Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh and ORS.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
11 July 1997
Judge
Justice K. Ramaswamy
Reported in
[1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 305
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Article 245 Constitution, Article 298 Constitution, Article 19 Constitution, Article 46 Constitution, Article 21 Constitution, Article 39 Constitution, Article 244 Constitution
Subject
Service, Property & land

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Full judgment

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SAMATHA

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v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.

JULY 11, 1997 [K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD

AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: A1ticles 14, 17, 21, 23, 38, 39, 46, 162, 244, 245, 298 Fifth Schedule-Para 5.

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Rese1ved Forest Area--Grant of mining leases by Govemment to 11011t1ibals-Pennissibility of-Object of Fifth Schedule discussed-'Reg11latio11' includes 'Prohibition '-Executive power under Alticle 298 and legislative power under Arlicle 245-Power to dispose ·Govemment property is subject to Fifth Schedule--legislative and constitutional history of protection to Scheduled TTibes discussed. Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Tramfer Regulation, 1959 : Section 3(1)(a), 3(4). Schedrtled Tribe-Immovable

property situated in agency

tract~~Prohibition for transfer infavour of 1wn-tTibals-Word 'person' in first E paTt of clause (a) includes State Govemment and its instiumentalities-Word · 'Person' used elsewhere refers to only natural persons-Grallt of mining lease in rese1ved forest infavour of non-t1ibals held void-Transfer of Governmellt land in favour of public corporation for public pu1pose held not prohibited-Transferee should conllibute for social, economic and education- F al development of scheduled TTibes-Scope a11d power of Government to dispose prope1ty i11 Scheduled area-Constitutional limitation 011 such properties. Scheduled Tribe-Right to life and economic .empowennent.

G Mi11es a11d 111i11erals (Regulation and Develop111e11t) Act, 1957: Section 11(5) (As ame11ded in 1991) Scheduled Area-Mining leases in:-Grant to non- tlibals-Validity of Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

Rese1ved Fores~ining leases in--Orant and renewal by State in favour of 11on-t1ibals-Effect and validity of Forest (Conservation) Act, 198(}-Section 2-11 Reserved forests-Applicability of Act to.

Transfer of Property Act, 1872-Section 105 Leas-Definition of Words and Phrases :

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'Person '-Meaning of-In the context of A.P. Schedule Area Land Transfer Regulation, 1959. 'Peace and Good Govemment'-Meaning and scope of-In the context of Para 5(2) of Fifth Schedule to•Constitution of India 'Forest and Forest Land'-Meaning of-'Socialism'-Meaning of-In the context of Preamble to the Constitution of India.

State of Andhra Pradesh granted mining leases to several non-tribal persons in the reserved forest area of Anantagiri Manda! of Visakhapatnam District-The appellant-Society, claiming to protect the interests and life of the Scheduled Tribes in the area, filed two Writ Petitions in public interest before the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the power of the Government to grant mining leases in favour of non-tribals in the scheduled area. It sought issue of mandamus to terminate the mining leases which had been granted and/or renewed in favouir of the private respondents inter alia on the grounds that (i) the said leases contravened the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 (As amended in 1970) as well as the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980; (ii) Such leases were prohibited under Section 11(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Develop· ment) Act, 1957 (As amended by 1991 Act).

A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions holding that (i) the word 'Person' in Section 3(1) of the Regulation does not include the Government and as such the Government was not prohibited from transferring the Government land in favour ofnon-tribals within the scheduled area; (ii) The Regulation does not prohibit transfer H of the Government land by way of lease to the non-tribals; (iii) in order to

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SAMATHA v. STATE

prohibit grant of mining lease in favour of the non-tribals within the A scheduled area Section 11 (5) of the MMRD Act was introduced in the year 1991. But the said provision was prospective in nature and would not apply to the existing leases; (iv) Prior approval of the Central Government under Section 2 of the Forest ((:onservation) Act was not required where the land in question has already been broken; (v) Forest (Conservation) Act applies B to the reserved forest and since it was not established as to the extent of the land covered by the mining leases which form a part of the reserved forest and since the joi;1t survey conducted indicated that there was no lessee who was occupying the reserved forest area, except in one case where to an extent of two thousand metres of the mining lease forms a part of the reserved forest, the validity on account of the ·non-compliance of the C Conservation Act cannot be gone into. Against the Judgment of the High Court the appellant preferred appeals before this Court. In the connected appeal, the appellant M/s. Hyderabad Abrasives and Minerals, was granted mining leases for 20 years in 1974 in the Peddamaredumilli reserved forest area in East Godavari District of Andhra Pradesh. Some other persons were also granted mining leases in East Godavari District. M/s. Sakti, a voluntary social organisation, filed a writ petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court challenging the grant of leases by the Government. Another Division Bench of the High Court took a contrary view holding that (i) grant of mining leases was illegal; (ii) the word 'person' used in Section 3 of the Regulatfon includes Government; (iii) any lease to the non-tribals even of a Government land situated in scheduled area was in violation of Section 3 and therefore void; (iv) a mining lease in a forest area for non-forest purpose of renewal thereof, without prior approval of the Central Government was in violation of Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act; Accordingly,- the DivisiOn Bench directed the Governmtnt to prohibit mining operations in scheduled area except that the mines stacked on the surface be permitted to be removed after obtaining proper permits.

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Against the decision of the High Court an appeal was preferred before this Court, contending that : (i) It is permissible to give a different meaning to the same word used in the same statute depending upon the object sought to be achieved by the H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A statue and, therefore, it would be within the principles of interpretation to

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interpret the word 'person' occuring in the First Part of Section 3(1)(a) to include the State Government whereas the same wor~ 'person' used in the latter part of Section 3(1)(a) may be interpreted to mean'an individual'; (ii) The word 'Regulation' in para 5(2)(b) of the Fifth Schedule requires to be interpreted broadly to preserve not only the tribal autonomy but also to subserve distributive justice in favour of the tribals in the matter of assignment of the land belonging to the Government in their favour; This Clause prohibits the allotment of land to non-tribals; (iii) The term 'peace aud Good Government' in para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule should be given wide interpretation; (iv) The expression 'Regulate the allotment of Land to members of Scheduled Tribes in such area; in Para 5(2)(b) of the Schedule should be construed to mean that the Governor should frame Regulation ensuring that laud does not pass out from tribals and the land allotments are made exclusively to tribals and the distribution of land amongst them inter se can be regulated; (v) Under the amended Section 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area land Transfer Regulations, 1959 transfer of immovable, property situated in the scheduled area to non-tribal is prohibited. The object of amendment of regulation was to prohibit totally transfer of any land in favour of a non-tribal member within the agency tracts; (vi) In view of Section 11 (5) of the Mines and l'v'i11erals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, no mining lease can be granted in favour of any person who is not a member of Scheduled Tribe; (vii) Grant of mining leases was in violation of Environment Protection Act, because the mining activities were not only polluting the tribal atmosphere and natural flora and fauna but were also becoming hazardous to human life; and (viii) In view of the embargo contained hi Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act prior permission of Central Government not having been obtained the mining activities within the forest area cannot be permitted to be continued. Disposing the appeals, this Court HELD:

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By the Court 1. The word 'person' in section 3(1)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area land transfer Regulation, 1959 includes the State Government. Consequently, the transfer of land in the scheduled area by way of lease, for mining purposes in favour of non-tribals stands prohibited under

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SAMATHA v. STATE

the Fifth Schedule read with Section 3 of the Regulation. 2. However, transfer of the government land in favour of its instrumentalities for public purpose stand excluded from the prohibition under Para 5(2)(b)_ of the Fifth Schedule and Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation. The leasee or licensee should incur atleast 20% of the net profit for social and economic empowerment of tribals as well as for maintenance of ecology.

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3. In the light of the provision contained in clause (a) of sub-para (2) of Para 5 of the Fifth Schedule, there is implied prohibition on the State's power of allotment of its land to non-tribals in the scheduled areas.

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4. The Executive power of the State to dispose of its property under Article 298 is subject to the provisions in the Fifth Schedule as an integral scheme of the Constitution. The legislative power of the State under Article 245 is also subject to Fifth Schedule to regulate allotment of the Government land in the scheduled areas.

5. Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act,1980 prohibits de-reservation of forest or use .of any forest land for any non-forest purpose of assignment by way of lease or otherwise of any portion of land to any private person other than government controlled agency. It is, therefore, 'necessary for the State Government to obtain prior permission of the Central Government for (i) de-reservation of forest; and (ii) the use of the forest land for non-forest purpose. 6. Section 11(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 prohibits grant of mining lease in scheduled areas in favour of non-tribals. 7. The meaning of the expression 'forest land' requires extended meaning given so as to protect forest land from deforestation to maintain ecology and to prevent environmental degradation and hazardous effects on Right to life and flora' and fauna.

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Per Ramaswamy, J.

1. Right from the inception of the Colonial administration, the agency areas were treated distinctly from other areas. Tribals were protected from exploitation; their rights and title to enjoy the lands in their

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (l.997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

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filtration of the non-tribals area was prohibited. Sugalis, i.e. Khanabadosh, non-tribals, by migration became in due course, tribals. Even those migrant non-tribals were prohibited to purchase the lands in agency areas from the tribals except with the prior sanction of the officer appointed by the Government in that behalf. [360-E-F]

2. It is clear from the legislative history that from the beginning of the British rule in India, the Legislature has adopted the policy to exclude some areas totally and some partially from the governance through the Executive ·: Council and given power to the Governor of the Province and the Governor C General/Viceroy to administer them with their special responsibilities. The partially excluded areas had the dual control by the Executive with primacy given to the Governor of the Province to apply or to exclude the application of the laws made by the legislature or the Executive Council to the partially excluded schedule areas. In either event the object was to prevent the tribals to get into the wiles of the money- lenders and preservation of their property D and customs and to allow the tribals autonomy of their living in accordance with their customs and culture. [365-D; E; F]

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3. Agriculture is the only source of livelihood for Schedule Tribes, apart from collection and sale of minor forest produce to supplement their income. Land is their most important natural and valuable asset and imperishable endowment from which the tribals derive their sustenance, social status, economic and social equality, permanent place of abode and work and living. It is a security and source for economic empowerment. Therefore, the tribes too have great emotional attachment to their lands. The land on· which they live and till, assures them equality of status and dignity of person and means of economic and social justice and potent weapon of economic empowerment in social democracy. [354-F; G]

4. A survey of various statutes imposing restrictions on alienation of lands allotted to Scheduled Tribes discloses enormity of the yawn:ing gap G between making of the various Acts and their proper enforcement. The magnitude of the problem is of national importance which need to be tackled and solved by Parliamentary law and effective enforcement. [36S-C; D]

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5. As a part of on-going industrial advancement, large industries or projects are being set up or constructed in the Scheduled areas displacing

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SAMATHA v. STATE

the Tribals and rendering them impoverished landless labourers. When their lands are acquired for public purpose, the Government should give alternative lands for rehabilitation and easy loans for reclamation. Law relating to prohibition of alienation and restoration of lands to tribes must be simple, less cumbersome and result-oriented. The machinery must be speedy and the officers must have compassion and sense of dedication and direction to ameliorate the economic status of the tribes to assimilate them into national main-stream. (374-D, EJ Prof. C.V.F. Haimendrof," Tribes of India· The Strnggle for Survival"; D1: P. V. Ramesh, "Land Refonns Land Transfer in Scheduled Area: published byA.P. Judicial Academy as "Scheduled Tribal and Social Justice" page 178; S.N. Dubey and Ratna Murdia, "La11d Alie11atio11 and Restoratio11 in Tribal Communities in India" (Himalaya Publishing House); Dr. G.P. Reddy "Politics of T1ibal Exploitatio11" pages 66-67; Dr. Ramakant Nath, B.M. Boal and N. Soreng, "The Khonds a11d Jau11gs in A11dhra Pradesh Hand Book for Development" The Reports of the Commissioner of SCs, and STs, 1980-81 and 1984-85; B.L Maharda, IAS "History and Culture of Giriasias", referred to.

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6. The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 came into force on March 4, 1959 in Andhra area and in Telangana E ar~a with effect from December 1, 1963. The definition of transfer under Section 2(g) is a com11rchensively wide definition except testamentary disposition by a tribal to another tribal so as to effectuate the prohibition of transfer of immovable property to any person other than a Scheduled Tribe or a cooperative society composed solely of members of the F Scheduled Tribes. Section 3 prohibits transfer of immovable property by a member of the Scheduled Tribes to· a non-Scheduled Tribe. The burden is on the non-tribal to prove that the land in his possession was not acquired by transfer from a tribal; in other words, the land belongs to tribal and the non-tribal possesses it in contravention of law. In case of G any transfer made in contravention of sub-section (1) of Section 3, the agent, the Agency Division Officer, or any other prescribed officer, may on an application by any one interested, or on information given in writing by a public servant or suo motu, issue decree of ejectment against any person in possessi<m of the property claiming under the transfer. This should be done after due notice to such person. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

Section 3 provides that if a transferer or his heirs are not willing to_ take back the property or where whereabouts of the transferer are not known the said officer may by order assign or sell the property to another member of the Scheduled Tribe or a Co-operative Society. Sub-section 3(4) provides that for the purpose of Section 3(4), the expression 'transfer' includes sale in execution of a decree and also a benami transfer made by a member of a Scheduled Tribe in favour of any other member of the Scheduled Tribes but does not includ.e a partition or a devolution by succession. [369-F; 370-B-C; 372-A; D; 372-G-H:; 373-A·B] 7. It is settled law that the transfer of immovable property between

C a member of the Scheduled Tribe to a non-scheduled Tribe in the Agency tracts is null and void. The non·tribals transferee acquires no right, title and interest in that behalf in furtherance of such sale. [373-E)

Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Kamataka & Ors., [1984) 3 SCC 301; Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., [1985) 1 SCC D 479; P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State ofAndhra Pradesh & Ors., [1988) 3 SCC 433 and Waman Rao v. Union of India, [1981) 2 SCR 1, relied on.

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8. The Regulation was extended to Telangana region w.e.f. December 1, 1963. Prior thereto, law in Telangana area was in operation 11rohibiting any transfer of agricultural lands without prior permission of the officers and 1950 Regulation draws rebuttable presumption that all the acquisi· tions of immovable property situated in Scheduled Areas ar1~ acquired through a transfer from tribals. The non-tribals shall be presumed to have acquired title from tribals unless they are able to prove to the rontrary that their possession of properties in the Agency tracts was lawfully acquired. [375-A, B, CJ

9. Establishment of the egalitarian social order through rule of law is the basic structure of t!1e Constitution. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles are the means, as two wheels of the chariot, to G achieve the above object of democratic socialism. The word "socialist" used in the Preamble must be read from the goals Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 38, 39, 46 and all other cognate Articles seek to establish, i.e., to reduce inequalities in income and status and to provide equality of opportunity and facilities. Social justice enjoins the Court to uphold government's endeavour to remove ecanomic inequalities, to provide decent standard of H living to the poor and to protect the interest of the weaker sections of the

SAMATHA v. STATE

society so as to assimilate all the sections of the society in a secular A integrated socialist Bharat with dignity of person and equality of status to ;ill. [396-G-H; 397-A]

Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 206; D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. UOI, [1983] 2 SCR 165; Excel Wear Etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 1009; State of Kamataka v. Shri Ranganatha B Reddy &Anr. Etc., [1978] 1 SCR641; Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Company v.Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr., [1983] 1 SCR 1000; State of Tamil Nadu Etc. Etc. v. L. Abu Kayur Bai & Ors. Etc., [1984] 1 SCR 725; Madhusudan Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1984] 2 SCC 381, referred to.

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Prof. Friedlander, "Introduction of Social Welfare" page 6; B. Shiva Rao, 'The Framing of India's Constitution: Selection Documents' Vol. IV p. 944; Dias, ''Jurispmdence" (5th Edn.) on 'distributive justice'; Justice P.B. Sawant, "Socialism under the Indian Constitution"; Mahatma Gandhiji, the father of the nation, Harijans' dated October 9, 1937; Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao, D ''Indian Socialism Retrospect and Prospect'~ pages 46-47; Mr. G.D.H. Cole, "The Growth of Socialism" published in 'Law and Opinion in England in the 20th Century" (Morris Ginsberg, Editor) page 79-80, referred to. 10. The Constitution envisions to establish an egalitarian social order rendering to every citizen, social, economic and political justice. Chapter· E VI, Part X of the Constitution deals with "Scheduled Tribes and Tribal Area". Article 244 provides that the provision of the Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State other than the States of Assam, Maghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. The Fifth Schedule makes the provisions as to the F administration and control of Scheduled Area and Scheduled Tribes. [387-H; 388-A; 368-D-E] 11. Fifth Schedule would manifest the animation of the founding fathers that lands in the Scheduled area covered by the Fifth Schedule require to be preserved by prohibiting transfers between tribals and non- G tribals and providing for allotment ofland to the members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area and regulating the carrying on of the business by money-lenders in such area. [368-B-C] 12. The predominant object of para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and the Regulation is to impose total prohibition of transfer H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of immovable property to any person other than a tribal for pc~ace and proven good management of tribal area to protect possession, right, title and interest of the members of the Scheduled Tribes held in th1: land at one time by the tribals. The non-tribals, at no point of time, have any legal or valid title to immovable property in agency tracts unless acquired with B prior sanction of the Government and saved by any law made consistent with the Fifth Schedule. With the passage of time, when person other than tribals gained unlawful title to and possession of the lands in agency tracts, their acquisition and holding of the immovable property, unless proved otherwise, have always been null and void. The Regulation, as its predecessor law, did prohibit transfer by a tribal to any other person and even C benami purchaser in the name of a tribal for the benefit of a non-tribal also is null and void. Non-tribal thereon, acquires no right, title and interest in the land situated in Scheduled area. Indisputably, any transfer inter vivas between tribals or non-tribals or inter se between non-tribals except testamentary disposition to a tribal, has been totally prohibited. D The only exception engrafted is the transfer to Co-operative Societies composed solely of tribals or mortgage of the land to a Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank registered as an instrumentality of the State or any Government approved lending agency to improve the agricultural lands or sale to an agent to the Government etc. A non-tribal person who is unable to find a tribal buyer is not totally prohibited to transfer it. He should E offer it to the named or nominated Government agent etc. who would purchase it in the prescribed manner under the Regulation and assign it on to a tribal. [375-D-H, 376-AJ 13. It is indisputable that apart from the patta lands or other lands F held by the tribals, the State holds vast tracts of land in scheduled area, in some areas with rich mineral deposits. Paragraph 5(2) of Fifth Schedule enjoins the Governor to make regulations for the peace and good governance in a Scheduled area. Without prejudice to the general power, subsequent clauses amplify particular powers. Clause (a) empowers him to prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the tribals G and non-tribals in such area. Clause (b) regulates the allotment of land only to members of the Scheduled Tribes in the area. The object of the founding father of the Constitution in empowering the Governor, on the basis of his personal satisfaction, is to regulate by law the administration or control of the Scheduled area for peace and good governance of the H scheduled Tribes in the area. [377-E; FJ

SAMATHA v. STATE

14. The Fifth and Sixth Schedules form an integral scheme of the A Constitution with direction, philosophy and anxiety to protect the tribals from exploitation and to pre~erve valuable endowment of their land for their economic empowerment to elongate social and economic democracy with liberty, equality, fraternity and dignity of their person in our political Bharat. [391,E; Fl

B. Shiva Rao, "In the Framing of the India's Constitution, Vol. II; Vol. 9 CA.D., p.p. 965-1001, referred to.

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15. The purpose of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the Constitution is to prevent exploitation of truthful inarticulate and innocent tribals and C to empower them socially, educationally, economically and politically to bring them into the mainstream of national life. The founding fathers of the Constituti.on were conscious of and cognizant to the problem of the exploitation of the tribals. They were anxious to preserve the tribal culture and their holdings. At the same time, they intended to provide and create opportunities and facilities, by affirmative action, in the light of the Directive D Principles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 46 and cognate provisions to prevent exploitation of the tribals by ensuring positively that the land is a valuable endowment and a source of economic empowerment, social status and dignity of persons. The Constitution intends that the land always should remain with the tribals. Even the government land should E increasingly get allotted to them individually and collectively through registered Cooperative Societies or agricultural/farming co-operative Societies composed solely of the tribals and would be managed by them alone with the facilities and opportunities provided to them by the Union of India through their Annual Budgetary allocation spent through the appropriate State Government as its instrumentalities or local body in a F planned development so as to make them fit for self- governance. The words "piece and good government" used in the Fifth Schedule require widest possible interpretation. [406-G-H; 407-A-D] T.M. Kanniyan v. Income-tax Office1; Pondicheny & Anr., [1968] 2 SCR 103 and Queen v. Russell, [1882] 7 AC 829, referred to.

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16. The object of Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the Constitution, is not only to prevent acquisition, holding or disposal of the land in Scheduled Areas by the non-tribals from the tribals or alienation of such land among non-tribals inter se but also to ensure that the tribals remain in possession H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S:C.R.

