The State of West Bengal and ORS. v. Kesoram Industries LTD. and ORS.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
15 January 2004
Judge
Justice V.N. Khare
Neutral citation
2004 INSC 34
Reported in
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 564
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Article 248 Constitution, Article 253 Constitution, Article 136 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution, Article 141 Constitution, Article 366 Constitution
Subject
Electricity

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Full judgment

THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. V.

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KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ORS. JANUARY 15, 2004

B [V.N. KHARE, CJ., R.C. LAHOTI, B.N. AGRAWAL, S.8. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.] ~

Constitution of India, 1950:

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Articles 245, 246, 248,253 and 265-Seventh Schedule, List II. Entries 49 and 50, List/, Entries 52 and 54-West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992 amending West Bengal Primary Education Act and West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act-Levy of education cess and rural employment cess under the two Acts and the Cess Act, 1880 on coal bearing land and other mineral bearing lands-Levy of cesses challenged as regards coal bearing land and brick-earth bearing land-Held, Per majority (Sinha, J. dissenting), levy of cesses is intra vires the Constitution-The cesses on coal bearing land and brick-earth bearing land, being tax on land, are covered by Entry 49 in List /I-Tax andfee not a subject dealt with by Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,1957 and power to levy tax and fee is available to States so long as they do not interfere with Centre's power of regulation and control of mines and minerals-Doctrine of occupied fieldDoctrine ofpith and substance-Doctrine ofpublic trust-West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992-West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973, s. 78West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, s.4-Cess Act, 1880, ss. 5 and 6-Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,1957. Seventh Schedule,List II, Entries 5,23,49,50 and 66, List/, Entries 52 and 54-Uttar Pradesh Special Area Development Authorities Act,1986 and Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997 levying cess on mineral rights-Levy of cess challenged by stone crushers-Held, Per majority (Sinha,J. dissenting), High Court rightly upheld levy of the cess as a tax covered by Entry 5 in list II-Besides, levy of the cess as a tax can also be upheld by reference to Entries 49 and 50 in list IIAlthough it is termed as "cess on mineral right", impact falls on the land delivering the mineral and thus levy of the cess falls within the scope of Entry 49 in List II-Levy of the cess can equally be upheld as a fee, by reference

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ST ATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

to Entry 66 in list II, for rendering such services as would improve infrastructure and general development of the area, benefits whereof would be availed by stone crushers also-Uttar Pradesh Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986-s. 35-Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997-rr. 2 and 3.

Articles 245, 246, 248 and 253-Seventh Schedule, list II, Entry 49, and list I Entries 52 and 54 -West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 amending West Bengal Education Act and West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act and levying cesses on tea estates-Held.Per majority (Sinha,J. dissenting), the cess levied is on tea-bearing land, a well defined classification and as such is covered by Entry 49 in List IIDeclaration under s.2 of Tea Act in term~ of Ent1y 52, list I with regard to the Union taking control of the tea induslly does not amount to vesting the power to tax or levy fee in the Central Government by reference to tea or tea estates-Goodricke Group Ltd upheld-West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act,1989-Tea Act, 1953.

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Article I 4-Classification of lands for the purpose of tax-Held, different pieces of land identically situated but being subjected to different uses, or having different potential can be classified s~parately. Taxation:

Measure of tax-Levy ofcess on coal bearing land, other mineral bearing lands and tea estates-Assessment of cess by reference to produce dispatched from land-Held, Per majority (Sinha,J dissenting)-QuantifYing the tax by reference to annual value of the land on the basis of what it produces or is capable of producing is a well known mode-Merely because quantum of produce dispatched from the land is the factor taken into consideration for determining the value of the land, ii does not become a tax on the produce.

Royalty-Nature of-Held, royalty is not a tax-It is paid to owner of land who may be a private person and may not necessari(v be a State-Lessor receives royalty as his income and for lessee royalty paid is an expenditure G incurred-It is clarified that in India Cement it was not the finding of the Court that royalty is a tax. (Sinha, J, dissenting). Cess-A cess may be a tax or fee and is generally used when the levy is for special administrative expense suggested by the name of the cess itself

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Interpretation of Constitution:

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Entries in Lists of Seventh Schedule-Construing of-Explained. Interpretation of Statutes:

Taxing statutes-Interpretation of-Explained. Words and Phrases:·

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Expression 'Dispatches' as occurring in the statutes levying cess on minerals and tea es/ates-Meaning of

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The West Bengal Legislature, by enacting the West Bengal Taxation Laws(Amendment) Act, 1992 amended the provisions of the West Bengal Primary Education Act,1973 and the 'Yest Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, and levied education cess and rural employment cess on coal bearing land and other mineral bearing land. The cesses were to be assessed with reference to dispatches of minerals produced from the land. So far as levy of cesses on coal bearing land was concerned, the same was successfully challenged in writ petitions before the High Court, which held that the cess assessed and computed on the basis of value of coal produced from the coal bearing land, was directly related to the value of coal produced from the coal mines and, as such, the cess could not be said to be on land so as to be covered by Entry 49 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The said judgment of the High Court in Kesoram Industries Ltd. (Textile Division) v. Coal India Ltd., AIR (1993) Calcutta 78 was challenged by the State Government in CA No. 1532-33 of 1993. As regards levy of cess on brick-earth bearing land, Writ Petition No. 247 of 1995 was filed before the Supreme Court on behalf of the persons engaged in brick manufacturing and. owning brick fields, contending that brick-earth being a minor mineral was covered under Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and by virtue of declaration made by s.2 thereof, by reference to Entry 54 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the field was covered by the 1957 Act; that the levy was on dispatch of minor mineral whereas the process of manufacturing bricks did not involve any dispatch of brick-earth as it

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

was captively consumed in the brick field itself and as such the cess was not leviable; and that the State Government was not empowered to levy any cess on either the extraction of brick-earth or on dispatch thereof. It was submitted that the same quantity of brick-earth was subjected by the Central Act to payment of royalty which was a tax and the same quantity was sought to be levied with cess which was incompetent so far as State Legislature was concerned.

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The State Government of Uttar Pradesh, in exercise of powers under Rules 2 and 3 of Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997 framed under s.35 of the U.P. Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986, sought to levy cess on mineral rights and took steps for recovery thereof by issuing notices to several stone crushers who were extracting stone as mineral. Such stone crushers filed writ petitions before the High Court, which upheld the levy of cess as being within the competence of State Legislature by reference to Entry 5 in List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. (Ram Dhani Singh v. Collector, Sonbhadra and Ors., AIR [20011 All. 5. Aggrieved, the stone crushers filed Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 2000. Levy of cess on tea estates imposed by virtue of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1981 by amending the provisions of West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 and the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, was struck down in Buxa, Dooars Company ltd. v. State of Wes! Bengal, [198913 SCC 211; and as the State became liable to refund the cess already collected, the State Legislature brought the West Bengal Taxation (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 amending the West Bengal Primary Education Act and West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act w.e.f. 1981 and levied cesses on tea estates at a given rate on the dispatch of green tea leaves produced in such. tea estates. By a validation clause, it was provided that cess collected for the period prior to the Amendment Act would be deemed to have been validly levied and collected thereunder. Constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, 1989 was upheld in Goodricke Group ltd. and Ors v. State of West Bengal and Ors., 119951 Supp. 1 SCC 707. But later, when a similar cess levied under the pari materia provisions of Orissa Rural Employment, Education and Production Act, 1982 was struck down in State ofOrissa v. Mahanadi Coal Fields Limited, [19951Supp.2 SCC 686, Writ Petition No. 262 of 1997 was filed before the Supreme Court again challenging the

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A constitutional validity of the very same amendments which were upheld in Goodricke 's case, and thus Goodricke was sought to be overruled.

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Besides the above matters, some more writ petitions and civil appeals involving similar issues were filed and all such cases were clubbed together. The three-Judge Bench before which these cases came up for hearing, noticed some conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court on the issues involved and opined that the matter be referred to a Constitution Bench. Accordingly, these cases came to be heard by the present Constitution Bench.

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Disposing of the matters, the Court, HELD: Per Lahoti, J. (for himself and for V.N. Khare, CJI, B.N. Agrawal and Dr. AR. Lakshmanan,JJ)

1.1. It is well settled that it is for the Legislature to draft a piece of legislation by making the choicest selection of words so as to give expression to its intention. The ordinary rule of interpretation is that the words used by the Legislature shall be given such meaning as the Legislature has chosen to assign them by coining definitions contained in the interpretation clause and in absence thereof the words would be given such meaning as they are susceptible of in the ordinary parlance, may be by having recourse to dictionaries. However, still, the interpretation is the exclusive privilege of the Constitutional Courts and the Court embarking upon the ·task of interpretation would place such meaning on the words as would effectuate the purpose of legislation avoiding absurdity, unreasonableness, incongruity and conflict. 1678-H; 679-A-BI

1.2. As is with the words used, so is with the language employed in drafting a piece of legislation. That interpretation would be preferred which would avoid conflict between two fields of legislation and would rather import homogeneity. It follows, as a corollary of the abovesaid statement, that while interpreting tax laws the Courts would be guided by the gist of the legislation instead of by the apparent meaning of the words used and the language employed. The Courts shall have regard to the object and the scheme of the tax law under consideration and the purpose for which the cess is levied, collected and intended to be used. The Courts shall make endeavor to search where the impact of the cess falls. The subject matter of levy is not to be confused with the method and

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

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manner of assessment or realisation. Legislation in the field of taxation and economic activities need special consideration and are to be viewed with larger flexibility in approach. 1679-B-D; 625-C]

R.K. Garg v. Union of India and Ors., 119811 4 SCC 675, relied on S.R. Bommai and Ors. v. Union of India, [19941 3 SCC 1, referred to.

Morey v. Doud, (1957) 354 US 457, referred to. )

>M. C. Seta/vad, Tagore law Lectures "Union and State relations under the Indian Constitution"(Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1974); referred to.

1.3 The Entries in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution must be so construed as to avoid any conflict. If there is no conflict, an occasion for deriving assistance from non-obstante clause "subject to" does not arise. If there is a conflict, the correct approach is to find an answer to three questions step by step as under:

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One - Is it still possible to effect reconciliation between two Entries so as to avoid conflict and overlapping? Two - In which Entry the impugned legislation falls by finding out the pith and substance of the legislation?

and Three - Having determined the field of legislation wherein the impugned legislation falls by applying the doctrine of pith and substance, can an incidental trenching upon another field of legislation be ignored? (672-B-E)

M.P. V. Sundararamier and Co. v. The State ofAndhra Pradesh and Anr., (1958) SCR 1422 and D.G. Gouse v. Kera/a, (1980) 2 SCC 410, relied on. Governor General in Council v. Province of Madras; AIR (1945) PC 98 - referred to.

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HM. Seervai: Constitutional law of India (Fourth/Silver Jubilee Edition, Vol.3), referred to.

2.1. In the scheme of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, there exists a clear distinction between the general subjects of legislation and heads

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A of taxation. They are separately enumerated. (671-B-C) Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. v. State of UP. and Ors., (1990( I SCC 109, relied on.

2.2. Article 265 mandates - no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. The scheme of the Seventh Schedule reveals an exhaustive enumeration of legislative subjects, considerably enlarged over the predecessor Government of India Act. Entry 97 in List I confers residuary powers on Parliament. Article 248 of the Constitution, which .speaks of residuary powers of legislation, confers exclusive power on , P:irliament to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated ( .• }.Jl the Concurrent List or the State List. At the same time, it provides that such residuary power shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists. It is, thus, clear that if any power to tax is clearly mentioned in List - II, the same would not be available to be exercised by Parliament based on the assumption of D residuary power. (656-F-H; 657-A]

Union of India v. Harbhajan Singh Dhillon, (1971 ( 2 SCC 779 and Mis. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1983( 45, relied on.

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H.M Seervai: Constitutional Law of India, Fourth/Silver Jubilee Edn. Vol.3 para 22.191, referred to.

2.3. rt is well-settled that the power to tax cannot be inferred by implication; there must be a charging section specifically empowering the State to levy tax. There is nothing like an implied power to tax. The source of power which does not specifically speak of taxation cannot be so interpreted by expanding its width as to include therein the power to tax by implication or by necessary inference. Power to tax is not an incidental power. (655-F; 658-D; 659-E( Taxation, by Cooley (Vol. I, Fourth Edn.); Constitutional Law of India,

G H.M Seervai, Fourth/Silver Jubilee Edn. Vol. 3 para 22.20, referred to.

2.4. The judicial opinion of binding authority flowing from several pronouncements of this Court has settled these principles: (i) in interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Taxing statutes cannot be interpreted on any presumption or

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ST ATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

assumption. A taxing statute has to be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statute so as to supply any deficiency; (ii) before taxing any person it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the Section; and (iii) if the words are ambiguous a11d open to two interpretations, the benefit of interpretation is given to the subject. 1659-B-D] I

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"Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P. Singh (Eighth Edition, 2001), referred to. 3.1. Power of 'regulation and control' is separate and distinct from the power of taxation and so are the two fields for purposes of legislation. Taxation may be capable of being comprised in the main subject of a general legislative head by placing an extended construction, but that is not the rule for deciding the appropriate legislative field for taxation between List I and List II. As the fields of taxation are to be found clearly enumerated in Lists I and II, there can be no overlapping. There may be overlapping in fact but there would be no overlapping in law. The subject matter of two taxes by reference to the two Lists is different. Simply because the methodology or mechanism adopted for assessment and quantification is similar, the two taxes cannot be said to be overlapping. This is the distinction between the subject of a tax and the measure of a tax. 1671-C-E) 3.2. A power to regulate, develop or control would not include within its ken a power to levy tax or fee, except when it is only regulatory. Power to tax or levy for augmenting revenue shall continue to be exercisable by the Legislature in whom it vests i.e. the State Legislature in spite of regulation or control having been assumed by another legislature i.e. the Union. 1661-E-FI

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Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Ors v. State ofU.P. and Ors., (1990) 1 sec 109, referred to. Mis Laxminarayana Mining Co., Bangalore and Anr. v. Taluk Development Board and Anr., AIR (1972) Mysore 299, explained and disapproved. ~

State v. Tucker, 56 U.S. 516, referred to,

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Taxation, by Cooley (Vol. I, Fourth Edn. Paras 26-27), referred to.

3.3. Entries 52, 53 and 54 in List I are not heads of taxation. They are general entries. Fields of taxation covered by Entries 49 and 50 in List II continue to remain with State Legislatures, in spite of Union having enacted laws by reference to Entries 52, 53, 54 in List I. It is for the Union to legislate and impose limitations on the States' otherwise plenary power to levy taxes on mineral rights or taxes on lands (including mineral bearing lands) by reference to Entries 50 and 49 in List II and lay down the limitations on State's power, if it chooses to do so, and also to define the extent and sweep of such limitations. [671-G-H; 672-A-BI

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3.4. The heads of taxation are clearly enumerated in Entries 83 to 92B in List I and Entries 45 to 63 in List II. List III, the Concurrent List, does not provide for any head of taxation. Entry 96 in List I, Entry 66 in List II and Entry 47 in List Ill deal with fees. The residuary power of legislation in the field of taxation spelled out by Article 248 (2) and Entry 97 in List I can be applied only to such subjects as are not included in Entries 45 to 63 of List II. It follows that taxes on lands and buildings in Entry 49 of List II cannot be levied by the Union. Taxes on mineral rights, a subject in Entry 50 of List II, can also not be levied by the Union though, as stated in Entry 50 itself, the Union may impose limitations on the power of the State and such limitations, if any, imposed by the Parliament by law relating to mineral development, to that extent, shall circumscribe the States' power to legislate. (674-B-D[ 3.5. Power to tax mineral rights is with the States; the power to lay down limitations on exercise of such power, in the interest of regulation, development or control, as the case may be, is with the Union. This is the result achieved by homogeneous reading of Entry 50 in List II and Entries 52 and 54 in List I. So long as a tax or fee on mineral rights remains in pith and substance a tax for augmenting the revenue resources of the State or a fee for rendering services by the State and it does not impinge upon regulation of mines and mineral development or upon control of industry by the Central Government, it is not unconstitutional. A reasonable tax or fee levied by State Legislation cannot be construed as trenching upon Union's power and freedom to regulate and control mines and minerals. [674-D-F; 663-H; 664-A) 3.6. Power to tax is not outside constitutional limitatidns. It is for Parliament to exercise power in the field made available to it by Entries

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

52 and 54 in List I. It is also for Parliament to state by law the limitations - and the sweep thereof - which it may choose to impose on the field available to the State for taxation, by reference to Entry 50 in List II. It may not be for Courts to venture into enquiry in just an individual case to find and hold what tax would hamper mineral development if Parliament has chosen to observe silence by not legislating or failed to say something explicit. (663-F-G(

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4.1. In the field occupied by the Centre for regulation and control, power to levy tax and fee is available to the State, so long as it does not interfere with the regulation - the power assumed and occupied by the Union. (662-E-F(

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Baijnath Kadio v. The State of Bihar and Ors., (1969( 3 SCC 838 and Western Coalfields ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority, Korba and Anr., [1982( I SCC 125, referred to. Goodricke Group ltd and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (1995) Supp. I SCC 707, upheld.

State of HG1yana and Anr. v. Chanan Mal, 1197711 SCC 340 and H.R.S. Murthy v. The Collector ofChittoor and Anr., (196416 SCR 666, relied on.

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4.2. As Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 itself provides and indicates, the assumption of control in public interest by the Central Government is on (i) the regulation of mines, (ii) the development of minerals, and (iii) to the extent 'hereinafter' provided. The scope and extent of declaration cannot and could not have been enlarged by the Court nor has it been done. The effect is that no State Legislature shall have power to enact any legislation touching (i) the regulation of mines, (ii) the development of minerals, and (iii) to the extent provided by 1957 Act. Tax and fee is not a subject dealt with by 1957Act nor can a power to levy tax or fee be spelled out from sections 13, 18 and 25 therof. (653-D-E; 655-E)

Synthetics and Chemicals ltd. and Ors v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1990( G I SCC 109 and The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors., (196311 SCR 491, relied on.

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State ofOrissa,v. MA. Tulloch and Co., (196414 SCR 461, explained.

4.3. The primary object and the essential purpose of legislation must

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A be distinguished from its ultimate or incidental results or consequences

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for determining the character of the levy. A levy essentially in the nature: of a tax and within the power of State Legislature cannot be annulled as unconstitutional merely because it may have an effect on the price of the commodity. A State legislation, which makes provisions for levying a cess, whether by way of tax to augment the revenue resources of the State or by way of fee to render services as quid pro quo but without any intention of regulating and controlling the subject of the levy, cannot be said to have encroached upon the field of 'regulation and control' belonging to the Central Government by reason of the incidence of levy being permissible to be passed on to the buyer or consumer, and thereby affecting the price of the commodity or goods. [673-B-D[ 4.4. Entry 23 in List II speaks of regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. Entries 52 and 54 of List I are both qualified by the expression "declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest". A reading in juxtaposition shows that the declaration by Parliament must be for the 'control of industries' in Entry 52 and 'for regulation of mines or for mineral development' in Entry 54. Such control, regulation or development must be 'expedient in the public interest'. Legislation by the Union in the field covered by Entries 52 and 54 would not denude the entire field forming subject matter of declaration to the State Legislatures. Denial to the State would extend only to the extent of the declaration so made by Parliament. In spite of declaration made by reference to Entry 52 or 54, the State would be free to act in the field left out from the declaration. The legislative power to tax by reference to Entries in List II is plenary unless the entry itself makes the field 'subject to' any other entry or abstracts the field by any limitations imposable and permissible. [673-D-G I

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State of Orissa v. MA. Tulloch and Co .. 119641 4 SCR 461 and The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State ofOrissa, [1961] 2 SCR 537, referred

to. 5.1. The nature of tax levied is different from the measure of tax. While the subject of tax is clear and well defined, the amount of tax is capable of being measured in many ways for the purpose of quantification. Defining the subject of tax is a simple task; devising the measure of taxation is a far more complex exercise and, therefore, the Legislature has

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to be given much more nexibility in the latter field. The mechanism and method chosen by Legislature for quantification of tax is not decisive of the nature of tax though it may constitute one relevant factor out of many for throwing light on determining the general character of the tax. 1671-E-GI

Union of India and Ors. v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd, 11983] 4 SCC 210 and The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd v. Stale of Orissa, 11961] 2 SCR 537, relied on.

Ra/la Ram v. Province of East Punjab, (1948) FCR 207; Kunnalhat Thathunni Moopil Nair etc. v. State of Kera/a and Anr., 11961] 3 SCR 77 and Ajay Kumar Mukherjee v. Local Board of Barpeta, (1965] 3 SCR 47, referred to.

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Morey v. Doud, 119571 354 US 457, referred to. Mis. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur v. State of Rajasthan, 11962] l SCR 517 and D.G. Gouse and Co. v. State of Kera/a; 1198012 SCC 410, referred to.

Re.: A reference under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and Section 3 of the Finance Act (Northern Ireland) 1934, (1936) A.C. 352, referred to.

5.2. The method of quantifying the cess by reference to the quantum of mineral produced would not alter the character of the levy. There are myriad methods of calculating the value of the land for the purpose of quantifying the tax. It does not become excise duty on manufacture and production of goods merely on account of having relation with the quantity of product yielded of the land. Rather it is a safe, sound and scientific method of determining the value of the land to which the product relates. The levy of cess in the instant matlers considered as a tax is constitutionally valid. [681-F-H; 682-AI Kunnathat Thathunni Moopi/ Nair e/c. v. State of Kera/a and Anr., (19611 3 SCR 77, Ajay Kumar Mukherjee v. Local Board of Barpeta, [19651 3 SCR 47; Western Coalfields Ltd v. Special Area Developmenl Aulhority, Korba and Anr., [19821 i SCC 125 and Ra/la Ram v. Province of Easl Punjab, 1948 FCR 207, relied on.

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6.1. 'Land', the term as occurring in Entry 49 of List II, has a wide connotation. Land remains land though it may be subjected to different user. The nature of user of the land would not enable a piece of land being

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A taken out of the meaning of land itself. Different uses to which the land is

subjected or is capable of being subjected provide the basis for classifying land into different identifiable groups for the purpose of taxation. The nature of user of one piece of land would enable that piece of land being classified separately from another piece of land which is being subjected to another kind of user, though the two pieces of land are identically situated except for the difference in the nature of user. The tax would remain a tax on land and would not become a tax on the nature of its user. [672-E-GI

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Anant Mills v. State ofGujarat, [1975] 2 SCC 115;Kunnathat Thathunni

C Moopil Nair etc. v. State ofKera/a and Anr., (1961 [ 3 SCR 77 and Ajay Kumar Mukherjee v. local Board of Barpeta, (1965] 3 SCR 47, relied on. Vivian Joseph Ferreira and Anr. v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors., [1972] I SCC 70 and The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. Hindustan Machine Tools ltd., [1975] 2 SCC 274,

D referred to.

