Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. The State of Maharashtra, Through Cbi, Bombay

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
21 March 2013
Judge
Justice P. Sathasivam
Neutral citation
2013 INSC 179
Reported in
[2013] 15 S.C.R. 1
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Section 10 Evidence Act
Subject
Criminal

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[2013] 15 S.C.R. 1 YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON

v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THROUGH CBI, BOMBAY PART-I (Appeals relating to death sentence) (Criminal Appeal No. 1728 of 2007 ETC.)

MARCH 21, 2013.

[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE (PREVENTION) ACT, 1987:

ACTIVITIES

SS. 3(3) of TADA and S. 120-B /PC rlw SS. 3(2)(i), 3(3),3(4),

5 and 6 of TADA - Serial bomb blasts in Bombay in March,

1993 - Conviction and death sentence to 11 accusedappellants by Designated Court - Held: The confessional statements of accused and co-accused as a/so the evidence of approver and other prosecution witnesses, the recoveries made and other evidences, establish the guilt of all accusedappellants - Their conviction affirmed - The sentence of dea.th E to first accused-appellant affirmed - Sentence of remaining ten, accused-appellants commuted to rigorous imprisonment for life - Life imprisonment means the whole natural life Therefore, subject to ss. 432 and 433 of the Code and clemency powers of President and Governor under Arts. 72 F and 161 of the Constitution, the ten accused-appellants shall be imprisoned for life until their death - The executive should take due consideration of judicial reasoning before exercising the remission power - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 120-B, 302, 307, 324, 427, 435, 436, 201 and 212 - Arms Act, 1959 - ss. G 3, 7, 25 (1-A), (1-BO - Explosives Act, 1884 - ss. 9-B (1 )(a) (b), and (c)-Explosive Substances Act, 1908 - ss. 3, 4(a), 5 and 6 - Prevention of Damage to Public Property, Act, 1984 - s. 4 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 432 and 433

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- Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 72 and 161. PENAL CODE, 1860.

s. 120-8 - Criminal conspiracy - Explained - Held. To bring home the charge of conspiracy within the ambit of s. B 120-8, it is necessary to establish that there was an agreement between the parties for doing an unlawful act Conspiracy, apart from being a substantive offence and distinct. from the offence to be committed for which the conspiracy was entered into, all conspirators are liable for the C acts of crime of each other which have been committed as a result of the conspiracy - Conspiracy is a continuing offence and if any acts or omissions which constitute an offence are done in India or outside its territory, the conspirators continue to be the parties to the conspiracy and since part of the acts, D in the instant case, were done in India, they would obviate the need to obtain the sanction of the Central Government - All of them need not be present in India - Conspiracy may be a general one and a smaller one which may develop in successive stages -Since conspiracy is hatched in secrecy, E to bring home the charge of conspiracy, it is relevant to decide from the facts of the case, conclusively the object behind it which is the ultimate aim of the conspiracy - Further, many means might have been adopted to achieve this ultimate object - The means may even constitute different F offences by themselves, but as long as they are adopted to achieve the ultimate object of the conspiracy, they are also acts of conspiracy - In order to determine whether conspiracy was hatched, the court is required to view the entire agreement and to find out as to what, in fact, the conspirators intended G to do - In the instant case, a common charge of conspiracy was framed against all the co-conspirators - Court is satisfied that prosecution has placed sufficient acceptable materials to prove the charge of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 10.

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

CONFESSION: Evidentiary value of confession - Held: s. 164 of the Code speaks about recording confessions and statements, and s. 15 of TADA is a similar provision - If the confessional statement is properly recorded satisfying the mandatory provision of s. 15 of TADA and the Rules made thereunder, and if the same is found by court as having been made voluntarily and truthfully, then the said confession is sufficient to convict the maker thereof - Whether such confession requires corroboration or not is a matter for the court to consider on the basis of facts of each case - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - s. 15 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 164. Confession as against a co-accused - Held: As a matter of caution, a general corroboration should be sought for But in cases where the court is satisfied that the probative value of confession is such that it does not require corroboration then it may record conviction on the basis of such confession of co-accused without corroboration - In the instant case, confessional statements of co-accused persons are admissible as primary and substantive evidence against appellants notwithstanding the amendment by Act 43of1993. TERRORIST AND DISRUPT/VE (PREVENTION) ACT, 1987:

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ACTIVITIES·

s. 15 (as amended by Amendment Act 43of1993) rlw s. 21 - The words "or co-accused, abettor, or conspirator" and the proviso to s. 15(1) were added by way of an amendment on 22.5.1993 - In the event of un-amended TADA as it stood prior to 22. 5. 1993 were to apply, there would be a presumption G of guilt against appellants pursuant to un-amended s. 21, since confession of other co-accused would implicate them for the offence of conspiracy - However, the amendment of 1993 did not bring about any change as to the admissibility and applicability of confession of co-accused - Code of H ·

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Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 164. Recording of confession by Police Officer - Held: No illegality persists in recording a confession u/s 15 of TADA by an officer supervising the investigation.

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Transmitting of confessional statement - Held: The requirement of sub-r. (5) o r. 15 of TADA Rules, which contemplates a confessional statement being sent to Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate, who, in turn, will haye to send the same to the Designated Court, is not mandatory and is only directory- Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Rules, 1987- r. 15(5). Retractions - Held: Where original confession was truthful and voluntary, court can rely upon such confession to convict the accused in spite of a subsequent retraction and denial in statement u/s 313 CrPC. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:

s. 306 - Grant of pardon and evidentiary value of TADA does not preclude applicability of s. 306 - Therefore, power to grant pardon u/s 306 also applies to cases tried under TADA and there was no infirmity in the order granting pardon to approver in the facts and circumstances of the case - Further, the provisions F of sub-s. (4) of s. 306 have not been violated - In the light of provisions of s. 133 rlw s. 114 Illus. (b) of Evidence Act, evidence of an approver needs to be corroborated in material particulars - In the instant case, it has been so corroborated by way of primary evidence by prosecution - Terrorist and G Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - ss. 7 and 21 Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 133 rlw s. 114 Illus. (b).

E statement of approver -

Chapter XXVll - ss. 353, 354 362 and 363 - Judgment - Held. Judgment in a criminal case indicates the termination of the case by an order of conviction or acquittal of the

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

accused and judgment is to be rendered in strict adherence A to the provisions of Chapter XXVI/ of the Code - Every judgment must contain: (1) the points for determination; (2) the decision thereon; and (3) the reasons for such decision - A conviction order is not a 'judgment" as contemplated u/ s 353 and judgment is pronounced only after the award of B sentence - ·in the case on hand, Designated Court has dealt with the issue of pronouncing the judgment uls 353(1) (c) in detail.

s. 235 rlw s. 354(3) - Right of hearing to the accused on the question of sentence - There is bifurcation of trial as C an accused has a right of pre-conviction hearing u/s 234 and secondly right of pre-sentence hearing uls 235 of the Code -The occasion to apply the provisions of s. 235(2) arises only after the conviction is recorded - The court, while on the question of sentence, is in an altogether different domain D where facts and factors which operate are of an entirely different order than those which come into play on the question of conviction - Where the court imposes death sentence, both s. 235(2) and s. 354(3) assume signal significance and they must be harmoniously and conjointly E appreciated and read Fairness, justice and reasonableness which constitute the essence of guarantee of life and liberty epitomised in Art..21 of the Constitution also pervades the sentencing policy in ss. 235(2) and 354(3) of the Code - These two provisions virtually assimilate the concept F of "procedure established by law" within the meaning of Art. 21 of the Constitution -In the instant case, requirements of pronouncing a judgment uls 353(1)(c) of the Code have been fully complied with - There is no illegality or irregularity in the process followed and specifically ulss 353, 354 and 235 G keeping in mind the magnitude of the task before the Designated Judge - The pronouncement of judgment was in compliance with the provisions of the Code and does not violate any of its provisions - Constitution of India, 1950 - · Art. 21.

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SENTENCE!SENTENCNG:

Balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances - Held: After the new CrPC of 1973, imprisonment for life would be the rule and a sentence of death an exception Amended s. 354(3) of the Code mandates that in me case of sentence of death, the judgment shall state the special reasons for such sentence - The judiciary with the aid of s. 235(2) ascertained the 'special reasons' pertaining to criminals as required bys. 354(3) to impose death penalty A careful evaluation of aggravating and mitigating C circumstances pertaining to both criminal and crime is the approach to ascertain the 'special reasons' for imposing the extreme penalty on a person - Thus, two cardinal factors: (i) the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of the crime and (ii) the degree of responsibility of the offender D must be taken into account in determining the sentence for an individual accused in addition to aggravating and mitigating circumstances - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1.973 - ss. 235(2) and 354(3)-Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - s. 3(2)(i) - Penal Code, 1860 - s. E 302. QUANTUM OF SENTENCE: Complicity of first accused-appellant - Sentence Held: First accused- was in a position of authority, particularly, F he had played a significant role in the context of the blasts, which is important while determining the sentence - He was one of the architects of the blasts, without whom the plan would have never seen the daylight - Besides, he was a/so entrusted with the task ofhandling the explosive bags and G for their safe keeping - He was actively involved in hawala transactions for purpose of facilitating the blasts - Without the planning of conspirators of which first accused was a party, the explosives and ammunition required for the execution would not have entered into the country and as a H consequence the execution itself would not have materialized

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

- Therefore, it can be concluded that no offence might have taken place at all but for the instigation by the absconding accused and the first accused-appellant -Besides, the dominant position of first accused is an aggravating factor by itself as it gives the status of direct responsibility - Under the established jurisprudence, two factors - (i) a commanding position and (ii) a crime of 'utmost gravity' ordinarily merit the extreme penalty even accounting for the guilty plea and mitigating factors - This is the 'special reason' which warrants death penalty to first accused- appellant - Therefore, having taken into account and weighed the totality of culpability of first accused-appellant and all the particular circumstances of the case, the decision of Designated Court is concurred with and the sentence of capital punishment to first accused-appellant is confirmed.

Complicity of other ten co-accused-appellants Sentence - Held: The role played by the other ten accusedappellants differentiates with that of the first accused-appellant - First accused-appellant and other absconding accused were the archers whereas the rest of the accused- appellants were the arrows in their hands - Though the incident of bomb blasts is not a brainchild of these ten accused-appellants, yet they turned the conspirators' orders into action by executing the blasts and, as such, they are liable for the consequence of their acts - It is actually the masterminds strategy which was executed by these ten subservient minions, as but for the masterminds, the blasts shoum have never seen the daylight - This may not help in complete exoneration of their liability but the degree of punishment must necessarily reflect this difference -Keeping in view the aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances and to differentiate the degree of punishment to the fist accused-appellant and other ten accused-appellants, the ends of justice would be served if the death sentence of these ten appellants is commuted to rigorous imprisonment for life - However, the lesser sentence imposed on these appellants cannot be a precedent in other

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cases and every case must be decided according to its facts and circumstances. Life imprisonment as rigorous imprisonment - Held: "Imprisonment for life" is to be treated as 'rigorous imprisonment for life''.

Life imprisonment - Duration of Held: Life imprisonment always means the whole natural life - There is a misconception that a prisoner serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14 C years or 20 years imprisonment - A convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission granted by appropriate Government u/s 432 of the Code, which in tum is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and D to further substantive check in s. 433-A of the Code- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 432 and 433-A. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973: ss. 432, 433 and 433-A - Power to remit/commute sentence - Held: Exercise of power by appropriate government under sub-s. (1) of s. 432 cannot be automatic or claimed as a right as this is only an enabling provision and subject to fulfilment of certain conditions mentioned in Jail Manual or in statutory rules - Decision to grant remission has F to be .well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 72 and 161.

/DENT/FICA TION: Test identification parade - Held: s. 20 of TADA rlw s. 21 G of the Code permits Special Executive Magistrate to carry out such functions as are required in a TADA case and in the instant case, identification parades were conducted by Special Executive Magistrates in compliance with provisions of · Criminal Manual - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities H (Prevention) Act, 1987 - s.20 - Criminal Manual -

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

Government Circular, Home Department No. MIS 10541 84588 dated 22.4.1955 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 21.

INVESTIFICATION.·

Recoveries - Panchnama - Mandatory conditions for a valid Panchnama, culled out - Circumstances when Panchnama is inadmissible - Explained - Evidentiary value of Panchnama - Held: Panchnama can be used as corroborative evidence when 'Pancha' gives evidence in court u/s 157 of Evidence Act - It can also be used as evidence of recorded transaction so as to refresh the memory of witnesses u/s 159 of Evidence Act - In the instant case, in view of the fact that prosecution has led ample corroborative evidence, Designated Court was fully justified in relying on the recoveries while accepting the prosecution case - Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 157 and 159 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 100 and 174.

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TERRORISM: 'Terrorism' - Explained - Held: In spite of several international conventions and Multilateral Agreements and domestic and international legislations to counter terrorism, it is a major problem that is reoccurring over the globe in many different forms - There is a dire need to best deal with it and to make sure to take preventive actions - The Court is of the considered view that the procedure/rules s':'ggested by it in the judgment must have to be adopted while dealing with the menace.

Role of Pakistan. in blasts - Held: Pakistan has infringed the recognized principles of international law which obligate all states to prevent terrorist attacks emanating from their territory and inflicting injuries to other states - In the instant case, accused persons were facilitated by /SI operatives in Pakistan for training without observing any immigration

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A formalities, and accused received training even from /SI officials themselves on some occasions - The events unveil the tolerance and encouragement shown by Pakistan towards terrorism - International law. Role of Police Officials - Held: The role of police officials has become more vital owing to frequent terrorist attacks occurring across the country - If police had been able to curtail the conveyance of contraband in the country at the relevant time, the occurrence could have been avoided - In C the instant case, some of the police personnel themselves have taken active part in smuggling and transportation of arms and explosives meant for the plan - Police.