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and enjoyment of the lands in Scheduled areas for their economic empowerment, social status and dignity of their person. Equally exploitation of mineral resources being national wealth undoubtedly, is for the development of the nation. The competing rights of tribals and the Sltate are required to be adjusted without defeating rights of either. The Governor is empowered, as a constitutional duty, by legislative and executive action, to prohibit acquiring, holding and disposing of the land by non-tribals in the Scheduled Areas. The Cabinet, while exercising its power under Article 298 should equally be cognizant to the constitutional duty to protect and empower the tribals. Therefore, the Court is required to give effed to the constitutional mandate and legislative policy of total prohibition on the transfer of the land in Scheduled area to non-tribals. [420-E, F, G]

17. In the absence of any total prohibition, undoubtedly Article 298 empowers the Governor being the head of the Executive to sanction transfer of its lands. Since the Executive is enjoined to protect social, economic and educational interest of the tribals and when the State leases out the D lands in Scheduled Areas to the non-tribals for exploitation of mineral resources, it transmits the correlative above constitutional duties and obligation to those who undertake to exploit the natural resources should also to improve social, economic and educational empowermf:nt of the tribals. As a part of the administration of the project, the license•~ or lessee E should incur the expenditure for; (a) re-forestation and maintenance of ecology in the Scheduled Areas;

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(b) maintenance of roads and communication facilities in the Scheduled Areas where operation of the industry has the impact; (c) supply of potable water to the tribals;

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(d) establishment of schools for imparting free education at primary and secondary level and providing vocational training to the tribals to enable them to be qualified, competent and confident in pursuit of employment; (e) providing employment to the tribals according to their qualifications in their establishment/factory;

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(t)

maintenance of sanitation;

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SAMATHA v. STATE

(g) construction of houses for tribals in the Sciisduled Areas as A enclosures; the expenditure for the above projects should be part of his/its Annual Budget of the industry establishment or business advocation/venture. [421-C-H; 422-A-B]

18. In this behalf, at least 20 per cent of the net profit should be set apart as a permanent fund as a part of industrial/business activity for establishment and maintenance of water resources, schools, hospitals, sanitation and transport facilities by laying roads etc. This 20% allocation would not include the expenditure for reforestation and maintenance of ecology. It is needless to mention that necessary sanction for exemption of said amount from income-tax liability, may be obtained; and the Centre should ensure grant of such exemption and see that these activities are undertaken, carried on and maintained systematically and continuously. The above obligations and ifuties, should be undertaken and discharged by each and every person/industry/licensee/lessee concerned so that the constitutional objectives of social, economic and human resource empowerment of the tribals could be achieved and peace and good governance is achieved in Scheduled Areas. [422-C; D; E]

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19. The executive power of the State to dispose of its property under Article 298 is subject to the provisions in the Fifth Schedule as an integral scheme of the Constitution. The legislative power of the State under Article E 245 is also subject to the Fifth Schedule, to regulate the allotment of the Government land in the Scheduled Areas. Therefore, the State Legislature of Andhra Pradesh has imposed total prohibition under Mines Act to transfer its lands to the non-tribals. Doubtless that under Article 298, the State exercises its power of disposal for public purpose. When two com- F peting public purposes claim preferential policy decision, option to the State should normally be to elongate and achieve constitutional goal. Secondly, the constitutional priority yields place to private purpose, though it is hedged by executive policy. As a facet of interpretation, the Court too adopt purposive interpretation tool to effectuate the goals set down in the Constitution. Equally, the executive Government iii its policy G options requires to keep them in the backdrop and .regulate disposal of their land-property in accordance with the constitutional policy, executive decision backed by public policy and, at the same time, preserve paramount Tribal interest in the scheduled area. No abstract principle could be laid in that behalf. Each case requires examination in the back- H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A drop of the legislative/executive action, its effect on the constitutional objectives and the consequential result yields therefrom. [401-E-H; 402-A) 20. It is true, that the Constitution has demarcated legislative, executive and judicial powers and entrusted them to the three wings of the B State; in particular the President/Governor of the State is to exercise the executive power in their individual discretion. It is not subject to legislative limitations to be done in accordance with rules of business. In particular, the President/Governor is entrusted with the executive power co-extensive with the legislative power enumerated in the' Seventh Schedule read with Article 245 of the Constitution. The executive power especially conferred C by the Constitution like the pleasure tenure or the power of pardoning a convict are not apposite to the issue. The power of the executivt' Government in that behalf has wisely been devised in the Constitution, is not subject to any restriction except in accordance with the Constitution and the law made under Article 245 read with the relevant Entry in the Seventh D Schedule to the Constitution is subject to Fifth Schedule when it is applied to Scheduled area. The power of the Government to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and the .making of contracts for any purpose confer~ed by Article 298 of the Constitution equally is co-extensive with the legislative power of the Union/State. However, Article 244(1) itself specifies that provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administrntion and E control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State except the excluded areas specified therein. The legislative power in Clause (1) of Article 245 equally is "subject to the provisions of the Constitution i.e. Fifth Schedule. Clause (1) of para 5 of part B of the Fifth Schedule applicable to Scheduled areas, adumbrates with a uon-obstante clause that "NotF withstanding anything in tile Constitution, in other words, despite the power, under Article 298, the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any particular Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State shall not apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State or shall apply to a scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State, subject to such G exceptions and modifications as he may specify in the notification and any direction given under clause (1) of para 5, may be given so as to have retrospective effect". The executive power of the State is, therefore, subject to the legislative power under Clause 5 (1) of the Fifth Scheduh~. Similarly sub-para (2) thereof empowers the Governor to make regulation for the peace and good government of any area in a State which is for the time H being a Scheduled Area. In particular and without prejudice to the

SAMATHA v. STATE

generality of the foregoing power, such regulation may regulate the. allot· A ment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area or may prohibit or restrict the transfer of land under Clause (a) by/or among the members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas. In other words sub-para 5(2) combines both legislative as well as executive power, clause 5(2)(a) and (c) legislative power and clause (b) combines both legislative as well B as executive power. The word 'regulation' in para 5(2)(b) is thus of wide import. [398-H; 399-A-H; 400-A; BJ

Marn Ram Etc. Etc. v. Union of India &Anr., [1981) 1SCR1196; Lois P. Myers v. United States,. 272 US 160; 71 Led 11 and The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961) 2 SCR 679, referred to. C William H. Rehnquist "The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas Law Review 693, referred to.

_,

21. While interpreting Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, this Court D has consistently held that the term 'regulation' would include total prohibi· tion. Therefore, the word 'regulate" the allotment of land to members of Scheduled Tribes in Scheduled area in the Fifth Schedule by Clause 5(2)(b) must be read as a whole to ensure regulation of the land only to and among the members of the Scheduled Tribes in the Scheduled area. In the light of the provisions contained in clause (a) of sub-para (2) of E para 5, there is implied prohibition on the State's power of allotment of its land to non-tribals in ~e Scheduled Areas. When so read there is no incompatibility and inco istency between the power of the executive Government and the Cons itution and conjoint operation would elongate the good government of the Scheduled Areas. So, while prohibiting transfer F of land between natural persons, i.e. tribes and non-tribals and preventing non·tribals to purchase from or transfer to another non-tribal, his right, title or interest in the land in the Scheduled Area, at the same breathe would not be permissible for the Government to transfer their land to a non-tribal except for equally competing pubic purpose. The answer ob· viously should be that it is permissible to the Gol'ernment to transfer its G land to the non· tribals. This -negative answer leads to effectuate the constitutional objective to preserve the land in the scheduled area to the tribals, prohibits the Government from allotting their land to the non· tribals; prohibit infiltration of the non·tribals into the scheduled area and prevents exploitation of the tribals by non·tribals in any form. This pur· H '

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [~997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A posive interpretation would ensure distributive justice among tlile tribals

in this behalf and elongates the constitutional commitment. Any other interpretation would sow the seed beds to disintegrate the tribal amtonomy, their tribal culture and frustrate empowerment of them socially, economi· cally and politically, to live a life of equality, dignity of person and equality of status. [400-C; G; H; 40l·A·D]

Narendra Kumar v. Union of llldia, [1960) 2 SCR 372; Fatehchand Himmatlal v. State of Maharashtra, [1977) 2 SCC 670; State of U.P. & Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. & Ors., [1979) '3 SCC 229; K Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1985} 2 SCC 116 and Air India Statutory C Corporation Etc. v. United Labour Union & Ors. Etc., (1996) 9 SCALE 70, referred to.

22. The word 'person' in the interplay of juristic thought is either natural or artificial. Natural persons are human beings while artificial persons are Corporations. Corporations are either Corporation agg_regate or Corporation sole. The question whether or not the word 'pt:rson' used in a statute would include the State has to be determined with reference to the provisions of the Act, the aim and its object and the purpose the Act seeks to subserve. There is no reason to consider the word 'person' in a narrow sense. It must be construed in a broader perspectivity,, unless the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, exempt the State from the operation of the Act as against the State and would include "State Government." [384-E; F, G] 23. The maxim "reddendo singula singulis" will apply to the' interpreta·

F tion of the word "person" so that the general meaning of the word "person" in its generic sense with its width may not be cut down by the specific qualification of one species, i.e., natural "person" when it is capable to encompass, in its ambit, natural persons, juristic persons and constitu· tional mechanism and governance in a democratic set up. The State, by G Cabinet form of Gover~ment, is a persona ficta, a Corporate sole Constitu· tion empowers the State to acquire, hold and dispose of thdr property. The governor in his personal responsibility is empowered to maintain peace and good government in scheduled area. The Fifth Schedule to the Constitution empowers him to regulate allotment of the land by para 5(2)(b) read with Section 3 of the Regulation of the land be it between H natural persons, i.e. tribals and non-tribals; it imposes total prohibition

SAMATHA v. STATE

.~

on transfer of the land in scheduled area. The object of the Fifth Schedule A and the Regulation is to preserve tribal autonomy, their culture and economic empowerment to ensure social, economic and political justice for preservation of peace and good government in the Scheduled Area. Therefore, all relevant clauses In the Schedule and the Regulation should harmoniously and widely be read so as to elongate the aforesaid constltu· B tional objective and dignity of person to the Scheduled Tribes, preserving. the integrity of the Scheduled Areas and ensuring distributive justice as an integral scheme thereof. Clauses (a) and (c) of sub-para (2) or para S of the Fifth Schedule prohibits transfers inter vivas between tribals and non-tribal natural persons and prevents money-lenders to exploit the tribals. Clause (b) intends to regulate allotment of land not only among C tribals but also prohibits allotment of the land belonging to the govern· ment to the non-tribals. In that behalf, wider interpretation of "regulation" would include "prohibition" which should be read into that clause. If so read, it subserves the constitutional objective of regulating the allotment of the land in Scheduled Areas exclusively to the Scheduled Tribes. Clause D 5(2) (b) ensures distributive justice of socio-economic empowerment which yields meaningful results in reality. If purposive construction, in this backdrop is adopted, no internal or external contradiction would emerge. The word "person" would include both natural person as well as juristic person and constitutional government. This Ifberal and wider interpretation would maximise allotment of Government land in scheduled area to E the tribals to make socio-economic justice assured in the Preamble and Articles 38, 39 and 46, a reality to the tribals. The restricted interpretation would defeat the objective of the Constitution. The wo.rd "person" would be so interpreted as to include State or juristic person corporate sole or persona ficta. Transfer of land by the juristic persons or allotment of land F by the State to the non-tribals would stand prohibited, achieving the object of para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Re~lation. If the word 'person' is interpreted to mean only natural persons, it tends to defeat the object of the Constitution, the genus and the Regulation, its species. As a corollary, by omission in the final draft of the Fifth Schedule of the power of the State Government to transfer its G • land to the non-tribals with the sanction of a competent authorised officer or authority would, by interpretation brought into effect and the object of the Constitution would easily be defeated. Therefore, the word 'person' includes the State Government. The State Government also stands prohibited to transfer by way of lease or any other form known to law, the H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. .

A Government land in scheduled area to non-tribal person, be it natural or

c

juristic person except to its instrumentality or a Co-operative Society composed solely of tribes as is specified in the second part of Section 3(1)(a). Any other interpretation would easily defeat the purpose of exclusive power entrusted by the Fifth Schedule to the Governor. If the Cabinet form of Government would transfer the land of the Government to non-tribals, peace would get disturbed, good governance in scheduled area would slip into the bands of the non-tribals who would drive out the tribals from scheduled area and create monopoly to the well devf!loped and sophisticated non-tribals; and slowly and imperceptible, but surely, the land in the scheduled area would pass into the lands of the non-tribals. The Jetter. of law would be an empty content and by play of words deflect the course of justice to the tribals and denude them of the socio-economic empowerment and dignity of their person. [407-H; 408-A-H; 401~-A-E]

24. '11Ie word 'person' in Section 3(1)(a) would, therefore, be conD strued to include not merely the natural persons, in the context of tribal and non-tribal who deal with the land in Scheduled Area by transfer inter vivos but all juristic person in the generic sense, including the Corporation, aggregate or Corporation sole, State, Corporation, partnership firm, a company, any person with corporate veil or persons of all hues, either as transferer or transferee so that the word "regulate" in para 5(2)(b) of the E . Fifth Scheduled in relation to the land in Schedule Areas would be applicable to them either as transferer or transferee of land in a Scheduled Area. It, thus, manifests the constitutional and legislative intention that tribals and a Cooperative Society consisting solely of tribal members alone should be in possession and enjoyment of the land in the scheduled area as F dealt with in various enactments starting from Gunjam and Vizianagaram Act, 1839 to the present regulation. [409-F; G; H; 410-A]

Ke1111eth Smith a11d De11is Kee11an, "English Law" (Seventh Edition) page 127; P.J. Fitzgeral "Salmond 011 Jurispmdence" (Twelfth Edition) page 66; R.W.M. Dias "Jurispmdence" (Fifth Edn.) page 265; Keeton "Eleme11tary G Principles of Jurispmdence" (1949 Edn.); America11 Jurisp1ude11ce 2nd Series, • Vol. 72 p. 407; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edn. p. 675; B. Shiva Rao, "In the making of the Constitution, referred to. State of West Bengal v. U11io11 of India, [1964] 1 SCR 371; Rese1ve H Bank of India v. Peerless General Fi11a11ce & Investme11t Co. Ltd. & Ors.,

SAMATHA v. STATE

[1987] 1 SCC 424; Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer, State of West A Bengal v. CorpOJation of Calcutta, [1967] 2SCR170; State Tradi11g Corporation of I11dia Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer& Ors., AIR (1963) SC 1811 and U11io11 of I11dia v. Jubbi, AIR (1968) SC 360, referred to.

Madras Electric Corporation v. Boarla11d, (1955) 1 All ER 753; T.R. Commissio11er v. Whiteworth Coal Co. Ltd., (1968) 2 All ER 91; Edgar B. B Sims v. United States of America 359 US 108; 3 L ed 2nd 66; States of Ohio v. Guy T. Helveri11g, 292 US 360; 78 Led 1307; State of Georgia v. Hiram W. Evans, 316 US 159; Led 1346; United States of America v. Cooper Corporation et al 312 US 600: 8?, Led 1071; United State~ v. I.C.C., (1949) 337 U.S. 426; Birkdale District Supply Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Southpait, (1926) AC C 355; Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitdte v. The King, (1921) 3 KB 500 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company et al. v. Charles Sairyer, 343 US 579 at 6321 : 96 L ed 1153, referred to.

The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, [1957] SCR 874; lshwar Singh Bindra & Ors. v. The State of UP, [1969] 1 SCR 219; Redurimilli D Ja11ardhana Reddy v. Progressive Democratic Students' Union & Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 506; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Ors. v.Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer • & Ors., [1994] 2 SCC 434; Pushpa Devi & Ors. v. Milkhi Ram (dead) by his Lrs., [1990] 2 SCC 134; Commissioner of Income-Tax Bangalore v. J.H. Gotta Yadagiri, [1985) 4 SCC 343 1md Dr. Ismali Fantqui & Ors. v. UOI & E Ors., (1994] 6 SCC 360, referred t9. 25. There is no internal and ~ernal contradiction in this process of harmonious and purposive interpretation of para 5(2)(a) of the Fifth Schedule which regulates transfer between natural persons; Para 5(2)(b) encompasses within its ambit, the transfer by the Government of its land F to a non-tribal and.clause (c) or the relevant clauses in Sections 3 and 4 of the Regulation. The Regulation prevents exploitation of the tribals through the State Government; from the other end, it does not allow · parting with of their land and prevents induction of non-tribals into the scheduled area by allotment of the land or by regulating allotment of the G land, be it private or private corporate aggregate. The interpretation per se, therefore, is public law interpretation to subserve the constitutional purpose without recourse to private law principles. [410-C; DJ

P. Rami Reddy & Ors. Etc. v. State of A.P. & Anr. Etc., [1968] Supp. 1 SCR 443; Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra &

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A Anr., [1985) 1 SCC 479 and Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Kamataka & Ors., [1984) 3 SCC 301, relied on.

26. Under the Constitution, in all ordinary matters of administra· tlon, the Ministers take full responsibility subject to the contrnl by the Legislature. The bureaucracy gives shape to the decisions taken by the Council or Ministers at the Cabinet meeting or by the individual Ministers by working out the details and they are applied in the given set of facts. In the exercise or their functions relating to land under any enactment, every Minister and government must have regard to the desirability of conserv· ing the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside. [387-C; D; G]

c Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain, [1997) 1 SCC 35; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR (1991) SC 101; Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab &Anr., [1974) 2 SCC 831 and R.K. Jain v. Union of India, [1995) 4 SCC 119, referred to.

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27. In a democratic policy governed by the rule oflaw, the administra· tion is run through constitutional mechanism i.e., Cabinet form of Govt. by a council of Ministers headed by the Chief Ministers. They aid, and advise the Governor, the executive head of the State. The bureaucracy an arm of the political executive-assists as an integral part of administrative mechanism. Their actions or the acts, individually or collectively, are directed to elongate and fulfil the socio-economic goals set down in the Constitution to establish the egalitarian social order in which social· economic justice is secured to the poor and weaker sections of the society including the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in particular, as enjoined in Article 46 of the Constitution, to promote their socio-economic interest and protect them from social injustice and all form:i of exploita· tions. The State is, therefore, a "person" within the constitutional mechanismpersonaficta Is enjoined to elongate the objects of the Constitution. [390-C; D; El 28. It is well established rule of interpretation that the words of width Issued In the Constitution requires wide interpretation to effectuate the goals of establishing an egalitarian social order supplying flesh and blood to the glorious contents and context of those words and to enable the citizen to enjoy the rights enshrined in the Constitution from generation to genera· tion. [406-D; El

•-

SAMATHA v. STATE

Asl10k Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., JT (1997) 2 SC 251, referred to. A 29. It is an established rule of interpretation that to establish Socialist Secular Democratic Republic the basic structure under the rule of faw, pragmatic broad and wide interpretation of the Constitution makes social and economic democracy with liberty, equality of opportunity B equality of status and fraternity a reality to "we, the people of India", who would include the Scheduled Tribes. All State actions should be to reach the above goal with this march under rule of law. The interpretation of the words 'person' 'regulation' and 'distribution' require to be broached broadly to elongate socio-economic justice to the tribals. The word 'regulates' In para 5(2)(b) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution and C the title of the Regulation would not only control allotment ()f land to the Tribes in Scheduled area but also prohibits transfer of private or Government's land in such areas to the non-tribals. While later clause (a) achieves the object of prohibl_tlng transfers inter vivos by tribals to the non·tribuals or non trlbals inter se, the first clause Includes the State D Government or being a juristic person in the integral scheme of para 5(2) of Schedule. The Regulation seeks to further achieve the object of declaring with a presumptive evidence that the .land in the Scheduled Areas belongs to the Scheduled Tribes and any transfer made to a non-tribal shall always he deemed to have been made by tribal unless the transferee establishes the contra. It also prohibits transfer of the land in any form known to law E and declared such transfer as void except by way of testamentary disposi· tion by a tribal to his kith and kin/tribal or by partition among them. The regulation am!. its predecessor law in operation in the respective areas . regulate transfer between a tribal and non-tribal with prior permission of the designated officer as a condition precedent to prevent exploitation of F the tribals. If a tribal is unwilling to purchase land from a non-tribal, the State Government is enjoined to purchase the land from a non-tribal as per the principles set down in the regnlatlons and to distribute the same to a tribal or a cooperative society composed solely of trlbals. [417·D·H; 418·A; BJ G 30. Justice is an attribute of human conduct. Law, as a social engineering, is to remedy existing imbalances, as a vehicle to establish an egalitarian social order. Social and economic democracy is the foundation on which political democracy would be a way of life in the Indian polity. Law as a social engineering is to create just social order removing ine·

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A qualities in social and economic life, socio-economic disabilities with which poor people are languishing by providing positive opportunities and facilities to individuals and groups of people. (391-G; 394-C-D]

C

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31. Declaration of "Right to Development Convention" adopted by the United Nations and ratified by India, by Article 1 "Right to development" became part of an inalienable human right. By virtue thereof, every human person and all people are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in .which all human rights and fundamental freedoms would be fully realised. All human rights are derived from the dignity of the person and his inherent worth. Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of the Constitution have fused in them as fundamental human rights as indivisible and inter-dependent. The Constitution has charged the State to provide facilities and opportunities among the people and groups of people to remove social and economic inequality and to improve equality of status. Article 39(b) enjoins the State to direct its policy towards securing distribution of the ownership and control of the material resources of the community as best to subserved the common good. The founding fathers with hind sight, engrafted with prognosis, not only inalienable human rights as part of the Constitution but also charged the State as its policy to remove obstacles, disabilities and inequalities for human development and positive actions to provide opportunities and facilities to develop human dignity and equality of status and of opportunity for social and economic democracy. Economic and social equality is a facet of liberty without which meaningful life would be hollow and mirage. (392-E-F; 392-B; C; D]

32. India being an active participant in the successful declaration of the Convention on Right to Development and a party signatory thereto, it is its duty to formulate its policies, legislative or executive, accord equal attention to the promotion of, and to protect the right to social,economic, civil and cultural rights of the people, in particular, the poor, the Dalits G and Tribes as enjoined in Article 46 read with Articles 38, 39 and all other related Articles read with right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. By that constant endeavour and interaction, right to life would become meaningful so as to realise its full potentiality of "person" as inalienable human right and to raise the standard of living, improve excellence and to live with dignity of person and of equal status H with social and economic justice liberty, equality and fraternity, the trinity

SAMATHA v. STATE

are pillars to establish the egalitarian social order in Socialist Secular A Democratic Bharat Republic. (393-G-H; 394-A; BJ 33. The core constitutional objective of "social and economic democracy'' in other words, just'social order, cannot be established without removing the inequalities in income and making endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status through the rule of law. The mandate for social and economic retransformation requires that the material resources or their ownership and control should be S!J distributed as to subserve the common good. A new social order, thereby, would emerge, out of the old unequal or hierarchical social order. The legislative or executive measures therefore, should be necessary for the reconstruction of the unequal social order by corrective and distributive justice through the rule of law. [39S-B; CJ

C

34. Article 21 of the Constitytion reinforces "right to life'!.--a fundamental right-which is an inalienable human right declared by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the sequential Conventions to which India is a signatory. [39S-D]

•

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3S. The tribals, have fundamental right to social and economic empowerment. As a part of right to development to enjoy full freedom, democracy offered to them through the States regulated power of good Government that the lands in Scheduled areas are preserved for social economic empowerment of the tribals. (396-E]

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984] 3 SCC 161; Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR (1991) SC 420; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR (1986) SC 180; C.E.S.C. Ltd. & Ors. v. S.C. Bose & Ors., (1992] 1 SCC 441; Consumer Education and Research Centre v. F Union of India, [199S] 3 SCC 42; Life Insurance Corporation v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, [199S] S SCC 482; Dalmia Cement Bharat Ltd. &Anr. Etc. v. UOI & Ors. Etc., JT (1996) 4 SC SSS; P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [199S] Supp. 2 SCC 182; Mis. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khim/al Totame & Ors., [1990] l SCC S20; Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., (1996] 2 SCC S49; Ahmedabad Municipal Corpora- G tion v. Nawab Khan Guiab Khan & Ors., JT (1996) 10 SC 48S; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. KS. Gandhi, (1991] 2 SCC; J.P. Unnikrishnan v. State of A.P., (1993] 1 SCC 64S and State of Kamataka v. Appa Batu Ingale & Ors., [199S] Supp. 4 SCC 469, referred to.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

36. The constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 amended Part IX of the Constitution. The principle of self-government based on democratic principles at Gram Panchayat Level and upwards was introduced through Articles 343 to 343 ZG. As an integral scheme thereof the Andhra Pradesh (Provision of the Panchayats Extension to Schedule Areas) Act, 1966 came to be made. The scheme of the Act would Indicate that the tribal autonomy of management of their resources including the prevention of the allena· tion of the land in the Scheduled Areas and taking of appropriation in that behalf for restoration of the same to the tribals, is entrusted to the Gram Panchayats. [407-D; E; G] 37. A lease creates a right or an interest in enjoyment of the demised property on terms and conditions contained therein to remain In posses· slon thereof for the duration of the period of lease unless it is determined in accordance with the contract or the statute. It is an encumbrance on the right to be In possession, use and enjoyment of the land by the transferee. Lease is the outcome of separation of ownership and possession. It may be either rightful or wrongful. If it is rightful, it is an encumbrance on the owner's title but if It is wrongful the transferee acquires no lawful right to enjoy the interest therein. Section 11(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 brought by State Amendment Act prohibits grant of mining lease in Scheduled Areas in favour of the non·tribals. [418-D; E; F] 38. Section 11 (5) brings out and effectuates public policy envisaged In the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and the Regulation. Undoubtedly, it is prospective but the underlying principle would permeate the purpose of interpretation that the State Government, being a person Is regulated under Section 3 of the Regulation prohibit transfer of their land situated in the Scheduled Areas in which mines are discovered or for any other purpose. G.O. Ms. No. 971/Rev. B. of 1969 provides thj\t Government land should not be given to non-tribals. The contention that the Government being empowered to operate the Regulation, by implication, the Regulation does not apply to Government land per force, is untenable in vieW of the above unambiguous constitutional legislative and executive policy. The contention that there is no need for its Incorporation and that the Govern· ment would be prohibited from transferring for public 'purpose, is un· tenable. They do not detract from legal reasoning and purposive interpretation. The transfer of such land for a public purpose, viz. to