6.2. To be a tax on land, the levy must have some direct and definite relationship with the land. So long as the tax is a tax on land by bearing such relationship with the land, it is open for the legislature for the purpose of levying tax to adopt any one of the well-known modes of determining the value of the land such as annual or capital value of the land or its productivity. The methodology adopted, having an indirect relationship with the land, would not alter the nature of the tax as being one on land. [672-G-H; 673-A[ 6.3. It is open for the Legislature to ignore the nature of the user and tax the land. At the same time it is also permissible to identify, for the purpose of classification, the land by reference to its user. While taxing the land it is open for the Legislature to consider the land which produces a particular growth or is useful for a particular utility and to classify it separately and tax the same. Different pieces of land identically situated otherwise, but being subjected to different uses, or having different potential, are capable of being classified separately without incurring the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. [628-A-C[ Anant Mills v. State ofGujarat, [1975[ 2 SCC 175;Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair etc. v. State of Kera/a and Anr., (1961[ 3 SCR 77, Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee v. local Board of Barpeta, [1965[ 3 SCR 47; Assistant

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Commissioner of Urban land Tax Madras and Ors. etc. v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. ltd. etc., 1196912SCC55; Ralia Ram v. The Province of East Punjab, (1948) FCR 207; Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy v. Province af Bombay and Ors., AIR (1940) Born 65); Vivian Joseph Ferreira and Anr. v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors., 11972] I SCC 70; The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. Hindustan Machine Tools ltd., 1197512 SCC 274; Mis. R.R. Engineering Co., etc. v. Zila Parishad, Bareil/y and Anr. etc., 11980] 3 SCC 330; District Board of Farrukhabadv. Prag Dutt and Ors., AIR (1948) Allahabad 382 (F.B.) and The State of Punjab v. The Union of India through the Secretary to Government Finance Department, Government of India, New Delhi, AIR (1971) Punjab and Haryana 155 (F.B.), relied on.

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7.1. A cess may be a tax or a fee and is generally used when the levy is for some special administrative expense, suggested by the name of the ccss, such as, health cess, education cess, road cess etc. [633-F-G; 681-B] 7.2. Royalty is not a tax. Royalty is paid to the owner of land who may be a private person and may not necessarily be State. A private person owning the land is entitled to charge royalty but not tax. The lessor receives royalty as his income and for the lessee the royalty paid is an expenditure incurred. It is clarified that even in India Cement it was not the finding of the Court that royalty is a tax. In that case what was impugned was a levy of cess on royalty and the question was whether such cess on royalty was within the competence of the State Legislature. In the majority judgment the word 'royalty' occurring in the expression - 'royalty is a tax' is clearly an error attributable either to a Jitenographer's devil or to sheer inadvertence. What the majority wished to say and has in fact said is 'cess on royalty is a tax'. A statement caused by an apparent typographical or inadvertent error in a judgment of the Court should not be misunderstood as declaration of such law by the Court. 1642-B-C; 633-D-E; 635-E; 636-A-BI

India Cement ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., 11990] 1

sec 12; clarified and distinguished

Orissa Cement ltd. v. State of Orissa and Ors., 11991] Supp. I SCC 430 and Buxa Dooars Tea Company ltd. and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors, 11989] 3 SCC 211, distinguished. State of M.P. v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills ltd. and Ors., 11995] Supp. 1

I

)578

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(2004] I S.C.R.

SCC 642 and Saurashtra Cement and Chemicals Industries and Anr. etc. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., 1200111 SCC 91, overruled to the extent they held royalty to be a tax. H.R.S. Murthy v. Collector of Chit/or, 1196416SCR666, relied on.

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D.K. Trivedi and Sons, and Ors. v. Stale of Gujarat and Ors., (19861 (Supp) SCC 20; Laxmi Narayan Agarwalla and Ors. v. State of Grisso and Ors., AIR (1983) Orissa 210; Surajdin Laxman!al v. State of M.P., Nagpur and Ors., AIR (1960) M.P. 129; Dr. Shanti Saroop Sharma and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR (1969) Punjab and Haryana 79; Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd, Ranavav v. Union of India and Anr., AIR (1979) Gujarat 180; lnderjeet Singh Sia! and Anr. v. Karam Chand Thapar and Ors., (19951 6 SCC 166; Ajit Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (19951 Supp. 4 SCC 224 and Quarry Owners' Association v. State of Bihar and Ors., (20001 8 SCC 655, referred to.

Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Vol.37 A, page 597); Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (Sixth Edition, 2000, Vol.3, page 2341); Words and Phrases, legally Defined (Third Edition, 1990, Vol.4, page 112); Wharton's Law lexicon (Fourteenth Edition, page 893); Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionwy (Eleventh Edition, 1993, page 243); Prem 's Judicial Dictionary (1992, Vol. 2, page 1458) and Black's law Dictionwy (Seventh Edition, p.1330), referred to. Coal Matters

8.1. The West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992 is intra vires the Constitution. The amendments incorporated by the said Act w.e.f. 1.4.1992 into the provisions of the West Bengal Primary Education Act 1973 and the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act 1976 classify the land into three categories: (i) coal-bearing land, (ii) mineral bearing land (other than coal-bearing land) or quarry and (iii) land other than the preceding two categories. These three are well-defined . classifications by reference to the user or quality and the nature of product which it is capable of yielding. The cess is levied on the land. The method of quantifying the tax is by reference to the annual value thereof. It is well known that one of the major factors contributing to the value of the land is what it produces or is capable of producing. Merely because the quantum of coal produced and dispatched or the quantum of mineral produced and dispatched from the land is the factor taken into

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' STA TE v. KE SO RAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

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consideration for determining the value of the land, it does not become a tax on coal or minerals. Being a tax on land it is fully covered by Entry 49 in List II. [674-G-H; 675-A-FJ 8.2. Assuming the impugned levy of cess to be a tax on mineral rights, it would be covered by Entry 50 in List II. Taxes on mineral rights lie within the legislative competence of the State Legislature "subject to" any limitation imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development. Entry 23 in List II speaks of regulation of mines and mineral developments, subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. The Central Legislation has taken over regulation and development of mines and mineral development in public interest. By reference to Entry 50 in List II and Entry 54 iri List I, the Central legislation has not cast any limitations on the State Legislature's power to tax mineral rights, or land for the matter of that. Simply because incidence of tax is capable of being passed on to buyers or consumers by the mine owners with an escalating effect on the price of the coal, it cannot be inferred that the tax has an adverse effect on mineral development. The impugned cess is a tax on coal-bearing and mineralbearing land. It can at the most be construed to be a tax on mineral rights. In either case, the impugned cess is covered by Entries 49 and 50 of List II. (675-8-FJ 8.3. Mahanadi Coalfields* was not correctly decided in as much as India Cement Ltd. and Orissa Cement Ltd.** were applied to the levy of a cess to which they did not apply. In Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. it was not rightly opined that the cess was levied on minerals and mineral rights and not on land. Hence the conclusion reached therein that the State Legislature did not have the legislative competence and that the State legislation trenched upon a field already occupied by Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957, a Central Legislation, is incorrect. [675-G-H; 676-A( Kesoram Industries Ltd (Textile Division) v. Coal India Ltd., AIR (1993) Calcutta 78, reversed.

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*State ofOrissa v. Mahanadi Coal Fields Limited, (1995) Suppl. 2 SCC 686, overruled. **India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1990) 1SCC12 and Orissa Cement Ltd\ v. State of0ris$a and Ors., [1991) Supp.

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[2004] I S.C.R.

l sec 430 ' distinguished.

t· Brick-Earth Matters

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9.t. Brick-earth is a minor mineral. The verdict in this judgment with regard to the impugned cess by reference to coal applies to brick-earth as well. The field as to taxation cannot be said to have been covered by Central Legislation, i.e., the l 957 Act, by reference to Entry 54 in List I. 1676-F-GI 9.2. Quantification of levy by reference to quantity of brick-earth dispatched is a methodology adopted for the purpose .of finding out the quantity of brick-earth removed from the land. It has a definite and direct co-relation with the land. The gist and substance of what the Legislature is taking into account is the brick-earth actually removed. "Dispatched" has the effect of taking into account the brick-earth "removed" and not simply "moved" and left behind. The average quantity of brick-earth utilized in making bricks, whether on the brick field itself or on a place nearby, does involve removal - and consequently, dispatch - of the brickearth from the place where it was to the place where it is captively consumed in making bricks. The fact that the methodology for working out the royalty payable and the cess payable is the same, does not have any detrimental effect on the constitutional validity of the cess whether it be treated as one on the land - classified by reference to its production, i.e., the brick-earth or as one on mineral rights in brick-earth. In either case it would be covered by Entries 49 or 50 in List II. 1676-G-H; 677-A-CI

... ,

'4

Minor Mineral Matters 10.t. The High Court has rightly held that as a tax the impugned levy of cess is clearly covered by Entry 5 of List II, and it is added, read with Entries 49 and 50 of List II. The High Court has upheld the validity of the U.P. Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986 by relating it to Entry 5 in List II which is 'local government'. Any local government exercising the power of governance over a local area shall have to administer, manage and develop the area lying within its territory which cannot be done without raising funds. 1681-C-D; 680-A-BI

Ram Dhani Singh v. Collector, Sonbhadra and Ors., AIR (2001) All 5, affirmed.

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ST ATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

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10.2. The constitutional validity of the enactment as a whole and the rules framed thereunder is not put in issue. What is under challenge is only the levy of cess. There is nothing wrong in the State legislation levying cess by way of tax so as to generate its funds. Although it is termed as a 'cess on mineral right', the impact thereof falls on the land delivering the minerals. Thus, the levy of cess also falls within the scope of Entry 49 of List II. Inasmuch as the levy on mineral rights does not contravene any of the limitations imposed by the Parliament by law relating to mineral development, it is also covered by Entry 50 of List II. 1681-D-FI 10.3. The levy of the impugned cess can equally be upheld as a fee by reference to Entry 66 read with Entry 5 of List II. The imposition of cess envisaged through the SADA Act and the Rules was a step towards developing the special area wherein mining activities on the land are carried on. The impugned cess can, therefore, be justified as a fee for rendering such services as would improve the infrastructure and general development of the area the benefits whereof would be availed even by the stone crushers. It is not necessary that the services ren~ered from out of the fee collected should be directly in proportion with the amount of fee collected. It is equally not necessary that the services rendered by the fee collected should remain confined to the persons from whom the fee has been collected. Availability of indirect benefit and a general nexus between the persons bearing the burden of levy of fee and the services rendered out of the fee collected is enough to uphold the validity of the fee charged. 1680-E-G; 683-D-EI 10.4. The impugned levy does not have the effect of increasing the royalty. Simply because the royalty is levied by reference to the quantity of the minerals produced and the impugned cess too is quantified by taking into consideration the same quantity of the mineral produced, the latter does not become royalty. The former is the rent of the land on which the mine is situated or the price of the privilege of winning the minerals from the land parted by the Government in favour of the mining lessee. The cess is a levy on mineral rights with impact on the land and quantified by reference to the quantum of minerals produced. The distinction, though fine, yet exists and is perceptible. 1683-E-Fl

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Tea Matters 11.1. The impugned levy of cess on tea estates as levied by the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 is intra vires the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004] I S.C.R.

A Constitution. Levy of the cess has already been upheld in Goodricke

Groups Ltd. That case has correctly been decided and the law laid down therein is correct and supported by authority in abundance. India Cement and Orissa Cement were rightly distinguished. The logic and reasoning assigned and conclusions drawn by this Court in Goodricke on all the counts are upheld. (670-G-H; 671-A;_676-B-Fl

Goodricke Group Ltd. and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (19951 Supp. I SCC 707, upheld.

India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (199011

C SCC 12; Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State o/Orissa and Ors., 11991 (Supp. I SCC 430 and Buxa Dooars Tea Company Ltd and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (1989( 3 SCC 211, distinguished .

11.2. Section 2 of the Tea Act, 1953 contains a declaration that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the tea industry. The declaration is in terms of Entry 52 in List I. Union's assumption of control of tea as industry and as being expedient in the public interest, does not amount to vesting the power to tax or levy fee iii the Central Government by reference to tea or on tea estates. Section 25 of the Tea Act empowers the Central Government to levy and collect excise duty on t.ea produces, which on collection shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India. There is no other provision in the Tea Act empowering levy of any tax or fee on tea or tea bearing land. The impugned levy is of cesses on tea estates, i.e. the land forming part of tea estates as defined in the impugned Act. The impugned cess is a tax on teabearing land, a well-defined classification and is covered by Entry 49 in List II. Simply because the method for quantifying the tax is by reference to the yield of the land determinable by taking into account the quantum of tea produced and dispatched, it does not become a cess on tea or a tax on production of tea or a tax on income of land. 1676-C-E)

Per Sinha, J (Dissenting):

I. I. The federalism under the Indian context points out to the supremacy of the Parliament, and the legislative entries contained in different Lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution oflndia must be construed accordingly. Fields of legislation carved out under Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution clearly spell out that in more important matters the Parliament will have greater control thereover. 1805-B; 712-AI

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ST ATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

Govt. of A.P. v. Medwin Educational Society and Ors ... JT (2003) 8 SC 567; State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Purushotham Reddy, JT (2003) 3 SC 15 State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR (1963) SC 1241, Automobile Transport v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1962) SC 1406, referred to.

Ref. Under Article 143, AIR (1965) SC 745 ITC Ltd. v. Agricultural Produce Market Commillee and Ors., 120021 9 SCC 232 and Gov.-Gen. in Council v. Madras, (1945) FCR 179, referred to. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Charles Paul, 373 US 132; 10 Law. Ed. 2d 248; The State of South Australia and Another v. The Commonwealth and Anr., (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373, referred to. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 10th Ed. P. 164, referred to.

1.2. The interpretation of the legislation will depend upon the legislative entries to which it relates and intent and purport of the makers of the Constitution, and no principle of interpretation can be introduced to the effect that the Court should lean towards a State. 1805-B-CI 1.3. Tilt in favour of the Centre is required to be construed having regard to the importance of the subject matter of Parliamentary legislation and the impact and practical inroad effect of the State Laws entrenching upon the legislative field occupied by the Parliament. Though the State Legislature has exclusive power with respect to the subjects specified in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, some of the Entries in List II specifically make the States power 'subject to' any law made by Parliament under the specified Entry in List I. Union and State Relations under the Indian Constitution by M.C. Setalvad - referred to. 1712-B, G-H] 2.1. Article 248 of the Constitution confers power upon the Parliament to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or the State List. Notwithstanding the fact that great care with which the various entries in the three lists have been framed, on some rare occasions it may be found that one or the other field is not covered by these entries. The makers of our Constitution have, in such a case, taken care by conferring power to legislate on such residuary subjects upon the Union Parliament, including taxation, by reason of Article 248 of the Constitution. Once it is found that the Parliament has exercised its superior power in terms of Article 248, question of levy of any tax on the product by a State would not arise. (714-F, 715-C-D; 729-F-G(

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Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, AIR (1998) SC 431 and Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, (1994( 5 sec 54, relied on. S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab, (2001 ( 7 SCC 126; Union of India v. Shri Harbhajan Singh Dhillon, (1971 ( 2 SCC 779; Synthetic and Chemicals ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR (1990) SC 1927 and State of A.P. v. K. Purushotham Reddy and Ors., JT (2003) 3 SC IS.

2.2. Once it is found that the State lacks legislative competence for imposition of tax on any of the subject, indisputably the Parliament alone will have legislative competence therefor. (715-F( Synthetics and Chemicals v. State of U.P., (1991 ( SCC 109, referred

to.

p

M.P. Sundararamier and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr., (1958( SCR 1422, distinguished.

2.3. There is nothing in the Constitution to debar the Parliament to legislate under Entry 54 read with Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. However, recourse to the residuary power must be taken as a last resort i.e. only when all the entries in the three lists are absolutely exhausted, that is to say, if the subject matter is beyond comprehension of the entries contained in the aforementioned three lists. It is trite that when two interpretations are possible resort to the residuary power may not be taken recourse to. (721-D-E( Union of India v. Shri Harbhajan Singh Dhillon, (1971 ( 2 SCC 779 and Union of India and Anr. v. Delhi High Court Bar Assn. and Ors., (2002( 4 sec 275, relied on. His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalbvaru etc. v. State of Kera/a and Anr., (1973( 4 SCC 225, referred to.

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3.1. Article 253 of the Constitution, which starts with a non-obstante clause and operates notwithstanding anything contained in Articles 245 and 246, provides that while giving effect to an international treaty, the Parliament assumes the role of the State Legislature and once the same is done the power of the State is denuded.India is a signatory to various international treaties and covenants and being a party to WTO and GA TT, it is obligated to fulfil its trans-national obligations. If for the purpose of

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ST ATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

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giving effect to the international treaties, the Parliament, in exercise of its power under Article 253 of the Constitution, takes over the legislative field occupied by List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, no exception thereto can be taken. 1715-A-B; 720-AI

Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalbvaru etc. v. State of Kera/a and Anr., 1197314sec225; Vishaka and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., 11997] 6 SCC 241 and Maganbhai lshwarbhai Patel v. {Jn ion of India and Anr., AIR )..

(1969) SC 783, relied on.

Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003] 6 SCC I; Islamic Academy of Edn. and Anr. v. State of Karanataka and Ors. etc., 12003] 6 SCC 325; Liverpool and London S.P. Assn. Ltd v. M. V. Sea Success I and Anr., (2003) JO SCALE I; State of Punjab and Anr. v. Modern Breweries and Anr., (2003) 10 SCALE 202 and Reference by President of India, AIR (1960) SC 845,

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referred to. 3.2. Tea and coal being subjects of great importance, the Parliament has taken over the complete control of the entire field in respect thereof and other minerals in terms of the Tea Act, 1953 and Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957 respectively. The Parliament by enacting Sections 25 both in the 1957 Act and the 1953 Act reserved the authority unto itself to impose any other tax falling in List I. The Parliament may also impose a tax which otherwise would not fall in any one of the taxing entries but may fall under the residuary entry being Entry 97 in List I. (805-C-D; 735-F-G] 3.3. Power to regulate the trade and for that purpose imposition of tax is well-known in India. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 is a regulatory statute. Imposition of tax by way of regulatory measures is permissible while enacting a regulatory statute. (739-B-C; 740-A]

Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd and Ors. v~ State of U.P. and Ors., (19901 1 SCC 109 and State of Punjab and Anr. v. Mis. Devans Modern Brewaries ltd. and Anr., (2003) 10 SCALE 202, relied on. ABL International Ltd and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India limited and Ors., JT (2003) 10 SC 300 and South Eastern Coalfields limited v. State of M.P. and Ors., (2003) 7 Supreme 539, referred to.

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[2004] I S.C.R.

3.4. The importance as regards fixation of price of coal and tea has a direct bearing with the regulation of mines and minerals development as also the tea industry. The Central Government has also reduced the custom duty on coal taking into the aforementioned consideration in view, as would appear from the Notification dated 8.1.2004 issued under the provisions of the Customs Act. As regards tea, under Section 30 of the Tea Act, the Central Government has the power to fix the market price. Fixation of a uniform mar~et price by the Central Government would not be possible if it is held that a different rate of cess can be levied by different States, which will have a direct impact on the sale price thereof. (731-A-B; 795-A-B; 799-E-FI State of MP. v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd., (19951Supp.1SCC642 and Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries ltd. v. Union ofIndia, (20011 I SCC 91, relied on. The King v. Barger., (1908) 6 CLR 41; Allorney-Genera/for Alberta v.

D Allorney General for Canada., (1939) AC at pp. 130-132 and The State of South Australia and Anr. v. The Commonwealth and Anr., (19421 65 C.L.R. 373, referred to.

3.5. Having regard to the purport and object of the 1953 Act and

E the 1957 Act and the declarations contained in Section 2 of the two Acts,

as contemplated in Entries 52 and 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, the State must be held to be denuded of its power to levy any tax on coal or tea, particularly, having regard to the provisions of Sections IO, 13, 15, 25 and 30 of the Tea Act and Sections 9, 9A, 13, 18 and 25 of the 1957 Act. Field of taxation on tea and mineral is specifically covered by Section 25 of the two Acts. Even if the doctrine of pith and substance is applied, it may not be possible to hold that the State legislature has only incidentally encroached upon the legislative field occupied by the Parliament. (805-D-HI

. State of U.P. and Ors. v. Varn Organic Chemicals ltd. and Ors., AIR (2003) SC 4650 and State of Bihar and Ors. v. Industrial Corporation Pvt. ltd. and Ors., (2003) 9 SCALE 169, relied on.

Kera/a State electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Co., 1197611 SCC 468; Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (196912 SCC 166; D.C. and G.M Co Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR (1983) SC

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

937; lshwtiri Khetan Sugar Mills (P) L1<.I.. v, State of U.P., AIR (1980) SC 1955; Kartar Singh v. Slale of Punjab, 119941 3 SCC 569; Ch. Tika Ramji and Ors. v. The S!ale of Uuar Pradesh and Ors.. 119561 SCR 393; Dislrict Mining Officer and Ors. v. Ta/a Iron and Steel Co. and Anr., (20011 7 SCC 358 and ITC Lid v. Agric11//ural Produce Market Commitlee and Ors., (20021 9 sec 232, referred to.

)>·

The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State ofOrissa, 1196112 SCR 537, distinguished. P. Kannadasan and Ors. v. State of TN. and Ors., 119961 5 SCC 670, referred to as already overruled.

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3.6. Once it is found that the entire field of mines and minerals as also tea, including the power to impose any tax is covered by the 1957 and 1953 Acts, the impugned tax by way of levy of cess on coal and tea must be held to be u/lra vires. 1738-G-HI Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Ors. v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Bee} Ltd. and Anr., (2003) 10 SCALE 432, relied on.

Slale of Rajaslhan v. Vatan Medical and General Store, (20011 4 SCC 642, held inapplicable.

4.1. Tax on lands and buildings in terms of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution can be levied on land as a unit and not otherwise. Applying the test laid down in several decisions of this Court, it is opined that the impugned cess is not a tax directly levied upon land as a unit by reason of the general ownership of the lands and buildings. 1806-E-F; 749-C-DI India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., 1199011 SCC 12; State of Orissa v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., 119951Supp2 SCC 686; Orissa Cemenl Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Ors., 119911Suppl.1 SCC 430; Stale of Bihar and Ors. v. Indian Aluminium Company and Ors., 119971 8 SCC 360; Central Coalfields Ltd v. The State of Bihar., AIR (1991) Patna 27 and Krishna Mohan (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., (20031 7 sec 151, relied on. Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of W.B., 119951 Supp. 1 SCC 707, disinguished.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004] 1 S.CR.

4.2. An impost on lands and buildings must be a tax directly imposed on lands and buildings and must have a definite relation thereto. The impugned levies, having regard to nature of impost cannot be said to be a tax on land as : (a) the impost is not directly on land; and (b) the levy does not concern itself with any aspects of land i.e. extent of land, nature, character, quality or location thereof. In the case of mineral, it is already embedded in the earth and there is no question of any yield in the sense that there would be an annual yield or annual income; in case of tea, it is also not concerned with the productive qualities of the land; and (c) the levy is not based on the land as a unit. 1745-A; 746-F-HI

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c on. Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth Tax Officer., 1196911SCR108, relied

4.3. Entry 49 of List II, however, should be read in such a manner so that the surface land must have a direct nexus with the sub-soil right which is an inchoate right. Indisputably, sub-soil right would include mineral right. 1742-E-FI 4.4. Levy of tax on coal bearing lands and mineral bearing lands where mining operations are being carried out through the process of incline or digging pits is illegal, inasmuch as the underground mining right would be larger in area than the surface right and, thus, it is not possible to uphold the validity of such statute with reference to the extent of the surface right as mineral is being extracted from a larger underground area. Different rights may belong to different persons over the same surface land and similarly different rights may belong to different persons in respect of or over underground rights. The impugned provisions do not specify who would be liable to pay in relation to different rights and who would be considered to be the owner of the land and to what extent. The impugned statutes, having not made any provision of different method of levy, are ultra vires. 1806-A-Cj Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and Ors., JT (2003) 9 SC 201 and State of A.P. etc. v. National Thermal Power Corpn. ltd and Ors. etc., 120021 5 SCC 203, referred to. As mineral bearing lands cannot be treated as an independent unit in respect of which tax can be invoked, the impugned Acts must be held to be unconstitutional. Besides, minerals extracted and brought to the surface would be treated as personal property and, thus, cannot be the

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD .

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subject-matter of tax on land. 1806-E; 781-AI

Palmer v. Corwith 3 Chand (Wis) 297, referred to. Cooley Taxation Vol.2 Fourth Edition, P.558 and 564, referred to ..

-<C.

,.

