State of Karnataka by Its Chief Secretary v. State of T. N. by Its Chief Secretary [dipak Misra, Cji] 829 the State of Karnataka by Its Chief Secretarystate of Tamil Nadu by Its Chief Secretary & Ors.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
16 February 2018
Judge
Justice Dipak Misra
Neutral citation
2018 INSC 153
Reported in
[2018] 5 S.C.R. 829
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Article 262 Constitution, Article 136 Constitution, Article 363 Constitution, Article 131 Constitution
Subject
Civil

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STATE OF KARNATAKA [2018] BY 5ITS S.C.R. CHIEF 829SECRETARY v. STATE

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY

v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 2453 of 2007) FEBRUARY 16, 2018

[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, AMITAVA ROY AND A.M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.] Inter-State Water Disputes: Water dispute raised by State of Tamil Nadu – Against State of Karnataka – Alleging that the executive action taken by State of Karnataka in constructing Kabini, Hemavathi, Harangi, Swrnavathi and other projects has affected the interest of the State of Tamil Nadu in the waters of Cauvery, an inter-State river – Also alleged that the executive action were in violation of agreements entered into between the erstwhile Madras Presidency and State of Mysore in the years 1892 and 1924 – Central Government referred the dispute to Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal – Claims also raised by State of Kerala to the waters of river Cauvery on account of the areas transferred to it from the State of Madras after State Reorganization Act, 1956 – Claim by Union Territory of Puducherry in the waters of Cauvery river since it was located within Cauvery basin and seven branches of Cauvery did flow through the said region – Tribunal held the agreements of 1892 and 1924 as valid and determined the utilisable quantum of waters of the Cauvery to be 740 thousand Million Cubic Feet (TMC) – The Tribunal allocated the waters of Cauvery, following the principle of equitable apportionment – It allocated 419 TMC to State of Tamil Nadu, 270 TMC to State of Karnataka 30 TMC to State of Kerala and 7 TMC to Union Territory of Puducherry – In addition, the Tribunal reserved 10 TMC for environmental protection and 4 TMC for inevitable escapages into the sea – Aggrieved by allocation of sharing of waters of Cauvery awarded by the Tribunal, appeals by way of SLP were filed by the States of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala – Held: Waters of an inter-State river passing through corridors of the riparian States constitute a national asset and no single State can claim exclusive ownership of its water – Principle

of equitable apportionment internationally recognized by the Helsinki Rules, Compione Rules and Berlin Rules which have also been incorporated in 1987 and 2002 National Water Policies, have been regarded to be the guiding factors for resolving disputes qua apportionment of waters of an inter-Sate river – The Tribunal was correct in its approach – Tribunal correctly determined the irrigated area of Tamil Nadu – Allocation of water to Tamil Nadu for domestic and industrial purposes and allocation of water to Kerala and Puducherry also requires no interference – Reservation of 10 TMC for environment protection and 4 TMC for inevitable escapages into sea also does not need any interference – However, the admission of facts and empirical data suggests that around 20 TMC of water is available in Tamil Nadu which has not been taken into account by the Tribunal – Therefore, keeping in view the risks associated with over-extraction of groundwater, 10 TMC of the available groundwater in Tamil Nadu to be taken into account for final determination of State of Tamil Nadu – Tribunal has also drastically reduced the share of Karnataka towards Domestic and Industrial purpose – Therefore, 4.75 TMC is awarded to Karnataka for this purpose – Thus, it would be appropriate to award to the State of Karnataka an additional 14.75 TMC (10 TMC on account of availability of groundwater in the State of Tamil Nadu and 4.75 for domestic and drinking purposes) – Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 – ss. 3 and 5. Inter-State Water Disputes:

Water Dispute – Between States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka – Pertaining to waters of Inter-State river Cauvery – Complainant State (State of Tamil Nadu) inter-alia alleged that the executive action of State of Karnataka (affecting the interest of State of Tamil Nadu) was in violation of the agreements entered into, in the years 1892 and 1924 between the erstwhile State of Mysore and Madras Presidency, in respect of distribution of waters of Cauvery river – State of Karnataka questioned the validity of the agreements on the ground of applicability of doctrine of paramountcy; and on the ground of unconscionability of the agreements – On appeal, held: After coming into force of Indian Independence Act, 1947, doctrine of paramountcy has no room for application – The agreements had neither any political arrangement

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

nor touched any facet of sovereignty of India, but they covered areas of larger public interest – The agreements did not come to an end either after coming into force of 1947 Act or after coming into force of the Constitution – State of Mysore might not have bargaining power in 1892 or 1924 but such power came alive after the 1947 Act or coming into force of the Constitution – State of Karnataka did not choose to denounce the same – Even after coming into force of States Reorganization Act, 1956, newly formed States did not raise any dispute to controvert the agreements – Thus, the State of Karnataka waived its right to question the legal tenability of the agreements – Therefore, the agreements are neither inoperative nor completely extinct – However, 1924 agreement was not intended to be of permanent character – It contemplated a fixed term of 50 years and its continuance after 50 years was dependent on certain aspects – Therefore, the 1924 agreement expired after 50 years i.e. in the year 1974 – Indian Independence Act, 1947 – s. 7 – States Reorganization Act, 1956.

Inter-State Water Disputes: Complaint by State of Tamil Nadu – Against State of Karnataka – Regarding allocation of waters of inter-State river Cauvery – Adjudicability of the complaint – Held: When States make a request under Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 for adjudication of disputes, interest of the inhabitants of the State is involved – Both the States are governed by parens patria principle – The matter deserved to be adjudicated on the bedrock of equal status of the States and doctrine of equitability – Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956. Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956: s.6A – Interpretation of – Held: Central Government does not have discretion to frame scheme u/s. 6A – Framing of the Scheme is exclusively meant for implementation of the award or as the same gets modified by Supreme Court.

Constitution of India: Arts. 143, 262 and 363 – Inter-State water dispute – Between States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka – Non-maintainability of the disputes on the basis of agreements entered between erstwhile State of Mysore and Madras presidency – Held: Bar under s. 363 is not applicable

in the present case as the issues in the present case have no connection with the concept of sovereignty and integrity of India. Constitution of India:

Art. 136 – Jurisdiction under – To entertain the appeal against Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal – In view of s. 6(2) of Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 – Held: The legislative intendment of s. 6(2) is not to create any embargo on the jurisdiction of Supreme Court – The fiction has been created for limited purpose of giving binding effect to the award passed by the Tribunal – Section 6 cannot be interpreted in an absolute mechanical manner and the words “same force as an order of decision” cannot be treated as an order or decree for the purpose of excluding jurisdiction of Supreme Court – A provision should not be interpreted to give a different colour which has a technical design rather than serving object of the legislation – Hence, s. 6(2) does not bar jurisdiction conferred on Supreme Court u/Art. 136 – Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 – s.6(2) – Interpretation of Statutes. Interpretation of Statutes:

Rules of interpretation – Purposive interpretation – A provision should not be interpreted to given a different colour which has a technical design rather than serving object of the legislation. Doctrines/Principles: Doctrine of paramountcy – Applicability of – Discussed. Principle of apportionment – Discussed.

Partly allowing the appeal filed by State of Karnataka and disposing of the appeals filed by the States of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, the Court HELD: 1. Doctrine of Paramountcy and its extinction on coming into force of the Indian Independence Act, 1947:

1.1 It cannot be said that after coming into force of the 1947 Act and thereafter the Constitution of India, the agreements of 1892 and 1924 became inoperative and totally extinct. [Para 84] [932-A] 1.2 After coming into force of the 1947 Act, the doctrine of paramountcy has no room for application, as the Government of

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

India became the full sovereign authority. The two agreements of 1892 and 1924 had neither any political arrangement nor touched any facet of sovereignty of India. Per contra, the agreements cover the areas of larger public interest which do not have any political element and in this backdrop, the agreements are neither inoperative nor completely extinct. [Para 404(i)] [1120-D]

H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior and others v. Union of India and another (1971) 1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9 – relied on. Dr. Babu Ram Saksena v. State [1950] SCR 573 : AIR 1950 SC 155; Hemchand Devchand v. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal (1905) 33 IA 1 : (1906) ILR 33 Cal 219; State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala and another (2014) 12 SCC 696 : [2014] 12 SCR 875; Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India and others (2006) 3 SCC 643 : [2006] 2 SCR 740; Virendra Singh and others v. State of U.P. [1955] 1 SCR 415 : AIR 1954 SC 447 – referred to. “Integration of Indian States” by Mr. V.P. Menon – referred to. 2. Unconscionability of the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 : On a keen scrutiny of the evidence on record, there is no proof that the State of Mysore, at the relevant time, had denounced the agreements. The agreements did not automatically come to an end either after coming into force of the 1947 Act or after coming into force of the Constitution because of the “Standstill Agreement” and further owing to the fact that there had been no denouncement. The bargaining power may not have existed in 1892 or 1924 but definitely, the said power to bargain or to choose, came alive after the 1947 Act and, undoubtedly, after the Constitution came into being. However, the State of Karnataka chose not to do so. Therefore, the agreements should not be declared as void because of unconscionability. [Para 119] [957D, E-G] New Bihar Biri Leaves Co. and others v. State of Bihar and others (1981) 1 SCC 537 : [1981] 2 SCR 417;

Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Another (1986) 3 SCC 156 : [1986] 2 SCR 278; O.P. Bhandari v. ITDC (1986) 4 SCC 337 : [1986] 3 SCR 923; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 600 : [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142; Balmer Lawrie & Company Limited and others v. Partha Sarathi Sen Roy and others (2J) (2013) 8 SCC 345 : [2013] 4 SCR 1018; West Bengal State Electricity Board and others v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and others AIR 1985 SC 722 : [1985] 2 SCR 1014 – referred to.

Black’s Law Dictionary by Bryan Garner, Editor-Chief (10th Edition, Thomson Reuters); Rivers in International Law (1959) by F.J. Berber; L. Oppenheim International Law (8th Edition); Chitty on Contracts (25th Edition, Vol.I) – referred to.

3. Status of Agreements after coming into force of States Reorganisation Act, 1956:

Nothing has been brought on record to show that any dispute was raised after the Reorganisation Act, 1956 came into force, by the newly formed States to controvert the agreements of 1892 and 1924. As the facts clearly depict, it continued. The State of Karnataka had waived its right to question the legal tenability of the agreement. It remains a fact that both the agreements with the Regulations remained in force despite coming into effect of the Reorganisation Act, 1956. [Para 133] [968-F-H] M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1958 SC 816 : [1959] SCR 729; Amar Chand Butail v. Union of India and others AIR 1964 SC 1658; Firm Bansidhar Premsukhdas v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 40 : [1966] Suppl. SCR 81; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Balbir Singh & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 242 : [1976] 2 SCR 115; Ranjan Sinha v. Ajay Kumar Vishwakarma 2017 (7) SCLAE 234; State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. [1964] 6 SCR 846; Sher Singh and others v. Financial Commissioner of Planning, Punjab and others (1987) 2 SCC 439 : [1987] 2 SCR 691 – referred to.

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE 4. Issue relating to expiry of the agreements: A scrutinized perusal of the 1924 Agreement reveals that the said Agreement was never intended to be of permanent character. On the contrary, it contemplated a fixed term of 50 years. Having perused the clause in entirety and considering the words, namely, ‘reconsideration’, ‘mutually agreed upon’ and ‘be open to’, it is clear that certain clauses in the Agreement had a restricted life span. Inasmuch as the relevant clauses which are open to reconsideration are absolutely essential parts of the contract and it is extremely difficult to place appropriate construction on the contract without them. The clauses in the contract do not indicate permanency but, on the contrary, indicate fixed term. The continuance of contract, was further a subjective consideration and merely agreed upon and, therefore, to hold that it continued solely because of the experience gathered would not be appropriate and it would be contrary to the concept of understanding the clauses in a contract to give effect to its continuance. The continuance after 50 years was dependent on certain aspects and, therefore, the agreement expired after 50 years i.e. in the year, 1974. [Paras 404(v), 146 and 147] [1121-A; 975-H; 976-A-D] In Re: Presidential Reference (Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal) 1993 (Supp) (1) SCC 96 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 497 – referred to. 5. Infraction of Article 363 of the Constitution of India and non- maintainability of the dispute on the basis of agreements of 1892 and 1924: The issues in the present case have no connection, whatsoever, with the concepts of sovereignty and integrity of India and, therefore, the bar under Article 363 of the Constitution of India is not attracted. It is not correct to say that the two agreements have to be looked into for the purpose of adjudication of the water dispute by the Tribunal because of Article 262 of the Constitution. [Paras 404(ii) and 104] [948-C; 1120-E-F]

State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala and another (2014) 12 SCC 696 : [2014] 12 SCR 875 – followed.

H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior and others v. Union of India and another (1971) 1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9 – relied on. State of Seraikella v. Union of India and another [1951] SCR 474 : AIR 1951 SC 253 – distinguished.

State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (2017) 3 SCC 362 : [2016] 8 SCR 499; In Re: Presidential Reference (Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal) 1993 (Supp) (1) SCC 96: [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 497; Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 515 : AIR 1963 SC 953 – referred to. 6. Adjudicability of the Complaint:

6.1 It is not correct to say that the complaint deserves to be dismissed in the absence of proven injury. The complaint does not contain the words “prejudicially affected’ but the antecedents of the complaint, the view of the Central Government while referring water dispute and the expression of opinion of this Court in *Presidential Reference (Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal) case. In the backdrop of the language of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 the expiration by the efflux of time and the role of this Court, the Court is not inclined to entertain such a plea. The matter (complaint) deserves to be adjudicated on merits. [Paras 149 and 150] [977-F; 978-B-C, D] *In Re: Presidential Reference (Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal) 1993 (Supp) (1) SCC 96: [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 497 – referred to. 6.2 On a perusal of the Helsinki Rules, 1966, it is clear that the said Rules have not accepted the Harmon doctrine. It has, on the contrary, laid emphasis on the need of equitable utilization of such international rivers. It is noticeable from Articles IV and V of the Helsinki Rules that they recognize equitable use of water by each basin State, setting out the factors, not exhaustive though, to be collectively taken into consideration for working out the reasonable and equitable share of the riparian States. The indicated factors, inter alia, include the geography of the basin, the hydrology of the basin, the climate, past utilization of waters,

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

economic and social needs of each basin State, population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State, availability of other resources and the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State. The emphasis clearly is that in determining the reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion is to be reached on the whole. [Para 161] [985-G-H; 986-A-B]

State of Wyoming v. State of Colorado 259 US 419 (1922); State of Nebraska v. State of Wyoming 325 US 589 (1945); Kansas v. Colorado 206 US 46 (1906); Colorado v. Kansas 206 US 46 (1906); State of New Jersey v. State of New York 283 US 336 (1931); State of Connecticut v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts 282 US 660 (1931); State of Colorado v. State of New Mexico 459 US 176 (1982) – referred to. 6.3 The definition of ‘water disputes’ in s. 2(c) of the InterState Water Disputes Act, 1956 and the provisions contained in Section 3 have to be given due significance. Section 3 protects the right of inhabitants of a State. [Para 165] [987-E] 6.4 When the States make a request under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 for adjudication of the disputes, the interest of the inhabitants of the State is involved. Both the States are governed by the parens patriae principle. The Tribunal in its approach primarily referred to Helsinki Rules, 1966. The Tribunal was correct in its approach. For determining reasonable and equitable shares, relevant factors have to be considered together, in reaching a conclusion. Keeping in view the various intricacies involved in the present case and the duty ordained upon this Court by the Constitution of India, the matter deserved to be adjudicated on the bedrock of equal status of the States and doctrine of equitability. Resultantly, it cannot be said that the complaint of the State of Tamil Nadu did not warrant any adjudication. [Paras 165 and 404(vi)] [987-E-F; 1121-B-D]

7. Principles of apportionment to be followed: 7.1 The waters of an inter-State river passing through the corridors of the riparian States constitute national asset and

cannot be said to be located in any one State. Being in a state of flow, no State can claim exclusive ownership of such waters or assert a prescriptive right so as to deprive the other States of their equitable share. It has been propounded therein that the right to flowing water is well-settled to be a right incident to property in the land and is a right publici juris of such character, that while it is common and equal to all through whose land it runs and no one can obstruct or divert it, yet as one of the beneficial gifts of Nature, each beneficiary has a right to just and reasonable use of it. [Para 363] [1092-A-C] 7.2 To conceive that equality rests on equal sharing of water within an arithmetical formula, would be fundamentally violative of the established conception of equitable apportionment because the said concept inheres a multiple factors. It is the obligation of the Tribunal to address the same and the duty of this Court is to adjudge within the permissible parameters of the justification of the said adjudication. The dissension has to be addressed in the backdrop of equal Status of the States and the doctrine of equitability. [Para 364] [1092-H; 1093-A-B] 7.3 The principles laid down in Helsinki Rules can be regarded as functional dynamics while equitably distributing the water in an inter-State river disputes. The salient feature of all these factors has to have inherent variability and inevitable flexibility thereof having regard to the local conditions, for it is difficult to ignore the undeniable and common emphasis necessary to ensure beneficial use of the available resources for a basin State and logically for its dependent populace warranted by the economic and social needs. While determining the said needs, amongst others, past and existing utilization of the water have to be borne in mind. To remain oblivious to the same would amount to playing possum with the doctrine of equitable distribution in praesenti. The noticeable quintessence of the determinants is the predication for a delicate balance in adjustments of the needs based on realistic, reasonable, judicious and equitable canons so much so that while satisfying the requirements of a basin State, a co-basin State is not subjected to any substantial injury. Though in terms of Articles VI and VII of Helsinki Rules, any other category of users is not entitled to any inherent preference over

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

any other use or category of users, yet the precedence of an existing reasonable use of a basin State over a proposed future use of a co-basin State has been recognized. Significantly, in terms of Article VIII, an existing reasonable use may continue in operation, unless the factors justifying its continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the conclusion that it be modified or terminated so as to accommodate a competing incompatible use clearly signifying that an existing use is also not absolute in terms and is subject to exigency based adjustments. [Para 367] [1094-H; 1095-A-E]

7.4 Substantially on the same lines is the Campione Consolidation of ILA Rules on International Water Resources 1966-1999. The distinguishing attribute of these Rules is the inclusion of water of an aquifer, i.e., underground water or “fossil waters” intercepted by the boundary between the two or more States as international ground-water so much so that it would form an international basin or part thereof qua the relevant factors to determine reasonable equitable share. These Rules include the criterion of interdependence of underground waters and other waters, including any interconnections between aquifers and any leaching into aquifers caused by activities in areas under the jurisdiction of the basin states. [Para 368] [1095-E-G] 7.5 Another set of rules on international drainage basin is called the Berlin Rules adopted by the International Law Association in its Berlin Conference in the year 2004. On the aspect of equitable utilization, Article 12 thereof provides that basin States, would in their respective territories manage the waters of an international drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner, having due regard for the obligation not to cause significant harm to other basin States and in particular, the basin States, would develop and use the waters of the basin in order to attain optimal and sustainable use thereof. The interest of the other basin States are to be kept in view. Article 13 of the Rules catalogues as well the relevant factors to determine the equitable and reasonable use of a basin State. While reiterating in essence the Rules as prescribed by the Helsinki Rules, the additional aspect to be considered is minimization of environmental harm. Article 14 of these Rules stipulates that in

determining an equitable and reasonable use, the States shall first allocate waters to satisfy vital human needs and that no other use or category of uses shall have an inherent preference over any other use or category of uses. Article 17 postulates that every individual has a right of access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water to meet his vital human needs and it is the obligation of the States to ensure the implementation of right of access to water on a non-discriminatory basis. [Paras 369 and 370] [1095-G-H; 1096-A-D] 7.6 The common thread decipherable from these Rules is the universal acknowledgment of the principle of equitable utilization as an effective and workable tool for the management of waters of an international drainage basin. [Para 371] [1096-DE] 7.7 The National Water Policy of 1987 sounded a threshold caveat that water is a prime natural resource, a basic human need and a precious national asset. While emphasizing that this resource is one of the most crucial elements in development planning, the policy announced that it is a scarce and precious national asset to be planned, developed and conserved on an integrated environmentally sound basis, keeping in view the needs of the States concerned. It underlined that resource planning in the case of water has to be done for a hydrological unit such as drainage basin as a whole or for a sub-basin and that all individual developmental projects and proposals should be formulated by the States and considered within the framework of such an overall plan for a basin or sub-basin so that the best possible combination of options can be made. As is manifest from the policy, it enjoined that water should be made available to water deficient areas by transfer from other areas including transfers from one river basin to another based on national perspectives after taking into account the requirements of the areas/basins. That apart, making provision for drinking water should be a primary consideration which was also highlighted. As regards the ground-water resources, it was marked that exploitation thereof should be so regulated as not to exceed the recharging possibilities as also to ensure social equity and to prevent ingress of sea water into sweet water aquifers. In the realm of planning and operation of systems,

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water allocation priorities were broadly outlined as (a) drinking water, (b) irrigation, (c) hydropower, (d) navigation and (e) industrial and other uses. [Paras 372 and 373] [1096-F-H; 1097A-C]

7.8 The 1987 policy laid stress that in view of vital importance of water for human and animal life, for maintaining ecological balance and for economic and developmental activities of all kinds and considering its increasing scarcity, the planning and management of this resource and its optimal, economical and equitable use has become a matter of utmost urgency. It emphasized that the success of the National Water Policy would depend entirely on the development and maintenance of a national consensus and commitments to its underlying principles and objectives. Significantly, the Policy, which is a national charter for Planning and Development of Water Resources for its disciplined and judicious utilization recognizes and accepts it to be scarce and valuable bounty of nature to be developed, conserved and put to planned use on an environmentally sound basis with due regard to the needs of the State concerned. The Policy, thus, sustains the concept of basin State as contemplated in the Helsinki Rules, Campione Rules and Berlin Rules. [Para 374] [1097-D-F] 7.9 The National Water Policy of 2002 which is a revised and updated form of the earlier model, reiterates the emphasis on the need for planning, development and management of the water resources from the national stand point. Pertaining to water allocation priorities, this Policy added to the list, in particular, ecology and agro industries and non-agricultural industries, qualifying that the priorities as enumerated could be modified or added if warranted by the specific considerations of the areas/ regions. The primacy of drinking water was reiterated. On the aspect of ground water development, it was stated that a periodical re-assessment of the ground water potential on the scientific basis should be made taking into consideration the quality of water available and the economic viability of its extraction. Same caution against over-exploitation of ground water was sounded. It was, inter alia, mandated that adequate safe drinking water facility should be provided to the entire population, both in urban and in

rural areas, and irrigation and multipurpose projects should invariably include in it drinking water component wherever there is no alternative source of drinking water. It was clarified that drinking water needs of human beings and animals should be the first charge on any available water. Qua irrigation, the Policy stated that planning either in an individual project or in a basin as a whole should take into account the irrigability of land, cost effective irrigation options possible from all available sources of water and appropriate irrigation techniques for optimising water use efficiency. The aspect that the irrigation intensity should be such as to extend the benefits of irrigation to a large number of farm families as much as possible, keeping in view the need to maximize production, was also underlined. It was most importantly provided that water sharing/distribution amongst the States should be guided by national perspective with due regard to the availability of water resources and the needs within the river basin. The Policy, therefore, did not bar as such the sharing or allocation of water in areas within the basin State. In conclusion, the Policy recorded that its success would depend entirely on evolving and maintaining national consensus and commitment to its underlying principles and objectives. It also laid emphasis on the needs of the community that requires to be taken into account for the development and management of water resources. [Para 376] [1098-A-G] 7.10 The national policies of the country therefore, evidently supplement and consolidate the prescriptions of the Helsinki Rules, Campione Rules and Berlin Rules in the matter of ascertainment of reasonable and equitable share of water in an inter-state river. [Para 377] [1098-H] 7.11 The Helsinki Rules and the other Rules envisage a basin State on the issue of equitable apportionment of an interState river. Though the Rules predicate that in determining the share of one basin State, the other co-basin States would not be subjected to substantial injury, yet the clear emphasis is to fulfill the economic and social needs of the population of the State and in the sphere of irrigation, its farmer community. Indubitably, the principle of apportionment would apply uniformly to all river basins in a State. The sharing of an inter-State river, as the professed

