square No. 1 would be the very negation of the purpose of the 1952 Act to speed up all such trials and D would result in more injustice than justice from an objective point of view. [168G-H, 169A-B]

52.1 Situations can and do arise where this Court may be con· strained to recall or modify an order which has been passed by it earlier and that when ex facie there is something radically wrong with the earlier order, this Court may have to exercise its plenary and inherent powers to recall the earlier order without considering itself bound by the nice technicalities of the procedure for getting this done. [163C] . 52.2 Where a mistake is committed by a subordinate court or a . High Court, there are ample powers in this Court tlf remedy the situa· lion. But where the mistake Is In an earlier order of this Court, there is no way of having it corrected except by approaching this Court. Some· timesJ the remedy sought can be brought within the four corners of the procedural law in which event there can be hurdle in the way of achiev· ing the desired result. But the mere fact that, for some reason, the conventional remedies are not available should not render this Court powerless to give relief. [163D-E]

G1

Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India, [1965] 2 S.C.C. 271; Soni Vrijla/. Jethalal v. Soni Jadavji Govindji, AIR 1972 Gnj. 148; Jang Singh v. Brij Lal, [1964] Z S.C.R. 145 at p. 159; Bhagat Ram v. State, [1972] 2 S.C.C. 466 and State v. Tara Chand, [1973) S.C.C. Cr. 774, · H referred to. "

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[1988] Supp. I S.C.R.

52.3 It may not be possible or prudent to lay down a comprehensive list of defects that will attract the ex debito justitiae relief. h63E] 52.4 Suffice it to say that the court can grant relief where there is some manifest Ulegality or want of jurisdiction in the earlier order or some palpable injustice is shown to have resulted. Such a power can be traced either to Article 142 of the Constitution or to the powers inherent in this Court as the apex Court and the guardian of the Constitution. [163F]

Issac v. Robertson, [1984] 3 AER 140, referred to.

C

52.5 However, such power has to be exercised in the "rarest of rare" cases and thert is great need for judicial discipline of the highest order in exercising such a power, as any laxity in this regard may not only impair the eminence, dignity and integrity of this Court hut may also lead to chaotic consequences. Nothing should be done to create an Impression that this Court can be easily persuaded to alter its views on any matter and that a larger Bench of the Court will not only be able to reverse the precedential effect of an earlier ruling but may also be inclined to go back on it and render it ineffective in its applica,iion and binding nature even in regi.ird to subsequent proceedings in the same case. [163G-H, 164A]

Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Ors.,

E l 1953] 2 SCR 603 and Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1987] l SCR 288, referred to.

53. The power of review Is conferred on this Court by Article 137 of the Constitution. It is subject not on to the provisions of any law made by Parliament but also to rules made by this Court under Article 145. [142H] The order dated 16.2.1984 does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record which can be rectified on a review application. The prayer for review has been made beyond the period mentioned in Rule 2 of Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules. No doubt this Court has power to extend the time within which a review petition may be fJ.Ied. But having regard to the circumstances of the Cftse there is hardly any reason to condone the delay in the prayer for review. [144A-B, 143B, 147H] The appellant was alive tQ all his present contentions. At least when the writ petition was dismissed as an inappropriate remedy, he should have at once moved this Court for review. [I 48AJ

...

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK

That apart even if the Court is inclined. to condone the delay, the application will have to he heard as far as possible by the same Judges who disposed of the earlier matter. [148B l 54. It will not behove the prestige and glory of this Court as envisaged under the Constitution ifearlier decisions are revised or re· called solely because a later Bench takes a different view of the issues involved. Granting that the power of review is available, it is one to be sparingly exercised only in extraordinary or emergent situations when there can he no two opinions about the error or lack of jurisdiction in the earlier order amtthere are adelluate reasons-to-invoke a resort to an unconventional method of recalling or revoking the same. Such a situation is not present in the instant case. [167F-G]

_55. Prem Chand Garg cannot ·be treated as an authority for the proposition that an earlier. order of this Court could be quashed by the issue of a writ on the ground that it violated the fundamental rights. Mirajkar clearly precludes such a course. [lSSG-H] Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 885, explained and distinguished. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, [1966] SCR 744, relied on. The direction issued by this Court was not warranted in law, being contrary to the special provisions of the 1952 Act, was also not in conformity with the principles of natural justice and that nnless. the direction can be jnstified with reference to s. 407 of the Cr.P.C., the petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution can be said to have been infringed by reason of this direction. [I42C] F However, this is not one of those cases in which it is considered appropriate to recall the earlier direction and order a re-trial of the .appellant de novo before a Special Judge. [1690] CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal G No. 468 of 1986. From the Jildg!Ilent and Order dated 24. 7 .86 of the Bombay i High Court in Special Case No. 24/82. P.P. Rao, R.D. Ovlekar. M.N. Dwevedi (Not in WP. No. 542) _.H

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[1988) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

Sulman Khurshid, N.V. Pradhan, D.R. Gadgil, R.S. Desai, M.N. Shroff, K.V. Sreekumar and P.S. Pradhan for the Petitioner. Ram Jethmalani, Miss Rani Jethmalani and Ashok Sharma for the Respondents.

C

A.M. Khanwilkar and A.S.Bhasme for the Respondents-State. The majority Judgment of Sabyasachi Mukharji, G.L. Oza and S. Natarajan, JJ. was delivered by Mukharji, J. Ranganath Misra and B.C. Ray, JJ. gave separate concurring opinions. G.L. Oza, J. also gave a separate opinion. M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. delivered a dissent­ ing opinion. S. Ranganathan, j. was a partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion: SABYASACID MUKHARJI, J. The main question involved in this appeal, is whether the directions given by this Court on 16th February, 1984. as reported in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, [1984) 2 S.C.R. 495 at 557 were legally proper. The next question is, whether the action and the trial proceedings pursuant to those directions, are legal and valid. Lastly, the third consequential question is, can those directions be recalled or set aside or annulled in those proceedings in the manner sought for by the appellant. In order to answer these questions certain facts have to be borne in mind. The appellant became the Chief Minister of Maharashtra on or about 9th of June, 1980. On 1st of September, 1981, respondent No. 1 who is a member of the Bharatiya Jania Party applied to the Governor of the State under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and section 6 of the Preven­ tion of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for sanction to prosecute the appellant. On 11th of September, 1981, res­ pondent No. 1 filed a complaint before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay against the appellant and other known and unknown persons for alleged offence under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 of the Act as also under sections 384 and 420 read with sections 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate refused to take cognizance of the offences under the Act without the sanction for prosecution. Thereafter a criminal

revi�ion application being C.R.A. No. 1742 of 1981 was filed in the

High Court of Bombay, by respondent No. 1.

-.

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK IMUKHARJI, J.]

;.

The appellant thereafter on 12th of January, ·1982 resigned from A the position of Chief Minister in deference to the judgment of the Bombay High Court in a writ petition filed against him. In CRA No. 1742 of 1981 filed by respondent No. 1 the Division Bench of the High. Cour~ held that sanction was necessary for the, prosecution of the appellan!and the High Court rejecte~ the request of respondent No. 1 to transfer the case from the Court of the Additional Chief Metropoli- .B tan Magistrate to itself. On 28th of July, 1982, the Governor of Maharashtra granted sanction under section 197 of the Code and section 6 of the Act in respect of five items relating to three subjects only and refused sanction in respect of all other items.

., -<

Respondent No. 1 on 9th of August, 1982 filed a fresh oomplaint against the appellant before the learned Special Judge br'.nging in many more allegations including those for which sanction was refused by the Governor. It was registered as a Special Case No. 24 of 1982. It was submitted by respondent No. 1 that there was no necessity of any sanction since the appellant had ceased to be a public servant after his resignation as Chief Minister. The Special Judge, Shri P.S. Bhutta issued process to the appellant without relying on the sanction order dated 28th of July, 1982. On 20th of October, 1982, Shri P.S. Bhutta 0:verruled the appellant's objection to his jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint and to issue proce;s in the absence of a notification under section 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 1952 Act) specifying which of the three Special Judges of the area should try such cases.

F,

The State Government on 15th of January, 1983 notified the appointment of Shri R.B. Sule. as the Special Judge to try the offences specified under section 6(1) of the 1952 Act. On or about 25th of July 1983, it appears that Shri R.B. Sule, Special Judge discharged the appeliant holding that a member of the Legislative Assembly is a public servant and there was no valid sanction for prosecuting the appellant .

.. 'i

On 16th of February, 1984, in an appeal filed by respondent No. 1 directly under Article 136, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that a member of the Legislative Assembly is not a public servant and set aside the order of Special Judge Sule. Instead of remanding the

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[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

case to the Special Judge for disposal in accordance with law, this Court suo motu withdrew the Special Cases No. 24/82 and 3/83 (arising out of a complaint filed by one P.B. Samant) pending in the Court of Special Judge, Greater Bombay, Shri R.B. Sule and transferred the same .to the Bombay High Court with a request to the learned Chief Jtistice to assign these two cases to a sitting Judge of the High Court B · for holding the trial from day to day. These directions were given, according to the appellant, without any pleadings, without any arguments, without any such prayer from either side and without giving any opportunity to the appellant to make his submissions before issuing the same. It was submitted that the appellant's right to be tried by a competent court according to the procedure ·established by law enacC ted by Parliament and his rights of appeal and revision to the High Court under section 9 of the 1952 Act had been taken away.

The directions of this Court mentioned hereinbefore are contained in the decision of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Anttday, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 495 at 557. There the Court was mainly concerned with whether sanction to prosecute was necessary. It was held that no such sanction was necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. This Court further gave the following directions:

...

"The accused was the Chief Minister of a premier Statethe State of Maharashtra. By a prosecution launched as early '3S on September 11, 1981, his character and integrity came under a cloud. Nearly two and a half years have rolled by and the case has not moved an inch further. An expeditious !rial is primarily in the interest of the accused and a mandate of Article 21. Expeditious disposal of a criminal case is in the interest of both the prosecution and the accused. Therefore, Special Case No. 24 of 1982 and Special Case No. 3/83 pending in the Court of Special Judge, Greater Bombay Shri.R.B. Sule are withdrawn and transferred to the High Court of Bombay with a request to the learned Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a sitting Judge of the High Court. On being so assigned, the learned Judge may proceed to expeditiously dispose of the cases preferably by holding the trial from day to day." The appellant as mentioned hereinbefore had appeared before the Special Judge and objected to the jurisdiction of the learned Judge on the ground that the case had not been properly allocated to him by the State Government. The Special Judge Bhutta after hearing

'

fA.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, J.[

the parties had decided ihe case was validly filed before him and he had properly taken cognizance. He based his order on the construction of the notification of allocation which was in force at that time. Against the order of the learned Special Judge rejecting the appellant's contention, the appellant filed a revision application in the High Court of Bombay. During the pendency of the said.revision application, the Government of Maharashtra issued a notification appointing Special Judge R.B. Sule, as the Judge .of the special case. It is the contention of the respondents before .. us that the appellant thereafter did not raise any further objection in the. High Court against cognizance being taken by Shri Bhutta. It is important to take note of this contention because one of the points urged liy Shri Rao on behalf of the appellant was that not only we should set aside the trial before the High CouTt as being without jurisdiction but we should direct that no further trial should take place before the Special Judge because the appellant has suffered a lot of which we shall mention later but also because cognizance of the offences had not been taken properly. In order to meet the submission that cognizance of the offences had not been taken properly, it was urged by Shri Jethmalani that after the Government Notification appointing Judge Sule as the Special Judge, the objection that cognizance of the offences could not be taken by Shri Bhutta was not agitated any further. The other objections that the appellant raised against the order passed by Judge Bhutta were dismissed by the High Court of Bombay. Against the order of the Bombay High Court the appellant filed a petition under Article 136 of the constitution. The appeal after grant of leave was dismissed by a judgment delivered on 16th February, 1984 by this Court in A. R. AntUlay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another, 11984 I 2 S.C.R. 914. There at page 954 of the report, this Court categorically observed that a private complaint filed by the complainant was clearly maintainable and that the cognizance was properly taken. This was the point at issue in that appeal. This was decided against the appellant. On this aspect therefore, the other point is open to the appellant. We are of the opinion that this observation of this Court cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered to be without jurisdiction. Therefore, this decision of this Court precludes any scope for argument about the validity of the cognizance taken by Special Judge Bhutta. Furthermore, the case had proceeded further before the Special Judge, Shri Sule and the learned Judge passed an order of discharge on 25th July, 1983. This order was set aside by the Constitution Bench of this Court on 16th February, 1984, in the connected judgment (vide 1984 2 S.C.R. 495). The order of taking cognizance had therefore become final and cannot be reagitated. Moreover section 460( e) of_ the Code expressly provides that if anv Magistrate not empowered by law

C

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.

_,

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to take cognizance of an offence on a complaint under section 190 of the Code erroneously in good faith does so his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground that he was not so empowered. Pursuant to the directions of this Court dated 16th February, 1984, on Jst of March, 1984, the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court assigned the cases to S.N. Khatri, J. The appe]lant, it is contended before us, appeared before Khatri, J. and had raised an objection that the case could be tried by a Special Judge only appointed by the Government under the 1952 Act. Khatri, J. on 13th of March, 1984, refused to entertain the appellant's objection to jurisdiction holding that he was bound by the order of this Court. There was another order passed on 16th of March, 1984 whereby Khatri, J. dealt with the other contentions raised as to his jurisdiction and rejected the objections of the appellant.

Being aggrieved the appellant came up before this Court by filing special leave petitions as well as writ petition. This Court on 17th D April, 1984, in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. Union of India and others etc., [1984] 3 S.C.R. 482 at 483 held that the learned Judge was perfectly justified and indeed it was the duty of the learned Judge to follow the decision of this Court which was binding on him. This Court in dismissing the writ petition observed, inter alia, as follows:

"In my view, the writ petition challenging the validity of the order and judgment passed by this Court as nullity or otherwise incorrect cannot be entertained. I wish to make it clear that the dismissal of this writ petition will not pre, judice the right of the petitioner, to approach the Court with an appropriate review petition or to file any other application which he may be entitled in law to file." D.N. Mehta, J. to wb'om the cases were transferred from Khatri, J. framed charges under 21 heads and.declined to frame charges under 22 other heads proposed by respondent No. 1. This Court allowed the appeal by special leave preferred by respondent No. J except in regard to three draft charges under section 384, I.P.C. (extortion) and directed the Court below to frame charges with regard to all other offences alleged. This Court requested the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court to nominate another Judge in place of D.N. Mehta, J. to take up the trial and proceed expeditiously to dispose of the case finally. See in.this connection R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay and another, [1986] 2 S.C.C. 716.

•

A.R. ANTULAY '· R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, .T.J

P.S. Shah, J. to whom the cases were referred to from D.N. A Mehta, J. on 24th of July, 1986 proceeded to frame as many as 79 charges against the appellant and decided not to proceed against the other named co-conspirators. This is the order impugned before us. Being aggrieved hy the aforesaid order the appellant filed the present • Special leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 2519 of 1986 questioning the jurisdiction to try the case in violation of the appellant's fundamental rights B conferred by Articles 14 and 21 and the provisions of the Act of 1952 . The appellant also filed Special leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 2518 of 1986 against the judgment and order dated 21st of August, 1986 of P.S. Shah, J. holding that none of the 79 charges framed against the accused required sanction under section 197(1) of the Code. The appellant also filed a Writ Petition No. 542 of 1986 challenging a portion of section 197(1) of Code as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 of the C Constitution.

•

This Court granted leave in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2519 of 1986 after hearing respondent No. 1 and stayed further proceedings in the High Court. This Court issued notice in Special D Leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 2518 and Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 542of1986 and directed these to be tagged on with the appeal arising out of Special I.eave Petition (Cr!.) No. 2519 of 1986. On 1lth of October, 1986 the appellant filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition for permission to urge certain additional grounds in E support of the plea that the origination of the proceedings before the Court of Shri P .S. Bhutta, Special Judge and the process issued to the appellant were illegal and void ab initio. ••

...

