S.S. Bola and ORS. ETC. v. B.D. Sardana and ORS. ETC.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
11 July 1997
Judge
Justice K. Ramaswamy
Reported in
[1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 507
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Article 309 Constitution, Article 141 Constitution, Article 246 Constitution, Article 20 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution, Article 235 Constitution, Article 311 Constitution
Subject
Service

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Full judgment

S.S. BOLA AND ORS. ETC.

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v. B.D. SARDANA AND ORS. ETC. JULY 11, 1997

(K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950 :

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A1ticles 245, 246 and 309, Seventh Schedule, List II, Ently 41-State c Legislature-Power to enact laws rendering judicial decisions ineffective-Held, Legislature is empowered to render a judicial decisio11 i11effective by enacting valid law within its legislative field fu11dame11tally altering or changing the basis upon which the judicial decision was given-But Legislature in exercise of its powers under Altic/es 245 and 246 ca11 not merely declare a decision of a coult of law to be invalid or to be inopera- D tive-Haryana Se1Vice of Engineers Class-I, Public Works Depaltment (Buildings and Roads Branch, Public Health Branch and lnigation Branch) Act, 1995 is valid except a pa1t of s. 25 thereof-Besides, the Act is not a validation Act since the Coult in the earlier decisions, had not invalidated any provision but merely inte1preted the relevant provisions of the Rules-Validation Act-Constitution of India-Alticles 32, 226-Judicial Review-Administra- E tive Law. Se1vice Law :

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Ha1yana Se1vice of Engineers Class I Public Works Depa1tment (Buildings and Roads Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Inigation Branch) F Respectively Act, 1995--ss. 5(2), 2(12)(c) a11d 12(2~Harya11a Se1Vice of Engineers Class I Public Works Depwtme11t-Promotio11 tO--Criteria for promotion of direct recmits and promotees-Retrmpective operatio11 to the Act-Held, valid-To have a palticular position in seniodty list in a cadre is not a11 accmed or vested right-Losing some steps in se11iority list withi11 a G cadre and future chances ofpromotion getting delayed thereby is not reduction in rank-State Govemment to prepare seniority list afresh in accordance with the Act. s. 25-Repealing provision-&.pressio11 'to the extent that these Rules shall conti11ue to apply to the persons, who were members of the se1vice before H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 1st day of November, 1966' is invalid and is strnck dowit-Remaining part of

the section and the proviso will remain operative-f'unjab service of Engineers, Class-I, Public Works Department (Roads & Building Branch) Rules, 1960, Punjab Service of Engineers Class-I Public Works Department (Public Health Branch) Rules, 1961 and the Punjab Service of Engineers Class-I Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964. Interpretation of Statutes :

Statement of Objects and Reasons of a statute-Held, is to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out legislative intent when meaning of statute C by its ordinary language is obscure or ambiguous and not when words of statute are clear and unambiguous. Principle of casus omissus-Applicability of In the State of Haryana, on its formation on 1.11.1986, the servii;es of D Class I Engineers in three Branches of Public Works Department, namely, Roads and Buildings Branch, Public Health Branch, and Irrigation Branch, were regulated by the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I Public Works Department (Roads and Buildings Branch) Rules, 1960, the Punjab Service of Engineers Class I Public Works Department (Public Health Branch) Rules, 1961, and the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I Public Works E Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964, respectively. Class I service of Engineers consisted of Executive Engineers, Superintending Engiueers, Chief Engineer and later Engineer-in- Chief also in the respective branches. Assistant Executive Engineers and posts of Class II Subordinate Service both were feeder channels for appointment by promotion as Executive F Engineers, the former being direct recruits and the latter were promotees from the Subordinate Service. In the Roads and Buildings Branch and the Public Health Branch 50% posts in Class I service were filled by promotees and 50% posts by direct recruit Assistant Executive Engineers. But as regards the Irrigation Branch till 8 years of framing of the Rules 75% posts G were filled by promotees and 25% by direct recruits and thereafter the posts were to be filled by both the cadres in equal proportion i.e. 50% each. To begin with, 14 officers of the erstwhile Punjab Cadre of Engineers were brought in the State of Haryana in Public Health Branch and since the cadre strength of Haryana was 10, four of them were adjusted against ex-cadre posts. Though the Rules provided quota for direct recruit and H promotee officers in the Class I posts, these ten officers were brought on the

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

basis or their domicile and the ratio between direct recruits and promotees A was not observed.

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Later, when the gradation lists were prepared, dispute arose between direct recruits and promotees of Roads and Buildings Branch and the Public Health Branch; and writ petitions were filed in the High Court. The B decisions of the High Court were challenged before this Court. This Court decided the matter regarding seniority of Roads and Buildings Branch in the case ofA.N. Sehgal and Others v. Raje Ram Sheoran and Others, [1992] 1 SCC 304 and that relating to Public Health Branch, in S.L. Chopra and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Others, [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 391. The Court, after considering Rules 3(1), 3(2), 5(1)(9), 6, 7, 11(1), 12(2) and 12(3) of C the respectives Rules, held that a direct recruit would always be recruited and appointed to a substantive vacancy, and from the date he started discharging the duty he would be a member of the 'service' whereas a promotee officer, irrespective of initial officiating promotion to a tern· porary vacancy or substantive vacancy, would become member of the D 'service' on his appointment to a substantive vacancy within the 50% quota meant for promotee officers. Thus a promotee occupying a post within 50% quota of direct recruits on their not being available, acquired no right to the post and would yield to direct recruits though promoted later to the senior posts i.e. Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and Chief E Engineer. The officiating period of the promotee officer between the date of initial promotion and the date of availability of the cadre post would thus ·be rendered fortuitous and stood excluded. This Court interpreted the relevant provisions of the Rules and directed the Government to determine the cadre post regularly, from time to time, allot the posts in F each year of allotment as contemplated under Rule 12 read with Rule 5(2)(a), issue orders appointing the officers substantively to the respective posts within the quota and determine the inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees accordingly. The State Government, in pursuance of the directions issued by this G Court, fixed the cadre strength for each year commencing from 1966 and determined the inter se seniority of the promotees and the direct recruits, and prepared a seniority list dated 6.4.1992. As regards the initial 10 posts, which constituted the service initially on 1.11.1966, five were treated as direct recruits fictionally and five as promotees. Against this seniority list H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A writ petitions were filed in the High Court. The High Court quashed the list, and aggrieved parties filed petitions for special leave before this Court. Meanwhile the State Legislature passed the Haryana Service of B Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch, Public Health Branch and Irrigation Branch) Act, 1995 giving the Act retrospective effect from 1.11.1966, thus making the decisions of this Court rendered in Sehgal and Chopra ineffective. The Act was challenged in writ petitions before the High Court and the said writ petitions were transferred to this Court. During the pendency of the matters before this C Court, two other seniority lists were prepared on 13.3.1997 and 19.3.1997 and both these lists were also challenged before this Court. So far as the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964 were concerned, the said rules D were not considered by this Court earlier. However, the dispute of seniority between direct recruits and promotees arose in the years 1976 and the matter was ultimately disposed of by the High Court in Letters Patent Appeals by its judgment dated 27.8.1992. The State Government as also the promotee officers challenged the said order in appeals before this E Court. When the Act came into force, one of the direct recruits challenged the validity of the Act by filing a writ petition before the High Court. The said writ petition was also transferred to this Court. It was contended for the direct recruits that the Act was an usurpation of judicial power by the Legislature to annul the judgments of this F Court in Sehgal and Chopra as was clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, and the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government; that the Act merely declared the earlier judgments to be invalid, and therefore, the Act was invalid and inoperative; that the mandamus issued by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra had to be complied with G and the State Legislature had no power to make the mandamus ineffective and to override the said judgments by enacting the Act; and, that in any case the Legislature could not have given the Act retrospective operation. It was also contended that the Act took away the rights accrued in favour of the direct recruits pursuant to the judgment of this Court, and, thereH fore, the Act should be struck down.

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

The contention on behalf of the State Government and the promotee A officers was that the State Legislature under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution had power to make the law determining the service conditions of the employees of the State and giving it retrospective effect; that the legislature having been aware of the inequitous situation which had been the result of the Rules for determination of inter se seniority between the B direct recruits and the promotees as interpreted by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra, intervened in enacting the Act to remove the inequities not by merely declaring the interpretation given by this Court to the relevant provisions of the Rules in the said judgments to be invalid but by making substantial alterations and changes to the basis itself by altering the definition of service, by providing that quota of promotees could exceed C beyond 50% as per proviso to 's. 5(2), and by changing the very criterion for determination of seniority, namely, the continuous length of service as engrafted ins. 12(2); and as such the Legislature could not be said to have encroached upon the field of judiciary nor could the legislation be said to be an act of usurpation of judicial power by the Legislature. Disposing of the matters, this Court HELD : per curiam : (i) Legislature is empowered to render a judicial decision ineffective

by enacting a valid law fundamentally altering or changing the basis upon , which the judicial decision was given; such a law can also be given retrospective operation. But, Legislature cannot declare a decision of a court of law to be invalid or to be inoperative, in which· case it would be held to be an exercise of judicial power which the Legislature do not possess.

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(ii) To have a particular position in seniority list is not an accrued or a vested right. Chances of promotion are not condition of service.

Per majority (Pattanaik and S. Saghir Ahmad, JJ.)

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(i) The Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Depart· ment. (Buildings and Roads Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Irriga· tion Branch) Respectively Act. 1995 is valid. The changes and alterations in the service rules, brought by the Act and giving the Act retrospective effect rendered the decisions of this Court in the cases of Sehgal and H

. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A Chopra ineffective. It is not a case of Legislature overriding a judicial decision but a case of rendering a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law within the competence of the Legislature.

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(ii) The nature of mandamus which had been issued by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra was merely a declaration of principles of seniority as the Rules then existing. The Legislature by enacting the Act and giving it retrospective effect made several vital changes both to the definition of service as also to criteria for determining inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees. The Act has not taken away any accrued right of the direct recruits.

Per Minority (K. Ramaswamy, J.)

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(i) The Legislature of Haryana was competent to enact the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads, Branch), (Public Health Branch) and Irrigation Branch) Respectively Act, 1995. But since the Act has with retrospective effect, in substance and in effect, declared the law laid down by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra as unenforceable by an indirect side track process of legislative fiat, it is unconstitutional. The Act is unconstitutional to the extent of its ret.rospective operation. The prospective effect does not have any effect on settled rights of the parties to these litigations. (ii) The relevant Rules as interpreted by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra is the law under Article 141 of the Constitution. The mandamus issued therein operates inter parties and binds the State Government. The Act made with retrospective effect is a fraud on the Constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional. It, therefore, does not affect the vested rights of the direct recruits which are still available to them and they are entitled to have their seniority determined accordingly.

Per Pattanaik, J. 1. The Haryana Service of Engineers Class I, Public Works Department, (Buildings and Roads, Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) Respectively Act, 1995, is a valid piece of legislation enacted by the State Legislature over which they had legislative competence under Article 309 and Entry 41 of List II of Vllth Schedule to the Constitution.

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

Though by giving the enactment retrospective effect the earlier judgments of this Court in Sehgal * and Chopra ** have become ineffective, this does not tantambunt to a mere declaration of invalidity of an earlier judgment nor does it amount to an encroachment by the Legislature into the judicial sphere. The Act cannot be said to be an act of usurpation of judicial power by the Legislature. (560-D-E; 575-H; 576-A]

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* A.N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje Ram Sheoran and Ors., (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 304 and **S.L. Chopra a~id Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 391, referred to.

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2.1. The Legislature can always render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting valid law on the topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively. But the Legislature cannot in exercise of its plenary power under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution merely declare a decision of a court of law to be invalid or to be inoperative in which case it would be held to be an exercise of judicial power, which under the scheme of Constitution, the Legislature do not possess. (543-A-C]

Indian Aluminium Co. and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors., [1996) 7 SCC 637; J.N. Saxena v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976) 3 SCR 237; M/s. Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Orissa, (1987) Supp. SCC 751; Bhubaneshwar Singh and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (1994) 6 SCC 77; Comorin Match Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1998] 4 SCC 281; Meernt Development Authority and Ors.etc. v. Satbir Singh and Ors. etc., [1996) 11 SCC 462 and State of Orissa and Anr. v. Gopal Chandra Rath and Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 242, relied on.

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Shri P. C. Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, [1969) 2 SCC 283; West Ramnad Electric Distribution Company Ltd. v. State of Madras, [1963) 2 SCR 747; Udai Ram Shanna and Ors. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., [1968) 3 SCR 41; Krishan Chandra Gangopadhyaya and Ors. v. Union of G India and Ors., [1975) 2 SCC 302 and Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors., [1985) 4 SCC 124, cited. Pritpal Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1980] Suppl. SCC 524; State of Gujarat & Anr. etc. v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and Ors. etc., [1983) 2 SCC 33; Ex. Capt. KC. Arora a11dA11r. v.State of Haryana and H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Ors., [1984] 3 SCC 281; T.R. Kapur and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., [1986] Suppl. SCC 584; P.D. Aggrawal and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1987] 3 SCC 622 and Madan Mohan Pathak andAnr. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., [1978] 2 SCC SO, held inapplicable.

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2.2. In the case of Sehgal and Chopra this Court had not invalidated any provision of the recruitment rules but merely interpreted some provisions of the Rules for determining. the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees. The Act passed by the Legislature, therefore, is not a validation Act but merely an Act passed by the State Legislature giving it retrospective effect from the date the State of Haryana came into existence and consequently from the date the service in question came into existence. [542-C-D] 2.3. The power of the Legislature under Article 246(3) of the Constitution to make law for the State with respect to the matters enumerated in List II of the Vllth Scheduled to the Constitution is wide enough to make law determining the service conditions of the employees of the State. In the instant case, there has been no challenge to the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the legislation in question nor has there been any challenge on the ground of contravention of Part III of the Constitution. [542-D-E] 2.4. Under the constitutional scheme the power of the Legislature to make law is paramount subject to the field of legislation as enumerated in the Entries in different Lists. The function of the judiciary is to interpret the law and to adjudicate the rights of the parties in accordance with law made by the Legislature. [ 542-E-F]

3.1. To find out whether the impugned Act is an usurpation of judicial power by the Legislature it would not be permissible to look to the Statement of Objects and Reasons which accompanied the Bill while introducing the same on the floor of the Legislature nor the affidavit filed G by an officer of the Government would control the true and correct meaning of the words of the statute. For that purpose the substantive provisions of the Act would be examined. [574-E-G]

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3.2. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that Objects and Reasons of a statute is to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out legislative

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

intent only when the meaning of the statute by its ordinary language Is obscure or ambiguous. But, if the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous then the statute itself declares the intention of the Legisla· ture and in such a case it would not be permissible for a Court to interpret the statute by examining the Objects and Reasons of the statute in ques· tion. The general rule of interpretation Is that the language employed is primarily the determining factor to find out the intention of the Legisla· ture. [545-F·G; 547-B]

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Aswini Kumar Ghosh andAnr. v.Arbinda Bose andAnr., SCR [1953] 1; The Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen, SCR [1960] 200; State of West Bengal v. Union of India, SCR 1 [1964] 371; Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat, Pimpri Waghere, [1976] 4SCC177 and Kanai/al Sur v. Paramnidhi, Sadhukhan, SCR [1958] 360, relied on.

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Robert Wigram Crawford v. Richard Spooner, 4 MIA 179 (PC), referred to. 4.1. The changes and alterations in the Act itself and giving It retrospective effect from the date when the State of Haryana came into existence and consequently the service of Engineers, came into existence, rendered. the earlier decisions of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra ineffec· tive. The provisions of the Act and the definition of "service" ins. 2(12)(c), proviso to s. 5(2) and the criteria for promotion, which was engrafted in s. 12(2) of the Act, and making it retrospective w.e.f, 1.11.1966, when interpreted, lead to the only conclusion that this Court could not have rendered the decision in Sehgal and Chopra on the face of the aforesaid provisions of the Act. It is, therefore, not a case of legislation by mere declaration without anything more, overriding a judicial decision but a case of rendering a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a· valid law within the legislative field of the Legislature. [548-G-H; 549·A·B]

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4.2. Under the 1960 and the 1961 Rules as interpreted by this Court G in the cases of Sehgal and Chopra, a direct recruit gets the year of allotment as the year in which he is recruited as Assistant Executive Engineer but so far as promotees are concerned they become members of the service only after they are appointed substantively to a cadre post and the quota of promotees cannot exceed 50% of the total number of posts in the service H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers to which direct

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recruitments are made. Inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees is regulated by Rules 12(6) and (7). As a necessary consequence a direct recruit when promoted as Executive Engineer from the posts of Assistant Executive Engineer was getting seniority over the promotee Executive Engineers and this situation has been avoided by the impugned Act by changing the definition of "service" in Rule 2(12) of the 1961 Rules, by providing the quota for promotees to exceed 50% in certain contingen· cies like non-availability of direct recruits to man the post of Executive Engineer and by changing the criteria for determination of illter se seniority and in place of determination of year of allotment, by providing length of continuous service to the post of Executive Engineer to be the determining factor. Necessarily, therefore, by the impugned Act a direct recruit in the rank of Executive Engineer would come down in the grada· tion list than what was assigned under the Rules of 1960 and 1961. [561·A·F]

5.1. To have a particular position in the seniority list within a cadre can not be said to be an accrued or a vested right of a Government servant; and losing some places in the seniority list within the cadre does not amount to reduction in rank even though the future chances of promotion get delayed thereby. Chances of promotion of Government servant are not a condition of service. [562·C·E]

The High Court of Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Roy, [1963) 1 SCR 437; The State of Punjab v. Kishan Das, [1971) 3 SCR 389; State of Maharashtra and Ahr. v. Chandrakant Anantit Kulkarni and Ors., [1981) 4 SCC 130; K. F Jagadeesan v. Union of India and Ors., [1990) 2 SCC 228; Union of India . and Ors. v. S.L. Dutta and Anr., [1991) 1 SCC 505 and Zohrabi v. Arjuna and Ors., [1980) 2 SCC 203, relied on.

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5.2. The direcfrecruits did not have a vested right nor any right had accrued in their favour in the matter of getting a particular position in the seniority list of Executive Engineers under the pre-amended Rules which is said to have been taken away by the Act. Thus, there is no bar for the Legislature to amend the law in consequence of which the inter se position in rank of Executive Engineer might get altered. Consequently, there is no invalidity in the enactment of the Act. [563-F-H]

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

5.3. The nature of mandamus which had been issued by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra was merely a declaration of the principles of seniority as per 1960 and 1961 Rules and the State Government was to draw up the seniority list in accordance with the said Rules. The Legislature by enact· ing the Act and giving it retrospective effect made several vital changes both in the definition of 'service' as well as in the criteria of determining the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and promotees. The Act has not taken away any accrued rights of the direct recruits. (554-F-H]

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Madan Mohan Pathak and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (1998] 2

sec so, held inapplicable. 6.1. Though the Act is a valid piece of legislation but s. 25 thereof cannot be sustained in toto sim:e a plain reading of the said provision does not make out any meaning. The section repeals the previous Rules as well as the Ordinance of 1995. It purports to indicate that the earlier Rules would apply to persons who were members of the service before 1.11.1986 though a plain reading of the main part of the section does not convey that meaning. (564-A; 565-A·B] 6.2. The contention that the Court should fill up the gap by applying the principle of casus omissus and provide the word "except" in the first part of s. 25 after the words "to the extent", cannot be accepted. It is not appropriate to apply the principle of casus omissus, inasmuch as the Act itself having been given retrospective effect with effect from 1st November, 1966, the date on which the State of Haryana came into existence, there is no rational to apply the pre-existing rules to those employees who were in the service before that date even after the pre-existing Rules are being repealed by the Act. In this view of the matter, the expression "to the extent that these rules shall continue to apply to the persons who were members of the service before 1st day of November, 1966" ins. 25 of the Act is invalid and is accordingly struck down. Remaining part of s. 25 as well as the proviso to the said section will, however, remain operative. (565-C-G]

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7.1. The High Court fell in error to hold that the State Government was not entitled to re-determine the cadre strength retrospectively every year and such re-determination is invalid and inoperative. On the other hand, since the cadre strength had not been determined regularly, though H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A It was enjoined upon the State Government to do so, this had called upon

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the State Government to re-determine the cadre strength and thereafter determine the inter se seniority of the direct recruits and promotees in terms of Rule 12 of the Recruitment Rules bearing in mind the law laid down by this Court interpreting the different provisions of the Rules. The said conclusion of the High Court is, therefore, quashed. [570-A·C] 7.2. As regards the Irrigation Branch, Rule 2(12)(c) makes a promotee officer, on probation or having successfully completed his probation awaiting appointment to a cadre post, to be a member of the service which was not the position in the Public Health Branch as well as in the Roads and Buildings Branch .. Then again under Rule 5(2) the percentage of promotees was required to be so regulated as not to exceed 75% of the numbers of posts in the service for the first 8 years from the date of commencement of the Rules and thereafter it shall not exceed 50% of ttie number of posts in the service excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers. Proviso to the aforesaid rule also entitles the Govern· ment to grant permission beyond 75% during the first 10 years of the commencement of the rules and beyond 50% thereafter in case sufficient number of direct recruit Assistant Executive Engineers are not available and considered fit for promotion. Rule 12 which deals with the determina· tion of inter se seniority is also somewhat different than the similar rule for the Public Health Branch and the Roads and Building Branch which had been considered by this Court in the cases of Sehgal and Chopra. [576-D; 577-A]

7.3. The Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in disposing of the appeal relating to Irrigation Branch, relying upon the F earlier decision of this Court in Sehgal's case. The High Court did not focus its attention to the difference in the rules meant for the Irrigation Branch and the Rules meant for the Public Health Branch and Roads and Buildings Branch. The judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 367 and 411 of 1992 is erroneous and is, therefore, G set aside. [577·A·CJ

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7.4. The Act, except a part of s. 25, having been declared intra vires and given retrospective effect with effect from 1.11.1966, the inter se seniority of direct recruits and promotees in each of the services, namely, the Buildings and Roads Branch, the Public Health Branch and the

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

Irrigation Branch will have to be re-drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The seniority lists already drawn up subsequent to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Sehgal and Chopra as well as during the pendency of these appeals in this Court are of no consequence in view of the Act coming into force. [577-D-F]

, Per S. Saghir Ahmad, !. (Concurring) : 1.1. Under the scheme of the Constitution, it is competent for the Legislature to put an end to the finality of a judicial decision and, therefore, it would be competent for the Legislature to render ineffective the judgment of the court by changing the basis of the Ac.t upon which that judgment was founded. The power to make a law includes the power to give it retrospective effect subject to the restriction imposed by Article 20(1) of the Constitution that a Legislature cannot make retrospective penal laws. It would be valid for the Legislature to make any other enactment with retrospective effect provided no fundamental right is infringed by reason of its taking away the vested right. [578-G-H; 579-A]

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Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors., [1970] 1 SCR 388 [1969] 2 SCC 283; In re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, AIR (1992) SC 522 = [1993] Supp. 1 SCC 96 a11d E Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India, [1994] 6 SCC 77, relied on.