Role of Customs Officials - Held: Customs officials primarily have a duty to prevent smuggling and ensure that D everything that enters into or goes out of the country is brought or sent is strictly in accordance with the provisions of law-It is shattering to notice that several Customs Officials played an active role as members of conspiracy and implemented the plan - A rationally structured and effective E customs department is needed in order to curtail illegal imports which can have frightening ramifications upon the nation's economy and citizens' security - Customs. Need to improve vigilance in Indian Maritime Zone and role of Coast Guards - Held: India being a· maritime nation, F the role of Coast Guards is very vital for shielding the coast from external attacks - Coast Guards being the strongest link in the security chain, are bound to be vigilant at sea and should be in full command of the coast - Only well strategized coast guards and high morale customs officers can prevent G any opportunity for terrorists to attack on 01,1r country via our maritime boundary - Coast Guards. On 12.03.1993, in a span of about two hours, a series of 12 bomb explosions took place at twelve different H locations in Bombay, as a result of which 257 persons

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR CBI , BOMBAY

died and 713 persons were seriously injured, and properties worth about Rs. _27 crores were destroyed. The bombs planted at several other places were diffused. The investigation revealed that accused 'DI' (AA-1 ), a resident of Dubai, and accused 'TM' (AA-2) formulated a conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in the city of Bombay. The object of the crime was to incite communal violence and to overawe and weaken the government, disturb social harmony and to break up the social, political and economic order of the country. In conspiratorial meetings held in furtherance of the object of the crime, arrangements were made for sending some of the accused persons to Pakistan and train them in handling arms and ammunition, and after such training to. bring them back to India, for smuggling of firefifhs and ammunition and explosives like ROX into lndi and their landing and trans·portation. Several accuse persons were involved in preparing vehicle bombs by filling explosives with time mechanisms in motor vehicles and parking of the said vehicles at targeted places. Bombs were planted and hand grenades lobbed at targeted places. The arrested accused persons made confessions and disclosure statements as a result of which a large number of incriminating articles were recovered. One of the main conspirators became approver and he was examined as PW-2. A large number of accused were involved in the conspiracy and execution thereof. Some of them absconded (described as AAs). A total number of 123 accused were prosecuted out of whom 100 were convicted by the Designated Court. The instant appeals were filed by the convicts, who were sentenced to death, namely, A-1 (the brother of accused AA-2), A-32, A-36, A39, A-44, A-10, A-29, A-9, A-11, A-12, and A-16.

Accused A-1 (Appellant in Crl. A. No. 1728 of 2007) was charged with offences punishable u/s 3(3) of Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 ,.

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(TADA) and s. 120-8 IPC read with s. 3(2)(i), (ii), 3(3), (4), 5 and 6 of TADA read with ss. 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436, 201 and 212 IPC and ss. 3 and 7 read with ss. 25 (1A), (1-B)(a) of the Arms Act 1959. ss/ 98 (1) (a)(b)(c) of the Explosives Act, 1884, ss. 3, 4(a) (b), 5 and 6 of Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and s. 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property />ct, 1984, for entering into criminal conspiracy in India and outside India in Dubai and Pakistan and/or being member of the said criminal conspiracy whose object was to commit terrorist acts in India with the intent to overawe the government of India, to strike terror in the people, and to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people, by using bombs, dynamites, hand grenades and other explosive substances like ROX or inflammable substances or fire arms like AK-56 rifles and other lethal weapons in order to cause death of or injuries to persons and to damage properties and in pursuance of the said conspiracy committed the said overt acts (charge head Firstly). This was the common charge framed against all the co-accused. Accused A-1 was also charged with other offences alleging that he advocated, abetted, advised, and facilitated the commission of terrorists acts that resulted in serial bomb blasts in Bombay and its suburbs on 12.3.1993; arranged finance and arranged air tickets and made arrangements to enable the coconspirators and accused to undergo weapons training in Pakistan, purchasing of vehicles and to prepare them for the purpose of bomb blasts at targeted places, facilitated smuggling and landing of arms and ammunitions by AA-2 and his associates for the said purpose; being in possession of arms and explosives smuggled into the country for committing terrorist acts; and made arrangements for absconding of AA-2 and his associates and co-conspirators from India. A-1 was convicted of the offences charged and was sentenced to death amongst other terms of imprisonment.

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

Accused A-32, A-36 and A-39 (Appellants in Crl. A. Nos. 609-610 of 2008), A-44 (appellant in Crl. A. Nos. 628629 of 2008), A-10 and A-29 (appellants in Crl. A. Nos. 637 638), -9 (Appellant in Crl. A. No. 365 of 2008), A-11 (appellant in Crl. A. Nos. 864-865 of 2008), A-12 (appellant in Crl. A. No. 897 of 2008) and A-16 (appellant in Crl. A. Nos. 941-942 of 2008), besides having been charged with common charge of criminal conspiracy under the head Firstly, were also charged with having committed further overt acts of receiving training in handling of arms and ammunitions and explosives in Pakistan, attending conspiratorial meetings for committing terrorist acts, participating in landing and transportation of arms, ammunition and explosives like ROX, being in possession of arms and ammunition and explosives smuggled into India for committing terrorist acts; participating in preparation of vehicle bombs and parking them at targeted places, taking vans with explosive laden suitcases to targeted places, planting the bombs at targeted places, throwing hand grenades at targeted places, and thereby causing death of several persons, injuries to many others and damage to properties. These appellants were also sentenced to death. They were further sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. It was contended for the appellant-A-1 that the impugned judgment was not a 'judgment' in terms of ss. 353, 354, 362 and 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code), since the reasons for conviction and sentence were not provided to him along with the order of conviction and sentence dated 12.9.2006 and 27.7.2007 respectively, and only the 'operative portion' was read out and after hearing the accused the conviction and sentence was imposed, which was impermissible. It was submitted that in the absence of the whole judgment, the sentence imposed could not be sustained; that there was no material to prove that there was a conspiracy among the accused persons and the

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prosecution failed to prove that A-1 had any knowledge of any such conspiracy and the bomb blasts on 12.3.1993; that since the prosecution case rested on the confessional statements of the accused persons and except A-97 all other had retracted their statements and, B as such, the conviction and sentence could not be sustained; that in the absence of any provision in TADA for pardoning an accused and permitting him to be approver, and PW-2 not being validly pardoned either under TADA or the Code, conviction based on his sole c testimony could not be sustained. Disposing of the appeals, the Court, HELD: 1.1. The word "judgment" has not been defined in IPC, nor even in TADA. The TADA contains: (a) judgment; and (b) orders. Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil D Procedure, 1908 defines "judgment" and 0.20, r. 1(1 )(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Madras amendment) refers "judgment when pronounced" and "judgment to be signed". In the light of the definition clause, namely, "judgment" though the same has not been explained in E the CrPC, the procedure to be followed both in the civil and criminal cases are all acceptable. [para 21 and 43) [113-B-E; 126-E-F] 1.2. Judgment in a criminal case indicates the termination of the case by an order of conviction or F acquittal of the accused and judgment is to be rendered in strict adherence to the provisions of Chapter XXVll of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Sections 353, 354, 362 and 363 make it clear as to how the judgment is to be in a criminal trial, language and contents and the G procedure to be followed in furnishing copy of the judgment immediately after pronouncement. [para 35 and 43) [123-E; 128-F] Hori Ram Singh vs. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 43; and Kuppuswami Rao vs. The King, AIR 1949 PC 1 - referred H to.

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

1.3. In view of the provisions of s.354 of the Code, it is necessary that every judgment must contain: (1) the points for determination; (2) the decision there~n; and (3) the reasons for such decision. The reason for the decision is an important ingredient of a judgment. The purpose of recording reasons is to facilitate the superior court to examine the correctness of the judgment of the courts below. Compliance with the law in this regard should not be merely formal but substantial and real, for it is this part of the judgment alone which enables the higher court to appreciate the correctness of the decision, the parties to feel that the court has fully and impartially considered their respective cases and the public to realise that a genuine and sincere attempt has been made to mete out even-handed justice. Reasons form the substratum of the decision and their factual accuracy is a guarantee that the court has applied its mind to the evidence in the case. In Bachan Singh and Ba/want Singh this Court has held that the judgment shall state reasons for the sentence awarded and in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence. [para 31, 36-37] [122-B; 123-F-G; 124-A-E; 125-

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Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab_, AIR 1980 SC 898; Ba/want Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1,976 SC 230 - relied

on

1.4. It is clear that "judgment" is a formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open court. It is also clear that passing a sentence without recording the judgment would amount to illegality. Pronouncing the sentence before completing the judgment, that is, before preparing the essential part, makes the sentence illegal and vitiates the conviction. [para 42] [128-D-E] 1.5. Right of hearing to the accused on the question

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A of sentence is provided u/s 235(2) of the Code. The purpose of the provision is recognition of new trend in penology and awarding of sentence taking into consideration various factors such as the prior criminal record of the offender, his age, employment, educational B background, sociological backdrop, family background, financial position, antecedents, social adjustment, emotional and mental condition and the prospects of his returning to normal path in conformity with law. It is in fact humanist principle of individualising punishment to suit C the person and his circumstances and, therefore, a hearing is required before imposition of penalty. [para 27)

[117 -D, F-G] Santa Singh vs. The State of Punjab 1977 (1) SCR 229 = (1976) 4 SCC 190; Ram Dea Chauhan @ Raj Nath D Chauhan vs. State of Assam 2001 (3) SCR 669 =AIR 2001 SC 2231; Narpa/ Singh & Ors. vs. State of Haryna, 1977 (2) SCR 901 =AIR 1977 SC 1066; Oagdu & Ors. etc. vs. State of Maharashtra, 1977 (3) SCR 636 =AIR 1977 SC 1579; Tarlok Singh vs. State of Punjab 1977 (3) SCR 711 = E AIR 1977 SC 1747; and Kamalakar Nandram Bhavsar & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 503; Motilal vs. State of MP. (Now Chhatisgarh 2004 (1) SCR 854 = (2004) 469 - referred to.

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Akhtari Bi (Smt) vs. State of MP. 2G01 (2) SCR 626 = AIR 2001 SC 1528 - relied on.

1.6. The legislative policy discernible from s. 235(2) read with s. 354(3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or making the choice of sentence for various G offences, including one u/s 302 of IPC, the court should not confine its consideration "principally" or merely to the circumstances connected with the particular crime, but also give due consideration to the circumstances of the criminal. It is for this reason that court while hearing a H convict on sentence is required to give a party an

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

opportunity of producing evidente or materials relating to the various factors having some bearing on the question of sentence. Therefore, there is bifurcation of trial as an accused has a right of pre-conviction hearing u/s 234 and secondly right of pre-sentence hearing u/s 235 of the Code. [para 31 and 37] [122-D-E; 124-G-H; 125-F-G]

Allauddin Mian & Ors. Sharif Mian & Anr. vs. State of Bihar 1989 (2) SCR 498 = AIR 1989 SC 1456 - relied on.

1.7. In Muniappan, this Court has held that the obligation to hear the accused on the question of sentence which is imposed by s.235(2) of the Code is not discharged by putting a formal question to the accused as to what he has to say on the question of sentence. The Judge must make a genuine effort to elicit from the accused all information which will eventually have a bearing on the question of sentence. The occasion to apply the provisions of s. 235(2) arises only after the conviction is recorded. The court, while on the question of sentence, is in an altogether different domain where facts and factors which operate, are of an entirely different order than those which come into play on the question of conviction. Where the court imposes death sentence, both s.235(2) and s. 354(3) assume signal significance and they must be harmoniously and conjointly appreciated and read. [para 39-40] [126-C-E, FG; 127-8] Muniappan vs. State of T.N, 1981 (3) SCR 270 =AIR 1981 SC 1220; Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 5 SCC 740; and Malkiat Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab 1991 (2) SCR 256 = (1991) 4 SCC 341referred to.

1.8. Therefore, fairness, justice and reasonableness which constitute the essence of guarantee of life and liberty epitomised in Art. 21 of the Constitution also

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A pervades the sentencing policy in ss. 235(2) and 354(3) of the Code. These two provisions virtually assimilate the concept of "procedure established by law" within the meaning of Art. 21 of the Constitution. Thus, a strict compliance with those provisions in the way it was El interpreted in Bachan Singh having regard to the development of constitutional law by this Court is a must before imposing death sentence. [para 41] [128-B-C] 1.9. Section 353(1) of the Code makes it clear that it

c is incumbent on the part of the Presiding Officer to

deliver the whole of the judgment or by reading out the operative part of the judgment and explaining the substance of the judgment in a language which is understood by the accused or his pleader. [para 43] [128D G-H] 1.10. In the instant case, on perusal of the conclusion in the judgment of the Designated Court with regard to A-1, it is very much clear that he was apprised regarding the offences for which he was found to be guilty. While E A-1 was awarded death sentence, it is clear from the conclusion that he was apprised that the sentence of death awarded to him is subject to the confirmation by the Apex Court and he was also informed that for the said purpose the Court would be making necessary reference F to Apex Court within 30 days from the date of completion of passing of final order. In the same order, the trial court has also apprised A-1 that it will take some time to complete the pronouncement of the final order of conviction and sentence of remaining accused and G completed the judgment by getting the same transcribed, corrected and signed. The court also directed the Sheristedar to handover the 'operative part' of the order passed on both the days, i.e., 12.09.2006 and 27.07.2007. [para 45] [132-G-H; 133-A-C]

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON~v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

1.11. It is clear that a conviction order is not a "judgment" as contemplated u/s 353 and that a judgment is pronounced only after the award of sentence. In the case on hand, the Designated Judge pronounced the operative part of the judgment on 27.7.2007 and explained the substance of the judgment to the appellant in compliance with the requirements of s. 353(1 )(c) of the Code. A perusal of the final judgment of the Designated Court shows that he has dealt with the issue of pronouncing the judgment u/s 353(1) (c) in detail. [para 47] [134-F-H]

C

Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang & Ors., 1995 (1) SCR

= (1995) 2 SCC 513; Lakdey Ashok vs. Government of

A.P., (2009) 6 ALT 677 - referred to.