This Court on 29th October, 1986 dismissed the application for revocation of special leave petition filed by respondent No. 1 and F referred the appeal to a Beuch of 7 Judges of this Court and indicated the points in the note appended to the order for consideration of this Bench. So far as SLP (Crl.) No. 2518/86 against the judgment and order dated 21st August, 1986 of P.S. Shah, J. of the Bombay High Court G about the absence of sanction under section 197 of the Code is concerned, we have by an order dated 3rd February, 1988 delinked that special leave petition inasmuch as the same involved consideration· of an independent question and directed that the special leave petition shollid be heard by any appropriate Bench after disposal of this .appeal, Similarly, Writ Petition (Ori.) No . .542 of 1986 challenging a H

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[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A portion of section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution had also to be delinked by our order dated 3rd February, 1988 to be heard along with special leave petition no 2518 of 1986. This judgment therefore, does not cover these two matters. B _,:/ In this appeal two questions arise, namely, (1) whether the directions given by this Court on 16th of February, 1984 in R.S. Nayakv. A.R. Antulay, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 495 withdrawing the Special Case No. 24/82 and Special Case No. 3/83 arising out of the complaint filed by one shri P.B. Samant pending in the Court of Special Judge, Greater Bombay, Shri R.B. Sule, and transferring the same to the High Cort of C Bombay with a request to the Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a sitting Judge of the High Court, in breach of section 7(1) of the Act of 1952 which mandates that offences as in this case shall be tried by a Special Judge only thereby denying at least one right of appeal to the appellant was violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and whether such directions were at all valid or legal and (2) if such direcD tions were not at all valid or legal in view of the order dated 17th of April, 1984 referred to hereinbefore, is this appeal sustainable or the grounds therein justiciable in these proceedings. In other words, are the said directions in a proceedings inter-parties binding even if bad in law or violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and as such are immune from correction by this Court even though they cause E prejudice and do injury? These are the basic questions which this Court must answer in this appeal.

The contention that has been canvassed before us was that save as provided in sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Code the provisions thereof (coresponding to section 9(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898) shall so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act apply to the proceedings before the Special Judge and for purposes of the said provisions ·the Court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors and the person conducting the prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor. It was submitted 'before us that it was a private complaint and the prosecutor was not the public prosecutor. This was another infirmity which this trial suffered, it was pointed out. In the background of the main issues involved in this appeal we do not propose to deal with this subsidiary point which is of not any significance. The only question with which we are concerned in this appeal is,

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK JMUKHARJI, J.J

whether the case which is triable under the 1952 Act only by a Special Judge appointed under section 6 of the said Act could be transferred to the High Court for trial by itself or by this Court to the High Court for trial by it. Section 406 of the Code deals with transfer of criminal cases and provides power to this Court to transfer cases and appeals whenever it is made to appear to this Court that an order under this section is expedient for the ends of justice. The law provides that this Court may direct that any particular case or appeal be transferred from one High Court to ano·ther High Court or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to another Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court. Equally section 407 deals with the power of High Court to transfer cases and appeals. Under section 6 of the 1952 Act, the State Government is authorised to appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas for specified offences including offences under the Act. Section 7 of the 1952 Act deals with cases triable by Special Judges. The question, therefore, is whether this Court under section 406 of the Code could have transferred a case which was triable only by a Special Judge to be tried by the High Court or even if an application had been made to this Court under section 406 ofthe Code to transfer the case triable by a Special Judge to another Special Judge could that be transferred to a High Court, for trial by it. It was contended by Shri Rao that the jurisdiction to entertain and try .cases is conferred either by the Constitution or by the laws made by Parliament. He referred us to the powers of this Court under Articles 32, 131, 137, 138, 140, 142 ·and 145(1) of the Constitution. He also referred to Entry 77 of List I of the Constitution which deals with the constitution of the courts. He further submitted that the appellant has a right to be tried in accordance with law. and no procedure which will deny the equal protection of la~ can be invented and any order passed by this Court which will deny equal protection of laws would be an order which is void by virtue of Article 13(2) of the Constitution. He referred us to the previous order of this Court directing the transfer' of cases to the High Court and submitted that it was a nullity because of the consequences of the wrong directions of this Court, The enormity of the consequences ·warranted this Court's order being treated as a nullity. The directions denied the appellant the remedy by way of appeal as of right. Such erroneous or mistaken directions ·should be corrected at the earliest · opportunity, Shri Rao submitted.

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Sliri Rao also submitted that the directions given by the Court were without jurisdiction and as·stich void. There was no jurisdiction, according to Shri Rao, or power to transfer '1 case from the Court of . H

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the Special Judge to any High Court. Section 406 of the Code only permitted transfer of cases from one High Court to another High Court or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to a Criminal Court subordinate to another High Court. It is apparent that the impugned directions could not have been given under section 406 of the Code as the Court has no such power to order the transfer from B the Court of the Special Judge to the High Court of Bombay.

Section 7(1) of the 1952 Act creates a condition which is sine qua non for the trial of offences under section 6( 1) of the said Act. The condition is that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of ·Criminal Procedure or any other law, the said ofknces shall be triable by .Special J14dges only. {Emphasis supplied). Indeed conferment of C the 'exolusi"e jurisdiction of lhe Special Judge is recognised by the judgment deliver~d iby this 'Court in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdris Sriniwas Nayakrandanother, [198412 'S.C.R. 914 where this Court had adverted to section 7( 1) of the 1952 Act and at page 931 observed that section 7 .of the 1952 Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Special Judge p appointed under .section 6 to try cases set. out in section 6(1)(a) and -6(1)(b) of the said Act. The Court emphasised that the Special Judge had·exclusive jurisdiction tO try offences enumerated in section 6(1)(a) and (b). In spite of this while giving directions in the other matter, that is, R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Anrulay, ll984] 2S.C.R 495 at page 557, this Court directed transfer to the High Court of Bombay .the cases pendE ing before the Special Judge. It is true that section 7(1) and Section 6 of the 1952 Act were referred to while dealing with the other matters but while dealing with the matter of directions and giving the impugned directions, it does not appear that the Court kept in mind the exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of the Special Court to tty the offences enumerated in section 6. Shri Rao made a point that the directions of the Court were given per incuriam, that is to say without awareness of or advertence to the rexclusive nature of the jurisdiction of the Special Court and without reference to the possibility of the violation of the fundamental rights in :a case of this nature as observed by a seven Judges Bench decision in G The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, {1952] S.C.R. 284. Shri Ram .Jethmalani on behalf of the respondents submitted that the judgment of the 'Constitution Bench of this Court was delivered on 16th of February, 1984 and counsel for both sides were present and it was neither objected to nor st.ated by the appellant that H he wanted to be heard in regard to the transfer of the trial forum. He

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, J.}

submitted that the order of discharge was not only challenged by a special leave petition before this Court but also that a revision application before the High Court being Criminal Revision Application No. 354/83 was filed but the Criminal Revision Application by an order of this Court was withdrawn and heard along with the special leave petition. That application contained a prayer to the effect that the order of discharge be set aside and the case be transferred to the B High Court for trial. Therefore, it was submitted that the order of transfer was manifestly just. There was no review against this order. It · was submitted that the order of transfer to a superior court cannot in law or in fact ever cause any harm or prejudice to any accused. It is an order made for the benefit of the accused and in the interests of justice. Reliance was placed on Romesh Chandra Arora v. The State, C [1960] 1 S.C.R. 924 at 927 and 934. It was further submitted by Shri Jethmalani that a decision which has become final cannot be challenged. Therefore, the present proceedings are an abuse of the process of the Court, according to him. It was further submitted that all the attributes of a trial court were present in a Court of Appeal, an appeal being a continuation of trial before competent Court of Appeal and, D therefore, all the qualifications of the trial court were there. The Higb Court is authorised to hear an appeal from the judgment of the Special Judge under the Act of 1952. It was submitted that a Special Judge except in so far as a specific provision to the contrary is made is governed by all the provisions of the Code and he is a Court subordinate to the Higb Court. See A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and another, E [1984] 2 S.C.R. 914 at 943 and 944.

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It was submitted that power under sectiion 526 of the old Code corresponding to section 407 of the new Code can be exercised qua a Special Judge. This power, according to Shri Jethmalani, is exerciseable by the Higb Court in respect of any 9ase under Section 407(1)(iv) F irrespective of the Court in which it is pending. This part of the section is not repealed wholly or pro tanto, according to the learned counsel, by anything in the 1952 Act. The Constitution Bench, it was submit-. ted, consciously exercised this power. It decided that the Higb Court had the power to transfer a case to itself even from a Special Judge. That decision is binding at least in this case and cannot be reopened, it G was urged. In ·this case what was actually decided cannot be undone, we were told repeatedly. It will produce an intolerable state of attars. This Court sought to recognise the distinction between finality of judicial orders qua the parties and the reviewability for application to other cases. Between the parties even a wrong decision can operate as res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata is applicable even to criminal H

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trials, it was urged. Reliance was placed on Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan. [1972) 2 S.C.C. 466. A judgment of a High Court is binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case; more so, a judgment which was unsuccessfully challenged before this Court.

It is obvious that if a case could be transferred under section 406 of the Code from a Special Judge it could only be transferred to another Special Judge or a court of superior jurisdiction but subordinate to the High Court. No such court exists. Therefore, under this section the power of transfer can only be from one Special Judge to another Special Judge. Under section 407 however, corresponding to section 526 of the old Code, it was submitted the High Court has power to transfer any case to itself for being tried by it, it was submitted. It appears to us that in Gurcharan Das Chadha v. State of Rajasthan, 11966) 2 S.C.R. 678 an identical question arose. The petitioner in that case was a member of an All India Service serving in the State of Rajasthan. The State Government ordered his trial before the Special Judge of Bharatpur for offences under section 120B/161 of the Indian Penal Code and under sections 5(1)(a) and (d) and 5(2) of the Act. He moved this Court under section 527 of the old Code praying for transfer of his case to another State on various grounds. Section 7(1) of the Act required the offences involved in that case to be tried by a Special Judge only, and section 7(2) of the Act required the offences to be tried by a Special Judge for the area within which these were committed which condition could never be satisfied if there was a transfer. This Court held that the condition in sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act that the case must be tried by a Special Judge, is a sine qua non for the trial of offences under section 6. This condition can ·be satisfied by transferring the case from one Special Judge to another Special Judge. Sub-section(2) of section 7 merely distributes, it was noted, work between Special Judges appointed in a State with reference to territory. This provision is at par with the section of the Code which confers territorial jurisdiction on Sessions Judges and magistrates. An order of transfer by the very nature of things must sometimes result in taking the case out of the territory. The third sub-section of section 8 of the Act preserves the application of any provision of the Code if it is not inconsistent with the Act save as provided by the first two sub-sections of that·Secticin. It was held by this Court that sectioin 527 of the old Code, hence, remains applicable if it is not inconsistent with section 7(2) of the Act. It was held that there was no inconsistency between section 527 of the Code and

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, J.[

section 7(2) of the Act as the territorial jurisdiction created by the latter operates in a different sphere and under different circumstances. A Inconsistency can only be found if two provisions of law apply in identical circumstances, and create contradictions. Such a situation does not arise when either this Court or the High Court exercises the power of transfer. Therefore, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction and power under section 527 of the Code can transfer a case from a B Special Judge subordinate to one High C,ourt to another Special Judge subordinate to another High Court. It has to be emphasised that that decision was confined to the power under section 527 of the previous Code and to transfer from one Special Judge to another Special Judge though of another State. It was urged by Shri Jethrnalani that Chadha.'s case (supra) being one of transfer from one Special Judge to another C the judgment is not an authority for the proposition that it cannot be transferred to a court other t)lan that of a Special Judge or to the High Court. But whatever be the position, this is no longer open at this juncture. The jurisdiction, it was submitted, created by section 7 of the Act D of 1952 is of exclusiveness qua the Courts subordinate to the High ·court. It is not exclusive qua a Court of superior jurisdiction including a Court which can hear an appeal against its decision. The nonobstante clause does not prevail over other provisions of the Code such as those which recognise the powers of the superior courts to exercise jurisdiction on transfer. It was submitted that the power of E transfer vested in the High Court is exercisable qua Special Judges and is recognised not merely by Chadha's case but in earlier cases also, Shri Jethmalani submitted. ;

It was next submitted that apait from the power under sections 406 and 407 of the Code the power of transfer is also exercisable by the F High Court under Article 228 of the Constitution. There is no doubt that under this Article the case can be withdrawn from the Court of a Special Judge. It is open to the High Court to finally dispose it of. A chartered High Court can make . orders of transfer under clause 29 of the Letters Patent. Article 134(1)(b) of the Constitution expressly recognises the existence of such power in every High Court.

It was further submitted that any case transferred for trial to the High Court in which it exercises jurisdiction only by reason of the order of transfer is a case tried not in ordinary original criminal jurisdiction but in extraordinary original criminal juri~diction. Some High Courts had both ordinary criminal jurisdiction as well as extraordinary H

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11988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

criminal original jurisdiction. The former was possessed by the High Courts of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. The first two High Courts abolished it in the 40's and the Calcutta High Court continued it for quite some time and after the 50's in a trwicated form until it was finally done away with by the Code. After the-Code the only original criminal jurisdiction possessed by all the High Courts is extraordinary. B It can arise by transfer under the Code or the Constitulion or uhder clause 29 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that it was not right . that extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction is contained only in clause 24 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. This is contrary to section 374 of the Code itself. That refers to all High Courts and not merely all or any one of the three Chartered High Courts. In P.P. Front, New Delhi v. K.K. Bir/a and others, 11984] C Criminal Law Journal 545, the Delhi High Court recognised its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction as the only one that it possessed. The nature of this jurisdiction is clearly explained in Madura, Tirupparankundram etc. v. Alikhan Sahib and Ors., 35 Calcutta Weekly Notes, 1088 and Sunil Chandra Roy and another v. The State, A.I.R. D !954 Calcutta 305, paragraph 15. Reference may also be made to the Law Commissioner's 41st Report, paragraphs 3.1 to 3.6 at page 29 and paragraph 31.10 at page 259.

The !952 Act was passed to provide for speedier trial but the procedure evolved should not be so directed, it was submitted, that ~t would violate Article 14 as was held in Anwar Ali Sarkar's casl: (supra).

Section 7 of the 1952 Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, or in any other law the offences specified in sub-section (1) of section 6 shall be triable by F Special Judges only. So the law provides for a trial by Special Judge only and this is notwithstanding anything contained in sections 406 and 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Could it, therefore, be accepted that this Court exercised a power not given to it by Parlia· meat or the Constitution and acted under a power not exercisable by it? The question that has to be asked and answered is ,if a case is tried G by a Speical Judge or a court subordinate to the High Court against whose order an appeal or a revision would lie-to the High Court, is transferred by this Court to the High Court and such right of appeal or revision is taken away would not an accused be in a worse position than others? This Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, 11984] 2 S.C.R. 495 did not refer either to section 406 or section 407 of the H Code. It is only made clear that if the application had been made to the

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, J.J

High Court under section 407 of the Code, the High Court might have transferred the case to itself. ·· i

The second question that arises here is if such a wrong direction has been given by this Court can such a direction inter-parties be challenged subsequently. This is really a value perspective judgment.

Jn Kiran Singh and othersv. Chaman Paswan and others, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 117 at 121 Venkatarama Ayyar, J. observed that the fundamental principle is well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its validity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied uponeven at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A C defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.

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This question has been well put, if we may say so, in the decision of this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, [1973] 1 S.C.R. 697 where Mathew, J. observed that the jurisdiction was a verbal coat of many colours and referred to the decision in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 where the majority of the House of Lords dealt with the assimilation of the concepts of 'lack' and 'excess' of jurisdiction or, in other words, the extent to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of jurisdiction. The effect of the dicta was to reduce the difference between jurisdictional error and . error of law withi.n jurisdiction almost to a vanishing point. What is i' wrong decision on a question of limitation, he posed referring to an article of Professor H. W.R. Wade, "Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the Anismanic case" and concluded; "it is a bit difficult to understand how an erroneous decision on a question of limitation or res judicata would oust the jurisdiction of the Court in the primitive sense of the term and render the decision or decree embodying the decision a nullity liable to collateral attack ..... And there is no yardstick to determine ·the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of the Court." (Emphasis supplied) While applying the ratio to the facts of the present controversy, it has to be borne in mind that section 7(1) of the 1952 Act creates a condition which is sine qua non for the trial of offenders under section 6( 1) of -that Act, Jn this connection, the offences specified under section 6(1) of the 1952 Act are those punishable under sections 161, 162,

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163, 164 and 165A of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 of the 1947 Act. Therefore, the order of this Court transferring the cases to the High Court on 16th February, 1984, was not authorised by law. This Court, by its directions could not confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Bombay to try any case which it did not possess such jurisdiction under the scheme of the 1952 Act. It is true that in the first judgment in B A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 914 when this Court was analysing the scheme of the 1952 Act, it referred to sections 6 and 7 at page 931 of the Reports. The arguments, however, were not advanced and it does not appear that this aspect with its remifications was present in the mind of the Court while giving the impugned directions.