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Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India & Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 334 = [1978] 2 sec 50, referred to.

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1.2. To declare what the law is or has been is a judicial power. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power. It would be within the exclusive domain of judiciary to expound the law as it is and not to speculate what it should be as it is the function of the Legislature. It is also within the exclusive power of the judiciary to hold that a Statute passed by the Legislature is ultra vires. The Legislature in that situation G does not become a helpless creature as it continues to remain a living pillar of a living Constitution. Though it cannot directly override the judicial decision, it retains the plenary powers under Articles 245, 246 and 248 of the Constitution to alter the law as settled or declared by judicial H decisions. [578-8-E]

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

Mis. Anwar Khan Mahboob Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1966] 2 SCR 40, relied on.

Finn CJ. Patel & Co. & Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 108, already overruled.

2.1. The Legislature can also validate an Act which was declared invalid by the Court or amend it with retrospective effect so as to remove the grounds of its invalidity. [578-F)

Rai Ramklishna & Ors. v. State of Bihar, [1964) 1 SCR 897 and Mt.

C Jadao Bahuji v. Municipal Committee, Khandwa & Anr., AIR (1961) SC 1486, relied on.

2.2. Where, however, the statutory provision is interpreted by the Court in a particular manner and directions are issued for implementing the judgment in the light of the interpretation placed on the statutory provisions, the Legislature need not pass a validating Act. In this situation, the Legislature, in exercise of its plenary powers under Articles 245, 246 and 248, can make a new Act altering fundamentally the provisions which were the basis of the judgment passed by the Court. This can be done with retrospective effect. So far as service conditions are concerned, they can be altered with retrospective effect by making service rules under Article 309 or by an Act of the Legislature. [580-A-C]

2.3. In the instant cases, the judgments rendered by this Court in the earlier decisions relating to the seniority of the present incumbents were F founded on the service rules then existing. These service rules have since been replaced by the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch) Respectively Act, 1995, which has been enforced with retrospective effect. The rule of seniority has been altogether altered and replaced by a new law made with retrospective effect G so as to do away with the mischief under which an undue advantage was being provided to a direct recruit, which was wholly inequitous and not sustainable on the principles of equity. The Act is valid, except the expression in s. 25, i.e. "to the ext~nt that these rules shall continue to apply to the persons who are members of the Service before 1st day of November H 1966", which is invalid. [580-C-F]

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

Comorin Match Industlies (P) Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1996) 4 A SCC281; Indian Aluminium Company v. State of Kera/a, [1996) 7 SCC 637 and Meerut Development Authority & Ors. v. Satbir Singh & Ors., [1996) 11

sec 462, relied on. 3. The judgments of the Punjab & Haryana High Court are liable to be set aside, with a direction to the State Government to re-determine the question of seniority in the light of this judgment and the Act. [580-G]

Per K Ramaswamy, J. 1.1. The Legislature of Haryana was competent under Article 309 or Entry 41 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to enac4he Haryana Service of Engineers Class I Public Works Depart· ment, (Buildings and Roads Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Irriga· tion Branch) Respectively Act, 1995. But, since the Act has with retrospective effect, in substance and in effect, declared the law laid down by this Court in the cases of Sehgal * and * Chopra as unenforceable by an indirect side track process of legislative fiat, it is unconstitutional. [681-F-G; 682-A·B]

.

A.N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje Ram Shesoran and Ors., [1992) Supp. 1 SCC 304; S.L. Chopra & Ors. v. State of Ha1yana and Ors., [1992) Supp. 1 sec 391, referred to.

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1.2. The Punjab Service of Engineers Class I Public Works Depart· ment (Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1960 and the Punjab Service of Engineers Class I Public Works Department (Public Health Branch) Rules, 1961, to the extent they are applicable to State of Haryana, !!OW repealed, as interpreted by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra's cases, is the F law under Article 141 of the Constitution. It binds not only inter-parties, but also the other wings of the State, namely, the Legislature and the Executive and all. The mandamus issued therein along with directions to prepare the seniority list and its implementation operates inter-patties and binds the State of Haryana. [681·D·E] G 1.3. The Legislature is not competent to declare with retrospective effect that the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Con· stitution in Sehgal and Chopra cases is illegal; nor is it empowered to make the mandamus and directions issued therein as ineffective and unenforce· able, except in certain given circumstances. (681-G-H] H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A

Madan Mohan Pathak & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR (1972) SC 50; Janapada Sabha Chhindwara etc. v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. & A11r. etc., [1970] 3 SCR 745; State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. M. Rayappa Gounder & Ors., [1971] 3 SCC 1; Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad etc. v. New Shorock Sug. & WVg. Co. Ltd. etc., [1971] 1 B SPG 288; /.N. Saksena v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 3 SCR 237; Ex. Capt. K. C. Arora & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1984] 2 SCC 218; State of Gujarat&Anr. v.Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni & Ors., [1963] 2 SCC 33; State of Haryana & Ors. v. Kamal Co-operative Fonners' Society Ltd. & Ors., [1993] 2 SCC 363; Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal [1993] Supp. 1 SCC 96; S.R. Bhagwat & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1995] 6 SCC 16; Delhi C Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1996] 2 SCC 449; Peddinti Ve11kata Muraliranganatha Desika Iyengar & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Anr., [1996] 3 SCC 75; K Sa11kara11 Nair (Dead) through Lrs. v. Devaki Amma Malathy Amma & Ors., [1996] XI SCC 428, relied on. 2.1. Judicial review is the basic feature of the Constitution which has

D been entrusted to the constitutional Courts, namely, the Supreme Court

F

of India and High Courts under Article 32 and Articles 226 and 227 respectively. Judicial review passes upon constitutionality of legislative Acts or administrative actions. The Courts either would enforce valid Acts/actions or refuse to enforce them when found unconstitutional. It is the constitutional duty and responsibility of the constitutional Courts, as assigned under the Constitution, to maintain the balance of power between the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. In a Parliamentary democracy, for the constitutional democracy to remain a living moral and intellectual force, it would be enforced through judicial review z.s an arch of democracy and rule of law. [682-C-E]

,Special Refere11ce No. 1 of 1964 [1965] 1 SCR 413; Mi11e1va Mills v. U11io11 of India, [1980] 3 SCC 625; L. Chandra Kumar v. U11ion of India, [1997) 3 SCC 216; S.R. Bommai v. U11io11 of I11dia, [1994) 3 SCR 1 and Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu a11d Ors., [1992] Supp. 2 SCC 651, followed.

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C. Ravicha11dran Iyer v. A.M. Bhattacharjee, [1995] 5 SCC 457 and Kartar Si11gh v. State of Punjab, [1994] 3 SCC 569, referred to. 2.2. In adjudging the constitutionality of an Act or action, the Court is required to carefully scan the impugned law to find out (a) whether the vice pointed out by the Court or the invalidity suffered by the previous law

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

is cured complying with the legal and constitutional requirement, (b) A whether the legislature has competence to enact the law to validate the law, and (c) whether such enactment of Act or validation is consistent with the constitutional principles or within limitations set by the Constitutional or fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. The Court can take into account the real consequences while judging the width of the B power; the Court cannot ignore the consequences flowing from particular construction ascertaining the limits of the provisions that granted the power. [683-C-F; 684-C-E]

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3.1. Separation of power among the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary is also basic feature of the Constitution. [636-A]

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His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavam v. State of Kerala, [1973] Supp. SCC 11, followed.

3.2. The Legislature in enacting new law or amending the existing law or revalidating the law has power to alter the language in the statute D by employing the appropriate phraseology and to put up its own interpretation inconsistent with that put up by the Court in au earlier judgment on the basis of the pre- existing law and to suitably make new law, amend the law or alter the law removing the base on which the previous decision was founded. The changes or altered conditions have to be such that the previous decision would not have been rendered by the Court had those conditions existed at the time of declaration of the law in the previous decision as invalid. It is also empowered to give effect to the Acts so enacted or revalidated prospectively or retrospectively with a deemed date or with effect from a particular date. But such an enactment must be applicable prospectively and not to the cases which have become final and F the rights having accrued to the parties for long under the judgment cannot be taken away except in the cases of fiscal statutes or cases relating to procedural facets of the Act. [684-A-C; F-G] Indian Aluminium Ltd. v. State of Kera/a, [1996] 1 SCC 637; Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors., AIR (1970) SC 192; Sada musa Sugar Works & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1996] 9 SCC 681; K Kannadasan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1996] 5 SCC 670; Comorin Match Indust1ies (P) Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1996] 4 SCC 281; R.L. · Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [1964) 6 SCR 784 and Meerut Development Auth01ity v. Satbir Singh, [1996] 11 SCC 464, relied on.

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SUPREMECCURTREPORTS [1997] SUPP.2S.C.R.

A

M.M. Pathak v. Union of India, [1978] 3 SCR 334; Udai Ram Shanna & Ors. etc. v. Union of India, [1968] 3 SCR 41; Mis. Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1967] Supp. SCC 751; Vinay Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, [1993] 1 SCC 345 and Bhubaneshwar Singh & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 77, referred to.

3.3. The Legislature has no power to overrule the decision of a constitutional Court by mere declaration without properly and constitutionally removing the base upon which the previous decision was founded; nor has it power to direct that the decision of the Court does not bind the State or its instrumentalities. The legislative judgm'ent,. by a facade of compliance or removal of the base, cannot render the decision or a writ of mandamus issued by the Court ineffective or invalid by a declaratory law that the previous decision of the Court is illegal or inequitous. Such a declaration is not conclusive, but is subject to judicial review. The real test is the effect of the legislation tested on the touch-stone of the Constitution and its direct result on the declaration of law as interpreted earlier or the mandamus/direction issued by the Court in the previous litigation. The doctrine of incidental power, cannot be extended to the exercise of the legislative power colourably or by fraud on the Constitution. [684-H; 685-A-B; 686-A]

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3.4. If the Legislature finds that the declaration of law by this Court/High Court is not consistent with the public policy envisaged in the Act and the interpretation seems to defeat the public interest or public justice, certainly the Legislature would be entitled to formulate its legislative policy consistent with the constitutional scheme and enact the law/amend even the law declared by.this Court. [663-D-E]

Indra Sawhney v. Union ofIndia, [1993] Supp. 3 SCC 217, relied on. I. Venkata Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1965] 3 SCC 198 and V.M. Syed Mohammad & Co. v. The State ofAndhra Pradesh, [1954] SCR 1117, referred to.

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4.1. The Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preamble of an A'ct opens the minds of the makers in enacting the law. It cannot altogether be eschewed from consideration of the relevant provisions the Act, when its constitutionality is tested and objects of the Act sought to be achieved.

of

[687-C-D]

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4.2. The Statement of Objects and Reasons while making reference

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

of decisions rendered by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra, indicates in A unmistakable brazen terms that the reasons for the enactment was that the declaration of law of this Court became unworkable and caused hardship to senior officers as junior officers gained undue advantage under the law declared by this Court. The object was to undo it and to declare the law in unambiguous terms by enacting the Act. [632-C-D]

4.3. It is seen from the record, that apart from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, specific stand was taken by the Government in the counter-affidavit filed in the writ petition before the High Court; and the Financial Commissioner in his order while determining the inter se seniority, had expressed himself that the interpretation in Sehgal and C Chopra's cases created inequitous situation favourable to direct recruits creating heart-burning among the promotees. That would indicate that brazen attempt was made by the Executive to mask their stand through legislative intervention. The Legislature did not adopt a proper device in enactment of the Act and there is no doubt that had it been brought to the D notice of the Legislature that the impact of the Act would lead to conflict between judicial review and legislative judgment, Legislature would not have found it expedient or attempted to enact the law to deflate the mandamus making it ineffective and rendered the correct declaration of law as illegal. [662-C-F]

4.4. The principle of fraud on power is applicable when the Legislature has power to enact but does not exercise that power as elucidated upon. On the other hand, the doctrine of fraud on the Constitution means that when the Legislature has no power and in spite of the constitutional limitation or prohibition, it makes enactment in pretence of its power. [686-G-H; 687-A]

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4.5. The present Act made with retrospective effect is a fraud on the Constitution; a colourable exercise of power; transgression of and trespassing into the power of judicial review expressly conferred in the constitutional Courts, namely, Supreme Court of India under Article 32 and the High Courts, under Article 226i227 of the Constitution. [687-D-E] G

K.C. Ganpat Narayan Dea & Ors. v. The State of Orissa, [1954] SCR 1, referred to. 4.6. The contention that in s. 25 of the Act the word 'except' should be supplied by employing the doctrine of casus omissus, cannot be accepted. The H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A legislation did not intend to introduce exception in view of the fact that they cannot directly overrule the decisions in Sehgal and Chopra. What they can· not directly do, cannot indirectly be allowed to be done. The Court cannot compound the camaflouge by supplying the so called omission deliberately caused by the legislature. It is not an unintentional one. [650-C·G]

Mis. Pyarchand Kesarimal Ponwal Bidi Factory v. Onkar Laxman Thange & Ors., (1969] 2 SCR 272 and JNU v. Dr. KS. Jawatkar & Ors., [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 679, referred to.

Nomes v. Doncaster, (1940) 3 All. E.R. 549, referred to.

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5.1. The object of inducting young blood by direct recruitment into the service and experienced officers by promotion is constitutionally permissible and valid to augment efficiency of service to inculcate discipline, hones· ty, integrity and excellence in higher echelons of service. Similarly, prescription of degree qualification (higher qualification to posts with higher responsibility) for promotion to the higher services is valid. [687-F-G]

State of Jammu and Kashmir v. T.N. Khosa, AIR (1974) SC 1 and Mohd. Sugat Ali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1976] SCR 482, followed.

p

5.2. The prescription of the ratio between direct recruits and promotees is equally constitutionally permissible and the permissible limits shall not be altered by executive action, unless the Executive has power. It should give proper, valid and satisfactory explanation in writing prior to exercise of the said power, for deviation from the quota rules and that too as a short term arrangement to tide over administrative expedience. (687-G-H; 688-A]

S.C. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 703; Shri H.D. Helms & Ors. v. Shri Mohan Chandra Joshi, AIR (1972) SC 2627; Bachan Singh & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (1972] 3 SCC 898; V.B. Badami Etc. G v. State of Mysore & Ors., (1976] 1 SCR 815 and Keshav Chandra Joshi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1992] Supp. 1 272, relied on. Narender Chandra & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1986] 1 SCR 211; Buleshwar Das v. State of U.P., [1981] 1 SCR 449; M.K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, [1971] 1 SCR 1037 and Gonna/ Bhimappa v. State of Kamataka,

H [1993] Supp. 3 sec 449, referred to.

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

5.3. The Rules concerned are required to be interpreted as regards the operation and effect of the deviation from the quota rules and its effect on the main principle of prescribing quota and integration of the promotee officers into the service on strict compliance with the relevant provisions of the Act/Rules. [688·A·B]

A

5.4. In an appropriate case, the quota may be relaxed temporarily with a view to meet the administrative exigencies by filling up the posts by promotees. The promotion of the promotee officers to an ex-cadre post or cadre posts would only be to meet the administrative expedience. That would be done, so long as the direct recruit Assistant Executive Engineers, who are members of the Service in junior scale of pay are not available for promotion as Executive Engineer and upwards in accordance with the Rules. As soon as the direct recruits become available, the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees as Executive Engineers or upward shall be determined in accordance with the Rules/Act within the respective quota. Any appointment in excess of quota is invalid and the service rendered thereunder becomes fortuitous. [688·B·E)

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6.1. No one has a vested right to promotion or seniority. The rule/provision in an Act merely affecting the chances of promotion would not be regarded as varying the conditions of service. The chances of promotion are not conditions of service. A rule which merely affects the E chances of promotion does not amount to change in the conditions of service. [689·B·E]

State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkami & Ors., {1981] 4 SCC 1301; Vinod Gurndas Ralkar v.National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., [1991] 4 SCC 333; Zoharabi v. Arjuna & Ors., [1980] 2 SCC 203, inapplicable.

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Ashok Kumar Gupta & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1997] 5 SCALE 289, referred to.

.

KC. Ganpat Narayan Deo & Ors. v. The State of Onssa, [1954] SCR 1, cited.

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6.2. An officer has an interest to seniority acquired by working out the rules. The seniority would be taken away only by operation of valid law. Right to be considered for promotion is a rule prescribed by conditions of H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A service. Once a declaration of law, on the basis of existing rules is made by a constitutional Court and a mandamus is issued or direction given for its enforcement by preparing the seniority list, operation of the declaration . of law and the mandamus and directions issued by the Court is the result of the declaration of law but not the operation of the rules per se. [689-C-E]

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6.3. Affecting the right of a person to be considered for promotion amounts to affecting the conditions of service, though affecting mere chance of promotion may not. The power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 carries with it the power to amend or alter the rules with retrospective effect. However the benefits acquired under the existing Rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect, that is to say, that there is no power to make such a rule under proviso to Article 309 which affects or impairs vested rights. [678-F-G]

B.S. Wadera v. Union of India, [1968) 3 SCR 575; Raj Kumar v. Union

D of India, [1975) 3 SCR 963; K. Nagaraj & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., [1985) 1 SCC 523; T.R. Kapur & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.,

[1986) Supp. SCC 584, referred to. 6.4. When an Act is made or an amendment to the law is made or

E revalidation of law is made by colourable exercise of power or fraud on the

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Constitution, it does not affect the vested rights. The right accrued by the declaration of law or the mandamus or directions issued by the Court cannot be taken away by such law or a valid law by retrospective operation since in the earlier litigation the Court did not declare any law as invalid or unconstitutional. This Court merely declared the law and directed the State Government to implement the law. [689-E-G] 6.5. In the instant case, as a result of the mandamus issued by this Court, which has become final, a judicially recognised right has been vested in the direct recruits to have their seniority determined under the repealed Rules; the said right is still available even after the Act has comr into force with retrospective effect since the retrospective effect has already, been held unconstitutional and the repealed Rules are saved by operation of Section 25 of the Act. As a consequence, they are entitled to have their seniority determined accordingly. [678-G-H; 679-A] 6.6. Preparation of seniority list in accordance with the declaration

·{ '

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA

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of law and the mandamus/direction issued is required to be complied with by the State Government unless it is properly revised or reversed by a constitutional Court in hierachy of appeals etc. Once the judgment attains finality, the directions given should be followed thereunder. The law is required to be implemented in its true spirit and not by mere pretence or facade of compliance. [689-G-H; 690-A] 6.7. The Act is unconstitutional to the extent of retrospective operation of. the Act. The prospective operation does not have any effect on the settled rights of the parties to these litigations since the repealed Rules are saved under s. 25 of the Act and would continue to apply to them. As ·a consequence, they are entitled to have their seniority determined accordingly. Even otherwise, the rights secured by declaratory law were not affected. (690-A-B] 6.8. The prospective operation of the Act from the 4ate of its coming into force namely, 30th November, 1995, would be worked out in the light of the declaration of law in this judgment and be applicable to the other persons in the Service on and from that date or for the purpose of future promotions under the Act to those officers who were not parties to the litigation. [690-B-C] 7.1. A promotee becomes member.of the Service under the repealed Rules vis-a-vis Buildings ~nd Roads Branch or Public Health Branch only when he is appointed substantively in accordance with Rule 8(9) of the respective Rules including Irrigation Branch within the quota. The declaration of law in Sehgdl and Chopra's cases ri:mains unaffected ~nder the Act and continues to be ill force. Similarly, any appointment made and weightage given to the promotees in excess of their quota, does not have any legal effect on the right to the seniority and the promotees within their quota alone are entitled to count their entire length of service from the respective dates of probation, without break. [691-A·B]

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7.2. Even if relaxation by way of promotion in excess of the quota is G temporarily made by the State Government, the State Government shall record reasons in support ofits action. However, such temporary deviation does not have any effect on the ratio prescribed under the Act/repealed Rules except that the promotee officers from Class-II Service belonging to Irrigation Branch are enabled to acc1uire the probationary status as Class-I Officers on a cadre/ex-cadre post. The confirmation of the probation awaits H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the substative vacancy. Until then, the promotees from Irrigation Branch do not become members of the Service in a substantive capacity. The same position has been created under the Act uniformly to all officers. [690-D-E] 7.3. Seniority of a direct recruit appointed as Assistant Executive

B Engineer starts from the date on which he starts discharging duties of the

C

post as probationer be it in a substantive vacancy or on ex-cadre post. His seniority remains unaltered. He continues to be a member of the Service of junior scale of pay even before being appointed as Executive Engineer, i.e., in the senior scale of pay to a cadre/ex-cadre post after his promotion as Executive Engineer on probation being declared, if the prescribed minimum period of service is completed or if the same is relaxed by the State Government uniformly to the promotees and the direct recruits, as was held in Chopra's case. Therefore, his seniority has to be determined and promotion given within the quota of the direct recruits as Executive Engineer and above in a substantive capacity. [691-C-E]

S.C. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 703, relied on.

Bishan Sarnp Gupta Etc. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors., Etc. Etc., [1975] 1 SCR 104, referred to.

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7,4. The Class II Officers became eligible for promotion as Executive Engineers only after the Committee prepared the list of the eligible officers in accordance with Rule 8 of the repealed Rules/Section 8, after approval by the. Public Service Commission and the State Government. Class II Officers whose names find place in the approved list shall be appointed by promotion as Executive Engineers and upwards as probationers in the order in the list. Appointment on probation and declaration thereof does not get ripened into appointment substantively to cadre post. Appointment to a cadre post available within quota is a condition precedent to become a member of the Service in a substantive capacity. The inter se seniority of the direct recruits and promotee Class II Executive Engineers then shall be determined in accordance with the Rules. It requires to be worked out on that basis. [691-E-F] 7.5. The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, was not correct to say that 10 posts of the promotees in Public Health Branch occupied from the date of initial constitution, is not challengeable and was not

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.]

challenged and, therefore, the contention that all the 10 posts would be A occupied by the promotees in the cadre post, is fallacious and incorrect. Only 50% of the promotees (75% for 8 years in Irrigation Branch) allotted by the State of Punjab to the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class-I on and with effect from 1st day of November, 1966, shall be retained within their quota and balance five posts in Public Health Branch, shall be made over B to the direct recruits. The preparation of seniority on that basis is perfectly consistent with the mandamus issued by this Court. Equally the direction issued by this Court with regard to the petitioner in Irrigation Branch and the other direct recruits in Buildings and Roads, Public Health and Irrigation Branches respectively would be applied on the same principles as applied to other direct recruits. They should be carried out accordingly. C The State Government would draw the seniority list afresh in the light of the above law and the directions. The directions of the two Division Benches of the High Court are confirmed with the modifications hereinabove. [691-H; 692-A-F] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 422 of D 1993 Etc. From the Judgment and Order dated 27.8.92 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 9358 of 1989.