1.12. Section 354(1 )(c) states that every judgment D referred to in s. 353 shall specify the offence of which the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced. In view of the same, the judgment u/s 353(1)(c) is to be pronounced only after the sentence in a case where conviction is determined. The process of delivery E of judgment includes the determination of guilt, or otherwise, of an accused and in the event of such guilt being established, also includes the process of sentencing the accused. In the instant case, the process of delivery of judgment commenced on 12.09.2006 when F the court pronounced its verdict on the guilt or otherwise of specific accused. Whilst doing so, the Designated Judge explained the offences for which the accused were being convicted and invited the accused persons to make their statements with reference to the quantum of G sentence. It is evident that at this stage, the detailed reasoning may not have been finally communicated to the accused, but the determination of the court as well as the broad understanding of the operative part of the judgment was communicated. [para 52-53] [137-F-H; 138H B-D]

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1.13. An analysis of the method followed by the Designated Judge, demonstrates that the requirements of pronouncing a judgment u/s 353(1 )(c) of the Code have been fully complied with. While pronouncing the operative part of the judgment, the Designated Court B ensured that the substance of the judgment has been explained to the appellant in compliance with the requirement of s. 353. It is also relevant to point out that the said order dated 27.07.2007 was pronounced in open court -and signed and dated by the Designated Judge in c compliance with the requirements of the said section. Thus, there is no illegality or irregularity in the process followed and specifically u/ss 353, 354 and 235 keeping in mind the magnitude of the task before the Designated Court. This Court, therefore, holds that the 0 pronouncement of the judgment was in compliance with the provisions of the Code and does not violate any of its provisions. [para 48 and 54] [136-A-C; 138-E-G] 1.14. It is also clear from the reasoning of the Designated Court that by adopting the same procedure, E the Designated Judge conveyed the conclusion with regard to various charges leveled against other accused (total convicted accused 100) and also apprised each one of them, including A-1 as well as their pleaders, the reasoning and other materials for arriving at such a F conclusion. He also apprised that because the convicted accused are 100 in number and the common judgment is running into thousands of pages, it may require some time and as soon as the full judgment will be made ready, the same will be supplied to them free of cost. It does not G mean that on the date of pronouncing the decision (decision was pronounced on various dates), the whole judgment was not ready or it was incomplete. [para 55] [138-G-H; 139-A-C]

1.15. Regarding the requirement of providing a copy

• YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

of the judgment in terms of s. 363 of the Code, it is significant to note that it was a joint trial of 123 accused persons. The appellant was apprised of the fact that a copy of the final judgment would be provided after completion of the order as regards sentence in respect of the remaining accused. The process of pronouncement of judgment had to be carried out for all accused and accordingly a copy of the final judgment could be provided to each of the accused only after the sentence was pronounced in respect of all the accused persons. Copy of the final judgment was provided free of cost to the appellant (A-1) after the pronouncement of the orders with respect to each of the accused by the Designated Court. [para 49-51] [136-D, F-H; 137-B-C] 1.16. As the Code mandates that the accused are entitled to full/whole judgment, unless the conclusion relating to all the convicted accused is read over and explained to them, opportunity of hearing on sentence has been provided to them or their respective counsel and incorporation of both the conclusions relating to conviction and sentence has been done, the same cannot be supplied to the accused. [para 56] [139-C-D] 1.17. Several applications were made to amend the conviction orders, which were dismissed by the Designated Court. Neither A-1, nor any of the counsel of accused persons pointed out any amendment that would attract the provisions of s. 362 of the Code. On the other hand, there is no alteration/amendment that has been made in the judgment after its pronouncement. [Para 58] [140-D-E, F-G] 1.18. From the materials placed and after verification of the decision, this Court is satisfied that the Designated Court apprised the accused about the contents of the judgment, and heard all the accused and their pleaders regarding sentence and, as such, it has complied with the

C

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A requirements of law; and considering the voluminous nature of work, even if there is mere procedural irregularity that would not vitiate the trial or the ultimate conclusion unless the same results in miscarriage of justice. The impugned judgment and procedure followed B and adopted by the Designated Court fulfil the mandate of the Code and there is neither violation of principles of natural justice nor breach of Arti. 21 of the Constitution. [para 59] [141-A-D] Shambhu & Ors. vs. The State AIR 1956 All. 633; Baldeo. C vs. Deo Narain and Ors. AIR 1954 All. 104; Surendra Singh & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 1954 SCR 330 =AIR 1954 SC 194; Ratia Mohan. vs. The State of Gujarat AIR 1969 Guj. 320; State of Orissa vs. Ram Chander Agarwala & Ors. 1979 (1) SCR 1114 = (1979) 2 SCC 305; Jhari Lal vs. Emperor AIR D 1930 Pat. 148; State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Jagdev Singh Talwandi 1984 (2) SCR 50 = (1984) 1 SCC 596; Krishna Swami vs. Union of India and Ors., 1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 53 =AIR 1993 SC 1407; K. V. Rami Reddi. vs. Prema 2008 (3) SCR 83 = (2009) 17 SCC 308; Sarojini Ramaswami E (Mrs.) vs. Union of India & Ors. 1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 108 = (1992) 4 SCC 506; M. Nagaraj & Ors. vs. Union .of India and Ors. 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 = (2006) 8 SCC 212; Confederation of ex-Servicemen Associations and Others vs. Union of India and Ors. 2006 (4) F Suppl. SCR 872 = (2006) 8 SCC 399; Iqbal Ismail Sodawala vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others 1975 (1) SCR 710 = (1975) 3 sec 140 - cited.

Conspiracy:

2.1. The law on conspiracy emerges to the effect that conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or an act, which is not illegal, by illegal means. The object behind the conspiracy is to achieve the ultimate aim of conspiracy. In order to H achieve the ultimate object, parties may adopt many

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

means. Such means may constitute different offences by themselves, but so long as they are adopted to achieve the ultimate object of the conspiracy, they are also acts of conspiracy. An important facet of the law of conspiracy is that apart from it being a substantive offence and distinct from the offence to be committed for which the conspiracy was entered into, all conspirators are liable for the acts of crime of each other which have been committed as a result of the conspiracy. It is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise to commission of a number of acts. Each conspirator can be attributed each others' actions in a conspiracy. Theory of agency applies and this rule existed even prior to the amendment of the Penal Code. This is reflected in the rule of evidence u/s 10 of the Evidence Act. Conspiracy is punishable independent of its fruition. The principle of agency is a rule of liability and not merely a rule of evidence. It is an unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment, which is the gist/essence of the crime of conspiracy. To bring home the charge of conspiracy within the ambit of s.1208, IPC, it is necessary to establish that there was an agreement between the parties for doing an unlawful act. In order to determine whether the conspiracy was hatched, the court is required to view the entire agreement and to find out in fact what the conspirators intended to do. [para 61-64, 66 and 81] [142-F-G; 144-EF; 145-D-E; 146-E-F; 151-D-E; 163-8-C, E-F] Major E.G. Barsay vs. State of Bombay (1962) 2 SCR 195; State of A.P. vs. Kandimalla Subbaiah (1962) 1 SCR 194; State of H.P. vs. Krishan Lal Pardhan (1987) 2 SCC 17 - referred to

Regina vs. Murphy (1873) 173 ER 502; Babula/ vs. Emperor, AIR 1938 PC 130- referred to

2.2. Section 10 of the Evidence Act further provides

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a unique and special rule of evidence to be followed in cases of conspiracy. As per s.10, the principles agreed upon unanimously are: (i) There shall be prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for the court to believe that two or more persons were part of a B conspiracy to commit a wrongful act or offence; (ii) Once this condition was fulfilled, anything said, done or written by any of its members, in reference to their common intention, will be considered as evidence against other co-conspirators; (iii) This fact would be evidence for the c purpose of existence of a conspiracy and that the persons were a part of such conspiracy. [para 78] [160B; 161-C-F]

2.3. It is difficult to establish conspiracy by direct evidence. Since conspiracy is hatched in secrecy, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, it is relevant to decide from the facts of the case, conclusively the object behind it, which is the ultimate aim of the conspiracy. Further, many means might have been adopted to achieve this ultimate object. The means may even constitute E different offences by themselves, but as long as they are adopted to achieve the ultimate object of the conspiracy, they are also acts of conspiracy. The conspiracy may be a general one and a smaller one which may develop in successive stages. [para 64, 65 and 81] [151-E-G; 163-E] Ajay Aggarwal vs. Union of India, 1993 (3) SCR 543 =AIR 1993 SC 1637 - referred to 2.4. A conspiracy is a continuing offence and continues to subsist and is committed wherever one of G the conspirators does an act or series of acts. So long as its performance continues, it is a continuing offence till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice or necessity. A crime is complete as soon as the agreement is made, but it does not end with the making of the H agreement. It will continue so long as there are two or

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

more parties to it intending to carry into effect the design. The entire agreement must be viewed as a whole and it has to be ascertained as to what in fact the conspirators intended to do or the object they wanted to achieve. [para 66 and 68] [152-G-H; 153-A-8; 154-8-C] Sudhir Shanti/a/ Mehta vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2009 (12) SCR 682 = (2009) 8 SCC 1); Yash Pal Milla/ vs. State of Punjab 1978 (1) SCR 781 =AIR 1977 SC 2433- referred to

2.5. The crime of conspiracy is complete the moment C there is an agreement in terms of s. 120-A of IPC. However, where the conspiracy has in fact achieved its object and resulted in overt acts, all the conspirators would be liable for all the offences committed in pursuance of the conspiracy on the basis of the principle D of agency which is inherent in the agreement which constitutes the crime of conspiracy. For an offence u/s 1208 IPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the conspirators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by E necessary implication. It is also not necessary that each member of the conspiracy must know all the details of the conspiracy. The offence can be proved largely from the inferences drawn from the acts or illegal omission committed by the conspirators in pursuance of a F common design. Conspiracy is a continuing offence, and if any acts or omissions which constitute an offence are done in India or outside its territory, the conspirators continue to be the parties to the conspiracy and since part of the acts were done in India, they would obviate the G need to obtain the sanction of the Central Government. All of them need not be present in India. [para 68 and 311] [153-G-H; 154-A-8; 376-C-D]

RK. Dalmia vs. Delhi Administration, 1963 SCR 253 = AIR 1962 SC 1821; Lennart Schussler & Anr. vs. Director of

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Enforcement & Anr., 1970 (2) SCR 760 = (1970) 1 SCC 152; Shivanarayan Laxminarayan Joshi vs. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 2 SCC 465 and Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, 1981 (3) SCR 68 =AIR 1981 SC 1062; Yogesh@ Sachin Jagdish Joshi vs. State of Maharashtra, 2008 (6) SCR 1116 = (2008) 10 SCC 394; Nirmal Singh Kah/on vs. State of Punjab, 1963 SCR 253 = AIR 2009 SC 984, Ram Lal Narang vs. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1979 SC 1791, K. R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kera/a 2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 498 = (2005) 12 SCC 631; State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath Thapa 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 189 =AIR 1996 SC 1744; Kehar Singh & Ors. vs. State (Delhi Admn.), 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 24 =AIR 1988 SC 1883; Firozuddin Basheeruddin & Ors. vs. State of Kera/a, (2001) 7 SCC 596; State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 79 = (2005) 11 SCC 600; Ram Narayan Popli vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2003 (1) SCR 119 = (2003) 3 SCC 641; Mohd. Khalid vs. State of West Bengal, 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31 = (2002) 7 sec 334 - referred to.

2.6. In the case on hand, the first condition for applying s. 10 of the Evidence Act is satisfied by the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 (approvers). There are 77 confessions which are voluntary and are corroborated with other circumstances of the case. These confessions F contain statements inculpating the makers as well as the co-accused. The conspiracy might have been started in Dubai but ultimately it continued in India and a part of the object was executed in India and even in the conspiratorial meetings at Dubai, the matter was G discussed with respect to India and amongst Indian citizens. [para 77 and 80] [159-F-G; 162-F-G]

2.7. A common charge of conspiracy has been framed against all the accused persons and in order to bring home the charge, the prosecution need not necessarily

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA,THR.CBl,BOMBAY

prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. The cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an isolated approach to each of the circumstances. [Para 287] [344-A-C] 1.8. This Court is satisfied that the prosecution has placed sufficient acceptable materials to prove the charge of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 84] [164F-G]

C

CONFESSION: 3.1. Section 164 of the Code speaks about recording confessions and statement and s.15 of TADA is a similar D provision. The words "or co-accused, abettor or conspirator' and the proviso in s.15(1) were added by way of an amendment on 22.5.1993. The amendment was also with respect to s. 21 of TADA (Presumption as to offences u/s 3). However, the amendment of 1993 did not bring E about any change as to the admissibility and applicability of the confession of the co-accused. In the event of unamended TADA, there would be a presumption of guilt against the appellants pursuant to un-amended s. 21 since confession of other co-accused would implicate the appellants for the offence of conspiracy. [para 86, 88 F and 96] [165-B; 168-E; 169-C-D; 178-C-D] Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh vs. Republic of India 2011 (1) SCR 929 = (2011) 2 SCC 490; Kalawati & Anr. vs. State of HP. 1953 SCR 546 =AIR 1953 SC 131; Dagdu G & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra 1977 (3) SCR 636 = (1977) 3 sec 68; Davendra Prasad Tiwari VS. State of U.P. (1978) 4 SCC 474; Shivappa vs. Stae of Kamataka 1994 (6) Suppl.