Shri Jethmalani sought to urge before us that the order made by. the Court was not without jurisdiction or irregular. We are unable to agree. It appears to us that the order was quite clearly per incuriam. · This Court was not called upon and did not decide the express limitation on the power conferred by section 407 of the Code which includes D offences by public servants mentioned in the 1952 Act to be overridden in the manner sought to be followed as the consequential direction of this Court. This Court, to be plain, did not have jurisdiction· to transfer the case to itself. That will be evident from an analysis of the different provisions of the Code as well as the 1952 Act. The power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character, so also the E power to confer a right of appeal or to take away a right of appeal. Parliament alone can do it by law and no Court, whether superior or inferior or both combined can enlarge the jurisdiction of a Court or divest a person of his rights of revision and appeal. See in this connec- · tion the observations in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur (supra) in which Justice Mathew considered Anisminic, [1969] 2 AC 147 and also see F Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 10 page 327 at para 720 onwards and also Amnon Rubinstein 'Jurisdiction and Illegality' (1965 Edn. pages 16-50). Reference may also be made to Raja Soap Factory v. S.P. Shantaraj, [1965] 2 SCR 800. The question of validity, however, is important in that the want G of jurisdiction can be established solely by a superior Court and that, in practice, no decision can be impeached collaterally by any inferior' Court. But the superior Court can always correct its own error brought to its noiice either by way of petition or ex debito justitiae. See Rubinstein's Jurisdiction and Illegality' (supra).

In the aforesaid view of the matter and the principle reiterated, it

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is manifest that the appellant has not been ordered to be tried by a procedure mandated by law, but by a procedure which was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. That is violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution also, as is evident from the observations of the 7 Judges Berich judgment in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (supra) where this Court found th.at even for a criminal who was alleged to have committed an offence, a special trial would be per se illegal because it will deprive the accused of his substantial and valuable privileges of defences which, others similarly charged, were able to claim. As Justice Vivian Bose observed in the said decision at page 366 of the report, it matters not whether it was done in good faith, whether it was done for the convenience of Government, whether the process could be scientifically classified and labelled, or whether it was an experiment for speedier trial made for the good of society at large. Justice Bose emphasised that it matters not how lofty and laudable the motives were. The question which must be examined is, can fair minded, reasonable, unbiased and resolute men regard that with equanimity and call it reasonable, just and fair, regard it as equal treatment and protection in the defence of liberties which is expected of a sovereign democratic republic in the conditions which are obtained in India today. Judged by that view the singling out of the appellant in. this case for a speedier trial by the High Court for an offence of which the High Court had no jurisdiction to try under the Act of 1952 was, in our opinion, unwarranted, unprecedented and the directions given by this Court for the said purpose, were not warranted. If that is the position, when that fact is brought to our notice we must remedy the situation. In rectifying the error, no procedural inhibition!!' should debar this Court because no person should suffer by reason of any mistake of the Court. The Court, as is manifest, gave its directions on· 16th February, 1984. Here no rule of res judicata would apply to prevent this Court from entertaining the grievance and giving appropriate directions. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Soni Vrajlal Jethalal v. Soni Jadavji Govindji and Others, A.LR. 1972 Guj. 148. Where D.A. Desai, J. speaking for the Gujarat High Court observed that no act of the court or irregularity can come in the way of justice being done and one of the highest and the first duty of all Courts is to take care that the act of the. Court does no injury to the suitors.

It appears that when this Court gave the aforesaid directions on 16th February, 1984, for the disposal of the case against the appellant 'by the High Court, the directions were given oblivious of the relevant . provisions of law and the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (supra).

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A See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th End, Vol. 26, page 297, para 578 and page 300, the relevant notes 8, 11and15; Dias on Jurisprudence, 5th Edn., pages 128 and 130; Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., I1944I 2 AER 293 at 300. Also see the observations of Lord Goddard in Moore v. Hewitt, 119471 2 A.E.R. 270 at 272-A and Penny v. Nicholas, 11950) 2 A.E.R. 89, 92A. "per incuriam" are those decisions B given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the Court concerned, so that in . such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. See Morelle v. Wakeling, 11955) 1 All E.R. 708, 718F. Also see State of Orissa v. The Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., 1198513 SCR 26. We are of the opinion that in view of the clear provisions of section 7(2) of the c Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, these directions were legally wrong.

The principle that the size of the Bench-whether it is comprised of two or three or more Judges-does not matter, was enunciated in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (supra) and followed by Justice Chinnappa Reddy in Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State of Maharashtra, 11985) 2 SCR 8 where it has been held that a Division Bench of three Judges should not overrule a Division Bench of two Judges, has not been followed by our Courts. According to wellsettled law and various decisions of this Court, it is also well-settled that a Full Bench or a Constitution Bench decision as in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (supra) was binding on the Constitution Bench because it was a Bench of 7 Judges. The principle in England that the size of the Bench does not matter, is clearly brought out in the decision of Evershed M.R. in the case of Morelle v. Wakeling (supra). The law laid down by this Court is somewhat different. There is a hierarchy within the Court itself here, where larger Benches overrule smaller Benches. See the observations of this Court in Mattu/al v. Radhe Lal, 119751 1 SCR 127, Union of India & Anr. v. K.S. Subramanian, 119771 1 SCR 87 at page 92 and State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, 1197711 SCR462 at 473. This is the practice followed by this Court and now it is a crystallised rule of law. See in this connection, as mentioned hereinbefore, the observations of the State of Orissa v. Titagarh Paper Mills (supra) and also Union of India and Others v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., 119851 Suppl 3 SCR 123 at 145.

In support of the contention that a direction to delete wholly the

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, J.[

impugned direction of this Court be given, reliance was placed on Satyadhvan Ghoshal v. Deorajini Devi, 11960] 3 SCR 590. The ratio of the decision as it appears from pages 601 to 603 is that the judgment which does not terminate the proceedings, can be challenged in an appeal from final proceedings. It may be otherwise if subsequent proceedings were independent ones.

The appellant should not suffer on account of the direction of this Court based upon an error leading to conferment of jurisdiction.

In our opinion, we are not debarred from re-opening this question and giving proper directions and correcting the error in the present appeal, when the said directions on 16th February, 1984, were violative of the limits of jurisdiction and the directions have resulted in deprivation of the fundamental rights of the appellant, guaranteed by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The appellant has been treated difil!rently from other offenders, accused of a similar offence in view of the provisions of the Act of 1952 and the High Court was not a Court competent to try the offence. It was directed to try the appellant under the directions of this Court, which was in derogation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The directions have been issued without observing the principle of audi alteram partem. It is true that Shri Jethmalani has shown us the prayers made before the High Court which are at page 121 of the paper-book. He argued that since the transfers have been made under section 407, the procedure would be that given in section 407(8) of the Code. These directions, Shri Jethmalani sought to urge before us, have been given in the presence of.the parties and the clarificatory order of April 5, 1985 .which was made in the.presence of the appellant and his Counsel as well as the Counsel of the State Government of Maharashtra, expressly recorded that no such submission was made in connection with the prayer for grant of clarification. We are of the opinion that Shri Jethmalani is not right when he said that the decision was not made per incuriam as submitted by the appellant. It is a settled rule that if a decision has been given per incuriam the Court can ignore it. It is also true that the decision of this Court in the case of The Bengal Immunity Co. L.td. v. The State of Bihar & Ors., 11955] 2 SCR 603 at 623 was not regarding an order which had become conclusive inter-parties. The Court was examining in that case only the doctrine of precedents and determining the extent to which it could take a different view from one previously taken in a different case between different parties. According to Shri Jethmalani, the doctrine of per incuriam has

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no application in the same proceedings. We are unable to accept this contention. We are of the opinion that this Court is not powerless to correct its error which has the effect of depriving a citizen of his fundamental rights and more so, the right to life and liberty. It can do so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any proceeding pending before it without insisting on the formalities of a review application. Powers· of B review can be exercised in a petition filed under Article 136 or Article . 32 or under any other provision of the Constitution if the Court is satisfied that its directions have resulted in the deprivation of the fundamental rights of a citizen or any legal right of the petitioner. See the observations in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U. P. Allahabad, 11963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 885.

,H

In support of the contention that an order of this Court be it administrative or judicial which is violative of fundamental right can always be corrected by this Court when attention of the Court is drawn to this infirmity, it is instructive to refer to the decision of this Court in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad (supra). This is a decision by a Bench of five learned Judges. Gajendragadkar, J. spoke for four learned Judges including himself and Shah, J. expressed a dissenting opinion. The question was whether Rule 12 of Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules empowered the Supreme Court in writ petitions under Article 32 to require the petitioner. to furnish security for the costs of the respondent. Article 145 of the Constitution provides for the rules to be made subject fo any law made by Parliament and Rule U was framed thereunder. The petitioner contended that the rule was invalid as it placed obstructions on the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. This rule as well as the judicial order dismissing the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for non-compliance with Rule 12 of Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules were held invalid. In order to appreciate the significance of this point and the actual ratio of that decision so far as it is relevant for our present purpose it is necessary to refer to a few facts of that decision. The petitioner and 8 others who were partners of M/s. Industrial Chemical Corporation, Ghaziabad, had filed under Article 32 of the Constitution a petition impeaching the validity of the order passed by the Excise Commissioner refusing permission to the Distillery to supply power alcohol to the said petitioners. The petition was admitted on 12th December, 1961 and a rule was ordered to be issued to the respondents, the Excise Commissioner of U .P., Allahabad, and the State of U.P. At the time when the rule was issued, this Court directed under the impugned rule that the petitioners should deposit a security

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, LI

of Rs.2,500 in cash within six weeks. According to the practice of this A · Court prevailing since 1959, this order was treated as a condition precedent for issuing rule nisi to the impleaded respondents. The petitioners found it difficult to raise the amount and so on January 24, 1962, they moved this Court for modification of the said order as to security. This application was dismissed, but the petitioners were given further time to deposit the said amount by March 26, 1962. This order was B passed on March 15, 1962. The petioners then tried to collect the requisite fund, but failed in their efforts and that led to the said petition filed on March 24, 1962 by the said petitioners. The petitioners contended that the impugned rule, in so far as it related to the giving of security,-was ultra vires, because it contravened the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 32 of the Constitution. C There were two orders, namely, one for security of costs and another for the dismissal of the previous application under Article 32 of the Constitution. This Court by majority held that Rule 12 of Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules was invalid in so far as it related to the furnish- D ing of security. The right to move the Supreme Court, it was emphasised, under Article 32 was an absolute right and the content of this right could not be circumscribed or ir•paired on any ground and an order for furnishing security for the respondent's c<lsts retarded the assertion or vindic:ation of the fundamental right under Article 32 and contravened the said right. The fact that the rule was discretionary did E not alter the position. Though Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order to do complete justice between the parties, the Court cannot make an order inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. No question of inconsistency between Article 142(1) and Article 32 arose. Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the majority of the Judges of this Court said that Article F 142(1) did not confer any power on this Court to contravene :he provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution. Nor did Article 145 confer power upon this Court to make rules, empowering lt to contravene the · provisions of the fundamental right. At page 899 of t~ Reports, Ga jendragadkar, ·J, reiterated that the powers of this Court arc no doubt very wide and they are intended and "will always be exercised in G the interests of justice." But that is not to say that an .etder can be made by this Court which is inconsistent with the funt'lamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. It w~ emphasised that an order which this Court could make in order to do complete justice . between the parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent H

!

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with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws (Emphasis supplied). The Court therefore, held that it was not possible to hold that Article 142(1) conferred upon this Court. powers wh,ich could contravene the provisions of Article 32. It follows, therefore, that the directions given by this Court on 16th February, 1984, on the ground of expeditious trial by transferring Special Case No. 24 of 1982 and B Special Case No. 3 of 1983 pending in the Court oi Special Judge, Greater Bombay, Shri S.B. Sule, to the High Court of Bombay with a request to the learned Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a sitting Judge of the High Court was contrary to the relevant statutory provision, namely, section 7(2) of the Criminal law Amendment Act, 1952 and as such violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Furthermore, it violates Article 14 of the Constitution as being made appliC cable to a very special case among the special cases, without any guideline as to which cases required speedier justice. H that was so as in Prem Chand Garg's case, that was a mistake ofso great a llllll!Ditude that it deprives a man by being treated differently of his 'fundamental right for defending himself in a criminal trial in accordance with law. If D that was so then when the ·attention of the Court is drawn the Court has always the power and the obligation to correct it ex debito justiti.ae and treat the second application by its inherent power as a power of review to correct the original mistake. No suitor should suffer for the wrong of the Court. This Court in Prem Chand Garg's case struck down not -only the administrative order enjoined by Rule 12 for deposit E of security in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution but also struck down the judicial order passed by the Court for non-deposit of such security in the subsequent stage of the same proceeding when attenpon of the Court to the infirmity of the rule was drawn. It may be me11tioned that Shah, J. was of the opinion that rule 12 was not violative. For the present controversy it is not necessary to deal with this F aspect of the matter.

The power of the Court to correct an error subsequently has been reiterated by a decision of a bench of nine Judges of this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, U966l 3 S.C.R. 744. The facts were different and not quite G relevant for our present purposes but in order to appreciate the amtentions urged, it will be appropriate to refer to certain portions of the same. There was a suit for defamation against the editor of a weekly newspaper, which was filed in the original side of the High Court. One of the witnesses prayed that the Court may order that publicity should not be given t-0 his evidence m the press as his business would be H affected. After hearing arguments, lhe trial Judge passed an oral ordu

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A.R. ANl'ULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, J.]

prohibiting the publication of the evidence of the witness. A reporter of the weekly along with other journalists moved this Court· under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the order. It was contended that: (1) the High Court did not have inherent power to pass the order; (2) the ioipugned order violated the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(a); and (3) the order was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

,.

It was held by Gajendragadkar, C.J. for himself and five other learned Judges that the order was within the inherent power of the High Court. Sarkar, J. was of the view that the High Court had power to prevent publication of proceedings and it was a facet of the power to hold a trial in camera and stems from it. Shah, J. was, however, of the view that the Code of Civil Procedure contained no express provision authorising the Court to hold its proceedings in camera, but if excessive publicity itself operates as an instrument of injustice, the Court has inherent jurisdiction to pass an order excluding the public when the nature of the case necessitates such a course to be adopted. Hidayatullah, J. was, however, of the view that a Court which was holding a public trial from which the public was not excluded, could not suppress the publication of the deposition of a witness, heard not in camera but in open Court, on the request of the witness that his business would suffer. Sarker, J. further reiterated that if a judicial tribunal makes an order which it has jurisdiction to make by applying a law which is valid in all respects, that order cannot offend a fundamental right. An order which is within the jurisdiction of the tribunal which made it, if the tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the matters that were litigated before it and if the law which it applied in making the order was a valid law, could not be interfered with. It was reiterated that the tribunal having this jurisdiction does not act without jurisdiction if it makes an error in the application of the law.

Hidayatullah, J. observed at page 790 of the report that in Prem Chand Garg's case the rule required the furnishing of security in petition under Article 32 and it was held to abridge the fundamental rights. But it was said that the rule was struck down and not the judicial decision which was <;>nly revised. That may be so. But a judicial decision based on such a rule is not any better and offends the fundamental rights just the same and not less so because it happens to be a judicial order. If there be no appropriate remedy to get such an order removed because the Court has no superior, it does not mean that the order is made good. When judged under the Constituion it is still a

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void order although it may bind parties unless set aside. Hidayatullah, J. reiterated that procedural safeguards are as important as other safeguards. Hidayatullah, J. reiterated that the order committed a breach of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appropriate order would be to recall the directions contained in the order dated 16th February, 1984.