D.D. Thakur, K.T.S. Tulsi, Rajinder Sachhar, N.B. Shetye, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Ms. Aparna Rohtagi, K.B. Rohtagi, N.N. Bhatt, Jasbir Malik, Prem Malhotra, Jinandra Lal, (B.D. Sardana) (In- Person), Mahabir Singh, S.C. Patel, Dhruv Mehta, S.K. Mehta, Fazlin Anam, S. Verma, Adarsh Goel, Sudershan Ooel, P.N. Puri and P.K. Manohar, for the appearing parties.

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The Judgments of the Court were delivered by PATTANAIK, J. I have gone through the erudite judgment prepared by Brother Ramaswamy, J. and having given an anxious consideration to G the conclusion arrived .at I am in respectful disagreement with the same. Taking into account the fact that Brother Ramaswamy, J. would be demiting his office on 13th of July, 1997, and the short time I have at my disposal I have not been able to be as elaborate as my brother but the two broad features which have persuaded me to take a contrary view are that the H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A implementation of the conclusions arrived at by Brother Ramaswamy, J.

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would lead to a situation where a direct recruit like Mr. B.D. Sardana as an Assistant Executive Engineer in the year 1977 would become senior to the promotee like Sri S.S. Bhola who were promoted as Executive Engineer way back in 1971 long before the entry of Mr. Sardana into the service. Further when the legislatures being aware of the aforesaid gross inequities and anomalous situation have come forward with a legislation by enacting an Act and giving it retrospective effect from the date the State of Haryana came into existence the Court should try to sustain the Act unless the Act is found to be repugnant to any of the constitutional provision. With the aforesaid background I have endeavoured broadly with the questions that arose for consideration. These appeals by Special Leave as well as the Transfer Cases relate to the age old problem in almost all services i.e. determination of inter-se seniority between the direct recruits and promotees within a cadre. These cases arise out of the earlier directions of this Court in two cases, namely, A.N. Sehgal and Others v. Raje Ram Sheoran and Others, [1992) Supp. 1 Supreme Court Cases, 304 and S.L. Chopra and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, [1992] Supp. 1 Supreme Court Cases 391 and the seniority list drawn up by the Government of Haryana pursuant to the aforesaid direction and the intervention by the legislators in enacting an Act called the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Civil Appeals nos. 422/93, 423/93 and 424/93, Writ Petition No. 582/95, and Transfer Case No. 44/96 relate to Public Health Branch and the orders passed by the State Government determining the inter se seniority in the said Branch. Out of these three Civil Appeals one is by the State of Haryana and two others are by the promotee affected officers belonging to the Public Health Branch and they are aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal . Writ Petition No. 582/95 is by direct recruit B.D. Sardana under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Act and praying for direction to grant him seniority just below the 10 officers who initially constituted the service when the State of Haryana came into existence. Transfer Case No. 44/96 had also been filed by direct recruit in the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging the validity of the Act which has been transferred pursuant to

S.S. BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.]

the orders of this Court. Civil Appeal Nos. 1448-49/93 filed by the State A and Civil Appeal Nos. 1452-53/93 filed by the promotee officers belonging to the Irrigation Branch are directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of· the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal which arose out of a Writ Petition filed by one M.L. Gupta who was directly appointed as an Assistant Executive Engineer on 27.8.1971. Trans- B . fer Case No. 40/96 is the Writ Petition filed by Shri Gupta challenging the validity of the Act which stood transferred to this Court pursuant to the orders of this Court. The brief facts leading to the enactment of the Act may be stated as under: The separate State of Haryana came into existence on 1.11.1966. When Punjab and Haryana was one State, the recruitment and conditions of service of Engineers in the State was being regulated by Rules framed by the Governor of Punjab in exercise of powers conferred by proviso under Article 309 of the Constitution. The set of Rules dealing with the Engineers of the Public Health Branch was called "The Punjab Service Engineers, Class-I, Public Works Department (Public Health Branch) Rules 1961. A similar set of Rules had also been framed by the Governor under Proviso to Artide 309 of the Constitution for the Engineers belonging to the Roads and Buildings Branch called the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class-I, Public Works Department (Roads and Buildings Branch) Rules, 1960. The provisions of these two rules are almost identical. A third set of Rules also had been framed by the governor for Engineers belonging to the Irrigation Branch, called ''The Punjab Service of Engineers, Class-I, Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules. After the formation. of the State of Haryana the Government of Haryana adopted all the aforesaid three rules to deal with the service conditions of the Engineers belonging to the three branches, namely, the Public Health Branch, the Roads and Buildings Branch and the Irrigation Branch. The dispute relating to the fixation of seniority of promotees and direct recruits in the Roads and Buildings Branch came up for consideration before this Court in the case of A.N. Sehgal and Others v. Raje Ram Sheoran and Others, [1992] Supp. 1 Supreme Court Cases 304, and this Court after thorough analysis of different provisions of the Rules relating to the Roads and Buildings Branch interpreted the Rules of seniority and directed the Government of Haryana to determine the ·cadre post regularly from time to time and to issue orders appointing substantively to the post within the

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A quota and determine the inter se seniority between the promotees and the direct recruits in the respective quota cadre post of Executive Engineer. The provisions of the Public Health Branch Rules came up for consideration in the case of S.L. Chopra & Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., [1992] Supp. 1 Supreme Court Cases 391, and the dispute in that case also was B the determination of inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees. This Court also interpreted the relevant provisions of the Rules for determination of intd se seniority in the Public Health Branch and directed the State Government to determine the cadre strength in Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, PwD (Public Health Branch) Rules of the C posts of Executive Engineer, Superh!lending Engineer and Chief Engineer and consider the cases of the appellant in the said case as well as the respondents for promotion to the senior posts of Executive Engineers, - Superintending Engineers and Chief Engin~ers respectively with the respective quota of 50 per cent and make appointment if found eligible and D fit for promotion. It may be stated that the Rules relating to Irrigation Branch which is slightly different from both the aforesaid Rules, namely, the Public He~th Branch and Roads and Buildings Branch had never cropped up for consideration. After the aforesaid two judgments of this Court and pursuant to the directions issued, the State Government began E the exercise of fixing the cadre strength during each year commencing from 1966 and also began determination of inter se seniority of the promotees and direct recruits in the different posts within the service and also drew up the seniority list of the employees. The first set of seniority list was drawn up on 6.4.1992 and being aggrieved by the said seniority list, Writ Petitions were filed and the Punjab and Haryana High Court having F quash~d the same, Special Leave Petitions were filed in this Court. During the pendency of the Special Leave Petitions in this Court and prior to the hearing of the cases two other sets cif seniority lists had been drawn up, one on 13.3.1997 and another on 19.3.1997 and strenuous arguments had been advanced in support of and against the aforesaid lists drawn up by G the Government. The main attack to the aforesaid list is that the earlier directions issued by this Court in Sehgal's case (supra) as well as Chopra's case (supra) have not been duly followed in drawing up the seniority list. Subsequent to the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court striking down the seniority list prepared by the Government pursuant to H the directions of this Court in Chopra's case (supra) the Haryana Legis-

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S.S. BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA[PATTANAIK,J.]

lators enacted the Act to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service A·· of persons appointed in all the three branches and the validity of the said Act had been challenged in the Writ Petitions filed in Punjab and Haryana High Court. Those Writ Petitions have been transferred to this Court and have been numbered as transfer cases. Elaborate arguments were advanced by the counsel for parties challenging the validity of the aforesaid Act B basically on the ground that it seeks to merely annul the judgment of this Court in Sehgal's case (supra) and in Chopra's case (supra) which is not permissible in law. It may be stated that if the Act is held to be valid then necessarily the seniority list drawn up by the State Government pursuant to the directions of this Court in Sehgal's case (supra and Chopra's case C (supra) will not hold good and a fresh seniority list has to be drawn up as the Act in question has been given retrospective effect with effect from the date of the formation of the State of Haryana in November 1966. If the Act is held to be ultra vires then also it has to be examined whether the seniority list drawn up by the State Government is in accordance with the earlier direction given by this Court in Sehgal's case (supra) and Chopra's case D (supra) and if not what further directions are necessary? It is in this context it must be borne in mind that in the earlier cases only the principles of determination of inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees had been considered and adjudged but as to how the initial allottees to the services would be considered there was no adjudication in E as much as that question did not crop up for consideration.

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So far as the the Public Health Branch is concerned, on the date of the formation of the State of Haryana 14 persons were brought frollf the erstwhile Punjab cadre of Engineers to constitute the initial cadre in the F State of Haryana and since the cadre strength of the service in Haryana was only 10, four of these persons were adjusted against l!X-cadre post. While bringing persons from the erstwhile Punjab cadre to Haryana the . relevant rules and the quota of direct recruits and promotees in the service had not been borne in mind and officers were brought from the erstwhile Punjab cadre depending upon the domicile of the employees. In other G words, those who belonged to the Haryana State were brought over to ; Haryana cadre and in regulating the cadre strength the ratio between direct recruits and promotees as per Recruitment Rules then in force had not been observed. In the aforesaid premises a question which would arise for consideration and ultimate decision would be as to how these 10 officers H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A who were brought over from the erstwhile Punjab State and constituted the

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initial cadre strength of service in Haryana would be dealt with? This question had not been dealt with either in Sehgal's case or in Chopra's case referred to S1;1pra. At this stage it would be appropriate to notice as to what was decided by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra. Sehgal deals with roads and building branch. In that case, one R.R. Sheoran·challenged Gradation List and the seniority assigned to Sehgal and others by filing a writ petition in Punjab and Haryana High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court came to hold that Sheoran was a member of the service from the date of his initial appointment as Assistant Executive Engineer whereas Sehgal and others who were promoted were not members of the service. This decision was challenged by Sehgal, a promotee officer and it was agreed between the parties that this Court would decide the principles on consideration of the Rules and leave the matter for the State Government to determine the inter se seniority by applying the law. This Court considered Rule 3(1), Rule 3(2), Rule 5(1)(a). Rules 6 and 7, Rule 11(1), Rule 12(3) and sub-rule (12) of Rule 2. This Court came to conclusion that a direct recruit would always be recruited and appointed to a substantive vacancy and from the date he starts dis~harging the duty attached to the post he is a member of the service subject to his successfully completing the probation and declaration thereof at a later date and his appointment relates back to the date of initial appointment, subject to his being discharged from service on failure to complete the probation \vithin or extended period or termination of the service according to rules. So far as a promotee is concerned it was held that a promotee would have initial officiating promotion to a temporary vacancy or substantive vacancy and on successful completion and declaration of the probation, unless reverted to lower post he awaits appointment to a substantive vacancy. Only on appointment to a substantive vacancy he becomes a member of the service. It was also held that a direct recruit appointed to an ex-cadre post alone is a member of the service even while on probation and Rule 2(12)(a) applies to them and it does not apply to a promotee from Class II service. This Court also held :

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"on a conjoint reading of Rules (12(3) and 12(5) it is clear that the year of allotment of the Assistant Executive Engineer in the post of Executive Engineer, shall be the calendar year in which the order of appointment as Assistant Executive Engineer had been made. Thus his seniority as Executive Engineer, by fiction of law,

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would relate back to his date of initial appointment as Assistant Executive Engineer and in juxtaposition to Class II officers' seniority as Executive Engineer is unalterable".

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Since Shri Sheoran was appointed as an Assistant Executive Engineer on August 30, 1971, it was directed that his seniority as Executive B Engineer shall accordingly be reckoned. While interpreting Rule 5(2) and proviso thereto it was held that the intendment appears to be that so long as the direct recruit Assistant Executive Engineer, eligible and considered fit for promotion is not available, the promotee from Class II service in excess of the quota is eligible to occupy in officiating capacity the senior posts, i.e. Executive Engineers and above. The moment direct recruits are C available, they alone are entitled to occupy 50 per cent of their quota posts and the promotees shall give place to the direct recruits. On the question what is the date from which the seniority of a promotee as Executive Engineer shall be reckoned, the Court held that a promotee within quota under rule 5(2) gets his seniority from the initial date of his promotion and D the year of allotment, as contemplated in Rule 12(6) shall be the next below 'the juniormost officer in the service whether officiating or confirmed as Executive Engineer before the former's appointment' counting the entire officiating period towards seniority, unless there is break in the service or from the date of later promotion. Such promotee, by necessary implication would normally become senior to the direct recruit promoted later. Com- E bined operation of sub-rules (3) to (5) of Rule 12 makes the direct recruit a member of the service of Executive Engineer from the date of year of allotment as an Assistant Executive Engineer. The result is that the promotee occupying the posts within 50 per cent quota of the direct recruits, acquired no right to the post and should yield to direct recruit, F though promoted later to him, to the senior scale posts i.e., Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and Chief Engineer. The promotee has right to confirmation in the cadre post as per Rule 11(4) if a post. is available to him within his quota or at a later date under Rule 5(2) read with Rule 11(4) and gets appointment under Section 8(11). His seniority G would be reckoned only from the date of the availability of the post and the year of allotment, he shall be next below to his immediate senior promotee to that year or the juniormost of the previous year of allotment whether officiating or permanent occupying the post within 50 per cent quota. The officiating period of the promotee between the dates of initial promotion and the date of the availability of the cadre post would thus be H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A rendered fortuitous and stands excluded. A direct recruit on promotion

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within the quota, though later to the promotee is interposed in between the periods and interjects the promotee's seniority snaps the links in the chain of continuity and steals a march over the approved promotee P!Obationer. Harmonious construction of Rules 2(1), 2(3), 2(7); 2(10), 2(12), 2(12)(a), 5(2)(a), 8, 9(2), 11, 12(3), 12(5) to 12(7) would yield to the above result, lest the legislative animation would be defeated and the rules would be rendered otiose and surplus. It would also adversely affect the morale and efficiency of the service. Mere officiating appointment by promotion to a cadre post outside the quota; continuous officiating therein and declaration of probation would not clothe the promotee with any right to claim seniority ov::r the direct recruits. The necessary conclusion would, therefore, be that the direct recruit shall get his seniority with effect from the date of the year of the allotment as Assistant Executive Engineer which is not alterable. Whereas the promotee would get his seniority w.e.f. the date of the availability of the posts within 50 per cent quota of the promotees the year of allotment is variable and the seniority shall be reckoned accordingly. Appointment to the cadre post substantively and confirmation thereof shall be mad.e under Rule 8(11) read with Rule 11(4) of the Rules. A promotee Executive Engineer would only then become member of the service. 'Appointed substantively' within the meaning of Rule 2(12)(a) shall be construed accordingly, We, further hold that the seniority of the promotee from Class II service as Executive Engineer shall be determined with effect from the date on which the ca<lre post was available to him and the seniority shall be determined accordingly. Ultimately this Court directed the Government of Haryana to determine the cadre posts, if not already done, regularly from time to time including the post created due to exigencies of service in terms of Rule 3(2) read with Appendix 'A' and allot the posts in each year of allotment as contemplated under Rule 12 read with Rule 5(2)(a) and issue order appointing substantively to the respective posts within the quota and determine the inter se seniority between the appellants therein who were promotees and Sheoran, direct recruits in the respective quota cadre posts of Executive Engineer. The Court also held that the inter se seniority of the direct recruits and promotees shall be determined in accordance with the principles laid down. In S.L. Chopra's case, which deals with Public Health Branch, this Court held that direct recruits get seniority from the date of appointment as Assistant Executive Engineer and it is unalterable. But the promotee's

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA (PATIANAIK, J.]

. seniority is variable by operation of Rules 8(11) and 11(4); 2(12)(a) and A 5(2) of the Rules. The State Government was accordingly directed to determine the cadre strength in the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I PWD (Public Health Branch) under the rules, Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers and consider the cases of the appellants therein as well as the contesting respondents B.D. Sardana, F.L. B Kansai for promotion to the senior posts of Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers respectively with the respective quota of 50 per cent and make appointment if found eligible and fit for promotion. In the said case the appellant was a promotee and the respondents were direct recruits.

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The seniority list which was drawn up on 6.4.92 assumed that out of ten incumbents who originally constituted the service in the Public Health Branch five have to be treated as direct recruits fictionally under Rule 5(3) and 5 as promotees so that the disparity in the ratio will not influence the future promotion. The seniority list which was drawn up on 19.3.97 took D the ten incumbents originally constituted service belonging to the quota of promotees since factually all of them were promotees under the Punjab Rules and then determined the inter se seniority of direct recruits and the promotees by application of law laid down by this Court in Sehgal's case (supra) Chopra's case (supra).·

In course of his submissions, Mr. Tulsi appearing for the State demonstrated that the Seniority List which was drawn up on 19.3.1977 topsy turbid the position to such an extent that a direct recruit as Assistant Executive Engineer who was not even born on the cadre when a promotee had been appointed as the Executive Engineer, such direct recruit became p senior to the promotee Executive Engineer. Such gross inequity which was resulted on account of giving effect to the Rules in force and interpreted by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra persuaded the legislature to intervene by enacting the Act and giving it retrospective effect. Let us now examine the validity of the Act, itself which was cha!- G lenged by the direct recruits in filing Writ Petitions in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and those Writ Petitions stood transferred to this Court. Mr. Sachar, the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners direct recruits contended that the Act is nothing but an usurpation of judicial power by the legislature to annul the judgments of this Court in H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Sehgal and Chopra and it merely declares the earlier judgments to be

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invalid without anything more and as such is invalid and inoperative. Further, the Act takes away the rights accrued in favour of the direct recruits pursuant to the judgments of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra and consequently the Act must be struck down. The learned counsel also urged that the mandamus issued by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra has to be complied with and the State Legislature has no power to make the mandamus ineffective by enacting an Act to override the judgment of this Court which tantamounts to a direct in-road into the sphere occupied by judiciary and consequently the Act has to be struck down. This argument of Mr. Sachar was also supported by Mr. Mahabir Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in T.P. (Civil) No. 46 of 1997 in his written submissions and it was urged that in any view of the matter the legislatures could not have given retrospective operation to the Act itself with reference to a situation that was in existence 25 years ago and such an act of the legislature must be held to be invalid as was held by this Court in the case of State of Gujarat and Another v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and Others, [1983) 2 S.C.C. 33. In elaborating the contention that the Act merely purports to override the judgment of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra the learned counsel referred to the Objects and Reasons of the Act as well as the affidavit filed on behal{ of the State Government which would unequivocally indicate that the Act was enacted to get over the judgments of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra. Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, the learned senior counsel for the State of Haryana and Mr: D.D. Thakur and Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing for the promotee respondents on the other hand contended that the power of the State Legislature under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution is wide enough to make law determining the service conditions of the employees of the State and it is undisputed position of law that the legislature can make law giving it retrospective effect. According to the learned counsel the legislature having been aware of the inequities situation which have been the result of the Rules which were operating for determination of the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees as interpreted by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra, intervened in enacting the Act to remove the aforesaid inequities not by merely declaring the interpretation given by this Court to the relevant provision of the Rules in Sehgal and Chopra to be invalid but by making substantial alterations and changes to the basis itself and and as such the legislatures

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA[PATIANAIK,J.]

cannot be said to have encroached upon the field of judiciary nor the legislation can be held to be an act of usurpation of judicial power 9Y the legislatures. According to the learned counsel the basic changes made in the Act are by altering the definition of service by addition of sub- clause (c), by providing the quota of promotees could exceed beyond 50% as per proviso to Section 5(2) and· by changing the very criteria for determination of seniority namely the continuous length of service as engrafted in Section 12(2) and these changes having been made and the legislative competence not having been assailed, the Act must be held to be valid piece of legislation. It was also contended by the learned counsel that in deciding the constitutionality of the Act the Court can look into the Objects and Reasons of the Act only when there is ambiguity in the substantive provisions of the Act itself, but where there is no ambiguity in the language of the Act which-declares the intention of the legislature, the Court would not be justified in looking to the Objects and Reasons for the enactment or the affidavit filed by the State Government to hold that the legislatures have usurped the judicial power and have enacted the Act merely to get over the judgments of this Court and mandamus issued by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra. According to the learned counsel in enacting the Act the legislature has taken into account the needs of the administration and laid down the principles for determining the inter se seniority in consonance with the accepted norms of service jurisprudence namely determination of seniority on the basis of length of continuous service in the cadre which was also observed by this Court in the two earlier cases while interpreting the Rules of 1961 which was operative in determination of inter se seniority of the employees. The learned counsel further urged that no vested right of any employee has been taken away by the Act inasmuch as to obtain a particular position in the seniority list within a cadre is neither a vested right of an employee nor can be said to be fundamental right under Part-III of the Constitution. Mr. Tulsi, learned counsel appearing for the State of Haryana in this context said that by operation of the Act no employee whether a direct recruit or a promotee would be reverted to any lower post from the post to which promotion has already been made even if he is found to be junior to others in the rank of Executive Engineer and as such the contention of Mr. Sachar and Mr. Mahabir Singh that it takes away a vested right of the employees is incorrect in law. Lastly, it was contended that the legislative competence having been conceded and the Act not having been found to be contrary to any of the fundamental rights under

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A Part-II of the Constitution the only question that requires consideration is

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whether it tantamounts to usurpation of judicial power by the legislature and for the contentions already advanced the Act not being one merely declaring a law laid down by this Court to be invalid, there has been no usurpation of judicial power, and therefore, the same is a valid piece of legislation determining the service conditions of the employees in the State of Haryana and this Court will not be justified in holding the Act to be invalid. A large number of authorities were cited at the Bar in support of their respective contentions which we will notice while .examining the correctness of the rival submissions.