4.5. The definition of land and immovable property as contained in the Cess Act, 1880 play an important role insofar as in terms of Section 78 of the West Bengal Primary Education Act and Section 4 of the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, cess would be levied on all immovable properties on which road and public work cesses are assessed. Section 5 of the Cess Act, 1880 provides all immovable properties would be liable to road cess and public works cess. The immovable property which is, therefore, not liable to a road cess and public works cess, a fortiori, cannot be subjected to education cess or rural employment cess. 1775-C-DI

Buxa Dooars Tea Company Ltd. and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors .. 119891 3 SCC 211, relied on.

4.6. In view of the definitions of 'land' and 'immovable property' contained in the Bengal Cess Act, 1880, as no road cess or public works cess can be imposed on standing crops or any kind of structures, houses, shops or other buildings which would include factories and workshops for processing tea, no levy by way of cess can be imposed by reason of the impugned Acts either on the mining leasehold or the tea estate containing standing crops as also houses and buildings. 1806-G-H; 807-AI

Krishna Mohan (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., 120031 7 sec 151, referred to.

The Anant Mills Co. ltd. etc. etc. v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1975) SC 1234; Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax Madras and Ors. etc. v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. ltd. etc., AIR (1970) SC 169 and D.G. Gose and Co. v. State of Kera/a, 119801 2 SCC 410, distinguished.

4.7. For the purposes of the Cess Act 'owner' would, with reference to a tea estate, the possession of which has been transferred by lease or mortgage or otherwise, mean the transferee so long as his right to possession subsists. It will, therefore, appear that the cess is levied not on land as a unit by reason of general ownership of land which may belong

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(2004) I S.C.Jl.

A to a legal owner but the cess may be levied even upon a person who ii in possession of a tea estate by lease or mortgage or even by a licence or permission. [774-E-F]

c

4.8. The legislative competence of the State in relation to agricultural land as also imposition of tax on land and buildings as contained in Entry 49 of List II must be considered having regard to Entry 52 or Entry 54 of List I and Entry 33 of List Ill. The legislative competence of the State, having regard to Articles 246, 248 and 253 of the Constitution, it is trite, would be subject to the legislative competence of the Parliament. [746-D-El Mahabir Prasad Jalan and Another v. The State of Bihar and Ors., AIR (1991) Patna 40; State of Karna/aka v. Vishwabarathi House Building Coop. Society and Ors., JT (2003) I SC 344; Shri Krishna Gyanudya Sugar ltd. v. State of Bihar., (200314SCC378; Bheemagari Bhaskar and Ors. v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Bhongir and Ors., (2002) I ALT I 59; Jagadish Chandra v. Kanai Lal, AIR (1951) Patna 525 and Kusum Kamini v. Jagdish Chandra, AIR (1941) Patna 13 and Purnendu Narain Singh v. Narendra Nath, AIR (1943) Patna 31, referred to. D.G. Gose and Co. v. State of Kera/a, (1980[ 2 SCC 410; State of Rajasthan v. Vatan Medical and General Store, (2001[ 4 SCC 642; Ra/la Ram v. Province of East Punjab, (1948) FCR 207 and New Manek Chowk Spinning and WeavingMi//s Co. ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Allahabad, (1967[ 2 SCR 679, distinguished.

4.9. Once strict construction of a taxing statute is applied it is possible to hold that the exercise of the State's jurisdiction is really an act of fraud on the Constitution inasmuch while imposing tax on land it seeks to levy tax on mines and minerals or tea in relation whereto it has even no regulatory power. [740-D-E) 4.10. Keeping in view the doctrine of public trust, while imposing a tax on land and in particular, mineral bearing land, the legislature must exercise its power consciously. It, while imposing tax on one subject cannot indirectly levy an impost on other subject. Entry SO of List II authorizes the State to tax mineral rights which has no correlation with the power to tax land. If both the entries are resorted simultaneously, the statutes bear out the same. From the impugned Acts, it cannot be inferred that

)>

11>-

ST ATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

the State intended to levy tax both on land and mineral right. (750-G-H; 751-C-EJ

M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 11997) I SCC 388; Perumatty Gram Panchayat Perumatty Vandithavalam P.O., Chettur Taluk represented by its President Sri A. Krishnan v. State of Kera/a and Ors., W.P. (C) No. 34292/ 2003 (G) decided by Kerala High Court, referred to.

5.1. Measure of a tax although may not be determinative of the nature thereof, the same will play an important role in determining the character thereof particularly keeping in view the purpose and object the Parliamentary Acts seek to achieve. In determining the legislative competence, the taxing event also plays an important role. (807-A-BJ

C

State ofOrissa v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 686; Unit Trust of India and Anr. v. P.K. Unny and Ors., (2001) 249 ITR 612; State ofOrissa v, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 686; Unit Trust of India and Anr. v. P.K. Unny and Ors., (2001) 249 ITR 612; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1983( 4 SCC 45; S.C. Nawn v. W.TO., Calcutta, 11969) SCR 108 and Bhagwan Das Jain v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCR 808 816, referred to. The London County Council and Ors. v. The Attorney General, 1901 Law Report, Appeal Cases 26; Solomon v. New South Wales Sports Club Ltd, 19 Co. L. Rep. 698 and Hylton, Plaintiff in Error v. The United States, US SCR l Law. Ed. Dallas 169, referred to.

;

5.2. Measure of tax is an indicia for determining the character and nature of tax. Subject of a tax and the measure of a tax have some relationship to determine the question as regards character of legislation. For the purpose of measure of tax only permissible methods of valuation can ·be adopted. (785-A; 786-D-E(

••

A distinction must be borne in mind as regards "use of land" and "activities on land". Use of land as a 'fair' or 'market• is permissible in terms of Entry 26 of List II. Imposition of tax, however, would be impermissible on 'activity on land' as it does not come within the purview of any of the entries contained in List II. A tax imposed on activities on land confined to extraction of mineral is clearly beyond the power of the State Legislature. (726-B-C; 798-B(

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004] I S.C.R.

D.G. Gose and Co. v. State of Kera/a., 119801 2 SCC 410 and Ra/la Ram v. Province of East Punjab, (1948) FCR 207, referred to. 5.3. The impugned levy is entirely dependent upon the production of mineral extracted or production of tea leaves which vary from mine to mine or garden to garden or location to location and from year to year. The impugned statutes having not provided for computing the annual value of land in such different situations and, thus, the tax on land being not measurable as an independent unit of the land must be held to be not workable. (747-A, G-Hl 5.4. The impugned levies are taxes on coal or other minerals raised

C in the mining areas and not a tax on land as contemplated under Entry 49 of List II. Irrespective of imposition of tax on the land as a unit, the impugned levies have only one consideration, i.e., production of coal which would, thus fall outside the purview of Entry 49 of List JI. (748-E-FJ

5.5. Despite India Cement and Orissa Cement* as also various decisions of this Court, tax has not been imposed taking the land as a unit. An endeavour has been made to levy cess only by changing the measure thereof. The State has not taken recourse to measure for removing the deficiencies in the Acts pointed out by this Court. 1803-F-Gl

*India Cement Ltd and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., 119901 1 SCC 12 and Orissa Cement ltd v. State of Orissa and Ors., 119911 Supp. 1 sec 430, relied on.

The Workmen of Mis. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd and Ors. v. The Management and Ors., AIR (1973) SC 1227 and Dharam Duft and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2003) 10 SCALE 141, referred to. 5.6. A statute will not be valid unless the defects pointed out are removed. Such removal of the defects must be done keeping in view the principle of 'legislative competence'. Even the Parliament could not validate an Act which was enacted without proper legislative competence. As the measure of tax levied led to the declaration of the law invalid being in pith and substance to be beyond the competence of the State Legislature by reason of the impugned Acts, the levy cannot be said to have been revalidated. They were required to be reenacted but such reenactment must also be in tune with any or other entries made in List II. (795-D-El

II>·

STATE v. KE SO RAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

:..

6.1. The principles of reading a judgment are well-known. What is binding in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution oflndia is the ratio of the judgment. The ratio decidendi of a judgment is the reason assigned in support of the conclusion. If the reasons contained in a judgment do not appeal to a subsequent Bench, the matter may be referred to a larger Bench but so long the same is not done, the ratio can neither be watered down nor brushed aside. India Cement, Orissa Cement and other judgments of coordinate benches are binding. Correctness or otherwise of the said judgments has not been questioned. It would, therefore, not be proper for this Court to read .something in the judgment which does not appear therefrom or to exclude from consideration reasonings on the basis whereof the conclusions of the judgment had been reached. [741-B-OI 6.2. This Court while inttrpreting binding judgments cannot in effect and substance overrule the same or read down the principle of law enunciated therein. Judicial discipline mandates that binding precedents be followed. Comments made by an author cannot be the basis for ignoring binding decisions of larger Benches. [805-A; 741-A) 7.1. The State being owner of the minerals and grant of mineral right being controlled by the Parliamentary statute, namely, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, which is a comprehensive Act and a self-contained Code providing for regulation of mines and mineral development including the power to levy tax, the State is denuded of its power to impose any tax on mineral right in terms of Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The terms and conditions including the right to receive royalty, the mode, manner and extent thereof; the limitations in relation thereto as well as enhancement in the quantum thereof are fixed by the statutory provisions, and, thus, the State would be denuded of its power to impose any further levy, impost or tax thereupon. [805-F-G; 703-C; 752-B-FI

The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd v. State of Orissa., [1961 [ 2 SCR 537; State of Orissa v. MA. Tulloch and Co., [19641 4 SCR 461; India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State a/Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1990[ 1 SCC 12 and Orissa Cement Ltd v. State of Orissa and Ors., [19911 Supp. 1 SCC 430, relied on. State of MP. v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd., [1995) Supp. 1SCC642 and Laxminarayan Mining Co. v. Taluk Dev Board, AIR (1972) MYS 299, referred to.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004] I S.C.R.

Bank of New South Wales v. Common Wealth, 76 CLR 1, referred to. Black's Law Dictionary, referred to.

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7.2. Entry 50 of List II is unique in the sense. that it is the only Entry in all the Entries in the three Lists (List I, II and III) (apart from Entry 37) in the Seventh Schedule where the taxing power of State Legislature has been subjected to "any limitation imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development". Entry 50 of List II is subject to law enacted by Parliament in terms of Entry 54 List I. Grant of mineral rights, undoubtedly, would come within the purview of regulation of mines and minerals development in terms of the 1957 Act. When a mining lease is granted, consideration for parting with the mineral right would be a part of the terms and conditions thereof. The right to receive royalty is also a mineral right. The power to tax on mineral rights, therefore, would essentially be different from a right to tax on mineral actually extracted. State indisputably receives royalty as a consideration for grant of mining lease in terms of the 1957 Act. As by reason of this Parliamentary legislation in terms of Entry 54 of List I, States have been compensated for parting with the mineral rights, by necessary implication, States' power to levy tax on such rights would also stand denuded. (752-B, E-F; 753-B; 762-D-E] 7.3. Once it is found that the entire field of legislation is occupied by the Parliament in view of the 1957 Act and the declarations contained therein, evidently Entry 50 of List II would not be attracted. Under the three impugned Acts, taxes have been levied on minerals and not on mineral rights and, thus, the State Legislations cannot be supported in terms of Entry 50 of List II. The charging section is directly referable to production of coal. The claim, thus, would amount to a colourable exercise of power. (755-F; 760-E-G] Bharat Coking Coal v. State of Bihar, (19901 4 SCC 557; K.C.G. Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, 11954) SCR 1 and Central Coalfields Ltd. and Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Ors., AIR (1991) Patna 27, referred to.

7.4. The levy even otherwise cannot be said to be referable to Entry 50 since - (a) it is a levy only on minerals extracted or produced from the coal mines; and (b) it is on quantity of minerals produced from the mining lease. (760-F] 7.5. The taxing power of the State in terms of Entry 50, List II of the

H Seventh Schedule must also be viewed from the context that all the mineral

STA TE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

f

rights as also the right to receive royalty by reason of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 and U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act vested in the State. The State thus can not impose a tax on its own right. 1764-IB, Fl 8.1. Royalty stricto sensu and in common parlance may not be a tax. But having regard to the definition of taxation contained in Clause (28) of Article 366 of the Constitution, there may not be any dispute that royalty being a statutory impost would come within the purview thereof. 1765-F-G; 766-AI

).

Quarry Owners' Association v. State of Bihar, 120001 8 SCC 655, referred to. 8.2. The Second Schedule appended to the 1957 Act states that the royalty would be payable at the rates specified on each tonne of coal. It is, therefore, a levy on the extraction or produce by weight. When the cess is levied on the royalty, the levy, which remains on extraction by weight, is enhanced or incremented. It is, thus, an incremental addition to the royalty. Its nature and character is the same as that of royalty. The value of the coal or for that matter of green tea leav~s has a direct nexus with the weight thereof. Thus, there may not be any significant distinction in principle between the levy in India Cement's case and levy in the present one. 1766-C-El

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India Cement ltd and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., 1199011

sec 12, relied on.

lnderjeet Singh Sia/ and Another v. Karam Chand Thapar and Ors., [19951 6 SCC 166; Ajit Singh v. Union of India and Ors., [1995) Supp. 4 SCC 224; State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone, 11981) 2 SCC 205 and D.K. Trivedi and Sons and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., [1986) Supp. SCC 20, referred to.

Coal Matters

,,,.

9.1. Coal was the only mineral which was subjected to nationalisaion in terms of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. Even coal mining leases granted to the lessees stood terminated. by reason of s.4A of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 in the year 1976. Fixation of price of coal by the Central Government, regard being had to quality thereof, had all along been subjected to statutory orders. Requirement of maintenance of price of coal on an all India basis had all along been considered to be imperative in the economic

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

.. I

[2004] I S.C.R.

A and industrial development of the country. [684-G-H; 685-B-C[

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9.2. Under the Nationalization Acts, except some collieries which belong to the companies engaged in the business of manufacture of steel, all other mines for all intent and purport belong to the public sector companies which are subsidiaries of Coal India Limited. It will be a matter of great concern if the price of coal becomes higher in the State of West Bengal than in other States. (803-E-Fl 9.3. The definition of mineral is wide a Coal washing plants or cokeoven plants are collieries or coal mines and 'washed coal', 'slurry', sludges and cokes of different grades would also come within the definition of 'coal'. Thus, the owners of the industries like coke-oven plants or coal washeries which may be set-up either within the precincts of a coal mine or outside the same, would be subject to payment of tax on their products although carrying out such operations is controlled and governed by Parliamentary regulatory statutes. Having regard to the definition of a mine vis-a-vis that of"immovable property" and "land" contained in Cess Act, 1880, reconciliation of imposition of tax on 'coal' and 'tea' is not possible. [795-F-Hl 9.4. Coal is also an essential commodity in terms of Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and its distribution, marketing as well as price is regulated and controlled by Colliery Control Order 1945 made under the Essential Commodities Act. As the price of coal is to be determined by the Central Government or the Coal Controller under the Colliery Control Order 1945 which was continued under Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and thus being covered by Entry 33 List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, no tax on coal can be imposed which will have a direct nexus on the value thereof. The impugned Acts must be construed having regard to the other statutes operating in the field. [795-B-DI BRICK-EARTH MATTERS

10. l. In view of the fact that royalty on minor mineral is required to be paid on dispatches, any imposition of tax at the point of dispatch must be held to be bad in law. Despatches of brick-earth from the Raiyati field for manufacture of brick having regard to the process of brick manufacturing would be clearly ultra vires as what is being dispatched is not brick-earth but bricks manufactured on the raiyati lands. Bricks so manufactured cannot be the subject matter of land tax. A tax imposed on the finished product would be excise duty. [768-E-FI

.

,.

"·

-

~.

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ST ATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD .

Bwca Dooars Tea Company ltd and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (1989( 3 sec 211, relied on.

India Cement Ltd and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (1990( 1

sec 12, referred to.

' >

..

10.2. Once the quantification of tax is made by reference to quantity of brick-earth or brick dispatched, measure of tax would be based on total value of the mineral dispatched or the material dispatched. The measure of cess on brick-earth on the dispatches of bricks which is a finished product would not be on dispatches of minerals but on the materials produced from minor mineral and, thus, must be held to be bad in law being beyond the purview of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Brick-earth and other minor minerals also being subject to Parliamentary control and regulation in terms of the 1957 Act, the State is denuded of its power to impose any tax thereupon or a product therefrom. (768-G; 769-D-E(

10.3. Furthermore, the very fact that the methodology of royalty or cess is the same is also a relevant factor for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of tax. Tax is, thus, being imposed on the activities on the land and not on the land itself. (769-C(

c

MINOR MINERAL MATTERS: 11.1. Section 3 of the U.P. Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986 provides for imposition of cess on mineral rights. Such a cess has been imposed subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development. The SADA Act refers to mineral development which indtsputably is the subject matter of the 1957 Act. Once the 1957 Act has been made, the power of the State to grant lease on the terms and conditions which being provided under the statutes, the State, over and above the amount by way ~f royalty, surface rent, dead rent, fees etc., cannot realize any other sum. Such an impost would directly come in the way of mineral development. (769-E-G; 770:-E)

~_.

The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State ofOrissa., (1961) 2 SCR 537; India Cement Ltd and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (1990) 1 SCC 12 and Central Coalfields ltd v. the State of Bihar, AIR (1991) Patna 27, relied on Western Coalfields ltd v. Special Area Development Authority, Korba

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004] I S.C.R.

A and Anr. (19821 1 sec 125, overruled. Jindal Stripe ltd. And Another v. State of Haryana and Ors., (20031 8 SCC 60; Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar v. CST, 119951 Supp I SCC 673 and State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce, 119961 9 SCC 136, referred to.

c

11.2. In terms of Entry 5 of the State List, the State cannot be held to have the legislative competence to levy tax on major mineral or minor mineral, as the case may be, as the field is covered by the 1957 Act and the rules framed thereunder and, thus, it cannot delegate the said power in favour of the statutory authority. 1770-B-Cl

11.3. A local authority has no right over the mineral or the mineral right. The power to impose tax on mineral right or mine and mineral cannot be bestowed by the State upon a local authority by delegation of power or otherwise. The said power per se does not fall within the purview of Entry 5. D The statutory authorities having regard to the provisions contained in Entry 5 may be delegated with the power to impose tax on land and buildings etc. which would have a direct nexus for which such authority has been constituted but not on 'mineral right' which is vested in the State. Besides, even the State is denuded of its power to impose any tax on mineral right or mines and minerals having regard to the provisions of the 1957 Act. 1770-F-H; 771-A-BJ

11.4. Conceptually fee and tax stand on different footings; whereas the . element of tax is based on the principle of compulsory exaction, the concept of fee relates to the principle of quid pro quo. No material having been brought on record that any services invoking the principles of quid pro quo are rendered to the owners of the mine, the impost cannot also be upheld on the ground that the same is a fee within the meaning of Entry 66, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. (771-D; 772-C-DI

11.5. Keeping in view the decisions of this Court, the SADA Act cannot be held to have been validly enacted in terms of Entry 50, List II. Once levy on mineral right contravenes the limits imposed by the Parliament, the G question of upholding its validity in terms of Entry 50 or for that matter in terms of Entry 49, would not arise. The cess levied under SADA Act will have a direct effect on royalty and ultimately the value of the mineral. Even otherwise, in terms of the provisions of Zamindari Abolition Act, the mineral right has vested in the State. Mineral right, therefore, cannot be subject matter H of taxation as the State cannot impose a tax on itself. (771-F-H; 769-F-GI

'

STA TE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. ltd. v. State of Orissa.. 119611 2 SCR 537 and Central Coalfields ltd. v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1991 Patna 27, relied on.

Tea Matters: 12.1. Sections lO and 30 of the Tea Act clearly show that not only the production of tea by way of manufacture in a factory but also cultivation thereof is under the Union control. The fields of legislation relating to agriculture and imposition of tax on land, which belong to the State legislature, have been taken away by Entry 52 List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution read with Article 253 thereof. 1773-B-q

c

Buxa Dooars Tea Company ltd. and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., 119891 3 SCC 211, relied on. 12.2. Tea industry is not only a controlled industry b~t also a declared one, and the Tea Act, having been enacted in terms of Entries 10 and 14 of List I as also A11icle 253, the State's power to make any law dealing with tea including levy of any tax on any types of tea which would include green tea leaves would completely be denuded, as a tax either in terms of Entries 14, 18 or 49 of List II would affect the said commodity. The expression 'tea' should be give~,,a broad meaning and Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution should be interpreted in relation to tea having regard to the purport and object it seeks to achieve. The definition of tea is "for the purposes of the Act" which would mean for all the purposes of the Act. 1807-B-C; 773-E-FI Maganbhai /shwarbhai Patel v. Union of India and Anr., AIR (1969) SC 783; State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce, 119961 9 SCC 136 and H.L. Sud, Income Tax Officer, Companies Circle /(/), Bombay v. Tata Engineering and locomotive Co. ltd., AIR 1969 SC 319, relied on.

MK. Kochu Devassy v. State ofKerala etc.. 1197912 SCC 117, referred to. 12.3. In the instant case, tax has been imposed not on the tea estate as a unit but on the activities on land inasmuch as growing of tea would be such activity which having regard to the provisio.ns of the Tea Act squarely falls within the purview of Entry 52, List I. Imposition of cess calculated on value of coal, tea etc. is beyond the legislative competence of the State. 1796-C-D; 798-A)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(2004) 1 S.C.R.

12.4. If a tea estate is taken to be a unit and green tea leaves are taken as the measure of tax on land comprising the tea estate, the levy of cess can never be uniform and will have no nexus with the land as the land used for factory, workshop and the houses for persons employed in the tea estate have no contribution to the production of tea leaves which have nexus only with the land where tea plants are grown which produce green tea leaves. Apart from this, in a tea estate, there are fallow land, nursery and other areas apart from the factory, workshop, and house where cultivation of tea bushes or plant are not possible. By use of the so-called measure of production of tea leaves, such lands would remain outside the levy of cess. Nexus between the levy and the measure of the levy is lost in the present case. The impugned levy is a tax only on production of tea leaves and hence beyond the competence of the State. 1785-H; 786-A-B; 787-A-Bl District Council of the Jowai Autonomous Dist/. v. Dwet Singh Rymbi,

119861 4 sec 38, referred to.

12.5. Measure of tax by way of levy of cess must also have a direct nexus with the point of taxation. In the instant case, tax is levied on green tea leaves which is produced out of an activity on land and which has no bearing with the tax on land as a unit. Thus, the point at which such tax is levied may also provide for a relevant factor for the purpose of judging the legislative competence of the State. [788-E-FI Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. The State of VIiar Pradesh and Anr., 1196113 SCR 242, relied on. Goodyear India ltd v. State of Hmyana, AIR (1990) SC 781 119901

p

2 sec 71, referred to.

12.6. In "Goodricke Group" the Court assumed that 'green tea leaves' was not marketable and proceeded on the basis that 'green tea leaves' has no nexus with the control over production of tea. If it is held that 'green tea leaves' is a raw material for production of tea or use thereof is necessary for G processing it, the same would be a marketable commodity. 1776-AI As 'green tea leaves' is marketable, the decision in Goodricke group having mainly been rendered on the premise that 'green tea leaves' was not marketable must be held to have passed sub-silentio and, thus, does not lay down correct legal position. 1806-F-GI

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.)

60\

Goodricke Group ltd and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., 11995) Supp. I SCC 707, overruled.

Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair etc. v. St(Jle of Kgrala and Anr., 11961 I 3 SCR 77, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE.JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1532-1533 of 1993. From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.92 of the Calcutta High Court in A.No. Nil of 1992 Arising out of Matter No, 1224/91 and A.No. Nil of 1992. WITH

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C.A. Nos. 3518-3519, 5149-54/92, 2350/93, 7614/94, 298, 299, 297/ 2004, W.P. (C) Nos. 262, 515, 641, 642/97, 347, 360199,50, 553/2000, 207, 288, 3891200 I, 81/2003, 247, 412/95, C.A. Nos, 5027, 6643-6650, 68941 2000, l 077 of 200 I. Mukul Rohtagi, Additional Solicitor General, Rakesh Dwivedi, B. Sen, D Bhaskar P Gupta, Dipankar P. Gupta, A.K. Ganguli, M.N, Krishnamani, R. Venkatarmani, Dr. Debi Pal, V.R. Reddy, K.K. Saha, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Dayan Krishnan, Dilip Sinha, J.R. Das, S. Misra, G. Biswal, Abhishek Chaudhary, Ms. Shruti Chaudhury, Ms. Sumita Goel, Suman J. Khaitan, D. Manda!, Gaurab K. Banerjee, Ms. Sangeeta Manda!, Kapil Chaudhary, Ms. E Swati Sinha, lndranil Ghosh, Arvind Verma, Ms. Jayasree Singh, Ms. Vineeta Bharadwaj, Ms. Mamta Tiwari, Pramod Kumar, Arvind Kumar Gupta, G.S. Chatterjee, P. Venugopal, P.S. Sudheer, K.J. John, Rana Mukherjtte,. Siddharth Gautam, Goodwil lndeevar, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Sushi! Kumar Jain, Prakash Shrivastava Prateek Jalan, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Ms. Bina Gupta, S. Ravi Shankar, S. Jayasinha, Arun, Ms. Rekha Pandey, A. Mariarputham, Ms. Neera F Gupta, D.S. Mehra, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Anip Sachthey, Ajit Kumar Sinha, Raj Kumar Gupta, Sheo Kumar Gupta, A.N. Bardiyar, Ms. Anil Katiyar, T.C. Sharma, Ms. Neelam Sharma, Ajay Sharma, H.K. Puri, S.K. Puri, Ujjwal Banerjee, Ms. Anindita Gupta, U.A. Rana, Ms. Anuradha Priyadarshini, Shreekant N. Terdol, B.V. Balaram Das, Ajay K. Agrawal, Ms. Atka Agrawal, G Gaurav Jain, Ms. Abha Jain for the appearing parties. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by • _..

R.C. LAHOTI, J. This batch of matters, s~me appeals by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution and some writ petitions filed in this Court, raise a few questions of constitutional significance centering around

).

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004] I S.C'.R.

A Entries 52, 54 and 97 in List I and Entries 23, 49, 50 and 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India as also the extent and purport of the residuary power of legislation vested in the Union of India. Cesses on coal bearing land, levied in exercise of the power conferred by State Legislation, have been struck down by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In exercise of the same power conferred by State legislation whereunder B cesses were levied on coal bearing land, cesses have also been levied on tea plantation land which are the subject-matter of writ petitions filed in this Court. The Bengal Brickfield Owners' Association have also come up to this Court by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, laying challenge to the same cesses levied on the removal of brick earth. These three sets of matters arise from West Bengal. The High Court of Allahabad has upheld the constitutional validity of cess levied in the State of U.P. on minor minerals which decisions are the subject-matter of civil appeals filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. For the sake of convenience, we would call these matters, respectively as (A) 'Coal Matters', (B) 'Tea Matters', (C) 'Brick Earth Matters', and (D) 'Minor Mineral Matters'. Inasmuch as the D basic constitutional questions arising for decision in all these matters are the same, all the matters have been heard analogously.

...

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We would first set out the facts in brief and so far as relevant for appreciating the issues arising for decision and thereafter deal with the same.

(A) Col Matters

A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has, vide its judgment dated 25.11.92 reported as Kesoram Industries Ltd (Textiles Division) v. Coal India Ltd, AIR (1993) Calcutta 78, struck down certain levies by way of cess on coal as unconstitutional for want of legislative competence in the State Legislature. Feeling aggrieved, the State of West Bengal has come up in appeal by special leave. The levies which are the subject matter of challenge are as under:

The Cess Act, 1880 "S.5 All immovable property to be liable to a road cess and public works cess. From and after the. commencement of this Act in

any district or part of a district, all immovable property situate therein except as otherwise in (Section 2) provided, shall be liable to the payment of a road cess and a public works cess."

..

~

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. (R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

"S.6 Cesses how to be assessed The road cess and the public A works cess [shall be assessed (a) in respect of lands on the annua,I Y!\lue thereof, (b) in respect of all mines and quarries, on the annual dispatches therefrom, and, (c) in respect of tramways, railways and other immovable property, on the annual net profit thereof, ascertaineQ respectively as in this Act prescribed.] and the rates at which such cesses respectively shall be levied for each year shall be determined for such ye11r in the manner in this Act prescribed:

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Provided that (I) the rates of such road cess and public works cess shall not exceed six paise and twenty-five paise respectively on each rupee of such annual value,

(2) the rates of each of such. roacl cess and public works cess shall not exceed(i) fifty paise on each tonne of coal, minerals or sand of such E annual dispatches, and (ii) six paise on each rupel,l of such annual net profits, Explanation. For the purposes of this proviso, one tonne of coke shall be counted as one and a quarter tonne of coal."

2. West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 "78. Education cess.-{I) All immovable properties on which road and public works cesses are assessed, [or all such properties which are liable to such assessment] according to the provisions of the Cess Act, 1880, shall be liable to the payment of education cess.

(2) The rate of the education cess shall be determined by the state Government by notification and shall not exceed (a) [in respect of lands, other than a tea estate] ten paise on H

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each rupee of the annual value thereof; (aa)

xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) in respect of coal mines [five per centum of the value of coal] on the dispatches therefrom;

c

(c) in respect of quarries and mines other than coal mines, [one rupee on each tonne of materials or minerals other than coal on the annual dispatches therefrom)

...

Explanation-For the purpose of clause (b) the expression 'value of coal' shall mean(i) in the case of dispatches of coal as a result of sale thereof, the prices charged by the owner of a coal mine for such coal, but excluding any sum separately charged as tax, cess, duty, fee or royalty for payment of such sum to Government to a local body, or any other sum as may be prescribed or (ii) in the case of dispatches other than those referred to in item (i), the prices chargeable by the owner of a coal mine for such coal if they were dispatched as a result of sale thereof, but excluding any sum separately chargeable as tax, cess, duty, fee or - royalty for payment of such sum to Government or a local body or any other sum as may be prescribed:

...

Provided that if more than one price is chargeable for the same variety of coal, the maximum price chargeable for that variety of coal shall be taken as the basis of valuation for the purpose of this item."

3. West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976.

"S.4. Rural employment cess. (I) On and from the commencement of this Act, all immovable properties on which road and public work cesses [are assessed or liable to be assessed) according to the provisions of the Cess Act, 1880, shall be liable to the payment of rural employment cess; Provided that on raiyat who is exempted from paying revenue in respect of his holding under clause (a) of sub-sec.(I) of S.23B of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 shall be liable to pay rural employment cess.

"'

).

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I

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. (R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

(2) The rural employment cess shall be levied annually -

(a) [in respect of lands, other than a tea estate,] at the rate of six paise on each rupee of development value thereof; (aa) xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) in respect of coal mines, at the rate of [thirty-five paise per centum] on each tonne of coal on the xxx dispatches therefrom;

(c) in respect of mines other than coal mines and quarries, [at the rate of fifty paise on each tonne of materials other than coal on the annual dispatches therefrom] Exp/anation.-For the purpose of clause (b) the expression 'value of coal' shall mean. -

(i) in the case of dispatches of coal as a result of sale thereof, the prices charged by the owner of a coal mine for such coal but excluding any sum separately charged as tax, cess, duty, fee or royalty for payment of such sum to Government or a local body, or any other sum as may be prescribed, or (ii) in the case of dispatches, other than those referred to in item (i), the prices chargeable by the owner of a coal mine for such coal if they were dispatched as a result of sale thereof, but excluding any sum separately chargeable as tax, cess, duty, fee or royalty for payment of such sum to Government or a local body, or any other sum as may be prescribed:

-·

Provided that if more than one price is chargeable for the same variety of coal, the maximum price chargeable for that variety of coal shall be taken as the basis of valuation for the purpose of this item." All the three legislations above-referred to are State enactments. The provisions of the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 and the West Bengal Rural Employ1mnt and Production Act, 1976, which levied cess were amended by the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992 with effect from 1-4-1992. The text of the said Amendment Act is as follows:

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p

"West Bengal Act II of 1992

.>

THE WEST BENGAL TAXATION LAWS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1992. [Passed by the West Bengal Legislature J

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[Assent of the Governor was first published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary, of the 27th March, 1992.]

An Act to amend the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 and the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976. WHERAS it is expedient to amend the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 and the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, for the purposes and in the manner hereinafter appearing: It is hereby enacted in the Forty-third Year of the Republic of India, by the Legislature of West Bengal, as follows:!. (I) This Act may be called the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992.

(2) It shall come into force on the I st day of April, 1992.

(Section 2.) 2. In the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973, -

(1) in section 78 for sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be substituted:'(2) The education cess shall be levied annually_

(a) in respect of land, except when a cess is leviable and payable under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2A), at the rate of ten paise on each rupee of annual value thereof as assessed under the Cess Act, 1880; (b) in respect of a coal-bearing land, at the rate of five per centum of the annual value of the coal-bearing land as defined in clause (I) of Section 2 of the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976; (c) in respect of a mineral-bearing land (other than coal-bearing land) or quarry, at the rate of one rupee on each tonne of minerals (other than coal) or materials despatched within the meaning of clause (I b) of Section 2 of the West Bengal Rural Employment

-

-(' STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

and Production Act, 1976, from such mineral bearing land or quarry; Provided that when in the coal-bearing land referred to in clause (b) there is no production of coal for more than two consecutive years, such land shall be liable for levy of cess in respect of any year immediately succeeding the said two consecutive years in accordance with clause (a): Provided further that where no despatch of minerals or materials is made during a period of more than two consecutive years from the mineral-bearing land or quarry as referred to in clause (c), such land or quarry shall be liable for levy of cess in respect of any year immediately succeeding the said two consecutive years in accordance with clause (a).

Explana(ion.-For the purposes of this chapter, 'coal-bearing land' shall have the same meaning as in clause (la) of Section 2 of the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976.'.

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(2) in section 78A, -

(a) for clause (a), the following clause shall be substituted:"(a) the education cess payable for a year under sub-section (I) of section 78 in respect of coal-bearing land referred to

in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of that section shall be paid by the owner of such coal-bearing land in such manner, at such intervals and by such dates as may be prescribed;";

-

(b) for clause (b ), the following clause shall be substituted:-

.....

,. ,...;..

"(b) every owner of a coal-bearing land shall furnish a declaration relating to a year showing the amount of education cess payable by him under clause (a) iri such form and by such date as may be prescribed and to such authority as may be notified by the State Government in this behalf in the Official Gazette (hereinafter referred to as the notified authority);";

(c) in clause (c),_ (i) for the words "coal mine", wherever they occur, the words "coal-bearing land" shall be substituted;

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(ii) for the word "return", wherever it occurs, the word

"declaration" shall be substituted; (iii) for the word "period", wherever it occurs, the word "year" shall be substituted;

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(d) for clause (d), the following clause shall be substituted:"(d) the education cess under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 78 shall be assessed by the notified authority in the manner prescribed, and if the declaration under clause (b) is not accepted, the owner of the coal-bearing land shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before making such assessment;"; (e) in clause (g), for the words "coal mine" in the two places where they occur, the words "coal-bearing land" shall be substituted;

(t) for clause (ga), the following clause shall be substituted:-

"(ga) where an owner of a coal-bearing land furnishes a declaration referred to in clause (b) in respect of any year by the prescribed date or thereafter, but fails to make full payment of education cess payable in respect of such period by such date, as may be prescribed under clause (a), he shall pay a simple interest at the rate of two per centum for each English calendar month of default in payment under clause (a) from the first day of such month next following the prescribed date up to the month preceding the month of full payment of such cess or up to the month prior to the month of assessment under clause (d) in respect of such period, whichever is earlier, upon so much of the amount of education cess payable by him according to clause (a) as remains unpaid at the end of each such month of default;" (g) for clause (gb), the following clause shall be substituted:-

"(gb) where an owner of a coal-bearing land fails to furnish a declaration referred to in clause (b) in respect of any year by the prescribed date or thereafter before the assessment under clause (d) in respect of such year and, on such assessment, full amount of education cess l'ayable for such year is found not to have been paid in the manner and by the

..

-( STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.)

date prescribed under clause (a), he shall pay a simple interest at the rate of two per centum for each English calendar month of default in payment under clause (a) from the first day of the month next following the prescribed date for such payment up to the month preceding the month offu II payment of education cess under clause (a) or up to the month prior to the month of such assessment under clause (d), whichever is earlier, upon so much of the amount of education cess payable by him according to clause (a) as remains unpaid at the end of each such month of default:

Provided that where the education cess payable under clause (a) is not paid in the manner prescribed under that clause by the owner of a coal-bearing land, the notified authority shall, while making the assessment under clause (d) in respect of a year, apportion on the basis of such assessment the education cess payable in accordance with clause (a);";

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(h) in clause (gc), for the words "coal mine'', the words "coalbearing land" shall be substituted; (i)

in clause (ge), for the words "coal mine", the words "coalbearing land" shall be substituted;

(j)

for clause (gf), the following clause shall be substituted:"(gf) interest under clause (ga) or clause (gb) shall be payable in respect of payment of education cess which falls due on any day after the 30th day of April, 1992, and interest under clause (gc) shall be payable in respect of assessment for which notices of demand of education cess under clause (d) are issued on or after the date of commencement of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992:

r ),

Provided that interest under clause (ga) or clause (gb) in respect of any period ended on or before the 31st day of G March, 1992, or interest under clause (gc) in respect of assessment, for which notices of demand of education cess under clause ( d) are issued before the date of commencement of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992, shall continue to be payable in accordance with the provisions of this Act as they stood immediately before the coming into H

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force of the aforesaid Act as if the aforesaid Act had not come into force;"; (k) in clause (gh), for the words "coal mine", the words "coalbearing land" shall be substituted;

(I) in clause (gi), for the words "coal mine", the words "coalbearing land" shall be substituted; (m) in clause (gj), for the words "coal mine", the words "coalbearing land" shall be substituted;

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"3. In the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976,( 1) in Section 2, _ (a) for clause ( 1), the following clauses shall be substituted (I) "annual value of coal-bearing land", in relation to a financial

year, means one-half of the value of coal, produced from such coalbearing land during the two years immediately preceding that financial year, the value of coal being that as could have been fetched by the entire production of coal during the said two immediately preceding years, had the owner of such coal-bearing land sold such coal at the price or prices excluding the amount of tax, cess, fee, duty, royalty, crushing charge, washing charge, transport charge or any other amount as may be prescribed, that prevailed on the date immediately preceding the first day of that financial year. Explanation.-Where different prices are prevailing on the date immediately preceding the first date of that financial year for different grades or qualities of coal, the value of coal of each grade or quality produced during the two years immediately preceding that financial year shall be determined accordingly; (Ia) "coal-bearing land" means holding or holdings ofland having one or more seams of coal comprising the area of a coal mine;

(lb) 'despatched', for a financial year, shall, in relation to a mineral-bearing land (other than coal-bearing land) or a quarry, mean one-half the quantity of minerals, or minerals, despatched during two years immediately preceding that financial year from such mineralbearing land or quarry;

.,

--'' '

.

STA TE: v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.)

(le) 'development value' means a sum equivalent to five times the annual value of land as assessed under the Cess Act, I 880; ';

(b) after clause (3 ), the following clause shall be added and shall be deemed always to have been added:'{4) 'year' means a financial year as defined in clause (15) of Section 3 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899;';

(2) in section 4, for sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be substituted:"(2) The rural employment cess shall be levied annually_

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(a) in respect of land, except when a cess is leviable and payable under clause (b) or clause (c) or sub-section (2A), at the rate of six paise on each rupee of development value thereof; (b) in respect of a coal-bearing land, at the rate of thirty-five per centum of the annual value of coal-bearing land as defined in clause (I) of Section 2; (c) in respect of a mineral-bearing land (other than coalbearing land) or quarry, at the rate of fifty paise on each tonne of minerals (other than coal) or materials despatched therefrom:

(g) for clause (gb ), the following clause shall be substituted:-

-""

'

\

.,.., "'

"(gb) where an owner of a coal-bearing land fails to furnish a declaration referred to in clause (b) in respect of any year by the prescribed date or thereafter before the assessment under clause (d) in respect of such year and, on such assessment, full amount of rural. employment cess payable for such year is found not to have been paid in the manner and by the date prescribed under clause (a), he shall pay a simple interest at the rate of two per centum for each English calendar month of default in payment under clause (a) from the first day of the month next following the prescribed date for such payment up to the month preceding the month of full payment of rural employment cess under clause (a) or up to the month prior to the month of such assessment under

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clause (d), whichever is earlier, upon so much of the amount of rural employment cess payable by him according to clause (a) as remains unpaid at the end of each such month of default: Provided that where the rural employment cess payable under clause (a) is not paid in the manner prescribed under that clause by the owner of a coal-bearing land, the notified authority shall, while making the assessment under clause (d) in respect of a year, apportion on the basis of such assessment the rural employment cess payable in accordance with clause (a);"; (h} in clause (gc), for the words "coal mine", the words "coalbearing land" shall be substituted;

(i) in clause (ge), for the words "coal mine", the words "coalbearing land" shall be substituted;

G) for clause (gt), the following clause shall be substituted:"(gf) interest under clause (ga) or clause (gb) shall be payable in respect of payment of rural employment cess which falls due on any day after the 30th day of April, 1992, and interest under clause (gc) shall be payable in respect of assessments for which notices of demand of rural employment cess under clause (d) are issued on or after the date of commencement of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992: Provided that interest under clause (ga) or clause (gb) in respect of any period ended on or before the 31st day of March, 1992, or interest under clause (gc) in respect of assessments for which notices of demand of rural employment cess under clause ( d) are issued before the date of commencement of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) AC!, 1992, shall continue to be payable in accordance with the provisions of this Act as they stood before the coming into force of the said Act as if the said Act had not come into force;"; (k) in clause (gh), for the words "coal mine'', the words "coalbearing land" shall be substituted;

'.

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTl,J.]

(1)

in clause (gi), for the words "coal mine", the words "coal-bearing land" shall be substituted;

(m) in clause (gj), for the words "coal mine", the words "coal-bearing land" shall be substituted; By order of the Governor R.BHATTACHARYYA, Secy. to the Govt. of West Bengal." It is the constitutional validity of the amendment in the two legislations, given effect to from I .4.92, which was successfully impugned in the High Court and is sought to be restored in these appeals. The High Court has placed reliance mainly on two decisions of this Court, namely India Cement ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (1990] I SCC 12 (Seven-Judges Bench decision) and Orissa Cement Ltd v. State of Orissa and Ors., (1991] Supp. I SCC 430 (Three-Judges Bench decision). In both these decisions the levy of cess impugned therein was struck down as unconstitutional. The High Court of Calcutta has held that the levy impugned herein is similar to the one held ultra vires the legislative competence of the State twice by the Supreme Court, and hence the same was liable to be struck down.

.....;'

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In the opinion of the High Court, the cess is assessed and computed on E the basis of value of coal produced from the coal bearing land, and coal bearing land has been defined to mean land having one or more seams of coal comprising the area of a coal mine. Therefore, it is the production of coal from a coal mine which is the basic event for the levies and the cess is to be levied at 35 per centum of the 'annual value of the coal bearing land', which, as per definition, is directly related to the value of coal produced from F the coal mines. The value of the coal has been related to the price. Explanation to Clause (I) of Section (2) of the 1976 Act, as amended by the 1992 Act, makes the real nature of the levy clearer by providing that where different prices are prevailing on the relevant date for different grades or qualities of coal, the value of coal of each grade or quality shall be refevant. The High Court has concluded that the cess cannot be said to be on land so as to be G covered by Entry 49 in List II. On behalf of the writ petitioner -respondents, the judgment of the High Court has been supported on similar grounds as were successfully urged before the High Court and which we shall presently Geal with. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant-State of West Bengal has submitted that having regard to the real nature of the levy, H

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A it clearly falls within the legislative field of Entry 49 in List II.

•.

(B) Tea matters

The writ petitions in which the validity of the levy of cesses relatable to tea estates is involved has an interesting legislative history behind it. By B virtue of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1981, amendments were effected in the provisions of the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973, and the West Bengal Rural Employment And Production Act, 1976. Cesses were sought to be levied upon certain lands and buildings in the State for raising funds for the purpose of providing primary education throughout the State and to provide for employment in rural areas. Different rates in respect of lands, coal mines and other mines on annual basis were provided. Tea estates were carved out as a separate category and a separate rate was prescribed therefor as under.

-.I

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·-

"Section 4(2) : The rural employment cess shall be levied annually -

(a) in respect of lands, other than a tea estate, at the rate of six paise on each rupee of development value thereof; (aa) in respect of a tea estate at such rate, not exceeding rupees six on each kilogram of tea on the despatches from such tea estate of tea grown therein, as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix in this behalf :

. •

Provided that in calculating the despatches of tea for the purpose of levy of rural employment cess, such despatches for sale made at such tea auction centers as may be recognized by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette shall be excluded: Provided further that the State Government, may fix different rates on despatches of different classes of tea.

Explanation-For the purpose of this section, 'tea' means the plant Camelia Sinensis (L) 0. Kuntze as well as all varities of the product known commercially as tea made from the leaves of the plant Camelia Sinensis (L) 0. Kuntze, including green tea and green tea leaves, processed or unprocessed."

Sub-section (4) was introduced in Section 4 which empowered the State Government to exempt "such categories of dispatches or such percentage of

... '

l STA TE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI. J.]

dispatches from the liability to pay the whole or any part of the rural A employment cess or reduce the rate ..... " By another amendment effected in 1982, the first proviso to clause (aa) in Section 4(2) was omitted. Several notifications were issued by the Government from time to time as contemplated by Section 4(2). The constitutional validity of the abovesaid amendment was challenged successfully in Buxa Dooars Tea Company ltd and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (1989] 3 SCC 21 I. The decision is by a Bench of two learned Judges. The levy of cess having been struck down, the State became liable to refund the cess already collected and the relevant schemes which were financed by the cesses so collected came under jeopardy. The West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 was enacted, which is under challenge herein. Section 2 of the impugned Act contains amendments to West Bengal Primary Education Act while Section 3 sets out the amendments to West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976. As mentioned hereinbefore, it would be enough to notice the gist of the amendments made . in one of the two Acts of 1973 or 1976, since the amendments in both are identical.

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Clause (aa) in sub-section (2) of Section 4 was omitted with effect from 1.4.1981. After sub-section (2), sub-section (2-A) was introduced with E retrospective effect from 1.4.1981. Sub-section (2-A) reads : (2-A) The rural employment cess shall be levied annually on a tea estate at the rate of twelve paise for each kilogram of green tea leaves produced in such estate.

Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, sub-section (3) and Section 4-B(i) 'green tea leaves' shall mean the plucked and unprocessed green leaves of the plant Camelia Sinensis (L) 0. Kuntze; (ii) 'tea estate' shall mean any land used or intended to be used for growing plant Camelia Sinensis (L) O.Kuntze and producing green tea leaves from such plant, and shall include land comprised in a factory or workshop for producing any variety of the product known commercially as 'tea' made from the leaves of such plant and for housing the persons employed in the tea estate and other lands for

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purposes ancillary to the growing of sucli plant and producing green tea leaves from such plant."