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SAMATHA v. STATE

..

construct a hospital or to set up a bank by the Government or its in· strumentalities and for any public purpose etc. is not prohibited for two reasons, namely, (i) there is no transfer of interest in the Government land in favour of a non-tribal; (ii) there is no transfer of its land in law to itself• The contention, therefore, that· the Regulation prohibits transfer of Government land for its public purpose is unsustainable. The contention that even philonthrophic persons imbued with social zeal and spirit to ameliorate the social status and economic position of the tribals, would also be prevented to serve them . is untenable. What the Regulation prohibits is the transfer of right, title and Interest in the immovable property In scheduled area in favour of non-tribals. There Is no prohibition on non-tribal philonthrophist to organise through tribals and a Coopera· tive society composed solely of tribals, actions to ameliorate socio· economic status of the tribals in the Scheduled Area. [419-C-H] The contention that the rich mineral wealth being a national asset cannot be kept unexploited which is detrimental to the national develop· ment, is devoid of force. Instead of getting the mineral exploited through non-tribals, by exploiting of tribals, the mineral could be exploited through an appropriate scheme, without disturbing ecology and forest by the tribals themselves, either individually or through Cooperative societies composed solely of the tribes with the financial assistance of the State or its in· strumentalities. it would itself be an opportunity to the tribals to improve their social and economic status and a source of their economic endowment and empowerment and would give them dignity of person, social and economic status and an opportunity to improve their excellence. [420-A; B; C]

-"·

39. In the light of the conclusion that the word 'person' would include the State Government, the necessary corrolary would be that the transfer of the land in Scheduled Area by way of lease, for mining purpose in favour of non-tribals stands prohibited by para 5 (2) (b) of the Fifth Schedule read with Section 3 of the Regulation. It is on record that the non-tribal individuals have transferred their lease hold interest in the mining leases In favour of some of the respondent-companies. The Government stands prohibited to transfer the mining lease to Corporation aggregate etc. except to its instrumentality. [422-G·H] 40. The lease being a transfer of an interest in the land or a right to enjoy such property during subsistence of lease, its transfer stands

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A prohibited. It is well settled position of law that renewal of lease is in."reality

a fresh grant of lease, though it is called a renewal because it postulates the existence of a prior lease. It has been brought out from record that some of the respondents-companies have got transfer of mining lease in their favour from the individual lessees. Therefore, the transfer of lease or renewal of mining lease in favour of some of the respondents is void as it defeats the constitutional and statutory objectives. [423-A; B; CJ

State of M.P. & Ors. v. Krishnadas Tikararn, [1995] Supp. 1 SCC 587; Ta1Un Bharat Sangh, Alwar v. Union of India & Ors., [1993] Supp. 3 SCC 115; State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi & Ors., [1985) Supp. SCR 354; Mis. C Victoria Granites (P) Ltd. v. P. Rama Rao & Ors., JT (1996) 9 SCC 303 and Arnbika Quany Works &Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1987) 1SCR562, referred to. 41. Transfer of the Government land in favour of its instrumentalities, in the eye of law, is not a transfer but one of entrustment of its D property for public purpose. Since, admittedly, a public Corporation acts in public interest and n1Jt for private gain, such transfer stands excluded from the prohibition under para 5(2) (b) of the Fifth Schedule and Section 3(l)(a) of the Regulation. Such transfer of lease, therefore, stands upheld. But a transfer of mining leases to non-tribal natural persons or company, E corporation aggregate or partnership firm etc. is unconstitutional, void and inoperative. [423-D; E; FJ

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42. The State Government is directed to ensure that all concerned industrialists, be they natural or juristic person stop forthwith mining operations within the scheduled area, except where the lease has been granted to the State Under-taking, i.e. A.P.S.M.D. Corporation; they should report compliance of this order to the Registry of this Court within six months of the receipt of this judgment. [431-D-E] 43. Prior to the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967, the Madras Forest

G Act 1882 was in force. For declaration of reserved forest for the purpose

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of the Central Forest Act or a State Act, the set scheme has been devised, namely, publication in the State Gazette constituting any land as a reserved forest specifying its situation, its limit and a declaration constituting such land as reserved forest. The words 'Forest Land' have not been defined in the Andhra Pradesh Act or the Central Forest Act. 'Forest' bears extended meaning of a tract of land covered with trees, shrubs,

SAMATHA v. STATE /

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vegetation and undergrowth inter-mingled with trees with pastures, be it A of natural growth or man-made forestation. The F.C. Act, as amended by 1988 Act was enacted to check deforestation and cqnservation of forest. Section 2, therefore, prohibits de-reservation of the forest or use of any forest land for any non-forest purpose of assignment by way of lease or otherwise of any portion of land to a11y private person other than GovernB ment controlled or owned, organised or managed by the State Government agency; it prohibits clearance of trees or natural growth in the forest land or any portion thereof to use if for reforestation except for preservation. Breaking up or clearance of fQrest land or a portion thereof is amplified to be of non-forest purpose. The object of the F.C. Act is to prevent any further deforestation which causes ecological imbalance and leads to environmental degradation.· It is, therefore, necessary for the State Government to obtain prior permission of the Central Government for (1) dereservation of forest; and (2) the use of forest land for non-forest purpose. The prior approval of the Central Government, therefore, is a condition precedent for such permission. The State Governments are enjoined by Forest Conservation Act with power coupled with duty, to obtain prior approval of the Central Government. [424-E; 425-B; G; 426-D-F]

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Collins English Dictionary, (1979) Edn.; Shorter Oxford English Dietionary; Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edn.) page 495; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fifth Edu.) Vol. 2 page 1014 and Black's Law Dictiona1y (6th Edu.) page 649, referred to.

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44. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 was enacted to protect and improve environment and prevention of hazards to human beings, other living creatures, lands and property. Section 3 of the Act enjoins the Central F Government that it should take such measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of the environment and preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollu· tion. Thus, the meaning of the expression 'forest land' in the respective Acts requires extended meaning given so as to preserve forest land from G 'deforestation' to maintain ecology and to prevent environmental degradation and hazardous effects on right to life. [426-G-H; 427·A-BJ

Virender Gaur & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1995) 2 SCC 577; Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangarsh Samiti v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1990) 4 SCC 449; Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1991) 1 SCC 598; H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, [1987) 2 SCC 295; State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Ors., [1988) 4 SCC 655; M.C. Mehta v. Union· of India & Ors., [1992) 1 SCC 358; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India & Ors., [1995) 3 SCC 77; Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., [1989) Supp. 1 SCC 504; Tarnn Bharat Sangh, A/war I B v. Union of India & Ors., [1992] Supp. 2 SCC 448; Ve/lore Citizens' Welfare Fornm v. Union of India & Ors., [1996] 5 SCC 647; Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 537; Siate of H.P. & Ors. v. Ganesh Wood Products & Ors., [1995) 6 SCC 363; Mis. Colorock Pvt. Ltd., Vijayawada v. The Directbr of Mines & Geology, Government ofAndhra Pradesh, [1983] 3 ALT 59; M.S. Anupama Minerals v. Union C of India & Ors .. AIR (1986) AP 225; M/s. Y~hwant Stone Wolks v. State of U.P., AIR (1988) All. 121; Upendra !ha v. State of Bihar, AIR (1988) Pat. 263 andAmbala Manibhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, [1986] 27 2 Guj. L.R. 1073, relied on.

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45. Mining operations, though detrimental to forest growth, are part of layout of the industry; provision should be made for investment or infrastructural planning to reforest the area; and to protect environment and regenerate forest. The Ministry of Environment and Forests and all Secretaries of all the State Governments holding charge of Forest Departments, have a duty to prevent mining operations affecting the forest. Whether mining operations are carried on within the reserved forest or other forest area, it is their duty to ensure that the industry or enterprise does not denude the forest to become a menace to human consistence nor a source to destroy flora and founa and biodiversity. The provisions of the Forest Conservation Act get attracted to ensure preservation of forest. It is well settled law that mining operation is a non-forest purpose. It would, therefore, be mandatory that even renewal of miniilg leases without prior approval of the Central Government, is void. [428-G-H; 429-A; E; HJ

46. In respect of the lands leased to the 19th respondent, it has been averred that (i) a sum of Rs. 350 crores has been invested for manufacG turing of "High Purity Sea Water" magnified by using 100% imported high technology. The said product saves large foreign ·exchange for the country; . and (ii) mining operations are carried on in plain area only and thereby forest area is not affected. Since these averments have been made for the first time in the written submissions, after Court reserved its decision, this H Court was deprived of the advantage of having the response of the State

SAMATHA v. STATE

Government, which in fact, has not taken any active interest in this A litigation. Therefore, it is necessary that the Chi~f Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh State should constitute a committee consisting of himself, Secretary (Industry), Secretary (Forest), Secretary (Tribal Welfare/Social Welfare) to have the factual information collected and consider whether It is feasible to permit the Industry to carry on mining operations. If the B Committee so opines, the matter may be placed before a Cabinet Sub-Com· mittee consisting of Chief Minister, Minister for Industries, Minister for Forests and Minister of Tribal Welfare to examine the issue whether licences could be allowed to continue until they expire by effiux of time or whether it is expedient to prohibit further mining operations in the light of Section 11 (5) of the Mining Act, to take appropriate action in that behalf C ·and submit report to this Court oil the Action so taken. [430-C-G] 47. In cases, where the similar Acts in other States do not totally prohibit grant of mining leases of the lands in the Scheduled Area, similar Committee of Secretaries and State Cabinet Sub-Committees should be constituted and decision taken thereafter. However before granting leases, D it would be obligatory for the State Government to obtain concurrence of the Central Government which would, for this purpose, constitute a Subcommittee consisting of the Prime Minister of India, Union Minister for Welfare, Union Minister for Environment so that the State's policy would be consistent with the policy of the nation as a whole. [430-H; 431-A-B] 48. It would also be open to the appropriate legislature, preferably after a thorough debate/conference of all the Chief Ministers, Ministers holding the concerned Ministry and the Prime Minister and the Central Ministers concerned, to take a policy decision so as to bring about a suitable enactment in the light of the guidelines laid down above so that there would emerge a consistent scheme throughout the country in respect of the tribal lands under which national wealth in the form of minerals, is located. [431-C] Per Saghir Ahmad, J. (Concurring)

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1. The legislative history relating to the administration and control of scheduled Areas indicates that from the very beginning, at least from the 19th Century, Scheduled Areas inhabited by aborigingals and tribals have been administered exclusively under .the control of the Central Government through the Governor of the State by providing special H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A statutory measures. From the earliest time till the making of the Constitu· tion, it was all along felt that the transfer of land in the Scheduled Areas by a tribal to a person who was not a member of the Scheduled Tribe be totally prohibited and if such a transfer was made, it was to be treated as null and void. Government land in the Scheduled Areas could also not be B allotted to persons who are not the members of the Scheduled Tribes. If such land was proposed to be allotted to them, it could be done only under the regulations made by the Governor. The basic concept was that the land of the Scheduled Tribes should be protected and should not be frittered away by transfer nor should any non-tribal be allowed to infiltrate in the Scheduled Area by getting an allotment of land made in his favour. In case C of a transfer of land which was void, the power to restore land to a tribal or his heirs after evicting the non-tribal is also vested in the Government. [455-D-G] B. Shiva Rao The Framing of India's Constitution, referred to.

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2. Constituent Assembly Debates indicate the mood of the repre· sentatives of the people and the urgency they felt in protecting the land of the tribals and need for prohibiting transfer of land in the Scheduled Areas to non-tribals by the State Government. In the Draft Constitution, prepared by the Drafting Committee, there was a clear prohibition on the allotment of Government land to non-tribals except in accordance with the rules made by the Governor. In the Constituent Assembly when the Draft Fifth Schedule was considered, no Member raised any objection that the Government should be free to allot its land to the non-tribals in the Scheduled Areas as all the Members were conscious of the fact that the special privileges and special status enjoyed by the tribals should not be disturbed by allowing non-tribals to enter into that area. [454-D; 455-H; 456-A; B] 3. The protective measures adopted through legislation for the preservation of tribal life, for the prevention of exploitation of tribals by non· tribals and money-lenders and to seal infilteration of non-tribals in the Agency tracts or Scheduled Areas rested on three main planks : (a) Prohibition of transfer of land by tribal to a non-tribal with the stipulation that such transfer will be null and void.

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(b) Prohibiting Government from allotting land vested in it to non-tribal.

SAMATIIA v. STATE

(c) Power of Government to evict non-tribal from the tribal's land A coming into his possession through a void sale-deed and restor~ ing the same to the tribal or his heirs. [456-B·D] 4. Under Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule, the Governor has been given the power to make Regulations for the "Peace and Good Government" of the Scheduled Area. The power to make Regulations also includes that power to repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature or any existing law which may, for the time being, be applicable to the Scheduled Area. The power to make Regulations is undoubtedly legislative in character. The power.to issue directions under Para 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule as to the applicability ofan Act of Parliament or State Legislatore with such exceptions and modifications as the Governor may direct, is also legislative in character. (457-A; D·F]

Chatturam & Ors. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar, (1947) FCR 116 = (1~47) FLJ 92 and Jatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar & Ors., (1949) FLJ 225, referred to. 5. The Governor has been given the legislative power to make Regula· tions for the "PEACE AND GOOD GOVERNMENT' of any area in a State which is a Scheduled Area. The weirds "PEACE AND GOOD GOVERN· MENT' are words of very wide import and give wide discretion to the Government to make laws for such purpose. (457-H; 458-A]

King Emperor v. Benari Lal Shanna, (1944) L.R. 72 I.A. 57; Raja Jogenmdra Narayan Deb v. Debendra Narayan Roy & Ors., (1942) L.R. 69 I.A. 76; Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal, (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727 and T.M. Kanniya11 v.Income Tax Officer, Pondicheny andAnr., [1968)

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2 SCR 103, referred to.

Attorney-General for Saskatchewan v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., (1953) AC 594; Riel v. The Queen, (1885) 10 AC 675 and Chenard & Co. & Ors. v. Joachim Arissol, (1949) AC 127, referred to.

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6. In exe}'cise of the power conferred by Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh Promulgated Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959. These regulations were amended by Regulation I of 1970, again by Regulation I of 1971 and by Regulation I of 1978. These Rei;:utations have been made to give effect to the. H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A power of Governor und~r clauses (a) and (b) of Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule for "Peace and Good Government" in the Agency Tracts. These Regulations also aim at ushering in an era of social equality where the most backWard and isolated people who constitute the Scheduled Tribes may be rehabilitated effectively in the nation's main-steam. The prohibition to sell the land· to non-tribals and the further requirement that if the property B comes to be vested in the Government or it becomes property at the disposal of the Government, it will be sold, assigned or distributed only to the tribals also is a measure nay, a strong measure, in that direction to give effect to the philosophy of"Distributive Justice". These Regulations indicate a departure from the normal laws relating to immovable property. NormalC Iy, an owner of an immovable property is free to transfer his property to anyone he likes. But if he possesses property in the Agency Tracts or the Scheduled Areas, his right to transfer the property is restricted as he can transfer it only to a member of the Scheduled Tribe or to a Co-operative Society comprising solely of the members of the Scheduled Tribes. So also, under the usufructuary mortgage, possession has necessarily to be transD ferred to the mortgagee but these Regulations prescribe that in no case shall possession be delivered to the mortgagee. [458-G; 463-H; 464-A-B; 461-B-C]

P. Rami Reddy& Ors. v.State ofAndhra Pradesh &Anr., [1988) 3 SCC 433, referred to.

7. At least in two circumstances, the property of a member of the Scheduled Tribe or any other person in the Scheduled Area becomes the property of the State Government:(1) lfa person is notable to sell his property either because a member

F of the Scheduled Tribe is not willing to purchase the property or is not

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willing to purchase the property on the terms at which it proposed to be sold, then the Agent, or the Agency Divisional Officer or any Prescribed Officer can, by order, acquire the property on payment of compensation. The property loses its original character and becomes the property of the State Government.

(2) If on a decree for ejectment being passed against a person in occupation of the property belonging to a Scheduled Tribe under a sale deed which is void, the property is sought to be restored to the transferor or his heirs but they are not willing to take back the property or their H whereabouts are not known, it would be open to the Government to assign

...

SAMATHA v. STATE

or transfer j:he property to any. other member of the Scheduled Tribe or · otherWise d/spose it of as if it was the property, at the disposal of the State Governmei:lt. [461-D-G]

A

8. In these circµmstances, when the property either co~es to vest in the State Government or becomes a property at the disposal of the State B Government, the Government cannot transfer the property to a "person" of its own choice but has to transfer, assign or sell to a member of the Scheduled Tribe or a Co-operative Society of the Scheduled Tribes. The possibility of the Government disposing it of to a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tri~e is totally ruled out by the Regulation.s by providing that it shall be sol~, assigned or transferred only to tribals or C their co-operative Society. If this applies to properties which become the Government properties, how the properties which are already the Government properties could be excluded from the applicability of these Regulations? The Government has to be bound down to the Constitutional scheme sought t!) be enforced through Regulations made by the Governor D under Para 5(2) of the Finh Schedule and cannot be permitted to transfer its own properties in favour of non-tribals so as to allow their infiltration into the Scheduled Area. The prohibition contained in Para 3(1)(a) that no person, whether he is a member of the Scheduled Tribe or not, shall transfer his immovable property to a non-tribal must, therefore, in its E scope, cover the Government, as well, which if it possesses land in the Agency Tracts, cannot transfer it either by sale, allotment, lease or otherwise to a non-tribal. To this limited extent, it has to be treated as a "person" within the meaning of Clause 3(l)(a) of the Regulations. [461-H; 462-A-D]

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9. The contention that the expression "or in such other manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed" occurring in Para 3(l)(c) indicate that the Government is not bound to sell the property to a niember of the Scheduled Tribe or the Co-operative Society of the Scheduled Tribe, cannot be accepted. The words "or in such other manner and subject to such conditions as may b!! prescribed" occurring in Para 3(l)(c) and the G words "or otherwise dispose it of as if it was a property at the disposal of the State Government" have to be read, not in isolation, but in the context of the other words used in those provisions. The emphasis throughout in these Regulations has been that the property would be sold or transferred only to a member of the Scheduled Tribe or their Co-operative Societies. H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The Constitutional scheme which is sought to be enforced through Regula-

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tions is that the property of the Scheduled Tribe or · the immovable property situated in Agency Tracts may be protected and be not frittered ' ' away and further that they may retain their original character and may continue to belong to members of the Scheduled Tribe or their. Co-operative Societies, or that if the property belongs to a non-tribal, it may not be transferred to a non-tribal and may be trasnferred to a tribal alone. The words ''.or in any other manner" in Para 3(1)(c) or the words "otherwise dispose it of as it was a property at the disposal of the State Government" occurring in Para 3 (2)(b) have to be read in that context with the result that even ifthe Government intended to deal with such immovable properties "in any other manner" it could deal only in a manner which would ultimately benefit a member of ,the Scheduled Tribe or their Co-operative Societies. The Fifth Schedule including Para 5 thereof as also the Regula• · tions made thereunder by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh clearly seek to implement the national policy that the· custom, culture, life-style and properties of the Scheduled Tribes in .the Agency Tracts and other immovable properties situated therein shall be protected. The Government being under a legal constraint to deal with the property situated iii the Agency Tracts only in the manner indicated above, cannot itself act beyond the scope of the Regulations by saying that it is free to dispose of its own properties in any manner it likes. If the Government was ,allowed to transfer or dispose of its own land in favour of non-tribals it would completely destroy the legal and constitutional fabric made to protect the Scheduled.Tribes. The prohibition, so to say, disqualifies non-tribal.s as a class from acquiring or getting property on transfer. On account of this disqualification, the Government cannot, even if it is not a "person" within the meaning of Para 3(1)(a), transfer, let out or allot its land or other immov.able property to a non-tribal. [462-F; G; 463-A-G] 10. The scheme set out in the Fifth Schednle and Regulations made by the Governor in exercise of the power under Para 5(2) of the Schedule, is to sell, distribute, assign or let out the Government bmd only to members of Scheduled Tribes. Section 11(5) introduced in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 only seeks to give effect to what was already contained in the Fifth Schedule and the Regulations made thereunder. In order to set at rest the above controversy raised at various levels that the Government land could also be allotted to non-

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SAMATHA v. STATE

tribals, tlie Amendm~nt was brought about in the Mines and Minerals A (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 so as to make it sure that it was ' never the intention that the Government land could be allotted to non· tribals. The Amendment only reitrates the existing position. [464-E; F; G]

Per Pattanaik, !. (Partly dissenting)

1. Under the British rule though steps had been taken to ·make provision for special administration of the tribal areas but there had been no prohibition for transfer of government land in favour of a non-tribal within the scheduled area. Under different laws and regulations operating in different tribal areas prior to coming into force of the Constitution there C was restriction in relation to transfer of lands belonging to the tribals in favour of a non-tribal within the scheduled area but not such restriction was there so far as governmentland was concerned. [502-E; Fl B. Shiv Rao "The Framing of India's Constitution'~ refe1red to.

2. The legislative history and the debates in the Constituent Assemb· ly culminating in engrafting of Schedule V of the Constitution conferring power on the Governor to make regulation for administration of tribal area were all aimed to prevent the tribals from exploitation of non-tribals and the prohibition/restrictions were all in relation to the transfer of lands E belonging to the tribals in favour of non-trib::ls and it never intended to have any such prohibition in relation to government land. The Draft Constitution had put two restrictions, namely, a member of a Scheduled tribe was not entitled to transfer land within the scheduled area to a member of non-Scheduled tribe, and so far as the land vested in the State F is concerned, the prohibition was that the said land belonging to the State should not be allotted or settled in favour of a non-scheduled tribe except in · accordance with the Rules made in that behalf by the Governor in consultation with .the Tribes' Advisory Council. To the aforesaid Draft · several amendments were proposed by several speakers. So far as para- G graph 6 of Schedule V of the Draft Constitution is concerned, the proposal in the draft that land belonging to the State should not be allotted to or settled with any person who is not a member of Scheduled Tribe was rejected and, therefore, in the final form in Schedule V there is no such indication that even the government land within the Scheduled area should not be allotted to a non-Scheduled Tribe person. It was not the intention H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of the Constitution Makers to prohibit alienation of the land vested in the State within the scheduled area in favour of a non-scheduled Tribe person. On the other hand, though it was in paragraph 6(2) of the Draft Constitution of Schedule V but it stood deleted while bringing the Vth Schedule in its final form. (502-G-H; 476-E-G; 477-C; DJ

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3. Vast track of lands lie within the Tribal area which is rich in mineral resources and the entire mineral resources of the country lie within the scheduled area of different States. In interpreting the provisions of the Regulation and the Constitutional mandate engrafted in Fifth Schedule of the Constitution as well as different other Articles of the Constitution, it must be borne in mind that the interpretation should subserve the main object, namely the development of the scheduled area and the protection of the tribal people from exploitation of the non-tribal people. It is in this perspective Articles 46 and 37 (b) of the Constitution have to be looked into. [477-F•G-H]

4. Article 46 embodies the concept of 'distributive justice' which connotes the removal of economic inequalities and rectifying the injustice resulting from dealings on transactions between unequals in society. It means those who have been deprived of their properties by unconscionable bargaining should be restored to their property.