At the outset it must be borne in mind that in the case of Sehgal (supra) as well as Chopra (supra) this Court had not invalidated any provisions of the recruitment rules but merely interpreted some provisions of the rules for determining the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees. The Act passed by the legislatures, therefore, is not a D validation Act but merely an Act passed by the State Legislature giving it retrospective effect from the date State of Haryana came into existence and consequently from the date the service in question came into existence. The power of the legislature under Article 246(3) of the Constitution to make law for the State with respect to the matters enumerated in List II E of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution is wide enough to make law determining the service conditions of the employees of the State. In the case in hand there has been no challenge to the legislative competence of the State legislature to enact the legislation in question and in our view rightly, nor there has been any challenge on the ground of contravention of Part III of the Constitution. Under the constitutional scheme the power F of the legislature to make law is paramount subject to the field of legislation as enumerated in the Entries in different Lists. The function of the judiciary is to interpret the law and to adjudicate the rights of the parties in accordance with law made by the legislature. When a particular Rule or the Act is interpreted by a Court of law in a specified manner and the law G making authority forms the opinion that such an interpretation would adversely effect the rights of the parties and would be grossly inequitious and accordingly a new set of Rule or Law is enacted, it is very often challenged as in the present case on the ground that the legislatures have usurped the judicial power. In such a case the Court has a delicate function H to examine the new set of laws enacted by the legislatures and to find out

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.)

whether infact the legislatures have exercised the legislative power by merely declaring an earlier judicial decision to be invalid and ineffective or the legislatures have altered and changed the character of the legislation which ultimately may render the judicial decision ineffective. It cannot be disputed that the legislatures can always render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting valid law on the topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively as was held by this Court in the case of Indian Aluminium Company v. The State of Kera/a, (1996] 7 Supreme Court Cases 637. What is really prohibited is that . legislature cannot in exercise of its plenary power under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution merely declare a decision of a Court of Law to be invalid or to be inoperative in which case it would be held to be an exercise of judicial power. Undoubtedly under the scheme of Constitution the legislature do not possess the same. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles it is necessary to examine the legality of the Act in question. If we do not examine the substantive provisions of the Act and merely go by the object and reasons as given for the enactment of the Act as well as the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State then the Act would be possibly held to be an intrusion to the judicial sphere by the legislature. The Statements of Objects and Reasons while introducing the Bill in Haryana Vidhan Sabha is extracted hereinbelow in extenso :

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"There were separate rules regulating service conditions and fixation of seniority in the Engineering Service in P.W.D. B. & R .. Public Health and PWD Irrigation Branch. These rules although different for the three branches were on identical lines with minor variations. These rules have been interpreted in the Supreme Court in the case of A. N. Sehgal v. R.R. Sheoran and S.L. Chopra v. B.D. Sardana. Subst:quently, the judgment has been interpreted further in the case of A.N. Sehgal v. R.R. Sheoran by an order dated 31st March, 1995 of the Supreme Court in a Contempt Petition filed by Shri R.R. Sheoran. In the Public Health side, the seniority list prepared under the directions of the Supreme Court in S.L. Chopra v. B.D. Sardana's case was challenged in the High Court which struck down the list. Thereafter an appeal was filed by the State in the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court in the case of State v. B.D. Sardana. The appeal was admitted by the Supreme Court and the operative portion of the judgment of the

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. High Court was stayed. The matter is pending for final decision in the Supreme Court, and meanwhile the seniority list prepared by the State is being operated by Public Health Branch. 2. Meanwhile, consequent to the directions given by the Supreme Court in the case of A.N. Sehgal v. R.R. Sheoran and orders of the Supreme Court dated 31st March, 1995 in the Contempt Petition filed by R.R. Sheoran subsequently the seniority list had to be redrawn in the case of B&R Branch, which was totally at variance with the manner in which the seniority was drawn up in the case of Public Health Branch. Thus, the directions of the Supreme Court in the case of B & R Branch had created a lot of administrative problems with certain very junior officers getting undue seniority and becoming senior to the officers under whom they were previously working. This naturally resulted in severe groupism and tension between officers of the department in their day to day working.

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3. In order to have uniform rules for all three branches of Engineering services and to clarify the position in an unambiguous manner so as to have uniformity and clarity in interpretation, it became necessary to make certain amendments with retrospective effect. This was possible only by enacting a legislation in this regard. As the Haryana Vidhan Sabha was not in session, it was decided to achieve the purpose through issue of an 'Ordinance on 13th May, 1995. The Ordinance replaced the existing rules for all the three branches of the PWD and the common enactment was to govern the service matters of Class-I service B & R Branch, Public Health Branch and Irrigation Branch".

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The relevant portion of the affidavit of Shri S.N. Tanwar, Joint Secretary to the Government of Haryana filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court indicating the grounds which impelled the legislature to enact the legislation in question may be extracted hereinunder :

"This interpretation by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has caused great hardships to the promotees. In order to remove this hardship to the promotees an Ordinance was issued on 13.5.1995 which has now become an Act No.20 of 1995 after assent of the Governor of Haryana on H 30.11.1995. If this Ordinance/Act is not issued the net result of the Order

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S.S. BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.]

of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would be that the directly recruited Assis- A tant Executive Engineer would be considered to be Executive Engineer from the date he was recruited as Assistant Executive Engineer. The interpretation of the judgment of the Supreme Court creates such a situation that persons who were promotees and were working as Executive Engineer years before even the Assistant Executive Engineers were B recruited became junior to the latter when the latter was promoted as Executive Engineer. This was somehow considered by the Government to be very seriously hampering proper working of the department. Giving such a seniority to a person recruited as Assistant Exef:utive Engineer have effected adversely the effective working of the department because the persons who are occupying the posts much higher to the Executive En- C gineer and above could become junior to Assistant Executive Engineer who is recruited even after the promotees have been discharging their duties on these higher posts. If such a situation will continue to prevail the promotees will not be able to work in that capacity when they would be considered to be junior to the persons who were recruited to Class I service much later D than their promotions. Moreover, the Government of Haryana always considered that the Assistant Executive Engineers directly recruited would deem to be having a seniority from the date when he is actually promoted as Executive Engineer. Since the Supreme Court did not accept this interpretation it became essential for the Government of Haryana inter alia for the reasons mentioned above to issue this Act retrospectively." If these materials are alone considered then one may be persuaded to accept the submission of Mr. Sachar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the clirect recruits - Writ Petitioners, that the Act in question was merely to declare the earlier decisions of this Court in Sehgal (supra) and in Chopra (supra) as invalid and as such is usurpation of the judicial power by the legislature. But it is a cardinal rule of interpretation that Objects and Reasons of a statute is to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out legislative intent only when the meaning of the statute by its ordinary language is obscure or ambiguous. But if the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous then the statute itself declares the intention of the legislature and in such a case it would not be permissible for a Court to interpret the Statute by examining the Objects and Reasons of the Statute in question.

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In the case of Aswani Kumar Ghosh and Another v. Arabi1ida Bose H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and Another, SCR (1953] 1, Patanjali Sastri, J. speaking for the majority of the Court, emphatically ruled out the Objects and Reasons appended to a Bill as an aid to the construction of a Statute. It was observed :

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"As regards the propriety of the reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it must be remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons induced .the mover to introduce the Bill in the House and what objects he sought to achieve. But those objects and reasons may or may not correspond to the objective which the majority of members had in view when they passed it into law. The Bill may have undergone radical changes during its passage through the House or Houses, an.d there is no guarantee that the reasons which led to its introduction and the objects thereby sought to be achieved have remained the same throughout till the Bill emerges from the House as an Act of the Legislature, for they do not form part of the Bill and are not voted upon by members. We, therefore, consider that the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill should be ruled out as an aid to the construction of the statute" In the case of 171e Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen, S.C.R. (1960] 200, S.K. Das, J., reiterated the principle:

"The Statement of Objects and Reasons is not admissible, however, for construing the section far less can it control the actual words used". \ · I

Sinha J., in the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India, S.C.R.

F 1 (1964] 371, held : "It is well settled that the Statement of Objects and Reasons

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accompanying a Bill,, when introduced in Parliament cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the Statute. They cannot be· used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation". In the case of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat, Pimpri Waghere, [1976] 4 SCC 177, this Court did not accept the recital in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that the amendment

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA [PATIANAIK, J:J

was made for the reason that the Panchayats could not levy tax on buildings A and held that the word 'houses' as originally used was comprehensive enough to include all buildings including factory buildings and that the amendment only made explicit what was implicit". The general rule of interpretation is that the language employed is B primarily the determining factor to find out the intention of the legislature. Gajendragadker, J. as he then was in the case of Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, S.C.R. [1958] 360 had observed that "the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself'. In the case of Robert Wigram C Crawford v. Richard Spooner, 4 MIA 179 (PC) p. 1987 Lord Brougham had stated thus."If the legislature did intend that which it has not expressed clearly; much more, if the legislature intended something very different; if the legislature intended pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for judges to invent something which they do not meet within the words of the text''. Thus when the plain meaning uf the words used in a statute D indicate a particular state of affairs the courts are not required to get themselves busy with the "supposed intention" or with "the policy underlying the statute" or to refer the objects and reasons which was accompanied in the Bill while introducing the same on the floor of the legislation. It is only when the plain meaning of the words used in the statute creates an E ambiguity then it may be permissible to have the extrinsic aid of looking to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for ascertaining the true intention of the legislatures. In the aforesaid state of affairs to find out whether the impugned Act is an usurpation of judicial power by the legislature it would not be permissible to look to the Statement of Objects and Reasons which accompanied the Bill while introducing the same on the floor of the F legislation nor the affidavit filed by an officer of the Government would control the true and correct meaning of the words of the statute. It would, therefore, be necessary to examine the Act itself and the changes brought about by the Act and the consequences thereof in relation to the decisions of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra interpreting the Rules of seniority G which were in force and which stood repealed by the Act itself.

The Preamble of the Act which is a key to the enactment clearly indicates that it is an act for consolidation of rules relating to different H Branches. It reads, thus :

A

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. "to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Building and Roads Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) respectively."

A comparative study of the provisions of the 1961 Rules framed by the Government in exercise of power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and 1995 Act passed by the Haryana Legislature indicate the following changes which have been brought about by the Act :

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"(a) The definition of member of service in Rule 2(12) of 1961 rules has been amended, Sub-clause (c) has been inserted in Clause 12 of Section i of 1995 Act by which an officer awaiting appointment to a cadre post has been made a member of service.

(b) A proviso has been added to Section 5(2) of 1995 Act which expressly provides for exceeding the quota of 50% of officers promoted to the post of Executive Engineers in the event, adequate number of Assistant Executive Engineers are not available.

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© The Percentage of quota has been altered from 50% to 75% in the case of Irrigation Branch by incorporating a second proviso to Section 5(2) of the Act.

(d) The rule with regard to determination of seniority has been completely changed from the one that existed in 1961 rules. While under the 1961 rules, according to Rule 12, no member of service could enjoy the benefit of service except in accordance with the quota prescribed under Rule 5, under Clause 2 of Section 12 of the Act, length of continuous service for the post of executive engineers, has been made the sole determining factor for the fixation of seniority."

The aforesaid changes and alterations in the Act itself and giving its G retrospective effect w.e.f. the date when the State of Haryana came into existence and consequently the service of engineers came into existence, rendered the earlier decision of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra ineffective. The provisions of the Act and the definition of "service" in Section 2{12){c), proviso to Section 5(2) and the criteria for promotion which was H engrafted in Section 12(2) and making it retrospective w.e.f. 1.11.1966,

S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.)

when interpreted lead to the only conclusion that this Court could not have rendered the decision in Sehgal and Chopra on the face of the aforesaid provisions of the Act. It is, therefore, not a case of legislature by mere declaration without anything more overriding a judicial decision but a case of rendering a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law within the legislative field of the legislature. It would be appropriate to extract a passage from the judgment of this Court in Indian Aluminium _Co. and Others v. State of Kera/a and Others, (1996) 7 S.C.C. 637, to which two of us were parties (Ramaswamy, J. and Pattanaik, J.) :

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"In a democracy governed by rule of law, the legislature exercises the power under Article 245 and 246 and other companion articles C read with the entries in the respective lists in the Seventh Schedule to make the law which includes power to amend the law. Courts in their concern and endeavour to preserve judicial power equally must be guarded to maintain the delicate balance devised by the Constitution. between the three sovereign functionaries. In order D that rule of law permeates to fulfil constitutional objectives of establishing an egalitarian social order, the respective sovereign functionaries need free play in their joints so that the march of social progress and order remains unimpeded. The smooth balance built with delicacy must always be maintained. In its anxiety to safeguard judicial power, it is unnecessary to be overzealous and E conjure up incursion into the judicial preserve invalidating the valid law competently made." It would be appropriate now to examine the different citations made at the Bar. Mr. Sachar, the learned senior counsel in support of his F contention that the impugned judgment is essentially a usurpation of the judicial power by the legislature relied upon the decisions of this Court in B.S. Yadav and Others v. State of Haryana & Others and Pritpal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, [1980) Supp. Supreme Court cases 524, State of Gujarat & Another Etc. v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and G others Etc., [1983) 2 Supreme Court Cases 33, Ex. Capt. KC. Arora and Another v. State of Haryana and Others, (1984) 3 Supreme Court cases 281, T.R. Kapur and Others v. State of Haryana and Ors., [1986) Supp. Supreme Court Cases 684. P.D. Aggarwal and Others v. State of U.P. and Others, [1987) 3 Supreme Court Cases 622; Madan Mohan Pathak and Another Etc. v. Union of India and Others, [1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 50. In B.S. H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Yadav's case supra the question for consideration before this Court was whether Governor could frame rule relating to conditions of service of judicial officers, and if so, then whether such rule contravenes Article 235 of the Constitution? This Court held that a combined reading of Article 309 and Article 235 would lead to the conclusion that though the legislature· or the Governor has the power to make Rules regulating the recruitment B and the conditions of service of judicial officers of the State and thereby regulate seniority of judicial officers by laying down rules of general application, but that power cannot be exercised in a manner which will lead to interference with the control vested in the High Court by the first part of Article 235. In paragraph 76 of the judgment the Court examined the C amended rule and the retrospectivity of the same and held that since the Governor exercises the legislative power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, it is open to him to give retrospective operation to the rules made under that provision. But the date from which the rules are made to operate must be shown to bear, either from the face of the rules D or by extrinsic evidence, reasonable nexus with the provisions contained in the rules, especially when the retrospective effect extends over a long period and no nexus is shown in the present case on behalf of the State Government. On the aforesaid reasonings the Court came to the conclusion that the retrospective effect that was given to the rules is bad in law. In the said case neither this Court examined the question of legislature invalidatE ing a decision of a competent Court of law nor the question whether there has been any intrusion by the legislature into the judicial sphere. We fail to understand how this case is of any assistance to the petitioners in the Writ Petitions challenging the validity of the Act.

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In Ranum Lat's (case) (supra) the employees of the Panchayat Services filed a Writ Petition in Gujarat High Court claiming that they are entitled to the benefit of revision of scales of pay which were made on the basis of the recommendation of the Pay Commission. The State of Gujarat resisted those petitions on the ground that the members of the Panchayat Service were not government semnts and, therefore, they are not entitled G to claim the relief asked for. The High Court of Gujarat allowed the Writ Petition on coming to the conclusion that the members of the Panchayat Service belonging to the local cadre were government servants and directed the State Government to make suitable orders under Gujarat Panchayat Service (absorption, seniority, pay and allowance) Rules, 1965 and several H other directions to fix the pay scales and allowance and other conditions

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.] •

of service of those employees in par with the State Government servants. The State had filed appeal against the said judgment in the Supreme Court and during the pendency of the appeal an Ordinance was passed which was later on replaced by the Act. The constitutional validity of the amending Act was challenged by filing the Writ Petition by the ex-Municipal employees who were included in the local cadre. This Court came to the conclusion that the Panchayat Service constituted under Section 203 of the Gujarat Panchayat's Act is a Civil Service of the State and the Members of the service are government servants. The Court, however, examined the validity of the Amending Act and came to the conclusion that before the Amending Act was passed the employees who had been allocated to the Panchayat Service had achieved the status of government servants under the provisions of the principal Act of 1961 and that status as government servant cannot be extinguished so long as the posts are not abolished and their services were not terminated in accordance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. It is in this context it was observed : "The legislation is pure and simple, self-deceptive, if we may use such an expression with reference to a legislature- made law. The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution, and to have conformity to the dos and don'ts of the Constitution, neither prospective nor retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene fundamental rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say, 20 years ago the parties had no rights, therefore, the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by 20 years, We are concerned with today's rights and not yesterday's. A legislature cannot legislate today with reference to a situation that obtained 20 years ago and ignore the march of events and the constitutional rights accrued in the course of the 20 years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of history."

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Thus the Amending Act was held to have offended the constitutional provisions of Article 14 and Article 311 and, therefore, was struck down. Thus in Raman Lal, the amending Act had the effect of depriving H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the ex-Municipal employees of their status of membership under the State without any option to them which was considered to be unconstitutional. In the case in hand the impugned Act and its retrospectivity merely alters the seniority within a cadre and such an alteration neither contravenes any constitutional provision nor it affects any right under Part - III of the B Constitution. In this view of the matter the aforesaid decision is of no assistance to the direct recruit petitioners who have assailed the legality of the Act. In KC. Arora's case, (1984] 3 S.C.C. 281 the amended provisions being given retrospective effect was found to have affected the accrued fundamental rights of the parties. Following the earlier judgment of this C Court in State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni, (1983] 2 SCC 33, this Court held that the Government cannot take away the accrued rights of the petitioners and the appellants, by making amendment to the rules with retrospective effect. In the aforesaid case under the rules in force the seniority had been determined by counting the period of military service. D Under the amendment rules by giving it retrospective effect the aforesaid benefit had been taken away. This Court, therefore, held that in view of the rules in force and the assurances given by the Government the accrued right of considering the military service towards seniority cannot be retrospectively taken away. In the case in hand no such accrued rights of the direct recruits are being taken away by the Act. On the other hand on E account of gross inequitious situation the legislatures have enacted an Act in consonanc.e with the normal service jurisprudence of determining the seniority on the basis of continuous length of service in a cadre. The aforesaid decision, therefore, cannot be said to be a decision in support of the contention that legislature have usurped the judicial power nor is it a F decision in support of the contention that by the impugned Act any fundamental rights of the direct recruits have been infringed. In the case of T.R. Kapur and Other v. State of Haryana and Others., (1986) supp. SCC 584, when the validity of Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I, PWD (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964 as amended by State of Haryana by G notification dated June 22, 1984 came up for consideration this Court found that the said rule is violative of Section 82(6) of the Punjab Reorgani~ation Act, 1966, as the prior approval of the Central Government had not been taken. On the question of power of the Governor to frame Rules under proviso to Article 309 and to give it retrospective effect the Court H held that though the rules can be amended retrospectively but any benefit

S.S.BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA[PATIANAIK,J.]

accrued under existing rule cannot be taken away. In other words a A promotion which has already been held in accordance with the rules in force cannot be nullified by the amended rules by fixing an additional qualification for promotion. By the impugned Act the Haryana Legislatures have not purported to nullify any promotion already made under the 1961 Rules which was in force prior to being repealed by the impugned Act. B Even Mr. Tulsi, appearing for the State, submitted that no promotion already made under the pre-amended rules will be altered in any manner by giving effect to the provisions of the Act. In this view of the matter, the aforesaid decision is also of no assistance to the direct recruits. In Madan Mohan Pathak and Another v. Union of btdia and Others, (1978) 2 SCC 50, C a seven Judge Bench of this Court considered the question of the power of the legislature to annul a judgment of the Court giving effect to rights of a party. There has been some observations in the aforesaid case w}\i.ch may support the contention of Mr. Sachar inasmuch as this Court observed that the rights which had passed into those embodied in a judgment and D became the basis of a mandamus from the High Court could not be taken away in an indirect fashion. The main plank of Mr. Sachar's argument is that after the judgment of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra interpreting the rules of seniority between the direct recruits and promotees, the direction of this Court to re-draw the seniority list according to the principle laid E down by this Court has been taken away by the enactment of the legislature and thus there has been an in-road of the legislature into the judicial sphere. But a deeper scrutiny of the decision of this Court in Pathak will not sustain the arguments advanced by Mr. Sachar. In Pathak's case in accordance with Regulation 58 a settlement had been arrived at for payment of bonus to Class III and Class IV employees on 24th of January, F 1974 and the said settlement had been approved by the Central Government. Notwithstanding the settlement when the Life Insurance Corporation did not pay bonus, the employees approached the Calcutta High Court. The High Court, therefore, issued a writ of mandamus on 21st of May, 1976 calling upon the Life Insurance Corporation to pay the bonus in accord- G ance with the settlement in question. Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge a Letters Patent Appeal was preferred and while the said appeal was pending the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 came into force on 29th of May, 1976 and Section 3 thereof purported to nullify the judgment of the Calcutta High Court by H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP.. 2 S.C.R.

A the non-obstante clause in relation to provisions of Industrial Disputes Act.

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In other words the Calcutta High Court while issuing mandamus had held the settlement has a binding effect once approved by the Central Government and the same cannot be rescinded. But the impugned Act purported to nullify the rights of the employees working under Class III and Class IV to get annual cash bonus in terms of such settlement. It is in this context in the majority judgment of the Court delivered by Bhagwati, J ., it was observed: "that the judgment given by the Calcutta High Court is not merely a declaratory judgment holding an impost or tax to be invalid so that a validation statute can remove the defect pointed out by the judgment amending the law with retrospective effect and validate such impost or tax. It is a judgment giving effect to the right of the petitioners to annual cash bonus under the settlement by issuing a writ of mandamus directing the LIC to pay the amount of such bonus. If by reason of retrospective alteration of the factual or legal situation, the judgment is rendered erroneous, the remedy may be by way of appeal or review but so long as the judgment stands, it cannot be disregarded or ignored and it must be obeyed by the LIC. Therefore, in any event, irrespective of whether the impugned Act is constitutionally valid or not, the LIC is bound to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court and pay annual cash bonus for the year April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 to the Class III and Class IV employees". In making the aforesaid observation the Court did not consider the constitutionality of the Act but went by theory that the mandamus issued by the court calling upon a party to confer certain benefits to the adversary unless annulled by way of appeal or review has to be obeyed. This principle has no application to the c<ise in hand as the nature of mandamus which has been issued by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra was merely a declaration of the principles of seniority as per 1961 Rules and the State Government was to draw up the seniority list in accordance with the said Rules. The legislature by enacting the Act and giving it retrospective effect made several vital changes both on the definition of service as well as the criteria for determining the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and promotees. The impugned Act as has been stated earlier has not taken away any accrued rights of the direct recruits, and therefore, the aforesaid observation in Pathak's case really will be of no assistance in deciding the

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S.S. BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA[PATIANAIK,J.)

question as to whether the Act purports to have made an in-road into the A judicial sphere. The majority judgment came to hold that the impugned Act is violative of article 31 Clause (2) as the effect of the Act was to transfer ownership debts due owing to Class III and Class IV employees in respect of annual cash bonus to the Life Insurance Corporation and there has been no provision for payment of any compensation for the compulsory acquisition of these debts. It may be stated that the majority B judgment did not consider the question as to whether the legislatures by enacting the Act have usurped the judicial power and have merely declared the judgment of a competent court of law to be invalid. Beg, C.J. in his concurring judgment in paragraph 32 of the judgment, however, has observed:

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"that the real object of the act was to set aside the result of the mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court, though, it does not mention as such, and therefore, the learned Judge held that Section 3 of the Act would be invalid for trenching upon the judicial power." Three other learned Judges, namely; Y.V. Chandrachud, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and P.N. Shinghal, JJ. agreed with the conclusion of Bhagwati, J. but preferred to rest their decision on the sole ground that the impugned Act violates the provisions of Article 31(2) of the Constitution and in fact E they considered it unnecessary to express any opinion on the effect of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Writ Petition No. 371 of 1976. Thus out of seven learned Judges, six learned Judges rested their decision on the ground that the impugned Act violates Article 31(2) of the Constitution and did not consider the enactment in question to be an act of usurpation F of judicial power by the legislature. The observation of Beg, C.J., in paragraph 32 does not appear to be in consonance with the several authorities of this Court on the point to be discussed hereafter. Thus the aforesaid decision cannot be pressed into service in support of Mr. Sachar's contention. In the aforesaid premises the authorities cited by Mr. Sachar G in fact do not support the contention urged by the learned senior counsel and on the other hand a series of authorities of this Court to be discussed hereafter are directly on the point unequivocally indicating that the power of the legislature to enact law and giving it retrospective effect which may .. factually render a decision of a competent court of law ineffective cannot be whittled down. H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

In /.N. Saxena v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 3 SCR 237 a contention had been raised with regard to the validity of an Act to the effect that the Act has been passed to overrule a decision of this Court which the legislature has no power to do. In that case the State of Madhya Pradesh had raised age of compulsory retirement for government servants B from 55 years to 58 years but th~ very Memorandum increasing the age of superannuation also empowered the Government to retire a government servant after the servant attains the age of 55 years. Thereafter Rules under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution were framed whereby the age of superannuation was raised to 58 years and there was no provision in the Rules empowering the government to retire a government servant after the C age of 55 years. The employee concerned, however, was retired from service on completion of 55 years and the said order on being challenged the Supreme Court held that the appellant will be deemed to have continued in service inspite of the order till he attains the age of 58 years and since the appellant had already attained the age of 58 years it is not possible D to direct that he should be put in service. But he will be entitled to such benefits as may accrue now to him by virtue of the success of the Writ Petition. After the judgment of the Supreme Court an Ordinance was promulgated which later on became an Act of the State of Madhya Pradesh and the said Act validated the retirement of the government servants including the appellant Saxena despite the judgment of the Court. The Act E was given retrospective effect and it empowered a government to retire a government servant on his attaining the age of 55 years and the Amending Act was challenged on the ground that the legislature has usurped the judicial power. This Court has negatived the said contention and held :

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''The distinction between a "legislative" act and a ''.judicial" act is well known, though in some specific instances the line which separates one category from the other may not be easily discernible. Adjudication of the rights of the parties according to law enacted by the legislature is a judicial function. In the performance of this function, the court interprets and gives effect to the intent and mandate of the legislature as embodied in the statute. On the other hand, it is for the legislature to lay down the law, prescribing norms of conduct which will govern parties and transactions and to require the court to give effect to that law. While, in view of this distinction between legislative and judicial

S.S. BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA[PATIANAIK,J.]

functions, the legislature cannot be· a bare declaration, without more, A directly over-rule, reverse or over-ride a judicial decision, it may, at any time in exercise of the plenary powers conferred on it by Article 245 and 246 of thr- Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting or changing with retrospective, curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is based. As pointed out by Ray CJ. in Indira Nehru B Gandhi v. Raj Narain, the rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent courts and tribunals by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well-known pattern of all validating Acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes for ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings is not an encroachment on judicial power."