SCR 171 = (1995) 2 SCC 76; State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT vs. Nalini & Ors., 1999 (3) SCR 1 = (1999)

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5 SCC 253; State of Maharashtra vs. Damu 2000 (3) SCR 880 (2000) 6 SCC 269; Bhagwan Singh & Ors. vs. State of M.P. 2003 (1) SCR 506 (2003) 3 SCC 21; Gurjinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2011) 3 SCC 530; Surender Kali vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 2011 (2) SCR 939 = (2011) 4 SCC 80; Kulvinder Singh & Anr. vs. State of Haryana 2011 (4) SCR 817 (2011) 5 SCC 258; and Inspector of Police, T.N. vs. John David 2011 (7) SCR 354 = (2011) 5 SCC 509 Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat 2009 (8) SCR 719 = (2009) 7 SCC 254; Jayawant Dattatray Suryarao vs. State of Mharashtra 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 54 (2001) 10 SCC 109; Ravinder Singh @ Bittu vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (3) SCR 622 = (2002) 9 sec 55; Mohmed Amin VS. Central Bureau of Investigation 2008 (16) SCR 155 = (2008) 15 SCC 49; Jameel Ahmed & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 9 SCC 673 - referred to.

=

=

=

=

State of Rajasthan vs. Ajit Singh 2007 (11) SCR 251 = (2008) 1 SCC 601; Ganesh Gogoi vs. State of Assam (2009) 7 SCC 404; State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru para 101 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 79 = (2005) 11 SCC 600; Harjit Singh vs. State of Punjab (2011) 4 SCC 441; Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi I 2007 (2) SCR 289 = (2007) 9 SCC 665, Sanjay Dutt vs. State through CBI, Bombay 1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 263 = (1994) 5 SCC 410, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 360 = (1994) 4 SCC 602 - cited. Fairey vs. Southampton County Council (1956) 2 ALL ER 843, The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. vs. Irving 1905 AC 369, In Re: Athlumney (1898) QB 547 - cited. 3.2. The confessional statement made by a person u/ s 15 of TADA shall be admissible in the trial of a coaccused for offence committed and tried in the same case together with the accused who makes the

• YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

confession. Further, a voluntary and truthful confessional A statement recorded u/s 15 of the TADA Act requires no corroboration. [para 368] [457-C-E] 3:3. The position of law on the evidentiary value of confession is as under:B (i)

If the confessional statement is properly recorded satisfying the mandatory provision of s.15 of TADA and the Rules made thereunder, and if the same is found by the court as having been made voluntarily and truthfully then the C said confession is sufficient to base conviction on the maker of the confession.

(ii)

Whether such confession requires corroboration or not, is a matter for the court to consider on the basis of the facts of each case.

o

(iii)

With regard to the use of such confession as against a co-accused, as a matter of caution, a general corroboration should be sought for E but in cases where the court is satisfied that the probative value of the confession is such that it does not require corroboration then it may record conviction on the basis of such confession of the co-accused without F corroboration. But this is an exception to the general rule of requiring corroboration when such confession is to be used against a coaccused.

(iv)

The nature of corroboration required both in regard to the use of confession against the maker as also against a co-accused is of a general nature, unless the court comes to the conclusion that such corroboration should be H

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on material facts also because of the facts of a particular case. The degree of corroboration so required is that which is necessary for a prudent man to believe in the existence of facts mentioned in the confessional statement. (v)

The requirement of sub-r. (5) of r.15 of the TADA Rules which contemplates a confessional statement being sent to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate who, in turn, will have to send the same to the Designated Court is not mandatory and is only directory. However, the court considering the case of direct transmission of the confessional statement to the Designated Court should satisfy itself on the facts of each case whether such direct transmission of the confessional statement creates any doubt as to the genuineness of the said confessional statement. [para 105] [184-G-H; 185-A-H; 186-A-8]

Nazir Khan vs. State of Delhi 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 884

= (2003) 8 sec 461; Sukhwant Singh VS. State, (2003) 8 sec

90; Mohmed Amin vs. Central Bureau of Investigation 2008 (16) SCR 155 = (2008) 15 SCC 49; Mohd. Ayub Dar vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir 2010 (8) SCR 916 (2010) 9 SCC 312 - referred to

=

3.4. It is clear that the confessions made by the appellants are truthful and voluntary and were made without any coercion. All safeguards enumerated u/s 15 of TADA and the rules framed thereunder have been duly complied with while recording the confessions of the appellants. [para 260] [315-E-F] 3.5. The evidence on record along with the confessions of various co-accused amply prove that the

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR CBI , BOMBAY

weapons training was organized with the aid of the Government of Pakistan and also clearly shows a very deep involvement of A-1 in the organization and conduct of serial bomb blasts in question. [para 125] [205-H; 206-

A]

Recording of confessions bv police officers: 3.6. It has been held by this Court that no illegality persists in recording a confession u/s 15 of TADA by an officer supervising the investigation. [para 202] [266-C, E]

=

S.N. Dube vs. N.B. Bhoir, 2000 (1) SCR 200 (2000) 2 SCC 254; Mohd. Amin vs. CBI, 2008 (16) SCR 155 (2008) 15 SCC 49; and Lal Singh vs. State of Gujarat 2001 (1) SCR 111 = (2001) 3 sec 221 - relied on.

=

3.7. PW-189 functioned as DCP for Zone X up till D August, 1994. He recorded the confessional statement of 96 accused persons in the case. The recorded confessions were sealed and sent to Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. He asserted that he had followed the procedures mentioned in the Rules and instructions E while making the record of confession of all the accused whose confession were recorded by him. PW-193 was posted as DCP in Bombay from April, 1992, up till December, 1995. He stated that by following the elaborate procedure, he recorded the confessional statements of F A-77, A-10, A-14, A-26,A-57, A-96, A-15, A-117 and PW-2. A perusal of the evidence of both the officers clearly show that they were aware of the procedure to be followed before recording the confession of the accused and how the same is to be recorded. The Designated G Court was fully justified in relying upon the evidence of PW-189 and PW-193. [para 195-197, 198-200 and 205] [263-E, G; 265-E-F; 273-F-G; 274-C] Retractions:

C

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4.1. Where the original confession was truthful and voluntary, the Court can rely upon such confession to convict the accused in spite of a subsequent retraction and its denial in statement uls 313, CrPC. A confessional statement given uls 15 shall not be discarded merely for the reason that the same has been retracted. [para 134 and 368] [209-D-E; 457-D] S.N. Dube vs. N.B. Bhoir 2000 (1) SCR 200 = (2000) 2 SCC 254; Manjit Singh vs. CBI, 2011 (1) SCR 997 = (2011) 11 SCC 578; State of Tamil Nadu vs. Kutty 2001 (11) Suppl. SCR 433 = AIR 2001 SC 2778; Mohd. Amin v. CBI, 2008 (16) SCR 155 = (2008) 15 SCC 49; Jameel Ahmed vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 9 SCC 673; State of Maharashtra vs. Bharat Chaganlal Raghani, 2001 (3) SCR 840 = (2001) 9 SCC 1; and Balbir Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 - relied on

Kalawati vs. State of Himachal 1953 SCR 546 = AIR 1953 SC 131; Parmananda Pegu vs. State of Assam, 2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 1 =AIR 2004 SC 4197, Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. State of Rajasthan 1963 Suppl. SCR 689 =AIR 1963 SC 1094, Kehar Singh & Ors. vs. State 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 24 =AIR 1988 SC 1883, Babubhai Udesinh Parmar vs. State of Gujarat (2006) 12 SCC 268; Wariyam Singh vs. State of UP., 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 807 = (1995) 6 SCC 458; Lal Singh vs. State of Gujarat, 2001 (1) SCR 111=(2001)3 SCC 221; Devender Pal Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi, 2002 (2) SCR 767 = (2002) 5 SCC 234; Ravinder Singh vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (3) SCR 622 = (2002) 9 SCC 55; Jameel Ahmed vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 9 SCC 673- referred to

4.2. Further, it is evident that in the instant matters, retractions were not made at the first available opportunity by the accused persons. After arrest, the accused persons were produced before the court number of times in 1993 and 1994. While the confessions

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR CBI , BOMBAY

were recorded in April and May 1993, retractions were made only in May, 1994, i.e. after a gap of 1 year. [para 261] (315-H; 316-A] 4.3. In the instant matters, the Designated Court rightly relied upon the original confession and discarded the subsequent retraction. [para 291] (347-D]

Grant of Pardon u/s 306 of the Code to approver (PW. 2): 5.1. The provisions in TADA clearly show that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would apply to all cases. Section 4(2) of the Code makes it clear that all the offences under any ,oth_er law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and dealt with according to the provisions of the Code but subject to specific clause/ reference of the Special Act. It is also clear from s. 5 of the Code that in the absence of specific provisions in any enactment, the provisions of the Code shall govern for the purpose of investigation, enquiry etc. Section 7(3) of TADA makes it clear that the provisions of the Code shall, so far as may be and subject to such modification made in the Act, apply to the exercise of powers by the officer under sub-s. (1 ). [para 190] (253-G; 254-D-E] 5.2. Section 20 of TADA makes it clear that certain provisions of the Code are automatically applicable and the Designated Court is free to apply those provisions for due adjudication of the cases under the Act. Thus, no provision of TADA is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for grant of pardon as envisaged u/ss 306 to 308. Further, TADA does not preclude the applicability of s. 306 of the Code. Section 306(2)(b) is specifically applicable where the offence for which an accused is being tried is punishable with imprisonment extending to seven years or more. In the instant case, the approver was accused of offences

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which carried the maximum punishment as capital punishment. [para 190] [256-G-H; 257-A, E] Harshad S. Mehta & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra 2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 577 = (2001) 8 SCC 257 ; Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1968) 1 SCR 695 - relied on

5.3. The object of s. 306 is to tender pardon in cases where a grave offence is alleged to have been committed by several persons so that the offence could be brought C home with the aid of evidence of the person pardoned. The legislative intent of this provision is, therefore, to secure the evidence of an accomplice in relation to the whole of circumstances, within his knowledge, related to the offence and every other person concerned. This D Court, therefore, holds that the power to grant pardon ul s 306 of the Code also applies to the cases tried under the provisions of TADA and there was no infirmity in the order granting pardon to the approver (PW-2) in the facts and circumstances of the case. Further, the provisions E of sub-s. (4) of s. 306 have not been violated and there is no illegality in not having examined the approver twice by the Designated Court. [para 191 and 194] [257-F-H; 258-A; 261-A]

Sardar Iqbal Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.) 1978 (2) SCR 174 = (1977) 4 SCC 536- relied on

Deposition of approver CPW2):

5.4. PW-2, who turned approver admitted that he took training in handling of weapons and ROX in Pakistan for a period of 10 days along with others. He admitted that he knew AA-2 and A-1. It was further stated that all the persons including A-1 were involved in planning, conspiracy, tra.ining, landing and planting of bombs. In the cross-examination, he admitted that he

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI, BOMBAY

was involved in the case from the stage of conspiracy till planting of bombs and is responsible for the explosions. He also admitted that he participated in all the stages of conspiracy till the achievement of the object. [para 148 and 161] [218-F, G-H; 219-A-C; 227-E-F] 5.5. A perusal of the entire evidence of PW-2 clearly shows that at no point of time he acted under pressure to become an approver. He withstood the lengthy crossexamination. His testimony runs into hundreds of pages and he covered all the aspects starting from initial conspiracy and ending with execution of blasts at various places in Bombay on 12.03.1993. This Court is also satisfied that his confessional statement before the Deputy Commissioner of Police and his statement before the Designated Court are not borne out of fear but due to his conscience and repentance. On the whole, his testimony is reliable and acceptable and the Designated Court rightly relied on his entire statement in support of the prosecution case. [para 176] [235-D-G] 5.6. In the light of the provisions of s.133 read with s.114 Illus (b) of the Evidence Act, the evidence of an approver needs to be corroborated in material particulars. In the instant case, the evidence of the approver has been corroborated in material particulars by way of primary evidence by the prosecution. [para 181] [237-G-H]

C

Appointment of Special Executive Magistrates 6'.1. Special Executive Magistrates (SEMs) are appointed by the State Government u/s 21 of the Code for particular functions on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit. They can exercise powers so conferred upon them by the State as are exercisable by an Executive Magistrate. The Criminal Manual and the Government Circular, Home Department, No. MIS.1054/ 84588 dated 22nd April, 1955 in clear terms requires that

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non-judicial Magistrates or Honorary Magistrates such as a Special Executive Magistrate should preferably conduct an identification parade and, accordingly, identification parades in the instant case were conducted by Special Executive Magistrates in compliance with the provisions B of the Criminal Manual. [para 207-211] [276-G-H; 277-A, C, E; 278-A-B]

State of Maharashtra vs. Mohd. Salim Khan 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 340 = (1991) 1 SCC 550 - relied on.