Similarly, when Article 39(b) of the Constitution enjoins upon the State to have its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributive as best to F subserve the common good, what, it connotes is a duty on the State for building of a welfare State and an egalitarian social order. The object is that the basic need of a common man must be fulfilled and the State should endeavour to change the structure of the society. The aforesaid provision, no doubt, may support a case of nationalisation of material resources but by no stretch of imagination it can be said that it enjoins upon the State G to exploit the mineral resources within the Scheduled area by itself or through the Scheduled Tribes alone. The declaration of 'Right to Development' adopted by the United Nations and notified by India casts a responsibility on the State to promote and protect social and economic order for development of all people and it has become States' respon· H sibility to create conditions favourable~ the realisation of the right to

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SAMATHA v. STATE

development. There possibly cannot be any dispute with the proposition A that the State should formulate its policies and laws so that the neglected tribals within the Scheduled areas get equal opportunity with their counter-parts in the other sophisticated parts of the State and State should be empowered to make laws for protection of these tribals from being exploited by the non-tribals. State should take all effective steps so B ·as to eradicate inequalities. However, this scheme of the Constituiion does not in any manner suggest that alienation of Government land within the scheduled area was intended to be prohibited in favour of a non-tribal person. [478-B-H; 479-A] 5. A combined reading of Article 244 and Schedule V of the Constitution would indicate that there is no constitutional obligation on the Governor to make regulation prohibiting transfer of government land in favour ofa non-tribal within the scheduled area. The history oflegislation treating the tribal areas different from the other areas is basically intended to save the tribal people from being exploited by the non-tribals. It is with that objective Article 244 of the Constitution made the Fifth Schedule applicable to administer scheduled area and tribal area, and the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, in turn, conferred power on the Governor to notify the laws made by Parliament or by the legislature of the State to apply or not to apply and further Governor has been conferred power to make regulation for the peace and good government of any area within a . Sta.le. Such wide power has been conferred upon the Governor which is plenary in nature so that Governor can by regulation prevent exploitation of the tribals from the non-tribals, When such legislations made by Governor in exercise of power has been challenged Courts have upheld the validity of the same on the ground that it is intended to save the tribals from the other non-tribals in the area who usually take advantage of the simplicity and ignorance of the tribal people. But it is difficult to accept the contention that the Constitutional scheme intended total prohibition of transfer of even the government land in favour of the non-tribal. [503-A; 485~E-H; 486-A]

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6. The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area land Transfer Regulation 1959 has been framed by the Governor in exercise of power conferred upon him under Paragraph 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. This original Regulation was subsequently amended in 1970. A plain reading of the regulation as it stood prior to its amendment in 1970 clearly indicates H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that the Governor has framed the regulation as a regulatory measure

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putting some embargo on the power of transfer of a member belonging to Scheduled Tribe in respect of his immovable property. The said embargo enabled a· member of a Scheduled Tribe to transfer the immovable property only in favour of another member of a Scheduled Tribe or in favour of a Co-operative Society composed solely of members of a Scheduled Tribe. If the transfer was intended to be made·in favour of a non-Scheduled Tribe member then it could be so made but only with previous sanction of the State Government or with the previous consent in writing of the agent or any prescribed officer subject to the rules made in that behalf. Thus immovable property belonging to a Scheduled Tribe could be lawfully transferred in favour of a non-Scheduled Tribe member but only with previous sanction of the State Government. Under the pre-amended provisions, therefore, question of any fetter on the powers of the State Government in transferring government land in favour of a non-tribal did not arise at all. [480-C-D; 482-H; 483-A-C] 7. The changes brought about by the amended Regulation of 1970 were essentially intended to facilitate effective enforcement of 1959 Regulation and the object of the amended Regulation cannot be held to be total prohibition of alienation of all land including a government land within the scheduled area in favour of a non-tribal. [486-G]

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8. It is a cardinal rule of construction of statute that the statute must be read as a whole and construction should be put to all the parts together and not of anyone part only by itself. Every clause of a statute is required to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act so that so far as possible the meaning of the enactment of the whole statute would be consistent. When legislature uses the same word in different parts of the same Section on statute, there is a presumption that the word is used in the same sense throughout. But the aforesaid presumption can easily be displaced by the context in which the particular word is used. A word which is used more than once in sub-section of a section may connote and denote divergent things depending upon the context. '

[487-G-H; 488-A-B-; G]

Suresh Chand v. Gu/am Chisti, [1990] 1 SCR 186; Mohd. Shafi v. Seventh Additional District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad & Ors., [1977] 2 H SCR 464; Reghubans Narain Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh Govemment through

SAMAIBA v. STATE

Collector of Bijnor, [1967] 1 SCR 489; Shamrao Vishnu Parnlekar v. District A Magistrate, Thana, [1956] SCR 644 and Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1977] 1SCR1072, referred to. Fa"el v. Alexender, (1976]. 2 All ER 721 and.Madras Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Boarland (ll!spector of Taxes), All ER B (1955] 1 753, referred to. 9. The word 'person' used in Section 3(1) (a) of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation as amended in 1970 has to be construed to convey the same meaning throughout the Section and the said expression does not include the State Government. Neither the legislative history nor the object with which special power has been conferred on the Governor under Fifth Schedule to the Constitution make it necessary to construe the word 'person' in the first part of Section 3(1)(a) differently from the rest part of the Section so as to include State Government within the said expression. (503-B; CJ 10. In the constitutional scheme under which the Regulation has been framed and the object and purpose for which the regulation has been framed by the Governor it is not warranted that a different meaning be given to the same word 'person' in' different part of the regulation. The normal rule is that general words in a statute must receive a general construction unless there is something in the Act itself such as subject matter with which the Act is dealing or the context in which the words are used to show the intention of the legislature that they must be given a restrictive or wider meaning. But on examining the provisions of Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation after its amendment, the word 'person' used in Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation cannot be interpreted differently because neither the contexi in which the word has been used calls for such an interpretation nor the interpretation of giving a literal meaning to the word would lead to any absurdity or unintended result nor even it can be said to be promoting larger national purpose. (488-H; 489-A-B; 490-D]

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11. The constitutional scheme embodied in Article 15(4) and Article 46 as well as the power conferred upon the Governor of a State under Schedule V of the Constitution are intended to preserve and protect the interest of the tribal in the tribal area. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that all lands within the tribal area vest in the tribal people. H

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State is the paramount owner of lands and in the garb of preventing the exploitation of tribals from the non-tribals so far as the lands belonging to the tribals are concerned the State cannot be denuded of its power to exploit resources which vest with the State. Judged from this angle there is no justification for interpreting the word 'person' in the first part of Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation to include State and, therefore, the prohibition and restrictions. contained in the regulation would not apply to the lands belonging to the State. [491-D; E; F] 12. If the word 'person' used in Section 3(1)(a) is interpreted to mean to include the State then the expression whether or not such a person is a member of a Scheduled Tribe becomes meaningless as the State can never be a member of the Scheduled Tribe. If a literal meaning to the word 'person' is given in Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation then the prohibitions or restrictions contained therein would apply with full force to inter se transfer ofland between the Scheduled Tribe and non-Scheduled Tribe and such an interpretation would subserve the main object of the legislation, namely, to save the tribal people from being exploited upon by the non-tribal people. If the constitutional scheme embodied in Articles 15(4) and 244 as well as in the Fifth Schedule is intended to save the tribal people from being exploited upon by the non-tribal both in relation to_ their lands as well as in the matter of taking loans from the moneylenders, there is no obligation to construe the word 'person' to include the State in the first part of Section 3(1) (a) of the regulation. In view of the history of the legislation, it is crystal clear that the prohibitions and restrictions never intended for the lands belonging to the Government and the provisions both prior to the Constitution and under the Constitution are intended to deal with the tribal people separately so that better attention can be bestowed for their social and economical upliftment ..It is with this objective, Fifth Schedule of the Constitution conferred power on the Governor not only to indicate which laws made by the Parliament and the State Legislature would apply within the Scheduled area and which laws would not apply, but further to make regulation for administration of the tribal areas for peace and good government in respect of a scheduled area. The matters indicated in Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of V Schedule of the Constitution as well as the general power of the Governor to frame regulation contained in sub-section (1) of Section 5 ofV Schedule, neither expressly nor by necessary implication prohibit transfer of government land in favour of a non-tribal within the Scheduled Area nor there is any

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SAMATHA v. STATE

mandate embodied in Article 15(4) or in Article 244 prohibiting the A transfer of government land in favour of a non-scheduled tiibe person within the scheduled area. Thus the expression 'person' used in Section 3(l)(a) of the Regulation should have its natural meaning throughout the Section to mean 'natural' person' and it does not include the State; In other words, the State is not denuded of its power in the matter of exploiting its B mineral resources within the scheduled area by grant or renewal of lease even in favour of non-tribal persons and the restriction§ and embargo contained in regulation 3(1)(a) is not applicable to the State in dealing with the land belonging to the State. Therefore, provisions of the Regulation have not been contravened by granting mining leases in favour of the Non· Scheduled Tribe person within the Scheduled Area. C [492-G-H; 493-A-H]

State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964) 1 SCR 371; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. &Anr. v.Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer& Ors., [1994) 2 SCC 434; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore v. J.H. Gotia Vadagir, [1985) 4 SCC 3434; Dr. M. Ismal Faruqui & Ors. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors. Etc. D Etc., [1994) 6 SCC 360; P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. Etc., [1988) Supp. 1 SCR 443; Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. Etc., [1985) 1 SCC 479; Manchegowda and Ors. v. State of Kamataka & Ors., [1984) 3 SCC 301 and Union of India v. Jubbi and Dunia Etc., [1968) 1SCR44, referred to. Appin v. Race Relations Board, [1974] 2 All ER 73, referred to. 13. Notwithstanding the conclusion that the word 'person' occurring in Section 3 (1) of the Regulation does not include 'State' and as such the F mining leases granted in favour of different persons do not contravene the provisions of the Regulation, the lessees should be required to spend a part of the profit for the upliftment of the tribals and for maintaining the ecology in the scheduled areas. Notwithstanding the constitutional obligation of the Governor to make special provision for ameliorating the economic status of the tribal people so as to assimilate them into the G national main stream, nothing tangible appears to have been achieved in this regard evenafter 50 years of independence. The tribal people who constitute a substantial majority of the Indian population still spend their time in jungles and other inaccessible areas and sufficient legislative and executive measure has not been taken for improving the living conditions H

·SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C,R.

A of these tribals people. Since the mining activities are being carried out· mostly within the scheduled areas it is the duty of the State to see that a part of the profits earned by the lessees should be spent for ameliorating the living conditions ·of the tribals by the lessees themselves. The said objective has to be achieved by appropriate legislation making it compulB sory for the lessees within the tribal area to spend a portion of the income arising out of the mining business for the general upliftment of the living conditions of the tribal people. This should be in addition to· the royalty and other cess under different legislations. The State may also consider the question of incorporating some provisions in the leases itself for achieving the aforesaid objectives. [499-A-G]

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14. The conclusion of the High Court in the impugned judgment that the Conservation Act applies only to a reserved forest cannot be sustained. The said conclusion is therefore set aside. Consequently no mining activities can continue on any forest land unless prior approval of the D Central Government is obtained as required under Section 2 of the Conservation Act. The forest land in Section 2 of the Conservation Act would receive an extended meaning to include within its sweep an extensive track of land covered with trees, shrubs, vegetation and undergrowth intermingled with trees with pastures, be it of natural growth or men made forestation, yet unless and until it is so determined by the State GovernE ment that the mining activities of the respondents are being carried on over forest land it will not be possible to state that the provisions of Section 2 of the Conservation Act gets attracted. Consequently, the only possible direction which this Court can issue in the facts and circumstances of the present case is that the State of Andbra Pradesh through its officers of the F Forest Department, should immediately inspect the mining areas of the private respondents and find· out whether the lands covered under the mining leases in question form a part of the forest land and if it comes to the conclusion that it is apart and parcel of the forest land and no prior approval of the Central Government bas been obtained for carrying out the mining activities then immediate direction should be issued to the G respondents to stop the mining activities. This direction is necessary in the case in hand as on the b.asis materials produce~ by the parties, it bas not been possible to come to the conclusion affirmately that the land in question formed a part and parcel of the forest land. [497-D; E; 498-8-F]

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T.N. Godavaraman 17iintmulkpad v. Union of llldia & Ors., [1997] 2

. SAMATHA v. STATE

SCC 267; [1998] 2 SCC 59; Supreme Court Monotoring Committee v. A Mussorie Dehradun Dev. Aty. & Ors., WP (Civil) No. 749 of 1995; Divisional Forest Officer & Ors. v. S. Nageswaramma, [1996] 6 SCC 442 and State of . Bihar v. Banshi Ram, Ambica Quany Works v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 1

sec 213, referred to.

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15. The petitioner has.not been able to make out any case of violation of .the provisions of the Environment Protection Act in the case in hand. · The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 was enacted by the Parliament as · it was thought necessary to protect and improve the environment and to prevent hazards to human beings, other living creatures , plants, and property. A combined reading of the provisions of the Act indicate that there must be necessary particulars to find out whether there has been any emission of the environment pollutant in excess of the standard fixed under the rules and it is only then the question of complaining before a court and taking cognizance of the same arises. In this case there is not an iota of material to come to the conclusion that on account of the mining operations. conducted by the respondents there has been any emission of environmental pollutant in excess of the standard prescribed under the Rules, nor it is possible to hold that there has been any environmental pollution on account of carrying on the mining operations. On the facts alleged it is not possible to embark upon the enquiry as to whether the grant of leases within the tribal area are in violation of the provisions of Environment Protection Act nor the leases can be annulled on that score.

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[503-G; 498-H; 499-A; 501-B; C; DI

Tarnn Bharat Sangh, A/war v. UOI & Ors., [1992] Supp. 2 SCC 448 and Subhash Kumar v. State of Bil!ar & Ors., [1991] 1 SCC 598, referred to.

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16. Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act being prospective in nature will have no application to the existing mining leases and, therefore, the leases of the respondents' can't be annulled on that score. After coming into force G of Section 11 (5) no mining leases can be granted or renewed within the Scheduled area to any person who is not a member of Scheduled Tribe within the State of Andhra Pradesh. The only exception being as contained in the proviso, namely, an undertaking owned or controlled by the State or Central Government or a society registered or deemed to be registered under Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act which is composed of H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A members of Scheduled Tribes are excluded from the rigour of sub-section

(5) of section 11. But section 11 (5) does not affect the subsisting leases and, therefore, the ieases in favour of the respondents cannot be said to be invalid on the ground of infraction of section 11(5) of the MMRD Act. This provision is prospective in operation and would be applicable to any lease or renewal of a lease subsequent to the enactment of section 11(5) of the MMRD Act. The leases of the respondents being prior to the aforesaid enactment are not hit by the said provision. [503-G; 501-H; 502-A-D] In CA. No. 4603 of 1997

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17. In view of the conclusions in the connected appeals to the effect that the word 'person' used in Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation does not include the State Government, and therefore, the prohibitions contained in the said Regulation with regard to transfer of land in favour of a non-tribal will not apply to the transfer of land made by the Government for the purpose of mining lease, the conclusion of the High Court on this D score is erroneous. [505-G-H; 506-A] 18. So far as the question of applicability of the Conservation Act is concerned the conclusion of the High Court in the impugned judgment has to be sustained. In view of the inquiry report and the stand taken by the E State Officials the land over which the appellant was permitted to carry on mining activities is a forest land and before grant of lease in favour of the appellant no approval of the Central Government has b!'en taken. Though the Conservation Act came into force much later than the grant of mining lease in favour of the appellant, but in view of the general directions issued by this Court in T.N. Godavanna11's case the mining F activities being a user of the forest land for non-forest purpose has to be stopped and in case it is intended to continue the mining activities the same can ·be done only after referring the matter to the appropriate authority of the Central Government and getting the permission for the same. Therefore, the conclusion of the High Court in the impugnedjudgG ment so far as violation of Conservation Act is concerned is unexceptionable. Necessarily, therefore, the ultimate direction given by the High Court remains unaffected. [506-A-E] T.N. Godavam1a11 171immulkpod v. UOI, [1997] 2 SCC 267; [1998] 2 SCC 59; Ambika Quany Works v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 1 SCC 213 and H State of Bihar v. Ba11shi Ram, [1995] 3 SCC 643, referred to.

SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 4601-02 and 4603/97 of 1997. From the Judgment and Order dated 28.4.95 and 27.8.93 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. Nos. 9513/93 and 7725 of 1994 and 3734/93. Rajiv Dhawan, Sudhir Chandra, P.A. Chaudhary, Dr. Roxna S. Swamy, R.N. Keshwani, D.N. Mishra, P. Niroop, Nandini Gore, Mrs. Sona Khan, A.V. Rangam, B. Parthasarathy, T. Anil Kumar, L.N. Rao, S.U.K. Sagar, Vimal Dave, J.P. Pathak, A.C. Mahimkar, (E.C. Agrawala and K.R. Chowdhary) (NP), T.V. Ratnam, L.N. Rao and V. Sridhar Reddy, for the appearing parties.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.

These appeals are directed to resolve mutually inconsistent law adumbrated by two Division Benches of Andhra Pradesh High Court. The appeals arising from SLP(C) No. 17080-81/95 are filed against the judgment passed on April 28, 1995 in Writ Petition Nos. 9513/93 and 7725/94 in which the Division Bench has held that the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled E Area Land Transfer Regulation (1of1959), as amended by Regulation II of 1970 (for short, the 'Regulation') and the Mining Act (67 of 1957) do not prohibit grant of mining leases of Government· land in the scheduled area to the non-tribals. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 (for short, the 'FC Act') does not apply to the renewals. The Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967 also does not apply to tht; renewal of the leases. It, accordingly F dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellant challenging the power of the Government to transfer the Government land situated in the tribal area . to the non-tribals for mining purpose.

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In the appeal arising from SLP(C) No. 21457 of 1993 filed by Hyderabad Abrasives and Minerals, another Division Bench, earlier had taken dramatically the opposite view and held that mining leases are illegal. The word 'person' used in Section 3 of the Regulation includes Government. Any lease to the non-tribals even of the Government land situated in scheduled area is in violation of Section 3 and so is void. Equally, it held that. a mining lease in a forest area for non-forest purpose or renewal

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A thereof, without prior approval of the Central Government, is in violation of Section ·2 of the FC Act. Accordingly, the Division Bench directed the

Government to prohibit mining operations in scheduled area except that the mines stacked on the surface be permitted to be removed after obtaining proper permits. This decision, though earlier in point of time, was not brought to the notice of later Bench mentioned above.

The admitted facts are that Borra reserved forest area along with its environs consisting of 14 villages, is the notified scheduled area in Ananthagiri Manda! of Visakhapatnam District of Andhra Pradesh. The State Government granted mining leases in this area to several non-tribal perC · sons. K. Appa Rao, respondent No. 13, was granted mining lease in that ·reserved forest area. Most of the area granted to Mis. Perclase India Ltd., respondent No. 7 falls in reserved forest area. M/s. Unirock Minerals Pvt. Ltd., respondent No. 8 had 125.30 acres in the reserved forest area and 45.70 acres in the non-reserved forest area. M/s. Kalyani Minerals, responD dent No. 10 had 48:00 acres in the reserved forest area and 32 acres in non-reserved forest area. One M. Seetharama Swamy was granted mining lease of an extent of 300 acres in Borra reserved forest area. Sri. R.K. Deo is also having mining lease in that area. Respondent No. 9 is said to be the legal heir of M. Seetharama Swamy. These facts are admitted in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government.