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In the case of M/s. Utkal Contractors and Joinary (P) Ltd. and Others v. State of Orissa, [1987) Supp. Supreme Court Cases 751, a similar contention had been raised but negatived by this Court. In that case the right to collect, sale and purchase of sal seeds had been given to the petitioners and during the subsistance of the contract Orissa legislature passed an Act D called Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act 1981. Under the provisions of the said Act the State issued Notification on 9.12.1982 which had the effect of rescinding the contract of the petitioner. That order was challenged by filing a Writ Petition which, however, was dismissed by the Orissa High Court. On an appeal this Court reversed the decision of the Orissa High Court and held that the Act does not apply to sal seeds on E government land. A declaration was made by this Court that the Act and the Notification issued under the Act do not apply to the forest produce grown in government forest and that it was, therefore, open to the Government to treat the contract dated 29th May, 1987 as rescinded. The judgment of this Court is reported in [1987] 3 SCC 279. Thereafter on 29th May p 1987 an Ordinance was promulgated, called the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1987 and it was given retrospedive effect as a result of which the earlier decision of this Court became ineffective. The petitioner, therefore; challenged the validity of the same on the ground that the legislature have encroached upon the judicial power and set aside the binding judgment of this Court. G Negativing the said contention this Court held : "The legislature may, at any time, in exercise of the plenary power conferred on it by Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting valid law. There is no H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. prohibition against retrospective legislation. The power of the legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively. That of course, is subject to the legislative competence and subject to other constitutional limitations. The rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent courts by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well known pattern of all validating acts. Such validating legislation which removes the cause of ineffectiveness or invalidity of action or proceedings cannot be considered as encroachment on judicial power, The legislature, however, cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly overrule, reverse or set aside any judicial decision."

This case is to a great extent in pari materia with the case in hand where this Court had earlier interpreted the Rules determining the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and promotees and thereafter the Haryana legislatures have enacted the Act giving it retrospective effect as D a result of which earlier decisions of this Court in Sehgal (supra) and Chopra (supra) have become ineffective. In Bhubaneshwar Singh a11d Another v. Union of llldia and Others, (1994] 6 SCC 77, a three Judge Bench of this Court held :

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"it is well settled that the Parliament and State Legislatures have plenary powers of legislation on the subjects within their field. They can legislate on the said subjects prospectively as well as retrospectively. If the intention of the legislature is clearly expressed that it purports to introduce the legislation or to amend the existing legislation retrospectively then subject to the legislative competence and the exercise being not in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution, such power cannot be questioned." The Court also further held :

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"that the exercise of rendering ineffective the judgments or orders of competent Courts by changing the very basis by legislation is a well known device of validating legislation and such validating legislation which removes the cause of the invalidity cannot be considered to be an encroachment on judicial power." In rendering the aforesaid decision, this Court relied upon heavily on

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S.S. BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA[PATIANAIK,J.]

the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Shri P.C. Mills Ltd. v.

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Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283. The Court also relied upon the decisions: of this Court in West Ramnad Electric Distribution Company Ltd. v. State of Madras, (1963) 2 SCR 747, Udai Ram Shanna and Others Etc. v. Union of India and Others, (1968) 3 SCR 41; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1975) 2 SCC 302 B and Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Others, [1985) 4 SCC 124. In Comorin Match Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1996) 4 SCC 281, the same question again came up for consideration. In this case an assessment order under the Central Sales Tax was set aside on the basis of the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Larsen and Tubro. In Larsen and Tubro certain provisions of the Act were declared ultra vires. In an appeal against the judgment of Madras High Court the Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act which had been declared ultra vires by Madras High Court were validly enacted. The Central Sales Tax Act was amended and the Amending Act was given retrospective effect declaring all assessments made upto 9.1.1%9 valid and binding. This was challenged on the ground that it tantamounts to over riding a decision of this Court by Legislatures. Rejecting the said contention this Court held: "this is not a case of passing a legislation trying to nullify the interpretation of law given in the judgment of a court of law. This is case of changing the law itself on the basis of which the judgment was pronounced holding that the assessment orders were erroneous in law."

C

In the case of Indian Aluminium (supra) to which two of us Brother F Ramaswamy, J. and Pattanaik, J. were parties a similar contention had been raised and after considering a large number of authorities of this Court and explaining the decision in the case of Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, this Court negatived the contention and held that when the legislatures enacting the Act has competence over the subject matter and G when the said enactment is consistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and the earlier defects pointed out by the Court have been removed by the legislatures then the enactment is a valid piece of legislation and cannot be struck down by the Court on the ground that it ' encroaches upon the judicial sphere. A relevant passage from th~ aforesaid •H decision has already been quoted in the earlier part of the _judgment.

A

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

In Meernt Development Authority and Others Etc. v. Satbir Singh and Others Etc., [1996] 11 SCC 462 on a similar contention being raised this Court negatived the same and held :

"It is well settled that when the Supreme Court in exercise of power

c

of judicial £eview, has declared a particular statute to be invalid, the legislature has no power to overrule the judgment; however, it has· the power to suitably amend the law by use of appropriate phraseology removing the defects pointed out by the court and by amending the law consistent with the law declared by the Court so that the defects which were pointed out were never on statute for effective enforcement of the law." A similar view has been expressed by this Court in the case of State of Orissa and Another v. Gopal Chandra Rath and Others, (1995] 6 SCC 242. In view of the aforesaid legal position when the impugned Act is

D examined the conclusion is irresistible that the said Act cannot be said to be an Act of usurpation of the judicial power by the Haryana Legislature, but on the other hand it is a valid piece of legislation enacted by the State Legislature over which they had legislative competence under Entry 41 of List II of the Vllth Schedule and by giving the enactment retrospective effect the earlier judgments of this Court in Sehgal (supra) and Chopra E (supra) have become ineffective. But since this does not tantamount to a . mere declaration of invalidity of an earlier judgment and nor does it amount to an encroachment by the legislature into the judicial sphere the Court will not be justified in holding the same to be invalid. Needless to mention that the impugned Act has neither been challenged on the ground p of the lack of legislative competence nor has it been established to have contravened any provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Consequently Mr. Sachhar's contention has to be rejected and the Act has to be declared intra vires. Necessarily, therefore the seniority list drawn up on different dates in accordance with. the earlier Rules of 1961 will have to be annulled and fresh seniority list has to be drawn up in accordance with the provisions G of the Act since the Act has been given retrospective effect with effect from 1.11.1996. It may, however, be reiterated that any promotion already made on the basis of the seniority list drawn up in accordance with the Recruitment Rules of 1961 will not be altered in any manner.·

H .

An ancillary question which arises for consideration is whether on

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S.S.BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.)

~·

account of the impugned Act any accrued or vested right of any of the A direct recruits to the service is being taken away? This consideration is relevant inasmuch as though the legislature may be empowered to enact law and give it retrospective effect but such law cannot take ·away any accrued or vested rights of the employees. Under the 1961 Rules as interpreted by this Court in the case of Sehgal and Chopra, a direct recruit B gets the year of allotment as the year in which he is recruited as Assistant Executive Engineer but so far as promotees are concerned they become members of the service only after they are appointed substantively to a cadre post and the quota of promotees can't exceed 50% of the total number of posts in the service excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers to which direct recruitments are made. Inter se seniority between C direct recruits and promo tees is regulated by Rules 12(6) and (7). As a necessary consequence a direct recruit when promoted as Executive Engineer from the post of Assistant Executive Engineer was getting seniority over the promotee Executive Engineers and this situation has been avoided by the impugned Act by changing the definition of "service" in Rule 2(12) D of the 1961 Rules, by providing the quota for promotees to exceed 50% in certain contingencies like non-availability of direct recruits to man the post of Executive Engineer and by changing the criteria for determination of inter se seniority and in place of determination of year of allotment, by providing length of continuous service to the post of Executive Engineer to be the determining factor. Necessarily, therefore, by the impugned Act E a direct recruit in the rank of Executive Engineer would come_ down in the gradation list than what was assigned under the Rules of 1961. The question, therefore is that, is the right of a government servant to get a particular position in the gradation list a vested or accrued right? The answer to this question has to be in the negative. As early as in 1962 this F Court in the case of The High Court of Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Roy, [1963) 1 S.C.R. 437, in the Constitution Bench considered the question whether losing some places in the seniority list amounted to reduction in rank, and came to hold : "In the context of Judicial Service of West Bengal, "reduction in rank" would imply that a person who is already holding the post of a Subordinate Judge has been reduced to the position of a Munsif, the rank of a Subordinate Judge being higher than that of a Munsif. But Subordinate Judges in the same cadre hold the same rank, though they have to be listed in order of seniority in the Civil

G

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. List. Therefore, losing some places in the seniority list does not tantamount to reduction in rank. Hence, it must be held that the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution are not attracted to this case." To the said effect is the judgment of this Court in the case of The

B State of Punjab v. Kishan Das, [1971] 3 S.C.R. 389, wherein this Court observed:

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"an order forfeiting the past service which has earned a Government l1_ervant increments in the post or rank he holds, howsoever adverse it is to him, affecting his seniority within the rank to which he belongs or his future chances of promotion does not attract Article 311(2) of the Constitution since it is not covered by the expression reduction in rank". Thus to ·have a particular position in the seniority list within a cadre

D can neither be said to be accrued or vested right of a Government servant and losing sQOie places in the seniority list within the cadre does not amount to reduction in rank even though the future chances of promotion ge.ts delayed thereby. It was urged by Mr. Sachar and Mr. Mahabir Singh appearing for the direct recruits that the effect of re-determination of the E seniority in accordance with the provisions of the Act is not only the direct recruits lose a few places of seniority in the rank of Executive Engineer but their future chances of promotion are greatly jeopardised and that right having been taken away the Act must be held to be invalid. It is difficult to accept this contention since chances of promotion of Government servant are not a condition of service. In the case of State of Maharashtra F and Another v. ChandrakantAnant Kulkarni and Others, [1981] 4 S.C.C. 130 this Court held :

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"Mere chances of promotion are no conditions of service and the fact that there was reduction in the chances of promotion did not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service. A right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion are not". To the said effect a judgment of this Court in the case of K Jagadeesan v. Union of India and Others, (1990] 2 S.C.C. 228, wherein this Court held :

S.S.BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.)

"the only effect is that his chances of promotion or his right to be considered for promotion to the higher post is adversely affected. This cannot be regarded as retrospective effect being given to the amendment of the rules carried out by the impugned notification and the challenge to the said notification on that ground must fail".

A

Again in the case of Union of India and Others v. S.L. Dutta and Another, (1991) 1 S.C.C. 505, this Court held :

"in our opinion, what was affected by the change of policy were merely the chances of promotion of the Air Vice- Marshals in the Navigation Stream. As far as the posts of Air Marshals open to the Air Vice-Marshals in the said stream were concerned, their right or eligibility to be considered for promotion still remained and hence, there was no change in their conditions of service."

C

In Zohrabi v. Aljuna and Others, (1980] 2 S.C.C. 203, this Court observed that : "a mere right to take advantage of the provisions of an Act is not an accrued right". The aforesaid observation would equally app~y to the case in hand E since the only argument advanced on behalf of the direct recruits was that the advantage which they were receiving under the 1961 Rules to get their seniority in the rank of Executive Engineer is being taken away by the impugned Act. Since the said right is not an accrued right the legislatures were well within their power to make the law.

F In the aforesaid premises, it must be held that the direct recruits did not have a vested right nor any right had accrued in their favour in the matter of getting a particular position in the seniority list of Executive Engineers under the pre-amended Rules which is said to have been taken away by the Act since such a right is neither a vested right of an employee G nor can it be said to be an accrued right. Thus, there is no bar for the legislature to amend the law in consequence of which the inter se position in rank of Executive Engineer might get altered. Consequently, we see no invalidity in the enactment of the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Building and ,Roads Branch) Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) Respectively Act, 1995. Though the Act H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A in question is a valid piece of legislation but it is difficult to sustain Section 25 of the Act in toto since a plain reading of the said. provision does not make out any meaning. Section 25 of the Act is quoted herein below in extenso:

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"25. The Haryana Service of Engineers Class I, Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch) (Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) Respectively Ordinance, 1995 (Haryana Ordinance No. 6 of 1995), is hereby repealed. The Punjab Service of Engineers, Class-I, Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1960, the Punjab Service· of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Public Health Branch) Rules, 1961, the Punjab Service of Engineers Class I, Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964, in their application to the State of Haryana, are also hereby repealed to the extent that these rules shall continue to apply to the persoµs who were members of the service before 1st day of November, 1966; Provided that such repeal shall not affect -

(a) any penalty or punishment imposed as a result of disciplinary proceedings; (b) any disciplinary action or proceedings initiated or pending · under the rules so repealed;

F

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(c) any relaxation in qualifications granted to any member of the service under the rules so repealed; (d) the benefits accrued to the persons who have retired from service during a period commencing from the 1st day of November, 1966 and ending with the date1 of promulgation of the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch) (Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) respectively Ordinance, 1995; and the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Depart-· ment (Building and Roads Branch) Rules, 1960, the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Punjab Health Branch) Rules, 1961 and the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I,

S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA[PATIANAIK, J.]

Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964, shall continue to be in force as if the same had not been repealed."

A

The aforesaid provision repeals the previous Rules framed under _ proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution as well as repealed the Ordinance of 1995. It also saves the action taken in respect of matters enumerated in B Clause (a) to (d). It further purports to indicate that the earlier Rules would apply to the persons who were members of the service before 1st day of November 1996 though on a plain reading of the main part of Section 25 really does not convey the aforesaid meaning. The learned counsel appearing for the State of Haryana could not indicate as to what is the true meaning of Section 25. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior C counsel, however, in course of his arguments contended that though on a plain gramatical meaning being given to Section 25 is not susceptible of representing the intention of the legislature and infact it conveys absolutely no m(!_aning but the Court should fill up the gap by applying the principle of casus omissus and provide the word "except" in the first part of Section D 25 after the word "to the extent and. such filling up being done the provisions of Section 25 would convey the true intention of the legislature. On principles Mr. Dhawan, learned senior counsel may be right in his submission that Courts can apply the principle of casus omissus and fill the gap by adding certain words when the St1tute does not convey the correct E meaning. But in the case in hand we do not think it appropriate to apply that principle, inasmuch as the Act itself h~ving been given retrospective effect with effect from 1st November, 1966 the date on which the State of Haryana came into existence there is no rationale to apply the pre-existing rules to those employees who were members of the service before that date even after the pre-existing rule is being repealed by the Act. In this view F of the matter we hold that the expression 'to the extent that these rules shall continue to apply to the persons who were members of the Service before 1st day of November, 1966 is invalid and is accordingly struck down. Remaining part of Section 25 as well as the proviso to the said Section will, however, remain operative. G .Though in view of our conclusion that the Act is intra vims, the inter se seniority of the concerned officers are required to be re-determined in accordance with the Act itself, subject however, to the restrictions that . promotions already made will not be annulled but since the judgment of H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the Punjab and Haryana High Court in favour of the direct recruit B.D. Sardana was rendered by interpreting the Recruitment Rules of 1961 and relying upon the earlier decisions of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra (supra) it would be appropriate for us to also deal with the said judgments since an appeal has been carried to this Court by the promotees in Civil B Appeal No. 422 of 1993. After the judgment of this Court in Sehgal (supra} and Chopra (supra) when the State Government drew up the seniority list in the rank of Executive Engineers on 6.4.1992 Shri Sardana who had been appointed directly as an Assistant Executive Engineer on 7.12.1977 challenged the said seniority list claiming therein that initially 10 officers having C formed the cadre when Haryana became a separate State and all of them being promotees and as such the quota of promotees was in excess of the 50% which is the permissible quota under the Recruitment Rules, he should be given the position just after 10 persons who constituted the initial cadre irrespective of the fact that he was recruited on 7.12.1977. The D further contention before the High Court was that the State Government was not entitled to re-determine the cadre strength each year after the judgment of this Court in Sehgal (supra) and Chopra (supra). The High Court by the impugned judgment appears to have been persuaded to accept both these contentions and the promotees, therefore, have assailed the legality of the same. Mr. D.D. Thakur, learned senior counsel appearE ing for these promotees as well as Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the promotees urged that the High Court was in error to hold that the State Government was not entitled to re-determine the cadre strength each year retrospectively subsequent to the judgment of this Court in Sehgal (supra) and Chopra (supra). It was contended F that 10 persons who constituted the initial cadre when the State of Haryana was formed and all those 10 persons having been allocated to Haryana from the erstwhile State of Punjab on the basis of their domicile it would be reasonable to construe and apply the Recruitment Rules which was in force in Punjab and which had been adopted by Haryana by fictionally G holding the recruitment of 10 persons to be the initial recruitment to the cadre and by fictionally holding that the Recruitment Rules which was adopted by Haryana was in fact came into existence so far as the State of Haryana is concerned on 1.11.1966. According to the learned wunsel unless such a construction is given the position will be very anomalous and H direct recruits like Shri Sardana will be senior to promotees who had been

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S.S.BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.)

promoted even in the year 1968 or 1969 even though Sardana was recruited A as an Assistant Executive Engineer only on 7.12.1977. According to the learned counsel the rule in question cannot be construed in such a manner to bring about gross inequities and, therefore, a reasonable construction should be made. Mr. Sachhar, learned senior counsel and Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned counsel appearing for the direct recruits and Mr. Sardana, B appearing in person, on the other hand, submitted that it was not necessary for the State Government to redetermine the cadre strength every year retrospectively since the judgment of this Court in Sehgal (supra) and Chopra (supra) merely authorises the Government to determine the cadre strength if it has not already been done. According to the learned counsel C such re- determination of cadre strength every year has been mala fidely done by increasing the strength of the cadre so as to accommodate the promotees within 50% quota available for them under the Recruitment Rules and, therefore, such re- determination must be struck down and the High Court has rightly struck down the same. It was also contended on their behalf that the initial cadre having been constituted on 1.11.1966 and the entire cadre being filled up by application of the provisions of the Recruitment Rules, 5 of them were beyond the permissible limit of 50% quota in the service. Consequently until the cadre strength is so maintained so as to bring down the ratio of 50% so far as the promotees are concerned any direct recruit may during the intervening period must be held to be E senior to such promotees and, therefore, the High Court was fully justified in holding that Mr. Sardana should rank below 10 persons who constituted the initial cadre irrespective of the hardship that may be caused to the promotees. According to the learned counsel while interpreting a particular rule the Court is not required to look into the hardship which the F interpretation may cause so long as the rules are unambiguous. It was ultimately contended that the High Court has rightly struck down the seniority list that has been drawn up on 6.4.1992 as well as the determination of cadre strength made by the State Government and, further the list that was drawn up on 15.4.1997, while the appeals were G pending in this Court is the correct gradation list reflecting the inter se seniority of the direct·recruits and promotees correctly in accordance with the interpretation of the rules given by this Court in the case of Sehgal * (supra) and Chopra (supra). The rival submissions require a careful examination of the relevant provisions of Rule of 1961 as well as in the light H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

. A of the earlier decisions of this Court in Sehgal (supra) and Chopra (supra). Before examining the same it may be stated that the Division Bench of the . Punjab and Haryana High Court in the impugned judgment came to the conclusion that the State Government was not entitled to re- determine the cadre strength retrospectively and by such action of the State Government B by increasing the cadre strength promotees have been given undue advantage and direct recruits like B.D. Sardana have lost their vested right and, therefore, such an order cannot be sustained in law. The High Court also further came to the conclusion that on carving of State of Haryana when the initial cadre was fixed at 10 and 10 persons brought over from erstwhile state of Punjab the Recruitment Rules 1961 must be made C applicable to them and consequently the quota of promotees cannot exceed 50%. In this view of the ~atter since all the 10 persons who constituted the cadre in 1966 were promotees and thus far beyond the permissible quota of 50%, the first direct recruit in the cadre Shri Sardana must be given 11th position in the seniority list and he would be senior to all those D promotees who were promoted affer the initial formation of the cadre irrespective of their date of promotion as an Executive Engineer and irrespective of the date on which Mr. Sardana was appointed directly as an Assistant Executive Engineer on 7.12.1977. As has been stated earlier, this Court in A.N. Sehgal's case (supra) on considering the recruitment E rules decided the principles for determination of inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees and left the matter for the Stat~ Government to re-determine the same by applying the law as declared by this Court. While interpreting the provisions of the Rules the Court came to hold that a promotee within quota under Rule 5(2) gets his seniority F from the initial date of his promotion and the year of allotment, as contemplated in Rule 12(6) shall be the next below 'the juniormost officer in ,the service whether officiating or confirmed as Executive Engineer before the former's appointment' counting the entire officiating period towards seniority, unless there is break in the service or from the date of later promotion. Such promotee, by necessary implication, would normally G become senior to the direct recruit promoted later. Combined operation of sub-rules (3) to (5) of Rule 12 makes the direct recruit a member of the service of Executive Engineer from the date of year of allotment as an Assistant Executive Engineer. The Court further held that necessary conclusion would, therefore, be that the direct recruits shall get seniority with H effect from the date of the year of the allotment as Assistant Executive

S.S. BOLAv. B.D. SARDANA[PATIANAIK,J.]