6.2. Section 20 of TADA read with s. 21 of the Code permits a Special Executive Magistrate to carry out such functions as are required in a TADA case and accordingly in the instant case Special Executive Magistrates, inter alia, conducted identification parades of the accused 0 persons. The constitutional validity of s. 20 of TADA has been upheld by this Court in Kartar Singh* wherein this Court held that Special Executive Magistrates appointed u/s 21 of the Code can record confessional statements for offences committed under TADA and perform such E other functions as directed. [para 213-214] [280-B-D] *Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab 1994 (2) SCR 375 = (1994) 3 sec 569 - relied on

Recoveries:

Panchnama (Salient features):

7.1 The primary intention behind the Panchnama is to guard against possible unfair dealings on the part of the officers entrusted with execution of search and also G to ensure that anything incriminating which may be said to have been found in the premises searched was really found there and was not introduced or planted by the officers of the search party. The legislative intent was to control and to check these malpractices of the officers, by making the presence of independent and respectable

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI tBOMBAY

persons compulsory for search of a place and seizure of A article. Panchnama is a document having legal bearings which recqrds evidence and findings that an officer makes at the scene of an offence/crime and of anywhere else which may be related to the crime/QUence and from where incriminating evidence is likely to be:~ollected. The B document so prepared needs to be. signed by the investigating officer who prepares the same and at least by two independent and impartial witnesses called 'Panchas', as also by the party concerned. The witnesses are required to be not only impartial but also c 'respectable', i.e. a person who is not dis-reputed. [paras 218] [281-G-H; 282-A-D] Evidentiary value of Panchnama: 7.2. Panchnama can be used as corroborative D evidence in the court when the 'Pancha' gives evidence in court of law u/s 157 of the Evidence Act. It can also be used as evidence of the recorded transaction by seeing it so as to refresh the memory of the witnesses u/s 159 of Evidence Act. [para 218-219] [282-B, F] Provisions relating to Panchnama in the Code: 7.3. The word 'Panchnama' is nowhere stated in the Code, but it can be construed from the language of certain provisions under the Code. Sections 100 and 174 F of the Code mandate the presence of respectable persons as witnesses at the time of search and investigation respectively. Section 174 of the Code enumerates the list of instances where the police officers are empowered to hold inquests, the proviso to this G section mandates the inquest to be conducted in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Clauses (4) to (8) of s.100 stipulate the procedure with regard to search in the presence of two or more respectable and independent persons preferably H

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from the same locality. The following mandatory conditions can be culled out from s. 100 of the Code for a valid Panchnama: i.

All the necessary steps for personal search of officer (Inspecting officer) and panch witnesses should be taken to create confitlence in the mind of court as nothing is implanted and true search has been made and things seized were found real.

ii.

Search proceedings should be recorded by the 1.0. or some other person under the supervision of the panch witnesses.

iii.

All the proceedings of the search should be recorded very clearly stating the identity of the place to be searched, all the spaces which are searched and descriptions of all the articles seized, and also, if any sample has been drawn for analysis purpose that should also be stated clearly in the Panchanama.

iv.

The 1.0. can take the assistance of his subordinates for search of places. If any superior officers are present, they should also si9n the Panchanama after the signature of the main 1.0.

v.

Place, name of the police station, Officer rank (1.0), full particulars of panch witnesses and the time of commencing and ending must be mentioned in the Panchnama.

vi.

The panchnama should be attested by the panch witnesses as well as by the concernecl 10.

vii.

Any overwriting, corrections, and errors in the

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YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA,THR.CBl,BOMBAY

Panchnama should be attested by the witnesses. viii.

If a search is conducted without warrant of court u/s 165 of the Code, the 1.0. must record reasons and a search memo should be issued. [para 220-222] [282-G-H; 285-B-H; 286-A-C]

Circumstances when the Panchnama is inadmissible: 7.4. The Panchnama will be inadmissible in the court of law in the following circumstances: i.

ii.

The Panchnama recorded by the 1.0. under his supervision should not be hit by s.162 of the Code. The procedure requires the 1.0. to record the search proceedings as if they were written by the panch witness himself and the same should not be recorded in the form of examining witnesses as laid down u/s 161 of the Code. The Panchnama must be attested by the panch witnesses for it to be valid in the eyes of law. In case· of a literate panch witness, he must declare that he has gone through the contents of Panchnama and it is in tune with wh.at he has seen in the places searched, whereas for illiterate panch witness, the contents should be read over to him for his understanding and then the signature should be appended. If the above said declaration is not recorded, then the panchnama document will be hit by s.162 of the Code. [para 223] [286-D-H; 287-A]

7.5. On any deviation from the procedure, the entire panchanama cannot be discarded and the proceedings are not vitiated. If any deviation from the procedure occurs due to a practical impossibility then that should

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be recorded by the 1.0. in his file so as to enable him to answer during the time of his examination as a witness in court. Where there is no availability of panch witnesses, the 1.0 will conduct a search and seize the articles without panchas and draw a report of the entire B such proceedings which is called as a 'Special Report'. [para 224] [287-8-C]

Pradeep Narayan Madgaonkar and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra (1995) 4 SCC 255; Mohd. Hussain Babamiyan C Ramzan vs. State Of Maharashtra, (1994) Cri.L.J. 1020, and Pannala/ Damodar VS. State of Maharashtra (1979) 4 sec 526, M. Prabhulal vs. The Assistant Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 958 (2003) 8 sec 449 and Ravindra Shantram Sawan VS. State of Maharashtra 2002 (3) SCR 881 = (2002) 5 SCC 604; D Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Kofi and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat 2010 (14) SCR 1 = (2011) 11SCC111 - referred to.

=

7.6. In the instant case, A-67 in his confessional statement narrated about various incriminating articles E and also identified the articles used for preparation of bomb. PW-282 identified the accused (A-67), who. had given him two suit cases, which he handed over to police. The said suit case contained hand grenades and bundles of wire. PW-541, P.I. DCBelD Unit, deposed about taking F charge of the incriminating suit cases, AK-56 rifles, ammunition and hand grenades and keeping the same in strong room of DCB, CID. [para 229, 232 233 and 237] [288-D; 290-F; 291-C; 293-G] 7. 7 From the statements of various accused, G particularly, A-10 and the evidence of PW-282 as well as PW-541 coupled with the affidavit sworn by PW-541 and in the light of the principles to b.e followed for a valid panchnama, this Court is satisfied that though minor discrepancies are there, on this ground the entire

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

prosecution case cannot be destroyed. In view of the fact that the prosecution has led ample corroborative evidence, the Designated Court was fully justified in relying on those recoveries while accepting the prosecution case. [para 240] [296-H; 297-A-B] COMPLICITY OF ACCUSED PERSONS:

Appellant-accused A-1 (Crl A. No. 1728 of 2007): 8.1. The .evidence in respect of A-1 is in the nature of the confessions made by the co-accused persons, the testimony of prosecution witnesses, the documentary evidence on record and the recoveries made. Apart from the evidence of PW-2, several accused persons in their confessional statements and other witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution clearly implicate A-1 and his involvement in all the events. [Para 80 and 83] [162H; 163-A; 164-C] 8.2. The prosecution heavily relied on the confessional statements of co-accused persons, namely, A-10, A-11, A-46, A-67 and A-97, which are admissible as primary and substantive evidence against the appellant (A-1) notwithstanding the amendment by Act 43 of 1993. [para 98 and 104] [179-8; 184-F]

8.3. The fact that A-1 was constantly present at Al- F Hussaini building, where the major part of the plans have been made and executed, is established, and his active involvement has also emerged from the confessional statement of A-67 and other evidence on record as to how he was dealing with the so called men of 'AA-2, G managing his ill gotten money, booking air tickets and actively working for confirming them for the conspirators. Further, there is enough evidence of his meeting with coaccused and actively working in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accused 'A-1' need not be present at each H

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and every meeting for being held to be a part of the conspiracy. [para 77] [159-G-H; 160-A-B] 8.4. It has clearly come in the confession of A-67, as corroborated by A-37 and A-46 as also PWs 37, 282 and 506 that A-1 delivered bags and suit cases to A-67 which cqntained handgrenades and electronic detonators and subsequently two suit cases were recovered at the instance of A-67 which contained 105 hand grenades and 150 electronic detonators. In the light of the evidence on record, it is clear that A-1 was in possession of handgrenades and electronic detonators which were concealed in the jeep and which were delivered to A-67 in three suitcases by A-1 through A-46. [para 118-120] [197-F; 198-A-C; 199-A-B] 8.5. The deposition of PW-2 (approver) reveals several incriminating circumstances against the appellant (A-1 ). PW-2 stated that the tickets were given by the appellant to a co-conspirator which fact has been corroborated by A-10 in his confessional statement. This evidence considered along with the fact that the tickets were arranged by the appellant (A-1) and he was present in the meeting of the co-conspirators, i.e., in the meeting of AA-2 including PW-2 and A-10, clearly establishes his unity with the object of the conspiracy. [para 177-178] [237-A-D] 8.6. The prosecution has established by evidence that arranging the tickets to Dubai was one of the responsibilities of A-1. It is very clear that the deposition of PW-2 to the extent that when PW-2 and other conspirators were called by AA-2, A-1was also present there, who on being asked by the former, handed over the tickets to a co-conspirator which clearly establishes the active participation of A-1 in the conspiracy. The fact that the co-conspirators were called for the meeting in the presence of A-1 and were being given instructions by AA·

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

2 about the conspiracy clearly establish the active participation of A-1 in the conspiracy. [para 179] [237-A-D]

8.7. Evidence of PW-2 makes it clear that though he did not mention about the participation of A-1 in all the meetings, however, he identified A-1 in court and asserted B that he is the brother of AA-2 and it was he who assisted his brother at the Al-Hussaini Building for all preparations, viz., purchasing tickets, getting visas, making arrangements for the persons who were sent to Pakistan via Dubai for training in handling and throwing bombs, C filling ROX in vehicles etc., their stay at Dubai and return of such persons from Pakistan to Bombay, payments to various persons who underwent training, which clearly prove the involvement of A-1 in the conspiracy as well as in subsequent events and actions along with his brother and other accused. [para 152] [233-A-C] 8.8. Apart from the categorical statement of coaccused, the prosecution has also examined the independent witnesses from the travel agencies and other authorities. Besides, there is ample evidence to E show that A-1 was incharge of all money transactions and monitoring the activities of all the persons concerned in the movement. The prosecution has also established that A-1 owned a blue Maruti Car which was used for carrying explosives and detonators one day before the blast took F place on 12.03.1993. A-1 left for Dubai on 11.03.1993 with the Indian Passport and thereafter he entered Pakistan with Pakistani Passport. Though he was not one among the persons who carried arms and ammunitions used for the blast but it was he who stood behind them from G starting till the end, viz., conspiracy, planning and making all the arrangements for sending certain persons to Pakistan for training in handling of arms and ammunitions. [para 249] [302-E-G]

C

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8.9. A perusal of the Confessions by: the coconspirators would show that the appellant (A-1) was playing a key role in furtherance of the conspiracy. The evidence along with further material relied on by the prosecution show that A-1 also played an active role in generation and management of funds for achieving the object behind the conspiracy and in all subsequent events. [para 250] [303-8] 8.10. This Court is satisfied that the prosecution has established all the charges leveled against A-1 and the Designated Court, after analysing all the materials including oral and documentary evidence and the independent witnesses, rightly convicted him. [para 249] [302-H; 303-A] OTHER APPELLANTS-ACCUSED PERSONS: 9. The evidence against all other accused-appellants is in the form of: (i) their own confessions; (ii) confessions made by other co-conspirators (coaccused); (iii) testimonies of prosecution witnesses including eye-witnesses; and (iv) documentary evidence. [para 286] [343-F-H] Appellants A-32, A-36 and A-39 (Criminal Appeal Nos. 609-610 of 2008):

10.1 The evidence on record, namely, the confessional statements of appellants-A-32 and A-39, the confessional statements of co-accused A-13, A-23, A-29, A49, A-52, A-57, A-64, A-94, A-98 and A-100, prosecution witnesses, namely PW-2 (approver), PW-5, PW-6 and PW13 (eye-witnesses) other witnesses of investigation, recoveri s, FSL reports, evidence with regard to injured victims a d deceased persons, it has been sufficiently established that each of the appellants, namely, A-32, A-36 and A-39 were actively involved in the conspiracy of causing blasts in Bombay in a

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

much as they attended conspiratorial meetings and in furtherance of the conspiracy they received weapons training in Pakistan; in the night of 11/12.03.1993, they participated in filling of ROX in vehicles at the Al-Hussaini building and; and on 12.03.1993, they threw hand grenades towards the Fishermen's colony which resulted in death of 3 persons and injuring 6 others. [para 258-263, 274 and 279] [310-D; 312-D; 313-F; 316-C; 334-D-H; 335A-B]

10.2. A perusal of all the materials clearly shows that the prosecution has established all the charges and the Designated Court rightly convicted them of the same. [para 281] [337-D]

C

Appellant-accused A-44: (Criminal Appeal Nos. 628-629 of 2008) 11.1. The confession ·of the appellant (A-44) establishes the charges framed against him in the trial. The fact that he knowingly committed the overt act of planting the bomb at Hotel Centaur, Juhu, is evident from his own confession. [para 290] [346-G] 11.2. The confessional statements of all the coaccused, viz., A-9, A-10 A-12 and A-15 clearly corroborate the confessional statement of the appellant (A-44) and establish that he went along with 'A' (AA) and A-10 in a Maruti Van; he witnessed the insertion of pencil detonators in the suitcases filled with ROX; he planted the suitcase filled with ROX in Hotel Centaur Juhu; and that he proceeded to park the scooter filled with ROX at Zaveri Bazaar. [para 293] [350-C-G] 11.3. From the perusal of the testimony of PW-17 and PW-18, the staff of Hotel Centaur Juhe, it is clear that the witnesses established the identity of the person, who planted the suitcase in the hotel, as the appellant.