•

Clause (a) in sub-section (3) was also substituted which had the effect of making the owner of the tea estate liable for the said cess. The other provisions require the owner of the tea estate to maintain a true and correct account of green tea leaves produced in the tea estate. Sub-section (4) was also substituted. The substituted sub-section (4) empowered the State Government to exempt from the cess such categories of tea estates producing green tea leaves not exceeding two lakh fifty thousand kilograms and located in such area as may be specified in such notification. Section 4-B contains the validation clause. It says that any cess collected for the period prior to the said Amendment Act shall be deemed to have been validly levied by it and collected under the Amended Act. Any assessment made or other proceedings taken in that behalf for assessing and collecting the said tax were also to be deemed to have been taken under the Amended Act. Goodricke Group ltd and Ors. filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in this Court. The levy of cesses under both the State enactments as amended by the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 was impugned. A few matters raising a similar challenge and pending in various High Courts were also withdrawn to this Court. All the matters were heard and decided by a three-Judges Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated November 25, 1994, reported as Goodricke Group Ltd and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., [1995] Supp. I SCC 707. The decision of this Court in India Cement Ltd and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1990] I SCC 12 (seven-judges Bench) and Orissa Cement limited v. State of Orissa and Ors., [1991] Suppl. I SCC 430 (threejudges Bench) were cited before the three-judges Bench in Goodricke. Both the decisions were distinguished and the constitutional validity of the 1989 amendments was upheld. The writ petitions were dismissed.

It appears that a similar cess was levied by a pari materia provision ·enacted by the State Legislature of Orissa as the Orissa Rural Employment, G Education and Production Act, 1982. The cess was on land bearing coal and minerals. Challenge to the constitutional validity of such cess was successfully laid before this Court, and the Orissa Legislation was struck down as unconstitutional and ultra vires the competence of the State Legislature in State of Orissa v. Mahanadi Coal Fields limited, [1995] Suppl. 2 SCC 686 H decided on April 21, 1995.

.

l. STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. (R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

On 30.3.1996 a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of A India has been filed in this Court laying challenge to the constitutional validity of the very same amendments which were unsuccessfully impugned in the Goodricke 's case.

't ~

The writ petitioners in the Tea Matters have in their petition state:! a few grounds in support of the relief sought for. However, a perusal of the grounds reveals that in substance the challenges is only one, i.e., the decision in Goodricke runs counter to the view of the law taken by Seven-Judges Bench in India Cement and three-Judges Bench in Orissa Cement; Goodricke was rightly not followed in Mahanadi Coal Fields; rather Mahanadi Coal Fields has whittled down the authority of Goodricke and that being the position of law the impugned cess is ultra vires the power of the State Legislature and deserves to be pronounced so. In short, the same challenge as was laid and turned down in Goodricke, is reiterated drawing support from the decisions of this Court previous and subsequent to Goodricke, and seeks the overruling of Goodricke.

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(C) Brick-Earth Matters

"

"

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The Bengal Brickfield Owners' Association, being a representative body of the persons engaged in the activity of brick manufacturing and owning brickfields as also one of the brickfield owners, have joined in filing a writ petition before this Court wherein the constitutional validity of the very same E provisions as contained in the Cess Act, 1880, the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 and the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976 ( both as amended by the West Bengal Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1992) has been put in issue, as has been subjected to challenge by the coal mine owners and the tea estate owners disputing the levy of cess allegedly on coal and tea. The grounds of challenge, briefly stated, are three in number: firstly, that brick-earth is a minor mineral to which the Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Act, 1957, applies and by virtue of the declaration made by Section 2 of the Act by reference to Entry 54 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the field relating to such minor minerals is entirely covered by the Central Legislation and hence the State Legislations G are not competent to levy the impugned cess; secondly, that the levy is on the dispatch of minor minerals for sale while the process of manufacturing bricks does not involve any dispatch of the brick-earth inasmuch as the brickearth is consumed then and there, on the brickfield itself, in the process of manufacturing of bricks, and there being no dispatch of brick-earth, the cess

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A is not leviable; and thirdly, that the State Government is not empowered to

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levy any cess on either the extraction of brick-earth or on the dispatch of brick-earth. In support of these three grounds, it is further submitted that the same quantity of brick-earth is subjected by Central Legislation to payment of royalty which is a tax, and the same quantity of brick-earth is sought to be levied with cess which is incompetent so far as the State Legislature is concerned. The writ petition places reliance on the decisions of this Court in India Cement ltd. and Ors., (supra), Orissa Cement Ltd., (supra) and Buxa Dooars Tea Company ltd. and Ors. (supra). Some of the members of the petitioner association were served with demand notices. The relief sought for in the petition is striking down of the relevant provisions of the three State Legislations as ultra vires the Constitution and quashing of the demand notices. The reason for filing the petition in this Court, as stated in the writ petition, is that the provisions sought to be impugned herein have already been declared ultra vires by the High Court of Calcutta in relation to 'tea', an appeal against which decision has been filed in this Court and by an interim order the operation of the judgment of the High Court was stayed.

According to the respondents, the cess sought to be levied by the impugned State Legislation is in the nature of fee and not tax. The purpose of levying fee, as stated in the Preamble to the relevant legislation, is rendering different services to the society and for public benefit. The cesses have been E levied by the State Government for securing of welfare to the people by the State as is enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution of India by providing communication facilities, removal of illiteracy and rural employment to the poor living below the poverty line. The impugned legislations levying the cess, do not encroach upon the field covered by the Central legislation. The brick-klin owners extract the brick-earth as an item of trade. From every I 00 F cft of brick-earth which weighs 5 metric tones, 1382 bricks are manufactured. The dispatch of 1382 bricks means the dispatch of JOO cft or 5 metric tones of brick-earth. A brickfield owner performs dual functions: firstly, he extracts a quantum of brick-earth from the quarry, and secondly, he dispatches the same for manufacture of bricks in the same quarry~field. The brickfield owner G is an extractor of brick-earth and also a manufacturer of bricks. The element of dispatch is kept hidden. That is why the cess is now assessed on annual dispatches. Dispatch, in the context of brick-earth, means removal of brickearth from one place to another which may be within the same complex and for domestic or captive use or consumption. In any case, the removal of brick-earth involved in the process cannot escape assessment.

I

Ji. STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI. J.]

(0) Minor Mineral Matters This batch of appeals puts in issue the judgment dated 1.3.2000 delivered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (reported as Ram Dhani Singh v. Collector, Sonbhadra and Ors., AIR (2001) Allahabad 5, upholding the constitutional validity of a cess on mineral rights levied under Section 35 of the U.P. Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986, read with Rule 3 of the Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997 (herein referred to briefly as 'SADA Act' and 'SADA Cess Rules' respectively). There was a bunch of 73 writ petitions filed in the High Court which have all been dismissed. The challenge is being pursued in this Court by ten writ petitioners through these appeals by special leave. The Governor of Uttar Pradesh promulgated U.P. Ordinance No.15 of 1985, which was repealed by U.P. Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986 (U.P. Act No.9 of 1986), containing identical provisions as were contained in the preceding Ordinance. The said Act received the assent of the President of India on 19.3.1986 and was published in U.P. Gazette of that day. Section 35 of the Act provides as under :

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"35. Cess on mineral rights.(I) Subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating

to mineral development, the Authority may impose a cess on mineral rights at such rate as may be prescribed. (2) Any Cess imposed under this section shall be subject to confirmation by the Sta.le Government and shall be leviable with effect from such date as may be appointed by the State Government in this behalf." On 24.2.1997, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 35 of the Act, the Governor made the Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997, which were published on the same day in the U.P. Gazette and came into force. Rule 2(b) and Rule 3(1) and (2), relevant for our purpose, are extracted and reproduced hereunder :

"2. In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context (a) xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) "Mineral Rights" means rights conferred on a lessee under a

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

mining lease granted or renewed for mining operations in relation to Minerals (providing operation for raising, winning or extracting coal) as defined in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (Act No.67 of 1957)". "3. (I) The Authority may, subject to sub-rules (2) and (3) impose a cess on mineral rights on such minerals and minor minerals and at such rates are specified below : MINERAL/MINOR MINERAL (I ) Cess on Coal (2) Cess on Stone, Coarse Sind/Sand

[2004] I S.C.R.

MINIMUM RATE" Rs.5.00 (per ton)

MAXIMUM RATE Rs.10.00 (per ton).

Rs.5.00 Rs.2.00 (Per Cubic metre) (Per Cubic metre)

(2) The rates shall not be less than the minimum rates or more than the maximum rates specified in sub-rule (I) and shall be detennined by the Authority by a special resolution which shall be subject to confirmation by the State Government.'' In exercise of the power conferred by the Act and the Rules, the State

E Government proceeded to levy cess and take steps for recovery thereof by serving notices and issuing citations on the several stone crushers (which the appellants are), who extract stone as mineral and convert the same into metal by a process of crushing. They filed the writ petitions disputing the levy and the demand by the State Government.

On behalf of the writ-petitioners, the SADA Cess Rules as also the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact Section 35 of the SADA Act were challenged on the ground that the MMDR Act, 1957, having been enacted containing a declaration under Section 2 as contemplated by Entry 54 of List-I and the Act being applicable to Sonbhadra falling within the State of U.P. as well, the State Legislature was denuded of its power to G enact the impugned law and levy the impugned cess. It was also submitted that the impugned cess would have the effect of adding to the royalty already being paid and thereby increasing the same, which was 11/tra vires the power of the State Government as that power was exercisable only by the Central Government.

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

The High Court has held the SADA Act, the SADA Cess Rules and the levy of cess thereunder within the competence of State Legislature by reference to Entry 5 in List II.

Reference to Constitution Bench Since the appeals referable to coal matters and the writ petition referable to tea matters raised common issues, the cases were taken up for hearing together. On 12.10.1999, the conflict amongst several decisions of this Court was brought to the notice of the three-judges Bench hearing the matter which passed the following order :

"Great emphasis has been placed by learned counsel for the State of C West Bengal upon the judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges in Goodricke Group Ltd. and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., [1995] Suppl. I SCC 707. Quite apart from the fact that there are pending proceedings in this Court seeking to reconcile the judgment in Goodricke with that in State of Orissa and Ors. v. Mahanadi D Coalfields Ltd and Ors., [1995] Suppl. 2 SCC 686, we find some difficulty in accepting as correct the view taken by Goodricke, particularly having regard to the earlier decision (of a Bench of two learned Judges) in Buxa Dooars Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, [1989) 3 SCC 211. We think, therefore, that these matters should be heard by a Constitution bench. The papers and proceedings may, accordingly, be placed before ·the Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate directions." The brick-earth matters were also clubbed with the abovesaid matters for hearing. The impugned judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Minor Mineral Matters has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Goodricke Group Ltd and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., [1995] Supp. I SCC 707. The correctness of the said decision was in issue ih Civil Appeal Nos. 1532-33 of 1993 and batch matters and hence these appeals were also directed to be placed before the Constitution Bench for hearing.

Th is is how the four sets of matters have been listed before and heard by the Constitution Bench.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004) I S.C.R.

A Relevant Entries and principles of interpretation Before we proceed to examine the merits of the submissions and counter submissions made on behalf the pa11ics, it will be useful to recapitulate and summarise a few principles relevant for interpreting entries classified and grouped into the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The B law is legion on the point and the principles which are being briefly stated hereinafter are more than settled. These principles are referred to in the several decisions which we shall be referring to hereinafter. So far as the principles are concerned they have been followed invariably in all the decisions, however diverse results have followed based on facts of individual C cases and manner of application of such principles to the facts of those cases. The relevant entries to which reference would be required to be made during the course of this judgment are extracted and reproduced herein:"SEVENTH SCHEDULE (Article 246)

List I - Union List 52. Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.

54. Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. 96. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not including fees taken in any court.

97. Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists. List II-State List

23. Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. 49. Taxes on lands and buildings. 50. Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.

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l STA TE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI. J.)

66. Fees in respect of any of the matter in this List, but not including fees taken in any court."

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Article 245 of the Constitution is the fountain source of legislative power. It provides - subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. B The legislative field between the Parliament and the Legislature of any State is divided by Article 246 of the Constitution. Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in Seventh Schedule, called the 'Union List'. Subject to the said power of the Parliament, the Legislature of any State has power to make laws with respect C to any of the matters enumerated in List III, called the 'Concurrent List'. Subject to the abovesaid two, the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II, called the 'State List'. Under Article 248 the exclusive power of Parliament to make laws extends to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. The power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in the D Concurrent List or State List vests in Parliament. This is what is called the residuary power vesting in Parliament. The principles have been succinctly summarized and restated by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court on a review of the available decisions in Mis. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals ltd. and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1983] 4 SCC 45, they' are E (I) the various entries in the three Lists are not 'powers' oflegislation but 'fields' of legislation. The Constitution effects a complete separation of the taxing power of the Union and of the States under Article 246. There is no overlapping anywhere in the taxing power and the Constitution gives independent sources of taxation to the Union and the States.

(2) In spite of the fields of legisfation having been demarcated, the question of repugnancy between law made by Parliament and a law made by the State Legislature may arise on Iy in cases when both the legislations occupy the same field with respect to one of G the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List and a direct conflict is seen. If there is a repugnancy due to overlapping found between List JI on the one hand and List I and List III on the other, the State law will be ultra vires and shall have to give way to the Union law.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (3)

[2004] I S.C.R.

Taxation is considered to be a distinct matter for purposes of legislative competence. There is a distinction made between general

subjects of legislation and taxation. The general subjects of legislation are dealt with in one group of entries and power of taxation in a separate group. The power to tax cannot be deduced from a general legislative entry as an ancillary power.

(4) The entries in the List being merely topics or fields of legislation,

they must receive a liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not in a narrow pedantic sense. The words and expressions employed in drafting the entries must be given the widest possible interpretation. This is because, to quote V. Ramaswami, J., the allocation of the subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but by way of a mere simplex enumeratio of broad categories. A power to legislate as to the

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principal mat/er specifically mentioned in the entry shall a/so include within its expanse the legislations touching incidental and ancillary mailers.

(5)

...... J

Where tl1e legislative competence of a Legislature of any State is questioned on the ground that it encroaches upon the legislative competence of Parliament to enact a Jaw, the question one has to ask is whether the legislation relates to any of the entries in Lists I or III. If it does, no further question need be asked and Parliament's legislative competence must be upheld. Where there are three Lists containing a large number of entries, there is bound to be some overlapping among them. In such a situation the doctrine of pith and substance has to be applied to determine as to which entry does a given piece of legislation relate. Once it is so determined, any incidental trenching on the field reserved to the other Legislature is of no consequence. The Court has to look at the substance of the matter. The doctrine of pith and substance is sometimes expressed in terms of ascertaining the true character of legislation. The name given by the Legislature to the legislation is immaterial. Regard must be had to the enactment as a whole, to its main objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. Incidental and superficial encroachments are to be disregarded.

(6) The doctrine of occupied field applies only when there is a clash

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..,.

between the Union and the State Lists within an area common to both. There the doctrine of pith and substance is to be applied

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTLJ.]

and if the impugned legislation substantially falls within the power A expressly conferred upon the Legislature which enacted it, an incidental encroaching in the field assigned to another Legislature is to be ignored. While reading the three Lists, List I has priority over Lists III and II, and List III has priority over List II. However, still, the predominance of the Union list would not prevent the State legislature from dealing with any matter within list II though it may incidentally affect any item in Lisi I.

(emphasis supplied) Tax Legislation

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The abovestated are general principles. Legislations in the field of taxation and economic activities need special consideration and are to be viewed with larger flexibility in approach. Observations of the Constitution Bench in R.K. Garg v. Union of India and Ors., [1981] 4 SCC 676, are apposite, wherein this Court has emphasized a greater latitude - like play in D the joints-being allowed to the Legislature because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or straitjacket formula. In this field the Court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment. Their Lordships qu~ted with approval the following statement of Frankfurter, J. in Morey v. Doud, (1957) 354 US 457:E "In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic F regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events, self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability". Their Lordships further observed that the Courts ought to adopt a pragmatic approach in solving problems rather than measuring the propositions by abstract symmetry. The exact wisdom and nice adaptations of remedies may not be possible. Even crudities and inequities have to be accommodated in complicated tax and economic legislations.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(2004] I S.C.R ..

We now proceed to enter a deeper dimension in the field of tax legislation by considering the problem of devising the measure of taxation. This aspect has been dealt with in detail in' Union of India and Ors. v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd., [ 1983) 4 SCC 210. Tracing the principles from the leading authority of Re.: a reference under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and Section 3 of the Finance Act (Northern Ireland) 1934, (1936) A.C. 352, B passing through Rafla Ram v. Province ofEast Punjab, (1948) FCR 207, and treading through the law as it has developed through judicial pronouncements one after the other, this Court has made subtle observations therein. It has long been recognized that the measure employed for asse.ssing a tax must not be confused with the nature of the tax. A tax has two elements: first, the C person, thing or activity on which the tax is imposed, and secondly, the amount of tax. The amount may be measured in many ways; but a distinction between the subject matter of a tax and the standard by which the amount of tax is measured must not be lost sight of. These are described respectively as the subject of a tax and the measure of a tax. It is true that the standard adopted as a measure of the levy may be indicative of the nature of the tax, D but it does not necessarily determine it. The nature of the mechanism by which the tax is to be assessed is not decisive of the essential characteristic of the particular tax charged, though it may throw light on the general character of the tax.

Here we may refer to certain illustrative cases of well settled authoritythe authority which has not been shaken so far and has rather withstood the test of time. Taxation - measure of levy not suggestive of nature of tax - illustrative cases

In Ra/la Ram (supra) the Federal Court held that a tax on buildings under Section 3 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1940, measured by a percentage of the annual value of such building, remained a tax on buildings even though the measure of annual value of a building was also adopted as a standard for determining income from property under the Income Tax Act. The same standard was adopted as a measure for the two levies, yet the levies remained separate imposts by virtue of their distinctive nature. The measure adopted, it was held, could not be identified with the nature of the tax levied . . In Mis. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur v. State of Rajasthan, [1962] I SCR

I

-+ STATE v_ KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, .1.) ):

A.

517, a tax on passengers and goods was assessed as a rate on the fares and A freights payable by the owners of the motor vehicles. The contention that the levy was a tax upon income and not upon passengers and goods was repelled by this Court. The Court pointed out that though the measure of the tax is furnished by the fares and freights it does not cease to be a tax on passengers and goods.

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In D.G. Gouse and Co. v. State of Kerala, [1980] 2 SCC 410, the Court examined the different modes available to the Legislature for measuring the levy of tax on buildings. The Court upheld the provision made by the Legislature linking the levy with the annual value of the building and prescribing a unifom1ed fonnula for determining its capital value and for calculating the tax.

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In The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1961] 2 SCR 537, the form in which the levy was imposed was held to be an impermissible test for defining in itself the character of the levy. It was argued that the method of determining the rate of levy was by reference to the minerals D produced by the min es and, therefore, it was levy in the nature of a duty of excise. This Court held that the method thus adopted may be relevant in considering the character of the impost but its effect must be weighed alongwith and in the light of the other relevant circumstances. Referring to Bombay Tyre International ltd (supra), the Court further held that it is clear that when enacting a measure to serve as a standard for assessing the levy, the E Legislature need not contour it along lines whi~h spell out the character of the levy itself. A broader based standard of reference is permissible to be adopted for the purpose of determining the measure of the levy. Any standard which maintains a nexus with the essential character of the levy can be regarded as a valid basis for assessing the measure of the levy.

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Meaning of 'Lands '-as used in Entry 49 in List ll

The word 'land'-as used in Entry 49 in List II, came up for the consideration of this Court in Anant Mills v. State of Gujarat, [1975] 2 SCC 175. It was held that the word 'land' cannot be assigned a narrow meaning G so as to confine it to the surface of the earth. It includes all strata above or below. In other words, the word 'land' includes not only the surface of the earth but everything under or over it, and has in its legal significance an indefinite extent upward and downward. The four-Judges' Bench upheld the validity of the law levying tax in respect of area occupied by underground

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004] I S.C.R.

A Jines by reference to Entry 49 in List II, holding it to be a tax on land only. Ample authority is available for the concept that under Entry 49 in List II the land remains a land without regard to the use to which it is being subjected. It is open for the Legislature to ignore the nature of the user and tax the land. At the same time it is also permissible to identify, for the B purpose of classification, the land by reference to its user. While taxing the land it is open for the Legislature to consider the land which produces a particular growth or is useful for a particular utility and to classify it separately and tax the same. Different pieces of land identically situated otherwise, but being subjected to different uses, or having different potential, are capable of being classified separately without incurring the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench in Kzmnathat Thathunni Moopi/ Nair etc. v. State of Kera/a and Anr., (1961] 3 SCR 77, held that the land on which a forest stands is not to be excluded necessarily from Entry 49. The erstwhile Entry 19 of List II applied to 'forest'. Their Lordships held that the use of the word 'forest' in Entry 19 could not be pressed into service to cut D down the plain meaning of the word 'land' in Entry 49. It was permissible to tax the land on which a forest stands by reference to Entry 49. In Ajay Kumar Mukherjee v. Local Board of Barpeta, (1965] 3 SCR 47, the appellant, a land holder, held a halt (or market) on his land. The Local Board asked the appellant to take out a licence and pay Rs. 600, later Rs. 700, by way of licence fee for holding the market. It was urged that the impost was unconstitutional, inter a/ia, on the ground that the tax was actually imposed on the market, which infringed Article 14 of the Constitution, and also because the State Legislature had no legislative competence to tax a market. The Local Board relied on E~try 49 in List II. The appellant urged that Entries 45 to 63 which deal with taxes do not contemplate a tax on markets. Repelling F the plea, the Constitution Bench held that the tax was on the land though the charges arise only when the land is used for a market. The tax remained a tax on land in spite of the imposition being dependant upon the user of the land as a market. The tax was an annual tax as contrasted to a tax for each day on which the market was held. The owner or occupier of the land was responsible for payment of tax on an annual basis. The amount of tax depended G upon the are;f of the land on which the market was held and the importance of the market. Thus, the tax was held to be a tax on land, though the incidence depended upon the use of the land as a market.

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In Vivian Joseph Ferreira and Anr. v. The Municipal Corporation of H Greater Bombay and Ors., (1972] I SCC 70, the tax was confined to the

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, .I.]

residential tenanted buildings. The classification was held to be valid. In The

Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. Hindustan Machine Tools ltd.,

(1975] 2 SCC 274, house tax was levied on the buildings. The new definition of 'house' included 'a factory'. However, the house tax was levied only on the building occupied by the factory and not on the machinery and furniture. The State Legislature claimed competence to do so under Entry 49, List II. The power to tax a building, exercisable without reference to the use to which the building is put, was held to be valid. In the opinion of the Court, it was irrelevant t~at the building was occupied by a factory which could not conduct its activities without the machinery and furniture. Once it is held that the land or building is available to be taxed, it does not matter to what use the land is being subjected though the nature of the user may enable land of one particular user being classified separately from the land being subjected to another kind of user. The tax would remain a tax on land. It cannot be urged that what is being taxed is not the land but the nature of its user. So also it is permissible to adopt myriad forms and methods ·of valuation for the purpose of quantifying the tax. In Ra/la Ram v. The Province of East Punjabu-(1948) FCR 207, the Federal Court made it clear that every effort should be made as far as possible to reconcile the seeming conflict between the provisions of the Provincial Legislation and the Federal Legislation. Unless the court forms an opinion that. the extent of the alleged invasion by a Provincial Legislature into the field of the Federal Legislature is so great as would justify the view that in pith and substance the impugned tax is a tax wit,hin the domain of the Federal Legislature, the levy of tax would not be liable to be struck down. The test laid down in Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy's case AIR (1940) Born 65 by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court was approved.