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norms of distribution suggest, has to be with the spirit of harmonious disposition and equanimous dispensation. The norms or the factors suggested can never be exhaustive and designed only a balanced framework of pragmatic measures to ensure beneficial use of water resources in an inter-State river on needbased application thereof and reciprocal adjustments for common good. In the regime of a welfare State wedded to the guarantees enshrined in the National Charter, any yardstick for distribution of any national asset like water would have to be essentially in furtherance thereof. The criteria identified in the Rules and supplemented by the national policies in letter and spirit, though in quite detail, can only be construed as illustrative and cannot be perceived as a strait-jacket formula or put in a compartment of mathematical exactitude to exclude any other consideration or exigency to effect a desirable apportionment of water of an inter-State river depending on the prevalent eventualities. Having regard to the geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, hydrogeological, climatic, ecological and other fluvial phenomena attendant on time, the spectrum of priorities and the factors associated therewith are bound to vary. [Para 377] [1099-A-E]

7.12 While no precise formula can be adopted, there has to be a sincere and pragmatic endeavour to have a rational amalgam of globally accepted norms and the local necessities founded on the doctrine of fairness and equity. The factors already enumerated, may inter se demand precedence of one over the other depending on the ground realities, the ultimate test being to ensure that the allocations on the basis thereof in favour of one basin State ought not to be substantially detrimental to the co-basin States. The order of precedence in the areas of necessity, as set out in the National Policy, is not incompatible with the acknowledged determinants for ascertaining the reasonable and equitable share of an inter-State river. Nevertheless, the weightage of one item of need would depend in a given situation on the degree and priority thereof thereby necessitating grant of preference of one over the other in departure of the sequence set out in the policy. This again is to underline the attribute of variability in the approach of application of the otherwise identified criteria, the ultimate goal being equitable apportionment of the resources. This concept gains more significance where the

resource is scarce and inadequate qua the demand thereof. It is warrantable as the dispute involves the inhabitants of one State with the inhabitants of another State. Such involvement by statutory command engulfs the principle of obtaining situational adjustment having due regard to priority. [Para 377] [1099-F-H; 1100-A-B]

7.13 The factors as set out in the Helsinki Rules and endorsed as well as supplemented by the Campione Rules and the Berlin Rules and further consolidated by our national policies as above are efficient, rational, objective and pragmatic guidelines to conduct any exercise for determining the reasonable and equitable share of basin States in the water of an inter-state river like Cauvery as in the present case. With these guidelines at disposal, the endeavour has to be essentially to ensure an appropriate balance of the genuine competing demands and interests of the basin States. The balancing has to be done in a pragmatic and feasible manner so that it will be ultimately functional and meet the aspirations of the riparian States. In such a working process, there has to be adjustment of the available resources. That apart, the process indeed has to be informed with egalitarian vision for achieving utilitarian ends keeping in view the inclusive spirit and the pluralistic ethos. Thus viewed and understood, periodical reviews to update the allocations merited by changes in the aforementioned natural and environmental phenomena bearing on the resources for supply and resultant reorientation of the inter se needs of the basin States, would have to be unfailingly undertaken on time. [Paras 377 and 378] [1100-C-F]

In Re: Presidential Reference (Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal) 1993 (Supp) (1) SCC 96 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 497 – referred to. 8. Determination of ‘irrigated areas” in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka:

8.1 The Tribunal, after adopting the principle of equitable apportionment, in the process of computing the reasonable and equitable shares of the basin States as the first initiative, determined the irrigated areas of the States and in doing so, noted from the report of the Cauvery Fact Finding Committee submitted in the year 1972 that the utilization of waters of Tamil Nadu

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

including Karaikal region of the Union Territory of Puducherry, Mysore and Kerala had been 566.60 TMC, 176.82 TMC and 5 TMC respectively. In view of the fact that river Cauvery is deficit in its water content compared to the demands of the riparian States involved, restrictions and savings in the matter of use thereof are not only necessary but also natural corollaries. In that view of the matter, it is incumbent to identify the areas under irrigation with the expansion thereof with time, together with the crop pattern and the suitability thereof, having regard to the extent of utilization of the deficient surface flow available. On the basis of the reports of the various Committees and the recorded data, the bearing of the 1924 Agreement in particular over the march of events cannot also be totally disregarded. [Para 380] [1101-C-E, G-H; 1102-A]

In Re: Presidential Reference (Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal) 1993 (Supp) (1) SCC 96: [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 497 – referred to. 8.2 The Tribunal, after taking into account all the factors, vis-a-vis Tamil Nadu, applied the restrictions to work out the irrigated area to which it would be entitled to assert its share of allocation, namely, no area for summer paddy; area of summer paddy raised prior to 1924 to be replaced by semi-dry crop; annual intensity of irrigation to be restricted to 100%; cropping period to be restricted within the irrigated season, i.e., 31st June to 31st January and ambitious lift irrigation schemes to be discouraged. It, thus, quantified such area for Tamil Nadu to be 24.71 lakh acres against its claim of 29.26 lakh acres. As far as Karnataka is concerned, the Tribunal noticed that in the pre 1924 Agreement era, irrigation in the then State of Mysore was primarily from direct diversion channels from the rivers together with the system of tank irrigation and that in the absence of any reservoir, the waters of Cauvery and its tributaries like Kabini, Hemawathi, Harangi and Suvaranwathi used to flow through the State but their ultimate destination was the Delta State of the then State of Madras as a result whereof, even as admitted by the State of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka could develop only 3.14 lakh acres of land by 1924. This inability of the State of Karnataka to develop its land for irrigation in the background of its persistent cavil of being deprived of its legitimate share and use of the water of Cauvery

cannot be ignored. It is a recorded fact that though under the 1924 Agreement, Karnataka in terms of the relevant provisions thereof ought to have developed 7.45 lakh acres by 1974, it could achieve only 2.15 lakh acres. However, the Tribunal in all allowed 18.85 lakh acres of area to Karnataka being under irrigation prior to 1974 against its claim of 20.98 lakh acres. In case of Karnataka as well, the Tribunal excluded the development of second crop in view of the scarcity of water in the basin with due regard to the rainfall pattern and even suggested restrictions on the crop variety and the duration thereof. On an overall consideration of the relevant materials and having regard to the imperative of economy of consumption of water, the approach of the Tribunal cannot be found fault with having regard to the existing situation. [Para 380] [1102-A-G] 9. Allocation of water for “irrigation needs” in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka:

9.1 The Tribunal, on the basis of the overall materials before it, took note, amongst others, of the crop pattern, duration of the crops, consumption of water thereby, soil conditions conducive thereto, rainfall pattern, Delta and system efficiency along with the drought conditions of Karnataka as projected by it, in conjunction with the testimony of the expert witnesses of both the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, and in the interest of economical use of the water of the deficit basin, allocated 250.62 TMC to Karnataka for its irrigated area of 18.85 lakh acres and 390.85 TMC to Tamil Nadu for its irrigated area of 24.71 lakh acres. Further, the Tribunal has considered the crop water requirement, namely, crop duration, ET crop, puddling requirements, percolation losses, effective rainfall and system efficiency. [Para 382] [1104-A-C] 9.2 Keeping in view the accepted principles, neither the analysis undertaken by the Tribunal nor the findings relatable thereto can be regarded as implausible by any standard. Certain parameters have been exhaustively examined by the Tribunal on the basis of the materials brought on record with supporting reasons and, therefore, the conclusion as regards assessment of water for irrigation needs cannot be termed as untenable, warranting interference in the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [Para 382] [1104C-E]

9.3 The assessment by the Tribunal, encapsules the factual and characteristically complex situation. Lands have already been irrigated. It is an issue of sustenance at the ground reality level. To reduce the allocation of water on this score would be inequitable. Therefore, in the obtaining fact situation, no interference is warranted. That apart, having regard to the degree of wiredrawn complexities involved, requiring in-depth expertise to dislodge the otherwise well-reasoned findings of the Tribunal founded on an exhaustive appreciation of the materials on record, the determination made by it in this regard cannot be upset. [Para 383] [1105-B-C]

10. Water allocation for the State of Kerala: In respect of the claim of Kerala, it is a matter of record that rainfall is evenly distributed over the months of May to November so much so that occasional support by artificial irrigation is required in the instances of shortfall in rains and that too during small periods. Against its demand of 99.8 TMC under different heads, it had demanded 35 TMC for transbasin diversion to generate hydro-electrical power. The Tribunal rejected the State’s request for transbasin diversion for hydro-power projects which, in terms of the National Water Policy of 2002, was even otherwise lower in preference to drinking water and irrigation. The Tribunal in adjudging the State’s share did notice that it had been unsuccessful in furthering its projects so much so that pending the completion and utilization thereof, the unutilized water allocated to it subject to the mechanism set up by the Cauvery Management Board/Regulatory Authority, would be received by Tamil Nadu. The Tribunal examined the information furnished by it in the common format and adjudged 29.76 TMC which was rounded upto 30 TMC as its share after due regard to its demand, amongst others, pertaining to different projects in Kabani, Bhavani, and Pambar basins having regard to their individual features and corresponding crop water requirement. This allocation included the share for domestic and industrial water purposes as well with the population projection for 2011. The findings of the Tribunal are not belied by the materials in

support thereof and, therefore, the same is accepted by this Court. [Para 384] [1105-E-H; 1106-A] Tamil Nadu Cauvery Neerppasana Vilaiporulgal Vivasayigal Nala Urimai Padhugappu Sangam v. Union of India and others (1990) 3 SCC 440 : [1990] 3 SCR 83 – referred to. 11. Water allocation for the Union Territory of Puducherry:

With regard to the claim of Union Territory of Puducherry for Karaikal region, it is a matter of record that because of its close proximity to the sea, the ground water by its nature is unsuitable for drinking and irrigation purposes and, thus, the Tribunal having regard to its irrigated area of 43000 acres allowed its second crop in departure from the yardstick applied for Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and granted 6.35 TMC by way of crop water requirement. It also relieved the Union Territory of the application of 20% consumptive utility formula while assessing its domestic and industrial water requirements. In the absence of any convincing reason to determine otherwise, the adjudication of the Tribunal on this count does not deserve any interference. [Para 385] [1106-B-D] 12. Recognition of ground water as an additional source in Tamil Nadu: 12.1 While exploring the possibility of ground water as an additional source to be conjunctively used along with the surface flow of river Cauvery, the factual matrix reveals, based on empirical data, that the contributions thereto are from surface water through infiltration into the ground by way of natural recharge, stream flow, lakes and reservoirs. The recharge of ground water is principally from rainfall as well as artificial modes, namely, application of water to irrigate crops, flooding of areas caused by overflowing of streams to their sites and seepage from unlined canals, tanks and other sources. Ground water, as the study by the Central Ground Water Board, Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India attests, caters to more than 45% of irrigation in the country. As against the stand of Tamil Nadu that the ground water within its Delta areas is mainly by way of recharge from the supplies of Mettur Dam which really is a

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

component of the surface flow of river Cauvery and further that the same is utilized by the farmers for raising of early nurseries ahead of releases from Mettur and for irrigating belated crops after stoppage of Mettur releases, exhaustive studies undertaken, amongst others, by the Central Ground Water Board, Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India, Irrigation Commission, 1972 and United Nations Development Programme evidenced availability of replenishable ground water in Tamil Nadu. [Para 386] [1106-D-H; 1107-A]

12.2 The United Nations Development Programme in its report, amongst others, mentioned that yearly quantity of ground water that can be extracted by using centrifugal pumps in the Cauvery sub-basin, Vennar sub-basin and in the new Delta was 33.7 TMC, 5.4 TMC and 32.5 TMC respectively and in addition 56.5 TMC of ground water per year can also be made available in the Cauvery sub-basin by lowering seasonally ground water level to 10 meters depth below the regional ground water level. Other studies made by the team of the Central Ground Water Board indicated ground water potential in the Delta area of Tamil Nadu to the extent of 64 TMC. The report of Mr. W. Berber, Consultant, World Bank on Ground Water Resources of Cauvery Delta estimated the available ground water in Cauvery Delta at 51.56 TMC. Tamil Nadu, in its pleadings, admitted that the total ground water extraction during the year 1989 was approximately 28.4 TMC in the Cauvery sub-basin, 7.3 TMC in the Vennar sub-basin and 11.3 TMC in the Grand Anicut Canal area (new Delta area) totaling 47 TMC. Tamil Nadu, in its pleadings, also mentioned that in the old Delta, there was a scope of conjunctive use of ground water to the extent of 30 TMC. [Para 386] [1107-A-D] 12.3 On the basis of these recorded and empirical inputs, the Tribunal returned a finding that in a normal year when there would be regular releases of water from Mettur, the bulk of contribution to ground water in the Cauvery sub-basin would be from such releases, but in any case, the contribution from surface irrigation and rainfall could by no means be overlooked. On weighing the pros and cons and having regard to the severe limitations in the mechanism for assessment of ground water resource, the Tribunal made an extremely safe estimate of 20

TMC of ground water which, in its view, could be used by Tamil Nadu conjunctively with surface water. In categorical terms, the Tribunal clarified that this quantum was arrived at after excluding the component of ground water recharge from river water bilateral infiltration. [Para 386] [1107-E-F]

12.4 The assertion made on behalf of Karnataka that ground water being a renewable resource, if not extracted regularly, would reduce the absorption capacity of the underlying aquifer resulting in rain water/surface water turning into wastage as run-off and that the admission of Tamil Nadu in its pleadings of availability of 30/47 TMC as ground water warranted reduction of at least 20 TMC, as estimated by the Tribunal, from the final allocated share of Tamil Nadu with proportionate reduction in the quantum of water to be provided by Karnataka at the interstate border, assumes significance. Having regard to the overwhelming empirical data following multiple research studies by different authorities authenticating beyond doubt availability of replenishable ground water in the Delta areas of Tamil Nadu, 20 TMC of ground water quantified by the Tribunal is an eminently safe quantity to be accounted for in finally allocating/apportioning the share of Cauvery water. Though over-extraction of ground water in the absence of adequate replenishment and further in the areas proximate to the coastal zone is generally avoidable. However, in the attendant facts and circumstances, in view of the studied scrutiny of all pertinent facets of the issue by balancing all factors, at least 10 TMC of ground water available in the Delta areas of Tamil Nadu can be accounted for in finally determining the apportionment of the share of the otherwise deficit Cauvery basin without touching the yield of 740 TMC. [Para 386] [1107-H; 1108-A-D]

12.5 The national policies, do not, as such, debar the conjunctive use of ground water, the only caveat being periodical assessment on a scientific basis thereof and to guard against exploitation of the said resource so as not to exceed the recharging possibilities. [Para 387] [1108-E-F] 12.6 The series of research studies made by different authorities and the range of availability of ground water as indicated by the experimental data, not only demonstrate

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

availability of ground water in the Deltas in the State of Tamil Nadu but also that adjustment of 10 TMC thereof, as proposed, would be safely permissible. Noticeably, the kind of experiment and research that had been made in the realm of ground water availability in the Deltas of Tamil Nadu has not been undertaken in Karnataka and there is no reliable empirical data with regard thereto vis-a-vis that State. [Para 387] [1108-F-G]

13. Water allocation for Domestic and Industrial purposes in Tamil Nadu: With regard to the computation and allotment of water for domestic and industrial purposes in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, the Court is in agreement with the formulae noted and applied by the Tribunal in working out the per capita daily requirements of the urban and rural population. There is also no reason to differ from the postulation with regard to the percentage of actual utilization qua various heads of uses, namely, irrigation, power, domestic and municipal water supply, industrial use, etc., as referred to in the Report of the Cauvery Fact Finding Committee which, indicate that whereas 20% of the quantity of water supplied would be actually consumed in domestic use, only 2.5% would be effectively utilized for industrial use within the basin and the rest would return to the source, i.e., river or its tributaries or the reservoir, storage and canal, as the case may be. [Para 388] [1108G-H; 1109-A-C]

14. Water allocation for Domestic and Industrial purposes of State of Karnataka: 14.1 In its statement of case, Karnataka had registered its claim for water for domestic and industrial uses as : Bangalore water supply – 30 TMC; Urban water supply (other than Bangalore) – 10 TMC; Rural water supply – 6 TMC; Industrial uses – 4 TMC. This along with its claim for irrigation - 408 TMC and for power projects (reservoir losses 6 TMC and Thermal Power Project - 1 TMC) – totals to 465 TMC. Karnataka, therefore, registered a claim of 30 TMC only for the city of Bengaluru. [Para 389] [1109-C, D-F] 14.2 The Tribunal, at the first instance, presumed that 50% of drinking water requirement would be met from the ground

water sources as it is generally seen that wells and tube-wells in urban and rural areas cater to substantial requirement of drinking water. While noting that it had called for information in the common format whereby the States had been required to project their population for the year 2000 and 2025 for working out drinking water requirement, the Tribunal, however, decided to assess the drinking water requirement as in the year 2011. On the basis of the information available, it held that only 1/3rd of the Bengaluru city lay within the Cauvery basin. It, therefore, limited its consideration of drinking water requirement of Bengaluru to that area only which was located within the Cauvery basin. It noticed that Karnataka had stated that the existing and ongoing drinking water schemes for the city were for 14.52 TMC in all as in June 1990 and also that it had claimed 30 TMC for Bengaluru city in its projection for 2025. The Tribunal, was disposed to work out the water requirement for urban and rural population on the basis of population projection of the basin for the year 2011 by adopting the percentage decennial growth for the year 1981-1991 census, district-wise and the area of each district falling within the Cauvery basin as furnished by Karnataka. The population projection of Bengaluru city on the Census Report of 2011, as furnished by Tamil Nadu, was taken note of as well. The Tribunal next quantified the water requirement of urban population to be 8.70 TMC and for rural population at 8.52 TMC. The Tribunal, as a consequence, proceeded to quantify the total drinking water requirement for urban and rural population to be 17.22 TMC (8.70 TMC + 8.52 TMC). It next assumed that 50% of the drinking water requirement would be met from ground water and the remaining 50% from the surface water. Thus, segregating 8.75 TMC to be catered to by the surface water, it worked out the consumptive use, i.e., 20% of the total for the human population including live stock to be 1.75 TMC (20% of 8.75 TMC). [Para 389] [1109-F-H; 1110-A-E] 14.3 Apart from the fact that there is no basis whatsoever for the Tribunal for having quantified the water requirement for urban population to be 8.70 TMC as well as for rural population to be 8.52 TMC, its assumption that 50% thereof would be met from ground water only in view of its perception that wells and tube-wells in urban and rural areas cater to the substantial

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

requirement of drinking water, is unacceptable and cannot be sustained. That apart, in the context of Bengaluru city, especially in view of the growth and rise of population in space and time, the Tribunal’s approach of confining the entitlement of its population in general to only 1/3rd of their requirement only in view of the location of 1/3rd of its physical entity within the Cauvery basin demands scrutiny. True it is, the concept of a basin and the beneficial uses of the water thereof ought to be traced generally to the sites and population thereof located in the basin, nevertheless, the principles of apportionment and the conception of reasonable and equitable share perceived for such uses comprehend a basin State addressing the social and economic needs of its community as a whole. Territorial or geographical demarcation for extension of beneficial uses of an inter-state river basin cannot always be strictly construed. The perception of a basin State inheres in it a degree of flexibility in approach in a unique fact situation to justify a warrantable flexibility and departure from such rigoristic approach. The requirements of its dependent population as a whole for drinking and other domestic purposes, therefore, cannot justifiably, in the prevailing circumstances, be truncated to their prejudice only for consideration of its physical location in the context of the river basin. It will be inconceivable to have an artificial boundary and deny the population the primary need of drinking water. The Court holds so in the special features of the case keeping in view the global status the city has attained and further appreciating the doctrine of equitable proportionality on the bedrock of pressing human needs. [Para 390] [1110-E-H; 1111-A-B, D, E-F]

14.4 As per the national water policies, not only drinking water has been placed at the top of the other requirements in the order of priority, but it has also been predicated that adequate drinking water facilitates should be provided to the entire population, both in urban and rural areas and that drinking water should be made a primary consideration. It was declared as well that drinking water needs of human beings and animals should be the first charge on any available water. Article 14 of the Berlin Rules also mandates that in determining an equitable and reasonable use, the States shall first allocate water to satisfy vital human needs. [Para 391] [1111-F-H]

14.5 The approach of the Tribunal cannot be approved in the facts and circumstances. The allocation of water for drinking and domestic purposes for the entire city of Bengaluru has to be accounted for. Karnataka had claimed 14.52 TMC, i.e., 6.52 TMC for existing water schemes for Bengaluru and 8.00 TMC for the ongoing drinking water schemes for the city as in June, 1990. It had demanded 30 TMC as drinking water requirement for the city with the projection of 2025. Having regard to the percentage of decennial growth, as has been adopted by the Tribunal, in 2011, the demand of Karnataka for drinking water requirement for Bengaluru city would be in the vicinity of 24 TMC. Even excluding the computation for urban population of the State to be 8.70 TMC as arrived at by the Tribunal and that too without any basis and accepting the water requirement of rural population to be 8.52 TMC though also without any basis, the total figure representing drinking and domestic water requirement of the urban and rural population would be 32.5 TMC rounded upto 33 TMC in comparison to 46 TMC as claimed by Karnataka in its statement. Having rejected the assumption that 50% of the drinking water requirement would be met from ground water, this 33 TMC would, be a safe and acceptable figure qua drinking and domestic water requirement of the State of Karnataka for its urban and rural population. By applying the consumptive percentage of 20%, the volume of water to be allocated to Karnataka on this count would be 6.5 TMC in lieu of 1.75 awarded by the Tribunal, i.e., an increase by 4.75 TMC. [Para 392] [1112-A-E] 14.6 Qua the view against transbasin diversion, not only in the context of Bengaluru city, a digression from the confines of the concept of in-river basin would be justified, since the National Water Policy of 1987, in categorical terms, enjoined that water should be made available to water short areas by transfer from other areas including transfers from one river basin to another. This very conspicuously emphasizes on an inclusive comprehension and in a deserving case like Bengaluru city, it would not be incompatible with the letter and spirit of the factors that ought to inform the determination of reasonable and equitable share of water in an inter-state river as well as of the national policies formulated for planning and development of the precious natural resource involved. [Para 393] [1112-F-H]

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

15. Allocation of water towards environmental protection:

On the aspect of allocation qua environmental protection, the Tribunal, in order to secure the purity of environmental and ecological regime in view of the injudicious use of available resources by human beings compounded by population explosion and distorted lifestyles and having regard to the spectre of river water pollution on account of industrial development and deforestation leading to siltation of reservoirs, etc., assigned 10 TMC to be reserved from the common pool to meet the environmental aspects. The endeavour and the initiative of the Tribunal is appreciable, having regard to the sustenance of purity of environment to which every individual is entitled and also simultaneously obliged to contribute to cultivate the feeling of environmental morality. Therefore, the Court is not inclined to interfere in any manner in the allocation of the quantum of 10 TMC towards environmental protection. [Paras 394 and 395] [1113-A-D]