It is also an admitted fact that Ananthagiri Manda! in which the mining areas are situated, is within the scheduled area. The tribal people from tribal groups are inhabiting therein. Two mining leases were granted to one Chalpati Rao, respondent No. 11 for graphite to an extent of 50 F acres in Nandkote Reserve Forest for a period of 20 years on August 26, 1971. The lease deed was executed on January 24~ 1972 and expired on January 23, 1992; it is stated that thereafter mining operations are not being carried on. Similarly, mining lease for an extent of 111 acres of land situated in Chimidipalli and Saripalli villages of Ananthagiri Manda!, was granted on August 29, 1974. The lease was executed on December 20, 1974 G for a period of 20 years which expired on December 19, 1994. Mining lease for Andhra Phosphates (P) Ltd. was granted to an extent of 271.544 hectares in Y. Seetharampuram, Veduruvada Reserved Forest on March 23, 1957 for 20 years. The lease deed was executed on June 10, 1957 which was renewed for 20 years on May 2, 1978. The renewed deed was executed H on the even date which would continue upto June 9, 1997. As stated earlier,

SAMATIIA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

K. Apparao, respondent No. 13, was granted mining lease for 20 years on July 20, 1978 which was executed on January 24, 1979. It is due to expire on July 23, 1999. But, it is stated that at present he is not working out the mining operations. Respondent No. 14, M. Venkatapathi Raju was granted mining lease for 13.84 acres for yellow Ochra in unserveyed revenue poramboke, in Konap~ram, Ananthagiri Manda! for a period of 20 years on April 4, 1980. The lease deed was executed on April 26, 1981 and is to expire on April 25, 2001. It is claimed that the lease is not being worked out and it is said to have lapsed. The lease granted to M/s. Visaka Mines & Minerals, respondent No. 15, is said to be in non-surveyed area in Mandaparti village of Ananthagiri Manda! on July 20, 1978 for a period of 20 years. The lease deed was executed on December 18, 1978 and it would expire on December 17, 1998. They are working out their mines. Another lease was granted for 130 acres in reserved forest area of Sivalingam village of Ananthagiri Manda! on September 20, 1977 for a period of 20 years which expires on December 30, 1997. It is stated that the lease had lapsed since it was not being worked out, w.e.f. February 9, 1988 as per G.O.Ms. No. 295 dated June 6, 1989. Associated Mica Exports, respondent No. 16 holds to leases for 50 acres in bumbriguda village of Ananthagiri Manda) of a period of 20 years granted on March 13, 1986. The lease was executed on September 11, 1986 and it is to expire on September 10, 2006. It is stated that lease is not being worked out at present. They had another lease for 10 acres in Borra group of villages for 20 years granted on October 20, 1983 and the lease deed was executed on November 21, 1983. The lease is to expire on November 20, 2003. It is stated that the mining is not being worked out at present. Respondent No. 17, N. Madan Mohan Reddy had a lease in Mallagumuru village of Ananthagiri Manda!. The extent of the land has not been mentioned but the lease was granted on July 4, 1984. The lease was executed on September 5, 1984 and it is to expire on September 4, _2004. It is stated that the mine is not being worked out at present. M/s. Trowall Cements Ltd. obviously got it transferred from N. Madan Mohan Reddy to whom lease was granted for 20 years in G.O.Ms. No. 303, Industries and Commerce on July 9, 1984 for a period of 20 years. The lease deed was executed by Madan Mohan Reddy on January 7, 1985 and is due to expire on January 6, 2005. It is stated that the mining is not being worked out and steps are being taken to declare it as a lapsed lease. It is the case of the appellant that the above lease was sub-leased to l\1/s. Indian Rayon Industries Ltd., respondent No. 19 but in

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the affidavit filed by the Government, it is said that no steps are taken to win over the mine from the leased area. On the other hand, in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 19, it i~ admitted that the mines are being worked out and that high purity calcite with minimum silica content is their product. Calcite mine is available in Visakhapatnam B District at a short distance of 100 kms. from their factory situated in Visakhapatnam. One M. Laxminarayana was the lessee of an extent of 21.56 acres of land in Nimmalapadu village in Ananthagiri Manda! which is valid upto May 31, 2005. Another lease of 37.895 hectares in Ananthagiri Manda! was granted ior a period of 10 years. The lease is valid upto July C 3, 1996. Respondent No. 19 had transfer of the said lease in its favour in G.O.Ms. No. 4, Industry and Commerce dated January 5, 1993 and they are working out the mines. M/s. Birla Periclase is a subsidiary of respondent No. 19. It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government that 21.56 acres of land containing mica, calcite, quartz and yellow ochra in Nimmalapadu village which is the subject matter of the original lease D dated November 17, 1984 for a period of 20 years had by M. Laxminarayana, was transferred to respondent No. 19. It was stated that the same has further been transferred in favour of M/s. A.P. Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. on December 20, 1994 by G.0.Ms. No. 456 dated December 7, 1994. The latter is a State Government Undertaking but that E is not so stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 19. It is sought to be justified that M. Laxminarayana, Respondent No. 20, has a legal right to assign the lease in favour of Respondent No. 19. It is also admitted in the Government's counter-affidavit that by operation of Section 11(5) of the Mine and Mineral (Regulation and F Development) Act, 1957 (for short, the 'Mining Act'), as amended by State Act, on and from August 14, 1991, no mining leases in the scheduled area should be granted in favour of non-tribals. It is also admitted that tribals have their patta lands in five enclosures and have their right to cultivate those lands. It is the case of the appellant that G after re-survey, the entire area was identified as reserved forest area or at any rate is a forest area in scheduled area. On this factual matrix, the appellant-Society claiming to protect the interests and life of the scheduled tribes in the area, filed the writ petitions questioning the power of the Government to grant mining leases in favour H of non-tribals in the scheduled area, in violation of the Regulation which

SAMATHA V. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

prohibits transfer of any land in scheduled area to a non-tribal. The Division Bench of the High Court has, held that the Regulation does not prohibit transfer of the Government land by way of lease to the non-tribals. The word 'person' in Section 3 of the Regulation is applicable to natural persons, namely, tribals and non-tribals. The Regulation prohibits transfer of the land in scheduled area by a tribal to a non-tribal natural persons. The leases granted in accordance with the provisions of the Mining Act to non-tribals are valid. The FC Act was not violated by grant of leases or renewal thereof. Therefore, the writ, as sought for, was not available. Resultantly, the writ petitions were dismissed.

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In the appeal of M/s. Hyderabad Abrasives and Minerals, the admitted facts are that the appellant was granted mining lease for 20 years in 1974 for mining leatarite situated in Peddamaredumilli Reserved Forest Area in East Godavari District. The total extent of the land leased was 318 acres out of which it was carrying on mining operation in 42 acres. Similarly, other persons were also granted mining leases in the reserved forest area in East Godavari District. Consequently, M/s. Shakti, the voluntary organisation filed, the writ petition in the High Court questioning the. power of the Government to grant mining leases in violation of Section 3 of the Regulation and the FC Act. The lease expired in 1994. The Division Bench held that by operation of the prohibition contained in Section 3 of the Regulation and Section 2 of the FC Act, the appellant is not entitled to mining operations. However, since he had already broken up the mining, the excavate.cl mine on the surface may be removed on obtaining permission from the appropriate authorities. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has filed the above appeal.

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The primary questions in these cases are : wliether the Regulation would .<tpply to transfer of Government land to a non-tribal?; whether the Government can grant mining lease of the lands situated in scheduled area to a non-tribal?; whether the leases are in violation of Section 2 of the FC Act?; and whether the leases are in violation of Environment Protection Act, 1986 (for short, the 'EP Act')? It is stated in paragraph 3(c) of the Petition of Samatha that the Borra Reserve Forest area was part of the domain of the Rajah of Jeypore and from time immemorial, it was a tribal area occupied by tribal village5. They have pattas in their favour and do cultivation. In 1967, 14 villages were declared as Borra Reserved Forest. About 250 tribal families settled in 14 villages have in their occupation, 436

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A acres of land in five enclosures. They are situated in Ananthagiri Manda!.

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In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 10, M/s. Kalyani Minerals, it is admitted that Borra caves may be as old as million of years. It is admitted that the "entire area around Borra caves is thickly forested." In the counter-affidavit filed by the District Forest Officer, respondent No. 4, it is admitted that Ananthagiri Manda! is a scheduled area and the tribals belong to diverse denominations. It is also one of the important hill regions of the eastern ghats and is known not only for the diversity of its flora and fauna but also for the richness of mineral deposits. It is also rich in forest wealth and the minerals. It is their contention that the forest wealth in this area is the national asset. Agriculture • a means of livelihood, succor for social justice and base for dignity of person.

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Agriculture is the main pmt of the economy and source of livelihood to the rural Indians and a source and succor for social status and a base for dignity of person. Land is a tangible product and sustaining asset to the agriculturists. In Waman Rao v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCR 1 a Constitution Bench had observed that India being a predominantly agricultural society, there is a "strong linkage between the land and the person's status in social system". The strip of land on which they till and live assures them equal justice and "dignity of their person by providing to them a near decent means of livelihood". Agricultural land is the foundation for a sense of security and freedom from fear. Assured possession is a lasting source for peace and prosperity.

Agriculture is the only source of livelihood for Scheduled Tribes, apart from collection and sale of minor forest produce to supplement their income. Land is their most important natural and valuable asset and imperishable endowment from which the tribals derive their sustenance, social status, economic and social equality, permanent place of abode and work and living. It is a security and source for economic empowerment. Therefore, the tribes too have great emotional attachment to their lands. The land on which they live and till, assures them equality of status and dignity of person and means to economic and social justice and potent weapon of economic empowerment in social democracy. Ninety per cent of the Scheduled Tribes predominantly live in forest

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SAMATIIA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.]

areas and intractable terrains 95 per cent of them are below poverty line A and totally depend upon agriculture or agriculture based activities. and some of them turn out as migrant construction labour due to their displacement from hearth and home for the so-called exploitation of minerals and construction of ptojects. As per 1991 Census, in Andhra Pradesh the population of the Tribes was 41.99 lakhs. They adopted traditional shifting cultivation (Podu or Jhoom), since they are poor and illiterate and away from winds of modern agricultural technology and economy. Such cultivation is predominantly prevalent in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, North-eastern States and some parts of Uttar Pradesh. According to this practice an area covered with vegetation is burnt out to serve as manure. Cultivation is done for a year C or two and then the area is abandoned. Another area is cleared in a similar manner and again abandoned. Vegetation regenerates in the abandoned area and after a lapse of 8 to 10 years, the area is again cleared and burnt and, thus, shifting cultivation is carried on. This cycle repeatedly goes on. Due to pressure on land this shifting cultivation has now been abandoned D and the Tribes are settling to cultivate crops in fixed holdings. Plight of the Tribes.

Detailed study in this behalf and of their exploitation has been conducted by sociologists and anthropologists, the foremost notable of E them being Prof. C.V.F. Haimendrof and Arher. Many others equally have evinced keen interest and investigated into living conditions of the tribes, their culture and customs, etc. which establishes that initially the tribals had held large tracts of lands as masters and had their own rich culture with economic status and cohesiveness as compact groups. The policy F adopted by the rulers encouraged non-tribals to immigrate in large number and settle down in tribal areas. Governments compelled tribal Chieftains to permit non-tribals to take hold of revenue administration, which led to the slippfug of lands from the hold of the tribes to the non-tribals. In the "Tribes of India - The Struggle for Survival", Prof. Haimendrof has graphi- G cally explained diverse methods by which the tribals were deprived of their lands. Numerous methods adopted to exploit them having become unbearable, they rebelled against their exploitation. Inderelli (Andhra Pradesh) police firing in which hundreds of innocent tribals were killed, is one of the latest events which would depict the enormity of their exploitation. By laying the railway tracks and roads as means of communication by H

SUPREME COU~T REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the British rulers, the tribal areas became accessible to the non-tribal immigrants who, with limited means, came in large number in search of livelihood and settled down in the agency areas and acquired large holdings by exploitation of the tribals. Dr. P.V. Ramesh, IAS, Director, Tribal Welfare in his article "Land Reforms Land Transfer in Scheduled Area" in B a seminar organised by A.P. Judicial Academy and published by it as "Scheduled Tribal and Social Justice" page 178 at 202 has stated that in Utnoor Division of Adilabad District a tribal in whose name, 148 acres was recorded as owner, was declared as surplus land-holder under the Land Reforms Act and the only 5 acres of land in his actual possession and enjoyment was taken by the Government as surplus land. In contract, C Izaradars surrendered Government land as they entered their names in revenue records as owners and claimed compensation under the Land Acquisition Act for 742 acres. The tribal economy was simple but with the gradual contact with the D non-tribals they started taking loans. The wiles money-lenders and traders exploited their innocence. Honest, truthful and hard working tribals become pry for the greed and exploitation by non-tribals. They charged maximum rate of interest etc. for fringe money or gains or goods lent to them. Tribals had to repay disproportionately in three or four fold in kind. E Exorbitant rate of interest was charged and repayment collected in kind, i.e., the produce in three or four-fold. In the "Land Alienation and Restoration in Tribal Communities in India" edited by S.N. Dubey and Ratna Murdia, (Himalaya Publishing House), compilation of articles presented and read out at a Seminar organised by Tata Institute of Social Science in which bureaucrats and social scientists participated. B. Danam, F IAS, then Project Officer, ITDA Khammam, had highlighted in his paper about diverse modes of exploitation by money-lenders of the tribals in Andhra Pradesh. They were : short-term loan at an exorbitant rate of interest (Kandagutha), the repayment of which was made in ltind, i.e., harvest produced from a particular extent of land; the medium-term loan G on the security of the immovable property, repayable with compound interest at yearly or half-yearly rests. Third mode was lease of land against a loan for a fixed number of years (Tirumanam) during which period the tribals have to cultivate their land, raise the crop and deliver the entire produce to the money-lender; by usufructuary mortgage, the money-lender H remains in possession and enjoys the produce from the land for a fixed

SAMATHA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.]

number of years or till the principal sum is repaid; by advancing cash and A kind loans (Namu) and lending commodities like foodgrains mostly for sustenance during the lean months or for seedlings, on the condition that the same would be repaid in full along with flat rate of interest at the time of harvest and in default payment should be with compound interest; in case of further default, the accumulated arrears get merged with the B principal, i.e., by way of compound interest. The other types of money-lending extend to petty loans or selling clothes on credit to the tribals during the lean months on the condition that it would be paid in full at the time of harvest and in default the money-lender would take over the land by threat of physical force.

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Legislative inteivention - Enforcement ineffectiveness. The Ganjam and Vizagapatnam Act of 1839 declared the Agency Areas of the Madras Presidency, comprising parts of southern Orissa and D seven present Andhra Pradesh districts for special administration. In 1874, the Scheduled Districts Act XIV (Central Act) was passed. Thereunder, Scheduled districts were defined to mean the territories mentioned in the First Schedule and parts thereof; they also include any other territory to which the Secretary of State for India by resolution in Council, may declare. Subsequently, the Act was extended to the Taluk of then Badrachalam in E East Godavari District which is now a part of Khamman District together with the districts covered under 1839 Act. The provincial Government issued rules prescribing the procedure to be followed by the officers appointed thereunder to administer Agency Tracts. Later on, the Agency Tracts and Land Transfer Act 1 of 1917 came to be passed. Thereunder, F to mitigate the hardships of the tribals from the wiles of money-lenders and other migrants from plain area, provision was made so that rate of interest would not exceeding 24% per annum and compound interest would not be charged nor any collateral advantage would be taken by the money-lenders. The total interest allowed or decreed should not to exceed the principal G amount. The "Scheduled Districts" defined in 1874 Act were reconfirmed in 1917 Act. Section 4 thereof prohibited transfer of land in the Agency Tracts which read as under :

"4. Transfer of Immovable prope1ty by a member of ti hill tribe.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. (1) Notwithstanding any rule of law or enactment to the contrary, any transfer of immovable property situated within the Agency . Tracts by the member of a hill tribe shall be absolutely null and void unless made in favour of another member of a hill tribe, or with the previous consent in writing of the Agent or of any other prescribed officer. (2) Where a transfer of property is made in contravention of sub-section (1), the Agent or any other prescribed Officer may on application by any one interested, decree ejectment against any person in possession of the property claiming under the transfer and may restore it to the transferor or his heirs.

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(3) Subject to such conditions as may be prescribed an appeal against a decree or order under sub-section (2) if made by the Agent shall lie to the Governor in Council and if made by any other officer shall lie to the Assistant Agent or to the Agent as may be prescribed. "Montague and Chaonsford Report, 1918 briefly touched the administration of tribal areas and political reform and excluded them from the reformed provincial Governments. Govt. of India Act, 1919 divided the area into two parts "wholly excluded and partially excluded areas for reform". The former were small and the latter were given joint responsibility of the Governor and the Government General in Council." Montague Chaonsford Report of 1918 suggested that the backward area where primitive (tribal) live should be excluded from proposed political reform and administration was entrusted to the Governors of the Provinces. Pursuant to Simon Commission Report, the Government of India Act, 1935 dealt with excluded and partially excluded areas as per Order 1936 issued under Section 91 of Government of India Act, 1935. Simon's Report is worth-extracting here and reads thus : "There were two dangers to which subjection to normal laws would have specially exposed these peoples, and both arose out of the fact that they were primitive people, simple, unsophisticated and frequently improvident. There was a risk of their agricultural land passing to the more civilized section of the population, and the

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SAMATIIA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.)

ow1pation of the tribals was for the most part agricultural : and, secondly, they were likely to get into the "wiles of the moneylenders". The primary aim of Government policy then was to protect them from these two dangers and preserve their tribal customs; and this was achieved by prescribing special procedures applicable to these backward areas." Therein also, "Scheduled Districts" defined in 1874 Act were treated as excluded and partially excluded areas. The administration thereof was exclusively vested in the Governor of the Province under Section 92 of Government of India Act, 1935 sub-sections (1) and (2) which are relevant for our purpose read as under :

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"92. (1) The executive authority of a Province extends to excluded and partially excluded therein, but, notwithstanding anything in this Act, no Act of the Federal Legislature or of the Provincial Legislature shall apply to an excluded area or a partially excluded area, D unless the Governor by public notification so directs, and the Governor in giving such a direction with respect to any Act may direct that the Act shall in its appli~ation to the area, or to any specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as he thinks fit.

(2) The Governor may make regulations for the peace and good government of any area in a Province which is for the time being an excluded area·, or a partially excluded area, and any regulations so made may repeal or amend any Act of the Federal Legislature, or of the Provincial Legislature or any existing Indian Law, which is for the time being applicable to the area in question. Regulations made under this sub-section shall be submitted forthwith to the Governor General and until assented to by him in his discretion shall have no effect, and the provisions of this Part of this Act with respect to the power of His Majesty to disallow Acts shall apply in relation to any such regulations assented to by the Governor General as they apply in relation to Acts of a Provincial Legislature assented to by him."

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

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repealed 1874 Act and brought excluded and partially excluded areas directly under the governance of the Governor under Section 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Thus they became the Scheduled Areas by virtue of the Scheduled Areas (Part 'A' States) Order, 1950 issued by the President of India. After the Advent of the Constitution, Fifth and Sixth B Schedules were engrafted as part of the scheme of the Constitution by the founding fathers. Fifth Schedule empowers the President of India who thereunder issued Scheduled Areas (Part 'A' States) Order, 1950 declaring specified areas therein to be Scheduled Areas within the States specified in Part 'A' of the First Scheduled to the Constitution of India. Therein also East Godavari, West Godavari and Visakhapatnam Agencies (Vizianagram C and Srikakulam Districts are part of it) were declared to be Scheduled Areas in Madras Province. Equally, by Scheduled Areas (Part 'B' States) Order, 1950 which became effective from December 7, 1950, the President exercised the power declaring certain specified areas as Scheduled Areas in Part 'B' States including the State of Hyderabad (Adilabad, Karimnagar, D Nizamabad, Warangal, Khammam, Mehboob Nagar Districts).

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It would, thus, be clear that right from the inception of the Colonial administration, the agency areas were treated distinctly from other areas. Tribals were protected from exploitation; their rights and title to enjoy the lands in their occupation and their autonomy, culture and ecology were preserved; infiltration of the non-tribals into tribals area was prohibited. Sugalis, i.e., Khanabadosh, non-tribals, by migration became in due course, tribals. Even those migrant non-tribals were prohibited to purchase the lands in agency areas from the tribals except with the prior sanction of the officer appointed by the Government in that behalf. However, with the connivance and fabrication of revenue records, non-tribals got hold of the lands and exploited the tribals.

Prof. Haimendrof has explained how notoriously the migrants

G swelled in number in the agency areas in Telangana of Andhra Pradesh and dispossessed the tribals from their holdings with impnnity and prevented them from enjoying right over their lands or unlawfully dispossessed them in collusion with the Patwaris, Deshmukhs or Deshpandes, the lower level loc:al officials. He has given the comparison of population at H page 57 thus :

SAMATIIA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

"Despite all such. obstacles the allocation of land to the tribals of A Adilabad which began in 1944 made good progress. By 1945 a total of 45, 417 acres of land had been granted to 3, 144 tribals, and by 1949 the amount of land assigned on patta to tribals had risen to 160,000 acres and the number of beneficiaries to 11,198. The work continued until about 85 per cent of the tribal householders .of B Adilabad adequate holdings of cultivable land." At page 59, he has stated that : "Visual impressions of the process of ethnic and cultural change are supported by demographic figures. While in 1951 the popula- C tion of Utnur Taluk was only 34,404, the majority of whom were tribals, by 1961 it had risen to 55,099 and by 1971 to 93,823. No official census figures are available for later years, but according to a malaria survey of 1977 the population of the taluk had then reached a total 112,000. This phenomenal increase is cl~arly due to immigration, and all the new comers are non-tribals. The change D in the composition of the population is reflected in the figures for tribals in individual circles. Thus in the Marlavai Circle, which in 1941 was almost totally tribal, the percentage of tribals in 1961 was still 90.38 per cent, but by 1971 it had dropped to 65.52 per cent, a figure which undoubtedly has diminished since then."

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Narrating the event (after his revisit), he has stated at pages 59-60 thus: "On 7 December 1976, Kumra Boju of Kerimeri came to see me in Kanchanpalli and told me the following story :

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My father Somu owned fifteen acres of patta land, but for the last thirteen years Rama Gaudu of Asifabad (a man of toddy-tapping caste) has been cultivating this land. When my father died I was a small child, and Rama Gaudu occupied our land. Some time G ago I applied to M. Narayan, the Special Dy. Collector, for restoration of my father's land. The Dy. Collector decided the case in my favour and restored the land to me. I was very happy and ploughed the land in preparation for sowing jawari. But when I was ready to sow Rama Gaudu, supported by some villagers of Keslaguda, stopped my cultivating. Theri the Tahsildar, the H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. revenue inspector, and the Patel came to the village and told me that my father's land was mine by right. But at the same time they advised me not to cultivate that land, but to occupy instead of adjoining field which belongs to a Muslim. How could I do this? Then Rama Gaudu brought some men and sowed on my land. Moreover Rama Gaudu had reported to the police that I had illegally ploughed his land. So the Sub-inspector of police came to my house with some constables and wanted to arrest me. But in the end they did not take me to Asifabad. Rama Gaudu has occupied also the patta land of three other Gonds, who are my mother's brothers. They all died but they have sons who have a claim to their land. Now none of us has any land of our own because Rama Gadu has all of it taken away."

This is· only a tiny iceberg of several instances. He has highlighted the gross injustice done to the tribals. The book contains full details which need no recounting here to avoid needless burden. Dr. G.P. Reddy 2.t pages 66-67 of his book "Politics of Tribal Exploitation" has stated thus :

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"These non-tribal cultivator immigrants enjoyed liberal concessions. They were assigned land just for asking even waiving land revenue. Many of them were also conferred with right of Patel and Patwari. They were encouraged not only to establish now villages but also to settle in already well- established Goa villages. In this process the aboriginals gained nothing but became mute witnesses to the process set In by the rules which ultimately pauparised the tribals, turning them from land owners to agricultural proletariat." Writing about the non-tribals acquiring interest in the land in the tribal areas of Adilabad, Sethumadhava Rao has stated that :

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"Where land outside the forest was vacant it was readily granted Patta to the non-tribals. The Gonds too had an opportunity of acquiring Patta rights in the land but they were slow to understand that they would suffer if they did not take advantage of these concessions. The new Watandars made a subtle use of their offi~e as village headmen to evict the original possessors or take lands vacated by them for themselves."

SAMAIBA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.]