C

In considering the question whether in a subsequent proceeding we can go to the validity or otherwise of a previous decision on a question of law inter-parties, it may be instructive to refer to the decision of this Court in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778. There, the petitioner was a partner in a firm which carried on the business of manufacture and sale of hand-made bidis. On December 14, 1957, the State Government issued a notification under section 4{l)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 19tl8. By a subsequent notification dated 25th November, 1958, hand-made and machine-made bidis were unconditionally exempted from payment of sales tax. The Sales Tax Officer had sent a notice to the firm for the assessment of tax on sale of bidis during the assessment period 1st of April, 1958 to June 30, 1958. The firm claimed that the notification dated 14th December, 1957 had exempted bidis from payment of sales tax and that, therefore, it was not liable to pay sales tax on the sale of bidis. This position was not accepted by the Sales Tax Officer who passed certain orders. The firm appealed under section 9 of the Act to the Judge {Appeals) Sales Tax, but that was dismissed. The firm moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court took the view that the firm had another remedy under the Act and the Sales Tax Officer had not committed any apparent error in interpreting the notification of December 14, 1957. The appeal against the order of the High Court on a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution was dismissed by this Court for non-prosecution and the firm filed an application for a restoration of the appeal and condonation of delay. During the pendency ofthat appeal another petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the fundamental right under Articles 19( l){g) and 31 of the Constitution. Before the Constitution Bench which heard the matter a preliminary objection was raised against the maintainability of the petition and the correctness of the decision of this Court in Kai/ash Nath v. State of U.P., A.LR. 1957 S.C. 790 relied upon by the petitioner was challenged. The learned Judges referred the case to a larger Bench. It was. held by this Court by a majority of five learned Judges that the answer to the questions must be in the negative. The case of Kai/ash Nath was not correctly decided and the decision was not sustainable on :

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJJ, J.I

the authorities on which it was based. Das, J. speaking for himself observed that the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution was itself a guaranteed fundamental right and this Court was not trammelled by procedural technicalities in making an order or issuing a writ for the enforcement of such rights. The question, however, was whether, a quasi-judicial authority which made_ an order in the undoubted exe~cise of its jurisdiction in p~uance of a provision of law which was intra vires, an: error of law or fact committed by that authority could not be impeached otherwise than on appeal, unless the erroneous determination related to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depended. It was held that a tribunal might lack jurisdiction if it was improperly constituted. In such a case, the characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision was that it binds; whether right or wrong, and no question of the enforcement of a fundamental right could arise on an application under Article 32. Subba Rao, J. was, however, unable to agree.

Shri Jethmalani urged that the directions given on 16th D February, 1984, were not per incuriam. We are unable to accept this submission. It was manifest to the Bench that exclusive jurisdiction · created under section 7(1) of the 1952 Act read with section 6 of the said Act, when brought to the notice of this Court, precluded the exercise of the power under section 407 of the Code. There was no argument, no submission and no decision on this aspect at all. There_ E was no prayer in the appeal which was pending before this Court for such directions. Furthermore, in giving such directions, this Court did not advert to or consider the effect of Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (supra) which was a binding precedent. A mistake on the part of the Court shall not cause prejudice to any one. He further added that the primary duty of.every Court is to adjudicate the cases arising between the F parties. According to him, it is certainly open to a larger Bench to take a view different from that taken by the earlier Bench, if it was manifestly erroneous and he urged that the trial of a corrupt Chief Minister before a High Court, instead of a Judge designated by the State Government was'not so injurious to public interest that it should be overruled or set aside. He invited us to consider two questions: (1) G does the impugned order promote justice? and (2) is it technically valid? After considering these two questions, we are clearly of the opinion that the answer to both these questions is in the negative. No prejudice need be proved for enforcing the fundamental rights. Violation of a fundamental right itself renders the impugned action void. So also the violation of the principles of natural justice renders H

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the act a nullity. Four valuable rights, it appears to us, of the appellant · have been taken away by the impugned directions •. (i) The right to be tried by a Special Judge in accordance with the procedure established by law and enacted by Parliament.

(ii) The right of revision to the High Court under section 9 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. (iii) The right of first appeal to the High Court under the same · section.

(iv) The right to move the Supreme Court under Article 136 thereafter by way of a second appeal, if necessary. In this connection Shri Rao rightly submitted that it is no necessary to consider whether section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code confers the right of appeal to this Court from the judgment of a learned Judge of the High Court to whom the case had been assigned inasmuch as the transfer itself was illegal. One has to consider that section 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code was subject to the overriding mandate of section 7(1) of the 1952 Act, and hence, it does not permit the High Court to withdraw a case for trial to itself from the Court of Special Judge. It was submitted by Shri Rao that even in cases where a case is withdrawn by the High Court to itself from a criminal court other than the Court of Special Judge, the High Court exercised transferred jurisdiction which is different from original jurisdiction arising out of initiation of the proceedings in the High Court. In any event section 374 of Criminal Procedure Code limits the right to appeals arising out of clause 24 of the Letters Patent.

In aid of the submissicm that procedure for trial evolved in dero. gation of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution would be bad, reliance was placed on Attorney General of India v. Lachma Devi and others, [1985] 2 Scale 144. in aid of the submission G on the question of validity our attention was drawn to 'Jurisdiction and Illegality' by Arnnon Rubinstein (1965 Eda.): The Parliament did not grant to the Court the jurisdiction to transfer a case to the High Court of Bombay. However, as the superior Court is deemed to have a general jurisdiction, the law presumes that the Court acted within jurisdiction. In the instant case that presumption cannot be taken, H firstly because the question of jurisdiction was not agitated before the

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, J.]

-.--

Court, secondly these directions were given per incuriem as mentioned hereinbefore and thirdly the superior Court alone can set aside an error in its 'directions when attention is drawn to that error. This view is warranted only because of peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. Here the trial of a citizen in a Special Court under special jurisdiction is involved, hence, the liberty ofthe subject is involved. In this connection, it is instructive to refer to page 126 of Rubinstein's aforesaid book. It has to be borne in mind that as in Kuchenmeister v. Home Office, [1958] 1 Q.B. 496 here form becomes substance. No doubt, that being so it must be by decisions and authorities, it appears to us patently clear that the directions given by this Court on 16th February, 1984 were clearly unwarranted by constitutional provisions and in derogation of the law enacted by the Parliament. See the observations of Attorney General v. Herman James Sil/em, [1864] 10 H.L.C. 703, where it was reiterated that the creation of aright to an appeal is an act which requires legislative authority, neither an inferior Court nor the superior Court or both combined can create such a right, it being one of limitation and extension of jurisdiction. See also the observations of Isaacs v. Roberston, [1984] 3 A.E.R. 140 where it was reiterated bY. Privy Council that if an order is regular it can be set aside by an appellate Court; if the order is irregular it can be set aside by the Court that made it on the application being made to that Court either under the rules of that Court dealing expressly with setting aside orders for irregularity or ex debito justitiae if the circumstances Warranted, namely, violation of the rules of natural justice or fundamental rights. In Ledgard v. Bull, 13 I.A. 134, it was held that under the old Civil Procedure Code under section 25 the superior Court could not make an order of transfer of a case unless the Court from which the transfer was souht to be made, had jurisdiction to try. In the facts of the instant case, the criminal revision application which was pending before the High Court even if it was deemed to be transferred to this Court under Article 139A of the Constitution it would not have vested this Court with power larger than what is contained in section 407 of Criminal Procedure Code. Under section 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with the Criminal law Amendment Act, the High Court could not transfer to itself proceedings under sections 6 and 7 of the said Act. This Court by transferring the proceedings to itself, could not have acquired larger jurisdiction. The fact that the objection was not raised before this Court giving directions on 16th February, 1984 cannot amount to any waiver. In Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramaniya Sastri, 14 I.A. 160 it was held that if there was inherent incompetence in a High Court to deal with all questions before it then consent could not confer on the High Court any jurisdictioin which it never possessed.

C

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We are clearly of the opinion that the right of the appellant under Article 14 regarding equality before the law and equal protection of law in this case has been violated. The appellant has also a right not to be singled out for special treatment by a Special Court created for him alone. This right is implicit in the right to equality. See Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (supra).

Here the appellant has a further right under Article 21 of the Constitution-a right to trial by a Special Judge under sectioin 7(1) of the 1952 Act which is· the procedure established by law made by the Parliament, and a further right to move the High Court by way of , revision or first appeal under section 9 of the said Act. He has also a right not to suffer any order passed behind his back by a Court in C violation of the basic principles of natural justice. Directions having been given in this case as we have seen without hearing the appellant though it appears from the circumstances that the order was passed in the presence of the counsel for the appellant, these were bad.

In Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. The State of Gujarat, [1974]3 S.C.R. 427, it was held that an order passed without hearing a party which affects his fundamental rights, is void and as soon as the order is declared void by a Court, the decision operates from its nativity. It is proper for this Court to act ex debito justitiae, to act in favour of the fundamental rights of the appellant. ·

In so far as Mirajkar's case {supra) which is a decision of a Bench of 9 Judges and to the extebt it affirms Prem Chand Garg's case (supra), the Court has power to review either under section 137 or suo motu the directions given by this Court. See in this connection P.S.R. Sadhananatham v. Arunachalam, [1980] 2 SCR 873 and Suk Das v. F Union of Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, [1986] 2 S.C.C. 401. See also the observations in Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot and others,· [1953] S.C.R. 1159, Satyadhyan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 590, Sukhrani (dead) by L.Ls. and others v. Hari Shanker and others, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 671 and Bejoy Gopa/ Mukherjiv. Pratul Chandra Ghose, [1953] S.C.R. 930. We are further of the view that in the earlier judgment the points for setting aside the decision, did not include the question of withdrawal of the case from the Court of Special Judge to Supreme Court and transfer it to the High Court. Unless a plea in question is taken it cannot operate as res judicata. See Shivshankar Prasad Shah and H others v. Baikunth Nath Sini:h and others, [1969] 1 S.C.C. 718, Bikan

,,..~ ·

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI. J.J

Mahuri and others v. Mst. Bibi Walian and others, A.LR. 1939 Patna 633. See also S.L. kapoor v. Jagmohan and others, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746 on the question of violation of the principles of natural justice. Also see Maneka Gant/hi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621 at pages 674-681. Though what is mentioned hereinbefore in the Bengal lmmunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and others (supra), the Court was not concerned with the earlier decision between the same parties. ·At page 623 it was reiterated that the Court was not bound to follow a decision of its own if it was satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam or the attention of the Court was not drawn. It is also wellsettled that an elementary rule of justice is that no party should suffer by mistake of the Court. See Sastri Yagnapurushadji and others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya and another, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 242, Jang Singh v. Brij/a/, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 145, Bhajahari Monda/ v. The State of West Bengal, [1959] S.. C.R. 1276 at 1284-1286 and Asgarali N. Singaporawalla v. The State of Bombay, [1957]S.C.R. 678 at 692. Shri Rao further submitted that we should not only ignore the directions or set aside the directions contained in the order dated 16th February, 1984, but also direct that the appellant should not suffer any further trial. It was urged that the appellant has been deprived of his fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 as a result of the directions given by this Court. Our attention was drawn to the observations of this Court in Suk Das's case (supra) for this purpose. He further addressed us to the fact that six and half years have elapsed since the first complaint was lodged against the appellant and during this long period the appellant has suffered a great deal. We are further invited to go into the allegations and to held that there was nothing which could induce us to prolong the agony of the appellant. We are, however, not hl~lined to go into this question.

The right of appeal under section 374 is limited to Clause 24 of Letters Patent. It was further submitted that the expression 'Extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction' under section 374 has to be understood having regard to the language used in the Code and other relevant statutory provisions and not with reference to decisions wherein Courts described jurisdiction acquired by transfer as extraordinary original jurisdiction. In that view the decisions referred to by Shri Jethmalani being Kavasji Pestonji Da/alv. Rustomji Sorabji jamadar & Anr., AIR 1949 Born. 42, Suni/ Chandra Roy & Anr. v. The State, AIR 1954 Cal. 305, Sasadhar Acharjya & Anr. v. Sir Charles Tegart & Ors., [1935] Cal.. Weekly Notes 1088, Peoples' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sardu/ Singh Caveeshgar & Ors:, AIR 1961 Punj. 87 and P.P. Front, New

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A Delhi v. K.K. Birla, [1984] Cr. L.J. 545 are not relevant. It appears to us that there is good deal of force in the argument that section 411A of the old Code which corresponds to section 374 of the new Code contained the expression 'original jurisdiction'. The new Code abolished the original jurisdiction of High Courts but retained B the extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction conferred by ,clause 24 of the Letters Patent which some of the High Courts had.

The right of appeal is, therefore, confined only to cases decided by the High Court in its Letter Patent jurisdiction which in terms is 'extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction'.

By the time the new Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 was framed, Article 21 had not been interpreted so as to include one right of appeal both on facts and law.

Shri Ram Jethmalani made elaborate submissions before us reD garding the purpose of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the constitution of the Special Court. In our opinion, these submissions have no relevance and do not authorise this Court to confer a special jurisdiction on a High Court not warranted by the statute. The observations of this Court in Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978, [1979] 2 SCR 476 are not relevant for this purpose. Similarly, the observations on E right of appeal in V.C. Shukla v. Delhi Administration, [1980] 3 SCR 500, Shri Jethmalani brought to our notice certain facts to say that the powers given in the Criminal Law Amendment Act were sought to be misused by the State Government under the influence of the appellant. In our opinion, these submissions are not relevant for the present purpose. Mr. Jethmalani submitted that the argument that in so far as F section 407 purports to authorise such a transfer it stands repealed by section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act is wrong. He said it can be done in its extraordinary criminal jurisdiction. We are unable to accept this submission. We are also unable to accept the submission that the order of transfer was made with full knowledge of section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the so-called eyclusive G jurisdiction was taken away from Special Judges and the directions were not given per incuriam. That is not right. He drew our attention to the principles of interpretation of statutes and drew our attention to the purpose of section 7(1) of the Act. He submitted that when the Amending Act changes the law, the change must be confined to the mischief present and intended to be dealt with. He drew us to the Tek H Chand Committee Report and submitted that he did not wish that an

A.R. ANTULAY 1•. R.S. NAYAK fMUKHARJI. J.J

occasional case withdrawn and tried in a High Court was because of delay in disposal of corruption cases. He further submitted that interference with existing jurisdiction and powers of superior Courts· can only be by express and clear language. It cannot be brought about by a side wind. Thirdly, the Act of 1952 and the Code have to be read and construed together, he urged. The Court is never anxious to discover a repugnancy and infer apro tanto repeal. Resort to the non obstante clause is permissible only when it is impossible to harmonise the two provisions.