16. Revised allocation amongst competing States: 16.1 With the evolution of the principle of equitable apportionment which is really to ensure equal justice to the basin States, the concept of prescriptive right or right to the natural flow of any inter-state river has ceased to exist. Having regard to the historical facts which demonstrate the constraints suffered by Karnataka resulting in its limited access and use of the surface flow of Cauvery in spite of being the upper riparian State, compared to Tamil Nadu, then Madras presidency, as well as severally drought conditions in its 28 districts/taluks, the Court is inclined to award an additional quantity of water to it in the measure of 14.75 TMC in all, i.e., 10 TMC (on account of availability of ground water in Tamil Nadu) + 4.75 TMC (for drinking and domestic purposes including such need for the whole city of Bengaluru). On these considerations, Karnataka is more deserving amongst the competing States to be entitled thereto. Out of this, 14.75 TMC would be deducted from the quantum allocated by the Tribunal in favour of Tamil Nadu. Thus, the final allocation of the shares in view of this determination would be as under:-

Karnataka : 284.75 (270 + 14.75) TMC Tamil Nadu : 404.25 (419 – 14.75) TMC Kerala : 30 TMC UT of Pondicherry : 7 TMC Environmental Protection : 10 TMC Inevitable escapagaes into sea : 4 TMC Total : 740 TMC [Para 396] [1113-E-H; 1114-A-B] 16.2 As a consequence of the aforesaid allocation, the State of Karnataka would now be required to make available at the inter-State border with Tamil Nadu, i.e., at Billigundulu, 177.25 TMC of water for the basin. Apart from the modifications effected hereinabove, no interference with the determination and findings recorded by the Tribunal, in view of the scrutiny of the available materials on record, is called for. [Para 397] [1114-C-D] 16.3 The Tribunal directed appointment of a Regulatory Authority to properly monitor the working of monthly schedule with the help of the concerned States and Central Water Commission and further directed that the upper riparian State shall not take any action so as to affect the scheduled deliveries of water to the lower riparian States. [Para 399] [1115-A-B] 16.4 In view of the reduction in the quantum of water, now required to be released by Karnataka at the inter-State border with Tamil Nadu, i.e., at Billigundulu, there would be, logically, a proportionate decrease in the monthly releases as worked out by the Tribunal. However, the same pattern therefor, as modeled by it would be maintained for the reduced releases. [Para 400] [1116-B] 17. Interpretation of s. 6A of inter-State water disputes Act, 1956:

17.1 The award of the Tribunal has to be treated as decree of the Supreme Court. It is so stated in Section 6(2) of InterState Water Disputes Act, 1956 to give teeth to the award passed by the Tribunal so that none of the States can raise objection to the same and be guided by the directions of the Tribunal. The purpose of framing the scheme is exclusively for implementation

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

of the award. The purpose of Section 6A is to act in the manner in which the award determines the allocation and decides the dispute with regard to allocation or sharing of water. Therefore, it is directed that a scheme shall be framed by the Central Government within a span of six weeks from the date of the present judgment, so that the authorities under the scheme can see to it that the present decision which has modified the award passed by the Tribunal is smoothly made functional and the rights of the States as determined by this Court are appositely carried out. It is categorically conveyed that the need-based monthly release has to be respected. It is hereby made clear that no extension shall be granted for framing of the scheme on any ground. [Para 403] [1119-F-H; 1120-A-B]

17.2 Union of India is not correct in contending that Section 6A of the 1956 Act by employing the word “may” has left room for discretion to the Central Government for the purpose of framing a scheme. The framing of the scheme is exclusively meant for implementation of the award or as the same gets modified by this Court. Subject to the scheme to be formulated under Section 6A of the 1956 Act, in terms of the present adjudication, the recommendations/directives of the Tribunal with regard to the monthly releases and not inconsistent with anything decided herein, are hereby endorsed for the present for a period of 15 (fifteen) years hence. [Para 404] [1123-C-E]

18. Maintainability of the Appeals by Special Leave: 18.1 The legislative intendment of Section 6(2) of InterState Water Disputes Act, 1956, is not to create any kind of embargo on the jurisdiction of Supreme Court. The said provision was inserted to give the binding effect to the award passed by the Tribunal. The fiction has been created for that limited purpose. Section 11 of the 1956 Act bars the jurisdiction of the courts and that is in consonance with the language employed in Article 262 of the Constitution. The Founding Fathers had not conferred the power on this Court to entertain an original suit or complaint and that is luminescent from the language employed in Article 131 of the Constitution and from the series of pronouncements of this Court. Section 6 cannot be interpreted in an absolute mechanical manner and the words “same force as an order or decision”

cannot be treated as an order or decree for the purpose of excluding the jurisdiction of this Court. It cannot be a decree as if this Court has adjudicated a matter and passed a decree. The Parliament has intended that the same shall be executed or abided as if it is a decree of this Court. A provision should not be interpreted to give a different colour which has a technical design rather than serving the object of the legislation. Therefore, Section 6(2) does not bar the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 136. [Para 18] [871-H; 872-A-E] 18.2 While adjudicating a matter of such a nature the Court cannot be totally guided exclusively either by “broad” or extraordinary discretionary or “narrow” or restrictive approach but it would be appropriate to have an intermediary approach as the controversy covers a span of more than 100 years involving change in boundaries, population growth and subsequent events. Though the parameters of applicability of Article 136 can be broad to appreciate the materials and scrutinize the manner of appreciation by the Court/Tribunal depending upon the lis raised. In the present appeals preferred by special leave, it would be appropriate for the Court to adopt an approach which is neither broad nor narrow but an “intermediary one”, especially having regard to the nature of the dispute that involves the inhabitants of three States and a Union Territory. [Para 382] [1104-F-H; 1105-A] State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka and others (1991) Suppl. 1 SCC 240 : [1991] 2 SCR 501 – relied on.

Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. and others v. State of Haryana (1979) 2 SCC 196 : [1979] 1 SCR 1070; Common Cause v. Union of India and others (2003) 8 SCC 250 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 471; K.T. Plantation Private Limited and another v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011] 13 SCR 636; Accountant General, State of Madhya Pradesh v. S.K. Dubey and another (2012) 4 SCC 578 : [2012] 3 SCR 720; Hukum Chand v. Union of India (1972) 2 SCC 601 : [1973] 1 SCR 896 – held inapplicable. Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131; Satyavir Singh

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

and others v. Union of India and others (1985) 4 SCC 252 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 791; A.K. Kaul and another v. Union of India and another (1995) 4 SCC 73 : [1995] 3 SCR 469; Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211; P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and another (1980) 3 SCC 141; Bengal Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Works Ltd., Calcutta v. Their Workmen [1959] (Supp) 2 SCR 136; Jose Da Costa & another v. Bascora Sadasiv Sinai Narcornim and others. (1976) 2 SCC 917; Ram Piari v. Bhagwant and others (1990) 3 SCC 364 : [1990] 1 SCR 813; Phulchand Exports Ltd. v. O.O.O. Patriot (2011) 10 SCC 300 : [2011] 15 SCR 1129; Crompton Parkinson (Works) Pvt. Ltd., Bombay v. Its Workmen and others [1959] Suppl. (2) SCR 936; Vashit Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra and others [1955] 1 SCR 509; Ram Bharosey Agarwal v. Har Swarup Maheshwari (1976) 3 SCC 435; Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai and another (2004) 3 SCC 214 : [2004] 1 SCR 483 – referred to.

Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation [1969] 1 All ER 208; The State of Washington Department of Ecology v. Clarence E. and Peggy V. Grimes 121 Wash. 2d. 459; In Re: Hague v. Nephi Irrigation Co. 16 Utah 421, 52 P. 765 (1898) : 41 LRA 311 – referred to.

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[2016] 8 SCR 499

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Para 2

[1991] 2 SCR 501

relied on

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[1950] SCR 573

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(1905) 33 IA 1: (1906) ILR 33 Cal 219

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[1971] 3 SCR 9

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[2014] 12 SCR 875

referred to followed

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[2006] 2 SCR 740

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[1955] 1 SCR 415

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[1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 497

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Paras 94,134,150

[1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 515

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Para 96

[1981] 2 SCR 417

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Para 105

[1986] 2 SCR 278

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[1986] 3 SCR 923

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[1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142

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[2013] 4 SCR 1018

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Para 107

[1985] 2 SCR 1014

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[1959] SCR 729

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Para 122

AIR 1964 SC 1658

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[1966] Suppl. SCR 81

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[1976] 2 SCR 115

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Para 122

2017 (7) SCLAE 234

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Para 122

[1964] 6 SCR 846

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Para 122

[1987] 2 SCR 691

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Para 126

[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131

referred to

Para 296

[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 791

referred to

Para 296

[1995] 3 SCR 469

referred to

Para 296

(2005) 6 SCC 211

referred to

Para 296

(1980) 3 SCC 141

referred to

Para 296

[1959] Suppl. (2) SCR 136

referred to

Para 296

(1976) 2 SCC 917

referred to

Para 296

[1990] 1 SCR 813

referred to

Para 296

[2011] 15 SCR 1129

referred to

Para 296

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

[1959] Suppl. 2 SCR 936

referred to

Para 296

[1955] 1 SCR 509

referred to

Para 296

(1976) 3 SCC 435

referred to

Para 296

[2004] 1 SCR 483

referred to

Para 296

[1990] 3 SCR 83

referred to

Para 350

[1979] 1 SCR 1070

held inapplicable

Para 360

[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 471

held inapplicable

Para 360

[2011] 13 SCR 636

held inapplicable

Para 360

[2012] 3 SCR 720

held inapplicable

Para 360

[1973] 1 SCR 896

held inapplicable

Para 360

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2453 of 2007 From the Judgment and Order dated 05.02.2007 of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal at New Delhi under Section 5(2) of the InterState Water Disputes Act, 1956. WITH C. A. Nos. 2454 and 2456 of 2007. Ranjit Kumar, S.G., Madhusudan R. Naik, Adv. Gen., Fali S. Nariman, S.S. Javali, Jaideep Gupta, Shekhar Naphade, A. S. Nambiar, Rakesh Dwivedi, Subramonium Prasad, Sr. Advs., Mohan V. Katarki, S. C. Sharma, Brijesh Kalappa, R.S. Ravi, V. N. Raghupathy, J. M. Gangadhar, Ranvir Singh, Abdul Azeem Kalebudde, G. Prakash, Jishnu M. L., Mrs. Priyanka Prakash, Mrs. Beena Prakash, Vijay Shankar, Kunal Chattarjee, Saurabh Gupta, G. Umapathy, C. Paramasivam, K.V. Vijayakumar, B. Balaji, S. Wasim A. Qadri, Mrs. Madhavi Diwan, Ajay Sharma, Ms. Snidha Mehra, Hemant Arya, Ms. Saudamini Sharma, Ms. Kirti Dua, Ms. Somya Rathore, Sumit, D. S. Mahra, M. K. Maroria, R. Nedumaran, V.G. Pragasam, S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, P. K. Manohar, Ms. Shantha Vasudevan, Manu Sundaram, Ramesh Babu M. R., Rajesh Mahale, B. Balaji, A. S. Bhasme, Ms. Aparna Bhat, Ms. Supreeta Sharanagouda, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DIPAK MISRA, CJI I N D E X*

S. No. A. B. C.

D. E. F.

G. H.

I.

J. K.

L. M. N.

O.

Hea ding The proceedings in this Court in the present Appeals Maintainability of the Appeals by Special Leave Stand of all parties pertaining to remand of the matter to the Tribunal after deliberation of the legal issues Reference of the dispute to the Tribunal The initial proceedings before the Tribunal The issue of Ordinance by the State of Karnataka and the Presidential Reference The genesis of the controversy Doctrine of Paramountcy a nd its extinction on coming into force of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 Infraction of Article 363 and nonmaintainability of the dispute on the basis of agreements Unconscionability of the 1892 and 1924 agreements Status of the agreements after coming into force of the States Reorganization Act, 1956 Issue relating to expiry of the agreements Did the complaint not require any adjudication? The a pproach adopted by the Tribunal post 1974 and correctness of the same The quintessence of pleadings before the Tribunal

Page No.

* Ed. note: The pages mentioned in the index above giving the scheme of the judgment denotes the page number of the original judgment.

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE P.

No.

The findings of the Tribunal on various issues P.1 Prescriptive rights and other claims P.2 Breach of agreements of 1892 and 1924 and consequences thereof P.3 Peripheral issues qua claims of Kerala an d Union Territory of Pondicherry (presently n amed as “Puducherry”) P.4 Gross water available for apportionment

P.4(i) P.4(ii)

Surface flow of water Identification of dependable yield Additional source of water The principles of apportionment Determination of "irrigated areas" in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Assessment of water for "irrigation needs" in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Assessment of water for "Domestic and Industrial Purposes" in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Assessment of water for "Environment Protection and Inevitable Escapages into Sea" in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Water allocation for the State of Kerala an d Union Territory of Pondicherry (presently n amed as “Puducherry”)

Final water allocation amongst competing States P.12 Monthly s chedule for delivery of water at inter-State contact points Mechanism (Cauvery Management Board) for implementation of Tribunal's decisions

P.4(iii) P.5 P.6

P.7

P.8

P.9

P.10

P.11

Q.

R.

Final order of the Tribunal

S.

Arguments adva nced on behalf of Sta te of Ka rnataka as regards the allocation of water on various heads S.1 Submissions of Mr. Fali S. Nariman S.2 Submissions of Mr. S.S. Javali

S.3

W.

X.

Our findings on issues of allocation

X.1

T.

U. V.

X.2

X.3

X.4 X.5 X.6

X.7

X.8

Conten tion raised by Mr. Mohan V. Katarki S.4 Propon ements of Mr. Sh yam Divan Arguments put forth by the State of Ta mil Nadu T.1 Submissions of Mr. Sh ekhar Naphade T.2 Conten tions raised by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi Arguments advanced on behalf of the State of Kerala Submissions urged on behalf of Union Territory of Puducherry Arguments on behalf of Union of India

Prin ciples of apportionment to be followed Determination of ‘irrigated areas” in Tamil Nadu and Karn ataka Assessment of water for “irrigation needs” in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Water allocation for the State of Kerala Water allocation for the Union Territory of Puducherry Recognition of grou nd water as an additional source in Tamil Nadu Water allocation for Domestic and Industrial purp oses in Tamil Nadu Water allocation for Domestic and In dustrial purposes of State of K arnataka

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE X.9

Y.

Allocation of water towards environmen tal protection X.10 Revised water allocation amongst competing States Interpretation of Section 6A of the 1956 Act

Z.

The conclusions in seriatim

In this batch of Appeals, the assail is to the award dated 05.02.2007 passed by the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (for brevity, “the Tribunal”) constituted under Section 3 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 (for brevity, “the 1956 Act”) by three States, namely, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala as each of them is aggrieved by the allocation and sharing of water of river Cauvery according to individual perception, perspective and understanding. It is worthy to mention here that there are two principal States, namely, State of Karnataka and State of Tamil Nadu who as adversaries take the centre stage. The other two, State of Kerala and Union Territory of Pondicherry (presently named as “Puducherry”) in their own way, attacked the award and also seriously criticized the stand and stance of the main protagonists because of their dominant, assertive and adamant attitude by which they not only feel neglected and discriminated but have also been compelled to harbour the idea that two of them have created impediment in their rightful due concerning the release of water.

A. The proceedings in this Court in the present Appeals 2. Before the hearing of the Appeals commenced, on being moved by the State of Tamil Nadu, State of Karnataka and the Central Government, certain orders came to be passed. It is necessary to adumbrate the nature of orders passed by this Court, for without the said narration, it will be an incomplete narrative. We may immediately state that we shall devote some space to the genesis of the disputes as it travels beyond 100 years and the learned counsel for the parties have argued with vigour and energy in that regard. The said submissions shall be noted and addressed in due course. Be it noted, at one stage, the issue of entertainability of the appeals by special leave was raised by the Union of India and this Court had to deal with it and delivered a judgment in State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu and others1. Certain other orders also reflected the stand of the contesting States and where

(2017) 3 SCC 362

and how they were to be guided by the cherished principle of rule of law by accepting the order of the Court and not take a deviant path. 3. Though the award was passed on 5th February, 2007, yet it was published by requisite notification dated 19th February, 2013. On 10.05.2013, in I.A. No. 5/2013 in Civil Appeal No. 2456 of 2007, a twoJudge Bench, taking note of the notification dated 19th February, 2013 and also considering the fact that the said notification was under consideration of the Central Government, passed an order constituting a Supervisory Committee as a pro tem measure for implementation of the final order of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal dated February 5, 2007 which was notified vide notification dated February 19, 2013. The two-Judge Bench ordered that the said Supervisory Committee shall consist of Secretary, Union Ministry of Water Resources as Chairman and the Chief Secretaries of the respective States of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Union Territory of Puducherry as members. 4. The order clarified that the aforesaid pro tem arrangement was without prejudice to the pending civil appeals, namely, Civil Appeal Nos. 2453 of 2007, 2454 of 2007 and 2456 of 2007. Further, the order granted liberty to the Central Government to apply for modification of the said arrangement as and when necessary. 5. I.A. No. 10 of 2016 in Civil Appeal No. 2456 of 2007 was filed by the State of Tamil Nadu wherein Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel who had appeared for the applicant, had contended that the State of Karnataka had not been complying with the directions given by the Tribunal in its final order and that the said order had been flagrantly violated. Further, during the course of arguments, Mr. Naphade had pointed out that if the water was not released by the State of Karnataka, the ‘samba’ crops would be absolutely damaged which would lead to an unacceptable plight to be faced by the farmers of the State of Tamil Nadu. 6. Per contra, Mr. Fali S. Nariman, learned senior counsel who had appeared for the State of Karnataka, had drawn the attention of the Bench to paragraph ‘D’ of Clause IX of the final order of the Tribunal which reads as under :“D. The Authority shall properly monitor the working of monthly schedule with the help of the concerned States and Central Water Commission for a period of five years and if any modification/

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

adjustment is needed in the schedule thereafter, it may be worked out in consultation with the party States, and help of Central Water Commission for future adoption without changing the annual allocation amongst the parties.”

Learned senior counsel for the State of Karnataka had submitted that it is obligatory on the part of the State of Tamil Nadu to approach the Supervisory Committee that was constituted vide notification dated 22nd May, 2013. Mr. Nariman had also drawn the attention of the Bench to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the notification which deal with the constitution and the role of the Supervisory Committee. For better appreciation, we think it condign to reproduce the said paragraphs. They read as under:-

“ Constitution of the Supervisory Committee:-

(1) There shall be a Committee under this scheme to be known as the Supervisory Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee).

(2) The Committee referred to in sub-rule(1) shall consist of the following, namely:(a)

Secretary, the Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India

Chairman Ex officio

Chief Secretaries to the State, Governments of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and the Union Territory of Puducherry or his duly nominated representative

Members, Ex officio

(c)

Chairman, Central Water Commission

Members, Ex officio

(d)

Chief Engineer, Central Water Commission S ecretary

MemberSecretary

(b)

3. Role of the Committee:- The role of the Committee shall be to give effect to the implementation of the Order dated the 5th February, 2007 of the Tribunal:

Provided that in case of any doubt or difficulty, the Chairman, Supervisory Committee and, if necessary, any of the parties may apply to Hon’ble Supreme Court for appropriate directions with notice to the other States and the Union Territory.” During the course of proceedings of the said I.A. No.10 of 2016, Mr. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel handed over a note to the Bench which contained certain suggestions, foremost of them being that the State of Karnataka shall release 10000 cusecs per day (about 0.86 TMC) from 7th September, 2016 to 12th September, 2016. Mr. Naphade, on the other hand, submitted that instead of 10000 cusecs per day (about 0.86 TMC), there should be release of 20000 cusecs of water per day. 7. The Bench, after giving a patient hearing to the learned counsel for both the parties, passed an order on 5th September, 2016 in the following terms:-

“(a) The applicant, the State of Tamil Nadu, shall approach the Supervisory Committee within three days from today. Response, if any, by the State of Karnataka be filed within three days therefrom.

(b) The Supervisory Committee shall pass appropriate direction in this regard within four days from the date of filing of the reference keeping in view the language employed in the final order of the Tribunal. Be it clarified, the Supervisory Committee is bound by the language used in the order passed by the Tribunal.

(c) Coming to the immediate arrangement, keeping in view the gesture shown by the State of Karnataka and the plight that has been projected with agony by Mr. Naphade, we think it appropriate to direct that 15 cusecs of water per day be released at Biligundulu by the State of Karnataka for ten days. (d) The State of Tamil Nadu is directed to release water proportionately to the Union Territory of Puducherry.”

8. On 06.09.2016, the matter was taken up as there was a mistake as the order dated 05.09.2016 incorrectly mentioned 10 cusecs and 20 cusecs in paragraph 1 and 15 cusecs in sub-paragraph (c) which required to be read as 10000 cusecs, 20000 cusecs and 15000 cusecs respectively. The corrections were carried out on that day.

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

9. An application for modification of the order dated 05.09.2016, viz., I.A. No.12 of 2016 in I.A. No.10 of 2016 in Civil Appeal No.2456 of 2007 was mentioned on 11.09.2016 which was taken up on 12.09.2016 on the basis of an affidavit for urgent hearing.

10. Vide paragraph 3 of the said affidavit, the deponent had submitted that modification of the interim order dated 5th September, 2016 passed by this Court was necessary because of spontaneous agitations in various parts of the State of Karnataka which had paralyzed normal life and resulted in destruction of public and private properties worth hundreds of crores of rupees. The deponent had further submitted that modification was required having regard to the ground realities, needs and requirements as stated in the application. 11. The Court, after perusal of the said affidavit and the annexed application for modification, noted that the application contained certain averments which cannot be conceived of to be filed in a court of law seeking modification of an earlier order. The Court categorically stated that agitation in spontaneity or propelled by some motivation or galvanized by any kind of catalystic component can never form the foundation for seeking modification of an order. The Court observed that its order was bound to be complied with by all concerned and it is the obligation of the executive to maintain law and order and to see that the Court’s order is complied with in letter and spirit. The Court further observed that citizens cannot become law unto themselves; and when a court of law passes an order, it is the sacred duty of the citizens to obey the same. The Court also expressed anguish over the pleadings in the application and also the affidavit filed for urgency and deplored the same. 12. Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka, unequivocally accepted during the hearing that the aforesaid affidavit was erroneously drafted. However, he contended that the prayer in essence required reconsideration of the order. The Court thereafter proceeded to deal with the proponements of Mr. Nariman in respect of the reliefs sought for in the application. The application mainly sought for the modification of order of this Court dated 05.09.2016 (as corrected on 06.09.2016) and an order to the effect to keep in abeyance Clause (c) of the directions of this Court in its order dated 05.09.2016 as corrected on 06.09.2016. 13. After giving due consideration to the exhaustive arguments presented by the senior counsel for both the States, the Court was of the

view that the prayer of abeyance did not deserve acceptance and, accordingly, rejected the same. As far as the prayer for modification was concerned, the Court modified the order dated 5th September, 2016 to the extent that the State of Karnataka shall release 12000 cusecs of water per day and that the said direction shall remain in force till 20th September, 2016. The Court also directed the Supervisory Committee to arrive at a decision in conformity with the final order of the Tribunal with respect to the situation of shortage of water and plight of farmers in both the States. 14. On 20.9.2016, I.A. No.12 of 2016 in I.A. No.6 of 2016 in Civil Appeal No.2456 of 2007 was taken up. After referring to its earlier orders, the Court considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and took note of the directions of the Tribunal for consideration of constituting the Cauvery Management Board. The Court, thereafter, directed the Union of India to constitute the Cauvery Management Board within four weeks and produce before the Court after four weeks the notification indicating that the said Board has been constituted. As an interim measure, the Court directed the State of Karnataka to release 6000 cusecs of water from 21st September, 2016 till 27th September, 2016. 15. On 27.09.2016, the Court sought the assistance of the learned Attorney General for India to apprise the Central Government to discuss with both the States so that an interim solution could be arrived at. On 30.09.2016, the minutes of the proceedings were produced by learned Attorney General for India and Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka, produced two letters and requested the same to be taken on record and the said prayer was acceded to. Proceeding further, however, the Court modified the order dated 5 th September, 2016. The two letters pertained to the communication between Mr. Nariman and the State Government relating to compliance of this Court’s order. It is not necessary to refer to the episode in detail. It is worthy to state here that on 04.10.2016, the matter was taken up as it was mentioned by the learned Attorney General for India. The mentioning related to modification of the earlier order. On that day, as the order of this Court was complied with and that sage controversy was put to rest. Mr. Nariman assisted the Court. We think it necessary to state here that Mr. Nariman had courageously lived upto the highest tradition of the Bar and we had recorded our uninhibited accession. Be

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

it noted, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India, the Court constituted a High Power Technical Team to arrive at an interim solution and directed the State of Karnataka to release 2000 cusecs of water from 7.10.2016 till 18.10.2016.