Another modus operandi for evicting the tribals who were cultivating A the lands was by treating them as Sivaijamabandi, i.e., treating as unauthorised occupants. A cultivator who held land under Sivaijamabandi tenure is liable to eviction at any time. The tribals who were owners under the law were treated as unauthorised occupants by manipulation of revenue records. The tribals who could not understand the meaning of Patta rights B could not be expected to understand the meaning of Sivaijamabandi. In many cases, though tribals had been cultivating the lands for several decades and generations, they were purposefully categorised as Sivaijamabandi, and were evicted. Their lands were assigned to non-tribals. It is ridiculous even to classify the lands held by tribals as Sivaijamabandi just because these people lacked knowledge of the nature of their rights C over their lands. Traditionally, the tribals of the area acquired absolute right over the land for cultivation the day they started clearing new patches of forest. Prof. Haimendrof has narrated hundreds of such cases wherein the poor D tribals had complained to him as to how they had lost their lands because of wrong and false entries made in the land records by the Patwaris. Even till recently, the records were not maintained properly. This gave scope for the manipulation both by the Patwaris as well as by the petty revenue officials. This manipulation of records took place mainly due to corrupt practices. Dubey's compilation gives first-hand account given by I.AS. officers on the field representing Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra represented then by K. Padmanabhaiah, the present Home Secretary, Govt. of India, Orissa, M.P., Rajasthan and West Bengal and they had given graphic first hand account of the magnitude of the problems of land F alienations, causes of exploitation. They pointed out urgent need for restoration of the lands to the tribals. Dr. G. Prakash Reddy from ICSSR surveyed the problems once again and has graphieally explained it in his "Politics of Tribal Exploitation" (Mittal Publication). "The Khonds and Jaungs in Andhra Pradesh, Hand Book for Development" by Dr. Ramakant G Nath, B.M. Boal and N. Soreng tells the plight of, and the need for restitution of the land to and rehabilitation of, Orissa tribes. The Reports of the Commissioner of SCs. and STs., 1980-81 and 1984-85 also emphasise the urgency of the problem. As in the year 1995, in Andhra Pradesh, the non-tribals are in possession of 7,51,435.66 acres in scheduled areas of A.P. State (Vide page 192 of Scheduled Tribes and Social Justice). H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

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Like in Madras province, in Bihar, the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 prohibited transfer of lands by sale etc. except with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner. The Bombay Province Land Revenue Code, 1879 also prohibited transfer of land from a tribal to a non-tribal without the permission of the District Collector. Similarly, the B Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1959 and the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulations 1969 also prohibit the alienation of land of the tribals. These regulations also provide for restoration of alienated land to the tribals or when converted for urban use, to give them equivalent lands. As early as in 1901, in Gujarat, some measures of protection were provided (when it formed part of the C Bombay Province) by amendment of Sections 73-A and 79-A in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and imposed ban on transfer of land of tribes in those scheduled villages in which survey and settlement had not been introduced without previous permission of the Collector. The Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and Tenancy Laws (Amendment) Act, D 1974 and the Maharashtra (Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1974 also prohibit alienation and ensure restoration of alienated lands to the tribes. Dr. B.L. Maharda, IAS, a bureaucrat of Rajasthan Cadre, in his "History and Culture of Giriasias" of State of Rajasthan, has narrated the similar problems of tribals.

The Regulation prohibits absolutely the transfer of land in scheduled areas of Andhra Pradesh between tribals and non-tribals or non-tribals inter se. In 1971, an amendment was made to exempt hypothecation of lands by tribes to the Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks and other financial institutions approved by the Government, subject to certain conditions. In F Assam, the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation Act, 1964 was enacted. In Himachal Pradesh, the H.P. Transfer of Land (Regulation) Act, 1968 was made. In Karnataka, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was made applicable in Bombay region of the Karnataka State. The Mysore Land Revenue (Amendnient) Rule, 1960 was suitably amended G imposing restriction or alienation of the lands allotted to the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes without prior permission of the Government. In Kerala, the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 contains similar provision. The Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction of Transfer of Land and Restoration of Alienation Lands) Act, 1975 was enacted for the same object which has recently been amended by a bill, details whereof are not availH able. Madhya Pradesh, the M.P.L.P. Code, 1959, under Sections 165(6) and

SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.)

168(1), prohibits alienation of land and remedy of restoration thereof is A provided. In Manipur, the Manipur Land Reforms and Land Revenue Act, 1970 was made. Similarly, the Orissa Scheduled Areas (Transfer of Immovable Property) Regulation and also Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 were made for the same purpose. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, as amended iii 1956, prohibits such transfer of lands. In Sikkim, Sikkim Revenue Order, 1977 and Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceiling and Reforms Act, 1977 are B enforced. Equally, the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 provides the same relief. In Tripura, Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 imposes similar restrictions. In Uttar Pradesh, the U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982 was made though its implementation was stayed by the High Court. C The above bird's eye survey discloses the enormity of the yawning gap between making of the Acts and their proper enforcement. The magnitude of the problem is of national importance which needs to be tackled and solved by Parliamentary law and effective enforcement.

As we have seen from the legislative history, from the beginning of the British rule in India, the Legislature has adopted the policy to exclude some areas totally and some partially from the governance through the Executive Council and given power to the Governor of the Province and the Governor General/Viceroy to administer them with their special E responsibilities. The partially excluded areas had the dual control by the Executive with primacy given to the Governor of the Province to apply or to exclude the application of the laws made by the legislature or the Executive Council to the partially excluded scheduled areas. In either event the object was to prevent the tribals to get into the wiles of the moneylenders and preservation of their property and customs and to allow the F tribals autonomy of their living in accordance with their customs and culture. Until the Simon Commission, the legislative protection was not available in that behalf. The Simon Commission found it necessary to bring the tribals to the main-stream of national life. In consequence, tribal area was to be brought under the direct administration of the elected govern- G ments by encouraging education, self-reliance and the provincial Government were to devote special attention for their upliftment. But the scheme was not given effect to in the Constitution of India Act 1935. As is seen Sections 91 and 92 of the Government of India Act and the Cabinet Mission Statement of May 16, 1946 emphasised the special attention on the tribal areas. H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

From this perspective, we are required to consider the debate in the Constituent Assembly and the draft statements by the two Committees, one . for the North-east area now called Sixth Schedule and the rest of the areas " covered under Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. The Draft Constitution on Fifth Schedule, presented by Dr. Ambedkar related to Draft Articles 215A and 215B making provision for the administration and control of scheduled areas and Scheduled Tribes. Emphasis was laid therein on the creation of the Tribal Advisory Council to assist the Governor or the Ruler of each State having scheduled area therein, who are required to submit annual report to Government of India regarding the administration of scheduled area in that State, so that the executive power of the Union shall extend to that area to give directions to the State as to the administration of the said area. Draft Part II, clause 5 relates to law applicable to scheduled area and clause (a) of sub-clause (2) of Clause 5 postulated, prohibition or restriction on the transfer of land by or among members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area; clause (b) regulate the allotment of the land to members of the Scheduled Tribe in such area and clause (c) regulate by person who lend money to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area. Sub-clause (3) of Clause 5 gives power to the Governor or Ruler to amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State or any existing law which is for the time being applicable to the area in question. The draft report contained provision for allotment of the lands to the non-tribals. The report dated August 18, 1947 indicates that areas like the Madras and Orissa agency still need to be of simplified type which does not expose them to the complicated machinery of ordinary law course vide Shiv Rao's study. It is provided at pp. 755-56 thus : As regards the allotment of new land for cultivation or residence, however, "we are of the view that the interest of the tribal need to be safeguarded in view of the increasing pressure on land everywhere. We have proceeded accordingly that the allotment of vacant land belonging to the State in scheduled area should not be made except in accordance with special regulation made by the Government on the advice of the Tribal Advisory Council". In the joint report on the partially excluded areas other then Assam and North-east frontier dated August 25, 1947 the above finds place. As per the minutes of the advisory committee dated December 7, 1947 it was felt that the amendment should be made after discussion in the Constituent Assembly. In the revision of Articles qua allotment of land to non-tribals was retained. However, after authorisation given by the Constituent Assembly to make necessary restructuring to the Fifth Schedule as explained by Dr. Ambedkar, the Draft was amended excluding all references to the allocation of

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SAMATHA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.]

land of tribals to the non-tribals with no amendment proposed by any A member vide Vol. 9 C.A.D., pp. 965-1001. It would, therefore, be seen that before the Draft Constitution became paramount law and the Fifth Schedule as its integral part, the members of the Constituent Assembly deliberated to protect land, the precious asset to the tribals, for their economic empowerment, economic justice, social status and dignity of their person by retention of the land with the tribals not only belonging to them but also allotment of the Government land. The proposal for allotment of the Government land to the non-tribals though was initially proposed but was ultimately dropped. After re-structuring Fifth Schedule, as presently found, the specific provision in the draft report to allot land to non-tribals was omitted which was accepted by the members of the Constituent Assembly without any demur or discussion.

The draft Constitution 1948, Clause (6) as originally proposed reads as under : "(1) alienation of allotment of land to non-tribals in Scheduled Areas, it shall not be lav,ful for a member of Scheduled Tribes to transfer any land in person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes; (ii) no land in scheduled area vested in the State within such area shall be allotted to person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes except in accordance with the rules made in that behalf by the Governor in conEultation ·with the Tribal Advisory Council for the State." The text ultimately approved by the Constituent Assembly as part of the Constitution reads as under: "(1) The Governor may make regulations for the peace and good government of any area in the State which is for the time being a scheduled area.

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(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, such regulations may : (a) prohibit or restrict the transfer of a land by or among members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area;

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(b) regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area; (c) regulate the carrying on of business as money- lenders by H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. person who lend money to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area."

It would, therefore, be clear from the narration of the Debates in the Constituent Assembly that various drafts were placed before the Constituent Assembly. Suggestions and ultimate approval of the Fifth Schedule, B as extracted hereinbefore, would manifest the animation of the founding fathers that land in the scheduled area covered by the Fifth Schedule requires to be preserved by prohibiting transfers between tribals and non-tribals and providing for allotment of land to the members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area and regulating the carrying on of the C business by money-landers in such area.

Constitutional Scheme to protect the T1ibes

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Chapter VI, Part X of the Constitution deals with "Scheduled Tribes and Tribal Areas". Article 244 provides that the provision of the Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State other than the State of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. The provision of Clause (2) of Article 244-A are not relevant for the purpose of this case; hence omitted. The Fifth Schedule makes the provisions as to the administration and control of Scheduled Area and Scheduled Tribes. Para (1) envisages that unless the context otherwise requires, the expression "State" defined in the Schedule does not include the State of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. Part V of the Schedule gets attracted to its administration and control. Para (2) envisaged that subject to the provisions of the Scheduled, the executive power of a State extends to the Scheduled Areas enumerated therein. Special duty has been entrusted to the Governor to report to the President of the administration of scheduled area. It enjoins that the Governor of each State, having Scheduled Areas therein, shall annually, or whenever so required by the President, make a report to the President regarding the administration of the Scheduled Areas in that State and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of directions to the State as to the administration of the said area. Para 5(2) provides that the Governor may make regulations for the peace and good government of any area in a State which is for the time being a Scheduled Area. Without prejudice to the above general power, special power has been conferred under clause (a) to prohibit or to restrict the transfer of land by or among

SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area and under Clause (b) to A regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area; under clause (c) regulates money-lending to the tribals in the Scheduled Area. In the Constitution, the expression 'Scheduled Areas' has been defined to mean such area as the President may by order declare to be B Scheduled Areas. Clause (2) of para 6 provides that the President may at any time by order (a) direct that the whole or any specified part of a Scheduled Area shall cease to be a Scheduled Area or a part of such an area; (aa) increase the area. of any Scheduled Area in a State, after consultation with the Governor of that State; (b) alter, but only by way of C rectification of boundaries, any Scheduled Area; (c) on any alteration of the boundaries of a State or on the admission into the Union or the establishment of a new State, declare any territory not previously included in any State to be, or to form part of, a Scheduled Area, Clause (d) deals with the rescission of any order under para 6. Such order may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be D necessary and proper, but save as aforesaid, the order made under subparagraph (1) of that paragraph shall not be varied by any subsequent order. Part D, para 7 empowers the Parliament to amend the Schedule by way of addition, variation or repeal of any of the provisions of the Fifth Schedule. Such a varied or modified Schedule shall be referred to such amended Schedule. The other details are not material for the purpose of E this case. Hence they are omitted.

Scope and Sweep of the Regulation 1970. As has been stated, the Regulation came into force on March 4, 1959 in Andhra area and in Telangana area with effect from December 1, 1963. The prior order in operation in Telangana area will be dealt with a little later. The material provisions relevant for the purpose are dealt with hereunder.

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Section 2(a) defines 'Agency tracts' to mean the areas in the districts G of East Godavari, West Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Srikakulam,Vi.zianagar, Adilabad, Nizamabad, Warangal, Khammam and Mahaboobnagar declared from time to time as Scheduled areas by the President under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. 'Scheduled Tribe' has been defined in Section 2(f) to mean any tribe or tribal community or part of or groups within any tribe or tribal community H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A resident in the Agency tracts and specified as such by a public notification by the President under Clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution. Section 2(g) defines 'transfer' to mean mortgage with or without possession, leas~, sa!e, gift, exchange or "any other dealing" with immovable property, not being a testamentary disposition and includes a charge on such property or a contract relating to such property in respect of such B mortgage, lease, sale, gift, exchange or other dealing. The definition of transfer is a comprehensively vide definition except testamentary disposition by a tribal to another tribal so as to effectuate the prohibition of transfer of immovable property to any person other than a Scheduled Tribe or a Cooperative Society composed solely of members of the Scheduled C Tribes. Section 3(1) reads as under : "3. Transfer of immovable property by a member of a Scheduled Tribe -

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(l)(a) Notwithstanding anything in any enactment, rule or law in force in the Agency tracts any transfer of immovable property situated in the Agency tracts by a person. Whether or not such person is a member of a Scheduled Tribe,. shall be absolutely null and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of person, who is a member of a Scheduled Tribe or a Society, Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act 1964 (Act 7of1964) which is composed .. solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes. (b) Until the contrary is proved, any immovable property situated in the Agency tracts and in the possession of a person who is not a member of Scheduled Tribe, shall be presumed to have been acquired by person or his predecessor in possession through a transfer, made to him by a member of a Scheduled Tribes. ( c) Where a person intending to sell his land is not able to effect such sale, by reason of the fact that no member of a scheduled Tribe is willing to purchase the land or is willing to purchase the land on the terms offered by such person, then such person may apply to the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or any other prescribed officer for the acquisition of such land by the State Government, and the Agent. Agency Divisional Officer or the

.,

SAMATHA v. STATE [K RAMASWAMY,J.]

prescribed officer as the case may be may by order, take over such A land on payment of compensation in accordance with the principles specified in Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961 (Act X of 1961) and such land shall thereupon vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and shall be disposed of in favour of members of the B Scheduled Tribes or a society registered or deemed to be registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964) composed solely of members or in such other manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed."

....

Section 2 reads as under : "2(a) Where a transfer of immovable property is made in contravention of sub-st:ction (i), the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or any other prescribed Officer may, on application by any one interested, or on information given in writing by a public servant, or suo motu decree ejectment against any person in possession of the property claiming under the transfer, after due notice to him in the manner prescribed and may restore it to the transfer of his heirs. (b) If the transferor or his heirs are not willing to take back the property or where their whereabouts are not known, the Agency, the Agency Divisional Officer or prescribed officer, as the case may be may order the assignment or sale of the property to any other member of a Scheduled Tribe (or a society registered or deemed to be registered under any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in the State) composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes, or otherwise dispose of it, as if it was a property at the disposal of State Government."

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Section 4 reads as under : "(4) For the purposes of this section, the expression 'transfer' includes a sale in execution of a decree and also a transfer made by a member of Scheduled Tribe in favour of any other member of a Scheduled Tribe benami for the benefit of a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe; but does not include a partition or a devolution by succession."

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

Section 3, therefore, prohibits transfer of immovable property by a member of the Scheduled Tribes to a non-Scheduled Tribe. Sub- section (l)(a) envisages, with a non obstante clause, that notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment, rule or law in force in the Agency tracts, any transfer of immovable property situated in the Agency tracts by a person, whether or not such person is a member of a Schedule Tribe, shall be absolutely null and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of a Scheduled Tribe or a society registered or deemed to be registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 and composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes. Clause (b) provides rule of evidence by way of presumption that until the contrary is proved, any immovable property situated in the Agency tracts and in the possession of a

non-Scheduled Tribe, shall be presumed to have been acquired by such person or his predecessor in possession, through a transfer made to him by a member of a Scheduled Tribe (emphasis supplied). The burden would

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always be on the non-tribal to prove that the Land in his possession was not acquired by transfer from a tribal; in other words, the land belongs to tribal and the non-tribal possesses it in contravention of law. Clause (c) of Section 3 provides that if a non-schedule tribe, though intending to sell, is unable to sell his land on account of either unwillingness of other tribal to purchase the land or the terms offered by him to a tribe, are inaccessible to a tribal, he may apply to the agent named or other prescribed officer who would acquire the land and take over possession of such land on payment of compensation in accordance with the principles laid down in Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961, as amended in 1972. Such land shall thereupon vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and shall be disposed of in favour of members of the Scheduled Tribes or a Co-operative Society composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes or in such other manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.

In case of any transfer made in contravention of sub-section (1) of Section 3, the agent, the Agency Division Officer, or any other prescribed officer, may, on an application by any one interested, or on information given in writing by a public servant or suo nwtu, issue decree of ejectment against an1 person in possession of the property claiming under the H transfer. This should be done after due notice to such person. Clause (b)

SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

of sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides that if a transferer or his heirs are not willing to take back the property or where whereabouts of the transferer are not known, the said officer may by order assign or sell the property to another member of the Schedule Tribe or a Co-operative Society. Sub- section 3(4) provides that for the purpose of Section 3(4), the expression 'transfer' includes sale in execution of a decree and also a benami transfer made by a member of a Scheduled Tribes in favour of any other member of the Scheduled Tribes but does not include a Partition or a devolution by succession. Section 3-A makes special provision relating to mortgages without possession; the details thereof are not material. Section 4 provides for the remedy of suit to be instituted in the Agency Courts against the member of the Scheduled Tribe; the details thereof are not material. Section 5 provides for attachment and sale of immovable property. Section 6 gives revisional power to the State Government. Section 6-A provides for penalties for contravention of the provisions of the Regulation. Section 7 prescribes limitation for purpose of initiating proceedings under the Regulation. Section 8 gives power to the State Government to make rules. Section 9 provides for repeal of repugnant provisions of the Madras Act 1 of 1917. Section 10 provides for baving of certain transfers and rights. It is settled law that the transfer of immovable property between a member of the Scheduled Tribe to a Non-scheduled Tribe in the Agency tracts is null and void. The non-tribal transferee acquires no right, title and interest in that behalf in furtherance of such sale. This Court in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1984) 3 SCC 301 had declared such sales to be voidable. In Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., [1985] 1 SCC 479 this Court upheld the constitutionality of similar provisions of Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974.

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When the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Regulation was impugned as violative of Articles 19(1)(t) and 14 of the Constitution, this G Court, in P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., [1988) 3 SCC 433 upheld its validity holdings that the Regulation aims to restore the lands to the tribals which originally belonged to them but passed into the hands of non-tribals. It would be unjust, unfair and highly unreasonable merely to freeze the situation, instead of reversing the injustice and restor- H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ing the status quo ante. The non-tribal economic exploiters would get no

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immunity and not be accorded a privileged treatment by permitting them to transfer the lands and structures, if any, raised on such lands to nontribals and to make profits at the cost of the tribals. Section 3, though it causes hardship to the non-tribals, equally, alleviates hardship of the tribals. The Court must keep in mind the larger perspective of the interest of the tribal community in its entirety; the restrictions cannot be condemned as unreasonable. The presumption embodied in Section 3(1)(b) is a rule of evidence. The non-tribals could be reasonably expected to disclose their title to the properties. The tribals due to handicaps and ignorance are unable to prove their right to land. The burden to prove title, therefore, was shifted to the non- tribals. The presumption was upheld as reasonable.

As a part of on-going industrial advancement, large industries or projects are being set up or constructed in the scheduled areas displacing the tribals and rendering them impoverished landless labourers. When their lands are acquired for public purpose, the Government should give alternative lands for rehabilitation and easy loans for reclamation. Law relating to prohibition of alienation and restoration of lands to tribes must be simple, less cumbersome and result-oriented. The machinery must be speedy and the officers must have compassion and sense of dedication and direction to ameliorate the economic status of the tribes to assimilate them into national main-stream. In Telangana area of the State of Andhra Pradesh, prior to the Regulation and pursuant to Part B State Regulation in Fifth Schedule, the AP Tribal Area Regulation, III of 1359F promulgated by Raj Pramukh of Hyderabad was in vogue. Section 46 of Agricultural Land and Tenancy Act, 1950 prohibits transfer of agricultural land without sanction of the competent authority. Section 3 of the Tribal Area Regulation excludes the application of any Act, Regnlation or Rules by a notification published in the official Gazette. Section 4 gives power to the Government to make Rules. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 prohibits eviction of tribals from the lands in their possession or occupied by them. Clause (t) prohibits grant of

patta rights over any land in notified area to a non-tribal; the agent is empowered to cancel such trans[er or revise any title of land granted to a H non-tribal in any notified tribal area. Clause (g) prohibits sale in execution

SAMATIIA v. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY, J.]

of a decree or whenever made, cancellation of sales not finally confirmed A before corning into force of the regulation etc. As stated earlier, the Regulation was extended to Telangana region w.e.f. December 1, 1963. Prior thereto, law in Telangana area was in operation prohibiting any transfer of agricultural lands without prior permission of the officers and 1950 Regulation referred to earlier draws rebuttable presumption that all B the acquisitions of immovable property situated in Scheduled Areas are acquired through a transfer from tribals. The non-tribals shall be presumed to have acquired title from tribals unless they are able to prove to the contrary that their possession of properties in the Agency tracts was lawfully acquired.

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Scope of Fifth Schedule - Interplay with Regulation. The predominant object of Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and the Regulation is to impose total prohibition of transfer of immovable property to any person other than a tribal for peace and D proven good management of tribal area; to protect possession, right, title and interest of the members of the Scheduled Tribes held in the land at one time by the tribals. The non-tribals, at no point of time, have any legal or valid title to immovable pruperty in Agency tracts unless acquired with prior sanction of the Government and saved by any law made consistant E with the Fifth Sche'dule. With the passage of time, when persons other than tribals gained unlawful title to and possession of the lands in agency tracts, their acquisition and holding of the immovable property, unless proved otherwise, have always been null and void. The Regulation, as its predecessor law, did prohibits transfer by a tribal to any other person and F . even benami purchaser in the name of a tribal for the benefit of a non-tribal also is null and void. Non-tribal thereon, acquires no right, title and interest in the land situated in scheduled area .. Indisputably, any transfer inter vivos between tribals or non-tribals or inter se between non-tribals except testamentary disposition to a tribal, has been totally prohibited. The only exception engrafted is the transfer to Co- operative Societies composed G solely of tribals or mortgage of the land to a Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank registered as an instrumentality of the State or any Government approved lending agency to improve the agricultural lands or sale to an agent to the Government etc. A non-tribal person who is unable to find a tribal buyer is not totally prohibited to transfer it. He should offer it to H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the named or nominated Government agent etc. who would purchase it in the prescribed manner under the Regulation and assign it on to a tribal. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had held that the transfer of land in Scheduled Area by a tribal given to either a Scheduled Caste or a Backward Class settled in Agency tracts as void.

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In P. Rami Reddy's case, this Court had observed thus : "Within the scheduled areas of both Telangana and Andhra regions the land was entirely in occupation of different tribal communities. The area was an inaccessible tract of land covered by forests and hills. These tribal communities were in occupation of lands and lived by shifting cultivation and gathering whatever produce that was available.

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The non-tribals who arrived in these areas late in the 19th Century in certain areas and the early 20th Century in certain other areas found the tribals who were in occupation of these lands an easy pray for the schemes of exploitation. The non-tribals were lending money to the tribal communities and taking the land belonging to them as security though nothing was taken in writing from a tribal. The rates of interest charged ranged between 25 to 50 per cent and in certain cases even 100 per cent. The tribals who were traditionally honest and who were simple in their thought and habits fell an easy prey to the schemes of the non-tribals. It was observed by several committees that the non-tribals were able to find ways and means to circumvent the provisions of Regulation 1 of 1959 by entering into benami transactions and other clandestine transactions with unsophisticated tribals. It is absolutely necessary to create conditions for peace and maintain peace and prevent the new non- tribals from settling down in the scheduled area. If the alienations are permitted to the non-tribals there is a danger of large-scale exploitation by the new non-tribals again with the result peace will be disturbed in that area.