Shri Jethmalani highlighted before us that it was for the first time a Chief Minister had been found guilty of receiving quid pro quo for orderS of allotment of cement to various builders by a Single Judge of the High Court confirmed by a Division Bench of·the High Court. He also urged before us that it was for the first time such a Chief Minister did not have the courage to prosecute his special leave petition before this Court against the. findings of three Judges of the High Court. Shri D J ethmalani also urge,d that it was for the first time I.his Court found that a case instituted in 1982 m.ade no progress till 1984. Shri Jethmalani also sought to contend that section 7(1) of the 1952 Act states "shall be triable by Special Judges only", ·but does not say that under no circumstances the case will be transferred to be tried by the High Couri even in its Extraordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction. He E submitted that section 407(l)(iv) is very much in the statute and and it is not repealed in respect of the cases pending before the Special Judge. There is no question of repealing section 407(l)(iv). Section · 407 deals with the power of the High Court to transfer cases and appeals. Section 7 is entirely different and ·one has to understand the scheme of the Act of 1952, he urged. It was an Act which provided for F a more speedy trial of certain offences. For this it gave power to appoint Special Judges .and stipulated for appointment of Special Judges under. the Act. Seetion 7 states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, the offences mentioned in sub-section (1) of . section 6 shall be triable by Special Judges only. By express terms· therefore, .it takes away the right to transfer cases contained in the G Code to any other Court which is not a Special Court. Shri Jethmalani sought to urge that the Constitution Bench had considered this position. That is not So. He submitted that the directions of this Court on 16th February, 1984 were not given per incuriam or void for any reason. He referred us to Dias on .iurisprudence, 5th Edition, page 128 and relied on the decision of Milianges v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., H

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[1975] 3 All E.R. 801 at 821. He submitted that the per incuriam rule

A does not apply where the previous authority is alluded to. It is true that previous statute is referred to in the other judgment delivered on the same date in connection with different contentions. Section 7( 1) was not referred to in respect of the directions given on 16th February, 1984 in the case of R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (supra). Therefore, as If mentioned hereinbefore the observations indubitably were per incuriam. In this case in view of the specific language used in section 7, it is not necessary to consider the other submissions of Shri Jethmalani, whether the procedure for trial by Special Judges under the Code has stood repealed or not. The concept of repeal may have no application in this case. It is clear that words should normally be given their ordiC nary meaning bearing in mind the context. It is only where the literal meaning is not clear that one resorts to the golden rule of interpretation or the mischief rule of interpretation. This is well illustrated from the observations of Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage Claim, I1844] 11 Cl & Fin 85 at 143. He observed:

"The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary tha!l to expound those words in that natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention, to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble, which, according to Chief Justice Pyer, Stewell v. Lord Zouch, [1569] 1Plowd353 at 369 is a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intend to redress".

This passage states the commonly accepted view concerning the relationship between the literal and mischief rules of interpretation of G statutes. Here there is no question as to what was the previous law and what was intended to be placed or replaced as observed by Lord Wilberforce in 274 House of Lords Debate, Co\. 1294 on 16th November, 1966, see Cross; Statutory Interpretation, second edition, page 36. He observed that the interpretation of legislation is just a part of the process of being a good lawyer; a multi-faceted thing, calling for H many varied talents; not a subject which can be confined in rules.

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, J.J

When the words are clear nothing remains to be seen. If words are as A such ambiguous or doubtful other aids come in. In this context, the submission of controversy was whether the Code repealed the Act of 1952 or whether it was repugnant or not is futile exercise to undertake. Shri Jethmalani distinguished the decision in Chadha's case, which has already been discussed. It is not necessary to discuss the controversy whether the Chartered High Courts contained the Extraordinary B Original Criminal Jurisdiction by the Letters Patent. Article 134(1)(b) does not recognise in every High Court power to withdraw for trial cases from any Court subordinate to its authority. At least this Article cannot be construed to mean where power to withdraw is restricted, it can be widened by virtue of Article 134(1)(b) C of the Constitution. Section 374 of the Code undoubtedly gives a right of appeal. Where by a specific clause of a specific statute the power is given for trial by the Special Judge only and transfer can be from one such Judge to another Special Judge, there is no warrant to suggest that the High Court has power to transfer such a case from a Judge uiidet section 6 of the Act of 1952 to itself. It is not a case of exclusion D of the superior Courts. So the submissions made on this aspect by Shri Jethmalani are not relevant. Dealing with the submission that the order of the Constitution Bench was void or non-est and it violated the principles of natural justice, it was submitted by Shri Jethmalani that it was factually inc01rect. Inspite of the submissions the appellant did not make any submission as to directions for transfer as asked for by Shri Tarkunde. It was submitted that the case. should be transferred to the High Court. The C.ourt merely observed there that they had given ample direction. No question of submission arose after the judgment was delivered. In any case, if this was ·bad the fact that no objection had been raised would not make .it good. No question of technical rules or res judicata apply, Shri Jethmalani submitted that it would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. He referred us to Re Tarling, [1979] 1 All E.R. 981at987;.Ali v. Secretary of State for the Horne Department, [1984] .1 All E.R. 1()09 at 1014 and Seervai's Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, pages 260 to 265. We are of the opinion that these submissions are not relevant. There is no abuse of the process of the Court. Shri Jethmalani submitted that there was no prejudice to the accused. There was prejudi!i<' ·to the accused in being singled out as a special class of accused for a special dispensation without room for any appeal as of right and without power of the revision to the High Court. There is prejudice in that, Reliance placed on the decision of this Court in

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Ramesh Chandra Arora v. The State, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 924 at 927 was not proper in the facts of this case.

If a discrimination is brought about by judicial perception and not by executive whim, if it is unauthorised by law, it will be in derogation of the right of the appellant as the special procedure in Anwar Ali B Sarkar's case (supra) curtailed the rights and privileges of the accused. Similarly, in this case by judicial direction the rights and privileges of the accused have been curtailed without any justification in law. Reliance was placed on the observations of the seven Judges Bench in Re: Special Courts Bill, 1978 (supra). Shri Jethmalani relied on the said observations therein and emphasised that purity in public life is a goal at all times and in all situations and ordinary Criminal c desired Courts due to congestion of work cannot reasonably be expected to bring the prosecutions to speedy termination. He further submitted that it is imperative that persons holding high public or political office must be speedily tried in the interests of justice. Longer these trials last, justice will tarry, assuming the charges to be justified, greater will D be the impediments in fostering democracy, ·which is not a plant of easy growth. All this is true but the trial even of person holding public office though to be made speedily must be done in accordance with the procedure established by law. The provisions of section 6 read with section 7 of the Act of 1952 in the facts and circumstances of this case is the procedure established by law; any deviation even by a judicial E direction will be negation of the rule of law.

Our attention was drawn to Article 145(e) and it was submitted that review can be made only where power is expressly conferred and the review is subject to the rules made under Article 145(e) by the Supreme Court. The principle of finality on which the Article proceeds applies to both judgments and orders made by the Supreme Court. But directions given per incuriam and in violation of certain constitutional limitations and in derogation of the principles of natural justice can always be remedied by the court ex debite justitiae. Shri Jethmalani's submission was that ex debite justitiae, these directions could not be recalled. We are unable to agree with this submission.

The Privy Council in Isaacs v. Robertson, (1984] 3 A.E.R. 140 held that orders made by a Court of unlimited jurisdiction in the course of contentious litigation are either regular or irregular. If an order is regular it can only be set aside by an appellate Court; if it is irregular it can be set aside by the Court that made it on application H being made to that Court either under rules of Court dealing expressly

A.R. ANTULAY "· R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI, J.]

with setting aside orders for irregularity or ex debite justitiae if the circumstances warranted, namely, where there was a breach of the rules of natural justice etc. Shri Jethmalani urged before us that Lord Diplock had in express terms rejected the argument that any orders of a superior Court of unlimited jurisdiction can over be void in the sense that they can be ignored with impunity. We are not concerned with that. Lord Diplock delivered the judgment. Another Judge who sat in the Privy Council with him was Lord Keith of Kinkel. Both these Law Lords were parties to the House of Lords judgment in Re Racal Communications Ltd. case [1980] 2 A.E.R. 634 and their Lordships did not extend this principle any further. Shri Jethnialani submitted that there was no question of reviewing an order passed on the construction of law. Lord Scarman refused to extend the Anisminic principle to superior Courts by the felicitous statement that this amounted to comparison of incomparables. We are not concerned with this controversy. We are not "comparing incomparables. We are correcting an irregularity committed by Court not on construction or misconstruction of a statute but on non-perception of certain provisions and certain authorities which would amount to derogation of the constitutional rights of the citizen.

The directions given by the order of 16th February, 1984 at page 557 were certainly without hearing though in the presence of the parties. Again consequential upon directions these were challenged ultimately in this Court and finally this Court reserved the right to E ' challenge these by an appropriate application. The directions were in deprival of Constitutional rights and contrary to the express provisions of the Act of 1952. The directions were given in violation of the principles of natural justice. The directions were without precedent in the background of the Act of 1952. The directions definitely deprived the appellant of certain rights of appeal and revision and his rights under the Constitution. We do not labour ourselves on the question of discretion to disobey a judicial order on the ground of invalid judicial order. See discretion to Disobey by Mertimer R. Kadish and Sanford H. Kadish pages 111 and 112. These directions were void because the power was not there for this Court to transfer a proceeding under the Act of 1952 from one Special Judge to the High Court. This is not a case of collateral attack on judicial proceeding; it is a case where the Court having no Court superior to it rectifies its own order. We recognise that the distinction between an error which entails absence. of jurisdiction and

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an error made within the jurisdiction is very fine. So fine indeed that it is rapidly being eroded as observed by Lord Wilberforce in Anismimc Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commissioner, [1969) 1 All E.R. 208 at 244. Having regard to the enormity of the consequences of the error to the appellant and by reason of the fact that the directions were given suo motu, we do not find there is anything in the observations of lttavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey and another, [1964) 1 S.C.R. 495 which detract the power of the Court to review its judgment ex debit•? justitiae in case injustice has been caused. No court, however, high han jurisdiction to give an order unwarranted by the Constitution and,, therefore, the principles of Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. D.C. Patel, [1953) S.C.R. 185 at 190would not apply. In giving the directions this Court infringed the Constitutional safeguards granted to a citizen or to an accused and injustice results therefrom. It is just and proper for the Court to rectify and recall that in justice, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

This case has caused us considerable anxiety. The appellantaccused has held an important position in this country, being the Chief Minister of a premier State of the country. He has been charged with serious criminal offences. His trial in accordance with law and the procedure established by law would have to be in accordance with the 1952 Act. That could not possibly be done because of the directions of E this Court dated 16th February, 1984, as indicated above. It has not yet been found whether the appellant is guilty or innocent. It is unfortunate, unfortunate for the people of the State, unfortunate for the country as a whole, unfortunate f'i'r the future working of domocracy in this country which, though is not a plant of an easy growth yet is with deep root in the Indian polity that delay has occurred due to F procedural wrangles. The appellant may be guilty of grave offences alleged against him or he may be completely or if not completely to a large extent, innocent. Values in public life and perspective of these , values in public life, have undergone serious changes and erosion during the last few decades. What was unheard of before is common place today. A new value orientation is being undergone in our life and in G our culture. We are at the threshold of the cross-roads of values. It is, for the sovereign people of the country to settle those conflicts yet the Courts have vital roles to play in such matters. With the avowed object of speedier trial the case of the appellant had been transferred to the High Court but on grounds of expediency of trial he cannot be subjected to a procedure unwarranted by law, and contrary to the H constitutional provisions. The appellant may or may not be an ideal

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MUKHARJI. J.J

politician, It is a fact, however, that the allegations have been brought against him by a person belonging to a political party opposed to his but that is not the decisive factor. If the appellant-Shri Abdul Rehman Antulay has infringed law, he must be dealt with in accordance with the law. We proclaim and pronounce that no man is above the law; but at the same time reiterate and declare that no man can be denied his rights under the Constitution and the laws. He has a right to be dealt with in accordance with the law and not in derogation of it. This Court, in its anxiety to facilitate the parties to have a speedy trial gave directions on 16th February, 1984 as mentioned hereinbefore without conscious awareness of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts under the 1952 Act and that being the only procedure established by law, there can be no deviation from the terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. That is the only procedure under which it should have been guided. By reason of giving the directions on 16th February, 1984 this Court had also unintentionally caused the appellant the denial of rights under Article 14 of the Constitution by denying him the equal protection of law by being signled out for a special procedure not provided for by law. When these factors are brought to the notice of this Court, even if there are any technicalities this Court should not feel shackled and decline to rectify that injustice or otherwise the injustice noticed will remain forever a blot on justice. It has been said long time ago that "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit"an act of the Court sha,ll prejudice no man. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law.

Lord Cairns in Alexander Rodger v. The Comptoir D'escompte De Paris, (Law Reports Vol. III 1869-71 page 465 at page 475) observed thus:

"Now, their Lordships are of opinion, that one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the Suitors, and when the expression 'the act of the Court' is used, it does not mean merely the act of the Primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case. It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals, if I may use the expression, to take care that no act of the Court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the Court."

'

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[19S8) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

This passage was quoted in the Gujarat High Court by D.A. Desai, J. speaking for the Gujarat High,Court in Vrajlal v. Jadavji (supra) as mentioned before. It appears that in giving directions on 16th February, 1984, this Court acted per incuriam inasmuch it did not bear in mind consciously the consequences and the provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the 1952 Act and the binding nature of the larger Bench decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (supra) which was not adverted to by this Court. The basic fundamentals of the administration of justice are simple. No man should suffer because of the mistake of the Court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or procedures are the hand-maids of justice and not the mistress of the justice. Ex debite justitiae, we must do justice to him. If a man has been wronged so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice that wrong must be remedied. This is a peculiar fact of this case which requires emphasis . .Shri Rao, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently canvassed before us that the appellant has suffered a great wrong for over six and a half years. He has undergone trials and proceedings because of the mistakes of the Court. Shri Rao submitted that the appellant should be made not to suffer more. Counsel urged that political battles must be fought in the political arena. Yet a charge of infraction of law cannot remain uninvestigated against itn erstwhile Chief Minister of a premier State of the coun!ry.

Shri Rao has canvassed before us on the authority of Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 169 at 179-180; Kadra Pahadiyal (I) v. State of Bihar, A.LR. 1981 S.C. 939; Kadra Pahadiya (II) v. State of Bihar, A.LR. 1982 S.C. 1167 and Sheela Barse v. Union of India, A.LR. 1986 S.C. 1773. He has, howF ever, very strongly relied upon the observations of this Court in Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (supra). In that case ihe appellant a government servant was tried and convicted to suffer imprisonment for two years for offences under Section 506 read with Section 34, I.P.C. He was not represented at the trial by any lawyer by reason of his inability to afford legal representation. On appeal the High Court held that the trial was not vitiated since no application for legal aid was made by him. On appeal this Court quashed the conviction and considered the question whether the appellant would have to be tried in accordance with law after providing legal assistance to him. This Court felt that in the interests of justice the appellant should be reinstated in service without back wages and accordingly directed that H no trial should take place. Shri Rao submitted that we should in the

•

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MISRA, .I.I

facts of this case in the interests of justice direct that the appellant should not be tried again. Shri Rao submitted to let the appellant go only on this long delay and personal inconveniences suffered by the appellant, no more injury be caused to him. We have considered the submission. Yet we must remind ourselves that purity of public Ufe is one of the cardinal principal which must be upheld as a matter of public policy. Allegations of legal infractions and criminal infractions must be investigated in accordance with law and procedure established under the Constitution. Even if he has been wronged, if he is allowed to be left in doubt that would cause more serious damage to the appellant. Public confidence in public administration should not be eroded any further. One wrong cannot be remedied by another wrong.

In the aforesaid view of the matter and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the legal wrong that has been caused to the appellant should be remedied. Let that wrong be therefore remedied. Let right be done and in doing so let no more further injury be caused to public purpose.