16. On the next date of hearing, i.e., 18.10.2016, the report of the Committee was filed but it was noticed that the Committee had not suggested anything with regard to the quantity of water. At this juncture, the learned Attorney General for India submitted that the appeals are not maintainable. The same stand was taken by Mr. A.S. Nambiar, learned senior counsel appearing for the Union Territory of Puducherry. On that day, the issue also arose for consideration of the nature of the interim order. Regarding the release of 2000 cusecs of water from 7.10.2016, it was submitted by Mr. Madhusudan R. Naik, learned Advocate General of Karnataka assisting Mr. Nariman for the State of Karnataka, that the order dated 18.10.2016 had been complied with. After noticing the submissions with regard to the release of water by way of interim measure, it was decided to hear the matter on merits. On that day, the earlier order passed by this Court was reiterated to the effect that the executive of both the States shall see to it that peace and harmony would be maintained in both the States and that the citizens do not become law unto themselves. Further, it was ordered that it would be the obligation of the executive to ensure that when the matter is heard and the interim order has been passed and that when the State of Karnataka is complying with the order, mutuality of respect between both the States and the citizens should be maintained. The order further impressed upon the fact that maintenance of law and order and care for public property is a sign of elevated democracy.

17. We have paraphrased the interim orders as we are disposed to think that they deserve to be reproduced as the same is necessary for what we are going to say in the final judgment. B. Maintainability of the Appeals by Special Leave 18. As stated earlier, the learned Attorney General for India raised the issue with regard to the maintainability of the appeals. In the reported judgment State of Karnataka (supra), the Court has held that when judged by the principles of statutory interpretation to understand the legislative intendment of Section 6(2), it is clear as crystal that the

Parliament did not intend to create any kind of embargo on the jurisdiction of this Court. The said provision was inserted to give the binding effect to the award passed by the Tribunal. The Court opined that the fiction has been created for that limited purpose. Section 11 of the 1956 Act bars the jurisdiction of the courts and needless to say, that is in consonance with the language employed in Article 262 of the Constitution. The Founding Fathers had not conferred the power on this Court to entertain an original suit or complaint and that is luminescent from the language employed in Article 131 of the Constitution and from the series of pronouncements of this Court. The Court further held that Section 6 cannot be interpreted in an absolute mechanical manner and the words “same force as an order or decision” cannot be treated as an order or decree for the purpose of excluding the jurisdiction of this Court. Elaborating the same, it was held that it cannot be a decree as if this Court has adjudicated a matter and passed a decree. The Parliament has intended that the same shall be executed or abided as if it is a decree of this Court. The Court further ruled that a provision should not be interpreted to give a different colour which has a technical design rather than serving the object of the legislation. The exposition of the principles of law relating to fiction, the intendment of the legislature and the ultimate purpose and effect of the provision compelled the Court to repel the submissions raised on behalf of the Union of India that Section 6(2) bars the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 136. At that stage, the Court clarified in the following words:“We would like to clarify one aspect. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka as well as the State of Tamil Nadu have commended us to various authorities which we have already referred to in the context of Article 136 of the Constitution, but the purpose behind the said delineation is to show the broad canvas of the aforesaid constitutional provision in the context of maintainability of the civil appeals. How the final order passed by the Tribunal would be adjudged within the parameters of the said constitutional provision has to be debated when we finally address the controversy pertaining to the subject-matter of the civil appeals.” 19. Referring to para 82 of the judgment, it is submitted by Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel for the State of Karnataka, that this Court should exercise the wide powers bestowed in it under Article 136

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

of the Constitution in a case of this nature and exercise its discretion. Similar was the submission of learned senior counsel appearing for the other States. Be it clarified that each one is a contesting appellant as also respondent.

20. Keeping in view the controversy at hand, we think it appropriate to advert to the other legal issues and appreciate the factual score on the required parameters which will be unfolded in the course of our deliberations. We do not presently intend to state it as wide or broad approach or restricted or narrow approach. The said concept shall be dwelled upon at the relevant stage. C. Stand of all parties pertaining to remand of the matter to the Tribunal after deliberation of the legal issues 21. At the commencement of the hearing of the appeals, a serious criticism was advanced on behalf of the State of Karnataka that after the hearing before the Tribunal was closed, the State of Tamil Nadu filed an affidavit which was marked as TN Ext. 1665 and when objections were raised, the Tribunal had assured that the said document would not be relied upon but unfortunately the Tribunal had referred to the contents of the affidavit and relied upon the same. Be it noted, the said affidavit came into existence because of the suo motu order passed by the Tribunal on 12.11.2002 which is as follows:“During the course of hearing of arguments it transpired that most of the riparian States which are party to the proceedings cultivate paddy and allow at least 2-3 inches of water to remain in fields throughout till the crop matures. We are told that this is the traditional practice which is being followed: In many States in India paddy crops, after transplantation, are watered from time to time and a particular level of water need not remain in the fields throughout. It need not be pointed out that traditional practice, which is being followed in Cauvery basin states obviously will consume and require more water in the fields. Since 1973, different recommendations have been made requesting the riparian States before us to practice economy while utilizing waters of river Cauvery. Learned Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu stated that during last several years, steps

have been taken to improve the water use efficiency. Similar stand has been taken on behalf of the States of Karnataka, Kerala and the Union Territory of Pondicherry. It need not be impressed that it better scientific methods are adopted in cultivation of paddy, the requirement of water is bound to be less. All the party States and the Union Territory of Pondicherry shall file their respective Affidavits within six weeks from today, as to what steps have already been taken to reduce the requirement of water for cultivation and what steps are likely to be taken in near future. In the Affidavit it should also be stated as to what minimum delta is required for different crop varieties in their respective States.” 22. It is assiduously urged that though the said affidavit has been filed in reply to the affidavits filed by the State of Karnataka in pursuance of the suo motu order passed by the Tribunal, yet the affidavit of the State of Tamil Nadu for the first time furnished its scientific crop water requirement, that is, a detailed statement of computed crop water requirement system fed by Mettur and other schemes in the basin and the Tribunal, contrary to the principles of law of evidence and in violation of the principal facet of natural justice, took the same on record and marked it as Ext. 1665. The Tribunal, as averred by the senior counsel for the State of Karnataka, had clarified that the affidavit filed by Tamil Nadu would not be relied upon in support of its case and that the case would be considered on the facts and documents already brought on record. 23. The said submission was equally seriously resisted by the State of Tamil Nadu by stating that the said affidavit did not contain anything new but was only a compilation of the materials already brought on record. As the debate continued, it was suggested to the learned counsel for the parties whether it would be advisable to remit the matter to the Tribunal on the said score. At this juncture, Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka, submitted that considering more than 27 years had elapsed from the date of constituting the Tribunal and also considering that all the State parties to the dispute were before this Court and that each of them had challenged the Tribunal’s final order, it would be appropriate for this Court to exercise its authority

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and decide the matter finally. He submitted that as per judicial pronouncements, the power of this Court under Article 136 read with Article 142 being plenary, is exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law in cases where the need of justice demands interference as in the present case. The current dispute is a unique one affecting the lives of millions of people and the stakes involved are unparalleled. He submitted that remanding the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration would be an exercise in futility and a drain on the resources of all the parties concerned which must be eschewed.

24. We may fruitfully state here that all the learned counsel, at least on this issue, unanimously stated that the remand is no solution to such a dispute and this Court should decide the legal and factual issues so that the controversy is put to rest. Thereafter, the hearing of the appeals continued. Accordingly, we shall proceed to decide the various legal issues which are of priority and upmost concern and thereafter advert to the approach to be adopted in the obtaining factual matrix.

D. Reference of the dispute to the Tribunal 25. The State of Tamil Nadu lodged a request before the Government of India raising a water dispute and requesting for adjudication of the same by a Tribunal constituted under Section 3 of the 1956 Act. In the said complaint dated 6th July, 1986, it was stated on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu that a water dispute had arisen with the Government of Karnataka by reason of the fact that the interests of the State of Tamil Nadu and the inhabitants thereof in the waters of Cauvery, which is an inter-State river, had been prejudicially affected. The relevant part of the said communication reads as follows:-

“(a) the executive action taken by the Karnatka State in constructing Kabini, Hemavathi, Harangi, Swrnavathi and other projects and expanding the aycut— (i) Which executive action has resulted in materially diminishing the supply of waters to Tamil Nadu.

(ii) Which executive action has materially affected the prescriptive rights of the ayacutdar already acquired and existing; (iii)Which executive action is also in violation of the 1892 and 1924 agreements; and

(b) the failure of the Karnataka Government to implement distribution and control of the Cauvery waters. The bilateral negotiations hitherto held between the States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have totally failed.

Also all sincere attempts so far made by the Government of India to settle this long pending water dispute by negotiations since 1970 have totally failed. Therefore, this request is made by the Government of Tamil Nadu to the Government of India under Section 3 of the InterState Water Disputes Act, 1956 to refer this water dispute to a Tribunal.” 26. The complaint referred to the matters connected with the dispute and the efforts made for settling the disputes by negotiations. The broad features pointed out are the “River Cauvery”, “Development of Irrigation in the Cauvery Basin”, “The Inter-State Agreements of 1892 and 1924”, “Violation of the aforesaid two agreements by Karnataka”, “Tamil Nadu’s concern”, “Tamil Nadu’s first call for adjudication in September, 1969", “Tamil Nadu’s formal request for adjudication in February, 1970", Tamil Nadu’s continued participation in the discussion and negotiations”, “Filing of suit by Tamil Nadu in the Supreme Court”, “Prime Minister’s advice”, “The Cauvery Fact Finding Committee (CFFC)”, “Consideration of the proposals put forth by the Union Government”, “Last bilateral discussions with Karnataka held on 23rd November, 1985”, “Chief Ministers’ meeting held at Bangalore (now known as Bengaluru) on 16 June, 1986" and the narration of the events. Thereafter, there was a request for expeditious action for referring the dispute to the Tribunal. The said part reads as follows:“From 1974-75 onwards, the Government of Karnataka has been impounding all the flows in their reservoirs. Only after their reservoirs are filled up, the surplus flows are let down. The injury inflicted on this State in the past decade due to the unilateral action of Karnataka and the suffering we had in running around for a few TMC of water every time the crops reached the withering stage has been briefly stated in note (Enclosure—XXVIII). It is patent that the Government of Karnataka have badly violated the inter-State agreements and caused irreparable harm to the age old irrigation in this State. Year after year, the realisation at Mettur

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

is falling fast and thousands of acres in our ayacut in the basin are forced to remain fallow. The bulk of the existing ayacut in Tamil Nadu concentrated mainly in Thanjavur and Thiruchirappalli districts is already gravely affected in that the cultivation operations are getting long delayed, traditional double crop lands are getting reduced to single crop lands and crops even in the single crop lands are withering and failing for want of adequate wettings at crucial times. We are convinced that the inordinate delay in solving the dispute is taken advantage of by the Government of Karnataka in extending their canal systems and their ayacut in the new projects and every day of delay is adding to the injury caused to our existing irrigation.

The Government of Tamil Nadu are of the firm view that the “water dispute with the Government of Karnataka has arisen by reason of the fact that the interests of the State of Tamil Nadu and the inhabitants thereof in the waters of Cauvery, which is an inter-State liver have been affected prejudicially by —

(a) the executive action taken by the Karnataka State in constructing Kabini, Hemavathi, Harangi, Swarnavathi and other projects and expanding the ayacuts: (i) which executive action has resulted in materially diminishing the supply of waters to Tamil Nadu;

(ii) which executive action has materially affected the prescriptive rights of the avacutdars already acquired and ‘existing; and (iii) which executive action is also in violation of the 1892 and 1924 Agreements; and

(b) the failure of the Karnataka Government, to implement the terms of the 1892 and 1924 Agreements relating to the use, distribution and control of the Cauvery waters. The bilateral negotiations hitherto held between the States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have totally failed.

Also all sincere attempts so far made by the Government of India to settle this long pending water dispute by negotiations since 1970 have, totally failed.

I am therefore to request the Central Government to refer the Cauvery Water Dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication under the provisions of Section 4 of the inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 without any delay.” 27. On the basis of the aforesaid letter of request, the Central Government, by the notification dated June 2, 1990, constituted the Tribunal and passed the following order of reference:“No. 21/1/90-WD Government of India (Bharat Sarkar) Ministry of Water Resources (Jal Sansadhan Mantralaya) New Delhi, June 2, 1990 Reference

In the exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5, of the Interstate Water Disputes Act, 1956 (33 of 1956), the Central Government hereby refers to the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal for adjudication, the water disputes regarding the interstate river Cauvery and the river valley thereof, emerging from Letter No. 17527/K2/82-110 dated July 6, 1986 from the Government of Tamil Nadu (copy enclosed). By order and in the name of the President of India (M.A. Chitale) Secretary, (Water Resources) Chairman, The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, New Delhi” E. The initial proceedings before the Tribunal 28. During the pendency of the reference, the Government of Tamil Nadu filed CMP No.4 of 1990 praying that the State of Karnataka be directed not to impound or utilize the water of Cauvery river beyond the extent impounded or utilized by them as on May 31, 1972 as agreed to by the Chief Ministers of the basin States and the Union of India for irrigation and power. It was also prayed that an order be passed restraining

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

the State of Karnataka from notifying any new projects, dams, reservoirs, canals, etc., and/or from proceeding further with the construction of projects, dams, reservoirs, canals, etc., in the Cauvery basin. The Union Territory of Puducherry filed CMP No. 5 of 1990 on 8.9.1990 seeking an interim order directing the State of Karnataka and Kerala to release the water already agreed to during the months of September to March. An emergent petition was filed by the State of Tamil Nadu forming the subject matter of CMP No.9 of 1990 to direct the State of Karnataka to release at least 20 TMC of water as the first installment pending formal orders in CMP No.4 of 1990. The said prayers were seriously opposed by the State of Karnataka and the State of Kerala on merits as well as on a preliminary objection that the Tribunal had no power or jurisdiction to entertain the said petitions and to grant any interim relief. The Tribunal upheld the objections raised by the State of Karnataka and the State of Kerala holding that the said applications were not maintainable in law and, accordingly, dismissed the same. Aggrieved by the said orders, special leave petition was filed for seeking leave to assail the said order. This Court passed the judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka and others2 wherein the majority view stated by N.M. Kasliwal, J. is extracted below:-

“22. The above passage clearly goes to show that the State of Tamil Nadu was claiming for an immediate relief as year after year, the realisation at Mettur was falling fast and thousands of acres in their ayacut in the basin were forced to remain fallow. It was specifically mentioned that the inordinate delay in solving the dispute is taken advantage of by the Government of Karnataka in extending their canal systems and their ayacut in the new projects and every day of delay is adding to the injury caused to their existing irrigation. The Tribunal was thus clearly wrong in holding that the Central Government had not made any reference for granting any interim relief. We are not concerned, whether the appellants are entitled or not, for any interim relief on merits, but we are clearly of the view that the reliefs prayed by the appellants in their C.M.P. Nos. 4, 5 and 9 of 1990 clearly come within the purview of the dispute referred by the Central Government under Section 5 of the Act. The Tribunal has not held that it had no incidental and ancillary powers for granting an interim relief, but it

1991 Supp (1) SCC 240

has refused to entertain the C.M.P. Nos. 4, 5 and 9 on the ground that the reliefs prayed in these applications had not been referred by the Central Government. In view of the above circumstances we think it is not necessary for us to decide in this case, the larger question whether a Tribunal constituted under the Interstate Water Disputes Act has any power or not to grant any interim relief. In the present case the appellants become entitled to succeed on the basis of the finding recorded by us in their favour that the reliefs prayed by them in their C.M.P. Nos. 4, 5 and 9 of 1990 are covered in the reference made by the Central Government. It may also be noted that at the fag end of the arguments it was submitted before us on behalf of the State of Karnataka that they were agreeable to proceed with the CMPs on merits before the Tribunal on the terms that all party States agreed that all questions arising out of or connected with or relevant to the water dispute (set out in the respective pleadings of the respective parties), including all applications for interim directions/reliefs by party States be determined by the Tribunal on merits. However, the above terms were not agreeable to the State of Tamil Nadu as such we have decided the appeals on merits.” Sahai, J. opined thus:-

“I agree with brother Kasliwal, J. that under the constitutional set up it is one of the primary responsibilities of this Court to determine jurisdiction power and limits of any tribunal or authority created under a statute. But I have reservations on other issues including the construction of the letter dated July 6, 1986. However, it is not necessary for me to express any opinion on it since what started as an issue of profound constitutional and legal importance fizzled out when the States of Karnataka and Kerala stated through their counsel that they were agreeable for determination of the applications for interim directions on merits.” 29. In view of the aforesaid directions, the Tribunal heard the said applications of Karnataka and Puducherry. Before the Tribunal, objections were again raised on behalf of the State of Karnataka with regard to the maintainability of the applications filed by the State of Tamil Nadu and Union Territory of Puducherry for interim relief. The Tribunal did not countenance that objection and expressed the view that the directions given by this Court were binding on it. The Tribunal

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

proceeded to decide the applications on merits and, vide its order dated June 25, 1991, and on a detailed analysis of the materials available, it directed the State of Karnataka, as an interim measure, to ensure that 205 TMC of water is available in Tamil Nadu’s Mettur Reservoir in a year from June to May. The modalities for regulating the release of water so fixed were also laid down with a further direction that 6 TMC of water for Karaikal region of the Union Territory of Puducherry would be delivered by the State of Tamil Nadu. The State of Karnataka was restrained from increasing its area under irrigation by the waters of the river of Cauvery beyond the existing 11.2 lakh acres. In issuing this direction, the Tribunal was guided by the consideration that pending final adjudication, the rights of the parties ought to be preserved and it was also ensured that by the unilateral action of one party, the other party was not prejudiced from getting appropriate relief at the time of passing of final orders. In quantifying the volume of 205 TMC of water to be released by the State of Karnataka from its reservoirs for Tamil Nadu’s Mettur reservoir, the Tribunal construed the average of the annual flow of waters of the river Cauvery into the reservoir of Mettur Dam in Tamil Nadu as the reasonable basis. For the said purpose, amongst other aspects, it took note of the inflow of water into Mettur Dam for a period of 10 years, i.e., 1980-81 to 1989-90 and worked out the figure by leaving out of scrutiny the abnormally good years and bad years and, thus, arrived at the figure of 205 TMC. While entertaining the grievance of State of Tamil Nadu to the effect that the releases ought to be made timely to meet the need of cultivation of crops for which it set down the norms, it noted that the State of Kerala had not applied for any interim order.

F. The issue of Ordinance by the State of Karnataka and the Presidential Reference

30. The State of Karnataka, however, on 25.07.1991, promulgated an Ordinance captioned “The Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991” which, for all intents and purposes, sought to negate the effect of the interim order dated 25.06.1991. The said Ordinance reads as follows:-

“An Ordinance to provide in the interest of the general public for the protection and preservation of irrigation in irrigable areas of the Cauvery basin in Karnataka dependent on the waters of the Cauvery river and its tributaries.

Whereas the Karnataka Legislative Council is not in session and the Governor of Karnataka is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, for the protection and preservation of irrigation in the irrigable areas of the Cauvery basin in Karnataka dependent on the water of Cauvery river and its tributaries. Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred under clause (1) of Article 213 of Constitution of India, I, Khurshed Alam Khan, Governor of Karnataka, am pleased to promulgate the following Ordinance, namely:

1. Short title, extent and commencement.— (1) This Ordinance may be called the Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991. (2) It extends to the whole of the State of Karnataka. (3) It shall come into force at once.

2. Definition.— Unless the context otherwise requires: (a) ‘Cauvery basin’ means the basin area of the Cauvery river and its tributaries lying within the territory of the State of Karnataka.

(b) ‘Irrigable area’ means the areas specified in the Schedule. (c) ‘Schedule’ means the Schedule annexed to this Ordinance.

(d) ‘Water year’ means the year commencing with the first of June of a calendar year and ending with the thirty-first of May of the next calendar year. 3. Protection of irrigation in irrigable area.— (1) It shall be the duty of the State Government to protect, preserve and maintain irrigation from the waters of the Cauvery river and its tributaries in the irrigable area under the various projects specified in the Schedule. (2) For the purpose of giving effect to sub-section (1) the State Government may abstract or cause to be abstracted, during every water year, such quantity of water as it may deem requisite, from the flows of the Cauvery river and its tributaries, in such manner and during such intervals as the State Government or any officer,

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

not below the rank of an Engineer-in-Chief designated by it, may deem fit and proper.

4. Overriding effect of the Ordinance.— The provisions of this Ordinance, (and of any Rules and Orders made thereunder), shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any order, report or decision of any Court or Tribunal (whether made before or after the commencement of this Ordinance), save and except a final decision under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 5 read with Section 6 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956. 5. Power to remove difficulties.— If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Ordinance, the State Government may, by order, as occasion requires, do anything (not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance) which appears to be necessary for purpose of removing the difficulty. 6. Power to make rules.— (1) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette make rules to carry out the purpose of this Ordinance. (2) Every rule made under this Ordinance shall be laid as soon as be after it is made, before each House of the State legislature while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more sessions and if before the expiry of the said period, either House of the State legislature makes any modification in any rule or order or directs that any rule or order shall not have effect, and if the modification or direction is agreed to by the other House, such rule or order shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be no effect, as the case may be.” 31. The notification mentioned a schedule of area which refers to irrigable areas in the Cauvery basin of Karnataka under various projects including minor irrigation works. The State of Karnataka instituted a suit under Article 131 against the State of Tamil Nadu and others seeking a declaration that the order of the Tribunal granting interim relief was without jurisdiction. In the meantime, the Ordinance stood replaced by the Act 27 of 1991 and the said Act reproduced the provisions of the Ordinance in verbatim except that in Section 4 of the Act, the words ‘any court’ were omitted and Section 7 was added repealing the Ordinance. After the Act was passed, the President under Article 143,

on July 27, 1991, referred three questions for opinion of this Court. The reference reads as follows:-

“WHEREAS, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the Central Government constituted a Water Disputes Tribunal called “the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal” (hereinafter called “the Tribunal”) by a notification dated June 2, 1990, a copy whereof is annexed hereto, for the adjudication of the Water Dispute regarding the Inter-State River Cauvery;

WHEREAS on June 25, 1991, the Tribunal passed an interim order (hereinafter referred to as “the Order”), a copy whereof is annexed hereto; WHEREAS, differences have arisen with regard to certain aspects of the Order;

WHEREAS, on July 25, 1991, the Governor of Karnataka promulgated the Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as “the Ordinance”), a copy whereof is annexed hereto; WHEREAS, doubts have been expressed with regard to the constitutional validity of the Ordinance and its provisions;

WHEREAS, there is likelihood of the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Ordinance, and any action taken thereunder, being challenged in courts of law involving protracted and avoidable litigation; WHEREAS, the said differences and doubts have given rise to a public controversy which may lead to undesirable consequences;

AND WHEREAS, in view of what is hereinbefore stated, it appears to me that the following questions of law have arisen and are of such nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court of India thereon;

NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution of India, I, Ramaswamy Venkataraman, President of India, hereby refer the following questions to the Supreme Court of India for consideration and report thereon, namely:

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

(1) Whether the Ordinance and the provisions thereof are in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution;

(2) (i) Whether the Order of the Tribunal constitutes a report and a decision within the meaning of Section 5(2) of the Act; and (ii) Whether the Order of the Tribunal is required to be published by the Central Government in order to make it effective;

(3) Whether a Water Disputes Tribunal constituted under the Act is competent to grant any interim relief to the parties to the dispute.” 32. To deal with the reference, the Constitution Bench narrated the factual background that had led to the reference. After analyzing various aspects, the opinion was expounded in the following terms:“Question No.1: The Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991 passed by the Governor of Karnataka on July 25, 1991 (now the Act) is beyond the legislative competence of the State and is, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution.