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In Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax Madras and Ors. etc. v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. etc., [1969] 2 SCC 55, for the purpose of attracting the applicability of Entry 49 in List II, so as to cover the impugned levy of tax on lands and buildings, the Constitution Bench laid down twin tests, namely, (i) that such tax is directly imposed on lands and buildings, and (ii) that it bears a definite relation to it. Once these tests were satisfied, it was open for the State Legislature, for the purpose of levying tax, to adopt the annual value or the capital value of the lands and buildings for determining the incidence of tax. Merely, on account of such methodology having been adopted, the State Legislature cannot be accused of having encroached upon

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004) I S.C.R.

A Entries 86, 87 or 88 of List I. Entry 86 in List I proceeds on the Principle

C

of Aggregation and tax is imposed on the totality of the value of all the assets. It is quite permissible to separate lands and buildings for the purpose of taxation under Entry 49 in List II. There is no reason for restricting the amplitude of the language used in the Entry 49 in List II. The levy of tax, calculated at the rate of a certain per centum of the market value of the urban land was held to be intra vires the powers of the State Legislature and not trenching upon Entry 86 in List I. So is the view taken by another Constitution Bench in Shri Prithvi Collon Mills ltd., etc. v. Broach Borough Municipality and Ors., [1969] 2 SCC 283, where the submission that the levy was not a rate on lands and buildings as appropriately understood, but rather a tax on capital value was discarded.

•

Mis. R.R. Engineering Co., etc. v. Zila Parishad, Bareilly and Anr. etc. [ 1980] 3

sec 330, is a case of circumstance and properties tax levied on the

basis of income which the assessee receives from his profession, trade, calling or property. The plea that the tax was a tax on income was discarded. The D test propounded by the Constitution Bench is that an excessive levy on circumstance may tend to blur the distinction between a tax on income and a tax on circumstances. Income will then cease to be a measure or yardstick of the tax and will become the very subject-matter of the tax. Restraint in this behalf is a prudent prescription for the local authorities to follow. The E Constitution Bench observed that it was only a matter of convenience that income was adopted as a yardstick or measure for assessing the tax and the evolvement of such mechanism was not conclusive on the nature of tax.

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We are inclined to make a reference to a few selected Full Bench decisions of different High Courts which have been cited with approval before this Court in many of the decisions to which we are making reference during the course of this judgment. In Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy v. Province of Bombay and Ors., A.LR. (1940) Bombay 65 (F.B.) the Provincial Government levied a tax at the rate of 5% of the annual letting value in the City of Bombay on the buildings and

G lands. The buildings were classified by reference to their annual letting value, and exception from payment of tax was also carved out in favour of such buildings as remained vacant and unproductive of rent for the specified period. It was urged that the impugned tax purported or desired to tax the value. Placing reliance on the Federal Court's decision in 'In Re: C. P. Motor Spirit H Act , 1939' (1939 FCR 18) Chief Justice Beaumont held that the impugned

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·~. STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, .I.]

tax was a tax on lands and buildings. Three submissions were made in support A of the challenge: (i) that the tax is graded by reference to the annual value of the property charged, (ii) that an allowance was available to be made in respect of vacant properties, and (iii) that the basis of the tax was the same as the basis on which tax on income from property was imposed by Sections 6 and 9 of Income Tax Act and, therefore in reality the rate was a tax on B income. Beaumont, C.J. held that regard must be had to the pith and substance of the impugned tax and not merely to the form. All the items in the Provincial List must be so construed as to exclude taxes on income. The tax is charged on lands and buildings and it is based on the estimated rent which the property would fetch. Such a value may bear very little relation to the actual income of the property. It is imposed without any relation to the capital value except C insofar as such value can be ascertained by reference to the rateable value. It did not make any difference if the arbitrary basis which was adopted for the purpose of the rate might as well be applied for ascertaining the capital value as for ascertaining income. The fact that some concession is allowed to the small owner, a concession which may be based as much on political D as on economic considerations and that an allowance may be made where the property is shown to produce no income, a fact which may be taken to show that the estimated value was found to be erroneous, cannot alter the nature of the tax. The concept that in case of conflict between the Federal List and Provincial List, an entry in the Federal List may be given a more restricted meaning, was endorsed. The legality of the levy was upheld. In District Board of Farrukhabad v. Prag Dutt and Ors., AIR (1948) Allahabad 382 (F.B.), a tax on 'circumstances and property' was under challenge. It was urged that it was· a tax on income. Chief Justice Malik held that the fundamental difference between the tax on 'income' and a tax on 'circumstances and property' is that income tax can only be. levied if there is income and if there is no income, no tax is payable. But in the case of 'circumstances and property' tax, where a man's status has to be determined, his total business turnover may be considered for purposes of taxation, though he may not have earned any taxable income. The State of Punjab v. The Union of India through the Secrtary to Government Finance Department, Government of India, New Delhi. AIR

(I 97 I) Punjab and Haryana I 55 (F.B.), is a Five-Judges Bench decision •· ll

delivered by Chief Justice Harbans Singh. Conflict was noticed between List I, Entry 86 and List II, Entry 49. Dealing with the scope of Entry 49 in List II, it was held that it empowers the State Legislatures to directly tax lands and H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004] I S.C.R.

A buildings, and for determining the basis of the tax the State Legislature may

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take either the area, annual rental value, market value or the capital value of the land as a basis for calculating and quantifying the tax on land. Merely because tax was calculated on the basis of annual rental value, it will not turn it into a tax on income, and if it is based on capital value, it will not turn it into a tax on capital value. Yet another angle, which the Constitutional Courts would advisedly do better to keep in view while dealing with a tax legislation, in the light of the purported conflict between the powers of the Union and the State to legislate, which was stated forcefully and which was logically based on an analytical examination of the constitutional scheme by Jeevan Reddy, J. in SR. Bomai and Ors. v. Union ofIndia, [1994] 3 SCC I, may be touched. Our Constitution has a federal structure. Several provisions of the Constitution unmistakably show that the Founding Fathers intended to create a strong centre. The historical background relevant at the time of the framing of the Constitution warranted a strong centre naturally and necessarily. This bias of the framers towards the centre is found reflected in the distribution of legislative heads between the Centre and the States. More important heads of legislation are placed in List I. In the Concurrent List the parliamentary enactment is given primacy, irrespective of the fact whether such enactment is earlier or later in point of time to a State enactment on the same subject matter. The residuary power to legislate is with the Centre. By the Forty-second Amendment a rew of the entries in List II were omitted or transferred to the other Lists. Articles 249 to 252 further demonstrate the primacy of Parliament, allowing it liberty to encroach on the field meant exclusively for the State legislature though subject to certain conditions being satisfied. In the matter of finances, the States appear to have been placed in a less favourable position. True, the Centre has been given more powers but the same is accompanied by certain additional responsibilities as well. The Constitution is an organic living document. Its outlook and expression as perceived and expressed by the interpreters of the Constitution must be dynamic and keep pace with the changing times. Though the basics and fundamentals of the Constitution remain unalterable, the interpretation of the flexible provisions of the Constitution can be accompanied by dynamism and lean, in case of conflict, in favour of the weaker or the one who is more needy. Several taxes are collected by the Centre and allocation of revenue is made to States from time to time. The Centre consuming the lion's share of revenue has attracted good amount of criticism at the hands of the States and financial exp.erts. The interpretation of Entries can afford to strike a balance, or at least try to

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [\l.C. LAHOTI, J.) ;..._

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remove imbalance, so far as it can. Any conscious whittling down of the powers of the State can be guarded against by the Cour(s. "Let it be said that the federalism in the Indian Constitution is not a matter of administrative convenience, but one of principle - the outcome of our own historical process and a recognition of the ground realities." Quoting from M.C. Setalvad, Tagore Law Lectures "Union and State relations under the Indian Constitution" (Eastern Law House, Calcutta, ] 974), Jeevan Reddy, J. observed-"!! is enough to note that our Constitution has certainly a bias towards the Centre vis-a-vis the States.It is equally necessary to emphasise -that Courts should be careful not to upset the delicately-crafted constitutional scheme by a process of interpretation." The Conflict-a cautious evaluation of "India Cement"

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We will now refer to and deal with those cases which have led to the three learned Judges of this Court, placing the matter for consideration by a Constitution Bench. We would refer to the cases mentioned in the order of reference and also to those cases which were heavily relied upon on behalf D of the respondents, disputing the validity of the impugned tax. Immediately, we take up India Cement . In India Cement ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1990] I SCC 12, what was impugned was a levy of cess on royalty and the question was, whether such cess on royalty is within the competence of the State Legislature. The appellant was required to pay, by the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958, local cess at the rate of 45 paise per rupee of the royalty already being paid. The question formulated by the Court, as arising for decision was : is cess on royalty a demand of land revenue or additional royalty? The Court found that the royalty was payable by the appellant as prescribed under the lease deed. The rates of the royalty were fixed under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, which is a Central Act, passed under Entry 54 in List I, by which the control of mines and minerals has been taken over by the Central Government. The State Legislature sought to justify and sustain the levy by reference to Entry 49, 50 or 45 in List IL Cess is a tax and is generally used when the levy is for some special administrative expense, suggested by the name of the cess, such as health cess, education cess, road cess etc. This is a well-settled position of law. The levy WC!s so11ght to be justified under Entry 45 in List II by including it within the me!lning of l!lnd revenue, and in the alternative under Entry 49 in List II as tax on lands. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the levy was

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A upheld. We would briefly state the reasoning which prevailed with the learned Judges.

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G.L. Oza, J. delivered a separate concurring opm1on. The ma1onty opinion expressed through Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was), first clarified the distinction between 'royalty' and 'land revenue'. 'Land revenue' is connotative of the share in the produce of land which the king or the Government is entitled to receive. 'Royalty' is a charge payable on the extraction of minerals from the land. A cess on royalty cannot, therefore, be called additional land revenue and as such the State was disabled from imposing tax on royalty. There is a clear distinction between 'tax directly on land' and 'tax on income arising from land'. Royalty is indirectly connected with land and a cess on royalty cannot be called a tax directly on land as a unit. The levy could also not be sustained under Entry 50 in List II which deals with taxes on mineral rights subject to limitation imposed by Parliament relating to mineral development. Assuming that the tax in pith and substance fell to Entry 50 in List II, it would be controlled by a legislation under Entry 54 in List I. A Division Bench decision of Mysore High Court in Mis. Laxminarayana Mining Co., Bangalore and Anr. v. Taluk Development Board and Anr., AIR ( 1972) Mysore 299 was cited with approval in India Cement. The Mysore High Court struck down as violative of MMDR Act, 1957 a licence fee on mining manganese or iron ore etc. imposed by a State Legislation. A perusal of the judgment of the Mysore High Court shows that the impost was by way of licence fee on the mining of certain minerals. Regulation and development of mines and minerals was undertaken by the Central Legislation and therefore the power of the State Legislature under Entries 23 and 52 in List-II got denuded in the field of regulation and development covered by the Central Legislation. The Division Bench vide para 6 held "it is therefore clear that to the extent the Central Act makes provision regarding the regulation and development of minerals, the powers of the State Legislatures under Entry 23 of List II stand curtailed". The State Government had sought to defend the licence fee on the ground that it was in the nature of a tax and not a licence fee. This plea has been specifically noted by the High Court and dealt with. However, what is significant to note is the revelation, made by careful reading of the judgment, that provision for licence fee was made in the Central Legislation and licence fee was sought to be imposed by the State too. In fact, the licence fee was a step trenching upon the field of regulation and therefore was liable to be struck down on this ground alone. Yet, another

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

reasoning which prevailed with the Higli Court was that Section 143 of the A State Act, which was not inconsistent with the Central Act, was reli11d on by the State Government as conferring power on it to levy the impugned licence fee. On that plea the High Court formed an opinion that. on the framing of Section 143 of the State Act it did not in express terms authorize a levy of fee or tax. The High Court observed - "It (Section 143) cannot also be construed as conferring such a power on the respondents to levy a tax or fee B on mining, in view of the well-settled and statutory construction that a Court construing a provision of law must presume that the intention of the authority in making it was not to exceed its power but to enact it validly". The ratio of the decision of the Mysore High Court is that provision for licenses and license fees, operating in the field of regulation of mines and minerals is not C available to be made by State legislation - in view of the declaration in terms of Entry 54 in List I. In our view, the decision by Mysore High Court cannot be read so widely as laying down the law that Union's power to regulate and control results in depriving the States of their power to levy tax or fee within their legislative competence without trenching upon the field of regulation and control. There is a distinction between power to regulate and control and power to tax, the two being distinct and that difference has not been kept in view by the Mysore High Court. (A diversion from main issue) Royalty, if tax?

We would like to avail this opportunity for pointing out an error, attributable either to a stenographer's devil or to sheer inadvertence, having crept into the majority judgment in India Cement Ltd. 's case (supra). The error is apparent and only needs a careful reading to detect. We feel constrained F t1 rather duty-bound - to say so, lest a reading of the judgment containing such an error t1 just an error of one word - should continue to cause the likely embarrassment and have adverse effect on the subsequent judicial pronouncements which would follow India Cement Ltd 's case, feeling bound and rightly, by the said judgment having the force of pronouncement by seven- Judges Bench. Para 34 of the report reads as under : "In .the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty,

is beyond the competence of the State legislature because Section 9 of the Central Act covers the field and the State legislature is denuded of its competence under Entry 23 of List II. In any event, we are of H

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r2004] I S.C.R.

the opinion that cess on royalty cannot be sustained under Entry 49 of List ll as being a tax on land. Royalty on mineral rights is not a lax on land but a payment for the user of land." (underlining by us)

In the first sentence the word 'royalty' occurring in the expression'royalty is a tax', is clearly an error. What the majority wished to say, and has in fact said, is • 'cess on royalty is a tax'. The correct words to be printed in the judgment should have been 'cess on royalty' in place of 'royalty' only. The words 'cess on' appear to have been inadvertently or erroneously omitted while typing the text of judgment. This is clear from reading the judgment C in its entirety. Vide para 22 and 3 I, which precede para 34 above said, their Lordships have held that 'royalty' is not a tax. Even the last line of para 34 records 'royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land'. The very first sentence of the para records in quick succession' ........ as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond D the competence of the State Legislature ..... .' What their Lordships have intended to record is ' ..... that cess on royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty is beyond the competence of the State Legislature .... .' That makes correct and sensible reading. A doubtful expression occurring in a judgment, apparently by mistake or inadve11ence, ought to be read by assuming that the Court had intended to say only that which is E correct according to the settled position of law, and the apparent error should be ignored, far from making any capital out of it, giving way to the correct expression which ought to be implied or necessarily read in the context, also having regard to what has been said a little before and a little after. No learned Judge would consciously author a judgment which is self-inconsistent F or incorporates passages repugnant to each other. Vide para 22, their Lordships have clearly held that there is no entry in List ll which enables the State to impose a tax on royalty and, therefore, the State was incompetent to impose such a tax (cess). The cess which has an incidence of an additional charge on royalty and not a tax on land, cannot apparently be justified as falling under Entry 49 in List II.

It is of significance for the issue before us, to determine the nature of royalty and whether it is a tax, and if not, then, what it is. Until the pronouncement of this Court in India Cement (supra), it has been the uniform and unanimous judicial opinion that royalty is not a tax.

First we will refer to certain dictionaries oft-cited in courts of law.

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~ STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.)

Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, (Vol. 37A, page 597)-

"Royalty" is the share of the produce reserved to owner for permitting another to exploit and use property. The word "royalty" means compensation paid to landlord by occupier of land for species of occupation allowed by contract between them. "Royalty" is a share of the product or profit (as of a mine, forest, etc.) reserved by the owner for permitting another to use his property."

Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (Sixth Edition, 2000, Vol. 3, page 2341) "the word "royalties" signifies, in mmmg leases, that part of the C reddendum which is variable, and depends upon the quantity of minerals gotten or the agreed payment to a patentee on every article made according to the patent. Rights or privileges for which remuneration is payable in the form of a royalty" Words and Phrases, Legally Defined (Third Edition, 1990, Vol.4, page 112) "A royalty, in the sense in which the word is used in connection with mining leases, is a payment to the lessor proportionate to the amount of the demised mineral worked within a specified period"

Wharton's Law Lexicon (Fourteenth Edition, page 893) "Royalty, payment to a patentee by agreement on every article made according to his patent; or to an author by a publisher on every copy of his book sold; or to the owner of minerals for the right of working the same on every ton or other weight raised."

Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary (Eleventh Edition, 1993, page 243) "A pro rota payment to a grantor or lessor, on the working of the property leased, or otherwise on the profits of the grant of lease. The G word is especially used in reference to mines, patents and copyrights." Prem's Judicial Dictionary (1992, Vol. 2, page 1458) "royalties are payments which the Government may demand for the appropriation of minerals, timber or other property belonging to the

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(2004) I S.C.R.

Government. Two important features' of royalty have to be noticed, they are, that the payment made for the privilege of removing the articles is in proportion to the quantity removed, and the basis of the payment is an agreement." Black's law Dictionary (Seventh Edition, p.1330) -

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"Royalty - A share of the product or profit from real property, reserved by the grantor of a mineral lease, in exchange for the lessee's right to mine or drill on the land. Mineral Royalty : A right to a share of income from mineral production.,

In D.K. Trivedi and Sons. and Ors. v. State a/Gujarat and Ors., (1986] Supp SCC 20, a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court dealt with "rent", "royalty" and "dead rent" and held as follows. Rent is an integral part of the concept of a lease. It is the consideration from the lessee to the lessor for D the demise of the property to him. In a mining lease the consideration usually moving from the lessee to the lessor is the rent of the area leased (often called surface rent), dead rent and royalty. Since the mining lease confers upon the lessee the right not merely to enjoy the property as under an ordinary lease but also to extract minerals from the land and to appropriate them for his own use or benefit, in addition to the usual rent for the area demised, the E lessee is required to pay a certain amount in respect of the minerals extracted proportionate to the quantity so extracted. Such payment is called "royalty". It may, however, be that the mine is not worked properly so as not to yield enough return to the lessor in the shape of royalty. Jn order to ensure for the lessor a regular income, regardless of whether the mine is worked or not, a F fixed amount is provided to be paid to him by the lessee. This is called "dead rent". "Dead rent" is calculated on the basis of the area leased while "royalty" is calculated on the quantity of minerals extracted or removed. Thus, while dead rent is a fixed return to the lessor, royalty is a return which varies with the quantity of minerals extracted or removed. Since dead rent and royalty are both a return to the lessor in respect of the area leased, looked G at from one point of view dead rent can be described as the minimum guaranteed amount of royalty payable to the lessor but calculated on the basis of the area leased, and not on the quantity of minerals extracted or removed. Jn H.R.S. Murthy v. Collector of Chittor, (1964] 6 SCR 666, too the Constitution Bench of this Court had defined Royalty to mean 'the payment H made for the materials or minerals won from the land'.

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STA TE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

....

The judicial opinion as prevailing amongst the High Courts 1nay be noti<ced. A Full Bench of the High Court of Orissa held in laxmi Narayan Agarwal/a and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors., AIR (1983) Orissa 210, 'Royalty is the payment made for the minerals extracted; it is not tax'. In Surajdin laxmanlal v. State of M.P., Nagpur and Ors., AIR (1960) M.P. 129, a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh referred to the Wharton's Law Lexicon and Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary and said - "royalties are payments which the Government may demand for the appropriation of minerals, timber or other property belonging to the Government." The High Court opined that there are two important features of royalty: (i) the payment is in proportion to the quantity removed; and (ii) the basis of the payment is an agreement.

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Drawing a distinction between 'royalty' and 'tax', a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana High Court held in Dr. Shanti Saroop Sharma and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR ( 1969) Punjab and Haryana 79 as under -

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"if a person is merely in occupation of land which contains minor minerals, he is not liable to pay any royalty, but it is only when he holds a mining lease and by virtue of that extracts one or more minor minerals that he is called upon to pay royalty to the Government where the lease is in respect of the land in which minor minerals vest in the Government. Royalty thus has its basis in the contract. For payment to the owner of the minerals for the privilege of extracting the minor minerals computed on the basis of the quantity actually extracted and removed from the leased area. It is more akin to rent or compensation payable to an owner by the occupier or lessee of land for its use or exploitation of the resources contained therein. Merely because the provision with regard to royalty is made by virtue of the rules relating to the regulation of the mining leases and a uniform rate is prescribed, it does not follow that it is a compulsory exaction in the nature of tax or impost."

A Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Saurashtra Cement and G Chemical Industries Ltd., Ranavav v. Union of India and Anr., AIR (I979) Gujarat 180, emphatically said "royalty may not be a fee but it is not a tax. It is a payment for the mineral which is removed or consumed by the holder of the mining

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[2004] I S.C.R.

lease. The minerals themselves,-the property beneath the soil - belong to the Union. When the holder of a mining lease removes these minerals or consumes them, he can do so only on payment of its price or value. Therefore, royalty is a share which the Union claims in the minerals which have been won from the soil by the lessee and which otherwise belong to it. Royalty is a share in such minerals and not a tax in the form of a compulsory exaction. It is not compulsmy because anyone who applies for a mining lease to win minerals for being removed or consumed must pay its price. If he does not want to pay the price, he may not apply for a mining lease. Royalty which is a share of the owner of the minerals - the Union - won by the lessee from the soil with the authority of the Union can never be said to be an imposition on the holder of a mining lease. We need not further multiply the authorities. Suffice it to say -that until the pronouncement in India Cement, nobody doubted the correctness of 'royalty' not being a tax.

Such has been the position even subsequent to the pronouncement in India Cement.

J.

In Jnderjeet Singh Sia/ and Anr. v. Karam Chand Thapar and Ors.[ I 995] 6 SCC I 66, a Bench of two learned judges held that -

"In its primary and natural sense 'royalty', in the legal world, is known as the equivalent or translation of jura regalia or jura regia. Royal rights and prerogatives of a sovereign are covered thereunder. In its secondary sense the word 'royalty' would signify, as in mining leases, that part of the reddendum, variable though, payable in cash or kind, for rights and privileges obtained. It is found in the clause of the deed by which the grantor reserves something to himself out of that which he grants. It may even be a clause reserving rent in a lease, whereby the lessor reserves something for himself out of that which he grants." In Ajit Singh v. Union of India and Ors., [I 995] Supp. 4 SCC 224, another Bench of two learned Judges held that the grant of mining lease involves grant of a privilege by the State. In both these decisions India Cement's is not noticed. In Quarry Owners' Association v. State of Bihar and Ors., [2000] 8

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

sec 655, a Bench of two learned Judges was faced with a submission, based on India Ceme~·t and subsequent decisions following it, that royalty is a tax. The learned Judges found it difficult to accept the concept but tried to wriggle out of the situation by observing "royalty Includes the price for the consideration of parting with the right and P'rivilege of the owner, namely, the State Government who owns the mineral. In other words, the royalty/dead rent, which a lessee or licensee pays, includes the price of the minerals which are the property of the State. Both royalty and dead rent are integral parts of a lease. Thus, it does not constitute usual tax as commonly understood but includes return for the consideration for parting with its property.' ' In India Cement (vide para 31, SCC) decisions of four High Courts holding 'Royalty is n•ot tax' have been noted without any adverse comment. Rather, the view seems to have been noted with tacit approval. Earlier (vide para 21, SCC) the con notative meaning of royalty being 'share in the produce of land' has been not.ed. But for the first sentence (in para 34, SCC) which we find to be an apparent error, no where else has the majority judgment held royalty to be a tax.

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How the abovenoted inadvertent error in India Cement has resulted into E throwing on the loop line the movement of later case law on this point may be noticed. In State of MP. v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills ltd. and Ors., [1995] Supp. 1 SCC 642 (decision by a Bench of three learned Judges) and Saurashtra Cement and Chemicals Industries and Anr. etc. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., [2001] 1 SCC 91 (decision by a Bench of two learned Judges) para 34 (from SCC) in India, Cement has been quoted verbatim and dealt with. In F Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills ltd. and Ors. 's case (supra), the Court noticed several dictionaries defining royalty and also the decisions of High Courts available and stated that traditionally speaking royalty is an amount which is paid under contract of lease by the lessee to the lessor, namely, the State Governments concerned and it is commensurate with the quality of minerals G extracted. But then (vide para 12), the Court felt bound by the view taken in India Cement, reiterated in Orissa Cement, to hold that royalty is a tax. The point that there was apparently a 'typographical error' in para 34 in India Cement was specifically raised but was rejected. In Saurashtra Cement and Chemicals Industries and Anr. (supra) too the Court felt itself bound by the decision in Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd. and Ors., (supra), backed by India H

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Cement, arid therefore held royalty to be tax.