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Further, the prosecution has produced sufficient evidence against the appellant (A-44) to bring home the charges framed against him. [para 295 and 305] [352-FG; 369-B]

Appellant-accused A-10 and A-29 (Criminal Appeal Nos. 637-638 of 2008)

C

12.1. From the confessional statement of A-10 and A29, it is evident that both the accused apart from implicating themselves in various activities along with other accused persons, corroborate with each other. It is also clear that both the appellants were present at the residence of 'AA-2' and went in a red coloured Maruti van which was loaded with explosive substances and parked it in the compound of the Plaza Cinema which later exploded killing 1o persons and injuring 36 others. [para 313] [384-F-G] 12.2. Confessional statements of co-accused viz., A32, A-46, A-57, A-64, A-100, A-9, A-12, A-15, A-17, A-44, A96, A-97, A-16, A-23, A-24, A-36, A-39, A-49, A-52, A-77, A94 and A-98 substantiate the fact that the appellants, viz., A-10 and A-29 were fully aware of the conspiracy and wilfully participated in performing the conspiratorial acts. Further, the_ confessions of these co-accused corroborate the confessional statements of the appellants (A-10 and A-29) in material particulars. [para 315] [396-C-E]

12.3. PW-2, in his deposition, implicates the appellants. He duly corroborates the confessions of the G co-accused and the confessions of the appellants themselves. The deposition of PW-2 has also been corroborated in material particulars. [para 318] [397-D, H; 398-A]

12.4. PWs-3 and 4, who were the Security Guards on

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

duty at Plaza Cinema at the relevant time, and had A witnessed the incident, sufficiently prove involvement of the appellants. Their depositions also provide corroboration with the confessional statements of A-10 and A-29 that they parked the Maruti van laden with explosives in Plaza Cinema compound which caused the B said explosions causing death of 10 persons and injuries to 36 people. [para 319 and 322] [398-G; 400-G-H] 12.5. Other Witnesses namely, PW-449, PW-447, PW455, PW-448 and PW-450 proved the injuries sustained by them during the explosion. PW-646, the doctor who C issued certificates regarding treatment of PW-449 and PW-407 sufficiently corroborates the fact of injury suffered by the victims. [para 323] [401-A-B] 12.6. In view of the confessional statements of the D appellants (A-10 and A-29), the confessional statements of the other co-accused persons, deposition of prosecution witnesses, as also the eye-witnesses, viz., PWs-3 and 4 along with other witnesses duly examined by the prosecution, the charges framed against the E appellants have been duly proved. [para 331] [404-A-B] Appellant-accused A-9 (Criminal Appeal No.365 of 2008): 13.1. Appellant (A-9) confessed to have facilitated AA· 2 fleeing from India in the morning of 12.3.1993. In the F night of 11.3.1993 he was present when ROX was being filled into vehicles and was being kept in suit cases by other co-accused. He went along with A-10 to drop coaccused A-12, A-44 and AA who went for planting bombs in Hotel Sea Rock, Hotel Centaur, Juhu and Hotel Centaur G Airport. He planted a scooter laden with ROX in Zaveri Bazar. The appellant consciously joined the_ conspiracy and committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. From a perusal of the entire confession, it is established that the appellant was fully aware and H

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conscious of the overt acts committed by him. The guilt of the appellant (A-9) is proved from his confession and it is established that he knew that his actions were wrong and illegal. [para 338 and 339) [412-C; 413-A-C, H; 414-A,

CJ

C

13.2. The involvement of the appellant (A-9) has also been disclosed in the confessional statements of coaccused namely A-10, A-11, A-12, A-15 and A-44. Besides, the prosecution has relied upon the evidence of prosecution witnesses namely, PW-29, PW-36; PW 469, PW 556, PW2, PWs 51, 82, 452, 299, 651, 81, 554 to establish the involvement of the appellant (A-9) in the conspiracy and the consequential acts including the purchase of scooters used in blasts. The recoveries made and the FSL Report have been proved. Further the injured witnesses and relatives of deceased, namely, PWs 394, 424, 578, 395 and 396 have also deposed. [para 340, 344 and 348] [414-E; 419-F; 425-C-D] 13.3. In view of the confessional statement of the appellant (A-9), the confessional statements of other coaccused persons as also the eye-witnesses PWs-29 and 36, along with other witnesses duly examined by the prosecution, the charges framed against the appellant (A9) have been duly proved. [para 351) [430-B-C] Appellant-accused A-11 (Criminal Appeal Nos. 864-865 of 2008):

14.1. From the confessional statement of the appellant (A-11 ), it is clear that he was a close associate G of 'AA-2' . He had full knowledge of all the facets of the conspiracy and played an active part in the landing and transportation of ROX and other explosives and making of suitcase and vehicle bombs. He planted a jeep containing a bomb at Century Bazaar. He was involved H in all the stages of conspiratorial design. It is thus

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

established from his own confession that he played an important and active role in the conspiracy. [para 359) [441-F-G] 14.2. The other co-accused, namely A-9, A-10, A-12, A-13, A-15, A-17, A-18, A-23, A-24, A-28, A-29, A-46, A-57, A-64, A-73 and A-100 in their confessions u/s 15 of TADA, have also discussed the role played by the appellant (A11) in the conspiracy. [para 365) [445-G]

14.3. Further, evidence of the approver (PW-2), the eye-witness (PW-15), experts and others clearly implicate C A-11 to the actual scene of the crime at Century Bazaar along with linking him to taking part in the entire conspiracy. The confession made by A-11 himself and the confessions of the various co-accussed are in consonance with the other available evidence. It is, D therefore, established that the appellant (A-11) was an active member of the conspiracy which led to the blasts at various places in Bombay and caused many deaths, injuries and loss to property. The involvement of the appellant in the entire conspiracy was of great E importance as he was himself involved in the landing of arms and ammunitions and even planted the jeep with a bomb which exploded in Century Bazaar. [para 376-377] [476-B-F] 14.4. This Court, therefore, holds that the prosecution has produced sufficient evidence to bring home the charges framed against the appellant (A-11 ). [para 378) [477-B]

Appellant-accused A-12 (Criminal Appeal No. 897 of G 2008): 15.1. Confessional statement of A-12 established that he was a trusted confidant of AA-2 since he was assisting him in the crime relating to Hawala transaction and was

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well acquainted with other co-conspirators; he participated in the landing, transportation and storage of arms and ammunitions and explosives that was used in the bomb blasts; he participated in filling of ROX in the vehicles parked in the garage of Al-Hussaini building; he planted the suitcase in Hotel Sea Rock knowing that it contains ROX and is fitted with time pencil detonator; and that he parked the scooter laden with black chemical and fitted with time pencil detonator at Katha Bazaar. [para 386] [491-E-H; 492-A-C] 15.2. The involvement of the appellant has also been disclosed in the confessional statements of the coaccused A-9, A-10, A-11, A-14 amd A-15. It is clear from the confession of the appellant (A-12) and the confessions of other co-accused that the work of filling of ROX in vehicles and suitcases was carried out in the garage of the Al-Hussaini Building. This Court is also satisfied that sufficient evidence is available on record to substantiate the fact that the appellant (A-12) participated in filling ROX in vehicles in the night intervening 11/12 31993. [para 388 and 396] [492-F; 510-F-G] 15.3. On perusal of the depositions of PWs-8 and 9, it is clearly established that on 12.03.1993, the appellant parked the scooter at Katha Bazaar, opposite to Matruchhaya Building which later exploded. The depositions also sufficiently corroborate the confessional statement made by the appellant that he parked a scooter laden with explosives at Katha Bazaar. From the evidence of PW-386 and PW-75, it is clearly discernible that the scooter was booked in the fake name. [para 392] [498-FG; 503-E] 15.4. The evidence of PWs 23, 462, 28 and 46 establishes the fact that the appellant (A-12) entered into the Room No. 1840 of Hotel Sea Rock along with the luggage and after leaving the same in the said room, he

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

went out of the hotel. Thereafter, a big explosion took place in the said room. Both PWs-23 and 28 have identified the appellant (A-12). [para 394] [506-E-F] 15.5. In view of the confessional statement of the appellant (A-12), the confessional statements of other coaccused persons, as also the eye-witnesses along with other witnesses duly examined by the prosecution and recoveries made, the charges framed against the appellant have been duly proved. [para 400] [512-C-D] Criminal Appeal Nos. 941-942 of 2008(A-16l 16.1. The appellant-accused A-16, in his confessional statement, has given details about his involvement in the conspiracy. He has given the description of the meetings that he attended. He also described about the training that took place in Pakistan and other relevant details about his own involvement as well as that of the other accused. [para 407] [522-H; 523-A] 16.2. A perusal of the confession by the accused shows that the appellant was playing a key role in furtherance of the conspiracy. The other co-accused namely, A-10, A-29, A-32, A-36, A-39, A-49, A-52, A-57 A64, A-94, A-98 and A-100, in their confessions u/s 15 of TADA have also discussed the role played by A-16 in the conspiracy. [para 409] [526-H; 527-A] 16.3. The evidence of approver (PW-2) and the confessional statement of A-64 show that A-16 participated in the landing and transportation of arms and ammunitions and explosives which were smuggled into India in February, 1993. PW2 further stated that A16 visited Pakistan via Dubai for receiving training in handling of arms and ammunitions and explosives from the agents of ISi to commit terrorist acts in India. He attended conspiratorial meetings during the month of March 1993 at the residence of '8' and A-96 for making

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plans to commit terrorist act. He also participated along with other co-conspirators in loading the explosives like ROX fitted with time device detonators in various vehicles during preparation of vehicle bombs in the intervening night between 11/12-3-1993. He surveyed and conducted reconaissence of the Stock Exchange Building and Air India Building on 10.03.1993 for causing explosions there. Therefore, it is established that the appellant was well aware of the conspiracy right from the inception and also of the consequences of his acts. [para 409, 413-414] [533-F; 540-E-H; 541-A] 16.4. It is evidently clear from the participation of A16 in all the important events and his presence in the conspiratorial meetings that he was an integral part of the conspiracy and knew everything about it. It was not the case that he was merely following the instructions. The testimony of the approver corroborates the confession of the accused as well as confessions of other coaccused in all material particulars. The approver was one of the conspirators and he was a party to all the landings, meetings, training and also went to plant the explosives laden vehicle at the Shiv Sena Bhawan. The account of the conspiratorial meetings, training and other events is reliable and fits in to the chain of events which has already been established by the confessions of various accused. [para 415] [541-B-D]

16.5. The evidence of the approver (PW 2), the eyewitnesses (PW 11, PW 12 and PW 445), the , experts and other witnesses, namely, PW 363, PW 329, PW 445 clearly G establish the involvement of A-16 in the explosions that took place at the Stock Exchange building, Air India building and the Shiv Sena Bhawan. It is established that A-16 was an active member of the conspiracy which led to the blasts at various places in Bombay and caused many deaths, injuries and loss to property. The

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

l

involvement of the appellant in the entire conspiracy establishes the critical role played by him in the blast. [para 430-431) [560-A-B, DJ

16.6. In view of the confessional statement of the appellant (A-16), the confessional statements of other co- B · accused persons, the statement of approver (PW-12) as also the eye-witnesses along with other witnesses duly· examined, the prosecution has produced sufficient evidence against the appellant to bring home the charges framed against him. [para 432) [560-E]

17. After meticulous examination of confessional statements of the accused and the co-accused, the recoveries made, and other evidences it establishes undoubtedly the guilt of all the death convicts. [para 474) [588-A-B]

QUANTUM OF SENTENCE: 18.1. It is manifestfrom the bare reading of judgments on death penalty from 1950 till date that the judiciary has always exercised its discretion in awarding this extreme penalty with great circumspection, caution and restraint. The dictum in Bachan Singh paraphrases that the duty cast upon the judges in deciding the appropriate sentence is a matter of judiciousness and not of law. [para 476] [588-E-F; 589-A]

Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898 relied on 18.2. Section 3(2)(i) of TADA prescribes death or life imprisonment in alternative as the penalty for a terrorist act. It is noticeable from the transformation in the sentencing policy that the courts were required to look into each and every case on its own merits, to determine the appropriate sentence for the offender. [para 477] [589D-E]

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18.3. The changes, which the Code has undergone in the last few decades, clearly indicate that Parliament is taking note of contemporary criminological thought and movement. After the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which came into force with effect from B 1st April, 1974, imprisonment for life would be the rule and a sentence of death an exception. Though TADA is a special Act, the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure is permissible to the extent of its consistency with the Act. [para 478-479] [589-E-F; 590-0]

Mithu vs. State of Punjab 1983 (2) SCR 690 = (1983) 2 SCC 277; Jagmohan Singh vs. State of UP 1973 (2) SCR 541=(1973)1 sec 20 - referred to.

18.4. Amended s. 354(3) of the Code mandates that D when the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such E sentence. As an outcome, the discretion to impose the sentence of death has been curbed to the extent of stating the 'special reasons' and judges are left with the task of discovering the 'special reasons'. [para 479] [590E-F, G]

Dalbir Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab 1979 (3) SCR 1059 = (1979) 3 SCC 745 - relied on

Bishnu Deo Shaw vs. State of West Bengal 1979 (3) SCR 355 = (1979) 3 SCC 714; Rajendra Prasad vs. State G of UP 1979 (3) SCR 78 (1979) 3 SCC 646 - referred to.

=

18.5. Enactment of sub-s.(2) of s. 235 CrPC is an act of affirming the new trend in penology, which mandates the courts to consider various factors such as the prior H criminal record of the offender, his age, employment,

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

educational background, home life, sobriety and social adjustment, emotional and mental condition, and the prospects of his returning to normal path of conformity with the law etc. in deciding the quantum of sentence. In this background of standards, the judiciary with the aid of s. 235(2) ascertained the 'special reasons' pertaining to the criminals as required by s.354(3) of the Code to impose death penalty. The majority view in Bachan Singh, gave a wider interpretation to the term "special reasons" by embracing within its ambit both the circumstances connected with the particular crime and the criminal. Upshot of this interpretation is that the 'special reasons' required for confirming the death sentence u/s 302 or in the context of this case in s.3(2)(i) of TADA will have to be identified by balancing the aggravating and mitigating or extenuating circumstances. [para 485, 486 and 490] [594-D-F; 597-C-D]

18.6. While determining the aggravating circumstances, relative weight ought to be given to both criminal and the crime and an identical approach must be adhered to for ascertaining the mitigating circumstances. E Since these two aspects are interwoven, it is difficult to segregate the two to state that all circumstances relating to crime will be aggravating, likewise that all circumstances relating to criminal are mitigating. The aggravating circumstances pertaining to both crime and F criminal are the reasons, which can be against the accused; likewise the mitigating circumstances marshalled from both crime and criminal can be the reasons in favour of the accused. A careful evaluation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances pertaining to G both criminal and crime is the approach to ascertain the special reasons for imposing the extreme penalty on a person. Thus, the two cardinal factors, viz., one, the

penalty imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of the crime and second, the degree of responsibility of the

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offender must be taken into account in determining the sentence for an individual accused in addition.to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. [para 491493] [597-E-G, H; 598-A-Cl,

Capital sentence to appellant-accused A-1:

18.7. The appellant-accused A-1 is the younger brother of 'AA-2', who is one of the masterminds behind the blasts. A-1 was in a position of authority, particularly, he had played a significant role in the context of the C blasts which is important while determining the sentence. The confessional statements of co-accused establish the dominating position of A-1 in comparison with other 10 accused-appellants. The following conduct of A-1 along to the co-conspirator family members may be relevant:D

a.