Question No. 2: (i) The order of the Tribunal dated June 25, 1991 constitutes report and decision within the meaning of Section 5(2) of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956; (ii) the said Order is, therefore, required to be published by the Central Government in the official Gazette under Section 6 of the Act in order to make it effective. Question No. 3: (i) A Water Disputes Tribunal constituted under the Act is competent to grant any interim relief to the parties to the dispute when a reference for such relief is made by the Central Government; (ii) whether the Tribunal has power to grant interim relief when no reference is made by the Central Government for such relief is a question which does not arise in the facts and circumstances under which the Reference is made. Hence we do not deem it necessary to answer the same.” 33. The aforesaid decision also noted a certain aspect which has been highlighted by the State of Karnataka in the course of arguments and we shall be dealing with it in extenso at a later stage. In paragraph 4 of the judgment, the Court stated:-

“4. There were two agreements of 1892 and 1924 for sharing the water of the river between the areas which are predominantly today comprised in the States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, and which were at the time of the agreements comprised in the then Presidency of Madras on the one hand and the State of Mysore on the other. The last agreement expired in 1974….” Again in paragraph 11, the Court observed:-

“…… In the said letter, Tamil Nadu primarily made a grievance against the construction of works in the Karnataka area and the appropriation of water upstream so as to prejudice the interests downstream in the State of Tamil Nadu. It also sought the implementation of the agreements of 1892 and 1924 which had expired in 1974.” 34. The State of Karnataka, still undaunted by such reverses, filed an application before the Tribunal to recall its order dated 25.06.1991 citing several grounds justifying such review. The Tribunal, vide its order dated 07.04.1992, however, declined to interfere with its earlier order dated 25.06.1991 with the observation that in case, thereafter, there was any change in circumstance or undue hardship in a particular year to any party, it would be open to such party to approach it for appropriate orders. The stage being thus set, following the submissions of the respective statements of cases, counters and rejoinders, the Tribunal framed the following issues:“(1) Are both the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 or either of them, invalid?

(2) Are both the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 or either of them invalid because of the alleged oppression or because the same were between the “unequal Riparian States” as claimed by the State of Karnataka? (3)

Are both the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 binding and enforceable upon all the parties to the present reference (dispute)?

(4) Are both the Agreements of 1892 and 1924, in so far as the river Cauvery and its tributaries are concerned invalid, on the ground that the then Chief Commissioner’s Province of

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

Coorg, Podukottai State, Travancore State and the French settlement of Pondicherry and Karaikal, were not parties to the said Agreement?

(5) Whether the circumstances, that, the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 were not executed also on behalf of the then Chief Commissioner’s Province of Coorg, Podukottai State, Travancore State and the French settlement of Pondicherry and Karaikal, made the said Agreements not binding and unenforceable against parties to the present reference. (6)

Is the State of Karnataka estopped from challenging both the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 or either of them, on the ground that it had said to have been acted upon?

(7) Is the State of Karnataka entitled to contend that in any view of the matter the State of Tamil Nadu had waived the rights claimed by it under the Agreements of 1892 and 1924? (8) Has there been any breach of both the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 or either of them, by any of the States. If so, what is the effect of any such breach upon the rights of the parties to the present reference? (9) Did both the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 or either of them provide for a fair and equitable distribution of waters of the river Cauvery and its tributaries to the parties of these Agreements? (10) (i) Could there be prescriptive rights as claimed by the State of Tamil Nadu/Union Territory of Pondicherry, in their pleadings.

(ii) If the answer to (i) is in affirmative, what was the nature of such prescriptive rights, and (iii) Whether the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 or either of them, were in recognition of the prescriptive rights as claimed by the State of Tamil Nadu?

(11) Have both the Agreements of 1892 and 1924 or either of them ceased to be operative and enforceable and binding because of subsequent events including enactment of various laws and happening of changed circumstances?

(12) What would be the true and proper construction of both the Agreements of 1892 and 1924, and their legal consequences?

(13) Were the Rules of Regulation in Annexure I to the Agreement of 1924 arbitrary, unconscionable and excessive to the requirements of the areas which then formed part of the Province of Madras?

(14) Whether the Rules and Regulation in Annexure I to the Agreement of 1924, are arbitrary and inequitable on the ground that the same were excessive to the requirements of the areas which now form the part of the State of Tamil Nadu?

(15) Does the entire Agreement of 1924 stand terminated at the expiry of 50 years from the date of its execution? Does not the said agreement continue to subsist even after the expiry of the period of 50 years, subject to the modifications to be made to it in accordance with clause 10(xi) of the same Agreement? What is the true scope and effect of clause 10(xi) of the Agreement? (16) If the answer to the first part of issue 15 is in the affirmative, whether the 1892 Agreement ought to continue in force until a new Agreement is entered into or the respective rights of the basin States are determined in accordance with law? (17) What is the present relevance and also the effect of the deliberations of the Cauvery Fact Finding Committee, and of the Study Team conducted by Shri CC Patel, Additional Secretary to the Government of India, and also of reports, measures and surveys conducted by other agencies? (18) Upon a true and proper assessment made according to the reliable and scientific method, what would be the approximate available surface waters of the Cauvery basin including the delta region? (19) Whether the Agreement of 1892 was operative and enforceable also in respect of those tributaries of the river Cauvery which were not specifically mentioned in the Schedule ‘A’ to the said Agreement?

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

(20) What is the extent of additional/alternative means of water resources available in the Cauvery basin by appropriate exploitation of ground water potentials and by trans-basin diversion?

(21) What is the approximate volume of ground water in each one of the States/Union Territory which are parties to the Reference and whether the said availability of ground water, if any, should be relevant in making fair and equitable distribution of the Cauvery river waters? (22) What should be the basis on which the availability of waters be determined for apportionment, namely, dependability or on percentage basis? If it is on percentage basis, what ought to be the said percentage?

(23) Whether there is wastage of waters in appreciable volume or quantity, either in the basin or in the delta areas of the Cauvery river? If so, what is its effect, if any, on the fair and equitable distribution of waters of the river Cauvery?

(24) Whether directions need be issued to the parties for ensuring that the cropping patterns are compatible with the rainfall and the river flows and other relevant factors and whether such directions, if any, would be feasible and germane for making equitable and fair distribution of the waters of the river Cauvery?

(25) What is the extent of the return flow of water used in irrigation by the different parties and what would be its effect on the apportionment of Cauvery waters among them? (26) What is the extent of drought prone/affected areas in the Cauvery basin region in each of the party States, and what is its effect, if any, in making equitable apportionment of waters? (27) Should trans-basin diversion of the water of rivers Kabini and Bhavani be permitted for generation of power and for irrigation and water supply by the State of Kerala? If so, to what extent and subject to what conditions and with what safeguards?

(28) Whether generation of power by trans-basin diversion of water by the parties would be legal and justified, particularly, if a part of such power would be utilised by the people of the river basin itself? (29) Are the States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu resorting to trans-basin diversion of the waters of river Cauvery? If so, whether those States can be permitted to object to the proposed trans-basin diversion of the water by the State of Kerala? (30) Should any preference or priority be given to utilization of water in a manner such that it can generate power as well as meet the needs of irrigation and water supply within the basin/outside the basin area? (31) What is the extent of the contribution by the different States to the total flow in the Cauvery river and what would be its relevance for equitable apportionment of waters to the party States? (32) Whether directions are required to be issued to ensure that the waters of the Cauvery and its tributaries maybe developed by each of the States, singly or jointly, to generate maximum hydroelectric power without detriment to irrigation uses? (33) Is the State of Karnataka entitled to compensation for the loss suffered as averred in paragraphs 18.9 to 18.11 of the Statement of Case of Karnataka and as per averments in paragraphs 34 to 41 of the Counter of Karnataka to the Statement of Case of Tamil Nadu? (34) Whether any order/direction should be issued upon any one or more of the States for regulated release of the Cauvery waters and whether in that event compensation is to be awarded in favour of the parties, prejudicially affected thereby? (35) To what extent should Kerala be permitted to utilise the waters generated in Kerala when such utilisation in Kerala

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

would secure either more or equal benefit for the country and its people than by its utilisation in any of the other States?

(36) Whether the State of Kerala requires a part of Cauvery water for generation of power, and, if so, to what extent? (37) Whether shortage of food in any of the States would be a relevant factor to be taken into consideration in making the apportionment of the Cauvery water?

(38) Whether the backwardness, under-developed and allegedly neglected area of a particular State would be relevant matters in making a fair and equitable distribution of the water of the Cauvery river?

(39) Whether the construction works executed by the State of Tamil Nadu in the Upper Bhavani, Vargarpallam West and Vargarpallam East, have unreasonably deprived the rights of the State of Kerala in the natural flow of the waters of the river Cauvery and, if so, to what effect?

(40) Whether the executive action taken by Karnataka in constructing Kabini, Hemavathi, Harangi, Suvarnavathy and other projects and expanding its ayacuts has prejudicially affected the interests of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry, materially diminished the supply of waters to Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry and materially affected the prescriptive rights claimed by Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry on behalf of their ayacutdars?

(41) Whether the above said executive action taken by Karnataka is in violation of 1892 and 1924 Agreements? (42) Whether the State of Tamil Nadu is entitled to compensation for the loss, damage and injury caused by the failure on the part of Karnataka to implement the terms of 1924 Agreement after 1974?

(43) If the answer to the above issue No.42 is in the affirmative, what is the amount of compensation to which Tamil Nadu is entitled?

(44) What is the equitable share of the Union Territory of Pondicherry in the waters of the inter-State river Cauvery?

(45) Is the understanding reached between the then Governor of French Settlement in India Pondicherry and the then Governor of Madras on 6thSeptember, 1926 to maintain adequate supply of water to the French Territory still subsisting and as such enforceable against the State of Tamil Nadu?

(46) Whether the projects executed by the States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have unreasonably impaired the free flow of water of the river Cauvery into the Union Territory of Pondicherry? (47) On what basis should the available waters be determined?

(48) How and on what basis should the equitable apportionment be made? (49) What directions, if any, should be given for the equitable apportionment and for the beneficial use of the waters of the river Cauvery and its tributaries?

(50) What directions, if any, are required to be given regarding the sharing of distress and surplus among the concerned parties to the reference in the event of the waters of the Cauvery falling short of the allocated quantum or being surplus to the same?” 35. Subsequent thereto, evidence was recorded. However, prior to the arguments, the issues, for the purpose of convenience, were regrouped finally as hereunder:-

“Sl.No. Subject 1. Agreements of 1892 and 1924 a) Arbitrary and inequitable b) Prescriptive rights and other claims c) Construction and review of agreements

Issue No. 9, 13 & 14 10 & 40 12, 15 & 16

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

d)

e)

2.

Breach of agreements and Consequences Constitutional and legal validity and enforceability Availability of water – surface flows, additional/ alternative resources

8, 33, 40 to 43 1 to 7,11 & 19

18, 20 to 22, 25, 27, 29, 31 & 47

Equitable apportionment and 26, 31, 34,37, related subjects: 38, 47 to 50 i) Cropping pattern ii) Trans-basin diversion iii) Relevant date of apportionment iv) Relevance of projects completed or otherwise.” 36. Reverting to the sequence of events, the Central Government finally, to give effect to the interim order dated 25.06.1991 passed by the Tribunal, by notification dated 11.08.1998, framed a scheme titled “The Cauvery Water (Implementation of the Interim Order of 1991 and all subsequent Related Orders of the Tribunal) Scheme, 1998 which, amongst others, provided for the constitution of the Cauvery River Authority, delineated its role, powers and functions.

3.

37. The Cauvery River Authority (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1998 were also framed and given effect to from 14.07.2000 in order to regulate the conduct of business of the Cauvery River Authority as provided in Clause 3(2) of the Cauvery Water (Implementation of the Interim Order of 1991 and all subsequent Related Orders of the Tribunal).

G. The genesis of the controversy 38. Having stated the issues framed before the Tribunal, we would have proceeded to deal with the primary legal issues. However, it is requisite to state the genesis of the reference to the Tribunal. Having narrated the facts to this extent, we think it appropriate to go to the narration of events which have been graphically exposited before us. It goes back to the year 1799. We do not intend to refer to the unnecessary facets except those which had been expounded to espouse the legal aspect. The first agreement between the Madras Presidency and the State of Mysore was entered into in the year 1892. Prior to entering into

the said agreement, there was correspondence between the British Resident in Mysore and the Government of Madras. It is worthy to note here that after the defeat of Tipu Sultan by the British, the Wadiyars, Rulers of the State of Mysore, were decored with the crown under Subsidiary Alliance Treaty in 1799. The State of Mysore undertook certain works in its territory pertaining to restoration of river which was protested by the Collector of Tanjore in the Madras Presidency. The correspondence continued which is not necessary to be referred to. In the year 1881, the Viceroy and the Governor General of India, by an Instrument of Transfer 1881, restored the administration of the Princely State of Mysore to another scion of the Wadiyar family by signing the “Sanad” described as “Instrument of Transfer”. Be it stated here, the State of Karnataka asserts that it was not a treaty but a “Sanad” as is reflected from the communication made by the British Foreign Secretary in his dispatch of 1874. The relevant part reads as follows:“He is in reality the recipient of favours - the person who benefits by the avowedly liberal policy of Government - and it seems to me to be in every way more becoming that the Government should attach its own conditions to its gift, and that these should be set forth in a Sanad or patent to be granted by Government to the Maharaja.” 39. As contended by the State of Karnataka, the “Instrument of Transfer” of 1881 placed the Maharaja in possession of the territories of Mysore and in the administration thereof, and declared that he would be entitled to hold possession thereof and administer them only so long as he fulfilled the conditions prescribed in the Instrument of Transfer. Emphasis has been laid on paragraphs 22 and 23 of the said instrument. After the year 1881, the British Government of Madras Presidency raised objections as regards the fact that there was continued implementation of the schemes for restoration of tanks in Mysore by stating that the Presidency of Madras had a right to uninterrupted natural flow in the river. On 13th June, 1889, the British Resident in Mysore thought it appropriate to remind the Dewan of Mysore that the British Resident could not accept the Dewan’s stand and that Mysore had the right to utilize to the fullest extent the natural water forces flowing through its territory. The relevant part of the letter reads thus:“In the first place international law is not applicable to a feudatory State like Mysore in its dealings with the paramount power. Even

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

if it were so, international law would not give Mysore the right claimed. Its position with reference to Madras territory is something similar to that of Switzerland ... The principle which should be taken as your guide in this important question is that no scheme for stopping the flow of water from Mysore into Madras territory will be permitted if it can be shown to be detrimental to the interests of the latter.”

40. On 20.11.1889, the British Government of Madras Presidency issued the following order:“The Mysore Government cannot claim to improve its irrigation works by impounding or diverting the supply of streams which feed works in British territory and to the water of which the British Government has acquired a prescriptive right.” 41. As the factual matrix would unroll, on 10.05.1890, a conference was held at Ooty where the Princely State of Mysore put forward its claim for the restoration of irrigation works which had been inaugurated during the British Government Administration in Mysore (1831-1881), but the claim was rejected by the then British Resident who formally expressed the opinion that the assertion of unlimited rights of Mysore was extreme and untenable. The minutes, among other things, recorded thus:“... After some argument the Diwan stated his position as follows: ...Madras rights extend only to the supply which has been actually turned to account for irrigation...” “Mr. Stokes said that ...He refused to admit that the Madras rights to the flow in the rivers was limited to the amount actually turned to account for irrigation, and contended that Madras is entitled by prescription to the whole flow allowed to pass the frontier, at which point Mysore loses all right or interest in it...” 42. As the time passed, the Government of India, on 21st August, 1891, clarified in a publication in the Official Gazette of India No. 1700/ E the relationship between the Government of India as represented by the Queen Empress of India on the one hand and the “native States” in India on the other. It read as follows:“The principles of International Law have no bearing upon the relations between the Government of India as representing the

Queen Empress on the one hand, and the native States under the suzerainty of her Majesty on the other. The paramount supremacy of the former, presupposes and implies the subordination of the latter.” [emphasis is supplied]

43. On 21.01.1892, the order was passed by the British Government of Madras directing that the consent of Madras Government should be obtained before the new reservoir is constructed within the Mysore State and in the event of disagreement between the two Governments, the matter has to be settled by arbitration.

44. In view of the above, the agreement was entered into between the Madras Government and State of Mysore on 18.02.1892. Clause 1 defines New Irrigation Reservoirs. Clause 3 defines Repair of Irrigation Reservoirs. Clause 4 states that any increase of capacity other than what falls under “Repair of Irrigation Reservoirs” as defined shall be regarded as a “New Irrigation Reservoir”. Clauses 2, 3 and 5 are reproduced below:-

“II. The Mysore Government, shall not, without the previous consent of the Madras Government, or before a decision under rule 4 below, build (a) any “New Irrigation Reservoirs” across any part of the fifteen main rivers named in the appended Schedule A; or across any stream named in Schedule B below the point specified in Column 5 of the said Schedule B, or in any drainage area specified in the said Schedule B, or (b) any “new anaicut” across the streams of Schedule A, Nos. 4 to 9 and 14 and 15, or across any of the streams of Schedule B, or across the following streams of Schedule A, lower than the points specified hereunder: Across 1. Tungabhadra – lower than the road crossing at Honhalli, Across 10. Cauvery – lower than the Ramaswami anaicut, and Across 13. Kabani – lower than the Rampur anaicut.

III. When the Mysore Government desires to construct any “New Irrigation Reservoir” or any new anaicut the previous consent of the Madras Government under the last preceding rule, then full information regarding the proposed work shall be forwarded to the Madras Government and the consent of that Government shall be obtained previous to the actual commencement of work. The Madras Government shall be bound not to refuse such consent

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

except for the protection of prescriptive right already acquired and actually existing, the existence, extent and nature of such right and the mode of exercising it being in every case determined in accordance with the law on the subject of prescriptive right to use of water and in accordance with what is fair and reasonable under all the circumstances of each individual case.

V. The consent of the Madras Government is given to new irrigation reservoirs specified in the appended Schedule C, with the exception of the Srinivasasagara new reservoir across the Pennar, the Ramasamudram new reservoir across the Chitravati and the Venkatesasagara new reservoir across Papaghni. Should, owing to the omission of the Mysore Government to make or maintain these works in a reasonable adequate standard of safety, irrigation works in Madras, themselves in a condition of reasonably adequate safety, be damaged, the Mysore government shall pay to the Madras government reasonable compensation for such damage. As regards the three new reservoirs excepted above the admissibility of any compensation from Mysore to Madras on account of loss accruing to Madras irrigation works from diminution of supply of water caused by the construction of the said works, will be referred to the Government of India whose decision will be accepted as final and should such compensation decided to be admissible, the decision of the Government of India as to the amount thereof will be accepted, after submission to them of the claims of Madras which would be preferred in full detail within a period of five years after the completion of said works.” 45. As stated in Clause 2, there are two Schedules, namely, Schedule A and Schedule B which do not require any reference. We may note here that on 18.02.1924, another agreement was entered. The prefatory note to the said agreement contains reference to the 1892 agreement, Clause 2 refers to Clause 3 of the 1892 agreement and certain disputes that had arisen between the two States and the reference to arbitration and the award in the year 1914, rectification of the award by the Government of India and the decision in appeal with the Secretary of State for India who had reopened the question. It is necessary to state what had been mentioned in the said reopening of the question:-

“6. Whereas thereupon the Mysore Government and the Madras Government with a view to an amicable settlement of the dispute entered into negotiations with each other; and 7. Whereas as the result of such negotiations, certain Rules of Regulation of the Krishnarajasagara reservoir were framed and agreed to by the Chief Engineers of the Mysore and Madras Governments on the 26th day of July of the year 1921, such Rules of Regulation forming Annexure I to this agreement; and 8. Whereas, thereafter, the technical officers of the two Governments have met in conference and examined the question of extension of irrigation in their respective territories with a view to reaching an amicable arrangement; and

9. Whereas as the result of such examination and conference by the technical officers of the two Governments, certain points with respect to such extension were agreed to respectively by the Chief Engineer for Irrigation, Madras, and the Special Officer, Krishnarajasagara Works, at Bangalore, on the 14 th day of September 1923, such points forming Annexure III to this agreement.”

46. In the said backdrop, the Mysore Government and the Madras Government entered into the 1924 agreement. We think it appropriate to reproduce the entire part of the said agreement as that is the fulcrum of the stand of the State of Tamil Nadu:-

“(i) The Mysore Government shall be entitled .to construct arid the Madras Government do hereby assent under clause III of the 1892 agreement to the Mysore Government constructing a dam and a reservoir across and on the river Cauvery at Kannambadi, now known a6 the Krishnarajasagara, such dam and reservoir to be of a storage capacity of not higher than 112 feet above the sill of the under-sluices now in existence corresponding to 124 feet above bed of the river before construction of the dam, and to be of the effective capacity of 44,827 million cubic feet, measured from the 6ill of the irrigation sluices constructed at 60 feet level above the bed of the river up to the maximum height of 124 feet above the bed of the river; the level of the bed of the river before the construction of the reservoir being taken as 12 feet below the sill level of the existing under-sluices; and such dam and reservoir

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

to be in all respects as described in schedule forming Annexure II to this agreement.

(ii) The Mysore Government on their part hereby agree to regulate the discharge through and from the said reservoir strictly in accordance with the Rules of Regulation set forth in the Annexure I, which Rules of Regulation shall be and form part of this agreement. (iii) The Mysore Government hereby agree to furnish to the Madras Government within two years from the date of the present agreement di-mensioned plans of anicuts and sluices or open heads at the off-takes of all existing irrigation channels having their source in the rivers Cauvery, Lakshmanathirtha and Hemavathi, showing thereon in a distinctive colour all alterations that have been made subsequent to the year 1910, and further to furnish maps similarly showing the location of the areas irrigated by the said channels prior to or in the year 1910. (iv) The Mysore Government on their part shall be at liberty to carry out future extensions of irrigation in Mysore under the Cauvery and its tributaries to an extent now fixed at 110,000 acres. This extent of new irrigation of 110,000 acres shall be in addition to and irrespective of the extent of irrigation permissible under the Rules of Regulation forming Annexure I to this agreement, viz, 1,26,000 acres plus the extension permissible under each of the existing channels to the extent of one-third of the area actually irrigated under such channel in or prior to 1910.

(v) The Madras Government on their part agree to limit the new area of irrigation under their Cauvery Metur project to 301,000 acres, and the capacity of the new reservoir at Metur, above the lowest irrigation sluice to ninety-three thousand five hundred million cubic feet.

Provided that, should scouring sluices but constructed in the dam at a lower level than the irrigation sluice, the dates on which such scouring sluices are opened shall be communicated to the Mysore Government.