We have clearly pointed out the said error, as we are fully convinced in that regard and feel ourselves obliged constitutionally, leg,ally and morally to do so, lest the said error should cause any further hann to the trend of jurisprudential thought centering around the meaning of 'royalty'. We hold that royalty is not tax. Royalty is paid to the owner of land who may be a private person and may not necessarily be State. A private person owning the land is entitled to charge royalty but not tax. The lessor receives royalty as his income and for the lessee the royalty paid is an e>(penditure incurred. Royalty cannot be tax. We declare that even in India Cement it was not the finding of the Court that royalty is a tax. A statement c:aused by an apparent typographical or inadvertent error in a judgment of the Court should not be misunderstood as declaration of such law by the Courlt. We also record our express dissent with that part of the judgment in Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills ltd and Ors. which says (vide para 12 of SSC report) that there was no 'typographical e.rror' in India Cement and that the said c:onclusion that royalty is a tax logically flew from the earlier paragraphs of the judgment. Inter-relationship of list I Entry 54 and List II Entry 23

With the abovesaid reflection of ours on clarifying India Cement,

E clarification now we proceed to examine the inter-relatiionship of List I Entry 54 and List II Entry 23 which have been quoted and reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. Conflict in Entries (in the three lists in Seventh Schedule)

The analysis of decided cases as made by eminent constitutional jurist H.M. Seervai in his work on Constitutional Law of India (Fourth/Silver Jubilee Edition, Vol.3) is apposite. Vide para 22. I 68, he states-" In Gov .-Gen. in Council v. Madras, (I 945) FCR I 79, the Privy Council laid down important principles for interpreting apparently conflicting legislative entries in general, and apparently conflicting_tax entries in particular. The Privy Council held, first, that though a tax in List I (e.g. a duty of excise) and a tax in List II (e.g. a tax on the sale of goods) of the Government of India Act, 1935, may overlap, in fact there would be no overlapping in law, if the taxes were separate and distinct imposts; secondly, that the machinery of tax collection did not affect the real nature of a tax. Another principle for reconciling apparently conflicting tax entries follows from the fact that a tax has two

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

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elements : the person, thing or activity on which the tax is imposed, and the amount of the tax. The amount may be measured in many ways; but decided cases establish a clear distinction between the subject matter of a tax and the standard by which the amount of tax is measured. These two elements are described as the subject of a tax and the measure of a tax. In D. G. Gouse v. Kera/a, [I 980] 2 sec 410, which is considered later, the above passage was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court as stating precisely the two elements involved in almost all tax cases, namely, the subject of a tax and the measure of a tax." It is necessary to examine the scheme underlying the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. We are relieved of the need of embarking upon any maiden voyage in this direction in view of the availability of a Constitution Bench decision in M.P. v. Sundararamier and Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr., [1958] SCR 1422. Venkatarama Aiyar, J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, traced the history of legislations preceding the Constitution, analysed the scheme underlying the division oflegislative powers between the Centre and the States and then succinctly summed up the quintessence of the analysis. It was held, inter alia:

I. In List I, Entries I to 81 mention the several matters over which Parliament has authority to legislate. Entries 82 to 92 enumerate the taxes which could be imposed by a law of Parliament. An examination of these two groups of Entries shows that while the main subject of legislation figures in the first group; a tax in relation thereto is separately mentioned in the second. 2. In List ll, Entries I to 44 form one group mentioning the subjects on which the States could legislate. Entries 45 to 63 in that List form another group, and they deal with taxes. 3. Taxation is not intended to be comprised in the main subject in which it might on an extended construction be regarded as included, but is treated as a distinct matter for purposes of legislative competence. And this distinction is also manifest in the language of Art. 248, Cls.( I) and (2) and of Entry 97 in List I of the Constitution. Under the scheme of the Entries in the Lists, taxation is regarded as a

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distinct matter and is separately set out.

4. The entries in the Legislative Lists must be construed broadly and

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not narrowly or in a pedantic manner. 5. The entries in the two Lists - List I and II u must be construed, if possible, so as to avoid conflict. Faced with a suggested co1ntlict between entries in List I and List II, what has first to be decided is whether there is any conflict. If there is none, the questi•Jn of application of the non-obstante clause 'subject to' does not arise. And, if there be conflict, the correct approach to the question is. to see whether it was possible to effect a reconciliation between tlhe two Entries so as to avoid a conflict and overlapping. Illustration

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[2004) I S.C.R.

If it is possible to construe Entry 42 in List I as not incltuding tax on inter-state sales it should be so construed and the power to levy such tax must be held to be included in Entry 54 in List II (Entries as they existed pre-Forty Second Amendment, 1976) (Sec: Governor General in Council v. Province of Madras, AIR ( 1945) PC 98, and Province of Madras v. Badder Paidenna and Sons, AIR (1942) FC 33. 6. In the event of a dispute arising it should be detennined by applying the doctrine of pith and substance to find out whether between two Entries assigned to two different legislatures the particu far subject of the legislation falls with in the ambit of the one or the other. Where there is a clear and irreconcilable conflict of jurisdiction between the Centre and a provincial legislature it is the law of the Centre that must prevail.

[underlining by us]

Referring to M.P. v. Sundararamier and Co., (supra) Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for six out of the seven Judges constituting the Bench in Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1990] I SCC I 09 held that under the constitutional scheme of division of powers in the Seventh Schedule, there are separate entries pertaining to taxation and other laws. A tax cannot be levied under a general entry. The abovesaid principles continue to hold the field and have been

H followed in cases after cases.

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI • .1.)

General power of "Regulation and Control' does not include power of taxation One thing, which too is well settled by a series of decisions is that the power of "regulation and control". is separate and distinct from the power of taxation. How this principle has been applied in myriad situations may be illustratively noticed. The Constitution Bench in The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd and Ors. v. The State of Orissa and Ors. etc., [1961) 2 SCR 537, was faced with a challenge·tothe constitutional validity of the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952. The petitioner-company was engaged in producing and selling coal excavated from its collieries at Rampur in the State of Orissa. The Act and the Rules framed and the notification issued thereunder levied the payment of cess on the petitioner's Rampur Colliery. The cause of action had arisen to the petitioner therein on account of the communications made to the company in March 1959 calling upon them to file monthly returns for the assessment of the cess which was levied by issuance of a notification dated June 24, 1958.

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The challenge to the constitutional validity of the levy imposed by the impugned Act came to be examined by reference to Entry 54 in List I !·ead with the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (Act No. 53 of 1948) as also by reference to Entry 52 in List I read with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act No.65of1951). On behalf of the State of Orissa, the levy was defended as a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II. The Constitution Bench entered into an enquiry as to what is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose which it is intended to achieve. It was observed that its primary object and the essential purpose must be distinguished from its ultimate or incidental results or consequences, as that is the true test in determining the character of the levy. The submission that the impugned levy could be either duty of excise or tax, was dismissed. The Constitution Bench held that the form in which the levy is imposed and the extent of the levy, i.e., being too high, do not alter the character of the levy from a fee into that of a duty of excise. The Constitution Bench laid down the features which would distinguish excise fro111 a tax or fee and also the features which distinguish a tax from a fee though there is no generic difference in a tax and a fee, both being compulsory exactions of money by public authorities.

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The scheme of the impugned Orissa 'Act was examined in-depth and their Lordships found that the cess levied by the impugned Act was a fee. The Act was passed for the purpose of the development of mining areas in the State. Orissa is a poor State carrying in its womb a lot of mineral wealth of great potential value, but the areas where its mineral wealth is located lack B infrastructure which would enable the exploitation of minerals. The primary and the principal object of the Act was to develop the mineral areas in the State and to assist more efficient and extended exploitation of its mineral wealth. The cess levied did not become a part of the consolidated fund and was not subject to an appropriation in that behalf ; it went into the special fund earmarked for carrying out the purpose of the Act and thus its existence C established a correlation between the cess and the purpose for which it was levied, satisfying the element of quid pro quo in the scheme. The scheme of the Act showed that the cess was levied against the class of persons owning mines in the notified area and to enable the State Government to render specific services to the said class by developing the notified mineral area. Its application was regulated by a statute and was confined to its purposes. D There was a definite correlation between the impost and the purpose of the Act which was to render services to the notified area. These features of the Act impressed upon the levy the character of a fee as distinct from a tax. The inter-relationship of Entries 23 and 66 in List II qua Entry 54 in

E List I was so stated by the Constitution Bench:-

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"The effect ofreading the two Entries together is clear. The jurisdiction of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to the limitation imposed by the latter part of the said Entry. If Parliament by its law has declared that regulation and development of mines should in public interest be under the control of the Union, to the extent of such declaration the jurisdiction of the State Legislature is excluded. Jn other words, if a Central Act has been passed which contains a declaration by Parliament as ~equired by Entry 54, and if the said declaration covers the field occupied by the impugned Act the impugned Act would be ultra vires, not because of any repugnance between the two statutes but because the State Legislature had no jurisdiction to pass the law. The limitation imposed by the latter part of Entry 23 is a limitation on the legislative competence of the State Legislature itself." The Constitution Bench then proceeded to test the validity of the cess

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.)

by" reference to two Central Acts, namely (A) the Mines and Minerals A (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (Act No.53 of 1948) and (B) The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act No.65 of 1951 ). (A) Act No.53 of 1948 is a pre-constitutional piece of Central legislation. It was found that the applicability of the Act which was initially attracted to

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mines as well as oil fields remained confined to oil fields in view of the subsequent parliamentary enactment, i.e., the MMDR Act, 1957 (Act No.67 of I 957). Therefore, the question which remained to be examined was only for the year 1952 as at that time the Act No.53 of I948 applied to mines as well as oil fields. The factual constitutional position was that Act No.53 of 1948 ceased to apply to Orissa post-constitution and assuming it applied yet there was no such declaration post-constitution made by Parliament as is referred to in Entry 23 in List II read with Entry 54 in List I and therefore in either case the validity of the said State Legislation was not impaired in spite of the finding recorded by the Court that 'there can be no doubt that the field covered by the impugned (State) Act is covered by the Central Act 53 of 1948'. (B) What is significant for our purpose is the law laid down by the Constitution Bench as to the validity of the impugned State legislation by reference to Act No. 65 of 1951, Section 2 whereof contained a declaration - "it is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule" as contemplated by Entry 52 in List 1 to which Entry 23 in List II is sl'bject. The first schedule included coal as an article as to which the industry engaged in the manufacture or production was brought within the purvkw of the Act. Section 9 empowered the Central Government to levy cess for the purpose of the Act on all goods manufactured or produced in any scheduled industries including coal. The Constitution Bench held that the Central Act was passed to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries one of which undoubtedly is coal mining industry. The declaration made by Section 2 of the Act covered the same field as is covered by the impugned State Act. Then the Constitution Bench held :-

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" ........ but in dealing with this question it is important to bear in mind the doctrine of pith and substance. We have already noticed that in pith and substance the impugned Act is concerned with the development of the mining areas notified under it. The Central Act, on the other hand, deals more directly with the control of all industries including

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of course 1he industry of coal. Chapter II of this Act provides for the constitution of the Central Advisory Council and Development Councils, Chapter III deals with the regulation of scheduled industries, Chapter IIIA provides for the direct management or control of industrial undertakings by Central Government in certain cases, and Chapter IIIB is concerned with the topic of control of supply, distribution, price, etc. of certain articles. The last chapter deals with miscellaneous incidental matters. The functions of the Development Councils constituted under this Act prescribed by S.6(4) bring out the real purpose and object of the Act. It is to increase the efficiency or productivity in the scheduled industry or group ofscheduled industries, to improve or develop the service that such indus/ly or group of industries renders or could render to !he community, or to enable such induslry or group of industries to render such service more economically. Section 9 authorises the imposition of cess on scheduled

industries in certain cases. Section 9(4) provides that the Central Government may hand over the proceeds of the cess to the Development Council there specified and that the Development Council shall utilize the said proceeds to achieve the objects mentioned in els. (a) to (d). These objects include the promotion of scientific and industrial research, of improvements in design and quality, and the provision for the training of technicians and labour in such industry or group of industries. II would thus be seen thal !he objecl of the Act

is to regulate !he scheduled industries with a view to improvemenl and development of the service that they may render to the society, and lhus assist the solulion of the larger problem of national economy. It is difjicull to hold that the field covered by the declaration made by S.2 of this Act, considered in the light of its several provisions, is the same as the field covered by the impugned Act. That being so, it

cannot be said that as a result of Entry 52 read with Act LXL of 1951 the vires of the impugned Act can be successfully challenged. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the impugned Act is relatable to Entries

G 23 and 66 in list If of/he Sevenlh Schedule, and its validity is not impaired or ajfecled by Entries 52 and 54 in list I read with the Act LXV of 195 I and Act l/11of1948 respectively. In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to

consider whether the impugned Act can be justified under Entry 50 in List II, or whether it is relatable to Entry 24 in List III and as such suffers from the vice of repugnancy with the Central Act XXXII of 194 7.''

[Underlining by us]

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

In spite of having held that the Central Act of 1951 was attracted to coal industries, their Lordships, by applying the doctrine of pith and substance, refused to annual the levy of cess under the impugned Orlssa Act based on the following distinction:Central Act, 1951