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Unless new enterants into the scheduled areas are prevented from settling down in the scheduled areas by purchasing properties either from tribals or non-tribals, it is not possible to prevent the exploitation of the unsophisticated tribals. It is only with a view to

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SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.)

enforce tlie valid provisions of Regulation I of 1959, the Regulation viz., Regulation I of 1970 was made. It is in the interests of the tribals and for their protection Regulation I of 1970 was passed, because without restricting or prohibiting the alienation of lands in the possession of non- tribals to non-tribals the objectives cannot be achieved. xxxx

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True, transfer by 'non-tribals' to non-tribals' would not diminish the pool. It would maintain status quo. But is it sufficient or fair enough to freeze the exploitative deprivation of the 'tribals' and thereby legalize and perpetuate the past-wrong instead of effecting the same. As matter of fact, it would be unjust, unfair and highly unreasonable merely to refreese the situation instead of reversing the injustice and restoring the status quo ante." In this Constitutional perception and statutory operation, the crucial question that aries for consideration is : whether the transfer of its land in a scheduled area, by the Government is valid in law?

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It is indisputable that apart from the patta lands or· other lands held by the tribals, the State holds vast tracts of land in scheduled area, in some areas with rich mineral deposits. The questions are; whether the State E Government is exempt from the Regulation?; whether the State Government stands above the law?; whether the meaning of the word "person" in Section 3(i)(a) of the Regulation would include the State Government? Article 244(1) read with the Fifth Schedule, Part I, while defining "State" excepts certain States as enumerated therein. It bears repetition that F paragraph 5(2) of Fifth Schedule enjoins the Governor to make regulations f~r the peace and good governance in a Scheduled area. Without prejudice to the general power, subsequent clauses amplify particular powers. Clause (a) empowers him to prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the tribals and non-tribals in such area. Clause (b) regulates G the allotment of land only (added to emphasise) to members of the Scheduled Tribes in the area. The question, therefore, is : while regulating allotment of land under trus clause, can the Government exclude itself from the power to allot land to a non-tribal when the object of Article 244(1) read with the Fifth Schedule is to control and maintain peace and good governance of the Scheduled area for the social and economic advance- H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ment of Scheduled Tribes? Would it be permissible to construe that the

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land belonging to the Government is outside such control or prohibition or restriction; whether the State Government could allot its land to nontribals in violation of the Constitution and the law? Answer to these crucial questions bears paramount significance and impact since the object of the founding fathers of the Constitution in empowering the Governor, on the basis of his personal satisfaction, is to regulate by law the administration or control of the Scheduled area for peace and good governance of the Scheduled Tribes in the area. The question is : whether any contra interpretation would subserve the Constitutional animation or would it frustrate the constitutional objective? The Division Bench of the High Court in Samatha's case relied upon the dictionary meaning of the word 'person' and the prohibition on transfer of land inter vivas between natural persons of Schednled Tribes and non-tribes in Agency tracts ; it came to conclude that the Regulation does not apply to the land owned by the State Government since the State Government is not a natural person. The earlier Division Bench had taken contra view. The question, therefore, is : which of the two views subserves the constitutional purpose and is correct in Jaw?

Meanings of the word 'Person' - whether Government is persona ficta?

From this perspective, the next question that arises is : whether the State Government is a person within the meaning of Section 3 of the Regulation aud whether its transfer of land to non- tribals or company is valid in law? The word 'person' in the interplay of juristic thought is either natural

F or artificial. Natural persons are human beings while artificial persons are Corporations. Corporations are either Corporation aggregate or Corporation sole. In "English Law'' by Kenneth Smith and Denis Keenan (Seventh Edition) at page 127, it is stated that "(L)egal personality is not restricted to human beings. In fact various bodies and associations of persons can, by forming a corporation to carry out their functions, create an organisation G with a range of rights and duties not dissimilar to many of those possessed by human beings. In English law such corporations are formed either by charter, statute or registration under the Companies Acts; there is also the common law concept of the Corporation Sole". At page 163, it is further stated that "(T)he Crown is the executive head in the United Kingdom and H Commonwealth, and government departments and civil servants act on

SAMA'IlIA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

behalf of the Crown". In "Salmond on Jurisprudence" by P.J. Fitzgeral"d (Twelfth Edition), at page 66, it is stated that "(A) legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality beyond the class of human beings is one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination.... ". At page 72, it is further amplified that "(T)he King himself, however, is in law no mere mortal man. He has a double capacity, being not only a natural person, but a body politic, that is to say, a corporation sole. The visible wearnr of the crown is merely the living representative and agent for the time being of this invisible and underlying persona ficta, in whom by law the powers and prerogatives of the government of this realm are vested". In "Jurisprudence" by R.W.M. Dias (Fifth Edition), at page 265, it is stated that" .... the value of personifying group activities is further reduced by the fact that courts have evolved ways of dealing with such activities without resorting to the device of persona".

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In Madras Electric Corporation v. Boar/and, (1955) 1 All ER 753, relied upon by Shri Dhawan, it has been held that the word 'person' in its ordinary and natural sense includes crown. The same view was reiterated in l.R. Commissioner v. Whiteworth Coal Co. Ltd., (1968) 2 All ER 91 at 108. On the concept of "legal personality" and the concept of "person", in "Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence" by Keeton (1949 Edition) relied E on by Shri Rajeev Dhawan, in Chapter XIII at page 150, it is stated that in modern law, this personification by law is confined to certain definite limits, although this restriction is based, not upon principle, but upon convenience. In law, however, we are concerned with legal persons, whther they are natural, i.e., human beings capable of sustaining rights F and duties, or artificial or juristic, i.e., grnups or things to which the law attributes the capacity to bear rights and duties. Legal personality is itself · nothing but a fiction, in so far as it is intended to imply no more than that a legal person is simply a complex of legal rights and duties. At page 151, it is stated that juristic persons may be defined as those persons or groups G of persons which the law deems capable of holding rights and duties, with a few exceptions. At page 152, he has amplified that corporation sole is a juristic person and it succinctly describes the position in modern English law. The conception of separate personality attaching to the successive occupants of a particular office is as valid juristically as the conception of incorporation of the members of a group. The Law of Property Act, 1925, H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Section 180 contents itself with addition briefly, that a corporation sole may now hold personal property with rights and duties. At page 154, it is stated that principles applying to corporation aggregate are not fully applicable to corporation sole. "Court regarded the corporation sole not as a person, but as a device for the transmission of rights from one natural person to another". He quotes Blackstone : that "corporation sole consists of one B person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are incorporated by law, in order to give them legal capacities and advantages, in particular that of perpetuity, which in the natural persons could not have had. In this sense the King is a corporation sole". At page 155, it is further stated that the law, therefore, has wisely ordained, that the person, qua C tenus. person, shall never· die, any more than the King; by making him and his successors a corporation sole. By which means all the original rights of a personage are preserved entirely to the successors. At page 169, it is stated that the reason for King personality, a corporate sole, is that corporate personality is a technical device, applied for a multitude of very D diverse aggregations, institutions and transactions, whereas each of many theories has been conceived for a particular type of juristic personality. None of them foresaw the extent to which the device of incorporation would be used in modern business, or we may add, to cloak the activities of some branch of Government.

Thus, in Great Britain, Crown has been regarded as a Corporation sole, persona ficta so that it has never been considered necessary to personify the State. The Crown in its political represents the State in England and can sue in the English courts as a person. In Madras Electric Corporation case, the same view was reiterated but when liability was F sought to be imposed upon a person, it was held that the general principle of person, does not include the Crown, unless the statute is binding on the Crown, by express provision or by necessary implication. As held in l.R. Commissioner v. Whiteworth Coal Co. Ltd., (1968) 2 All ER 91 at 108, in a taxing statute it was held that there was no objection to interpret the word 'person' to include the Crown in any provision other than those which seek G to impose a burden.

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In the American Jurisprudence 2nd Series, Vol. 72, page 407, it is stated that a State, in the ordinary sense of the Federal Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organised under a government sanctioned and limited by

SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed. A While the municipal corporation is organised under the authority of a state legislature and draws its public character from the law of the state creating it, it is endowed with a public character by virtue of having been invested by the legislature with subordinate legislative powers to administer local and internal affairs of the community, as well as by having been created as B a branch of the state government to assist it in the civil government of the State. A public corporation, with capacity to sue and be sued, under modern statutory provisions, is a legal person. So also, for purposes of convenience, certain Departments of Government or the board of managers of a public institution are sometimes incorporated, but the C corporations thus created, although public, are not municipal corporations. In Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, Page 675, the word "Government" has been defined thus : "From the Latin gubernaculum, signifies the instrument, the helm, whereby the ship to which the state was compared, was guided on course by the "gubernator" or helmsman, and in that view, the government is but an agency of the state, distinguished as it must be in accurate thought from its scheme and machinery of government. In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.

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The system of polity in a state, that form of fundamental rules and principles by which a nation or state is governed, or by which individual members of a body politic are to regulate their social actions. A constitution, either written or unwritten, by which the rights and duties of citizens and public officers are prescribed and G defined, as a monarchical government, a republican government, etc. The sovereign of supreme power in a state or nation. The machinery by which the sovereign power in a state expresses its will and exercises its functions, or the framework of political institutions, departments, and officers, by means of which the H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. executive, judicial, legislative, and administrative business of the state is carried on."

In Edgar B. Sims. v. United States of America, (359 US 108 : 3 L ed 2d 66), Federal tax authorities issued notices of levy of tax for assessment on unpaid income of employees of the State of West Virginia, and had the notice served on the defendant. The State auditor, seized the accrued salaries of the taxpayers pursuant to Sections 6331 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The defendant-State refused to honour the levy and instead, delivered payroll warrants to the taxpayers for their, then accrued salaries. Thereafter, the Government brought the action in the District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia to recover from defendant the amount of salaries he had so paid to the taxpayer in disobedience to the Government's levies. The District Court upheld the Government's order. The Court of Appeals, on appeal, affirmed it. On a writ of certiorari, it was held by the Supreme Court of USA that the levy of tax made under Section 6331 was authoriser:\ levy and that defendant under Section 6332 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as 'person' was liable to pay the same.

In State of Ohio v. Guy T. Helvering, (292 US 360 : 78 L ed 1307 at 1310) the question was whether "the State'', when it was selling liquor through its agency and sources, "was a person" within the meaning of E U.S.C. title 26, Section 205 (Section 3244, as amended)? It was held at page 1310 that the tax is levied upon every person who sells liquor etc. The word 'person' as used in the title, should be broadly construed as to mean and include a partnership, association, company or corporation, as well as a natural person. Whether the word 'person' or 'corporation' includes a State F or the United States depends upon the connection in which the word is found. In South Carolina case, the United States Court disposed of the question by holding that since the State was not exempt from the tax, the statute reached the individual sellers who acted as dispensers for the State. While not rejecting that view, the Court preferred to place on the word 'person' the broader ground that when the State itself becomes a dealer in G intoxicating liquors, it falls within the reach of the tax either as a 'person' under the statutory extension of that word to include a corporation, or as a 'person' without regard to such extension.

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In State of Georgia v. Hiram W Evans, (316 US 159 : 86 L ed 1346) the same view was reiterated by the U.S.A. Supreme Court and it was held

SAMA1HA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.)

that if the word 'person' is to include a State as plaintiff, it must equally include a State as a defendant or else the language used would be meaningless.

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In United States of America v. Cooper Corporation et al., (312 US 600: 85 L ed 1071) relied on by Sri Sudhir Chandra, considering the word B 'person' used in Sections 7, 85 and 178 of the Sherman Anti Trust Act, it was held that although the term "person", as used in a statute, is not ordinarily construed to include the sovereign, this is not a hard and fast rule of exclusion, but may be negatived by resort to aids to construction indicating a contrary intent. On the facts, it was held that State was not a person. In that context it was held that in the absence of any indication to C the contrary, the term 'person', when used in different sections of a statute, was employed throughout the statute, in the same, and not different sense. But the said decision was reversed in State of Georgia case. In United States v. l.C.C., (1949) 337 U.S. 426 it was held that when relief is sought against State itself, the word 'person' would include the State and be construed· D accordingly.

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In Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer, Staie of West Bengal v. Corporation Calcutta, [1967] 2 SCR 170 a Bench of nine Judges of this Court was to consider whether the State of West Bengal, when it was carrying on trade, as owner and occupier of the market at Calcutta, without E obtaining the licence, was bound by the Calcutta Municipality Act or, by necessary implication, was exempted to obtain licence. A complaint against the State, for its failure to obtain licence was filed by the Municipal Corporation. It was contended that the State is not a person under Section 218 of the said Act. Per majority, it was held that the Common Law rule F of construction that the Crown is not, unless expressly named or clearly intended, bound to be a State, was held to be not acceptable as a rule of construction. It was held that the archaic rule based on prerogative and protection of the Crown has no relevance to a democratic republic. It is inconsistent with the rule of law based on the doctrine of .equality and introduces conflicts and anomalies. The normal construction, viz., that an G enactment applies to citizens as well as to the State, unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State from its operation, steers clear of all the anomalies and is consistent with the philosophy of equality enshrined in the Constitution. Under the Act there is a distinction between fine imposed under Section 537 and under Section 541 of the Act, the fines H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP.2S.C.R.

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under Section 537 are in respect of offences enumerated therein they certainly go to the coffers of the States. In respect of such offences it may be contended that, as the fines paid reach the State itself, there is an implication that the State was not bound by the Sections enumerated therein, for a person who receives the fine, cannot be the same person who B pays it. This incongruity may lead to the said necessary implication. Another Bench of nine Judges in State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., AIR (1963) SC 1811 at 1817 per majority interpreted the word 'citizen' in a broader perspective. In Union of India v. Jubbi, AIR (1968) SC 360 at 362 a three-Judge Bench had held that a statute applies to State as much it does to a citizen, unless, it C expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from its operations. If the Legislature intended to exclude the applicability of the Act to the State, it could have easily stated in Section 11 itself or by a separate provision that the Act was not to be applied to the Union or to the lands held by it. In the absence of such a provision, in a constitutional set up like I) the one we have in this country, and of which the overriding basis is the broad concept of equality, free from any arbitrary discrimination, the presumption would be that a law of which the avowed object is to free the tenant of landlordism and to ensure to him security of tenure would bind all landlords irrespective of whether such a landlord is an ordinary_ individual or the Union. In that case., it was contended that Abolition of Big E Landed Estates and'land Reforms Act, 1953 and Section 11 thereof does not apply to the land held by the Government. This Court rejected that contention. It would, therefore, be settled law that the question whether or not the word 'person' used in a statute would include the State has to be determined with reference to the provisions of the Act, the aim and its F object and the purpose the Act seeks to subserve. There is no reason to consider the word 'person' in a narrow sense. It must be construed in a broader perspectivity, unless the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from the operation of the Act as against the State and would include "State Government".

G Property of the State - how dealt with under the Constitution. Part I of the Constitution of India deals with Union and its territories. Article 1 declares that India, that is Bharat shall be a Union of States. The States and the territories thereof have been specified in the First Schedule H to the Constitution. The territory of India shall comprise of - (a) the

SAMATIIA v. S}ATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

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territory of States; (b) the Union territories specified in the First Schedule; A and (c) such other territories as may be acquired. Articles 2 to 4 deal with · the power of the Parliament to admit into the Union, by law, any State, or establish new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. Formation of the new States and alteration of areas, boundaries and names of the existing States are regiµated by law made by Parliament. It also gives power B to the Parliament to amend the First and the Fourth Schedules and to provide for supplemental, incidental and consequential matters. The First Schedule enumerates the States and the first in the alphabetical order is Andhra Pradesh with territories specified thereunder. Under Part VI of the Constitution titled "The States", Article 152 defines "State". For the Interpretation of the Constitution, by operation of Article 367, unless the context otherwise requires or modifies, the General Clauses Act shall apply. Section 3(23) thereof defines'"Government to include both the Central Government and State Government. Section 3(8) defines "Central Government" and Section 3(60) defines "State Government" as regards anything done and or to be done, shall mean the Governor. The Governor of each State is its Executive Head and the executive power of the State shall be exercised by the Governor either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with· the Constitution as envisagec\. under Article 154. The executive power of the State, subject to the provl~ons of the Constitution, by operation of Section 162, shall extend to the ~atters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. The proviso thereto is not relevant for the purpose of this case.

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The executive power, therefore, of the State is co-extensive with that of the legislative power of the State. The Governor shall appoint the Chief Minister and on his advise, he appoints the Council of Ministers, who shall aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his function except, in so far as he is, by or under the Constitution, reqilired to exercise his functions or any of them, in his discretion. The Council of Ministers, headed by the G Chief Minister, shall be collectively and individually responsible to the Legislature and the people in the matter of the governance of the State. AH· executive actions of the Government of a State, shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor and the business of the Government is conducted in accordance with Article 166 and the Business Rules made, H

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A by the Governor, by clause (3) thereof.

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Under Chapter III of Part XII, Article 294 vests in the union and the corresponding State all property and assets which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution were vested in His Majesty for the Purposes of the Government of Dominion of India or of each Governor's Province, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise; similarly all rights, liabilities and obligations, respectively of the Government of the Dominion of India and of the Government of each corresponding State, shall belong to the Government of India and the Government of each corresponding State. Article 295 provides for succession to the property, assets, rights, liabilities and obligations in other cases. Article 298 provides that the executive power of the Union and of each State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade or business, and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose co-extensive with legislative power. The Union of India and each State under Article 300 may sue or be sued, with all rights and liabilities as a constituent power of the State under the Constitution. Article 299 empowers Union of India and the Government of each State to enter into contract, in the exercise of the executive power, to be expressed in the name of the president or the Governor, as the case may be. All assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor, by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or otherwise. However, the President or the Governor shall not be personally liable therefor. Article 300 is of material importance. As stated earlier, the Government of India or a State may sue or be sued, by the name of the State and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the law enacted and by virtue of the power conferred by the Constitution, it can sue and be sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases.

The members of the Legislature are elected by the people periodically at the end of every five years. The political party or group of G political parties who secure majority in the Legislative Assembly of the State elects the leader who would be called upon by the Governor to form the Govt. and on his appointment as the Chief Minister. On his advise, the Governor appoints his Council of Ministers who act in collective responsibility to aid and advise the Governor in the governance of the State H during the tenure of their office.

SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

Pennanent bureaucracy acts as an ann of the Government.

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Articles 309 to 312A in Chapter I of Part XIV under the heading "Services under the Union and the States" regulate the recruitment and conditions of service and appointments to the public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or the States, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and acts of the appropriate Legislature. B Details thereof are not material for the purpose of this case; suffice it to state that Constitution has created permanent bureaucracy consisting of diverse all India services allotted to various States and State Services created thereunder, to assist the political executive and to implement the provisions of the Constitution, the laws and the executive policy of the C appropriate Government. Under the Constitution, in all ordinary matters of administration, the Ministers take full responsibility, subject to the control by the Legislature. The bureaucracy gives shape to the decisions taken .by the council of Ministers at the Cabinet meeting or by the individual Ministers by working out the details and they are applied in the given set of facts. In Halsbury's Laws of England {4th Edn.) Vol. 8 in D paragraph 1152 at page 711, it is stated that the Government offices and departments through which the general executive administration of the country is carried on owe their establishment and organisation, together with the powers they possess and duties they perform, partly to the royal prerogative and partly to the Parliament. They derive almost all their E powers directly or indirectly from Parliament, which alone can provide them with the supplies of money, necessary for their operations. Their internal arrangements, on the other hand, are hardly ever organised or directly interfered with by Parliament, but have been a matter for the royal prerogative. This principle proprio vigore applies to Cabinet form of functioning under our Constitution. In paragraphs 1155 at page 713, it is F further stated that where functions entrusted to a minister or to a department are performed by an official employed in the ministry or department there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the acts or decisions of the officials are that of the Minister. In the exercise of their functions relating to land under any enactment, every Minister and government G department must have regard to the desirability of conserving the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside.

Ministerial Responsibility. As stated hereinbefore, the Constitution envisions to establish an H

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A egalitarian social order rendering to every citizen, social, economic and

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political justice in a social and economic democracy of that Bharat Republic. Article 261(1) of the Constitution provides that full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the territory of India, to public acts, record and judicial decisions of the Union and of every State. In Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v. Dau/at Mal Jain, [1997] 1 SCC 35, a Bench of this Court had held thus ; "The Governor runs the Executive Government of a State with the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers which exercise the powers and performs its duties by the individual Ministers as public officers with the assistance of the bureaucracy working in various Departments and Corporate sectors etc. Though they are expressed in the name of the Governor, each Minister is personally and collectively responsible for the actions, acts and policies. They are accountable and answerable to the people. Their powers and duties are regulated by the law and the rules. The legal and moral responsibility or liability for the acts done or omissions, duties performed and policy laid down rest solely on the Minister of the Department. Therefore, they are indictable for their conduct or omission, or misconduct or misappropriation. The Council of Ministers are jointly and severally responsible to the Legislature. He/they, is/are also publicly accountable for the acts or conducts in the performance of duties. The Minister holds public office though he gets constitutional status and performs functions under Constitution, law or executive policy. The acts done and duties performed are public acts or duties as holder of the public office. Therefore, he owes certain accountability for the acts done or duties performed. In a democratic society governed by rule of law, power is conferred on the holder of the public office or the concerned authority by the Constitution by virtue of appointment. The holder of the office, therefore, gets opportunity to abuse or misuse of the office. The politician who holds public office must perform public duties with the sense of purpose, and a sense of direction, under rules or sense of priorities. The purpose must be genuine in a free democratic society governed by the rule of law to further socio-economic democracy. The executive Government should frame its policies

SAMA1HA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

to maintain the social order, stability, progress and morality. All A actions of the Government are performed through/by individual persons in collective or joint or individual capacity. Therefore, they.. should morally be responsible for their actions.