(vi) The Mysore Government and the Madras Government agree, with reference to the provisions of clauses (iv) and (v) preceding, that each Gov-ernment shall arrange to supply the other as soon after the close of each official or calendar year, as may be

convenient, with returns of the areas newly brought under irrigation, and with the average monthly discharges at the main canal heads, as soon after the close of each month as may be convenient. (vii) The Mysore Government on their part agree that extensions of irrigation in Mysore as specified in clause (iv) above shall be carried out only by means of reservoirs constructed on the Cauvery and its tributaries mentioned in Schedule A of the 1892 agreement. Such reservoirs may be of an effective capacity of 45,000 million cubic feet, in the aggregate and the impounding therein shall be so regulated as not to make any material diminution in supplies connoted by the gauges accepted in the Rules of Regulation for the Krishnarajasagra forming Annexure I to this agreement, it being understood that the rules for working such reservoirs shall be so framed as to reduce to within 5 percent any loss during any impounding period, by the adoption of suitable proportion factors, impounding formula or such other means as may be settled at the time. (viii) The Mysore Government further agree that full particulars and details of such reservoir schemes, and of the impounding therein, shall be furnished to the Madras Government to enable them to satisfy themselves that the conditions in clause (vii) above will be fulfilled. Should there arise any difference of opinion between the Madras and Mysore Governments as to whether the said conditions are fulfilled in regard to any such scheme or schemes, both the Madras and Mysore Governments agree that such difference shall be settled in the manner provided in clause (xv) below. (ix) The Mysore Government and the Madras Government agree that the reserve storage for power generation purposes now provided in the Kriahnaraja sagra may be utilized by the Mysore Government according to their convenience from any other reservoir hereafter to be constructed, and the storage thus released from the Krishnarajasagra may be utilized for new irrigation within the extent of 110,000 acres provided for in clause(iv) above. (x) Should the Mysore government so decide to release the reserve storage for power generation purposes from the Krishnarajasagra, the working tables for the new reservoir from which the power water will then be utilized shall be framed “after taking into

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

consideration the conditions specified in clause (vii) above and the altered conditions of irrigation under the Krishnarajasagara.

(xi) The Mysore Government and the Madras Government further agree that the limitations and arrangements embodied in clauses (iv) to (viii) supra shall at the expiry of fifty years from the date of the execution of these presents, be open to reconsideration in the light of the experience gained and of an examination of the possibilities of the further extension of irrigation within the territories of the respective Governments and to such modifications and additions as may be mutually agreed upon as the result of such reconsideration. (xii) The Madras Government and the Mysore Government further agree that the limits of extension of irrigation specified in clauses (iv) and (v) above shall not preclude extensions of irrigation effected solely by improvement of duty, without any increase of the quantity of water used. (xiii) Nothing herein agreed to or contained shall be deemed to qualify or limit in any manner the operation of the 1892 agreement in regard to matters other than those to which this agreement relates or to affect the rights of the Mysore Government to construct new irrigation works on the tributaries o the Cauvery in Mysore not included in Schedule A of the 1892 agreement (xiv) The Madras Government shall be at liberty to construct new irrigation works on the tributaries of the Cauvery in Madras and, should the Madras Government construct; on the Bhavani, Amaravati or Noyil rivers in Madras, any new storage reservoir, the Mysore Government shall be at liberty to construct, as an offset, a storage reservoir in addition to those referred to in clause (vii) of this agreement on one of the tributaries of the Cauvery in Mysore, of a capacity not exceeding 60 per cent of the new reservoir in Madras. Provided that the impounding in such reservoirs shall not diminish or affect in any way the supplies to which the Madras Government and the Mysore Government respectively are entitled under this agreement, or the division of surplus water which, it is anticipated, will be available for division on the termination of this agreement as provided in clause (xi).

(xv) The Madras Government and the Mysore Government hereby agree that, if at any time there should arise any dispute between the Madras Government and the Mysore Government touching the interpretation or op-eration or carrying out of this agreement, such dispute shall be referred for settlement to arbitration, or if the parties so agree shall be submitted to the Government of India.” 47. As is noticeable, Clause 10(ii) provided that the Mysore Government had agreed to regulate the discharge through and from the concerned reservoir strictly in accordance with the Rules of Regulation set forth in Annexure I, which Rules of Regulation shall be and form part of that agreement. The relevant part of Annexure I is reproduced below:-

“7. The minimum flow of the Cauvery that must be ensured at the upper anicut before any impounding is made in the Krishnarajasagara, as connoted by the readings of the Cauvery dam north gauge, shall be as follows:Month Readings of the Cauvery Dam North gauge. June .. Six and a half feet.

July and August

..

Seven and a half feet

September

..

Seven feet.

October

..

Six and a half feet.

November

..

Six feet.

December

..

Three and a half feet.

January

..

Three feet.

8. The discharges connoted by the gauge readings set forth in rule 7 shall, in the case of regulation during the irrigation season (vide rule 9) of 1921, be deducted from the average discharge curve derived from the joint gaugings of the Cauvery at the Cauvery dam made in the four years ending 1920. The said discharges shall be revised, if necessary, after completion of the joint gaugings of 1921 and shall be used for the purpose of regulation for the five years ending 1926. The said discharges shall be finally revised and adopted for all subsequent regulation,

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

at the conclusion of the joint gauging of the year 1926, on the basis of the joint gaugings of the ten years ending 1926.

9. The south-west monsoon shall, for the purpose of these rules be considered to extend from the 1st June to the 30th September, both days inclusive, and the north-east monsoon from the1st October to the 31st January, both days inclusive. The irrigation season shall be taken to extend from the 1st June to the 31st January, both days inclusive. All dates in this rule shall have reference to the Upper Anicut.”

48. Annexure III of the agreement pertains to the extent of irrigation of Mysore and Madras. The relevant part is as follows:-

“2.The extent of future extension of irrigation in Mysore under the Cauvery and its tributaries mentioned in Schedule A of the 1892 agreement shall be fixed at 110,000 acres, and Madras shall have their Cauvery-Mettur project as revised in 1921 with their new area of irrigation fixed at 301,000 acres, …”

49. It is worthy to note here that another agreement was entered into between both the governments in the year 1929 to clarify Rules 7 and 8 of the Rules of Regulation pertaining to the Krishna Raja Sagara reservoir which is as follows:“AGREEMENT WHEREAS on the 18th February 1924 an agreement between the Governments of Mysore and Madras was signed and whereas by clause 10(2) of the said agreement the Mysore Government agreed to regulate the discharge through and from the Krishnarajasagara reservoir strictly in accordance with the Rules of Regulation being Annexure I to the said agreement;

and WHEREAS disputes had arisen between the two Governments in regard to the interpretation, operation and carrying out of rules 7 and 8 of the said Rules and Regulation; And

WHEREAS both the Governments have submitted the matters in dispute to the Arbitration of the Honourable Mr. Justice Page with Messrs. Howley and Forbes as assessors.

Now the two Governments have agreed in lieu of an award in that behalf to adopt finally for all Regulation subsequent to 1st July 1929, the following discharges for the respective months in place of the averages referred to in clause 8 of Annexure I:June for 61/2 feet gauge

.. 29,800 cusecs.

July and August for 71/2 ft. gauge

.. 40,100

“

September for 7 feet gauge

.. 35,000

“

October for 6 1/2 feet gauge

.. 29,800

“

November for 6 feet gauge

.. 25,033

“

December for 31/2 feet gauge

.. 8,913

“

January for 3 feet gauge

.. 6,170

“

and in rule 10, defining the impounding formula, C will denote the said above mentioned discharges.

THIS agreement is without prejudice to the other questions outstanding between the parties in regard to the clauses of the agreement other than clauses 7 and 8 of the Rules of Regulation. 17th June 1929. (Signed) R. RANGA RAO) (Signed) A.G. LEACH, Officiating Chief Secretary Secretary to the Government to the Govt. of Mysore Public Works and Labor Department, Madras.” 50. In 1934, a new reservoir at Mettur which was constructed by Madras became operational pursuant to Clause 10(v) of the agreement of 1924 and the Madras Government had agreed to limit “the new areas of irrigation under their Cauvery Mettur project (Project Report of 1921) to 301,000 acres” and the capacity of “the new reservoir at Mettur” to 93.5 TMC. In the said order, the State of Madras started planning of Nhawan reservoir under Clause 10 (xiv) of the agreement of 1924 and, as a result, Mysore became entitled to construct a reservoir of 60% of the capacity planned by Madras and, accordingly, Mysore proposed Kabini Reservoir as an offset reservoir under Clause 10(xiv) of the said agreement. In this regard, the finding of the Tribunal is as follows:“Regarding Kabini project, the objection of Madras was that the proposal of Mysore for transfer of half of power storage from

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

Krishnarajasagar to Kabini was not permissible although according to the State of Karnataka it was permissible under Clasue 10(ix) of the agreement. Apart from objection regarding the transfer of power storage with regard to Kabini other objections had also been raised. From the notes of discussion between the then engineers of the two States on 11th and 12th March, 1940 (Tamil Nadu Vo,VII/Exh.445 page 148) it appears that the two Chief Engineers of Madras and Mysroe Governments finally agreed on the impounding in reservoir to be built on Kabini during the critical months from June to January, applying the Rule 10 of Rules of Regulation of KRS (Annexure I to the Agreement). The notes of discussions and agreements between the two Chief Engineers were duly signed by them, and no further action was taken by the State of Madras. Any agreement between the two chief engineers was subject to the approval of the State of Madras and the Government of Mysore. Then by letter dated 21st May. 1945 the Secretary to Maharaja of Mysore made a request to the Resident in Mysore to obtain the concurrence of the Madras Government. There was no reply from Madras Government although the contents of the aforesaid letter had been communicated to the Government of Madras. No explanation was furnished as to why when the Chief Engineers of two States had fixed and settled the impounding formula in terms of the agreement of 1924. for the reservoir on Kabini. the State of Madras was not communicating its approval. Because of that the project on Kabini as planned by Mysore in 1933 under clause 10(iv) of the agreement remained unimplemented.”

51. In the year 1935, the British Parliament enacted the Government of India Act, 1935 (for short, “the 1935 Act”). In the year 1947, the Indian Independence Act, 1947 (for brevity, “the 1947 Act”) came into force. The Maharaja of Mysore had executed an agreement “Instrument of Accession” initially only on two subjects, namely, defence and external affairs and communications which was accepted by the Governor General of India on 16.08.1947. Thereafter, a White Paper was released on Indian States and “Standstill Agreement” was entered into between the Dominion of India and the Maharaja of Mysore. A supplementary “Instrument of Accession” was executed on 01.06.1949 for all matters enumerated in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule of the 1935 Act which was contained in the said supplementary

agreement. After coming into force of the Constitution of India, the 1947 Act stood repealed by reason of the provisions contained in Article 395 of the Constitution of India and the erstwhile province of Madras under the 1935 Act became a Part A State of Madras with effect from 26.01.1950. On 01.11.1956, the new State of Mysore was formed by the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Reorganisation Act”). 52. In August 1972, the State of Tamil Nadu filed a suit OS No. 1 of 1971 against the State of Mysore which was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit if necessary. On 29.05.1972, the Chief Ministers of Mysore, Tamil Nadu and Kerala discussed with the Union Minister for Irrigation and Deputy Minister. The relevant part of the discussion reads as follows:“Note on discussions regarding Cauvery held at New Delhi on 29th May, 1972”

“Discussions were held on 29th May, 1972 at New Delhi between the Chief Ministers of Mysore, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Union Minister for Irrigation and Power and Deputy Ministers were present. The Chief Ministers were assisted by Ministers of respective States, those present were as follows: I. Tamil Nadu:

1. Thiru M. Karunanidhi, Chief Minister 2. Thiru S. Madhavan, Minister for Law 3. Thiru SJ. Sadiq Pasha, Minister for Public Works II.Mysore:

1. Shri D. Devaraj Urs, Chief Minister 2. Shri M.N. Nanja Gouda, Minister for State for Major Irrigation III. Kerala: 1. Shri C. Achutha Menon, Chief Minister

2. Shri T.K. Divakaran, Minister for Public Works Union Minister for Irrigation and Power stated that river problems are best settled through negotiations and this was the course the Central Government was adopting for the last few years in settling the differ rences on the use® of waters of Cauvery. Earlier, it

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

was aimed to arrive at an interim agreement to be valid till 1974. when the earlier agreement of 1924 would have come up for review after 50 years, as provided in the agreement. Now, as 1974 is near, this attempt has been given up in favour of finding an overall approach to solve the problem amicably amongst the several States. (Emphasis supplied) The discussions amongst the Chief Ministers revealed general consensus on the three following points as in para 2:

2.1 A serious attempt should be made to resolve by negotiations the Cauvery dispute between eh States as eariy as possible. 2.2. The Centre may appoint a Fact Finding Committee consisting of Engineers, retired Judges and if necessary, Agricultural Experts to collect all the connected data pertaining to Cauvery waters, its utilization and irrigation practices as well as projects both existing, under construction and proposed in the Cauvery basin. The Committee will examine adequacy of the present supplies or excessive use of water for irrigation purposes. The Committee is only to collect the data and not make any recommendations. The Committee may be asked to submit its report in three months time. 2.3 Making use of the data, discussions will be held between the Chief Ministers of the three States to arrive at an agreed allocation of waters for the respective States. 3. Union Government will assist in arriving at such a settlement in six months, and in the meanwhile, no State will take any steps to make the solution of the problem difficult either by impounding or by utilizing water of Cauvery beyond what it is at present.”

53. Pursuant to the above, the Cauvery Fact Finding Committee (CFFC) was set up by the Government of India. The terms of the reference to the CFFC were as follows:“(i) To collect all the connected data pertaining to Cauvery waters; its utilization at different points of time: irrigation practices; as well as projects both existing, under construction, and proposed in the Cauvery basin. (ii) To examine adequacy of the present supplies or excessive use of water for irrigation purposes.

(iii) To collect data relevant to the use of water in different States like the physical and other features; cultivated areas; existing and proposed uses for domestic and industrial water supply; hydroelectric power generation, navigation, salinity control and other non-irrigational purposes.

(iv) Any other connected matters.” 54. The CFFC submitted a report on 15.12.1972. The relevant part of the report is reproduced below:“As desired in the above resolution, we hereby submit our report.

The data was received from Kerala on 21st September, 1972 from Mysore on 19th October, 1972 and Tamil Nadu on 24th October, 1972. Both Mysore and Tamil Nadu supplemented their data during their discussions with the Committee at New Delhi from 7th to 14th November, 1972. Some clarifications and elucidations had been asked for from the States during the discussions and again during the visit of the Committee to Mysore and Tamil Nadu from 6th to 8th December, 1972. The replies from the State Governments have not yet been received. The data supplied by the three States runs into 20 volumes. In addition, they have left with the Committee project reports for their study which also run into 36 volumes. As this voluminous data requires very careful examination and scrutiny, the Committee “had asked for further extension of one month from 15th December, 1972 to 15th January, 1973. But the same has not been agreed to. In view of the above, the Committee had no alternative but to submit its report on 15th December, 1972, though it has not been possible to do full justice to this important work. In accordance with the note on discussions regarding Cauvery held at New Delhi on 29th May, 1972, between the Union Minister for Irrigation and Power and the Chief Ministers of Kerala, Mysore and Tamil Nadu {a copy of which had been supplied to the Committee) “the Committee is only to collect the data and not make any recommendations”. As such, the Committee has refrained from making any recommendations.” 55. On 14.08.1973, an additional report was submitted. In October, 1973, the States of Mysore, Tamil Nadu and Kerala desired the

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

Government of India to make a study on the scope of economy in the use of water and in pursuance of the same, the C.C. Patel Committee was constituted. The Committee made various recommendations and an estimate of irrigation water requirement in each State. On 12.08.1976, a Committee with Mr. E.C. Saldhana, Member, Central Water Commission, as Chairman was set up by the Central Government with the following terms of reference:-

“(i) To assess the requirement of water of the existing areas under irrigation as well as new areas which are proposed to be brought under irrigation taking into consideration the availability of water from the rainfall within the respective command areas:

(ii) To assess the availability of water for use in a normal year taking into consideration integrated operation of the reservoirs and the demand pattern of releases: (iii) To recommend regulation of supplies in normal or good years for protecting the existing ayacuts as well as for the new areas, taking into consideration the savings to be effected progressively in Tamil Nadu including Karaikal region of Pondicherry and Karnataka.” 56. In March 1977, a draft report was submitted to the Government of India. As is manifest, discussions, deliberations and negotiations went on between the two States and eventually, as stated earlier, on 06.07.1986, the State of Tamil Nadu lodged a complaint under the 1956 Act with the Government of India raising water dispute thereby requesting for adjudication of the water dispute by a tribunal. 57. We have already noted that the State of Karnataka had brought out an ordinance and how the Court has dealt with the same. 58. Having noted the aforesaid and observing what the Constitution Bench had stated, we may proceed to deal with the contentions canvassed on behalf of both the States with regard to the validity of the agreements.

H. Doctrine of Paramountcy and its extinction on coming into force of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 59. Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel, has attacked both the agreements on two counts, namely, (i) the Maharaja of Mysore was not in a position to enter into an agreement on equal terms with the Madras

Government as the communications would show, and further, (ii) the manner in which the agreements were reached, the status conferred by the British Government and the Maharaja, the orders passed by the British Government from time to time and eventually, the order of the Secretary of State for India who upheld the appeal of the British Government of Madras against the Griffin Award clearly show the subservience of the Maharaja of Mysore to the paramount power of the British Crown. He has drawn our attention to a passage of the Griffin Award which is as under:“The Secretary of State holds that the Government of Madras were within their rights in appealing to him, firstly because the procedure prescribed in rule IV of the agreement of1892 was varied in the Arbitration Proceedings and, secondly, because, while the Agreement of1892 was and is valid as between the Governments of Madras and Mysore, this does not relieve him (i.e. the Secretary of State) of his genera! responsibility for intervening in any matter in which it seems to him that the public interest is threatened with injury, even if the possible injury would be consequent on action taken under an award given, or purporting to be given, under rule IV”. 60. Relying on the same, it is propounded by Mr. Nariman that a binding arbitration award between the Indian State and a Province in British Government was not regarded as binding by the Secretary of State and he could refuse to recognize it and from the said, the Doctrine of Paramountcy is manifest and that alone should be treated as sufficient to treat the agreements as absolutely unfair, arbitrary and unreasonable. Learned senior counsel would contend that when in such a situation the agreement had been entered into, the same cannot be regarded as valid in law after India got independence and should be declared as null and void under the Constitution of India that came into force on 26 th January, 1950. It is urged by him that having regard to the regime of paramountcy and taking note of the fact that the Crown had the paramount power and exercised the same in favour of the Madras Government ignoring whatever objection could be raised then by the Dewan of Maharaja of Mysore, the agreement cannot be constituted as valid and acceptable in law. The argument on the factual score by Mr. Nariman has been seriously contested by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu, urging that the agreements were arrived at

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

after several correspondences and proper consideration. He has also drawn our attention to the letter dated 12.02.1924 from the Dewan of Mysore to the Secretary of the Maharaja. The said letter reads thus:-

“I have discussed the whole matter this morning with my colleagues and they entirely approve of my recommendations. I feel relieved and proud that after four years of strenuous fight. I am able to put up for His Highness approval a settlement which is eminently satisfactory and favourable to Mysore and its future generations.

PS. - Sir Visvesvaraya has gone away to Bhadravathi, so, I cannot speak to him. I have already discussed all the main points with him a week ago and he was fully satisfied that we got all we could and had a very satisfactory settlement.”

61. Referring to the language employed in the said letter, it is submitted by Mr. Nariman that the same does not really indicate anything that can be considered as consent or acceptance but instead reflects some kind of resignation. He has emphasized on the words “that we got all we could” to highlight that it is reflective of compulsive surrender having no choice and accepting whatsoever has been given in the absence of any option. He would further submit that the agreement of 1924 only permitted the State of Mysore to undertake irrigation in the Princely State on certain terms. It was because of the unilateral imposition by the paramount power. 62. In this context, it is also necessary to refer to what Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel, has drawn our attention to from the letter of the Dewan of Mysore to the Maharaja of Mysore. The said part reads as follows:“I am sending tonight with this letter a complete comprehensive agreement embracing all the points of dispute, bringing forward every clause as agreed to up to date during the past 4years of discussion and signed by the technical officers of the two Governments. It will be seen that we have given a concession to Madras in regard to the Bhavani Project and have got, in return, a quid pro quo that we shall be entitled to have an additional reservoir. The other points are already settled. The whole case has caused me, during the past few days, considerable anxiety and I honestly now think that with the concession now obtained and with the

finality in regard to the krishnarajasagara, taken together with the possibility of an additional development of 110,000 acres during the next 50 years, Mysore interests are fully safeguarded even though Mysore now agrees to the Metur project slightly enlarged. We have made a very still fight over this question, and as Madras have climbed their other contentions and are prepared to sign the agreement as now submitted, we may, with good grace, yield on this one point so far as only the additional 1,500 m.c. ft. extra storage is concerned, which is negligible and conclude the dispute once for all. I have discussed the whole matter this morning with my colleagues and they entirely approve of my recommendations. I feel relieved and proud that after four years of strenuous fight, I am able to put up for His Highness approval a settlement which is eminently satisfactory and favourable to Mysore and its future generations.” 63. Elaborating the stand of paramountcy, this Court has been apprised of certain factual aspects. In 1929, certain disputes arose between the two Governments pertaining to the interpretation, operation and carrying out of Rules 7 and 8 of the Rules of Regulation of 1921 (Annexure to the Agreement of 1924) and under Clause 10(ii), the matters in dispute were referred to arbitration of Mr. Justice Page of the Calcutta High Court and during the arbitration, both the Governments agreed to adopt the same as final as regards the discharges at the upper Anicut and certain further aspects. In 1934, a new reservoir at Mettur which was constructed by Madras became operational pursuant to clause 10(v) of the Agreement of 1924 and the Madras Government agreed to limit the new areas of irrigation under the Cauvery-Mettur project to 301,000 acres and the capacity of the new reservoir at Mettur to 93.5 TMC. It is the stand of the State of Karnataka that when the Mettur Dam became operational with effect from 1934, the natural flow for upper Anicut which was at a considerable distance below Mettur could not be maintained at the stipulated six and a half to seven and a half ft. equal to 29800 cusecs to 40100 cusecs since the water of the upstream flowed into Mettur reservoir. Despite the same, as urged by Mr. Nariman, clause 10(ii) of the Agreement of 1924 required strict observance of Rule 7 of the Rules of Regulation and was not altered and it was so because of the paramount power exercised by the authority and it did not desire the

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

anomaly to be corrected. Various other aspects have been stressed upon to highlight that the State of Mysore had no authority to bargain and it was compelled to succumb to the paramount exercise of power. We are at present not referring to the specific reservoirs as that shall be dealt with at a later stage.

64. The legal validity of the agreement of the year 1924 was challenged before the Tribunal and it has addressed whether the agreement has become constitutionally invalid. Adverting to the same, the Tribunal has opined that when the 1924 Agreement was entered into, the Government of India Act, 1919 was in force. Section 30 of the said Act enabled the Governor General in Council to make any contract for the purpose of that Act. The Government of India Act, 1919 was repealed by the Government of India Act, 1935.

65. On behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu, reliance was placed on Section 177 of the Government of India Act, 1935 to sustain the contention that the 1924 Agreement continued to be in force and when British paramountcy lapsed on 15th August, 1947, the agreement did not lapse automatically due to the proviso to Section 7(1) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. It is further put forth that the agreement continued to be in force in the absence of denouncement of those agreements by either party or by superseding them by any fresh agreement. That apart, the State of Mysore which was a Princely State at the time of its accession to the Dominion of India executed both the “Instruments of Accession” and the “Standstill Agreement” under which the agreement continued between the State of Madras and the then State of Mysore. After the Constitution came into force, the liabilities and obligations arising out of the said agreements under Articles 294-B and 295(2) devolved on the two States and after the reorganization of the States in November, 1956, the terms of the agreement made earlier are to be treated as binding on the successor State or States under Section 87(1) of the Reorganisation Act. The contention of the State of Karnataka before the Tribunal was that the Agreement of 1924 is not covered by Section 177 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and as such, it lapsed after coming into force of the said Act.