In the aforesaid view of•the matter the appeal is allowed; all

proceedings in this matter subsequent to the directions of this Court on 16th February, 1984 as indicated before are set aside and quashed. The trial shall proceed in accordance with law, that is to say under the Act of 1952 as mentioned hereinbefore. RANG ANATH MISRA, J: I have had the advantage of perusing

the judgment proposed by my learned Brother Mukharji, J. While I agree with the conclusion proposed by my esteemed Brother, keeping the importance of the matter, particularly the consequences the decision may generate as also the fact that I was a party to the two-Judge Bench decision 'of this Court reported in 1986 (2) SCC 716 in view, I propose to express my opinion separately. Abdul Rehman Antulay, the appellant, was the Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra from 1980 till January 20, 1982, when he resigned his office but continued to be a member of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, Respondent No. 1 herein, lodged a complaint in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 28th Esplanade, Bombay, on September 11, 1981, against Antulay alleging commission of several offences under the lndiao . ' Penal Code as also Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ('1947 Act' for short). The learned Magistrate was of the view that prosecution under Sections 161 and 165 of the Penal Code and

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A Section 5 of the 1947 Act required sanction as a condition precedent and in its absence the complaint was not maintainable. The Governor of Bombay later accorded sanction and the Respondent no. 1 filed a fresh complaint, this time in the Court of the Special Judge of Bombay, alleging the commission of those offences which had formed the subject-matter of the complaint before the Magistrate. On receivB ing summons from the Court of the particular Special Judge, Antulay took the stand that the said Special Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in view of the provisions of Section 7 of the Criminal Law Aniendment Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 1952 Act) to take cognizance and such cognizance could not be taken on a private complaint. These objections were overruled by the Special C Judge by order dated October 20, 1982, and the case was set down for recording evidence of the prosecution. The Criminal Revision Petition of the accused against the order of the Special Judge was rejected by the Bombay High Court and it held that a private complaint was maintainable and in view of the notification specifying a particular Special Judge for the offences in question there was no basis for the objecD tions. This Court granted special leave to the accused against the decision of the High Court that a private complaint was maintainable. Crimi;ial Appeal No. 347 of 1983 thus came to be instituted. In the meantime, objection raised before the Special Judge that without sanction the accused who still continued to be a member of Legislative Assembly, could not be prosecuted came to be accepted by the Special E Judge. The complainant filed a criminal revision application before the High Court questioning that order. This Court granted special leave against the decision that sanction was necessary, whereupon Criminal Appeal No. 356 of 1983 was registered and the pending crinimal revision application before the High Court was transferred to this Court. Both the criminal appeals and the transferred criminal revision were F heard together by a five-Judge Bench of this Court but the two appeals were disposed of by two separate judgments delivered on February 16, 1984. The judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 347 of 1983 is reported in (1984) 2 SCR 914. In the present appeal we are not very much concerned with that judgment. The judgment of Criminal Appeal No. 356 of 1983 is reported in (1984) 2 SCR 495. As already noticed the main G theme of the criminal appeal was as to whether a member of the Legislative Assembly was a public servant for whose prosecution fpr the offences involved in the complaint sanction was necessary as a condition precedent. This Court at page 557 of the Reports came to hold:

"To sum up, the learned Special Judge was clearly in

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MISRA, J.]

7)

error in holding that M.L.A. is a public servant within the meaning of the expression in Section 12(a) and further erred in holding that a sanction of the Legislative Assembly of Maharashtra or majority of the members was a condition precedent to taking cognizance of offences committed by the accused. For the reasons herein stated both the conclusions are wholly unsustainable and must be quashed and set aside."

Consequently this Court directed: "This appeal accordingly succeeds and is allowed. The order and decision of the learned Special Judge Shri R.B. Sule dated July 25, 1983 discharging the accused in Special Case No. 24 of 1982 and Special Case No. 3/1983 is hereby set aside and the trial shall proceed further from the stage where the accused was discharged." This Court gave a further direction to the following effect: ;

>

"The accused was the Chief Minister of a premier State-the State of Maharashtra. By a prosecution launched as early as on September 11, 1981, his character and integrity came under a cloud. Nearly 2: '12 years have rolled by and the case has not moved an inch further. An expeditious trial is primarily in the interest of the accused and a mandate of Article 21. Expeditious disposal of a criminal case is in the interest of both, ·the prosecution and the accused. Therefore, Special Case No. 24 of 1982 and Special Case No: 3/83 pending in the Court of Special Judge, Greater Bombay Shri R.B. Sule are withdrawn and transferred to the High Court of Bombay with a request to the learned Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a: sitting Judge of the High Court. On being so assigned, the learned Judge may proceed to expeditiously dispose of the cases preferably by holding the trial from day to day."

Pursuant to this direction, the two cases came to be post~d for trial before Khatri J. of the Bombay High Court and trial opened on April 9, 1984. The appellant challenged Khatri J. ;s jurisdiction on 12th March, 1984 when the matter was first placed before him but by two separate 'orders dated 13th March, 1984 and 16th March, 1984, th: learned Judge rejected the objection by saying that he was bound by

[ 1988] Supp.

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this Court's direction of the 16th February, 1984. Antulay then moved this Court by filing an application under Article 32 of the Constitution. A two-Judge Bench consisting of Desai and A.N. Sen. JJ. by order dated 17th April, 1984 dismissed the applications by saying:

Sen, J.: "There is no merit in this writ petition. The writ peti­ tion is accordingly dismissed.

In my view, the writ petition challenging the validity of the order and judgment passed by this ti;urt as nullity or otherwise incorrect cannot be entertained. I wish to make it clear that the dismissal of this writ petition will not pre­ judice the right of the petitioner to approach the Court with an appropriate review petition or to file any other application which he may be entitled in law to file." Desai, J.: "I broadly agree with the conclusion recorded by my brother. The learned Judge in deciding the SLP (Cr!.) Nos. 1949-50 of 1984 has followed the decision of this Court. The learned Judge was perfectly justified and indeed it was the duty of the learned Judge to follow the decision of this Court which is binding on him. Special leave petitions are dismissed." (1984 (3) SCR 482). -

p

16 witnesses were examined by Khatri J. by July 27, 1984. Khatri J. was relieved of trying the case on his request, whereupon the learned Chief Justice numinated Mehta J. to continue the trial. 41 more witnesses were examined before him and at the stage when 57 wit­ nesses in all had been examined for the prosecution, the Trial Judge invited the parties to consider the framing of charges. 43 draft charges were placed for his consideration on behalf of the prosecution and the learned Trial Judge framed 21 charges and recorded an order of dis­ charge in respect of the remaining 22. At the instance of the complain­ ant, Respondent No. 1, the matter came before this Court in appeal on special leave and a two-Judge Bench of which I happened to be one, by

judgment dated April 17, 1986, in Criminal Appeal No. 658 of 1985

[(1962) 2 sec 716] set aside the order of discharge in regard to the H several offences excepting extortion and directed the learned Trial

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MISRA, .J.J

Judge to frame charges for the same. This Court n;q11ested.~l,i.e•]earned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court to nominate anoth.er Judge to take up the matter from the stage at wl,iich Mehta J. had mad.e the .order of discharge. Shah J. came to .be nominated •by the learned Chief .:Justice to continue the trial. By order ,dated July 24,, 1986, Shah J .. rejected the application of the accused for proceeding against the alleged co-conspirators by holding that there had been a long delay, B most of the prosecution witnesses had already been examined and that if the co-conspirators were then brought on record, a de novo trial would be necessitated. The appellant challenged the order of Shah J. by filing a special leave petition before this Court wherein he farther alleged that the High Court had no jurisdiction to try the case. A ·two-Judge "Ben~h, of whic_h •Mykh,erji J., my learned brother, was a member, granted special leaye, whereupon this Criminal Appeal c (No. 468 of 1986).cameto be registered. The'Respondent.No. 1 asked for revocation of special leave in .Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4248 of 1986. While rejecting .the said revocation applic_ation, by order dat.ed October 29, 1986, i)le two,Judge Bench formulated several questions that.arose for consideration and referred the matter D for hearing by a Benrh of seven Judges of the•Court. That is how this seven-Judge Bench has comet() be constituted to hear the appeal.

·,

It is the settled position in law that jurisdiction of courts comes solely from the law of the land and cannot be exercised otherwise. So far as the position in this country is concerned conferment of jurisdic- lE tion is possible either by the provisions -0f the Constitution or by specific laws enacted by the Legislature. For instance, .Article 129 confers all the powers of a court of record on the Supreine Court including the power to punish for contempt ·Of itself. Articles 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137·, 138 and 139 confer different jurisdictions -00 the Supreme Court while Articles 225, 226, 227, 228 and 230 deal with ;F conferment of jurisdiction on the High Courts. Instances of conferment of jurisdiction by specific law are very common. The law_s of procedure both criminal and civil confer jurisdiction on different courts. Special jurisdiction is con.ferred· by special statute. It is thus clear that jurisdiction can be exercised only when provided for either in the Constitution or in the laws made by the Legislature. Jurisdiction G is thus the authority or power of the court to deal with a matter -and make an order carrying binding force in the facts. In support of judicial opinion for this view reference may be made to the permanent edition of 'Words and Phrases Vol. 23A' at page 1611. It .would be appropriat,e to refer to two small passages occurring at ·pages 174 .a1,1d .175 of the Volume1·At page 174, referring to the decision in Carli/e.v. N(ltiona/ H

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I19881 Supp. 1 S.C.R.

Oil & Development Co. it has been stated: "Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine, and in order .that it may exist the following1<1re essential: (1) A court created by law, organized and sitting; (2) authority given it by law to hear and determine causes of the kind in question; (3) power given it by law to render a judgment such as it assumes to render; (4) authority over the parties to the case if the judgment is to bind them personally as.a judgment in personam, which is acquired over the plaintiff by his appearance and· submission of the matter to the court, and is acquired over the defendant by his voluntary appearance, or by service of process on him; (5) authority over the thing adjudicated upon its being located within the court's territory' and by actually seizing it if liable to be carried away; (6) authority to decide the question involved, which is acquired by the question being submitted to" it by the parties for decisiod." ·

Article 139A of the Constitution·authorises this Court to-transfer cases from a High Court to itself or from one High Court to another and is, therefore, not relevant for our purpose. Section 406 of the Code empowers this Court to transfer cases and appeals by providing:

•

"(l) Whenever it is made .to appear to the Supreme Court that an order under this section is expedient for the ends of justice, it may direct that any particular case of appeal be transferred from one High Court to another High Court or from a Crimine.l Court subordinate to one High Court to an.other Criminal Court of equal or superior juris~ diction subordinate to another High Court. · (2) The Supreme Court may act under this $ection only on the application of the Attorney-General of India or of a party interested, and every such application shall be made by motion, which shall, except when the applicant is the Attorney-General of India or the Advocate-General of the State, be supported by affiavit or affirmation. (3) .............. ".

The offences alleged to have been committed by the accused here are either p\lnishable under the Penal Code or under Act 2 of 1947, both

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAY AK [MISRA, .T.J

of which could have been tried in an appropriate court under the Criminal Procedure Code; but Parliament by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 46 of 1952 (1952 Act for short) amended both the Penal Code as also the Criminal Procedure Code with a view to providing for a more speedy trial of certain offences. The relevant sections of the 1952 Act are sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. For convenience, they are extracted below:

"6. Power to appoint special Judges {1) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint as many special Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas as may be specified· in the notific.ation to try the following offences, namely,

·'

..(a) an· offence punishable under section 161, section 162, section 163, section 164, section 165 or section 165A of the .{ndiaP Penal Code (45 of 1860) or section 5 of the Preventi<>n of Corruption Act, .1947 (2 of 1947);

· (b) any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to . commit' or r.ny abetment of any of the offences specified in clause (a). (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a special Judge under this Act unless he is, or has been, a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions .Tuclgc undct the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1898 (5 of 1898) .. ,

"7. Coses triable by Special Judges (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898). ot in any other law the offences specified in sub·section ( 1) of section 6 shall be triable by ·Special. Judges only;

(2) Every offence specified in sub-section ( l) of section 6 shall be tried by the Special Judge for the area within which it was committed, or where there are more Special Judges than one for such area, by such one bf them as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government.

(3) When trying any case, a Special Judge may also

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[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

try any offence other than an offeru:« specified in section 6 with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5of1898), be charged at the.same irial".

''

8. Procedure and powers of Special Judges (1) A Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial, and in .trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates.

'

(2) A special Judge, may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirect!}' concerned in, or privy to, an offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full a.nd true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor; in the commission thereof; and any pardon so tendered shall, for the purposes .of ~ections ·339 and 339·A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (S of 1898), be deemed to have been tendered under section 338 at' that Code. (3) Save as provided in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge; and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Court of the Special Judge ·shall be deemed to be a Court of Session t'l'}'ing cases without '!, jury or without the aid of assessors and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Judge·shall be deemed to.be a public prosecutor. (3-A) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (3), the ·provisions of sections 350 and 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), shall, so far as may be. apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge, and for the purposes of the said provisions a special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate. (4) A special Judge may pass upon any person convicted by him any sentence authorized by law for punish-

A.R: ANTULAY ,. R.S. NAYAK IMISRA, J.I

ment of the offence of which such person is convicted."

"9. Appeal and revision-The High Court may exer­ cise, so far as they may be applicable, all the powers con­ ferred by Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) on a High Court as if the Court of the special Judge were a Court of Session trying

cases without a jury within the local limits of the jurisdic­ tion of the High Court." "10. Transfer of certain peniiing cases-All cases tri­

able by a special Judge under section 7 which, immediately before the commencement of this Act, were pending before any Magistrate shall, on such commencement, be

C

forwarded for trial to the special Judge having jurisdiction over such cases." On the ratio of the seven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284 the vires of

this Act are not open to challenge. The majority of the learned Judges in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case expressed the view that it was open to the Legislature to set up a special forum for expedient trial or n particular class of cases. Section 7(1) has clearly provided that offences specified in sub-section (1) of section 6 shall be triable by the Special Judge only and has taken away the power of the courts established under the Code of Criminal Procedure to try those offences. Section 10 of the Act

required all pending cases on the date of commencement of the Act to stand transferred to the respective Special Judge. Unless there be challenge to the provision creating exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Judge, the procedural law in the Amending Act is binding on courts as also the parties and no court is entitled to make orders contrary to the law which are binding. As long as section 7 of the Amending Act of

1952 hold the field it was not open to any court including the apex Court to act contrary to section 7( 1) of the Amending Act. The power to transfer a case conferred by the Constitution or by section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not specifically relate to the special Court. Section 406 of the Code could perhaps be

applied on the principle that the Special Judge was a subordinate court for transferring a case from one special Judge to another special Judge.

That \llGU\d be so because such a transfer would not contravene the mandate of section 7(1) of the Amending Act of 1952. While that may be so, the provisions for transfer, already referred to, do not authorise

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[19881 Supp. 1 S.C.R.

transfer of a case pending in th,e court of a special Judge first to the Supreme Court and then to the High Court for trial. A four Judge Bench in Raja Soap Factory v. S.P. Santharaj, [1965] 2 SCR 800 was considering the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with a matter Shah J., as he then was, spoke for the court thus: "But if the learned Judge, as reported in the summary of the judgment, was of the opinion that the High Court is competent to assume to itself jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess, merely because an 'extra-ordinary situation' has arisen, with respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to approve of that view. By 'jurisdiction' is meant the extent of the' power which is conferred upon.the court by its Constitution to try a proceeding; its exercise cannot be enlarged because what the learned Judge calls an extraordinary _situation 'requires' the Court tO ex_erc!se it".

, Brother Mukharji in his elaborate judgment has come to the D conclusion that the question of transferring the case from the court of the special Judge to the High Court was not in issue before the fiveJudge Bench. Mr. Jethmalani in course of the argument has almost accepted the position that this was not asked for on behalf of the complainant at the hearing of the matter before the Constitution Bench. From a reading of the judgment of the Constitution Bench it E appears that the transfer was a suo motu direction of the court. Since this particular aspect of the matter had not been argued and counsel did not have an opport.unity of pointing out the legal bar against transfer, the learned Judges of this Court obviously did not take note of the special provisions in section 7( l) of the 1952 Act. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Rao for Antulay that if this position had been F appropriately placed, the direction for transfer from the court oi exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court would not have been made by the Constitution Bench. It is appropriate to presumethatthis Court never' intends to act contrary to law.