The confessional statements of various coaccused made a mention that 'AA-2' had instructed them to stay in touch with A-1 for further instructions. Thus, A-1 assumed the role of 'AA-2' in India during his absence. As an outcome, 'AA-2' gave the commands to A1, who in turn passed them to other accused thereby signifying the trusted position that A1 obtained from 'AA-2', apart from being just a younger brother.

b.

A-1 's role was not limited only to the extent of correspondence between the masterminds and all other accused but he was also entrusted with task of handling the explosive bags and for their safe keeping.

c.

Furthermore, he was actively involved in hawala transactions for the purpose of facilitating the blasts on 12.3.1993.

d.

Besides, he acquired tickets both for Dubai

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR CBI , BOMBAY

and Pakistan for transporting the other accused-appellants to the respective places for the purpose of training and coaching them in envisaging their participation for the blasts in Bombay.[para 496 and 498] [598-G-H; 599A, 8-D]

18.8. Essentially, A-1 's deeds can't be viewed distinct from the act of 'AA-2'. Therefore, both owe an equivalent responsibility for the blasts. They were the architects of the blasts, without whom the plan would have never seen C the daylight. From this conduct, A-1 was one of the 'driving sprit' behind the plan of the 1993 blasts, whereas the other appellants played a far lesser role and thus a lesser contribution to the crimes resulting from this plan. To be clearer on the dominant position, the blasts on 123-1993 was at the discretion of the masterminds, as they D had the effective control over the incident. It is this effective control over the incident, which is absent in the role played by rest of the appellants. [para 499] [600-A-

C]

16.9. It is true that there is no direct act attributed to A-1 as far as parking of the explosives filled vehicles in different localities are concerned. But without the · planning of conspirators for which A-1 was a party too, the explosives and ammunition required for the execution F wouldn't have entered into the country and as a consequence the execution itself wouldn't have materialized. Furthermore, it is not conceivable to envisage that these principal perpetrators will take the execution in their hands. So they targeted the meek souls G who were underprivileged and easily impressible to accomplish their ulterior motive. It is also a proved fact that the family members of AA-2 including A-1 fled the country anticipating detention for their illegal acts. Thus, it can safely be concluded that no offence might have H

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taken place at all but for the instigation by the absconding accused and A-1. Therefore, the dominant position of the accused is an aggravating factor by itself, as it gives the status of direct responsibility. [para 501502] (600-G-H; 601-A-C] 18.10. Following aggravating circumstances emerge against A-1: i.

A-1 was one of the brains behind the hatching of larger conspiracy for the Bombay Bomb Blasts in 1993.

ii.

The dominant position and significant role played by A-1 is a factor that may aggravate his punishment.

iii.

The "vulnerability of the victims" and "the depravity of the crimes" constitute additional aggravating circumstances.

iv.

Crime of terrorism is in itself an aggravating circumstance as. it carries a "special stigmatization" due to the deliberate form of inhuman treatment it represents and the severity of the pain and suffering inflicted.

v.

A-1 was part of the deliberate choosing of localities like Century Bazaar, Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Stock Exchange Building etc. where there was more prospect of public gathering. The manner of its execution and its design would put it at the level of extreme atrocity and cruelty.(para 503] (601-C-H; 602-

[2013] 15 S.C.R.

A] 18.11. Following mitigating circumstances were pleaded on behalf of A-1:

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

i.

He is a Chartered Accountant by profession and a respectable person in the society before the occurrence of this incident.

ii.

There is no overt act committed by the accused himself. In fact, the act of A-1 returning to India unlike other. absconders is in itself a mitigating circumstance in his favour.

iii.

No criminal antecedent.

iv.

He suffers from depression since 1996.

v.

He had served more than 19 years in jail. [para 504) [602-8-F]

18.12. In the considered opinion, of this Court, the lack of prior criminal record is a mitigating factor; other mitigating circumstances are not at the higher pedestal to bargain for reduction of sentence. [para 505) [602-F-

G] 18.13. Under the established jurisprudence, the two factors- a commanding position and a crime of 'utmost gravity' ordinarily - merit the extreme penalty even accounting for the guilty plea and mitigating factors. This is the special reason, which warrants death penalty to the accused. Therefore, having taken into account and weighed the totality of A-1 's culpability and all the particular circumstances of the case, this Court concurs with the decision of the Designated Court and confirms the sentence of capital punishment to A-1. [para 506 and 507) [603-A-C]

LIFE SENTENCE to other appellants-accused A-32, A-36, A-39, A-44, A-10, A-29, A-9, A-11, A-12 and A-16: 18.14. There is a significant difference in the role

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played by A-1 and the rest of the appellants. A-1 as well as other absconders were the real conspirators who hatched the scheme for such a tragic act; whereas the other 10 appellants i.e A-32, A-36, A-39, A-44, A-10, A-29, A-9, A-11, A-12 and A-16 were mere subservient subordinates whose knowledge and acquaintance might have been restricted to their counterparts. Thus, A-1 and all the absconding accused were the archers whereas rest of the appellants were the arrows in their hands. [para 500) [600-D-F] 18.15. These 10 accused-appellants have traded the freedom of choice for the freedom to commit atrocities. Though the incident of bomb blasts is not a brainchild of these appellants, yet they turned the conspirators' orders into action by executing the blasts for which they are liable for the consequence of their acts. Every person is responsible for his or her actions and he/she can't evade the accountability by placing the responsibility on another person. At the same time, our legal system mandates that the sentence shall reflect the relative significance of the accused's role. [para 509) [603-D-F] 18.16. The following aggravating circumstances remain the same in respect of the 10 accused-appellants:

1.

These 10 accused-appellants underwent special training in Pakistan for the purpose of executing the blasts in India.

2.

These accused persons/individuals parked the vehicles with explosives at different spots as directed by their masterminds for the explosion of bombs.

3.

Crime of terrorism is in itself an aggravating circumstance as it carries a "special stigmatization" due to the deliberate form of

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

inhuman treatment it represents and the A severity of the pain and suffering inflicted. 4.

5.

The "vulnerability of the victims" and "the depravity of the crimes" constitute additional aggravating circumstances.

The manner of execution of crime and its design is at a level of extreme atrocity and cruelty. [para 510] [603-H; 604-A-D]

18.16. The mitigating circumstance of these C appellants differ from individual to individual. The mitigating circumstances can be classified into seven heads, namely, (i) age, (ii) act of remorse, (iii) no prior criminal antecedents, (iv) co-operation with the investigation, (v) family circumstances, (vi) ill health and o (vii) delay in execution. The first five aspects have been accepted as mitigating circumstances by the established practices of this Court. As far as 'ill health' is concerned, it is not a mitigating but a special circumstance which may aid in reduction of sentence. The vital distinction E between the 'special circumstance' and 'mitigating ·circumstance' appears to lie in the fact that the reduction in penalty is given not owing to any merit- earned on the part of the accused, but because of compelling 'reasons of humanity', illustrating a humane approach to F sentencing in this context. [para 510 and 512] [604-E; 612F-H; 613-A] 18.17. Another vital factor stated as mitigating circumstance in all these appeals is that they have all been imprisoned for around 20 years and they continue G to be in jail. Nevertheless, as has been held by the Constitution Bench in Triveniben*, the sentence can't be commuted merely on the ground of delay alone. It was further observed that no absolute or unqualified rule can be laid down that in every case in which there is a long H

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delay in the execution of death sentence, the sentence must be substituted by life imprisonment. Thus, no accused can claim as a matter of right to commute his/ her death sentence on the ground of delay in the judicial process. However, noting the lengthy incarceration suffered by the accused over a period of two decades, as an exceptional scenario, this Court is inclined to consider the long delay as a mitigating circumstance but less significance will be attached to it in comparison with other six circumstances.[para 513] [613-8-E] *Triveniben vs. State of Gujarat 1989 (1) SCR 509 = (1989) 1 sec 678 - referred to

18.18. Furthermore, all these 10 accused-appellants belong to the lower strata of society, most of whom don't O even have any regular job for their livelihood. Their personal life was relatively moderate before this incident. These appellants have fallen prey to the ulterior motive of the conspirators for accomplishing their hidden motives, which was to spread terror among the people. E Such evidence can in no way exonerate or excuse them for their participation in the commission of crime. However, it provides a somewhat nuanced picture and may imply that their participation in the massacres resulted from misguided notions rather than extremism. Technically, it is these 10 appellants who parked the explosive filled vehicles in the respective destinations. However, it is actually the masterminds' strategy, which was executed by the subservient minions i.e these 10 appellants. This may not help in complete exoneration of the liability of these 1O appellants but the degree of G punishment must necessarily reflect this difference. It is vital to remember that 'but for' the masterminds, this blast should have never seen the daylight. [para 514-516] [613E-G; 614-8-C]

18.19. Therefore, to differentiate the degree of

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YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

punishment to A-1 and other 10 appellants, the ends of justice would be served if the death sentence of these ten appellants be commuted to imprisonment for life. [para 517] (614-D]

18.20. With a note of caution, it is reiterated that it is B ordinarily expected that two accused convicted of similar crimes in similar circumstances should not in practice receive very different sentences, often the differences are more significant than the similarities, and the mitigating and aggravating factors dictate different results. C Therefore, the lesser sentence imposed on these 10 appellants cannot be a precedent in other cases and every case must be decided according to its facts and circumstances. (para 518] (614-D-F] ·State of UP. vs. Sanjay Kumar (2012) 8 SCC 537 referred to.

Life Imprisonment is Rigorous Imprisonment: 19.1. There was a misperception that life imprisonment is distinct from the punishment of rigorous or simple imprisonment shown in clause (4) of s. 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This issue was clarified in Md. Munna. Therefore, "imprisonment for life" is to be treated as "rigorous imprisonment for life". [para 520] (617-F-G; 618-A]

Md. Munna vs. UO/ and Ors.!Kartick Biswas vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 233 = (2005) 7 sec 417 - referred to.

Meaning of Life Imprisonment:

19.2: Life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years or even 30 years, rather it always means the whole natural life. This Court in Sangeet* has observed that there is misconception that

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a prisoner serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14 years or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government u/s 432 of the Code, which in turn is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and to further substantive check in s. 433-A of the Code. This Court has always clarified that the punishment of a fixed term of imprisonment so awarded would be subject to any order passed in exercise of clemency powers of the President of India or the Governor of the State, or remission and commutation guaranteed u/s 432 of the Code, as the case may be. Further, the power to grant remissions and to commute sentences is coupled with a duty to exercise the same fairly, reasonably and in terms of restrictions imposed in several provisions of the Code. [para 521, 522 and 524] [618-B-C, F; 619-B-D] *Sangeet and Anr. vs. State of Haryana, 2012 (11) Scale 140; and State of UP. vs. Sanjay Kumar (2012) 8 SCC 537 - referred to.

19.3. In order to check all arbitrary remissions, the Code itself provides several conditions. Sub-ss. (2) to (5) of s.432 of the Code lay down basic procedure for making F an application to the appropriate Government for suspension or remission of sentence either by the convict or someone on his behalf. This Court is of the view that exercise of power by the appropriate Government under sub-s. (1) of s.432 of the Code cannot G be automatic or claimed as a right for the simple reason, that this is only an enabling provision and the same would be possible subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. Those conditions are mentioned either in the Jail Manual or in statutory rules. This Court, in various decisions, has held that the power of remission cannot

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

be exercised arbitrarily. The decision to grant remission has to be well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned. The statutory procedure laid down in s. 432 of the Code itself provides this check on the possible misuse of power by the appropriate Government. [para 523] [618-F-H; 619-A] 19.4. Therefore, subject to ss. 432 and 433 of the Code and clemency powers of President and Governor, as vested by the Constitution under Arts. 72 and 161, respectively, the appellants- accused A,32, A-36, A-39, A44, A-10, A-29, A-9, A-11, A-12 and A-16 shall be imprisoned for life until their death. The executive should take due consideration of judicial reasoning before excising the remission power. [para 525] [619-D-E] Death Ref. Case (Crl.l No. 1 'Of 2011 19.5. The death reference with regard to A-1 is confirmed; and for rest of the appellants convicted under this part, the death sentence is commuted into life imprisonment. [para 527] [619-H]

C

TERRORISM: 20.1. The quantity of ROX that was used in blasts clearly shows and establishes the fact that the blasts were intended to tear the economic, moral and social fabric of the nation and to induce communal tensions. The planning, timing and the intensity of the blasts establish that the blasts were synchronised so as to cause maximum damage to life and property. [para 377 and 431] [476-F-H; 560-C-D] 20.2. The term "terrorism" is a concept that is commonly and widely used in everyday parlance. There is no particular form of terror and, as such, anything intended to create terror in the minds of general public

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in order to endanger their lives and damage to public property may be termed as a terrorist act and a manifestation of terrorism. Acts of terrorism can range from threats to actual assassinations, kidnappings, airline hijackings, bomb scares, car bombs, building B explosions, mailing of dangerous materials, computerbased attacks and the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons - weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Another trend common to both national and international terrorism is the emergence of terrorist c groups motivated by religious fanaticism, though terrorism is abhorred and condemned by all the religions of the world. Terrorists conduct planned and coordinated attacks targeting innocent civilians with a view to infuse terror in the minds of people. India, particularly, has been D a victim on several occasions. [para 433-434 and 442] [560-F-G; 561-B; 564-F-H] 20.3. In spite of several international conventions and Multilateral Agreements and domestic and international legislations to counter terrorism, it is a major problem that E is reoccurring over the globe in many different forms. It is a plague for a nation or society that should be eradicated. There is a dire need to best deal with it and to make sure to take preventive actions. In the considered view of this Court, the following procedures/ F rules must have to be adopted while dealing with it:(i)

Better governance and law enforcement is the real need of the hour.