Engineer which is not alterable. Whereas the promotee would get his seniority with effect from the date of the availability of the posts within 50% quota of the promotees and the year of allotment is variable and the seniority shall be reckoned accordingly. In concluding paragraph of the judgment the Court directed the Government of Haryana to determine the cadre posts regularly from time to time including the post created due to exigencies of service in terms of Rule 3(2) read with Appendix 'A' and allot the posts in each year of allotment as contemplated under Rule 12 read with Rule 5(2)(a) and issue orders appointing substantively to the respective posts within the quota and determine the inter se seniority between the promotees and direct recruits in the respective quota cadre posts of Executive Engineers etc. In Sehgal (supra) the Court was dealing with the service of Engineers Class I PWD (Roads and Building) Branch. Similarly in Chopra (supra) the Court dealt with the service of Engineers (Public Health Branch), the rules of Public Health Branch being the same as the rules in Roads and Building Branch. In concluding paragraph of the said judgment though an affidavit had been filed by one of the appellants that the State Government has determined the cadre strength but this Court declined to go into the question and left it open to the Governm~nt to determine the seniority after giving opportunity to all parties in the light of the law laid down in the case. In Chopra's case (supra) in paragraph 10 of the judgment this Court had observed that under Rule 3(2) read with Appendix 'A' the State Government is enjoined to determine the cadre post from time to time and during the first 5 years on first day of January every year and later from time to time and divide the posts as per the ratio of the available cadre posts to the promotees and the direct recruits and shall make appointment in a substantive capacity.

A

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F

In course of argument Mr. K.T.S. Tuls~ learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Haryana had pointed out that the State Government had taken steps for making direct recruitment to the cadre but as no competent people were available, per force the cadre was to be managed by filling up the posts by promotees and it was done in the public interest. G The learned coiJnsel had urged that there is no justification in the arguments advanced by the counsel for direct recruits that the promotees were in fact given undue favour. We are, however, really not concerned with this submission while interpreting the relevant provisions of the Rules and the Rules having been framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitu- H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A tion the same has to be scrupulously followed. But at the outset on going

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through the two earlier decisions of this Court in Sehgal (supra) and Chopra (supra) there should be no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court was in error to hold that the State Government was not entitled to re-determine the cadre strength retrospectively every year and such re-determination is invalid and inoperative. On the other hand since the cadre strength had not been determined regularly though it was enjoined upon the State Government to do so this Court had called upon the State Government to re-determine the cadre strength and thereafter determine the inter se seniority of the direct recruits and promotees in terms of Rule 12 of Recruitment Rules bearing in mind the law laid down by this Court interpreting the different provisions of the Rules. The said conclusion of the High Court, therefore, must be quashed.

Now coming to the question as to how the initial appointees to the service are to be dealt with since in the two earlier cases this Court had D never considered this question, the question assumes a greater significance. The Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution came into force w.e.f. the June, 1961, the date on which the Rule was published in the Official Gazette Under sub- rule (1) of Rule 3, it is stipulated that the service shall comprise of such number of posts of E Assistant Executive Engineers, Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers as may be specified by Government from tine to time. Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 the strength of the service for the first five years after the commencement of these rules shall be determined each year on the 1st day of January or soon thereafter as may be pracF ticable according to the provisions of Appendix A and the strength so determined shall remain in force till it is revised. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 stipulates that the recruitment to the service shall be so regulated that the number of posts filled up by promotion from Class II Service shall not exceed fifty per cent of the number of posts in the Service, excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers. Proviso to sub-rule (2) provides G that till adequate number of Assistant Executive Engineers eligible and considered fit for promotion are not available the actual percentage of officer promoted from Class II service may be larger than 50%. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 speaks of a fictional situation namely in the service as constituted immediately after the commencement of these rules, it shall be H assumed that the number of persons recruited by promotion from Class II '

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S.S. BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA[PATTANAIK,J.)

• Service shall be 50% of the senior posts in the service and future recruit- A ment shall be based on this assumption. Sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 3 and sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 5 of 1961 Rules may be extracted hereinbelow in extenso :

"3. Strength of Seivice : (1) The. Service shall comprise of such number of posts of Assistant Executive Engineers, Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers as may be specified by Government from time to time. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-rule (1) the strength of the Service for the first five years after the commencement of these rules shall be determined each year on the 1st day of January or as soon thereafter as may be practicable according to the provisions of Appendix A The strength so determined shall remain in force till it is revised. 5. Recrnitment to seivice : (2) Recruitment to the service shall be so regulated that the number of posts filled by promotion from Class II Service shall not exceed fifty per cent of the number of posts in the Service, excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers; Provided that till such time as an adequate number of Assistant Executive Engineers, who are eligible and considered fit for promotion, are available, the actual percentage of Officers promoted from Class II Service may be larger than fifty per cent.

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(3) In the service as constituted immediately after the commencement of these rules, it shall be assumed that the number of recruited by promotion from Class II Service is fifty per cent of the senior posts in the Service and further recruitment shall be G based on this assumption." From a combined reading of the aforesaid provisions the following situation emerges : (a) That the Rules came into force w.e.f. 9th of June, 1961 but the H

SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1997]SUPP.2S.C.R.

A service existed even prior to the said date;

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(b) On constitution of the service immediately after the commencement of the Rules by operation of a fiction it was assumed that number of persons recruited by promotion from Class II service is 50% of the senior post in the service, This fictional situation emerges in view of sub-rule (3) of Rule 5, so that, the future recruitment to the service can be regulated appropriately under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5; and (c) A duty was enjoined upon the State Government to determine the strength of the service each year on the 1st day of January or soon thereafter as may be practicable for the first five years after the commencement of the Rules and the strength thus determined year to year would remain in force till it is revised. When recruitments were being made without determination of the

D cadre strength and statutory rules came into force for the first time on 9th of June, 1961 the Rules cast a duty on the Government to determine the cadre strength each year and thereafter make recruitment in terms of Rule 5 regulating the manner of filling up the post in the service subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 5. Rule 12 is rule for deter. E mination of seniority. This Rule has already been interpreted by this Court in Sehgal and Chopra indicating the manner in which the seniority has to be determined inter se between the promotees and direct recruits. When State of Haryana came into existence and persons were serving in the erstwhile State of Punjab were drafted into State of Haryana and conF stituted the initial cadre strength of the service in the State of Haryana and the Government of Haryana adopted the Punjab Rules of 1961 for determining the service conditions of the employees it would be reasonable to hold that so far as the State of Haryana is conderned the Recruitment Rules came into force on 1.11.1966 and since the persons who constituted the service came from erstwhile State of Punjab depending upon their G domicile it would be further reasonable to construe that they constituted the service soon after the rules were adopted by the State of Haryana and thereafter Rule 5(3) should be attracted in respect of those 10 officers who constituted the service and by such application, by a fiction 50% should be treated to be promotees and on so treating them further recruitment to the H service was required to be regulated in accordance with sub-rule (2) of

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S.S. BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA[PATIANAIK,J.]

Rule 5 and it is then the inter se seniority has to be determined under Rule A 12. In other words, out of 10 persons who were brought over from the erstwhile State of Punjab and constituted the service in the State of Haryana 5 will be assumed to have been recruited by promotion from Class II service by application of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 even if factually all the 10 were promotees while they were recruited under the Punjab Rules. B Since· the initial cadre strength was only 10 of the total number of posts in the services, the Recruitment Rules by fiction held 50% of the persons constituted the service immediately after the commencement of the Rules to be promotees. Thereafter the State Government was duty bound to determine the cadre strength every year in the first five years as per sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 and in fact this direction had been given in the earlier judgments in the case of Sehgal and Chopra and after such determination of the cadre strength if in a particular year it is found that the promotees have usurped the quota of direct recruit then such promotee cannot be held to be senior to the direct recruit notwithstanding their earlier recruitment to the service. If these principles are borne in mind D then the gradation list which had been prepared by the State Government on 6.4.1992 was possibly the correct gradation list and the High Court was in error to quash the said gradation list on a conclusion that the earlier direction of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra has not been followed. Obviously, the High Court misunderstood the directions of this Court in E the case Sehgal and Chopra. We are, however, not going to examine the said gradation list that was prepared on 6.4.1992 or any other gradation list which had been prepared subsequently during the pendency of these appeals, since in our view the Act having been come into force and the Act have been given retrospective effect the seniority has to be drawn up F afresh in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

c

So far as the rules dealing with Irrigation Branch is concerned, the said rules namely Punjab Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch) Class I Service Rules, 1964 has not been considered earlier by this Court at any point of time. One Shri M.L. Gupta was appointed to the post of Assistant G Executive Engineer as a direct recruit on 27.8.1971, pursuant to the result of a competitive examination held by the Haryana Public Service Commission in December, 1970 said Shri Gupta was promoted to the post of ~ Executive Engineer on 17.9.1976. He made presentation to the State Government to fix up his seniority in accordance with the service rules but H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A as the said representation was not disposed of for more than three years he approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by filing C.W.P. No. 4335 of 1984. That petition was disposed of by the High Court on the undertaking given by the State that the seniority will be fixed up soon. The said undertaking not having been complied with, said Shri Gupta apB preached the High Court in January 1986 by filing Contempt Petition. In September, 1986 the State Government fixed the inter se seniority of said Shri Gupta and other members of the service and Gupta was shown at serial no. 72. Two promotees had been shown at serial nos. 74 and 75. Those two promotees filed a writ petition challenging the fixation of inter se seniority between the direct recruits and promotees and High Court of C Punjab and Haryana by its judgment passed in May 1987 quashed the order dated 29.9.1986 whereunder the seniority of the direct recruits and promotees has been fixed and called upon the State Government to pass a speaking order assigning position in the gradation list. The State Government issued a fresh notification on 24.7.1987 giving detailed reasons re-afD firming the earlier seniority which had been notified on 29.9.1986. Prior to the aforesaid notification of the State Government Shri Gupta had filed a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court which had been registered as CWP No. 6012 of 1986 claiming his seniority at No. 22 instead of 72 which had been given to him under the notification dated 29.9.1986. E The promotees also filed a writ petition challenging the Government order dated 24.7.1987 which was registered as CWP No. 5780 of 1987. Both the writ petitions, one filed by the direct recruit - Shri Gupta (CWP No. 6012 of 1986) and the other filed by the promotees (CWP No. 5780 of 1987) were disposed of by the learned Single Judge by judgments dated 24th F January, 1992 and 4th March, 1992 respectively, whereunder the learned Single Judge accepted the stand of the promotees and Shri Gupta was placed below one Shri OP Gagneja. Said Shri Gupta filed two appeals to the Division Bench against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which was registered as Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 367 and 411 of 1992. The aforesaid Letters Patent Appeals were allowed by judgment dated 27th G August, 1992. This judgment of the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court was challenged by the State of Haryana in the Supreme Court which has been registered as C.A. Nos. 1448-49 of 1993. This Court granted leave and stayed the operation of the judgment in the matter of fixation of seniority. The promotees also challenged the said judgment of the Division H Bench in this Court which has been registered as CA Nos. 1452-1453 of _

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA(PATIANAIK,J.]

1993. during the pendency of these appeals in this Court, an Ordinance was promulgated on 13.5.1985 as Ordinance No. 6 of 1995 and the said Ordinance was replaced by the impugned Act of 20 of 1995 by the Haryana Legislature. The validity of the Act was challenged by said Shri Gupta and pursuance to the order of this Court the said writ petition having been transferred to this Court has been registered as T.C. No. 40 of 1996. So far as the validity of the Act is concerned, the question of any usurpation of judicial power ,by the legislature does not arise in relation to Irrigation Branch inasmuth as the Recruitment Rules of 1964 framed by the Governor of Punjab in exercise of power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution which has been adapted by the State of Haryana on and from the date Haryana was made separate State had not been considered by this Court nor any direction has been issued by this Court. The legislative competence of the State legislature to enact the Act had also not been assailed and in our view rightly since the State legislature have the powers under Entry 41 of List - II of the Seventh Schedule to frame law governing the conditions of service of the employees of the State Government. That apart Article 309 itself stipulates that the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Proviso to Article 309 confers power on the President in connection with the affairs of the Union and on the Governor in connection with the affairs of the State to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate · Legislature under Article 309 main part. In this view of the matter, the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the legislation in question is beyond doubt. The only question which, therefore, arises for consideration and which is contended in assailing the validity of the Act is that under the Act the direct recruits would lose several positions in the gradation list and thereby their as;crued and vested rights would get jeopardised and their future chances, of promotion also would be seriously hampe;red and such violation tantamounts violation of rights under Part III of the Constitution. For the reasons already given while dealing with the aforesaid contention in connection with the Public Health Branch and the Roads and Building Branch the contention raised in the Transfer Case cannot be sustained and, therefore, the Transfer Case would stand dismissed. The Act in question dealing with tl1e service con<l.iticm. of the

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A engineers belonging to the Irrigation Branch must be held to be a valid piece of legislation passed by the competent legislature and by giving it retrospective effect no constitutional provision has been violated nor any right of the employee under Part - III of the Constitution has been infringed requiring interference by this Court.

So far as the four appeals are concerned, one at the instance of the State and other at the instance of the promotee engineer, even though it is not necessary to examine those appeals since the inter se seniority of the members of the service will:have to be re-drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Act, yet arguments having been advanced by the learned C advocates appearing for the parties, we may briefly deal with the same. The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in disposing of the Letters Patent Appeal in favour of the direct recruit has come to the conclusion that the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the Recruitment Rules dealing with the Public Health Branch and the Roads D and Building Branch in Sehgal and Chopra would equally apply to the Irrigation Branch. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion the learned Judges of the High Court nave failed to appreciate the difference between the rules dealing with the irrigation Branch and the two set of rules dealing with the Public Health Branch and the Roads and Building Branch. So far E as the rules dealing with the Irrigation Branch is concerned, Rule 2(12)(c) makes a promotee officer on probation or having successfully completed his probation awaiting appointment to a cadre post to be a member of the service which was not the position in the Public Health Branch as well as in the Roads and Building Branch. Then again under Rule 5(2) the percentage or promotees was required to be so regulated so as not to F exceed 75% of the number of posts in the service for the first 10 years from the date of the commencement of the Rules and thereafter it shall not exceed 50% of the number of posts in the service excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineer. Proviso to the aforesaid rule also entitles the Government to grant permission beyond 75% during the first 10 years of G the commencement of the rules and beyond 50% thereafter in case sufficient number of direct recruits - Assistant Executive Engineers are not available and considered fit for promotion. Rule 12 which deals with the determination of inter se seniority is also somewhat different than the similar rule for the Public Health Branch and the Roads and Building H Branch which had been considered by this Court in the cases of Sehgal and

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA[PATIANAIK,J.]

Chopra. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Cou.rt was not justified in disposing ?f the appeal relying upon the earlier decisions of this Court in A.N. Sehgal's case. The learned Judges have not focussed their attention to the difference in the rules meant for the Irrigation Branch and the Rult<s meant for the Public Health Branch and Roads and Building Branch. The impugned judgment, therefore, passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is erroneous and cannot be sustained. 6ut as has been stated earlier it is not necessary to delve into the question in a more detailed manner since the Act having come into force and the Act being made effective retrospectively w.e.f. 1.11.1966, the date on which the State of Haryana was formed, the inter se seniority has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Consequently, the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in LPA Nos. 367 and 411of1992 is set aside and the State of Haryana is directed to re-determine the inter se seniority of the members of the service belonging to the Irrigation Branch in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Civil Appeal Nos. 1448-1449 of 1993, 1452-1453 of 1993 and T.C. No. 40 of 1996 are disposed of accordingly.

In the ultimate result, therefore, we hold Haryana Act 20 of 1995 is intra vims except part of Section 25 which has been held to be ultra vims. The Act having been given retrospective effect with effect from 1.11.1966 the inter se seniority of direct recruits and promotees in each of the services, namely, the PWD Branch,· the Public Health Branch and the Irrigation Branch will have to be re-drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The seniority lists already drawn up subsequent to the judgment ofihis Court in the case of Sehgal and Chopra and as well as during the pendency of these appeals in this Court are of no consequence in view of the Act coming into force. It is, however, made clear that any promotion already given on the basis of seniority determined by the Government under the pre-existing rules will not be annulled notwithstanding any change in the seniority to be determined under the Act. The impugned judgments of Punjab and Haryana High Court are set aside. The State Government is directed to re-consider the question of seniority of the employees of the three Branches under the Act within a period of six months from today and to give consequential promotion on that basis soon thereafter.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. All the appeals and the transfer cases are disposed of accordingly.

S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. I have had the advantage of going through the judgment prepared separately by Brother Ramaswamy and Brother Pattanaik. I agree with Brother Pattanaik on all the questions involved in this case, but I want to add a few words of my own without setting out the facts of the case which have already been reproduced in the two Judgments. 2. To declare what the law is or has been is a judicial power. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power. This is the principle deducible from the decision of the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra v. Emperor, AIR (1944) FC 86 (90) and Ogden v. Black Ledge, (1804) 2 Lawyers Edition 276 (278). 3. It would be within the exclusive domain ofjudiciary to expound the law as is it and not to speculate what it should be as it is the function of the Legislature. It is also within the exclusive power of the judiciary to hold that a Statute passed by the Legislature is ultra vires. The Legislature in that situation does not become a helpless creature as it continues to remain a living pillar of a living Constitution. Though it cannot directly override the judicial decision, it retains the plenary powers under Articles 245, 246 and 248 to alter the law as settled or declared by judicial decisions. This is what was observed by this Court in Mis. Anwar Khan Mahboob Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1966] 2 SCR 40, which had the effect of indirectly overruling its previous decision in Finn C.J. Patel & Co. & Ors. v. 17ie State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 108. The Legislature can also validate an Act which was declared invalid by the Court or amend it with retrospective effect so as to remove the grounds of its im :,Jidity. (See : Rai Ramkrishna & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (1964) 1 SCR 897 and Mt. Jadao Bahuji v. Municipal Committee, Khandwa & Anr., AIR (1961) SC 1486). 4. The power to make a law includes the power to give it retrospective effect subject to the restriction imposed by Article 20( 1) that a Legislature cannot make retrospective penal laws. It would be valid for the Legislature to make any other enactment with retrospective effect provided no Fundamental Right is infringed by reasons of its taking away the vested right. Under the scheme of the Constitution, it is competent for the

S.S. BOLAv. B.D.SARDANA[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.]

Legislature to put an end to the finality of a judicial decision and, therefore, it would be competent for the Legislature to render ineffective the judgment of the court by changing the basis of the Act upon which that judgment was founded (See : Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors., (1970] 1 SCR 388 = (1969] 2 SCC 283; In re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, AIR (1992) SC 522.(1993] Supp. 1 SCC 96). Hidayatullah, CJ. in Shri Prithvi Mills case observed as under : "When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before validation can be said to take place effectively. The most important condition, of course, is that the Legislature must possess the power to impose the tax, for, if it does not, the action must ever remain ineffective and illegal. Granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise. A court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances."

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This decision was considered in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India & Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 334 = (1978j 2 SCC 50, but was not doubted by the majority view in that case. 5. In Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India, [1994) 6 SCC 77, it was F observed that any action in exercise of the power under an enactment, which has been declared invalid by a Court, cannot be made valid by merely saying so unless the defect which has been pointed out by the Court is removed with retrospective effect. It was further observed that the Validating Legislation must remove the cause of invalidity. It was further G observed that till such defect as was pointed out by the Court in a Statute was removed by the subsequent enactment with retrospective effect, the binding nature of the judgment of the Court cannot be ignored. In a situation of this nature, it would be open to the Legislature to pass a Validating Act, even with retrospective effect, removing the defect or the H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ground on which the Statute was held to be bad or ultra v1res. 6. Where, however, the statutory provision is interpreted by the Court

in a particular manner and directions are issued for implementing the

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judgment in the light of the interpretation placed on the statutory provisions, the Legislature need not pass a Validating Act. In this situation, the Legislature, in exercise of its plenary powers under Articles. 245, 246 and 248 can make a new Act altering fundamentally the provisions which were the basis of the judgment passed by the Court. This can be done with retrospective effect. So far as service conditions are concerned, they can be altered with retrospective effect by making service rules under Article 309 or by an Act of the Legislature. 7. In the instant case, the judgments rendered by this Court in the earlier decisions relating to the seniority of the present incumbents were founded on the service rules then existing. These service rules have since been replaced by the impugned Act which has been enforced with retrospective effect. The various aspects of merits have been considered by my Brother Pattanaik and I cannot usefully add any further words on merits. I fully agree and endorse that in view of the settled legal position, specially those set out in the decisions referred to earlier as also in Comorin Match lndustlies (P) Ltd. v. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996] 4 SCC 281; Indian Aluminium Company v. State of Kera/a, (1996] 7 SCC 637; and Meerut Developmellf Authority & Ors. v. Satbir Singh & Ors., (1996] 11 SCC 462, the impugned Act, namely the Haryana Act XX of 1995 is valid to the extent indicated by Brother Pattanaik. In this case the rule of seniority has been altogether altered and replaced by a new law made with retrospective effect so as to do away the mischief under which an undue advantage was being provided to a direct recruit, which was wholly inequitous and not sustainable on the principles of equity. 8. I also agree that the judgments of the Punjab & Haryana High

G Court are liable to be set aside, with a direction to the State Government to re-determine the question of seniority in the light of this judgment and the Haryana Act XX of 1995. 9. The Civil Appeals, the Writ petition and the Transferred Cases

H are disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.