There is no doubt that after the Division Bench of Desai and Sen, JJ. dismissed the writ petition and the special leave petitions on 17th April, 1984, by indicating that the petitioner could file an appropriate review petition or any other application which he may be entitled in law to file, no further action was taken until charges were fran1ed on the basis of evidence of 57 \vitne~ses and a mass of docu-

men ts. After a gap of more than three years, want of jurisdiction of the H High Court was sought to be reagitated before the two-Judge Bench

.r _

A.R. ANTULAY '"

R.S. NAYAK [MISRA . .I.I

in the present proceedings. During this intervening period of three years or so a lot of evidence wa5 collected by examining the prosecu- A tion witnesses and exhibiting documents. A learned Judge of the High Court devoted his full time to the case. Mr. Jethmalani pointed out to us in course of his argument that the evidence that has already been collected is actually ahnost three-fourths of what the prosecution had to put in. Court's time has been consumed, evidence has been col- B lected and parties have been put to huge expenses. To entertain the claim of the appellant that the transfer of the case from the Special Judge to the High Court was without authority of law at this point of time would necessarily wipe out the evidence and set the clock back by about four years. It may be that so_tne of the witnesses may no longer be available when the de novo. trial takes place. Apart from these features, according to Mr. Jethmalani to say at this stage that the- C dire.ction given by a five-Judge Bench is not. binding and, therefore, not operative ·will shakeethe confidence of. the litigant public in the judicial pmcess and.in the interest of the system fr should not be done, ·. Long arguments were advanced on .either side in support of their · respective stands-the appellant pleading that the 'direction for trans- . D fer of the proceedings from the Spe,cial Judge tq the High Court was a nullity and Mr . .Jethmalani contending that the ~pex,Court had exercised its powers for expediting the frial and the action was not contrary to law, Brother Mukharji has dealt with these submissions at length and I do not find any necessity to dwell. upon this aspect· in full measure. In the ultimate analysis I am satisfied that this Court did.not E ·possess the power to transfer the proceedings from the _Special)udge to the High Court: Antulay has raised objection at this stage before the matter has been concluded. In case after a full dressed trial, he is convicted, there can be no doubt that the wise men in law will raise on his behalf, inter alia, the same conten\ion as has been advanced now by way of challenge to the conviction. If the accused is really guilty of the F offences as alleged by the prosecution there can be no two opinions that he should be suitably punished and the social mechanism of punishing the guilty must come heavily upon him. No known loopholes should be permitted to creep in and subsist so as to give a handle to the accused to get out.,of the net by pleading legal ·infirmity ~hen on facts the offences are made'out. The importance of this consideration G should not be overlooked in assessing the situation as to whether the direction of this Court as contained in the five-Judge Bench decision should be permitted to be questioned at this stage or not.

' Mr. Rao for Antulay argued at length and Brother Mukharji has noticed all those contentions that by the change of the forum of the

o

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trial the accused has been prejudiced. Undoubtedly, by this process he misses a forum of appeal because if the trial was handled by .a Special Judge, the first appeal would lie to the High Court and a further appeal by special leave muld come before this Court. If the matter is'tried by the High Court theie w.ould be only one forum .of appeal being this Court, whether as of right or by way of special leave. The appellant has also conlended that the direction violates Article .14 of the Constitution because he alone has been singled out and picked up for being t•eated differently from similarly placed accused persons. Some of these aspects cannot be overlooked with ease. I must, however, indicate here that the argument based upon the extended meaning given to the contents of Article 21 of the Constitution, though attractive have not appealed to me. One of the well-known principles of law is that decision made by a competent court should be taken as final subject to further proceedings ·contemplated by the law of procedure. In the absence of any further proceeding, the direction of the Constitution Bench of 16ih of . February, 1984 became final and it is the obligation of everyone to implement the direction of the apex Court. Such an order of this Court should by all canons of judicial discipline be binding .on this Court as "'ell and cannot be interfered with after attaining finality. Brother Mukharji has referred to several authorities in support of h.is conclusionthat an order made without jurisdiction is not a valid one and can be ignored, overlooked or brushed aside depending upon the situation. I .do not propose to delve into that. aspect in my separate judgment. · It is a well-settled p<>Sition in law that an act of the court should not injure any of- the suitors. The Privy Council in the well-known debsion of Alexander Rodger v. The·Comptori D' Escompte De Paris, [1871] 3 P.C. 465 observed:-

"One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression act of the court is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter upto the highest court which finally dis·poses of the. c.ase. It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals, if I may use the expression, to take care that no act of the court in the course of the whole of the proceed-

•

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A.R. ANTULAY L

R.S. NAYAK [MISRA. J.[

ingS does an injury to the suitors in courts."

Brother Mukharji has also referred to several other authorities which support this view. · Once it is found that the order of transfer by this Court dated 16th of February, 1984, was not within jurisdiction by the direction of the transfer of the proceedings made by this Court, the appellant should not suffer.

What remains to be decided is the procedure by which the direction of the 16th of February, 1984, could be recalled or altered. There can be no doubt that certiorari shall not lie to quash a judicial order of C this Court. That is so on account of the fact that the Benches of this Court are not subordinate to larger Benches thereof and certiorari is, therefore, not admissible for quashing of the orders made on the judicial side of the court. Mr. Rao had relied upon the ratio in the case of Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, UP., Allahabad, [1963] 1 SCR 885. Brother Mukharji has dealt with this case at considerable D length. This Court was then dealing with an Article 32 petition which

had been filed to challenge the vires of rule 12 of Order 35 of this Court's Rules. Gajendragadkar, J., as the learned Judge then was, spoke for himself and three of his learned brethren including the learned Chief Justice. The facts of the case as appearing from the judgment show that there was a judicial order directing furnishing of E security of Rs.2,500 towards the respondent's costs and the majority judgment directed: "In the result, the petition is allowed and the order passed against the petitioners on December 12, 1961, calling upon them to furnish security of Rs.2,500 is set aside." F Shah, J. who wrote a separate judgment upheld the vi res of the rule and directed dismissal of the petition. The fact that a judicial order was being made the subje~t matter of a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was not noticed and whether such a proceeding was tenable was not considered. A nine-Judge Bench of this Court in Naresh G Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., [1966] 3 SCR 744 referred to the judgment in Prem Chand Garg's case (supra). Gajendragadkar, CJ., who delivered the leading and ma.iority judgment stated at page 765 of the Reports: "In support of his argument that a judicial decision

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I1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

can be corrected by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 32(2), Mr. Setalvad has relied upon another decision of this Court in Prem Chand Garg v~ Excise Commissioner, UP. Allahabad (supra). In that case, the petitioner had been required to furnish security for the costs of the respondent under rule 12 of order 35 of the Supreme Court lfoles. By his petition filed under Article 32, he contended that the rule was invalid as it placed• obstructions on the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. This plea was upheld by the majority decision with the result that the order requiring him to furnish security was vacated. In appreciating the effect of this decision, it'is necessary to bear in mind the nature of the contentions raised before the Court in that case. The rule itself, in terms, conferred discretion on the court, while dealing with applications made under Article 32, to impose such terms as to costs as to the giving of security as it thinks fit. The learned Solicitor General who supported the validity of the rule, urged that though the order requiring security to be deposited may be said to retard or obstruct the fundamental right of the citizen guaranteed by Article 32(1), the rute itself could not be effectively challenged as invalid, because it was merely discretionary; it did not impose an obligation on the court to demand any security; and he supplemented his argument by contending that under Article 142 of the Constitution, the powers of this court were wide enough to impose any term or condition subject to which proceedings before this Court could be permitted to be conducted. He suggested that the powers of this Court under Article 142 were not subject to any of the provisions contained in Part III including Article 32(1). On the other hand, Mr. Pathak who challenged the validity of the rule, urged that though the rule was in form and in substance discretionary. he disputed the validity of the power which the rule conferred on this Court to demand security ........... It would thus be seen that the main controversy in the case of Prem Chand Garg centered round the question as to whether Article 145 conferred powers on this Court to make rules, though they may be inconsistent with the constitutional provisions prescribed by Part III. Once it was held that the powers under Article 142 had to be read subject not only to the fundamental

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MISRA, J.J

-~·

rights, but to other binding statutory provisions, it became A clear that the rule which authorised the making of the impugned order was invalid. It was in that context that the validity of the order had te be incidentally examined. The petition was made not to challenge the order as such, but to challenge the validity of the rule under which the order was made. Once a rule was struck ct.own as being invalid, the B order passed under the said rule had to be vacated. It is difficult to see how this decision can be pressed into service by Mr. Setalvad in support of the argument that a judicial order passed by this Court was held to be subject to the writ jurisdiction of this Court itself ....... ". In view of this decision in Mirajkar's case. (supra) it must be taken as concluded that judicial proceedings in this Court are not subject to the writ jurisdiction thereof.

On behalf of the appellant; at one stage, it was contended that the appeal may be taken as a review. Apart from the fact that the D petition of review had to be filed within 30 days-and here there has been inordinate delay-the petition for review had to be placed before the same Bench and now that two of the learned Judges of that Constitution Bench are still available, it must have gone only before a Bench of five with those two learned Judges. Again under the Rules of the Court a review petition was not to be heard in Court and was liable E to be disposed of by circulation. In these circumstances, the petition of appeal could not be taken as a review petition. The question, therefore, to be considered now i~ what is the modality to be followed for vacating the impugned direction. This being the apex Court, no litigant has any opportunity of F approaching any higher forum to question its decisions. Lord Buckmaster in 1917 A.C. 170 stated: "All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure proper administration of justice. It is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve. and be subordinate to that purpose."

This Court in Gujarat v. Ram Prakash, [1970] 2 SCR 875 reiterated the position by saying: "Procedure is the handmaid and not a mistress of

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law, intended to subserve and facilitate the cause of justice and not to govern or obstruct it, like all rules of procedure, this rule demands a construction which would promote this cause." Once judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the Court to rectify the mistake by exercising inherent powers. Judicial opinion heavily leans in favour of this view that a mistake of the Court can be corrected by the Court itself without any fetters. This is on the principle as indicated in Alexander Rodger's case (supra). I am of the view that in the present situation, the Court's inherent powers can be exercised to remedy the mistake. Mahajan, J. speaking for a four-Judge Bench in Kishan Dea v. Radha Kissen, {1953] SCR 136, at page 153 stated: "The Judge had jurisdiction to correct his own error without entering into ·a discussion of the grounds taken by the decree-holder or the objections raised by the judgmentdebtors." The Privy Council in Debi v. Habib, ILR 35 All. 331, pointed out that an abuse of the process of the Court may be committed by the court or by a party. Where a court employed a procedure in doing something which it never intended to do and there is an abuse of the process of the court it can be corrected. Lord Shaw spoke for the Law lords thus: "Quite apart from section 151, any court might have rightly considered itself to possess an inherent power to rectify the mistake which had been inadvertently made." It was pointed out by the Privy Council in Murtaza v. Yasin, AIR 1916 PC 85 that:

"Where substantial injustice would otherwise result, the court has, in their Lordships' opinion, an inherent power to set aside its own judgments of condemnation so as to let in bona fide claims by parties ...... ". Indian authorities are in abundance to support the view that injustice done should be corrected by applying the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit an act of the court shall prejudice no one.

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [MISRA, J.]

To err is human, is the off-quoted sayi~g. Courts including the apex one are no exception. To own up the mistake when judicial satisfaction is reached does not militate against its status or authority. Perhaps it would enhance both. It is time to sound a note of caution. This Court under its Rules of Business ordinarily sits in divisions and not as a whole one. Each Bench, whether small or large, exercises the powers vested in the Court and decisions rendered by the Benches irrespective of their size are considered as decisions of the Court. The practice has developed that a larger Bench is entitled to overrule the decision of a smaller Bench notwithstanding the fact that each of the decisions is that of the Court. That principle, however, would not apply in the present situation and since we are sitting as a Bench of Seven we are not entitled to reverse the decision of the Constitution Bench. Overruling when made by a larger Bench of an earlier decision of a smaller one is intended to take away the precedent value of the decision without affe~ting the binding effect of the decision in the particular case. Antulay, therefore, is not entitled to take advantage of the matter being before a larger Bench. In fact, if it is a ~ase of exercise of inherent powers to

rectify a mistake it was open even to a five-Judge Bench to do that and it did not require a Bench larger than the Constitution Bench for that purpose. Mr. Jethmalani had told us during arguments that if there was E interference in this case there was possibility of litigants thinking that the. Court had made a direction by going out of its way because an influential person like Antulay was involved. We are sorry that such a suggestion was made before us by a senior counsel. If a mistake is detected and the apex Court is not able to correct it with a view to doing justice for fear of being misunderstood, the cause of justice is F bound to suffer and for the apex Court the apprehension would not be a valid consideration. Today it is Abdul Rehman Antulay with a political background and perhaps some status and wealth but tomorrow it can be any ill-placed citizen. This Court while administering justice does not take into consideration as to who is before it. Every litigant is entitled to the same consideration and if an order is war~anted in the G interest of justice, the contention of Mr. Jethmalani cannot stand in the way as a_ bar to the making of that order. There is still another aspect which should be taken note of. Finality of the orders is the rule. By our directing recall of an order the well-settled propositions of law would not be set at naught. Such a

p

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I1988) Supp. I S.C.R.

situation may not recur in the ordinary course of judicial functioning and if there be one certainly the Bench before which it comes would appropriately deal with it. No strait jacket formula can be laid down for judicial functioning particularly for the apex Court. The apprehension that the present decision may be used as a precedent to challe'nge judicial orders of this Court is perhaps misplaced because those who are familiar with the judicial functioning are aware of the limits and they would not seek support from this case as a precedent. We are sure that if precedent value is sought to be derived out of this decision, the Court which is asked to use this as an instrument would be alive to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in which this order is being made. I agree with the ultimate conclusion proposed by my learned brother Mukharji. OZA, J. I had the opportunity to go through opinion prepared by learned brother Justice Mukharji and I agree with his opinion. I have gone through these additional reasons prepared by learned brother Justice R.N. Misra. It appears that the learned brother had tried to emphasise that even if an error is apparent in a judgment or an order passed by this Court it will not be open to a writ of certiorari and I have no hesitation in agreeing with this view expressed. At the same time I have no hesitation in observing that there should be no hesitation in correcting an error in exercise of inherent jurisdiction if it comes to our notice. It is.clear from the opinions of learned brothers Justice Mukharji and Justice Misra that the jurisdiction to try a case could only be conferred by law enacted by the legislature and this Court could not confer jurisdiction if it does not exist in Jaw and it is this error which is sought to be corrected. Although it is unfortunate that it is being· corrected after long lapse of time. I agree with the opinion prepared by Justice Mukharji and also the additional opinion prepared by Justice Misra. RAY, ·J. I have the privilege of going through the judgment prepared by learned brother Mukharji, J and I agreed with the same. Recently, I have received a separate judgment from brother R .N. Misra, J and I have decipherred the same. In both the judgments it has been clearly observed that judicial order of this court is not amenable to a writ of certiorari for correcting

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A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK (VENKATACHALIAH, J.]

any error in the.judgment. It has also been observed that the jurisdiction or power to try and decide a cause is conferred on the courts by· the Law of the Lands enacted by the Legislature or by the provisions of the Constitution.· It has also been highlighted that the court cannot confer a jurisdiction on itself which is not provided in the law. It has also· been observed that the act of the court does not injure any of the suitors. It is for this reason that the error in question is sought to be corrected after a lapse of more than three years. I agree with the opinion expressed by Justice Mukharji in the judgment as well as the additional opinion given by Justice Misra in his separate judgment. VENKATACHALIAH, J. Appellant, a former Chief Minister of Maharashtra, is on trial for certain offences under Sections 161, 165, Indian Penal Code and under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The questions raised in .this appeal are extra-ordinary in many respects touching, as they do, certain matters fundamental to the finality of judicial proc~dings. It also raises a question--0f far-reaching consequences_.:_whether, independently of the review jurisdiction under Article 137 of the Constitution, a different bench of this Court, could undo the finality of earlier pronouncements of different benches which have, otherwfae, reached finality. If the appeal is accepted, it will have effect of blowing-off, by a side-wind as it were, a number of earlier decisions of different benches of this Court, binding inter-parties, rendered at various stages of the said criminal prosecution including three judgments cif 5 judge benches of this Court. What imparts an added and grim poignance to the case is that the appeal, if allowed, would set to naught all the proceedings taken over the years before three successive Judges of the High Court of Bombay and in which already _57 witnesses have been exami.ned for the prosecution-all these done pursuant to the direction dated 16.12.1984 issued by a five judge Be.nch of this Court. This by itself should be no deterrant for this Court to afford relief if there has been a gross miscarriage of justice and if appropriate proceedings recognised by law are taken. Lord Atkin said "Finality is a good thing, but justice is a better". [See 60 Indian Appeals 354 PC]. Considerations of finality are subject to the paramount consid~rations of justice; but the remedial action must be appropriate and known toJaw. The question is whether there is any such gross miscarriage of justice in this case, if so whether relief can be granted ih the manner now sought.