State Legislation of 1952.

~~~~~~~~~~-'-~~~~~

Deals more directly with the control of all industries including the

Is concerned with the development of the mining areas notified under it.

industry of coal with a view to improvement and development of the service that they may render to the society and thus assist the solution of the larger problem of national economy.

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Though both were cesses, one levied by the Central Act and the other levied by the State Act, inasmuch as they had different fields to operate, Entries 52 and 54 in List I were held not to have any adverse or denuding effect on the legislative competence of the State referable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II.

As a result, the writ petitions laying challenge to the constitutional validity of Orissa Act of 1952 were directed to be dismissed.

The distinction: Here we will pause for a moment with a view to highlight a feature of singular significance in The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. as it would be the decisive factor for the applicability of the ratio of the case - where it would apply and where it would not. Section 6 of Act No.43 of 1948 which came up for the consideration of the Constitution Bench, specifically provides:"6. Power to make rules as respects minerals development - (I) The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for the conservation and development of minerals.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-

xxx

xxx

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(i) the levy and collection of royalties, fees or taxes in respect of minerals mined, quarried, excavated or collected;. xxx

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xxx

xxx

I0. Rules to be laid before the Legislature. -All rules made under any of the provisions of this Act shall be laid before the Central Legislature as soon as may be after they are made." Thus, the power to levy and collect fees or taxes in respect of minerals mined, quarried, excavated or collected was expressly conferred on the Central Government by a specific provision made in that regard by the Act itself. Because the power to levy tax or fee was appropriated to itself by a Central Legislation it was held that the impugned Orissa Act-a State Legislation, could not have provided for the levy of a fee as by virtue of the Central Legislation, the Union having exercised its power to legislate, the field was covered and excepted from the legislative competence of the State. Yet the recovery was held not liable to be annulled inasmuch as the Central Act No.53 of 1948 was a pre-Constitution Legislation and as to which a declaration in terms of Entry 54 in List I was not made by the Parliament after the coming into force of the Constitution. As to the Central Act of 1951, though it contained a declaration as contemplated by Entry 52 of List I, and though it applied to several goods including coal, the doctrine of pith and substance when correctly applied showed that the Central Act was intended for improvement of service while the State Act of 1952 was intended to deal with development of mining areas and the latter was valid. The.MMDR Act, 1957, which we are called upon to deal with, stands on much better footing for the writ petitioners herein as it does not contain any provision similar to Sections 6 and I0 of the Central Act No.53- of 1948 or Section 9 of the Central Act No.65 of 1951. Challenge to levy under the abovesaid Orissa Act 27 of 1952 did not

G come to an end with Hinger-Rampur Coal Co .. It was once again raised in the High Court with success and the State of Orissa came up in appeal which was heard and decided by a Constitution Bench in State of Orissa and Anr. v. Mis. M.A. Tulloch and Co., (1964] 4 SCR 461. The respondent writpetitioner was working a manganese mine in the State of Orissa under a lease H granted under the provisions of the MMRD Act, 1948. The fee levied under

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. (R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

the Orissa Act for the period of six quarters from September 30, 1956, to March 31, 1958, was under challenge. The MMDR Act 1957 came into force w.e.f. June 1, 1958. The recovery impugned, therefore, related to the period pre-MM DR Act 1957 i.e. for the period during which Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 was applicable. The recovery was sought to be effected after the enactment and coming into force of the Act No.67 of 1957, though the recovery was referable to the period prior to it. It was held that the demand was liable to be raised for the period for which it was raised and the validity of the demand was an issue concluded by Hingir-Rampur Coal Co .. The demand having validly accrued prior to June I, 1958, the recovery thereof could be validly enforced, notwithstanding the repeal of Act No.65 of 1951, on the general principles of interpretation of statutes as also under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Reiterating the findings in HingirRampur Coal Co. the Constitution Bench held that the impugned Act empowered the State Government to levy a fee on a percentage of the value of the mined ore at the pit's mouth, the collections being intended for the development of the "mining areas" in the State. This finding is very significant.

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The Constitution Bench laid down the following principles which are relevant for our purpose :(I)

Entry 23 of the State List vests in the State Legislature power to enact laws on the subject of 'regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union'. It would be seen that "subject to" the provisions of list I the power of the State to enact Legislation on the topic of "mines and mineral development" is plenary. The relevant provision in List I is, as already noticed, Entry 54 of the Union List.

(2) To the extent to which the Union Government had taken under its control the regulation and development of minerals that much (i.e. to that extent) was withdrawn from the ambit of the power of the State Legislature under Entry 2 3 and legislation of the

State which had rested on the existence of power under that entry ~· would, to the extent of that control, be superseded or rendered ineffective, for here we have a case not of mere repugnancy between the provisions of the two enactments but of a denudation or deprivation of State legislative power by the declaration which Parliament is empowered to make, and has made.

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(3) The States would lose legislative competenc'e only to the "extent to which regulation and development under the control of the Union has been declared by Parliament to be expedient in the public interest". (4)\ It would be logical first to examine and analyse the State Act and determine its purpose, width and scope and the area of its operation and then consider to what "extent" the Central Act cuts into it or trenches on it.

As to the MMDR Act, 1957, the Constitution Bench in MA. Tulloch observed by reference to Section 18 of the Act that the intention of Parliament C was to cover the entire field and thus to leave no scope for the argument that until rules were framed there was no inconsistency and no supersession of the State Act. The following holding of the above Constitution Bench is again worth noting :

" ... that technically speaking the power to levy a fee is under the entries in the three lists treated as a subject-matter of an independent grant of legislative power, but whether it is an incidental power related to a legislative head or an independent legislative power it is beyond dispute that in order that a fee may validly be imposed the subjectmatter or the main head of legislation in connection with which the fee is imposed is within legislative power. The material words of the Entries are : "Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List". It is, therefore, a prerequisite for the valid imposition of a fee that it is in respect of "a matter in the List". If by reason of the declaration by Parliament the entire subject-matter of "conservation and development of minerals" has been taken over, for being dealt with by Parliament, thus depriving the State of the power which it therefor possessed, it would follow that the "matter" in the State List is, to the extent of the declaration, subtracted from the scope and ambit of Entry 23 of the State List. There would, therefore, after the Central Act of 1957, be "no matter in the List" to which the fee could be related in order to render it valid." In the last but one para of M.A. Tulloch this sentence occurs:- "If this were the true position about the effect of the Central Act 67 of 1957 as the liability to pay the fee which was the subject of the notices of the demand

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~ STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.) '

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had accrued prior to June I, 1958, it would follow that these notices were A valid and the amounts due thereunder could be recovered notwithstanding the disappearance of the Orissa Act by virtue of the superior legislation by the Union Parliament''. This observation, read out of the context and facts of the case alongwith the Court having referred to Sections 18 and 25 of the MMDR Act 1957, creates an impression that the power to levy fee having been appropriated by the Central Legislation to the Central Government, the cess B levied by the State would stand obliterated or repealed, is the holding by the Court. But that is not the ratio of the case and it could not have been because in Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. the Constitution Bench has clearly held to the contrary and the Constitution Bench in MA. Tulloch has squarely followed the holding in Hingir-Rampur Coal Co.. Nobody should act on an assumption that in MA. Tulloch the Constitution Bench has held - much less as a ratio of the decision-that under Act No. 67 of 1957 the Central Government has appropriated to itself the power to levy tax or cess on minerals or mineral bearing land. All that the Court has said is that the 1957 enactment covers the field of legislation as to the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. As Section 2 itself provides and indicates, the assumption of control D in public interest by the Central Government is on (i) the regulation of mines, (ii) the development of minerals, and (iii) to the extent hereinafter provided. The scope and extent of declaration cannot and could not have been enlarged by the Court nor has it been done. The effect is that no State Legislature shall have power to enact any legislation touching (i) the regulation of mines, (ii) E the development of minerals, and (iii) to the extent provided by Act No.67 of 1957. The Preamble to the Central Act 67 of 1957 itself speaks-An Act to provide for the development and regulation of mines and minerals under the control of the Union. Tax and fee is not a subject dealt with by Act No.67 of 1957. Let us demonstrate the same from the provisions of the Act and for that purpose relevant part of Section 13, sub-Section (1) and relevant part of F sub-Section (2) of Section 18, sub-Section (3) of Section 18 and Section 25 are extracted and reproduced as under :

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"13. Power of Central Government to make rules in respect of minerals. - ( 1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for regulating the grant of reconnaissance G permits, prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minerals and for purposes connected therewith. ~

)ol.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following

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matters, namely:

)...

(a) to (h)******

(i) the fixing and collection of fees for reconnaissance permiis, prospecting licences or mining leases, surface rent, security deposit, fines, other fees or charges and the time within which and the manner in which the dead rent or royalty shall be payable;

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18. Mineral development. - (I) It shall be the duty of the Central Government to take all such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and systematic development of minerals in India and for the protection of environment by preventing or controlling any pollution which may be caused by prospecting or mining operations and for such purposes the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as it thinks fit.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: (a) to (o)--(Not reproduced)

(p) the procedure for and the manner of imposition of fines for the contravention of any of the rules framed under this section and the authority who may impose such fines; and

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(q) the authority to which, the period within which, the form and the manner in which applications for revision of any order passed by any authority under this Act and the rules made thereunder may be made, the fee to be paid and the documents which should accompany such applications. .......

(3) All rules made under this section shall be binding on the Government.

25. Recovery of certain sums as arrears of land revenue, - Any rent, royalty, tax, fee or other sum due to the Government under this Act or the rules made thereunder or under the terms and conditions of any reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease may, on a certificate of such officer as may be specified by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, be recovered in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. (R.C. LAHOTI, .1.]

We have th~ee comments to offer on M.A. Tulloch. Firstly, the·provisions of the Act No.67 of I 957 did not directly come up for the scrutiny of the Constitution Bench as there was no demand raised after the commencement of this Act which was put in issue before the Constitution Bench; the Constitution Bench was only adjudicating upon the issue whether a liability to pay cess incurred under the previous Act could be enforced under Act No.67 of I957 or in other words if Act No.67 of I957 had any castigating effect on the demand validly raised under the previous enactment. Secondly, the extent to which power to legislate by the States was excluded by the Central Act No.65 of 1951 was not a question dealt with in-depth as it was done in Hingir-Rampur Coal Co .. Thirdly, M.A. Tulloch, if·not correctly read, creates a wrong impression that Act No.67 of 1957 provides for levy of tax and fee, which in fact it does not. Section 13(2)(i) cannot be read as empowering the Central Government to levy any tax or fee. The expression "other fees and charges" have to be interpreted ejusdem generis taking colour from other words and phrases employed in the same clause. The word "charges" cannot and does not include within its meaning any tax. The expression "other fees or charges" must be assigned such meaning as to include therein only such fees and charges as are meant for regulation or development.

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We are clear in our minds that a power to levy tax or fee cannot be spelled out from sections 13, 18 and 25 of the Act No.67of1957. It is well- E settled that power to tax cannot be inferred by implication; there must be a charging section specifically empowering the State to levy tax. Section I 8 (2)(q) speaks of fee to be paid on applications for revision and not on minerals, mineral rights or mining land. Section 25 speaks of 'recovery of tax and fee' amongst others. Two observations are spontaneous. Firstly, a provision for F recovery, being a machinery provision, cannot be read as empowering the levy of tax or fee. Secondly, it speaks of tax or fee being due to the Government without defining the same and without qualifying the word 'Government' with Central or State. A perusal of several provisions of the Act and in particular Sections 9-A, 15, 15 (I-A) (a) and (g), 15(3), 17(3), 21(5), 25 goes to show that the power of recovery is invariably given to the State Government - G and obviously the word 'Government' in Section 25 refers to the State Government, which only is empowered to recover the sums due as arrears of land revenue. The relevant principles of Jaw laid down in M.A. Tulloch, which we H

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A have extracted and reproi:luced hereinabove, do not run contrary to the view we are taking in the present case. The recovery of fee could have been held to be vitiated in that case because the field of mining activity in manganese ore was fully covered by the MMDR Act, 1957, and the levy under the impugned State Act, as found by the two Constitution Benches in HingirRampur Coal Co. and MA. Tulloch was being collected for the development B of the mining areas in the State. The doctrine of pith and substance noted and applied in Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. has been restated in MA. Tulloch wherein the Constitution Bench had said, as noted hereinabove, that the Orissa Act was concerned with the development of the mining areas notified under the Act while the Central Act on the other hand dealt more directly with the C control of all industries including of course the industry of coal and the object of the Central Act was to regulate the scheduled industry with a view to make improvement and development of the service that they may render to the society and thus assisting the solution of the larger problem of the national economy. In spite of the declaration made by Section 2 of the Central Act of 1951 considered in the light of its several provisions it was found D difficult to hold that the field covered by the Central Act was the same as the field covered by the impugned Orissa Act. None of the two Constitution Benches have held that power to regulate and develop with which the Central Act of 1951 was concerned would include the power to levy tax and fee, which power shall have to be traced to some other entry in List J.. List I E contains a general entry i.e. Entry 96 for levy of fee in respect of matters in List I but so far as levy of tax is concerned there are separate and specific entries (see Entries 82 to 92B in List I and Entries 45 to 63 in List 11). Further in view of Entry 50 of List II, Parliament can by any law relating to mineral development limit or place limitations on the power of the State Legislatures to impose taxes on mineral rights.

Power to tax not a residuary power

Article 265 mandates - no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. The scheme of the Seventh Schedule reveals an exhaustive enumeration of legislative subjects, considerably enlarged.over the predecessor G Government of India Act. Entry 97 in List I confers residuary powers on Parliament. Article 248 of the Constitution which speaks of residuary powers of legislation confers exclusive power on Parliament to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or the State List. At the same time, it provides that such residuary power shall include the H power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those

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STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTJ, J.]

Lists. It is, thus,· clear that if any power to tax is clearly mentioned in List- A II the same would not be available to be exercised by Parliament based on the assumption of residuary power. The Seven-Judges Bench in Union of India v. Harbhajan Singh Dhillon, [1971] 2 SCC 779, ruled, by a majority of 4:3, that the power to legislate in respect of a matter does not carry with it a power to impose a tax under our constitutional scheme. According to Seervai (Constitutional Law of India, Fourth/Silver Jubilee Edition, Vol. 3, B para 22.l91):- "Although in Dhil/on's case conflicting views were expressed about the nature of the residuary power, the nature of that power was stated authoritatively in Kesvananda's case, [1973] 4 SCC 225. Earlier, in Golak Nath's, case AIR (1967) SC 1643, Subha Rao C.J. (for himself, Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidyalingam JJ) had held that Art. 368 only provided the procedure C for the. amendment of the Constitution, but that the power to amend the Constitution was to be found in the residuary power conferred on Parliament by Arts. 245 and 246(1) read with entry 97, List I and by Art. 248. Seven out of the nine Judges who overruled Golak Nath 's case held, inter a/ia, that the power to amend the Constitution could not be located in the residuary powers of Parliament. Hegde and Mukherjea JJ. held that "It is obvious that these Lists have been very carefully prepared. They are by and large exhaustive. Entry 97 in List I was included to meet some unexpected and unforeseen contingencies. It is difficult to believe that our Constitution-makers who were keenly conscious of the importance of the provision relating to the amendment of the Constitution and debated that question for several days, would have left the important power hidden in entry 97 of List I leaving to the off chance of the courts locating that power in that entry. We are unable to agree with those learned judges when they sought to place reliance on Arts. 245, 246 and 248 and entry 97 of List I for the purpose of locating the power of amendment in the residuary power conferred on the Union." (italics supplied)

-,..

Similar views were expressed by five other judges. According to Seervai, "the law laid down in Kesavananda 's case is that if a subject of legislation was prominently present to the minds of the frames of our Constitution, they would not have left it to be found by courts in the residuary power; a fortiori, if a subject of legislative power was not only present to the minds of the framers but was expressly denied to Parliament, it cannot be located in the residuary power of Parliament." Vide para 22.194 the eminent jurist poses a question: "Does Art. 248

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A add anything to the exclusive residuary power of Parliament under Art. 246

)

(I) read with Entry 97 List I to make laws in respect of "any other matter" not mentioned in List II and List III including any tax not mentioned in those Lists?" and answers by saying - "The answer is 'No'." As to the riddle arising in the context of mines and minerals development

B legislation by reference to the Entries in List I and List II, Seervai states -

C

"the regulation of mines and mineral development is a subject of exclusive State legislation, but for the limitation placed upon that power by making it subject to the provisions in that behalf in List I. If Parliament does not exercise its power under Entry 54, List I, the States' power under Entry 23, List II would remain intact. If Parliament exercised its power under Entry 54, List I, only on a part of the field, as for example, major minerals, the States' legislative power over minor minerals would remain intact." (para 22.195 at p. 2433) Power to tax must be express, else no power to tax

There is nothing like an implied power to tax. The source of power which does not specifically speak of taxation cannot be so interpreted by expanding its width as to include therein the power to tax by implication or by necessary inference. States Cooley in Taxation (Vol.I, Fourth Edition)"There is no such thing as taxation by implication. The burden is always upon the taxing authority to point to the act of assembly which authorizes the imposition of the tax claimed." (para 122 at p.278).

Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Eighth Edition, 200 I) while dealing with general principles of strict construction of F taxation statutes states, -"A taxing statute is to be strictly construed. The well-established rule in the familiar words of Lord Wensleydale, reaffirmed by Lord Halsbury and Lord Simonds, means : "The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words". In a classic passage Lord Cairns stated the principle thus : "If the person G sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there H is admissible in any statute, what is called an equitable construction, certainly,

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):., STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

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such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute. Viscount Simon quoted with approval a passage from Rowlatt, J. expressing the principle in the following words : "In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." (at p.635) The judicial opinion of binding authority flowing from several pronouncements of this Court has settled these principles: (i) in interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Taxing statutes cannot be interpreted on any presumption or assumption. A taxing statute has to be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statute so as to supply any deficiency; (ii) before taxing any person it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the Section; and (iii) if the words are ambiguous and open to two interpretations, the benefit of interpretation is given to the subject. There is nothing unjust in the tax-payer escaping if the letter of the law fails to catch him on account of Legislature's failure to express itself clearly. (See, Justice G.P. Singh, ibid, pp.638-639) . Power to tax is not an incidental power. According to Seervai, although legislative power includes all incidental and subsidiary power, the power to impose a tax is not such a power under our Constitution. It is for this reason that it was held that the power to legislate in respect of inter-state trade and commerce (Entry 42, List I, Schedule 7) did not carry with it the power to tax the sale of goods in inter-state trade and commerce before the insertion of Entry 92A in List I and such power belonged to the States under Entry 54 in List II. Entry 97 in List I also militated against the contention that the power to tax is an incidental power under our Constitution (See: Constitutional law of India, H.M. Seervai, Fourth/Silver Jubilee Edition, Vol. 3, para 22.20).

c

Power to regulate and control and power to tax - determining the nature of legislation by reference to the power exercised

~

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It is of par'.'111ount significance to note the difference between 'power to regulate and develop' and 'power to tax'. The primary purpose of taxation is to collect revenue. Power to tax may be exercised for the purpose of regulating an industry, comrnerce or any

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A other activity; the purpose of levying such tax, an impost to be more correct,

C

is the exercise of sovereign power for the purpose of effectuating regulation though incidentally the levy may contribute to the revenue. Cooley in his work on Taxation (Vol. I, Fourth Edition) deals with the subject in paragraphs. 26 and 27. "There are some cases in which levies are made and collected under the general designation of taxes, or under some term employed in revenue laws to indicate a particular class of taxes, where the imposition of the burden may fairly be referred to some other authority than to that branch of the sovereign power of the state under which the public revenues are apportioned and collected. The reason is that the imposition has not for its object the raising of revenue but looks rather to the regulation of relative rights, privileges and duties as between individuals, to the conservation of order in the political society, to the encouragement of industry, and the discouragement of pernicious employments. Legislation for these purposes it would seem proper to look upon as being made in the exercise of that authority which is inherent in every sovereignty, to make all such rules and regulations as are needful to secure and preserve the public order, and to protect each individual in the enjoyment of his own rights and privileges by requiring the observance of rules of order, fairness and good neighbourhood, by all around him. This manifestation of the sovereign authority is usually spoken ofas the police power. The power to tax must be distinguished from an exercise of the police power. (State v. Tucker, 56 SC 516). The political power 'is a very different one from the taxing power, in its essential principles, though the taxing power, when properly exercised, may indirectly tend to reach the end sought by the other in some cases. "(p.94) "The distinction between a demand of money under the police power and one made under the power to tax is not so much one of form as of substance." (p.95). The distinction between a levy in exercise of police power to regulate and the one which would be in nature of tax is illustrated by Cooley by reference to a license. He says-"So-called license taxes are of two kinds. The one is a tax for the purpose of revenue. The other, which is, strictly speaking, not a tax at all but merely an exercise of the police power, is a fee imposed for the purpose of regulation." (p.97)

"Suppose a charge is imposed partly for revenue and partly for regulation. Is it a tax or an exercise of the police power? Other considerations than those which regard the production of revenue are admissible in levying taxes, and regulation may be kept in view when revenue is the main and primary purpose. The right of any sovereignty to look beyond the immediate purpose to the general effect neither is nor can be disputed. The government H has general authority to raise a revenue and to choose the methods of doing

,;,, •

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. (R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

'r 1'.

so; it has also general authority over the regulation of relative rights, privileges A and duties, and there is no rule of reason or policy in government which can require the legislature, when making laws with the one object in view, to exclude carefully from its attention the other. Nevertheless cases of this nature are to be regarded as cases of taxation. If revenue is the primary purpose, the imposition is a tax. Only those cases where regulation is the primary purpose B can be specially referred to the police power. If the primary purpose of the legislative body in imposing the charge is to regulate, the charge is not a tax even if it produces revenue for the public." (Cooley, ibid, pp.98-99) This Court in seven-Judges Bench decision in Synthetics and Chemicals ltd. and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1990] l SCC 109, agreed that

C

regulation is a necessary concomitant of the police power of the State. However, it was an American doctrine and in the opinion of the Court it was not perhaps applicable as such in India. The Court endorsed recognizing the power to regulate as a part of the sovereign power of the State exercisable by the competent legislature. Brushing aside the need for discussio~ on the question - whether under the Constitution the States have police power or D not, the Court accepted the position that the State has the power to regulate. However, in the garb of exercising the power to regulate, any fee or levy which has no connection with the cost or expenses of administering the regulation, cannot be imposed; only such levy can be justified as can be treated as part of regulatory measure. Thus, the State's power to regulate E perhaps not as emanation of police power but as an expression of the sovereign power of the State has its limitations. In our opinion, these observations of the Court lend support to the view which we have formed that a power to regulate, develop or control would not include within its ken a power to levy tax or fee except when it is only regulatory. Power to tax or levy for augmenting revenue shall continue to be exercisable by the Legislature in F whom it vests i.e. the State Legislature in spite of regulation or control having been assumed by another legislature i.e. the Union. State Legislation levying a tax in such manner or of such magnitude as can be demonstrated to be tampering or intermeddling with Center's regulation and control of an industry can perhaps be the exception to the rule just stated.

In Synthetics and Chemicals ltd. and Ors. v. State ofU.P. and Ors.,[1990] I SCC I 09 the question before the seven-Judges Bench was as to the power of State to legislate on industrial alcohol as a subject. Entry 8 in List II and Entry 33 in List III came up for consideration. Their Lordships noticed the provisions of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (as H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2004] I S.CR.

A amended in 1956), especially Section 18-G thereof, and held that the provisions

evinced clt:ar intention of the Union to occupy the whole field relating to industrial alcohol and therefore the State. could not claim to regulate it. The power with regard to the control of alcoholic industries was considered and their Lordships concluded that in spite of the Central Legislation operating in the field the State was left with the following powers available to legislate in respect of alcohol "(a) It may pass any legislation in the nature of prohibition of potable liquor referable to Entry 6 of List II and regulating powers.

C

(b) It may lay down regulations to ensure that non-potable alcohol is not diverted and misused as a substitute for potable alcohol.

(c) The State may charge excise duty on potable alcohol and sales tax under Entry 52 of List II. However, sales tax cannot be charged on industrial alcohol in the present case, because under the Ethyl Alcohol (Price Control) Orders, sales tax cannot be charged by the State on industrial alcohol. (d) However, in case State is rendering any service, as distinct from its claim of so-called grant of privilege, it may charge fees based on quid pro quo. See in this connection, the observation of Indian Mica case, (1971] 2 SCC 236."

It may be seen that the power to levy sales tax on industrial alcohol was available to the State but for the provisions of the Ethyl Alcohol (Price Control) Orders on account of which the State could not charge sales tax on industrial alcohol. The State could levy any fee based on quid pro quo. The seven-Judges Bench decision lends support to the view we are taking that in the field occupied by the Centre for regulation and control, power to levy tax and fee is available to the State so long as it does not interfere with the regulation - the power assumed and occupied by the Union. Before a seven-Judges Bench in The Automobile Transport (Rajas/hon) ltd v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors., (1963] I SCR 491, the question

G arose if State could make Jaws imposing regulatory restrictions on free trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Article 30 I of Constitution and whether a State tax could be treated as impeding freedom under Article 30 I of Constitution. The following statement of law by majority speaking through S.K. Das, J. (at pp.524-525) is very much in point for our purpose:-.

. ..,

STATEv. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.)

"Such an interpretation would, in our opinion, seriously affect A the legislative power of the State Legislatures which power has been held to be plenary with regard to subjects in list II. The States must also have revenue to carry out their administration and there are several items relating to the imposition of taxes in list II. The Constitution-makers must have intended that under those items the States will be entitled to raise revenue for their own purposes. If the B widest view is accepted, then there would be for all practical purposes, an end of State autonomy even within the fields allotted to them under the distribution of powers envisaged by our Constitution. An examination of the entries in the lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution would show that there are a large number of entries in C the State list (list II) and the Concurrent list (list III) under which a State Legislature has power to make laws. Under some of these entries the State Legislature may impose different kinds of taxes and duties, such as property tax, sales tax, excise duty etc., and legislation in respect of any one of these items may have an indirect effect on trade and commerce. Even laws other than taxation laws, made under D different entries in the lists referred to above, may indirectly or remotely affect trade and commerce. If it be held that every law made by the Legislature of a State which has repercussion on tariffs, licensing, marketing. regulations, price-control etc., must have the previous sanction of the President, then the Constitution in so far as E it gives plenary power to the States and State Legislatures in the fields allocated to them would be meaningless." '·

.,..

Their Lordships also observed (at p.526-527) that the freedom guaranteed by Article 30 I does not mean freedom from taxation. The power of levying tax is essentially for the very existence of Government, though its exercise may be controlled by constitutional provisions made in that behalf. Power to tax is not outside constitutional limitations. It is for Parliament to exercise power in the field made available to it by Entry 52 and 54 in List I. It is also for Parliament to state by law the limitations - and the sweep thereof - which it may choose to ·impose on field available to State for taxation by reference to Entry 50 in List II. It may not be for Courts to venture into enquiry in just an individual case to find and hold what tax would hamper mineral development if Parliament has chosen to observe silence by not legislating or failed to say something explicit. A reasonable tax or fee levied by State legislation cannot, in our opinion,

H .

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(2004) I S.C.R.

A be construed as trenching upon Union's power and freedom to regulate and control mines and minerals. India Cement and decisions post India Cement, based thereon : India Cement is clearly distinguishable so far as the present cases are

B concerned. As we hav~ already pointed out it was a case of cess levied by

C

Sate Legislature on royalty and not on mineral rights or land and buildings. That is why the levy was held ultra vires. Seervai's comment and objective criticism on India Cement is noteworthy (See - ibid, para 22.257 C). Royalty is income and State Legislatures are not competent to tax an income. This single ground was enough to strike down the levy of cess impugned in India Cement. Nothing more was needed. The Orissa Cement Ltd., (supra) also, as the very opening part of the report shows, dealt with the levy of a cess by the State based on the royalty derived from mining lands which was held to be directly and squarely governed by India Cement and, therefore, struck down. In State of Orissa and Ors. v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd and Ors., [ 1995] Supp. 2 SCC 686, the impugned levy by the State Legislature was a tax of Rs. 32 per thousand acre on coal bearing lands. It was sought to be defended as falling under Entry 49 or in the alternative under Entry 23 or Entry 50 in List II. The attack was that the legislation being one on mineral lands and mineral rights and the Parliament having enacted the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, the field was entirely covered and the State Legislature was incompetent to levy the tax. Reliance was placed on India Cement, Orissa Cement and Buxa Dooars Tea Co. Ltd., (supra). Only mineral bearing land and coal bearing land were the subject of the levy of tax. The three-Judges Bench speaking through K.S. Paripoornan, J., concluded that the charging section of the impugned Act imposed a tax on the minerals also, and was not confined to a levy on land or surface characteristic of the land. All non-mineral bearing lands and non-coal bearing lands were left out of the levy. The levy was struck down as levying a tax not on land (related to surface characteristic of the land) but on minerals and mineral rights. Goodricke 's case (supra) was cited before their Lordships and it was observed that in Goodricke 's case the impugned levy was held to be a tax on land and that makes all the difference. We find it difficult to subscribe to the reasoning adopted in Mahanadi

Coalfields Ltd.

•

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STA TE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

Buxa Dooars Tea Co. ltd. and Ors. v. Staie of West Bengal and Ors., A [1989] 3 SCC 211 is a two-Judges Bench decision. Rural employment cess was levied at the rate of Rs.5 per kg. on all dispatches of tea. The rate was changed from time to time but that is not very material. A careful reading of the report shows that the primary challenge was on the ground of the impugned cess being violative of Article 14 and 30 I of the Constitution as it had the B direct and immediate effect of impeding the movement of goods throughout the territory of India. The challenge was sustained. Incidentally, and VP.ry briefly, their Lordships have in one paragraph also dealt with the question of legislative competence of the State Government by reference to Entry 49 in List II. Their Lordships have observed, "if the legislation is in substance legislation in respect of dispatches of tea, legislative authority must be found C for it with reference to some other entry. No Entry in Lists II and III is pertinent. Moreover, the Union had, in public interest, assumed control over the tea industry including the tea trade and control of tea prices." Therefore, the Court concluded that the impugned legislation was also void for want of legislative competence as it pertained to a covered field. Suffice it to observe D that to the extent the learned Judges have dealt with the challenge ~y niference to legislative competence of the State Legislature under Eqtry 49 in List JI, there is not much of discussion and is just incidental and the ot>s!!rvotions are too wide to be countenanced. Another distinguishing feature common to these decisions is that the distinction and demarcation of fields of operation between Central and State Acts by reference to the doctrine of pith an.d E substance seems to have been not adverted to. From Baijnath Kadio to Eastern Coalfields

......

Before we proceed to deal with Goodricke, it will be necessary to complete the chain of thought by referring to four decisions and the law F which developed therewith between the years 1970 and 1982 which can be termed a period by itself on the issues at hand, In Baijnath Kadio v. The State of Bihar and Ors., [1969) 3 SCC 838, the writ-petitioners were holding mining leases for minor minerals. The State G of Bihar amended the Bihar Mino.r Mineral Concession Rules, 1964, whereby with effect from 27 .1.1964 the rates of dead rent, royalty and surface rent were revised. Additional demands were raised. It was submitted that in view of the provisions contained in the MMDR Act, 1957 incorporating (vide, Section 2 thereof) a declaration within the meaning of Entry 54 in List I, it was, not competent for the State Legislature to revise the rates as abovesaid. H

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A This Court held that the whole of the legislative field relating to mihor minerals was covered by the Central Legislation by virtue of the declaration made by Section 2 and the enactment of Section 15 in the Act, thereby leaving no scope for the enactment of the second proviso to Section 10 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act whereunder the powers to increase the royalty, dead B rent and surface rent were sought to be exercised. There were pre-existing old leases which could have been modified only by a legislative enactment made by the Parliament on the lines of Section 16 of Act No.67 of 1957. Any attempt to regulate such old mining leases will fall not in Entry 18 but in Entry 23 of List II even though the regulation incidentally touches them. The pith and substance of the amendment of Section 10 of the Bihar Land Reforms C Act falls within Entry 23 although it incidentally touches land and not vice versa. Entry 18 did not come to the rescue of the State Government and Entry 23 was subject to the provisions of List I. The impugned provision and the action taken thereunder were held ultra vires the Constitution. The decisions of this Court in The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. ltd and Ors. and Mis. MA. D Tulloch and Co. were referred to. However, the law laid down by the Constitution Bench (vide para 13) is significant. It held :" ....... It is open to Parliament to declare that it is expedient in the

public interest that the control should rest in Central Government. To what ex/en/ such a declaration can go is for Parliament to determine and this must be commensurate with public interest. Once this declaration is made and the extent laid down, the subject of legislation 10 the extent laid dawn becomes an exclusive subject for legislation

by Parliament. Any legislation by the State after such declaration and lrenching upon the field disclosed in the declaration must necessarily be unconstitutional because that field is abstracted from the legislative competence of the State Legislature." [Underlining by us]

H.R.S. Murthy v. The Collector of Chilloor and Anr., [1964) 6 SCR 666 was a writ petition filed -under Article 32 of the Constitution laying challenge G to the validity of notices of demand for the payment of land cess under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920. The mining lease dated September 15, 1953, authorised the lessee to work and win iron ore in a tract of land in Chittoor; dead rent, royalty and surface rent were payable under the mining lease. The District Board levied land cess on the annual rental value of all H occupied lands. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the land cess

STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.]

was dismissed. The Court held:(1) It is therefore not possible to accept the contention, that the fact that the lessee or licensee pays a royalty on the mineral won, which is in excess of what he would pay if his right over the land extended only to the mere use of the surface land, places it in a category different from other types where the lessee uses the surface of the land alone. Jn each case the rent which a lessee or licensee actually pays for the land being the test, it is manifest that the land cess is nothi

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