66. The Tribunal referred to Section 177(1), noted the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and held thus:“7. On a plain reading of Section 177(1) of the Government of India Act 1935 aforesaid it is apparent that it conceived contract

to be made by or on behalf of the Secretary of State in Council. On the facts furnished on behalf of the State of Karnataka itself it appears that the Agreement which had been initially signed by the Dewan of Mysore and Secretary to the Government of 88 Madras on 18th February 1924 was also signed by the Maharaja of Mysore as well as the Governor of Madras. It was also approved by the Secretary of State and that approval was communicated by telegram dated 18th June 1924. Thereafter, the Government of India approved and confirmed the said agreement on 11th July 1924 which is apparent from the note made on the photo copy of the agreement by the Political Secretary. In this background, it shall be deemed that the said agreement had been executed on behalf of the Secretary of State in Council. Merely because in the agreement it had not been mentioned that it was being executed on behalf of the Secretary of State in Council, shall not make the agreement invalid. It is well known that in such matters a presumption has to be raised that official acts have been performed by complying with the requirement of the law. According to us after lapse of about 80 years from the date of the execution of the agreement it shall be a futile attempt to examine the legal validity of the execution of the agreement of the year 1924 which had been acted upon by the then State of Madras and the Government of Mysore in respect of sharing of the water of Cauvery and its tributaries including in respect of construction of reservoirs over Cauvery and its tributaries by two States. Pursuant to that agreement KRS was constructed and became functional in the year 1931 within Mysore and Mettur was constructed by Madras which became functional in the year 1934. The reservoirs on tributaries within the States of Mysore/Karnataka and Madras/ Tamil Nadu have also been constructed and they are functioning. No dispute was raised at any stage on behalf of the Mysore or Karnataka till 89 the expiry of the period of 50 years in 1974, in respect of any defect in the execution of the agreement of the year 1924 or that it was not binding on Mysore/Karnataka.”

67. The submission was structured on the basis of the 1947 Act and the judgment rendered in Dr. Babu Ram Saksena v. State3. The Tribunal analyzed the said decision and the views of Patanjali Sastri, J. who delivered his opinion on behalf of M.H. Kania, CJ and himself and

1950 SCR 573 : AIR 1950 SC 155

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

the opinion rendered by B.K. Mukherjee, J. Be it noted, Fazal Ali, J. agreed with both Sastri, J and Mukherjee, J. and opined that the appeal deserved to be dismissed. Mahajan, J. concurred with Mukherjee, J. After noting the facts, the Tribunal observed thus:-

“16. It appears that three remaining Hon’ble Judges Fazl Ali, J, Mahajan,J, and Das,J, agreed with the opinion aforesaid expressed by Hon’ble Justice Mukherjea. The majority of the Judges in the aforesaid Supreme Court case dismissed the appeal taking special facts and circumstances of that particular case, i.e. the merger of the Tonk State along with several other States and giving rise to the United State of Rajasthan. In the process of merger Tonk had lost its identity and had relinquished its life. As such a treaty previously concluded had lapsed.” 68. After so stating, the Tribunal distinguished the said decision as the factual matrix is different. It has been held by the Tribunal that the State of Mysore was a ruling State and after accession, it became a Group B State under the Constitution of India and at no stage, there has been any merger of the said State with any other State by which the Ruling State of Mysore stood extinguished or relinquished as in the case of State of Tonk which was the subject matter of controversy in Dr. Babu Ram Saksena (supra). Thereafter, the Tribunal has held:“According to us the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court is of no help to the State of Karnataka. No other decision or provision was brought to our notice in support of the contention that the Agreement of the year 1924 ceased to exist after the Indian Independence Act 1947 came into force. The result will be that it shall be deemed that the said Agreement of 1924 survived and continued even after the coming into force of the Indian Independence Act 1947 and the Constitution of India.” 69. Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel, has assiduously and astutely canvassed about the doctrine of paramountcy. For the said purpose, he has drawn our attention to Section 7 of the 1947 Act. The said provision reads as follows:“7. (1) As from the appointed day(a) His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as respects the government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India;

(b) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise; and (c) there lapse also any treaties or agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and any persons having authority in the tribal areas, any obligations of His Majesty existing at that date to any such persons or with respect to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable at that date by His Majesty in or in relation to the tribal areas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise: Provided that, notwithstanding anything in paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of this subsection, effect shall, as nearly as may be, continue to be given to the provisions of any such agreement as is therein referred to which relate to customs, transit and communications, -posts and telegraphs, or other like matters, until the provisions in question are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State or person having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or by the Dominion or Province or other part thereof concerned on the other hand, or are superseded by subsequent agreements.

(2) The assent of the Parliament of the United Kingdom is hereby given to the omission from the Royal Style and Titles of the words “ Indiae Imperator “ and the words “ Emperor of India “ and to the issue by His Majesty for that purpose of His Royal Proclamation under the Great Seal of the Realm.”

70. According to Mr. Nariman, after coming into force of the said provision, the agreements lapsed and the finding of the Tribunal that they continued because of the “Standstill Agreement” or the constitutional provisions as enshrined under Article 295(2) is absolutely erroneous. In this context, we may refer to the “Standstill Agreement” which is a part of the White Paper on Indian State issued by the Government of India, Ministry of States. In part 4 of the said White Paper, accession of the

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

States to the Dominion of India is mentioned and it refers to the lapse of paramountcy. Paragraph 82 deals with “Standstill Agreement”. It reads as follows:-

“Standstill Agreements, the acceptance of which was made by the Government of India conditional on accession by the States concerned were also entered into between the Dominion Government and the acceding States. The Standstill Agreements (Appendix IX), provided for the continuance for the time being of all subsisting agreements and administrative arrangements in matters of common concern between the States and the Dominion of India or any part thereof.” 71. It is submitted by Mr. Nariman that the “Standstill Agreement” dated 09.08.1947 which was actually executed by the Maharaja of Mysore stipulated that nothing in the said agreement could include the exercise of any paramountcy function and, therefore, the “Standstill Agreement” will not cover the State of Mysore. Learned senior counsel would contend that with the coming into force of the Constitution of India on 26.01.1950, the 1947 Act passed by the Parliament stood repealed by reason of the provision of Article 395 of the Constitution and Mysore became a Part B State under the Constitution and the erstwhile province of Madras became a Part A State. According to him, even if the “Standstill Agreement” executed between the Maharaja of Mysore and the Dominion of India was operative and existing, it came to an end. According to him, the 1947 Act did not survive beyond the final accession of the State of Mysore to the Union of India and “Standstill Agreement” entered into by the Government of India with various Indian States including the provincial State of Mysore were purely temporary arrangements designed to maintain status quo in respect of administrative matters. He has seriously criticized the finding of the Tribunal and contended that the Tribunal has failed to take proper note of the decision in Dr. Babu Ram Saksena (supra). He has commended us to certain passages to bolster the argument:“The Attorney-General appearing for the Government advanced three lines of argument in answer to that contention. In the first place, the standstill agreement entered into with the various Indian States were purely temporary arrangements designed to maintain the status quo ante in respect of certain administrative matters of common concern pending the accession of those States to the

Dominion of India, and they were superseded by the Instruments of Accession executed by the Rulers of those States. Tonk having acceded to the Dominion on the 16th August, 1947, the standstill agreement relied on by the appellant must be taken to have lapsed as from that date. …..

As we are clearly of opinion that the appellant’s contention must fail on this last ground, we consider it unnecessary to pronounce on the other points raised by the Attorney General especially as the issues involved are not purely legal but partake also of a political character, and we have not had the views of the Governments concerned on those points.”

72. We have already referred to the decision in Dr. Babu Ram Saksena (supra) and how the Tribunal has dealt with the same. The emphasis of Mr. Nariman is on the words “partake also of a political character”. Stress is laid that when an agreement partakes a political character, the doctrine of paramountcy clause melts into insignificance by virtue of Section 7 of the 1947 Act. In this regard, he has placed reliance on Hemchand Devchand v. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal4. The effort of the learned senior counsel is to draw a distinction between categories of political cases and those which fall in the other categories. The relied upon passages from the said judgment read as follows:-

“The real question is whether in cases like those now before their Lordships the action of the tribunals in Kathiawar, and of the Governor in Council on appeal from those tribunals, is properly to be regarded as judicial or as political. And at this point a distinction arises between the two cases under appeal; because the first of them has been disposed of as a civil, the second as a political, case. xxxxx The further appeal to the Secretary of State in Council is a fact of clearer import. In Lord Salisbury’s Despatch of the March 23, 1876, the practice of such appeals is dealt with as a thing at that date already fully established, and it continues to the present day in civil as well as in political cases. This system of appeal to the Secretary of State affords strong evidence that the intention of Government is and always has been that the jurisdiction

(1905) 33 IA 1 : (1906) ILR 33 Cal 219

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

exercised in connection with Kathiawar should be political and not judicial in its character.”

And again:“Such cases can only be justly disposed of on principle of equity in the fullest sense of the term, and not in the circumscribed sense, which is familiar to the practice of the High Courts; and sometimes consideration must be given to the political expediency which underlies the relation in which the Government stands to the protected States.’’ 73. Placing reliance on the said passages, it is urged by him that when the Secretary of State was dealing with such a case, the said case was regarded as “political” and not “judicial” in character as was later authoritatively stated in the letter of the Viceroy of India – that is, Lord Reading’s letter dated 27.03.1926 to the Nizam of Hyderabad – which set out the doctrine of paramountcy in classical terms. Elaborating further, it was contended by him that the appeal preferred by the Government of Madras against the Griffin Award which was in favour of the Maharaja of Mysore was allowed and the Maharaja of Mysore was described as the head of a “Vassal State”, and hence, he was not in a position to negotiate or bargain with the paramount power on equal terms and was compelled to go for amicable settlement on compulsion. In this regard, inspiration has been drawn from the decision in H. H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior and others v. Union of India and another5. Shah, J., speaking for the majority, observed:“100. In the era before 1947 the term “State” applied to a political community occupying a territory in India of defined boundaries and subject to a single Ruler who enjoyed or exercised, as belonging to him, any of the functions and attributes of internal sovereignty duly recognised by the British Crown. There were in India more than 560 States: forty out of those States had treaty relations with the Paramount Power: a larger number of States had some form of engagements or Sanads, and the remaining enjoyed in one or the other form recognition of their status by the British Crown. The treaties, engagements and Sanads covered a wide field, and the rights and obligations of the States arising

(1971) 1 SCC 85

out of those agreements varied from State to State. The rights that the British Crown as the Paramount Power exercised in relation to the States covered authority in matters external as well as internal. The States had no international personality, the Paramount Power had exclusive authority to make peace or war, or to negotiate or communicate with foreign States. The Paramount Power had the right of intervention in internal affairs which could be exercised for the benefit of the head of the State, of India as a whole, or for giving effect to international commitments.”

74. Further, the Court referred to the Cabinet Mission which announced its Plan on May 16, 1946 for the entry of the States into the proposed Union of India and simultaneously declared that the paramountcy of the British Crown could neither be retained nor transferred to the new Government. The Court also took note of the Indian (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 which extensively amended Sections 5 and 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Court dwelt upon the inheritance of the paramountcy power of the British Crown and, in that context, held:“131. We are unable to agree with the Attorney-General that the “old unidentified concept of paramountcy of the British Crown” was inherited by the Union, by reason of the instruments of accession and merger agreements and that “recognition of Rulership was a ‘gift of the President’, and not a matter of legal right, existing as it did in the area of paramountcy and remaining with the Government of India”. The British Crown did not acquire paramountcy rights by any express grant, cession or transfer, it exercised paramountcy because it was the dominant power. Paramountcy had no legal origin, and no fixed concept: its dimensions depended upon what in a given situation the representatives of the British Crown thought expedient. Paramountcy meant those powers which the British authorities by the might of arms, and in disregard of the sovereignty and authority of the States chose to exercise. But that paramountcy lapsed with the Indian Independence Act, 1947: even its shadows disappeared with the integration of the States with the Indian Union. After the withdrawal of the British power and extinction of paramountcy of the British power the Dominion Government

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

of India did not and could not exercise any paramountcy over the States. In clause 3 of the Standstill Agreement it was expressly recited that.... Nothing in the agreement includes the exercise of any paramountcy functions”. The relations between the States and the Dominion Government were strictly governed by the instruments executed from time to time. Subject to the power conferred in respect of certain matters of common interest to legislate and exercise executive authority the Princes had sovereignty within their territories. With the advent of the Constitution the States ceased to exist, and the Princes and Chiefs who were recognized as Rulers were left with no sovereign authority in them. It is difficult to conceive of the government of a democratic Republic exercising against its citizens “paramountcy” claimed to be inherited from an imperial power. The power and authority which the Union may exercise against its citizens and even aliens spring from and are strictly circumscribed by the Constitution.

132. The fundamentals on which paramountcy rested i.e. the compulsion of geography and the essentials for ensuring security and special responsibility of the Government of India to protect all territories in India survived the enactment of the Indian Independence Act, for between August 15, 1947 and the date of integration of the various States, the Government of India was the only fully sovereign authority. But paramountcy with its brazenfaced autocracy no longer survived the enactment of the Constitution. Under our Constitution an action not authorised by law against the citizens of the Union cannot be supported under the shelter of paramountcy. The functions of the President of India stem from the Constitution — not from a “concept of the British Crown” identified or unidentified. What the Constitution does not authorise, the President cannot grant. Rulership is therefore not a privilege which the President may in the exercise of his discretion bestow or withhold.”

75. Relying upon the said authority, it is canvassed by Mr. Nariman that the agreements of 1892 and 1924 were relatable to paramountcy functions and, therefore, the “Standstill Agreement” of Mysore could not be held to have continued the said two agreements since they are relatable to paramountcy and, in fact, after the lapse of suzerainty of the

British Crown under the 1947 Act, both the agreements are bound to be treated to have been lapsed. In this context, he has drawn inspiration from certain passages of the book “Integration of Indian States” by Mr. V.P. Menon who has commented on the provisions of Section 7 of the 1947 Act. The comments of the learned author in this regard are as follows:“The next question was whether, even if paramountcy lapsed, all agreements of a commercial, economic or financial character between the States on die one hand and the British Government, the Secretary of State, and the Governor-General on the other, would cease to be legally effective. I pointed out that there were several important agreements which had been entered into for the common benefit of the States and British India where paramountcy did not enter, such as the agreement of 1920 with Bahawaipur and Bikaner regarding the Sutlej Valley canals project, and the Government of India agreement on salt with Jaipur and Jodhpur. The mutual rights and obligations- of parties under such agreements could not be regarded as lapsing on the withdrawal of paramountcy. On the commencement of the Government of India Act of 1935, the Crown’s rights and obligations had become for all practical and constitutional purposes the rights and obligations of the Central Government and were secured as such by the provisions of the Act. The financial commitments of the Central Government under agreements of this type were considerable. I therefore took the view that it would be best that these agreements should continue to be binding both on the States and on the successor Governments. Sir Conrad Corfield. on behalf of the Political Department contested my point of view. He referred to a meeting between himself and Lord Pethick-Lawrence at which it had been agreed that the abolition of the Crown Representative would automatically cause paramountcy to become void, together with any subsisting agreements between the Crown and the States. Sir Conrad did not agree with the view that paramountcy did not enter into the Sutiej Valley Canals Agreement of 1920 and the Jaipur and Jodhpur Salt Agreements. The first of these had been entered into on behalf of Bahawaipur by a Council of Regency

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

controlled by the paramount power while the ruler was a minor. The Jaipur and Jodhpur Salt Agreements wee typical of those which States had been required to conclude with the paramount power during the latter half of the nineteenth century in the interests of the central revenues. The Political Adviser was unable to entertain the view that the agreements should be continued after the lapse of paramountcy.

Lord Mountbatten did not take sides in this conflict of opinion. He merely forwarded both my view as well as that of the Political Department to the India Office. It was about this time that the Secretary of State intimated that the Indian Independence Bill should include a specific denunciation of the treaties with the Indian States. Normally speaking, treaties were terminated by ‘acts of State’, but there was no reason why, on an occasion of this importance and in the peculiar circumstances, this should not be done by an Act of Parliament which would emphasize the legal position whereby paramountcy did not pass to the new Indian Dominions. This was considered by the Viceroy’s advisers; they deprecated any such formal denunciation of treaties. Meanwhile the Secretary of State’s opinion in regard to the continuance of existing agreements was received. He stated that His Majesty’s Government fully appreciated the importance attached by the Reforms Commissioner to the avoidance if possible of complete severance of relations with the States and the necessity for negotiations between parties over the whole field. But he considered that the views of the Political Department must prevail, as they were in line with His Majesty’s Government’s policy as stated in the Cabinet Mission memorandum. It was impossible to distinguish between agreements freely negotiated and those imposed. In any case, all had been made under the authority of the Crown and not of the executive Governments - central or provincial - of British India....”

[Emphasis supplied] 76. He has also drawn strength from the other Water Disputes Tribunals, namely, Narmada, Krishna and Godavari. His principal

emphasis is on the fact that the agreements entered into between the two States were for political considerations as the State of Mysore was a princely State under the British suzerainty and the State of Madras was a province of British India and the disputes were never settled by application of international law but through authoritative decision of the British Crown. In essence, the submission is that after coming into force of the 1947 Act, the agreements became extinct by operation of law. 77. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the authority in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala and another6 which was dealing with the water level of Mullaperiyar Dam after it was solved by this Court on 27.02.2006 in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India and others7. The controversy had arisen because the Kerala State legislature had enacted the law immediately thereafter fixing and limiting full reservoir level to 136 ft. The Constitution Bench referred to the Periyar Lake Lease Agreement dated 29.10.1886 which allowed the masonry dam to come up across Periyar reservoir. The agreement stipulated many aspects. In 1979, the Government of Kerala had entered into a correspondence with the Tamil Nadu Government to take immediate steps to strengthen the dam keeping in view the safety of the Mullaperiyar Dam. Simultaneously, the Kerala Government also requested the Central Government to depute a team from the Central Water Commission (CWC) to inspect the Dam and suggest strengthening measures. In pursuance of the request from the Kerala Government, the CWC held meeting and three level measures, (i) emergency, (ii) medium, and (iii) long term were suggested to strengthen the Dam. In the meantime, it was recommended that the water level in the reservoir be kept at 136 ft. In the second meeting held on 29.04.1980, it was opined that after the completion of emergency and medium-term strengthening measures, the water level in the reservoir can be restored up to 145 ft. In the year 1998, the State of Tamil Nadu had a grievance that despite the measures being suggested by CWC, no consensus could be reached between the State Governments, that is, Tamil Nadu and Kerala, to raise the water level in the Mullaperiyar Reservoir beyond 136 ft. Various writ petitions were filed in both the High Courts and, eventually, the matters stood transferred to this Court and some directions were issued in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum (supra). The Expert Committee, after discussion, opined that the water level in

(2014) 12 SCC 696 (2006) 3 SCC 643

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

the Mullaperiyar Reservoir could be raised to 142 ft as that would not endanger the safety of the main Dam, including spillway, Baby Dam and earthen bund. The Constitution Bench referred to the first litigation before this Court, the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation Act, 2003, the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006, the second litigation before this Court, grounds of challenge to the 2006 (Amendment) Act and the defence put forth by the State of Kerala. Certain issues were framed by the Court out of which four questions being relevant for the present purpose are reproduced below:-

“4. (b) Whether the pleas relating to validity and binding nature of the deed dated 29-10-1886, the nature of Periyar River, structural safety of the Mullaperiyar Dam, etc. raised by the first defendant in its defence, are finally decided by the judgment of this Court dated 27-2-2006 in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India and consequently first defendant is barred from raising or reagitating those issues and pleas in this suit, by the principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata? 5. Whether the suit based on a legal right claimed under the lease deed executed between the Government of the Maharaja of Travancore and the Secretary of State for India on 29-101886, is barred by the proviso to Article 131 of the Constitution of India? 6. Whether the first defendant is estopped from raising the plea that the deed dated 29-10-1886 has lapsed, in view of subsequent conduct of the first defendant and execution of the supplemental agreements dated 29-5-1970 ratifying the various provisions of the original deed dated 29-10-1886? 7. Whether the lease deed executed between the Government of the Maharaja of Travancore and Secretary of State for India on 29-10-1886 is valid, binding on first defendant and enforceable by plaintiff against the first defendant?” 78. Be it noted, initially, the matter was heard by a three-Judge Bench and later on, it was referred to the Constitution Bench as some of the issues framed in the suit involved decision on certain substantial questions of law concerning interpretation of the Constitution. Dealing with the issues on the 1886 lease agreement, the Court posed the

question – whether it is an existing contract under the 1935 Act. Reference was made to Section 177 of the 1935 Act and interpreting the same, the Court held:“41. Section 177 of the 1935 Act, omitting the unnecessary part reads,

“177. (1) … any contract made before the commencement of Part III of this Act by, or on behalf of, the Secretary of Statein-Council shall, as from that date— (a) if it was made for the purposes which will after the commencement of Part III of this Act be purposes of the Government of a Province, have effect as if it had been made on behalf of that Province….” By virtue of this provision, the existing contracts of the Secretary of State-in-Council would have the effect as if they had been made on behalf of the Province. When we see the 1886 Lease Agreement in the light of Section 177 of the 1935 Act, there remains no doubt at all that lease that was executed by the Secretary of State-in-Council for the Presidency of Madras (Madras Province) had the effect as if it had been made on behalf of the Presidency of Madras or for that matter Madras Province. To put it differently, by legal fiction created under Section 177(1)(a), the Presidency of Madras (Madras Province) became lessee under the 1886 Lease Agreement. We have, therefore, no hesitation in accepting the submission of Mr Vinod Bobde, learned Senior Counsel for Tamil Nadu that by virtue of Section 177 of the 1935 Act, as from the commencement of the 1935 Act, the Government of the Province of Madras is deemed to be substituted as the lessee in the 1886 Lease Agreement.” 79. Thereafter, the Court addressed the issue of the effect and impact of the events between 18.07.1947 and 26.01.1950 which relate to the 1947 Act and the Constitution of India. The Court referred to the “Standstill Agreement” which was entered into between the State of Travancore and the Dominion of India, the omission of Section 177 of the 1935 Act and the merger of two States – Travancore and Cochin. Analysing further, the Court referred to Section 7 of the 1947 Act and observed thus:-

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

“45. As noted above, the 1947 Act came into effect from 15-81947. Section 7 deals with the consequences of the setting up of the new dominions. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 declares that suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses. On lapsing of suzerainty, it provides for lapsing of all treaties and agreements in force between His Majesty and the Rulers of Indian States from that date. The proviso appended to sub-section (1), however, continues such agreements unless the provisions in such agreement are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State or are superseded by a subsequent agreement.

46. It is the contention of Mr Harish N. Salve that firstly, 1886 Lease Agreement lapsed by virtue of main provision of Section 7(1)(b) of the 1947 Act as it comprehends all treaties and agreements and secondly, the Maharaja of Travancore denounced all agreements including the 1886 Lease Agreement.