The words of caution of the judicial committee in Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. The Court of Wards & Ors., [1886] lILR 660 (at page 664) are worth recalling:

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[1988) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

"There is a salutary maxim which ought to be observed by all courts of last resort-interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. Its strict observance may occasionally entail hardship- upon individual litigants, but the mischief arising from that source must be small in comparison with the great mischief which would necessarily result from doubt being thrown upon the finality of the decisions of such a tribunal as this." (emphasis supplied). 2. I have had the opportunity, and the benefit, of reading in draft the learned and instructive opinions of my learned Brothers Sabyasachi Mukharji J., and Ranganath Misra J. They have, though for slightly differing reasons, proposed to accept the appeal. This will have the effect of setting-aside five successive earlier orders of d!fferent benches of the Court made at different stages of the criminal prosecution, including the three judgments of Benches of five Judges of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCR 495 and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1984) 2 SCR 914 and R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, [ 1984) 3 SCR 412. I have bestowed a respectful and anxious consideration to the weighty opinion of my brothers with utmost respect, I regret to have to deny myself the honour of agreeing with them in the view they take both of the problem and the solution that has commended itself to them. Apart from other things, how can the effect and finality of this Court's Order dated 17.4.1984 in Writ Petition No. 708 of 1984 be unsettled in these proceedings? Admittedly, this order was made after hearing and does not share the alleged vitiating factors attributed to the order dated 16.2.1984. That order concludes everything necessarily inconsistent with it. In all humility, !..venture to say that the proposed remedy and the procedure for its grant are fraught with far greater dangers than the supposed injustice they seek to relieve: and would throw open an unprecedented procedural flood-gate which might, quite ironically, enable a repetitive challenge to the present decision itself on the very grounds on which the relief is held permissible in the appeal. To seek to be wiser than the law, it is·said, is the very thing by good laws forbidden. Well trodden path is the best path. Ranganath Misra J. if I may say so with respect, has rightly recognised these imperatives:

"It is time to sound 'a note of caution. This Court

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK [VENKATACHAL!AH, J.]

under its rules of business ordinarily sits in divisions and not as a whole one. Each Bench, whether small or large, exercises the powers vested in the Court and decisions rendered by the Benches irrespective of their size are considered as decisions of the Court. The practice has developed that a larger bench is entitled to over-rule the decision of a small bench notwithstanding the fact that each of · the decisions is that of the Court. That principle, however, would not apply in the present situation and since we are sitting as a Bench of Seven we are not entitled to reverse the decision of the Constitution Bench." Learned brother, however, hopes this case to be more an exception than the Rule: "Finality of the orders is the rule. By our directing recall of an order the well-settled propositions of law would not be set at naught. Such a situation may not recur in the ordinary course of judicial functioning and if there be one, certainly the bench before which it comes would appropriately deal with it." 3. A brief advertence to certain antecedent events which constitute the back-drop for the proper perception of the core-issue arising in this appeal may not be out of place: Appellant was· the ·Chief Minister of Maharashtra between 9.6.1980 and 12.1.1982 on which latter date he resigned as a result of certain adverse findings made against him in a Court proceeding. On 9.8.1982; Ramdas Srinivas Nayak, respondent No. 1, with the sanction of the Governor of Maharashtra, accorded on 28. 7 .1982, filed in the Court of Special-Judge, Bombay, a criminal Case No. 24 of 1982 alleging against the appellant certain offences under Section ·161 and 165 of Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, of which the Special-Judge took cognisance.

Appellant questioned the jurisdiction of Special Judge to take G cognisance of those offences on a private compiaint. On 20.10.1982, the Special Judge over-ruled the objection. On 7.3.1983, the High Court dismissed appellant's revision petition in.which the order of the Special Judge was assaHed. The criminal case thereafter stood transferred to another Special Judge, Shri R.B. Sule. Appellant did not, accept the order of the High Court dlited 7.3 .1983 against which he ff

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[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

came up ln appeal to this court, by Special-leave, in Criminal appeal No. 347 of 1983. During the pendency of this appeal, however, another important event occurred. The Special Judge, Shri R.B. Sule, by his order dated 25.7.1983, discharged the appellant, holding that, the prosecution was not maintainable without the sanction of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, of which the appellant continued B to be a member, notwithstanding his ceasing to be Chief Minister. Respondent No. 1 challenged this order of discharge in a Criminal Revision Petition No. 354 of 1982 before the High Court of Bombay. Respondent No. 1 also sought, and was granted, special-leave to appeal against Judge Sule's order directly to this court in Criminal appeal No. 356 of 1983. This Court also withdrew to itself the ,said C criminal revision application No. 354 of 1982 pending before the High Court. All the three matters-the two appeals (Cr!. A. 347 of 1983 and 356 of 1983) and Criminal Revision Petition so withdrawn to this Court-were heard by a five Judge bench and disposed of by two separate Judgments dated 16.2.1984.

By Judgment in Cr!. appeal N9. 356 of 1983 R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, [1984] 2 SCR 495 this Court, while setting aside the view of the Special Judge that sanction of the Legislative Assembly was necessary, further directed the trial of the case by a Judge of the Bombay , High Court. This Court observed that despite lapse of several years after commencement of the prosecution the case had "not moved an E inch further", that "expeditious trial is primarily necessary in the interest of the accused and mandate of Article 21", and that "therefore Special case No. 24 of 1982 and Special Case No. 3 of 1983 pending in the Court of Special Ju'dge, Greater Bombay, Shri R.B. Suie" be withdrawn and transferred to the High Court of Bombay, with a request to the learned Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a sitting F Judge of the High Court. The Judge so designated was also directed to dispose of ihe case expeditiously, preferably "by holding the trial from day-to-day".

Appellant, in these proceedings, does not assail the correctness of the view taken by the 5 Judge Bench on the question of the sanction. Appellant has confined his challenge to what he calls the constitutional infirmity-and the consequent nullity-of the directions given as to the transfer of the case to a Judge of the High Court. In effctuation of the directions dated 16.2.1984 of this Court the trial went on before three successive learned Judges of the High Court. It is not necessary here to advert to the reasons for the change of

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK {VENKATACHALIAH, J.]

Judges. It is, however, relevant to mention that when the matter was before Khatri J. who was the first teamed Judge to be designated by the Chief Justice on the High Court, the appellant challenged his jurisdiction, on grounds which amounted to a challenge to the validity of directions of this Court .for the transfer of the case. Khatri J. quite obviously, felt bound to repel the challenge to his jurisdiction. Learned Judge said appellant's remedy, if any was to seek a review of the directions dated 16.2.1984 at the hands of this Court. Learned Judge also pointed out in his order dated 14.3.1984 what, according to him, was the true legal position permitting the transfer of the case from the Special-Judge to be tried by the High Court in exercise of its extra-ordinary original criminal jurisdiction. In his order dated 16.3.1984, Khatri J. observed: " ....... Normally it is the exclusive jurisdiction of a Special Judge alone to try corruption charges. This position flows from Section 7 of the 1952 Act. However, this does not mean that under no circumstances whatever, can trial of such offences be not tried by a Court of superior jurisdiction than the Special Judge. I have no hesitation in contemplating at three situations in which a Court of Superior jurisdiction could try such offence ...... " "8. The third situation can be contemplated under the Code of Criminal· Procedure itself where a Court of superior jurisdiction may have to try the special cases. Admittedly, there are no special provisions in the 1952 Act or 1947 Act relating to the transfer of special cases from · one Court to the other. So by virtue of the combined operation of Sec. 8(3) of the 1952 Act and Section 4(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court will have jurisdiction under Sec 407 of the Code in relation to the special cases also. An examination of the provisions of Section 407 leaves no doubt that where the requisite conditions are fulfilled, the High Court will be within its legitimate powers to direct that a special case be transferred to and tried before itself." Appellant did not seek any review of the directions at the hands of the Bench which had issued them, but moved in this Court a Writ Petition No. 708 of 1984 under Article 32 of the Constitution assailing the view taken by Khatri J. as to jurisdiction which in substance meant

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a challenge to the original order dated 16.2.1984 made by this court. A A division Bench consisting of D.A. Desai and A.N. Sen, JJ. di~missed the writ petition on 17.4.1984. Sen, J. speaking for the bench said:

"In my view, the writ petition challenging the validity of the order and judgment passed by this Court as nullity or otherwise is incorrect, cannot be entertained. I wish to make it clear that the dismissal of this writ petition will not prejudice the right of the petitioner to approach the Court with an appropriate review petition or to file any other application which he may be entitled in law to file." (emphasis supplied) [A.R. Antulayv. Union, [1984] 3 SCR482] This order has become final. Even then no review was sought.

It is also relevant to refer here to another pro,nouncement of a five Judge bench of this Court dated 5.4.1984 in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, [1984] 3 SCR 412 in Criminal misc. petition No. 1740 of 1984 disposing of a prayer for issue of certain directions as to the procedure to be followed before the designated Judge of the High Court. The bench referred to the provisions of law, which according to it, enabled the transfer bt the trial of the criminal case to the High Court. The view taken by my two learned. Brothers, it is needless to emphasise, has the effect of setting at naught this pronouncement of the five Judge Bench as well. The five Judge bench considered the legal foundations of the power to transfer and said:

" ............ To be precise, the learned Judge has to try the case according to the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report by Magistrate. This position is clearly an unambiguous in vie.v of the fact that this Court while allowing the appeal was hearing amongst others Transferred case No. 347 of 1983 being the Criminal Revision Application No. 354 of 1983 on the file of the High Court of the Judicature at Bombay against the order of the learned Special Judge, Shri R.B. Sule discharging the accused. If the criminal revision application was not withdrawn to this Court, the High Court while hearing criminal revision application could have under sec. 407(8), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would have to follow the same procedure which the Court of Special

.!

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK !VENKATACHALIAH, J.)

Judge would have followed if the case would not have been so transferred ..... " (emphasis supplied)

According to the Bench, the High Court's power under Section 407, Criminal Procedure Code for withdrawing to itself the case from a Special Judge, who was, for this purpose, a Sessions Judge, was preserved notwithstanding the exclusivity of the jurisdidion of the Special Judge and that the Supreme Court was entitled to and did exercise that power as the Criminal Review application pending in the High Court had been withdrawn to the Supreme Court. The·main basis of appellant's case is that all this is per-incurriam, without jurisdiction and a nullity. In the meanwhile Mehta J. was nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court in place of Khatri. J. In addition to the 17 witnesses already examined by Khatri J. 41 more witnesses were examined for the prosecution before Mehta J. of the 43 charges which the prosecution required to be framed in the case, Mehta J. declined to frame charges in respect of 22 and discharged the appellant of those alleged offences. Again respondent No. 1 came up to this Court which by its order dated 17.4.1986 in Criminal Appeal No. 658 of 1985, [reported in (1985) 2 sec 716] set aside the order of discharge in regard to 22 offences and directed that charges be drawn in respect of them. This Court also suggested that another Judge be nominated to take up the case. It is, thus, that Shah J came to conduct the further trial. 4. I may now tum to the occasion for the present appeal. In the further proceedings before Shah J. the -appellant contended that some of the alleged co-conspirators, some of whom had already been examined as prosecution witnesses, and some others proposed to be so examined should also be included in the array of accused persons. This prayer, Shah J had no hesitation to reject. It is against this order dated 24.7.1986 that the present appeal has come up. With this appeal as an opening, appellant has raised directions of the five Judges Bench, on 16.2.1984; of the serious violations of his constitutional-rights; of a hostile discrimination of having to face a trial before a Judge of the High Court instead of the Special-Judge, etc. A Division Bench consisting of E.S. Venkataramiah and Sabyasachi Mukharji JJ. in view of the seriousness of the grievances aired in the appeal, referred it to be heard by a bench of seven Judges. 5. The actual decision of Shah J in the appeal declining to pro-

p

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ceed against the alleged co-conspirators is in a short compass. But the appeal itself, has assumed a dimension far beyond the scope of the order it seeks to be an appeal against. The appeal has become significant not for its pale determined by the order under appeal; but more for the collateral questions for which it has served as a spring board in this Court.

6. Before going into these challenges, it is necessary to say something on the merits of the order under appeal itself. An accused person cannot assert any right to a joint trial with his co-accused. Normally it is the right of the prosecution to decide whom it prosecutes. It can decline to array a person as a co-accused and, instead, examine him as a witness for the prosecution. What weight is to be c attached to that evidence, as it may smack of the testimony of a guilty partner, in crime, is a different matter. Prosecution can enter Nolle proseque against any accused-person. It can seek to withdraw a charge against an accused person. These propositions are too well settled to require any further elaboration. Suffice it to say that the matter is D cooicluded by the pronouncement of this Court in Choraria v. Mahara~htra, I1968] 2 SCR 624 where Hidayathullah J referred to the argument that the accomplice, a certain Ethyl Wong in that case, had also to be arrayed as an accused and repelled it, observing:

" ..... Mr. Jethmalani's argument that the Magistrate.should have promptly put her in the dock because of her incriminating answers overlooks S. 132 (proviso)".

" ..... The prosecution was not bound to prosecute her, if they thought that her ev"dence was necessary to break a smugglers' ring. Ethyl Wong was prosecuted by S. 132 (proviso) of the Indian Evidence Act even if she gave evidence incriminating herself. She was a competent witness although her evidence could only be received with the caution necessary in all accomplice evidence ...... "

•

On this point, really, appellant cannot be heard to complain. Of the so called co-conspirators some have been examined already as prosecution witnesses; some others proposed to be so examined; and two others, it would appear, had died in t!ie interregnum. The appeal on the point has no substance and would require to be dismissed. We must now turn to the larger issue raised in the ap~eal. 7. While Shri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel far the appel-

-

A.R. ANTULAY v. R.S.

•

NAYAK [VENKATACHALIAH, J.].

]ant, handling an otherwise delicate and sensitive issue, deployed all t,, ! �al tools that a first rate legal-smithy could design, Shri Ram Je, ,,d]ani, learned Senior Counsel, however, pointed out the impermissibility both as a matter of law and propriety of a different bench embarking upon the present exercise which, in effect, meant the exertion of an appellate and superior jurisdiction over the earlier five Judge Bench and the precedential problems and anomalies such a course would create for the future.

8. The contentions raised and urged by Shri P .P, Rao admit of being summarised and formulated thus:

(a) That Supreme Court has, and can, exercise only such jurisdiction as is invested in it by the Constitution and the C laws; that even the power under Article 142(1) is not unfet­ tered, but is confined within the ambit of the jurisdiction otherwise available to it; that the Supreme Court, like any other court, cannot make any order that violates the law; that Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, D 1952, (1952 Act) envisages and sets-up a special and exclu­ sive forum for trial of certain offences; that the direction for trial of those offences by a Judge of the High Court is wholly without jurisdiction and void; and that 'Nullity' of the order could be set up and raised whenever and wherever the order is sought to be enforced or effectuated; (b) That in directing a Judge of the High Court to try the case the Supreme Court virtually sought to create a new jurisdiction and a new forum not existent in and recognised by law and has, accordingly, usurped Legislative powers, violating the basic tenets of the doctrine of separation of powers;.

(c) That by being singled out for trial by the High Court, appellant is exposed to a hostile discrimination, violative of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 and if the principles in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, G [1952] SCR 284. The law applicable to Anwar Ali Sarckr should equally apply to Abdul Rahman Antulay. (d) That the directions for transfer were issued withom affording an opportunity to the appellant of being hear� and therefore void as violative of Rules of Natural Justice.

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(e) That the transfer of the case to the High Court deprived appellant of an appeal, as of right, to the High Court. At least one appeal, as of right is the minimal constitutional safeguard.

·~.

(f) That any order iqcluding a judicial order, even if it be of the highest Court, which violates the fundamental rights of a person is a nullity and can be assailed by a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution on the principles laid down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, UP., [1963] 1SCR885.

(g) That, at all events, the order dated 16.2.1984 in so far as the impugned direction is concerned, is per incuriam passed ignoring the express statutory provisions of Section 7(1) of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, and the earlier decision of this Court in Gurucharan Das Chadha·v. State of Rajasthan, [1966] 2 SCR 678.

(h) That the direction for transfer of the case is a clear and manife,t case of mistake committed by the Court and that when a person is pr~judiced by a mistake of Court it is the duty of the Court to correct its own mistake: Actus Curiae N ominem Gravabit. 9. Courts are as much human institutions as any other and share all human susceptibilities to error. Justice Jackso~ said:

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