S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA(K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

K. RAMASWAMY, J. Applications for impleadment allowed.

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These appeals and transfer cases are wrapped up of complex facts interwoven with diverse principles in service jurisprudence, compounded by legislative intervention impinging upon judicial review by enacting Act 20 of 1995 to regulate the conditions of service of persons appointed to the B Haryana Service of Engineers, Class-I, Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) respectively. The said Act 20 of 1995 (for short, the 'Act') came into force with effoct from November 13, .1995. It amended and repealed the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class-I, PWD (Buildings and Roads" Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) Rules, Irrigation C Branch by Ordinance 6 of 1995. The latter repealed the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class-I, PWD (Roads and Buildings Branch), (Public Health Branch) Rules 1960 and (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1961 issued under Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution (for short the 'Rules'). The Act was given retrospective effect from 1st day of November, 1966, the date on D which the State of Haryana was formed by bifurcation of the former State of Punjab. The cases have their chequered history. On the date of formation of the State of Haryana, the respective services were manned by and E constituted of ten promotee officers allotted from the former State of Punjab. All of them were from Haryana (erstwhile Punjab) Class-II subordinate officers. The respective repealed Rules constituted Haryana Services of Engineers, Class-I, PWD consisting of Buildings and Roads Branch, Public Health Branch and Irrigation Branch respectively which F were governed by the statutory repealed Rules. The class-I service of Engineers consists of the Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineer. Subsequently, the post of Engineer-in-Chief was added in the respective branches. The Assistant Executive Engineers are the feeder cadre to the said Class-I Service; they are drawn by way of direct recruitment. Haryana (erstwhile Punjab) Class-II, Subordinate service was G also feeder channel for appointment by promotion, as Executive Engineers and thereafter as Superintending Engineers or Chief Engineers or Engineer in Chief, as the case may be. The respective repealed Rules and the Act contained a provision for appointment by transfer from any other State or Central Service; however, none was appointed from that feeder channel. H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Therefore, these cases do not concern that group and ·it has now become

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a dried up source. As stated, as on November 1, 1966, ten posts, each manned by promotee personnel, were allotted to the respective Branches of Haryana Services of Engineers, Class-I. The Rules provided the ratio of recruitment in Buildings and Roads and Public Health branches, viz., 50% to the direct recruits and 50% to the promotees. In the irrigation Branch, for the first eight years, the ratio between promotees and direct recruits was 75% and 25%; thereafter, it became 50 : 50 as in other two branches. Though the Rules provided for creation of the cadre posts every year under Article 3 read with Appendix-A of the respective repealed Rules, the State failed to demarcate the cadre posts; nor did it operate the services in strict conformity with the respective quotas as per the repealed Rules. As usual, it led to the acrimony between the promotees and the direct recruits; their inter se seniority, which is a perennial and unending source of litigation, has again given rise to these appeals and transferred writ petitions filed in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana.

The usual endless acrimony for seniority, between promotees and direct recruits, when the former are interjected into the service due to lapse of regular direct recruitment and their passage into Class-I service, is being met with turbulence for faculty transposition channels. The unsuccessful E writ petitions filed in the High Court by promotees were dealt with in appeals by this Court concerning Buildings and Roads and Public Health Branches inA.N. Sehgal & Ors. v. Raja Ram Sheoran & Ors., [1992] Supp. 1SCC304 and S.L. Chopra & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 391. Therein, Dr. B.D. Sardana of Public Health Branch was one the contesting respondents. The third stage now intermingled with the F chains from the prornotees in Irrigation Branch which undoubtedly was not dealt with on the previous occasion. They came to be linked with the two branches and together dealt with in the Ordinance and the Act as well as by the High Court. The respective repealed Rules stand now wiped out from the statute after the corning into force of the Act with retrospective G effect, i.e., from November 1, 1966. Instead of dealing again with the repealed Rules of the respective Branches, it would be appropriate, advantageous and of necessity to reiterate from Sehgal and Chvpra's cases the findings and mandamus issued H by this Court. The judgments now stand repealed by legislative judgment

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA[K.RAMASWAMY,J.)

from ex-facie tenner under the Act. Though the facts are baffling, questions A of law are diverse and the intricacies of judicial review, all require careful examination for resolution of the controversy. The galaxy of the senior counsel representing the promotees and the counsel for the State made their bee-line herculean efforts to sustain the constitutionality of the Act and the consequential seniority determined on its basis. On ultimate B analysis, after deep probe and independent investigation, we find that the valiant arguments of the respective counsel for State and the promotees, if given acceptance would lead to destruction of the vitality of judicial review; resultant husk would remain for the successful party; and the mandamus issued by this court would bear no fruit. Thus, the revelation of emerging C results given us deeper anxiety to have a pervasive fresh look into the legal setting and constitutional contours; and to set out our soujourn to tread on delicate track. Founding Fathers of the Constitution fondly entrusted, expressly, to this Court "as worthy Judges", in the language of Dr. K.K. Munshi, the doyan of the Bar and prominent member of the Constitution, as per the solemn oath tak_en, to uphold the Constitution, to dispense D justice according to constitution and the law without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. This case calls for decision on the delicate task of judicial revit;w of legislative act and we solemnly undertake hereunder, to discharge that onus constitutional duty.

As stated earlier, it is not necessary to reiterate the relevant provisions of the repealed statutory Rules governing Buildings and Roads Branch and Public Health Branch since they have been extensively dealt with by a Bench of two Judges (to which one of us, K.R.S., J., was a member) in Sehgal and Chopra's cases relieving us of the task to tread the F path once over; it would be sufficient to record those findings and the mandamus issued with directions contained therein for compliance. At the outset, we may state that when the Bench dealt with the matter in Sehgal and Chopra's cases, a pointed question was put to the counsel then appearing, whether it would be advantageous to decide the question of law without determination of the cadre posts and fixation of the inter se G seniority between promotees and direct recruits. The learned counsel for the parties, including the State, informed this Court of their difficulty in understanding the scope of the Rules and requested this Court to declare the law on the Rules and leave it to the State to determine inter se seniority on the basis of the law so declared. Acceding to that request, the Division H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Bench considered all the relevant Rules, declared the law and gave the

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directions to the State Government and the mandamus for compliance thereof. In Sehgal's case, in para 6 at page 309, this Court had observed that the service shall comprise Assistant Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers. "Rule 3(2) read with Appendix 'A' enjoins the State of Haryana to determine the cadre strength of service each years, Appendix 'A' lays down the procedure for determination of the cadre strength of service. The senior posts include Executive Engineers and above while the junior scale posts include Assistant Executive Engineers", be it cadre or ex-cadre posts. "Rules 6 and 7 prescribed qualification and method of appointment by direct recruitment. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 states that appointment to the service shall be made according to the number of vacancies to be filled up by direct recruitment strictly in the order of merit". Rule 11(1) regulates and operates probationary period. On satisfactory completion of the probation by operation of Rule 11(3)(a), the direct recruits get confirmation into the service and those whos~ service is found unsatisfactory become liable to be discharged from service. As stated earlier, the post of Assistant Executive Engineers was a junior scale post which is integral to the service and Rule 12(3) prescribes the year of allotment as the calendar year in which the order of appointment is issued by the Government.

In para 7, it is stated that Rule 2(1) defines appointment to service which includes an appointment made according to the terms and provisions of the rules to an officiating vacancy or to ex-cadre post provided that an officer so appointed shall not be deemed to have become a member of that service as defined in Rule 2(12). The Assistant Executive Engineer, F though appointed to an ex-cadre post, since he is appointed by direct recruitment, becomes a member of the service from the date of his appointment as the Assistant Executive Engineer; though he performs the duty of an ex-cadre post awaiting appointment to a regular post, on satisfactory completion of the probation and its confirmation, the seniority dates back G to the date of appointment. Therefore, the date of his appointment as Assistant Executive Engineer and his becoming a member of the service remain unalterable. It was held in paragraph 8 as under :

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"A reading of the rules clearly indicates that an Assistant Executive Engineer appointed by open competition to a substantive vacancy

S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA[KRAMASWAMY,J.)

in a cadre post and put on probation is a member of the service. A Equally such Assistant Executive Engineer recruited by open competition and appointed to an ex-cadre post and put on probation and who having successfully completed his probation and awaits appointment to a cadre post would also become a member of the service."

In paragraph 9, it was held that "Para ll(b) of Appendix 'A' read with Rule 3(2), while determining the cadre strength of the service, it adumbrates creation and appointment of Assistant Executive Engineers (direct recruit) to an ex-cadre junior scale post in each year. Therefore, in a given situation, a direct recruit appointed to an ex-cadre post, cannot be C kept in lurch until he is appointed to a cadre post so as to become a member of the service. Obviously to avoid such a hiatus, Rule 2(12)(a) was introduced. The main part of Rule 2(12)(a) declares that an appointee substantively to a cadre post i.e., permanent post is a member of the service. The inclusive definition brings out that an officer appointed by D direct recruitment and put on probation in an ex-cadre post, who having successfully completed probation and awaits appointment to a cadre post, is also a member of the service." "The words 'and such an officer' 'directly appointed' would obviously be referable to an Assistant Executive Engineer directly appointed to an ex-cadre post who is entitled to be placed E on probation and on successful completion awaits appointment to a cadre post. By operation of the definition clause, he ~!so becomes the member of the service from the date of initial appointment. This view is further fortified by the definition of the appointment to the service in Rule 2(1) which says that appointment to the service includes an appointment made, according to the terms and provisions of these rules, to an officiating F vacancy or to an ex-cadre post. Rule 2(7) says that direct appointment means appointment by open competition but excludes 'promotee' or 'transferee'. So a promotee promoted to an officiating vacancy or an ex-cadre post does not become a member of the service unless he is appointed substantively to a cadre post. We, therefore, hold that a direct G recruit appointed to an ex-cadre post alone is a member of the service even while on probation and Rule 2(12)( a) applies to them and it does not apply to a promotee from Class II service." In para 12, it was held that "It is settled law that prescription of quota H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A for recruitment from different sources is constitutionally a valid rule." Para 13 dealt with quota of 50% to the promotees as Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and Chief Engineer and it was found in paragraph 12 that 50% of the post as Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and Chief Engineer shall be occupied only by direct recruit B Assistant Executive Engineers. It may be made clear at this juncture that the entire Haryana Service of Engineers Class-I, PWD compositly consists of Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers, Chief Engineers and Engineer-in-Chief in the respective Branches. It was, therefore, held that 50% quota between direct recruits and promotees would apply to all posts C of Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Engineer-in-Chief unlike in some other State/Central services, Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers etc. are not each a separate cadre. In para 19 at page 317, it was held as under :

"19. It is ;;ettled law that "appointment to a post in accordance with the rules is a condition precedent and no one can claim appoint ment to a post or promotion, as of right, but has a right to be considered for promotion in accordance with the rules. Appoint ment by promotion or direct recruitment, therefore, must be in accordance with the rules so as to become a member of the service in a substantive capacity. Seniority is to be fixed in accordance with the principles laid down in the rules." The rights of promo tees were considered in par a 20 thus :

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"20. Rule 8 prescribes procedure for appointment by promotion from Class II service. Rule 9(2) states that promotion would be made by selection on the basis of merit and suitably in all respects and no member of the service shall have any claim, to such promotion as a matter or right by mere seniority. The committee as constituted under Rule 8 shall prepare the list of officers considered fit for promotion in the order of merit and on approval by the Public Service Commission, the State Government shall appoint the persons from the list in the order in which the names have been placed by the Commission. Appointment by promotion may be made under Rule 8(12) to an ex-cadre post or to any post

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA(KRAMASWAMY,J.]

in the cadre in an officiating capacity from the list prepared as A aforesaid. On promotion, as per Rule 11(1), officer shall be on probation for a period of one year, but if the officer had been officiating as an Executive Engineer the period of officiation would be counted towards probation. Rule 11(4) provides that on satisfactory completion of the probationary period, the government B confirms the officiating promotee and "appoint him in a substantive capacity on a cadre post provided the post is available to him". If no cadre post is available, the officer has to wait for an appointment to the cadre post."

c

Accordingly, the promotee officers from the subordinate Class II service as Executive Engineer under Rule 9 read with Rule 8 constitute a source of recruitment by promotion to Haryana Engineers Service Class-I. By operation of Rule 11(4), the probationer promotee gets appointed in a substantive capacity on ".a cadre post available to him". If no cadre post is available the promotee has to wait for an appointment to the cadre post. D As regards the quota between direct recruits and promotees, in para 12, this Court considered the operation of Rule 5 and its effect and held that "recruitment to the service 'shall be so regulated that the number of posts so filled by promotion from Class II Service shall not exceed 50% of the number of posts in the service excluding the posts of Assistant Executive E Engineer'; provided that till such time the adequate number of Assistant Executive Engineers who are eligible and considered fit for promotion are available, the actual percentage of officers promoted from Class II service may be larger than 50 per cent". It was concluded thus :

F "A reading thereof clearly manifests the legislative animation, namely, that the promotees from Class II service shall not exceed 50% of the posts in the service. The word 'shall' indicates that it is mandatory that the remaining 50% posts shall be kept open only to the Assistant Executive Engineers who were directly recruited G but later were found eligible and fit for promotion as Executive Engineers. Therefore, unless the government resorts, exceptionally with prior permission of Public Se~vice Commission, vide Rule 10 to recruitment by transfer of an officer from other service of the State Government or of the Union, the remaining 50% of the posts of Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief En- H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. gineers shall be occupied only by the direct recruit Assistant Executive Engineers."

It is settled law that prescription of quota for recruitment from different sources is constitutionally a valid rule. It may be necessary to recapitulate that the service consists of Junior Scale posts; Class II AssisB tant Executive Engineers and Class-I posts are of Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and the Chief Engineers. Thus, the entire cadre posts are held by the promotees and direct recruits from the stage of ·Executive Engineers to the stage of Engineer-in-Chief in the ratio of 50 : 50 between direct recruits and the promotees.

c

The effect of Rule 5 and the result of 50% quota to the promotees from Class II service was dealt with in para 13 and stated as under : "The intendment appears to be that so long as the direct recruit Assistant Executive Engineer eligible and considered fit for promotion is not available, the promotee from Class II service in excess of the quota is eligible to occupy in officiating capacity in the senior posts, i.e., Executive Engineers a'nd above. The moment

direct recruits are available, they alone are ··entitled to occupy 50% of their quota posts (Class-I) and the promotees shall give place to the direct recruits." The need to blend the direct recruits and promotees is to augment efficiency of the service. It was dealt with in paragraph 17 and 18 which read as under :

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"17. With a view to have efficient and dedicated services accountable for proper implementation of governinent policies, it is open and is constitutionally permissible for the State, to infuse into the services, both talented fresh blood imbued with i:o_nstitutional commitments, enthusiasm, drive and initiative by direct recruitment, blended with matured wealth of experience from the subordinate services. It is permissible to constitute an integrated service of persons recruited from two or more sources, namely, direct recruitment, promotion from subordii'.ate service or transfer from other services. Promotee from Subordinate service generally would get few chances of promotion to higher ecltelons of service.

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA [K. RAMASWAMY, J.)

Avenues and facilities for promotion to the higher services to the A less privileged members of the subordinate service would inculcate in them dedication to excel their latent capabilities to man the cadre posts. Talent is not the privilege of the few but equal avenues made available would explore common man's capabilities overcoming environmental adversity and open up full opportunities to B develop one's capabilities to shoulder higher responsibilities without succumbing to despondency. Equally talented young menwomen of great promise would enter into service by direct recruitment when chances of promotions are attractive. The aspiration to reach higher echelons of service would thus enthuse a member C to dedicate honestly and diligently to exhibit competence, straight forwardness with missionary zeal exercising effective control and supervisions in the implementation of the programmes. The chances of promotion would also enable a promotee to imbue involvement in the performance of the duties; obviate frustration and D eliminate proclivity to corrupt practices, lest one would tend to become corrupt, sloven and mediocre and a deadwood. In other words, equal opportunity would harness the human resources to augment the efficiency of the service and undue emphasis on either would upset the scales of equality germinating the seeds of degeneration." "18. With a view to achieve this object, the rule- making authority envisaged to appoint direct recruits as well as by promotion from Class II Service otherwise by transfer from other services. In interpreting the rules, effect must be given to allow everyone drawn F from these sources to have their due share in the service and chances of involvement to effectively discharge the duties of the posts honestly and efficiently with dedication. Any wanton or deliberate deviation in the implementation of the rules should be curbed and snubbed and the rules must be strictly implemented G to achieve the above purpose. If wanton deviations are allowed to be repeated, it would breed indiscipline among the services and amount to undue favour to some and denial of equality for many for reasons known or unknown subverting the purpose of the rules." H

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A

The interplay of seniority between direct recruit Assistant Executive Engineers and promotee Clause II subordinate service Engineers for · promotion as Executive Engineer was dealt with in para 21 which reads as under:

"21. A promotee within quota under Rule 5(2) gets his seniority from the initial date of his promotion and the year of allotment, as contemplated in Rule 12(6) shall be the next below 'the juniormost officer in the service whether officiating or confirmed as Executive Engineer before the farmer's appointment' counting the entire officiating period towards seniority, unless there is break in the service or from the date of later promotion. Such promotee, by necessary implication, would normally become senior to the direct recruit promoted later. Combined operation of sub-rules (3) to (5) of Rule 12 makes the direct recruit a member of the service of Executive Engineer from the date of year of allotment as an Assistant Executive Engineer. The result is that the promotee occupying the posts within 50 per cent quota of the direct recruits, acquired no right to the post and should yield to direct recruit, though promoted later to him, to the senior scale posts i.e., Executive Engineer, Supt;rintending Engineer and Chief Engineer. The promotee has right to confirmation in the cadre post as per Rule 11(4) if a post is available to him within his quota or at a later date under Rule 5(2) read with Rule 11(4) and gets appointment under Section 8(11), his seniority would be reckoned only from the date of the availability. of the post and the year of allotment, he shall be next below to his immediate senior promotee of that year or the juniormost of the previous year of allotment whether officiating or permanent occupying the post within 50 per cent quota. The officiating period of the promotee between the dates of initial promotion and the date of the availability of the cadre post would thus be rendered fortuitous and stands excluded. A direct recruit on promotion within his quota, though later to the promotee is interposed in between the periods and interjects the promotee's seniority; snaps the links in the chain of continuity and steals a march over the approved promotee probationer. Harmonious construction of Rules 2(1), 2(3), 2(7), 2(10), 2(12)(a),

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SAR.DANA [K. RAMASWAMY, J.j

5(2)(a), 8, 9(2), 11, 12(3), 12(5) to 12(7) would yield to the above A result, lest the legislative animation would be defeated and the rules would be rendered otiose and surplus. It would also adversely affect the morale and efficiency of the service. Mere officiating appointment by promotion to a cadre post outside the quota; continuous officiation therein and declaration of probation would B not clothe the promotee with any right to claim seniority over the direct recruits. The necessary conclusion would, therefore, be that the direct recruit shall get his seniority with effect from the date of the year of allotment as Assistant Executive Engineer which is not alterable. Whereas the promotee would get his seniority with C effect from the date of the availability of the posts within 50 per cent quota of the promotees, the year of allotment is variable and the seniority shall be reckoned accordingly. Appointment to the cadre post substantively and confirmation thereof shall be made under Rule 8(11) read with Rule 11(4) of the Rules. A promotee D Executive Engineer would only then become member of the service. 'Appointed sub;tantively' within the meaning of Rule 2(12)(a) shall be construed accordingly. We, further hold that the seniority of the promotee from Class II service as Executive Engineer shall. be determined with effect from the date on which the cadre post was available to him and the seniority shall be determined accord- E ingly." Ultimately, the directions were given in para 28 as under : "We accordingly, direct the Government of Haryana to determine F the cadre posts, if not already done, regularly from time to time including the posts created due to exigencies of service in terms of Rules 3(2) read with Appendix 'A' and allot the posts in each year of allotment as contemplated under Rule 12 read with Rule 5(2)(a) and issue orders appointing substantively to the respective G posts within the quota and determine the inter se seniority between the appellant-promotees and R.R. Sheoran, direct recruit in the respective quota cadre posts of Executive Engineers etc. within four months from the date of receipt of this judgment. The inter se seniority of promotees and direct recruits shall be determined accordingly. All the impugned pro11Hltinns or those pending H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2S.C.R. proceedings in the High Court or in this Court shall be subject to the above determination and the status quo would continue till the appointments according to the rules are made and seniority is determined in the light of the law declared in this judgment. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their respective costs."

Similarly, in Chopra's case, the same consideration was adopted and ultimately in paragraphs 11 and 12, this Court had given the directions as under:

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"11. As far as the appellants are concerned, they shall be considered for appointment to a substantive vacancy against a cadre post within their 50 per cent quota of the promotees and their seniority would be counted next below the immediate senior promotee of the same year or juniormost promotee of the preceding year of allotment either officiating or confirmed, in accordance with sub-rules (6) and (7) of Rule 12 and Rules 8(11) and 11(4). The year of allotment is accordingly, alterable. If a promotee Class II officer holds the cadre post within the quota of direct recruit, his period of service from the date of initial promotion till the date of availability of a cadre post is rendered fortuitous. A direct recruit though promoted later steals a march over the promotee and gets right to consideration and if found fit gets promotion within his 50 per cent quota and thereby becomes senior to the officiating promotee." "12. Therefore, the State Government is directed to determine the cadre strength in the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, PWD (Public Health Branch) under the rules, Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers, consider the cases of the appellants and the contesting respondents B.D. Sardana, F.L. Kansai for promotion to the senior posts of Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers respectively with the respective quota of 50 per cent and make appointment, if found eligible and fit for promotion. This exercise shall be done within four months from the date of the receipt of the order. The impugned pro~otions or any appointment made pending the writ petitions in the High Court or appeals in this Court are subject to

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA[K.RAMASWAMY,J.)

the above diredions. The status quo as of today will continue till the government carries out the directions. The appeal and the writ petition are accordingly disposed of and Civil Appeal No. 2316 of 1986 is dismissed but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs." Though time given under the above directions had expired, the State Government failed to comply with directions and we are informed that in the meanwhile some of the promotees who were not eo-nominee parties to the appeals before this Court, filed the writ petition in the High Court, R. Sheoran, promotee from Buildings and Roads Branch had filed a contempt petition and this Court accepted the unconditional apology for the contrite and contumacious conduct committed by them in implementation of the directions and disregard for the implementation of the mandamus, due to advice tended to them; this Court directed them by order dated March 31, 1995 to redetermine the seniority in that behalf afresh in the light of the directions contained in the judgment as well in the order dated March 31, 1995; we are informed that it has been done. Dr. B.D. Sardana though filed a contempt petition, since a writ petition was already pending in the High Court, we felt it expedient to have the matter decided by the High Court in the light of the law laid down by this Court. Similarly, J.K. Dewan and other promotees in Irrigation Branch claimed seniority over M.L. Gupta, the direct recruit Assistant Executive Engineer appointed w.e.f. August 21, 1971. They claimed that they were promoted as Executive Engineers on different dates between March 19, 1970 to November 30, 1973 and M.L. Gupta completed his 5 years' tenure as Assistant Executive Engineer with effect from September 17, 1976 by which date the promotees had already completed their probation period and were confirmed as Executive Engineer. Therefore, they claimed seniority over the direct recruit, M.L. Gupta and Subsequent direct recruits. Their claim was not acceded to and the final seniority was published by the Government. The seniority list was prepared on September 29, 1986 which was the subject matter of the Writ Petition No. 5082 of 1986 which the High Court had directed by an order of the aforesaid date to determine the seniority by passing a speaking order and quashed their seniority accordingly. Similarly, Writ Petition No. 6182 filed by the direct recruit, M.L. Gupta claiming seniority uver promotee Executive Engineer

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A was also disposed of. The financial Commissioner by his proceedings dated July 23, 1987 ordered that the promotees should be placed as juniors to M.L. Gupta though they were promoted earlier to him. That gave rise to Writ Petition No. 5780/87 filed by the promotees against M.L. Gupta claiming seniority over him. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ B petition filed by M.L. Gupta and allowed the writ petition filed by the promotees by his order dated January 24, 1992 and held that the promotees were senior to the direct recruits. The L.P.A. Nos, 367 and 411 of 1992 filed by M.L. Gupta were allowed by the Division Bench by judgment dated August 27, 1992 and it was held that M.L. Gupta is senior to the promotees C and, therefore, the promotee should be ranked junior to him. That gave rise to number of appeals filed by the promotees as well as the ·State Government. In M.L. Gupta's case Division Bench had given directions as under:

"For the reasons recorded above, both the Letters Patent Appeals are allowed. The judgment of learned Single Judge in both the cases are set aside. Civil Writ Petition filed by Devki Nandan Pant and others stands dismissed whereas Civil Writ Petition filed by M.L. Gupta is allowed. The order fixing seniority of M.L. Gupta vis-a-vis respondent Nos. 2 to 42 is quashed. The promotion of respondent Nos. 2 to 42 to the post of Superintending Engineer and above considering them senior to M.L. Gupta also stands quashed. Direction is given to the respondents to re-fix the seniority of members of the service treating M.L. Gupta as senior to respondent Nos. 2 to 42 allocating necessary years of allotment arid thereafter pass orders of confirmation and promotion respectively with retrospective effect from the date the posts became available for confirmation and promotion."