47. It is true that Section 7(1)(b) of the 1947 Act uses the expression “all treaties and agreements” but, in our opinion, the word “all” is not intended to cover the agreements which are not political in nature. This is clear from the purpose of Section 7 as it deals with lapsing of suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States and the consequence of lapsing of suzerainty. Obviously, the provision was not intended to cover the agreements and treaties other than political. We, accordingly, hold that Section 7(1)(b) concerns only with political treaties and agreements.” And again:“53. It is argued by Mr Harish N. Salve that the Standstill Agreement, which is between parties different from those who had executed the 1886 Lease Agreement, is a fresh agreement which brought into force, for the time being, contractual obligations between the Maharaja of Travancore and the Dominion of India. As the parties were different and the 1947 Act provided for the lapse of the British suzerainty over the Princely States, the question of continuance of the 1886 Lease Agreement does not arise. In any case, the learned Senior Counsel for Kerala argues

that the Standstill Agreement could not survive after the deletion of Section 177 of the 1935 Act. We find no merit in these arguments. The Standstill Agreement is not a fresh agreement between the Dominion of India and the State of Travancore as suggested by Mr Harish N. Salve. The Standstill Agreement was intended for the benefit of the parties who were parties to the agreements and arrangements, which were matters of common concern existing between the Crown and the State of Travancore. In the background of Instrument of Accession, it became necessary to have some arrangement so that the existing agreements and arrangements between the Crown and the Indian States continued. We do not think that the Standstill Agreement is political in nature as contended on behalf of Kerala.

54. The argument that the Standstill Agreement could not survive after the deletion of Section 177 with effect from 15-8-1947 by virtue of India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 is also without substance. Section 177 was deleted because it could no longer work and because the Dominion of India was to come into being with provinces as part of the Dominion and there was to be no Secretary of State-in-Council. We are in agreement with Mr Vinod Bobde, learned Senior Counsel for Tamil Nadu that deletion of Section 177 was prospective and it did not affect the deeming that had already taken place in 1935. The Standstill Agreement, in our view, cannot be said to have been wiped out by the deletion of Section 177. xxxxx

56. The argument that there is no successor of Crown is irrelevant because by virtue of Section 177, the Government of Province of Madras had already become lessee in the 1886 Lease Agreement by deeming in 1935 itself. The Standstill Agreement continued the 1886 Lease Agreement between the Province of Madras and the State of Travancore. The 1886 Lease Agreement did not lapse under the main provision of Section 7(1)(b) of the 1947 Act. There was no unequivocal and unambiguous denouncement of the 1886 Lease Agreement by the Ruler of Travancore under proviso to Section 7(1)(b). The Province of Madras was beneficiary of the Standstill Agreement. Surely, deletion of Section 177 has not affected the rights of Province of Madras.”

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

80. sThe Court analysed the opinions of the learned Judges expressed in Dr. Babu Ram Saksena (supra) and eventually held thus:-

“61.5. A careful consideration of the judgment by Mukherjea, J. in Ram Babu Saksena would show that His Lordship’s opinion has no application to a non-political agreement such as the 1886 Lease Agreement. The observation of Mukherjea, J., “When as a result of amalgamation or merger, a State loses its full independent power of action over the subject-matter of a treaty previously concluded, the treaty must necessarily lapse. …” is in the context of an extradition treaty which is purely political in nature. In our view, Ram Babu Saksena is clearly distinguishable and does not help Kerala in its argument that the 1886 Lease Agreement lapsed on merger of the two States, Travancore and Cochin, into the United State of Travancore and Cochin.” 81. The Constitution Bench also addressed the issue whether the 1886 lease agreement was an Act of State and opined that the 1886 lease agreement is not political in nature. It distinguished the Constitution Bench decision in Virendra Singh and others v. State of U.P.8 and ruled that the said decision is distinguishable and that the 1886 lease agreement is an ordinary agreement and not political in nature. It is worthy to note that the Constitution Bench addressed the scope of Article 363 and Article 131, scanned both the Articles and held:“73. Article 131 of the Constitution deals with the original jurisdiction of this Court. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction in any dispute, inter alia, between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other if and insofar as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence of legal right depends. However, by the proviso appended thereto, the jurisdiction of this Court is barred if the dispute to which a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule is a party if the dispute arises out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument was entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution and has or has been continued in operation after such commencement.

(1955) 1 SCR 415 : AIR 1954 SC 447

74. There is similarity of provision in Article 363 and proviso to Article 131. The original jurisdiction conferred on this Court by the main provision contained in Article 131 is excepted by virtue of the proviso in the matters of political settlements. By making provisions such as Article 363 and proviso to Article 131, the political settlements have been taken out of the purview of judicial pronouncements. Proviso appended to Article 131 renders a dispute arising out of any treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or similar instrument which is political in nature executed before the commencement of the Constitution and which has or has been continued in operation, non-justiciable and jurisdiction of this Court is barred. The jurisdiction of this Court is not taken away in respect of the dispute arising out of an ordinary agreement. The instruments referred to and described in the proviso are only those which are political in nature. Nonpolitical instruments are not covered by the proviso.

75. The 1886 Lease Agreement does provide for resolution of disputes between the parties to the agreement by way of arbitration: it contains an arbitration clause. The submission of Kerala that enforcement of any award under the arbitration clause would be political in nature is misplaced. The assumption of Kerala that the 1886 Lease Agreement was not justiciable and enforceable in court of law prior to the Constitution as no court in Travancore would obviously entertain a claim against Maharaja and no court outside the State of Travancore have jurisdiction over the Maharaja of Travancore is not relevant at all and devoid of any merit. 76. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by this Court in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum that the 1886 Lease Agreement would not come within the purview of Article 363 and jurisdiction of this Court is not barred. As a necessary corollary, the dispute arising out of the 1886 Lease Agreement is not barred under Article 131 proviso as well. Moreover, the principal challenge laid in the suit pertains to the constitutional validity of the 2006 (Amendment) Act for which Article 363 or for that matter under Article 131 proviso does not come into operation at all.”

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

82. Commenting on the aforesaid decision, it is contended by Mr. Nariman that in Madhav Rao Scindia (supra), the majority had clearly expressed the view that paramountcy no longer survived after the coming into force of the Constitution of India. In the said decision, it has been clearly spelt out that it is difficult to conceive of the Government of a democratic Republic exercising against its citizens “paramountcy claim to be inherited, imperial power”. According to Mr. Nariman, when everything has come to an end, the concept of restriction to ‘political nature’, as has been held in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala (supra), sounds a discordant note.

83. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel, per contra, would submit that the decision in State of Tamil Nadu (supra) does not run counter to the principle stated in Madhav Rao Scindia. According to him, Madhav Rao Scindia exclusively dealt with a political situation. To bolster the said aspect, he has drawn our attention to the “Standstill Agreement” which does not apply to any paramountcy function. He has also laid stress on the passage that discusses about quid pro quo for agreeing to surrender the power and authority by the rulers and that is why it was enacted in the Constitution that the Princes who had signed the covenant of the nature specified should be recognized as rulers. In essence, the submission is that if the authority in Madhav Rao Scindia’s case is appositely read and understood, it dealt with the abolition of Privy Purses by the President of India and how the action was erroneous and how the Court treated it to be of political nature. 84. It is absolutely manifest that the ruling in Madhav Rao Scindia (supra) states that after coming into force of the 1947 Act, the paramountcy lapsed and after the integration of the States with the Indian Union, the shadow of paramountcy faded and the Government of India became the full sovereign authority. After the Constitution came into force, the exercise of power by the State over its citizens stood circumscribed by the Constitution. In the said case, the doctrine of paramountcy has no play. The two agreements, on a studied scrutiny, do not indicate any aspect that can be called political or touching any facet of the sovereignty of India. The agreements covered the areas of larger public interest like construction of dams and irrigation of land existing within the two States, namely, the State of Mysore and the State of Madras and had nothing to do with political arrangement. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Nariman that after

coming into force of the 1947 Act and thereafter the Constitution of India, the agreements of 1892 and 1924 became inoperative and totally extinct. I. Infraction of Article 363 and non-maintainability of the dispute on the basis of agreements

85. The next plank of submission pertains to the constitutional infraction of Article 363. Article 363 reads as follows:“Article 363. Bar to interference by courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc.– (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of Article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument (2) In this article

(a) Indian State means any territory recognised before the commencement of this Constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State; and (b) Ruler includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognised before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State.”

86. Pressing into service the aforesaid Article, it is contended by Mr. Nariman that the said Article commences with a non-obstante clause but subject to the provisions of Article 143 and that would exclude anything contained in Article 262(1) and, therefore, the bar under Article 363(1) must prevail. He has criticized the finding of the Tribunal which has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the Privy Purse case

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

placing reliance on the view of Hegde, J. which is not the majority view because the majority spoke through Shah,J. It is urged by him that the finding of the Tribunal that Article 363 cannot bar the investigation of any complaint including a complaint regarding the agreement which has been executed by the then Ruler of a Princely State like Mysore which became an Indian State within the Dominion of India, a State under the First Schedule after coming into force of the Constitution is untenable. That apart, the Tribunal has opined that once the dispute is referred to the Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution to examine the dispute in respect of use, distribution or control of waters of any inter-state river or river valley, the said jurisdiction cannot be controlled or curtailed by Article 363 and in case of agreement relating to sharing of water of inter-State river, the Tribunal has to examine the claims of the different riparian States in the background of such agreement and, therefore, the enquiry is not barred under Article 363 of the Constitution. Attacking the said findings, it is canvassed by Mr. Nariman that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate the fact that Articles 262 and 263 operate in entirely different fields, for Article 262 is only an exception how a particular matter relating to inter-State river water disputes between States of India have to be decided because it is not decided by the exclusive remedy provided in Article 131 of the Constitution but by an alternative mode now prescribed by the Parliament by law under Article 261(2), that is, the 1956 Act. It is further put forth by him that the agreements of the present nature come within the purview of Article 363 and to substantiate the said argument, he has placed reliance on State of Seraikella v. Union of India and another9.

87. It is submitted by Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu, that the bar of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 363 of the Constitution relates only to certain clauses of agreements, treaties, covenants, engagements, “Sanad”, etc. The expression “other similar instruments’ clearly indicates that it is not as if all kinds of agreements and treaties would come within the purview of the said provision. Article 363 covers only such political agreements executed between the Rulers of Indian States and the Government of the Dominion of India between 1947 and 1950. From the intrinsic language of Article 363 read with the proviso to Article 131, it is clear that the bar of jurisdiction of the Court applies only to disputes arising out of political agreements.

951 SCR 474 : AIR 1951 SC 253

88. He has referred to the debates of the Constituent Assembly especially the observations made by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as the Chairman of the Drafting Committee while moving the draft Constitution for consideration by the Constituent Assembly. The said observations are extracted hereunder:-

“On the 15th August 1947 we had 600 Indian States in existence. Today by the integration of the Indian States with Indian Provinces or merger among themselves or by the Centre having taken them as centrally administered areas, there have remained some 20 or 30 States as viable States. This is a very rapid process and progress. I appeal to those States that remain to fall in line with the Indian Provinces and to become full units of the Indian Union on the same terms as the Indian Provinces. They will thereby give the Indian Union the strength it needs. They will save themselves the bother of starting their own Constituent Assemblies and drafting their own separate constitution, and they will lose nothing that is of value to them. I feel hopeful that my appeal will not go in vain and that before the Constitution is passed, we will be able to wipe off the differences between the Provinces and the Indian States.”

(B. Shiva Rao (Ed.), The Framing of India’s Constitution – Select Documents, Volume IV, at p.434) 89. The learned senior counsel would submit that the purpose of Article 363 was to protect the Government of India from purely political agreements which had been entered into between the Rulers of the Indian States and the Dominion of India or its predecessor Governments so as to prevent any obstruction to the smooth accession of the Indian States to the Dominion of India. 90. To appreciate the submissions advanced before this Court, we are required to analyse what has been said by this Court in State of Seraikella. In the said case, a suit was filed under the Original Jurisdiction of the Federal Court as it was functioning before the Constitution of India came into force. The State of Seraikella was a State in Orissa and on 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff-State acceded to the Dominion of India by virtue of the Instrument of Accession executed by its Ruler and accepted by the Governor General under Section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935. After coming into force of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Dominion of India was set up under

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

the Government of India Act, 1935 as adopted which provided that the Indian State may accede to the Dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession. It was expressly provided that by executing the said instrument, the Ruler should not be deemed to have committed to the acceptance of any future Constitution of India or to fetter his discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future Constitution. Various other postulates which were part of the instrument have been taken note of by the Constitution Bench. It is worthy to note that apart from the initial instrument, no supplement instrument was executed by the Ruler and no amendment of the 1947 Act was accepted by him. A “Standstill Agreement” was also executed by the Ruler under which it was agreed that matters of common concern as specified in the Schedule to the agreement would continue between the Dominion of India and the said State until new agreements were made in that behalf. The controversy arose in the suit as the plaintiffState claimed to have merged in the province of Bihar. It was contended by the plaintiff that the Government of Orissa wrongfully and illegally purported to administer the plaintiff-State by virtue of the Notification of 23.12.1947 under the Indian Independence Act, 1947. It was claimed that the Act was ultra vires and had no binding effect on the plaintiffState. It was also contended that the agreement dated 15.12.1947 was void for want of consideration and was inoperative. It was further canvassed that on 18th May, 1948, without the consent and approval of the plaintiff-State or its Ruler, the Province of Bihar absolutely illegally took over the administration of the State and passed the Seraikella and Kharsawan States Order, 1948. It was also asserted that the Dominion of India had no authority to go beyond the Instrument of Accession and further had no authority to delegate powers to the Province of Bihar to administer the plaintiff-State. The Constitution Bench, noting various facts and commenting on coming into effect of the Constitution of India and the jurisdiction conferred on the Court under Article 131, proceeded to analyse the scope and ambit of Article 363 of the Constitution. Dwelling upon the same, Kania, C. J. opined that the all-embracing opening words of Article 363 in terms override all provisions of the Constitution, but are made subject only to the provisions of Article 143 which enables the President to consult the Supreme Court on matters referred to and, therefore, clearly override the operation of Article 374(2) also. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court having been stated in Articles 131 to 136, Article 363 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in those

articles and other articles of the Constitution, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court will have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, “Sanad” or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution and which had or had been continued in operation after such commencement. If, therefore, the dispute arises in respect of a document of that description and if such document had been executed before the Constitution by a Ruler and which was or had continued in operation after such commencement, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine such issue. The learned Chief Justice repelled the argument that the Article is prospective and not retrospective and, hence, it only covers the cases which are filed in the Supreme Court after the Constitution came into force and did not affect suits filed in the Federal Court before the Constitution of India came into operation. Thereafter, he adverted to the assertions made in the plaint and stated that the only question which remained for decision was whether on the structure of the plaint, the dispute raised in the suit arose out of the provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, “Sanad” or any other similar instrument. Eventually, Kania, C.J. held:“I have already noticed above that the dispute in respect of the agreement of the 15th December, 1947, is immaterial for the present discussion. If the plaintiff repudiates that agreement he is seeking to enforce his rights after ignoring the same. If the plaintiff (as noticed in four of the suits) relies on this agreement, it becomes a part of the Instrument of Accession under Section 6(5) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the dispute will still have to be considered having regard to the terms of the two documents viz. the original Instrument of Accession and the supplementary Instrument. The question thus resolves itself into an analysis of the plaint and to find out what the plaintiff seeks to get by his suit. Apart from the fact that in prayers (f) and (g) of his plaint he seeks to enforce his rights under the Agreement of the 15th December, 1947, it appears clear that the whole ambit of the suit is to enforce his Instrument of Accession. The plaintiff contends firstly that it had signed the Instrument of Accession through its Ruler. The State next complains that, acting beyond the powers given over under the Instrument of Accession, the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are trespassing

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

wrongfully on its legislative and executive functions, that the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are making laws which they have no power to make having regard to the Instrument of Accession, and are wrongfully interfering with the administration of the State beyond the rights given to them under the Instrument of Accession. The whole plaint is nothing else except the claim to enforce the plaintiff’s right under the Instrument of Accession. The dispute therefore in my opinion clearly is in respect of this Instrument of Accession and is covered by Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India. The question of the validity of the different enactments and orders is also based on the rights claimed under the Instrument of Accession so far as the plaintiff is concerned. On the side of the defendants, the position is that they admit the Instrument of Accession and they do not claim that they are exercising the disputed rights under that Instrument. Their contention is that the Agreement of the 15th of December, 1947, was validly signed and is binding and enforceable against the plaintiff. The defendants contend that their action in passing the disputed legislation and orders and the action in taking over the administration are all based on that Agreement of 15th December, 1947. If the plaintiff contends that that Agreement is not binding on it, it cannot enforce its rights under the original jurisdiction of the Court. If the plaintiff has a grievance and a right to a relief which the defendants contend it has not, the forum to seek redress is not the Supreme Court exercising its original jurisdiction on the transfer of the suit from the Federal Court. According to the defendants, the situation in those circumstances will be of a Sovereign Independent State trespassing on the territories, powers and privileges of another neighbouring independent State. To redress a grievance arising out of such action on the part of the defendants, the Supreme Court is not the forum to give relief. The issue is answered in the negative, costs in the cause.”

91. Bose, J., in his separate opinion, addressed the Issue No.1 which was to the following effect:-

“1. Whether having regard to the subject-matter of the suit and the provisions contained in Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India, this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit?” Answering the said issue, he opined:-

“Even so, it is next contended, Article 363, which enacts a general rule of non-interference by courts in certain classes of disputes, cannot control the operation of Article 374(2), which is a special provision providing that suits, appeals and proceedings pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of the Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same. There would be considerable force in this argument but for the opening words of Article 363(1), namely, “notwithstanding anything in this Constitution.” These words clearly indicate that the bar to the exercise of jurisdiction enacted in Article 363 controls the operation of Article 374(2)and excludes the rule of construction invoked by the plaintiffs.” 92. The aforesaid decision has to be appositely understood and appreciated. Mr. Nariman would submit that any controversy relating to any agreement is not entertainable by this Court. According to him, a complaint for raising a dispute under Article 262 of the Constitution can be independent without the base or foundation of the 1892 and 1924 agreements but to structure the stand on the fulcrum of the agreements would run counter to Article 363 of the Constitution as has been held by the Constitution Bench in State of Seraikella (supra). It is also proponed by him that the later decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala (supra) has not taken note of the earlier decision and introduced the element of political agreement and categorized agreements into distinct ones, namely, political agreement and ordinary agreement. The argument deserves keen scrutiny. We have extensively discussed the facts in State of Seraikella (supra) and the view expressed therein. As is perceptible to us, the Constitution Bench, in actuality, was dealing with a political issue as there is constant reference to the “Instrument of Accession” and the claim was to enforce the instrument and further to declare the legislative and executive action of the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar as illegal. The stand of the respondent, namely, Dominion of India, was that it was acting as per the Instrument of Accession. The rival stands and the analysis made thereon clearly reflect the political nature of the controversy. 93. Sastri, J., in his concurring opinion, stated:“22. … The controversies regarding these matters are but contentions whereby the parties seek to establish, on the one hand, that the Instrument of Accession still governs their mutual

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

rights and obligations and, on the other, that that Instrument stands superseded and is no longer in force. Issues have no doubt been framed in regard to these matters but they cannot, in my opinion, be considered to be disputes for the purposes of Article 131 or Article 363(1). These articles deal with the jurisdiction of Courts and they envisage disputed claims to substantive legal rights. The claims in these suits are undoubtedly based on the respective Instruments of Accession and they are repudiated because those Instruments of Accession are said to have been superseded by reason of the alleged agreement of December, 1947. These claims are disputes to which Article 363(1) clearly applies. The other so-called disputes are only incidental and ancillary controversies raised with a view to support or overthrow the claims and cannot, in my opinion, affect the operation of the bar under that Article any more than, for instance, Issue 5 relating to the necessity for notice to the defendants under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. 23. Nevertheless, it is contended, the article has no application here and it cannot operate retrospectively and applies only to disputes arising after the commencement of the Constitution. I am unable to accept this restricted interpretation of Article 363(1). While the Article undoubtedly postulates the continued operation of the treaties, agreements, etc., entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution and giving rise to the disputes, it does not require, as a condition of its application, that such Disputes should arise after the commencement of the Constitution. I see no reason for importing a restriction which a plain grammatical construction of the language employed does not warrant. It is not correct to say that the wider construction would make the operation of the article retrospective, for the bar to interference by the court operates only after the Constitution came into force irrespective of the disputes concerned having arisen before or after the commencement of the Constitution. It was said that the article should not be construed so as to bar the trial of pending suits or proceedings. But this is not a case of a pending action in a court which continues to function. The Federal Court, in which the suits were pending, and which had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with them, was abolished and a new court, the Supreme Court of India, was

created with original jurisdiction strictly limited to disputes relating to legal rights between States recognised as such under the Constitution. But as the States specified in Part B of the First Schedule had a semi-sovereign status before the Constitution, agreements with them were in the nature of international treaties and covenants, and disputes arising out of them would not lie in municipal courts. That principle is given effect to, so far as the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is concerned, by the proviso to Article 131 which defines such jurisdiction and, in regard to all courts and in respect of all proceedings, by Article 363(1). The reason for applying that principle is greater, not less, in regard to such disputes arising before the Constitution when these States, then known as Indian States, enjoyed a higher degree of political freedom. Furthermore, the construction contended for by the plaintiffs as applied to Article 131 would mean that the Court would, notwithstanding the proviso, have jurisdiction in respect of such disputes, provided they arose before the commencement of the Constitution. If that had been intended, one would expect that such jurisdiction would have been conferred by positive enactment, instead of being left to be derived by implication from a proviso intended to delimit the jurisdiction conferred by that article. It seems to me, therefore, that the proviso to Article 131 must be construed as applicable to disputes of the kind mentioned arising both before and after the commencement of the Constitution. If so, Article 363(1) must receive the same construction, the language employed being essentially the same.”

94. Relying on the aforesaid opinion of Sastri. J., it is submitted by Mr. Nariman that each of the agreements of 1892 and 1924 executed by the Ruler of a semi-sovereign state has to be regarded as an international treaty, covenant or agreement as in any case even under common law which continues under the provisions of Article 372 and thus, the municipal courts or authorities would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon them, for Article 363 clearly stipulates that municipal courts do not interfere in such agreements where one of the parties has a semi-sovereign status. In essence, the contention is that the agreements are not liable to be adjudicated in a court of law or tribunal as has been held by the Constitution Bench in In Re: Presidential Reference (Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal)10 to the effect that the entire “judicial power of the State”

1993 (Supp) (1) SCC 96

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. STATE

under Article 131 relating to adjudication of water disputes stood transferred under the law enacted under Article 262(1), that is, the 1956 Act and the finding recorded by the Tribunal is not a court and, therefore, Article 363(1) would not apply to it is incorrect. According to him, the agreements are not to be looked into for any purpose.

95. To appreciate the submission, we may refer to the analysis put forth by the Tribunal in this regard. The Tribunal adverted to the decision in Madhav Rao Scindia (supra) and came to hold thus:-

“21. The same is the position here. The Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 has not been enacted under Entry 56 of the Union List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It has been enacted under power vested in the Parliament by Article 262 of the Constitution. In view of Article 262 Parliament may by law provide for adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter- State river or river valley. Article 262(2) has a non-obstante clause saying that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, Parliament may by law provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint as is referred in clause (1). It has already been pointed out above that in exercise of this power in the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, Section 11 excludes the jurisdiction of all courts including the Supreme Court, if in Article 363(1) there is a non- obstante clause giving an overriding effect, then even in Article 262(2) there is a non-obstante clause which read with Section 11 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act shall exclude the jurisdiction of Supreme Court or any other court in respect of a dispute relating to use, distribution and control of waters of inter-State river or river valley. It cannot be disputed that Article 262 is a special provision providing for adjudication of any dispute in respect of use, distribution or control of waters of an inter-State river or river valley. As such on the well-known rule of construction generalia specialibus non derogant, a special provision excludes the gen

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