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When a Government in office misuses its powers, figuratively, B we refer to the individual Minister/Council of Ministers who are constituents of the Government. The Government acts through its bureaucrats, who shapes its social, economic and administrative policies to further the social stability and progress socially, economically and politically. Actions of the Government, should be accounted for social morality. Therefore, the actions of the C individuals would reflect on the actions of the Government. The actions are intended to further the goals set down in the Constitution, the laws or administrative policy. The action would, therefore, bear necessary integral connection between the 'purpose' and the end object of public welfare and not personal gain. The action D cannot be divorced from that of the individual actor. The end is something aimed at and only individuals can have and shape the aims to further the social, economic and political goals. The ministerial responsibility thereat comes into consideration. The Minister is responsible not only for his actions but also for the job of the bureaucrats who work or have worked under him. He owes E the responsibility to the ekctors for all his actions taken in the name of the Governor in relation to the Department of which he is the head." In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., [1974] 2 SCC 831, a F Bench of seven Judges of this Court had held that under the Cabinet System of Government as embodied in our Constitution, the Governor is the Formal head of the State. He exercises all his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution, on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required G by or under the Constitution to exercise his function in his discretion. The satisfaction of the Governor for the exercise of any power or function, . required by the Constitution, is not the personal satisfaction of the Governor but is the satisfaction in the constitutional sense under the Cabinet System of Government. The executive is to act subject to the control of the legislature. The executive power of the State is vested in the Governor as H

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head of the Executive. The real executive power is vested in the Ministers of the Cabinet. The Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as its head aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his executive functions. The same principle was reiterated by a Bench of · three Judges in R.K. Jain v. Union of India, [1995] 4 SCC 119. Therein, it was held that in a democracy governed by rule of law, State is treated on B par with a person by Article 19(6) in c<immercial/industrial activities. It would thus be clear that in a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the administration is run through constitutional mechanism i.e., Cabinet form of Govt. by a Council of Ministers headed by the Chief C Minister. They aid and advise the Governor, the executive head of the State. The bureaucracy - an arm of the political executive - assists as an integral part of administrative mechanism. Their actions or the acts, individually or collectively, are directed to elongate and fulfil the sociOeconomic goals set down in the Constitution to establish the egalitarian D social order in which socio-economic justice is secured to the poor and we~er sections of the society including the Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in particular, as enjoined in Article 46 of the Constitution, to promote their socio-economic interest and protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. The State is, therefore, a "person" within the constitutional mechanism persona ficta is enjoined to elongate E the objects of the Constitution.

Scope of the power of the Govt. in disposal of its property in Scheduled area and constitutional duty and limitation of the State.

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In "In the Framing of the India's Constitution", a study by B. Shiva Rao, (Volume II) in Chapter 20 on the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution on the Tribal Area, the author has surveyed the historical background for integration of Scheduled Tribes into the national mainstream. The historical survey and legislative development do assure us that throughout... ... A system of modified exclusion of law was applied to the Scheduled areas. G The power was with the Governor. He exercises the executive and legislative power to apply, or to refrain from applying any law made by Parliament or State Legislature to the Agency tracts. The object of Government policy is to protect the tribals or their land, .... by securing to them protection from exploitation. The principal duty of the administration is to protect H them from exploitation. Considering the past experience and the exploita-

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SAMA1HA v. STATE (K. RAMASWAMY,J.)

tion of the tribals' simplicity and truthfulness by the non-tribals, it became A imperative by statutory safeguards to preserve the land which is their natural endowment and mainstay for their economic empowerment. No laws affecting social matters, occupation of land including tenancy laws allotment of land and setting apart of land for village purposes and village · management, including the establishment of village panchayats, would B apply, unless they are suitable to the conditions. Shiva Rao has stated at page 579 thus : "The transfer of land in a Scheduled Area from a tribal to a non-tribal was forbidden; and the State Government was also prohibited from allotting State land in a Scheduled Area to nontribals except in accordance with rules made after consulting the Tribes Advisory Council. Likewise, if advised by the council, the Governor was obliged to license money-lending, prescribing such conditions as were considered necessary; and the breach of these conditions would be an offence. In order that public attention must be focussed on the development work carried out in these areas, the State Government was required to show separately in its annual financial statement the revenues and expenditure pertaining to these areas." Thus, the Fifth and Sixth Schedules an integral scheme of the Constitution with direction, philosophy and anxiety is to protect the tribals from exploitation and to preserve valuable endowment of their land for their economic empowerment to elongate social and economic democracy with liberty, equality, fraternity and dignity of their person in our political Bharat.

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Egalitarian Social Order - Scope and Content. Justice is an attribute of human conduct. Law, as a social engineering, is to remedy existing imbalances, as a vehicle to establish an egalitarian social order in a Socialist Secular Bharat Republic. The Upanishad says G that, "let all be happy and healthy, Jet all be blessed with happiness and let non be unhappy". Bhagwatgeeta preaches through Yudhishtra that, "I do not Jong for kingdom, heaven or rebirth, but I wish to alleviate the sufferings of the unfortunate'. Prof. Friedlander in his "Introduction of Social Welfare" at page 6 states that social welfare is the organised system of social service and institutions are designed to aid individuals and groups H

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A to attain specified standard of life and health and personal and social

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relationship which permit them to develop their full capacities and to promote their well-being in harmony with the needs of their families and the community. Welfare State is a rubicon between unbridled individualism and communism. All human rights are derived from the dignity of the person and his inherent worth. Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of the Constitution have fus~d in them as fundamental human rights as indivisible and inter- dependent. The Constitution has charged the State to provide facilities and opportunities among the people and groups of people to remove social and economic inequality and to improve equality of status. Article 39(b) enjoins the State to direct its policy towards securing distribution of the ownership and control of the material resources of the community as best to subserve the common good. The founding fathers with hind sight, engrafted with prognosis, not only inalienable human rights as part of the Constitution but also charged the State as its policy to remove obstacles, disabilities and inequalities for human development and positive actions to provide opportunities and facilities to develop human dignity and equality of status and of opportunity for social and economic democracy. Economic and social equality is a facet of liberty without which meaningful life would be hollow and mirage.

Right to development - a fundamental right.

Declaration of "Right to Development Convention" adopted by the United Nations and ratified by India, by Article 1 "right to development" became part of an inalienable human right. By virtue thereof, every human

person and all people are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy

F economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms would be fully realised (emphasis supplied). Clause (2) thereof provides that "the human right to development also implies the full realisation of the right of the people to improve their natural wealth and resources". Article 2(1) provides that "the human person G is the central subject of development and should be and active participant and beneficiary of the right to development". Clause (2) says that all human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full resp~ for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which alone can ensure free and complete fulfilment of the human being and they H should, therefore, promote and protect an appropriate political, social and

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SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

economic order for development". Clause {3) thereof provides that the A State have "the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the wellbeing of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom".

Article 3(1) recognises and enjoins that it is the State's primary responsibility to create conditions favourable to the realisation of the right to development. Under clause (3) thereof, it reminds the State of its duty to cooperate with each other and of "ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development". Article 6(2) reassures that "human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal att.ention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights (emphasis supplied) and clause (3) thereof enjoins that "the States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development. Article 8 enjoins that "the State should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realisation of the right to development and shall ensure inter alia equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income". it also provides that "an appropriate economic and social reform should be canied out with a view to eradicating all social injustice". Article 9 gives a right declaring that "all the aspects of the right to development set forth in the present declaration are indivisible and interdependent and each of them should be considered in the context of the whole" and Article 10 concludes and reminds the State of its duty "to take steps to ensure them the full exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development, including the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legisl_ative and other measures at the national levels". The directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution are fore-runners to the Convention (Emphasis supplied).

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India being an active participant in the successful declaration of the G Convention on Right to Development and a party signatory thereto, it is its duty to formulate its policies, legislative or executive, accord equal attention to the promotion of, and to protect the right to social, economic, civil and cultural rights of the people, in particular, the poor, the Dalits and Tribes as enjoined in Article 46 read with Articles 38, 39 and all other H

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Constitution of India. By that constant, endeavour and interaction, right to life would become meaningful so as to realise its full potentiality of "person" as inalienable human right and to raise the standard of living, improve excellence and to live with dignity of person and of equal status with social and economic justice, liberty, equality and fraternity, the trinity are pillars to establish the egalitarian social order in Socialist Secular Democratic Bharat Republic. Social and economic democracy is the foundation on which political democracy would be a way of life in the Indian polity. Law as a social engineering is to create just social order removing inequalities in social and economic life, socio-economic disabilities with which poor people are languishing by providing positive opportunities and facilities to individuals and groups of people. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, in his closing speech in the Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1949, had lucidly elucidated thus :

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"What does social democracy mean? It means way of life which recognises liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are not to be treated as separate items in a trinity. They form a union of trinity in the sense that to divorce one from the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy. Liberty cannot be divorced from equality, equality cannot be divorced from liberty. Nor can liberty and equality be divorced from fraternity. Without equality, liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the many. Equality without liberty, would kill individual initiative - we have in India a society based on the principle of graded inequality which means elevation for some and degradation for oth~rs. On the economic plan, we have a society in which there are some who have immense wealth as against many who live in abject poverty". We cannot afford to have equality in politic:tl life and inequality in economic life. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradiction? How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? We must remeve this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those who suffered from inequality will blow up the structure of politiccil democracy which this Assembly has laboriously built up."

SAMATifA v. STAIB [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]

(Vide B. Shiva Rao's, 'The Framing of India's Constitution : Select A Documents', Vol. IV, p. 944.) .~

The core constitutional objective of "social and economic democracy" in other words, just social order, cannot be established without removing the inequalities in income and niaking endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status through the rule of law. The mandate for social and economic retransformation requires that the material resources or their oWnership and control should be so distributed as to subserve the common good. A new social order, therefore, would emerge, out of the old unequal or hierarchical social order. The legislative or executive measures, therefore, should be necessary for the reconstruction of the unequal social order by corrective and distributive justice through the rule of Jaw.

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Right to life - Scope and Content. Article 21 of the Constitution reinforces "right to life" - a fundamental D right - which is an inalienable human right declared by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the sequential Conventions to which India is a signatory. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress, AIR (1991) SC 101at173 in paragraph 223, this Court had held that right to life would include right to continue in permanent employment which is not a bounty of the employer nor can its survival be at the volition E or mercy of the employer. Income is the foundation to enjoy many fundamental rights and when work is the source of income, the right to work would become as much a fundamental right. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and uncertain application. That will be a mockery of them. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. F Union of India, [1984] 3 SCC 161 at 183-84, this Court had held that right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and that opportunities and facilities should be provided to the children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. Adequate facilities, just and humane conditions of work etc. are the minimum requirements which must G exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and the State has to take every action. In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR {1991) SC 420, this Court had held that the right to life includes the right to enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment of life. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR (1986) SC 180, this Court had H

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A held that right to livelihood is an important facet of the right to life. In C.E.S.C. Ltd. & Ors. v. S.C. Bose & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 441 at 462-63, para

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30, it was held that right to social and economic justice is a fundamental right. Right to health of a worker is a fundamental right. Therefore, right to life enshrined in Article 21 means something more than mere survival of animal existence. The right to live with human dignity with minimum sustenance and shelter and all those rights and aspects of life which would go to m~e a man's life complete and worth living, would form part of the right to life. Enjoyment of life and its attainment - social, cultural and intellectual - without which life cannot be meaningful, would embrace the protection and preservation of life guaranteed by Article 21. Right to health and social justice was held to be fundamental right to workers in Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India, [1995] 3 SCC 42 and Life Insurance Corporation v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, [1995] 5 SCC 482. Right to economic equality is held to be fundamental right in Dalmia Cement Bharat Ltd. & Anr. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors. Etc., IT (1996) 4 SC 555. Right to shelter is held to be a fundamental human right in P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1995] Supp. 2 SCC 182, M/s. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khim/al Totame & Ors., [1990) 1 SCC 520, Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. [1996) 2 SCC 549 andAhmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Guiab Khan & Ors., JT (1996) 10 SC 485. The tribals, therefore, have fundamental right to social and economic empowerment. As a part of right to development to enjoy full freedom, democracy offered to them through the States regulated power of good Government that the lands in Scheduled areas are preserved for social economic empowerment of the tribals.

p Meaning of Socialist Democratic Republic. It is necessary to consider at this juncture the meaning of the "socialism" envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution. Establishment of the egalitarian social order through rule of law is the basic structure of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles are the G means, as two wheels of the chariot, to achieve the above object of democratic socialism. The word "socialist" used in the Preamble must be read from the goals Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 38, 39, 46 and all other cognate Articles seek to establish, i.e., to reduce inequalities in income and status and to provide equality of opportunity and facilities. Social justice H enjoins the Court to uphold government's endeavour to remove economic

SA.1v1ATIIA v. STATE [K RAMASWAMY, J.]

inequalities, to provide decent standard of living to the poor and to protect the interest of the weaker sections of the society so as to assimilate all the sections of the society in the secular integrated socialist Bharat with dignity of person and equality of status to all.

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Shri P.A. Choudhary, learned senior counsel for the 13th respondent, B contended that the word 'person' in Section 3(1) of the Regulation does not cover the executive Government of the State nor does it prohibit the Government from transferring its land. According to him, such an interpretation would get the Regulation exposed itself to be ultra vires of Article 298 of the Constitution which should be avoided. The premise of his contention is founded on the principle that the Constitution empowers the C Executive to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and the Governor, as sovereign head of the Executive, gets no power under the Fifth Schedufe to prohibit the State Government to transfer its property to non-tribals. On the other hand, the Constitution has full faith in the Executive to implement the directives contained in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution to D promote the welfare of the Tribes. The Constitution has built up a balance structure distributing powers and functions to each of the three branches of the State. The Fifth Schedule read with Article 244 of Chapter X of the Constitution, with a non-obstante clause, has conferred only the legislative power on the µovernor, referable to Article 245 to enact the law relating E to scheduled areas. The power to acquire, hold and dispose of the property of the State was wisely left untouched in that behalf. The prohibition contained in Fifth Schedule, therefore, does not effect the power of the State under Article 298 to dispose of its property situated in Scheduled area in the manner it deems appropriate. To buttress his contention, the learned counsel cited a.passage froni Walter Bagehot - The English Con- F stitution at page 283 that the queen, without consulting the Parliament, can by law disband the Army, engage or dismiss the officers from General Commanding-in-Chief doWnwards. She could sell all her war ships and all novel stores etc. He also cited "Governmental Law" by Hartley and Griffith, paie-~289 in that behalf. He further cited Lord Birkeenhead's dictum in G Efrkdale District Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Corporation of Southport, (1926) AC 355 at 364, wherein it was held that power entrusted to a person or public body by the Legislature was to effectuate public purpose. They cannot divest themselves of those powers and duties. Nor can they do any action incompatible with due exercise of their powers or the discharge of H their duties.

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In Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King, [1921] 3 KB 500, cited by the learned counsel, the Government had given an undertaking to the owners and permitted the neutal warships to carry a particular class of cargo to a British colony in which event the said ships will be released from detention On the faith of it the owners of the ships carried the cargo and requested for their release from detention. When clearance was refused, action was laid in the court for damage for breach of contract. It was held that such an undertaking by the Government was not enforceable in a Court of law, as it was not being within the competence of the Crown to make a contract which would have the effect of limiting its power of executive action in the future. He also cited Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company et al. v. Charles Sa"'.Yer, 343 US 579 at 632: 96 L ed 1153 at 1198 for the proposition that the President has executive inherent power to seize private property to meet an emergency subject to the legislation confronting him of the power. He also cited Lois P. Myers v. United States, 272 US 160 : 71 ~ ed 11 wherein it was held that th!'! President has the executive power to appoint and remove executive subordinates. In the State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2 SCR 679, cited by Shri Choudhary, it was held that the pleasure doctrine of the President under Article 310 of the Constitution is qualified by Article 311 and is not subject to any law made by the Parliament or the Legislature of the State. In other words, according to the learned counsel, the ratio therein reiterates that the executive power of the President/Governor granted under the Constitution is not subject to any limitations but is co-extensive with the exercise of the legislative power.

Marn Ram Etc. Etc. v. Union of India &Anr., [1981] 1SCR1196 was cited for the proposition that the power, of the President under Article 72 and of the Governor under Article 162, are not subject to legislative control. The power of Legislature imposing minimum sentence of imG prisonment under Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not subject to, nor can nullify wholly or partly, the executive power of the President or the Governor to pardon or to reduce the life imprisonment of a convict. It is true, as contended by Shri Chowdhary, that the Constitution has

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SAMATIIA v. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.)

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to the three wings of the;State; in particular the PresidenUGovernor of the State is to exercise the executive power in their individual discretion. It is not subject to legislative limitations to be done in accordance with rules of business. In particular, the PresidenUGovernor is entrusted with the executive power co-extensive with the legislative power enumerated in the Seventh Schedule read with Article 245 of the Constitution. The executive power especially conferred by the Constitution like the pleasure tenure or the power of pardoning a convict are in our view, not apposite to the issue. The power of the executive Government in that behalf has wisely been devised in the Constitution is not subject to any restriction except in accordance with the Constitution and the law made under Article 245 read with the relevant Entry in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is subject to Fifth Schedule when it is applied to Scheduled area. The power of the Government to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and the making of contracts for any purpose conferred by Article 298 of the Constitution equally is co-extensive with the legislative power of the Union/State. However, Article 244 (1) itself specifies that provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State except the excluded areas specified therein. The legislative power in Clause (1) of Article 245 equally is "subject to the provisions of the Constitution" i.e. fifth Schedule. Clause (1) of para 5 of Part B of the Fifth Schedule applicable to Scheduled areas, adumbrates with a non obstante clause that "Notwithstanding anything in the · Constitution, in other words, despite the power, under Article 298, the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any particular Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State shall not apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State or shall apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State, subject to such exceptions and modifications as he may specify in the notification and any direction given under clause (1) of para 5, may be given so as to have retrospective effect". The executive power of the State is, therefore, subject to the legislative power under clause 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule. Similarly sub-para (2) thereof empowers the Governor to make regulation for the peace and good government of any area in a State which is for the time being a Scheduled Area. In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulation may regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled ·Tribes in such area or may prohibit or restrict the transfer of land under clause (a) by or among the

A

c

F

G

H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas. In other words sub-para 5(2) combines both legislative as well as executive power, clause 5(2)(a) and (c) legislative power and clause (b) combines both legislative as well as executive power. The word 'regulation' in para 5(2)(b) is thus of wide import.

B Meaning of the word 'Regulation' in the title of the Regulation, para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. The question then is: whether the word "regulate" in para 5 clause (2)(b) would .include prohibition to transfer the Government land? It C requires no elaborate discussion in this behalf. While interpreting Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, this Court has consistently being held that the term 'regulation' would include total prohibition vide Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, [1960] 2 SCR 372; Fatehchand Himmatla/ v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 2 SCC 670; State of U.P. & Ors. v. Hindustan D Aluminium Corpn. and Ors., [1979] 3 SCC 229; K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1985) 2 SCC 116. This Court consider the meaning of the word "regulation" in Air India Statutory Corporation Etc. v. United Labour Union & Ors. Etc., 1996 9 SCALE 70 paragrapl). 56 at 104-05. Therein, the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 came for consideration. The question was whether the word "regulation" would E include regularisation of the contract labour in the establishment in which contract labour system was abolished, though it was not expressly provided. A Bench of three Judges had held that the word "regulation", in the absence of restrictive words, must be regarded as plenary in the larger public interest. By necessary implication it includes to do everything which F is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out the purposes in view. Accordingly, it was held that though no express provision was made in the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act to regularise the services of the contract labour, working in an establishment after the abolition of contract labour, by necessary implication, the word 'regulation' includes the power to regularise their services as permanent employees in the G establishment. Therefore, the word "regulate" the allotment of land to · members of Scheduled Tribes in scheduled area in the Fifth Schedule by Clause 5(2)(b) must be read as a whole to ensure regulation of the land only to and among the members of the Scheduled Tribes in the Scheduled area. In the light of the provisions contained in clause (a) of sub-para (2) H of para 5, there is implied prohibition on the State's power of allotment of

SAMATIIA v. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.)

its land to non-tribals in the Scheduled Areas. When so read there is no A incompatibility and inconsistency between the power of the executive Government and the Constitution and conjoint operation would elongate the good governance of the Scqeduled Areas. So, while prohibiting transfer of land between natural persons, i.e., tribles and non-tribals and preventing non-tribals to purchase from or transfer to another non-tribal, his right, B title of interest in the land in the scheduled area, at the same breathe would not be permissible for the Government to transfer their land to a non-tribal except for equally competing public purpose. The answer obviously should be that it is permissible' to the Government to transfer its lands to the non-tribals. This negatii~ answers leads to effectuate the constitutional objective to preserve the land in the scheduled area to the tribals, prohibits C the Government from allotting their land to the non- tribals; prohibit infiltration of the non-tribals into the scheduled area and prevents exploitation of the tribals by non- tribals in any form. This purposive interpretation would ensure distributive justice among the tribals in this behalf and elongates the constitutional commitment. Any other interpretation would D sow the seed beds to disintegrate the tribal autonomy, their tribal culture and frustrate empowerment of them, socially, economically and politically, to live a life of equality, dignity of person and equality of status. It would, therefore, be clear that the executive power of the State to dispose of its property under Article 298 is subject to the provisions in the E Fifth Schedule as an integral scheme. of the Constitution. The legisJative power of the State under Article 245 is also subject to the Fifth Schedule, to regulate the allotment of the Government land in the Scheduled Areas. Obviously, therefore; the State legislature of Andhra Pradesh has now imposed total prohibition under Mines Act to transfer its lands to the F non-tribals. Doubtless that under Article 298, the State exercises its power of disposal for public purpose. When two competing public purposes claim preferential policy decision, option to the State should normally be to elongate a,nd achieve constitutional goal. Secondly, the constitutional priority yields place to private purpose, though it is hedged by executive policy. As a facet of interpretation, the Court too adopts purposive inter- G pretation tool to effectuate the goals set down in the Constitution. Equally, the executive Government in its policy options requires to keep them in the backdrop and regulate disposal of their land-property in accordance with the constitutional policy, executive decision backed by Public policy and, at the same time, preserve paramount Tribal interest in the scheduled H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A area. No abstract principle could be laid in that behalf. Each case requires examination in the backdrop of the legislative/executive action,its effect on the constitutional objectives and the consequential result yields therefrom. The law relating to the power of the President under the Constitution of U.S.A. as has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. or the B executive power of the Queen under the scheme in English unwritten Constitution transformed by Convention does not assist us much in this behalf. Shri Chowdhary also cited an article "The Notion of a Living Constitution" written by William H. Rehnquist, the present Chief Justice of Supreme Court of USA [Texas Law Review Vol. 54, 693) emphasising that the Executive should have full freedom in exercising its executive C power and the Court cannot limit the executive power by interpretation of a statute or regulation. This also is of no assistance since the Constitution oUndia conferred express power of judicial review on the constitutional Courts, i.e., Supreme Court of India and High Courts under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution respectively. From the aforestated constitutional D perspective and the interpretation of the words 'person' and 'regulation' put up in the earlier parts of the judgment, the question arises: whether the word 'person' under Section 3(1) of the Regulation would include the State Government. Shri Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, conE tended that the word 'person' in Section 3(1)(a) requires interpretation, keeping in view the contextual -constitutional history of prohibition on transfer of the land by a tribal to a non-tribal including that of the Government land, differently depending upon the context in which it has occurred ·in the first part of Section 3(2)(a) the word 'person' may be F considered in a generic sense and in the second part thereof to mean a natural person. Prohibition on the transfer of the land by a tribal to a non-tribal visualises transfer between natural persons. The factum of membership of the person as a tribe does not necessarily cut down the width of the word 'person', namely, legal person taken alongside the natural person. The word 'person' requires interpretation in the natural sense of G the Context in which it is used. Legal person may be natural, artificial or statutory person. The words "whether or not" in clause 3(2) (a) are in the nature of clarification and it would not cut down the contextual meaning. The words "such person" in the first part of Section 3(1)(a) must be interpretated to mean transferor, namely, artificial or statutory person H apart from natural person. The objection of Section 3(1)(a) would be

SAMATIIA v. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.)

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