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As stated earlier, Mr. Sardana challenged the seniority prepared by the Government contrary to the mandamus issued in Chopra's case. G Similarly, the promotees filed writ petition in the High Court. While determining the inter se seniority as per the directions of this Court, the Financial Commissioner had temerity to express himself in writing that the judgments of this Court were iniquitous against the promotees; therefore, he followed his own sense of justice proclaimed in this regard, contrary to H the mandamus, and determined the seniority which came to be challenged

S.S. BOLA v. B.D.SARDANA(KRAMASWAMY,J.)

by B.D. Sardana in the High Court. Pending the writ Petition in the High Court, the Government came forward with Ordinance No. 6 of 1995 and the Act, amended the law with retrospective effect from 1st day of November 1966 nullifying the mandamus issued by this Court directing redetermination of the seniority between direct recruits and promotees in Buildings and Roads Branch and Public Health Branch respectively; making the mandamus ineffective by a legislative device. Some of the direct recruit officers filed writ petition in the High Court challenging the constitutionality of the Ordinance and the Act and the sequenfa•l seniority list prepared by the Government. When the matters had come up for final hearing and the pendency of those writ petitions and the effect of the Act on the seniority of the direct recruits and the judgment in these appeals was brought to our notice, wt passed an order transferring those writ . petitions to this Court to be heard along with these appeals. Thus, these transfer cases. The Division Branch by judgment dated August 27, 1994 disposed of writ petitions in the following terms :

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"after adjustment of B.D. Sardana taking his year of allotment as 1977, as already discussed above, immediately after the aforesaid· 10 persons allocated to State of Haryana since their seniority is not under challenge declaration of cadre strength for subsequent years, may be retrospectively, will be valid as right of other direct E recruits will not be involved as none has so far been appointed to the service. However, state is required to refix the seniority of B.D. Sardana, a direct recruit and other promotees to the extent of their quota fixed including 10 persons allocated to Haryana as on November 1, 1966 in the cadre. State Government is also required F to pass fresh promotion orders of B.D. Sardana and other promotees to the post of Superintending Engineer and above as and when such posts became available keeping in view the seniority of the member to be redetermined."

G As stated earlier, the seniority list of the. Irrigation branch vis-a-vis M.L. Gupta was also directed to be reconsidered. All the promotee officers and the State Government filed appeals against B.D. Sardana as well as M.L. Gupta. Sardana filed appeal as against the part of the judgment giving 100 per cent quota to initially allotted promotees.

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We directed the counsel to argue in the first instance on the constitutionality of the Act. Dr. B.D. Sardana appeared in person and, therefore, we cannot expect him to argue on the constitutionality; but, on facts, he made out a good point which may be dealt with at a later stage. Shri D.D. Thakur, Shri Rajeev Dhawan, Shri Rohtagi, learned senior counsel and Shri Tulsi, learned senior counsel for the State, while making candid statement that the Statement of Objects and Reasons clearly manifests the blatant object, viz., to nullify the mandamus by a legislative judgment, requested this Court to eschew it from consideration and look at the operative parts of the provisions of the Act to find whether the legislature has made any attempt to overrule the judicial decisions by legislative judgment. The attempt of the counsel is as under :

This Court in Sehgal antj Chopra's cases pointed out that the normal continuous length of service did not find mention in the repealed Rules. D The promotees became members of the service only from the date of their substantive appointment to the cadre posts. Consequentially, their length of service as Executive Engineer, though performed in regular posts which were available, was cut off as fortuitous. The direct recruits were not available. The base pointed out in the judgment was knocked of its bottom by suitable amendments made under the Act repealing the statutory Rules. E Though the repealing provision again is not happily worded, the Court is required to supply omission "except as already done" to give effect to the provisions of the Act so that the senior promotee officers, continuously officiating from the date of the availability of the posts, though in excess of the quota, could be deemed to have been regularly appointed. Thereby, F they became seniors to direct recruits. Shri Rajeev Dhawan appearing for promotees in Irrigation Branch further contended that the repealed Rules relating to Irrigation Branch thus contained the proviso to Rule 5(2) of the repealed Rules which postulates that when the promotees were appointed and on completion of their probation, it was declared. They must be deemed to be the members of the service. Thereby, the absence of statutory G rules in respect of Buildings and Roads Branch and Public Health Branch, was removed by the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Act with which we deal with later. Therefore, there is a consistent rule brought in the Act that from the inception of their appointment by promotion, Class II officers would become members of the Class-I service. Right to promotion though is not H a vested right, a right to be considered for promotion is the rule. As and

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA [K RAMASWAMY, J.]

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when vacancy arises, every officer, be it promotee or direct recruit, is A entitled to consideration for promotion in accordance with the rules then existing. The effect of retrospective operation would mean that the Act by fiction of law was in operation with effect from November 1, 1966, when the promotees were appointed and started officiating, though in excess of their quota. They were discharging the duties of the posts in accordance B with the Rules and they became members of the service from the respective dates of promotion and thereby their continuous length of service as Executive Engineer and upwards is required to be counted for the purpose of seniority. Thereby, they became seniors to the direct recruits. By fiction of law, the Act has taken away their right to be considered for promotion which arises only in accordance with the Rules then existing. Rules of C quota, due to non-availability of the direct recruits, stood broken down .and became inoperative. Therefore, the quota also cannot be implemented. ~hri Tulsi further contended that the State had not placed before this Court when Sehgal and Chopra's decisions were rendered, that the .Govern- D ment made its efforts to have the direct recruits appointed within their quota and notified from time to time to the Public Service Commission for recruitment but due to non-recruitment, the consequence would be that the promotees who performed the duties of the post must be given unbroken seniority from the respective dates of promotion. Normal continuous length of service is the· rule. The Act gives effect to that rule by E retrospective effect. The mandamus as directed to be implemented within the prescribed quota is no longer the good law. The Act is a piece of legislative device within the power and competence of the legislature. No direction could be given to disobey the law and to determine seniority F contrary to the Act.

At this juncture, it is also relevant to point out that before appearance of Shri Tulsi, Shri Altaf Ahmad, learned Additional Solicitor General had appeared on behalf of the State of Haryana. Shri Altaf Ahmad had taken a very candid stand and submitted that the direction issued by G this Court in Sehgal and Chopra's cases are clear, unambiguous and transparent. Officers, though understood with clarity the directions, had misapplied the law in their own perception with the wrong notion of equality. The seniority was not correctly prepared as per the mandamus. He stated that he would suitably advise the officers to redetermine the seniority in the light of the directions given by this Court. He further stated H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that the Legislature was not well advised to make the Act to overrule the mandamus by .legislative judgment, the Legislature, however, has the competence to amend the law prospectively removing the defects pointed out by this Court. The Act will become operative prospectively giving 50 per cent quota each to the direct recruits and promotees. It remains to be B operative undi:r the Act. Any relaxation in defiance of the Act giving advantage to the promotees Would be permissible only if the State Government should give satisfactory explanation and that too in writing, that they made all sincere efforts to have the required number of direct recruits, recruited within the quota of 50% posts but that became impracticable since required number of direct recruits were not selected by the Public C Service Commission. On giving such satisfactory explanation only, the Government should determine the inter se seniority between direct recruits · and promotees in respect of the future vacancies only. He would advise the Government to act accordingly.

We indeed appreciated the fair stand taken by Shri Altaf Ahmad on behalf of the State and gave direction to comply with the fixation of the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees accordingly. · But, ·unfortunately, instead of doing that exercise, the Government have changed the counsel and Shri Tulsi has taken over the threads from Shri Ahmad on behalf of the State. According to Shri Tulsi, so.long as the Act E remains on the statute, no one can be permitted to disobey the law.. According to the learned counsel, the State is empowered te enact the l~w suitably removing the defects in the law pointed out by the Court Which was lacking in the repealed Rules by enacting the faw with R!trospective effect. This is an accepted and recognised constit,µtional principle ap-. . F proved by this Court in catena of decisions. :Fherefore, the mandamus issued by this Court is no longer in operation 11nd tM directions ~n in Sehgal and Chopra's cases are no longer enforceable, The seniority shall be determined only in accordance with the provisions of the Act. . Shri Rajeev Dhawan further contended that the motives cannot be G attributed to the Legislature that it deliberately intended to overrule the decisions of the Court. The Act is neither a fraud on legislative power nor a colourable exercise of that power. Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule read with Article 309 of the Constitution empowers the Haryana State Legislature to make the Act. Therefore, the Legislature neither lacks H competence to enact the law nor it be characterized as fraud on power or

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S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA [K. RAMASWAMY, J.)

colourable exercise of power. The Act, therefore, is now uniformly ap- A plicable to all the three Branches of the P.W.D. Department of the_ Haryana Engineering Service Class-I. The seniority list prepared in 1992 in compliance of mandamus exhausted itself. The seniority should be determined as per the law as· it exists under the Act. The direct recruits have no vested right to promotion but they have right to be considered for B promotion as per the existing law, that is the Act. The learned counsel cited several decisions in support of the contentions. Shri.Rajeev Dhawan also has given elaborate written arguments in that behalf. Only Shri Raju Ramachandran has given brief written arguments on behalf of some of the direct recruits on the effect of Statement of Objects. Though opportunity was given to the counsel appearing for direct recruits to give their written C arguments, many of them have not availed the same. Three main principal questions arise for decision are : whether the Act is ultra vires the constitution? Whether the mandamus issued by this Court became ineffectual and unenforceable after corning into force of the D Act and whether the inter se seniority between the promotees and direct recruits has correctly been drawn in accordance with the mandamus issued by this Court? With a view to get at the bottom of these questions and to appreciate the respective contentions it is necessary to look into the relevant provisions in the Act. It would be redundant to reiterate once over the operative parts of the judgment in Sehgal and Chopra's cases and the E directions issued thereunder. The ingenuity of the learned counsel for the promotees would be appreciated for their effort to salvage the promotee officers to get them seniority from the respective dates of promotion. But giving legitimacy to the actions in question on the equitable considerations would leave indelible inversion on the efficacy of judicial review. It would F grant legitimacy to the legislature to overrule hereafter every inconvenient final judgment by legislative judgment with retrospective effect, rendering judicial review a supine mute witness to legislative overruling judicial decisions emasculating the vitality of judicial review which would generate feeling of disbelief in the efficacy of rule of law. As soon as a judgment rendered by constitutional court becomes final, it would become an easy G passage for the executive to tap the door of the legislature and have the mle nisi or mandamus or directions issued by a constitutional court nullified by legislative judgment. In view of these starking effects, the true legal and fonstitutional perspectives requires correct perspective in that behalf. The inevitable consequences that would emerge from giving accep- H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2S.C.R.

tance to the contentions of the counsel for promotees and the State of Haryana, driven us to give very deep, anxious and thoughtful consideration to these questions. Article 309 of the Constitution in Part XIV of the Constitution titled "Service under the State and the Union", postulates that recruitment and conditions of se1vice, the Union or of a State; subject to the provisions of the Constitution., the ·Acts of the appropriate legislature may regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to Public Services and post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of the State. Under the proviso, the President for Union of India or the Governor of the State respectively have been empowered to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the respective services and post of the Union of India or the State until the provision in this behalf is made by or under an appropriate legislature under this Article. Any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of such Act. Entry 41 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule empowers the State legislature to make law concerning State Public Services; State Public Service Commission. Article 245( 1) empowers the legislature of the State to make any law for the whole or any part of the State. Such law shall be subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the law made by the Parliament for the whole or any part of the territory of India.

It would, thus, be clear that the legislature of the State of Haryana has, no doubt, been empowered to make law regulating recruitment and conditions of service of the persons serving the State of Haryana. The p Rules made by the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 shall hold that field until provision in that behalf is made by an Act of the legislature of the State of Haryana under that Article or Article 245(1) read with Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The statutory Rule made under the proviso shall have effect subject to the provisions of such an Act. Thus, the Act replacing the Ordinance and the repealed Rules shall have effect of G regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the Haryana Services of Engineers Class II, PWD (Buildings & Roads), (Public Health) and Irrigation Branch) respectively. As stated earlier, the Act, has come into force on and with effect

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S.S. BOLA V. B.D.SARDANA[KRAMASWAMY,J.)

of the Act. By operation of Section 3, it shall apply to the persons who are the members of the Service but shall not include persons who were appointed before the 1st day of November, 1966. In other words, the persons appointed prior to 1st day of November, 1966 are not governed by the provisions of the Act and thereby they were not in law, the members of the service. There was no saving provision with regard to their continued membership for retiral service conditions under the repealed Rules except as mentioned in Section 25 and the proviso thereto. The allotees thereby, stood excluded from service. The repeal shall not affect the benefit accrued to the persons who have retired from service during the period commencing from the 1st day of November, 1966 and ending with the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance. In other words, even the retired employees under the repealed Rules were never members of the service of the respective Branches except to the extent of the benefits they had already derived and enjoyed under the repealed Rules. This is the disastrous consequence that has been brought about in relation to the employees allotted on 1st November, 1966 and those retired either prior to the 1st day of November, 1966, or after passing of the Ordinance 6 of 1995 or from the date of prospective operation of the Act. They are men of non grata.

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As regards the existing members and the service conditior.s of the respective Branches, Section 2 deals with the definitions. It defines in sub-section (1) of Section 2 "appointment to the service" to mean an E appointment made to the post in service and includes an appointment, made according to the terms and provisions of the Act to an officiating vacancy of a post in service. "Assistant Executive Engineer" as defined in Service 2(2), means a member of the service in the junior scale of pay. Thereby, his entitlement to be a member of the service under the repealed F Rules has been continued under the Act. His continuance as a member of the service in the junior scale of pay from the date of his appointment remained undisturbed and uninterrupted.

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Section 2(3) defines 'cadre post' to mean a permanent post in the service. Section 3(1) of the Act provides that the service shall comprise of G such number of posts of Assistant Executive Engineers, Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers, Chief Engineers and Engineer-in-Chief, as may be determined each year on the 1st day of January or as soon thereafter, as may be practicable according to the provisions of AppendixA. The strength so determined shall remain in force till it is revised. It H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A would, thus, be seen that the cadre posts are the permanent posts in the

service determined each year on the Ist day of January or soon thereafter. The number of cadre posts in the service shall comprise of such number of the aforestated junior scale posts and senior scale posts. The first category consists of Assistant Executive Engineers and the second category consists of Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers, Chief Engineers and Engineer in-Chief in the respective Branches.

Sub-section (4) of Section 2 defines 'Class-II Service' to mean the Haryana Service Engineers, Class II Public Work Department in the Buildings and Roads Branch. Public Health Branch or Irrigation Branch, C as the case may be. In other words, the Class- II service, namely, the officers in that category, remain as such officers until they are duly brought in and made members of service after being duly promoted and appointed to the service of the respective Branches in accordance with the provisions of the Act; until then they do not become members of the service of the D respective Branches of Class-I service. As seen earlier, under sub-section (1) of Section 2 appointment is made to the posts in the service of the cadre posts including an appointment made according to the terms and provisions of the Act to an officiating vacancy of a post in service. By mere officiation, he does not become a member of the Service. Therefore, before making an appointment, every year on 1st day of January or soon thereE after, the required number of cadre posts shall be determined and thereafter any person appointed to the service, be it an Assistant Executive Engineer, in the junior scale of pay of the service under the Act or promotee officer from Class-II service defined under Section 2(4) shall be appointed to a cadre post in accordance with the provisions of the Act p which is a condition precedent. Until that is done, they do not become members of the service. Section 2(8) defines 'direct appointment' to mean as appointment by open competition but does not include; (a) "appointment made by promoG tion"; and (b) an appointment made "by transfer" of an officer already in the service of a State Government br of the Union. Explanation postulates that a Class II officer who enters the Service by open competitive selection shall for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to have entered the Service by direct appointment. In other words, the promotee officer otherwise seeks an appointment by direct recruitment by a competitive selection H through Public Service Commission from open market and appointed as

S.S. BOLA v. B.D. SARDANA [K. RAMASWAMY, J.)

,

such does become a member of the service. Since by operation of clause A (a) of sub-section (8) of Section 2, the promotee/transferee shall not be included as member of the service. An appointment made by promotion/tro.,sfer stood excluded from definition of direct appointment. Sub-section (12) of Section 2 defines 'member of the service' to mean "an officer appointed substantively to a cadre post" and includes (a) in the case of a direct appointment an officer on probation, or such an officer,

who having successfully completed his probation, awaits appointment to a cadre post; he becomes a member of the service from the date of the

'

appointment, since he was appointed directly on probation to a cadre or to an ex-cadre post. A direct recruit on successful completion of probation C but kept on' officiating basis in an ex-cadre post, awaits appointment to a cadre post; nevertheless; remains to be a member of the service. As ~tated earlier, he continues to be a member of the service in the junior scale of pay as Assistant Executive Engineer from the date of his appointment which remains unalterable. Under clause (b) of Section 2(12) an officer becomes a member of the service in case of an appointment by transfer D who is on probation or who, having successfully completed his probation, awaits appointment to a cadre post, initially as he was appointed by transfer, becomes a member of the service from the date of his appointment by transfer provided such an officer does not have a lien on a substantive post in any Government Department. In other words, it is settled service jurisprudence under the fundamental Rules that an officer E cannot be appointed substantively to more than one post and he cannot also hold two posts simultaneously in a substantive capacity. Therefore, an officer appointed to a cadre post substantively as per the provisions of the Act on a transfer but who lost his lien in his parent department, he becomes a member of the service under the Act from the date of his F appointment on successful completion and declaration of his probation, provided that he ceased to hold a lien on a substantive post in his parent Department. Under clause (c) of sub-section (12) of Section 2, in case of an officer appointed by promotion, he becomes a member of the service on his G successful completion of probation and awaits appointment to a cadre post. Explanation qualifies as under :

"It is necessary that a member of the Service shall at any given time be actually doing the work of a cadre post. He may be working in H

A

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP.2S.C.R. an ex-cadre post for reasons of administrative convenience. Conversely, an officer working in an officiating post may in fact perform the duties of a cadre post." In other words, the explanation qualifies that a person, i.e., a direct

B recruit Assistant Executive Engineer but was posted to an ex-cadre post, when he was discharging the duties of the post, though in an ex-cadre post for reasons of administrative convenience, nonetheless be becomes a member of the service by operation of clause (a) of Section 2(12). An officer officiating against an ex-cadre post may, in fact, perform the duties of the cadre post. In other words, though on successful completion of the probaC tion and awaits appointment to a cadre post, nevertheless, prior to bis actual appointment to a cadre post, he is empowered to perform and officiate his duties of a cadre post, though he was appointed as a direct recruit and was posted to an ex-cadre post. Equally, the promotee Class II officer appointed on probation is also entitled to continue on an ex- cadre post or cadre post in an officiating capacity and the period of officiation D counts towards probation. In other words, the promotee officer does not come within the ambit of the explanation as a substantive capacity but authorised the promotee officer to perform the duties of a cadre post either as a probationer or in an officiating capacity which falls far short of substantive capacity. By operation of clause (c) of Section 2(12), a Class-II officer defined under Section 2(4) on his appointment by promotion as an E Executive Engineer, i.e., to the Class-I service as first appointment from feeder channel into Class-I service, he is empowered to officiate as an officer on probation on cadre/ex-cadre post. On successful completion of his probation, he•does not automatically become a member of the service until he is duly appointed to a cadre post. In other words, he is empowered, p by reason of the explanation to Section 2(12), to officiate on a cadre post, . but it does not amount that he was appointed to a cadre post in a substantive capacity. This demarcation of the nature of the membership of the service between direct recruit Assistant Executive Engineer on one hand and the officer appointed by transfer or promotee Class II officer who does not have such status but gets limited right to officiate in a G cadre/ex-cadre post as Executive Engineer, brings out the nature of their membership of the service. S!-lb-section (15) of Section 2 defines 'service' to mean the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I Public Works Department in the Buildings H and Roads Branch, Public Health Branch and Irrigation Branch, as the

-,

S.S. BOLA V. B.D.SARDANA[KRAMASWAMY,J.]

case may be. An officer in Class I service becomes an officer of that service A only when he is appointed substantively to the cadre post, be it from junior scale of pay posts, namely, Assistant Executive Engineers, who is a member of the service in the junior scale of pay or an officer appointed by transfer or a promotee officer from Class II service to a cadre post as Executive Engineer. As seen earlier, the Assistant Executive Engineer who is a B member of the junior scale of pay service, appointed to an ex-cadre post and has completed the probation and awaits appointment to the cadre post, remains to be a member of the service and empowered to officiate in the cadre post as Executive Engineer though he has not become full member of the service while promotee officer does not get that right unless the C procedure under Section 8 is gone through and on selection as a probationer as per the merit list. Therefore, as soon as the Assistant Executive Engineer successfully completes the probation, unless he is discharged from service for unsatisfactory performance of the duties, he remains to be a member of the service as his date of appointment remains the same, i.e., from the date of his initial appointment as Assistant Execu- D tive Engineer and remains to be a member of the service and ·entitles to discharge the service on a cadre post and his seniority dates back to his date of initial appointment to the cadre/ex-cadre post as Assistant Executive Engineer. Thereby, the direct recruit Executive Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer direct recruit appointed directly to a substantive post E and Assistant Executive Engineer direct recruit appointed to an ex cadre post are treated on par and their service conditions remain unalterable throughout. But, in the case of the officers belonging to Class-II service, as defined under Service 2(4), he does not become a member of the service as Class I officer until he is appointed to the cadre post substantively, nor F he be empowered to officiate in the cadre post except as a probationer or in an o

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