(ii)

We must formulate long term as well as short term strategies to combat terrorism.

(iii)

More advanced technologies must be used for communication among law enforcement agencies.

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YAKUB ABDUL 8fa,ZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

(iv)

Fighting terrorism would require a long term planning and sustained multi-dimensional action.

(v)

There should be proper coordination between all the agencies with high level of motivation and a quick response system must be established to tackle the menace immediately.

(vi)

Rule of Law must always be upheld and it is the duty of the constitutional authority to defend the life and limb of its subjects. [para 435, 439 and 451] [561-D; 563-D; 576-C-H]

C

Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 1994 (1) SuppL SCR 360 = (1994) 4 SCC 602;

~

Girdhari Parmanand Vadhava vs. State of Maharashtra, 1996(6) Suppl. SCR 631=(1996)11SCC179; State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT vs. Nalini & Ors., 1999 (3) SCR 1 = (1999) 5 SCC 253; Mohd. Khalid vs. State of West Bengal 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31 = (2002) 7 SCC 334; Nazir Khan & Ors. vs. State of Delhi 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 884 = (2003) 8 SCC 461; Madan Singh vs. State of Bihar 2004 (3) SCR 692 = (2004) 4 SCC 622; People's Union for Civil Liberties and Anr. vs. Union of India 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 860 = (2004) 9 SCC 580 - referred to Black's law dictionary; The 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism; The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997; The United Nations Security Council 2004 Resolution; League of Nations Convention (1937); and UNSC Resolution No. 1373 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter - referred to.

Role of Pakistan in the Blasts: 20.4. It is devastating to state that Pakistan being a member of the United Nations, whose primary object is

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A to maintain international peace and security, has infringed the recognized principles under international law which obligate all states to prevent terrorist attacks emanating from their territory and inflicting injuries to other states. As per Para 2 of UNSC Resolution No. 1373 B adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, every State has the obligations to perform as mentioned in the judgment. A hoste-State that has the capability to prevent a terrorist attack but fails to do so will inherently fail in fulfilling its duty under Article 2(4) since terrorism c amounts to force by definition. [para 452 and 455] [577C, E; 578-8]

20.5. In the relevant scenario, the accused persons were facilitated by ISi operatives in Pakistan for training without observing any immigration formalities, which means, they had a green channel entry and exit in Pakistan. Their confessions reveal that the accused received training from the ISi officials themselves on some occasions. A large number of convicted accused and absconders have received training in making of bombs by using ROX and other explosives, handling of sophisticated automatic weapons like AK-56 Rifles and handling of hand grenades in Pakistan. These events unveil the tolerance and eni;ouragement shown by Pakistan towards terrorism. The training received in Pakistan materialized in the unfortunate serial blasts in Bombay on 12.3.1993. A responsible State owes an obligation not only to another state but also to the international community as a whole. It is sincerely hoped that every State will strive towards the same. [para 453, 456 and 457] [577-F-G; 579-C-D; 580-G] Role of Police Officers:

20.6. The role of police officials has become more vital in the present century owing to the frequent terror H attacks occurring across the country. It is important to

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA. THR. CBI, BOMBAY

take note of increasing use of explosive devices by the terrorists not only because of their high damage potential but also due to their easy mobility. Thus, the police have a specific and special role, a duty and a responsibility, to curb the conveyance of explosives by vigilant patrolling and search and seizure, if required. Section 20 of the Arms Act, 1959 empowers them to ar.rest persons conveying any arms or ammunitions under suspicious circumstances. If the Mumbai police officials had been able to curtail the conveyance of the contraband in January and February 1993, the occurrence of 12th March 1993 could have been avoided. [para 459 and 461] [581-C-E, G] 20.7. In the instant case, some of the police personnel themselves have taken active part in smuggling and transportation of arms and explosives into Bombay with the help and assistance of a Customs Officer.· Bribe money changed hands in this connection and substantial amounts were seized from some of the police personnel during investigation. [para 462] [582-A-G)

Role of Customs Officers: 20.8. The Customs officials primarily have a duty to prevent smuggling and ensure that everything that enters into or goes out of the country is brought or sent strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law. It is shattering to notice that several customs officers, including the Commissioners of Customs, played an active role as members of conspiracy and implemented the plan. Every kind of smuggling activity is devastating to the economy, but the smuggling of dangerous arms and ammunitions causes wreckage not only to the economy but also to people's lives. The occurrence of Bombay Bomb Blasts is an evidence that such incidents take place along the Indian coastline due to the lack of

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A moral ethics and misconduct on the part of the officials. [para 464-466) [583-C-D, E-G] 20.9. From the evidence on record, it is evident that without the help of the customs officials, the accused would not be in a position to smuggle the weapons required for the said blasts. A rationally structured and effective customs department is the need of the hour in order to curtail illegal imports which can have frightening ramifications upon the nation's economy and citizens' C security. [para 468) [587-E-F] Need to improve vigilance in the Indian Maritime Zone and role of Coast Guards: 20.10. India being a maritime nation, the role of Coast 0 Guards is very vital for shielding the coast from external attacks. The coastal belt is surveyed by three teams of officers firstly, the Indian Navy, which is responsible for overall seaward security of long coastline. Secondly, the Coast Guards who guard the Exclusive Economic Zone E (EEZ) in order to prevent poaching, smuggling and other illegal activities in the EEZ. Lastly, the customs officials, who scrutinize and monitor every commodity which enters the Indian boundaries. The occurrence of Bombay bomb blasts on 12.3.1993 discloses a deficient performance of the officials. Coast Guards being the F strongest link in the security chain are bound to be vigilant at sea and should be in full command of the coast. The role of the coast guards is as important as any military troops. Only well strategized coast guards and high morale customs officers can prevent any G opportunity for the terrorists to attack on our country via our maritime boundary. [para 469, 471 and 473) [586-H; 587-A-B,C,E. G-H] Case Law Reference:

AIR 1956 All. 633

cited

para 13

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR, CBI , BOMBAY

AIR 1954 All. 104

cited

para 14

1954 SCR 330

cited

para 15

AIR 1969 Guj. 320

cited

para 16

1979 (1) SCR 1114

cited

para 17

AIR 1930 Pat. 148

cited

para 18

1984 (2) SCR 50

cited

para 19

1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 53

cited

para 20

2008 (3) SCR 83

cited

para 21

1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 108

cited

para 22

2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336

cited

para 23

2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 872

cited

para 24

1975 (1) SCR 710

cited

para 25

1995 (1) SCR 456

referred to

para 26

2001 (3) SCR 669

referred to

para 29

1977 (2) SCR 901

referred to

para 30

1977 (3) SCR 636

referred to

para 32

1977 (3) SCR 711

referred to

para 32

AIR 2004 SC 503

referred to

para 32

2004 (1) SCR 854

referred to

para 32

2001 (2) SCR 626

relied on

para 32

AIR 1939 PC 43

referred to

para 35

AIR 1949 PC 1

referred to

para 35

AIR 1980 SC 898

relied on

para 37

AIR 1976 SC 230

relied on

para 37

1989 (2) SCR 498

relied on

para 38

1981 (3) SCR 270

referred to

para 39

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(2009) 5 sec 740

referred to

para 40

1991 (2) SCR 256

referred to

para 41

(2009) 6 ALT 677

referred to

para 47

(1962) 2 SCR 195

referred to

para 61

(1873) 173 ER 502

referred to

para 6~

AIR 1938 PC 130

referred to

para. 63

(1962) 1 SCR 194

referred to

para 63

1993 (3) SCR 543

referred to

para 66

2009 (12) SCR 682

referred to

para 66

1978 (1) SCR 781

referred to

para 67

1963 SCR 253

referred to

para 68

1970 (2) SCR 760

referred to

para 68

(1980) 2 sec 465

referred to

para 68

1981 (3) SCR 68

referred to

para 68

2008 (6) SCR 1116

referred to

para 69

1963 SCR 253

referred to

para 70

AIR 1979 SC 1791

referred to

para 70

2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 498

referred to

para 71

1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 189 referred to

para 72

1999 (3) SCR 1

referred to

para 73

1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 24

referred to

para 73

(2001) 1 sec 596

referred to

para 74

2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 79

referred to

para 74

2003 (1) SCR 119

referred to

para 75

2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31

referred to

para 76

2011 (2) SCR 939

referred to

para 87

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

2011 (4) SCR 817

referred to

para 87

2011 (7) SCR 354

referred to

para 87

2009 (8) SCR 719

referred to

para 90

2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 54

referred .to

para 91

2002 (3) SCR 622

referred to

para 92

2008 (16) SCR 155

referred to

para 93

(2003) 9 sec 673

referred to

para 94

2007 (11) SCR 251

cited

para 99

(2009) 7 sec 404

cited

para 100

2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 79

cited

para 101

2007 (2) SCR 289

cited

para 102

1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 263 cited

para 102

1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 360 cited

para 102

(1956) 2 ALL ER 843

cited

para 102

1905 AC 369

cited

para 102

(1898) QB 547

cited

para 102

2011 (1) SCR 997

relied on

para 128

1953 SCR 546

relied on

para 131

2001 (11) Suppl. SCR 433 relied on

para 132

2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 1

relied on

para 133

1963 Suppl. SCR 689

referred to

para 133

1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 24

referred to

para 133

1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 807 referred to

para 136

2000 (1) SCR 200

relied on

para 137

2001 (1) SCR 111

referred to

para 138

2001 (3) SCR 840

referred to

para 139

2002 (2) SCR 767

referred to

para 140

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2002 (3) SCR 622

referred to

para 141

2010 (8) SCR 916

referred to

para 146

2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 577

relied on

para 146

(1968) 1 SCR 695

relied on

para 189

1978 (2) SCR 174

relied on

para 192

2000 (1) SCR 200

relied on

para 202

2001 (1) SCR 111

relied on

para 204

1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 340 relied on

para 211

1994 (2) SCR 375

relied on

para 213

(1995) 4 sec 255

referred to

para 225

(1994) Cri.L.J. 1020

referred to

para 226

(1979) 4 sec 526

referred to

para 226

2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 958

referred to

para 227

2002 (3) SCR 881

referred to

para 227

2010 (14) SCR 1

referred to

para 228

1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 360 referred to

para 444

1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 631

referred to

para 445

1999 (3) SCR 1

referred to

para 447

2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31

referred to

para 447

2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 884

referred to

para 448

2004 (3) SCR 692

referred to

para 449

2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 860

referred to

para 450

1983 (2) SCR 690

referred to

para 477

1973 (2) SCR 541

referred to

para 479

1979 (3) SCR 355

referred to

para 480

1979 (3) SCR 78

referred to

para 481

1979 (3) SCR 1059

relied on

para 482

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY

1989 (1) SCR 509

referred to

para 513

(2012) a sec 537

referred to

para 519

2005 (31 5uppl. SCR 233

referred to

para 520

2012 (11) Scale 140

referred to

para 524

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1728 of 2007. From the Judgment & Order dated 25.10.2007 of the Presiding Officer of the Designated Court, under TADA (P) Act, 1987 of Bombay Blast Cases.Greater Bombay in Bombay Blast Case No.1 of 1993.

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WITH Crl. A. No. 609-610/2008, 628-629/2008, 637-638/2008, 365/ 2008, 864-865/2008, 897/2008, 941-942/2008 and Death Ref. Case (Crl.) No. 1/2011. Faisal Farook, Shubail Farook, Rauf Rahim, Priya Puri, Farhana Shah, Satbir Pilania, Dr. Sushil Balwada for the Appellant.

Mukul Gupta, Satyakam, Anubhav Kumar, Anando Mukherjee, Harsh N. Parekh for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

P. SATHASIVAM, J. Criminal Appeal No. 1728 of 2007. 1. This appeal and the connected matters have been directed against the final orders and judgments of conviction and sentence passed on various dates by the Presiding Officer of the Designated Court under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short 'the TADA') for Bombay Bomb Blast Case, Greater Bombay in BBC No. 1 of 1993. These appeals have been filed under Section 19 of the TADA by the accused against their conviction and sentence and by the CBI

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for confirmation of the death sentence and against the acquittal of some of the accused persons.

2. Brief facts:

The case of the prosecution is as follows:

(a) Babri Masjid at Ayodhya was demolished on 06.12.1992. After its demolition, violence broke out throughout the country. In order to take revenge of the said demolition, Tiger Memon (AA) and Dawood Ibrahim, a resident of Dubai, C formulated a conspiracy to commit a terrorist act in the city of Bombay. In pursuance of the said object, Dawood Ibrahim agreed to send arms and ammunitions from abroad. Tiger Memon, in association with his men, particularly, the accused persons, received those arms and ammunitions through seaD coasts of Bombay. In continuation of the said conspiracy, Tiger Memon sent some of the accused persons to Dubai and from there to Pakistan for training and handling in arms and ammunitions. (b) On 12.03.1993, the commercial hub of the country, the E city of Bombay, witnessed an unprecedented terrorist act sending shock waves throughout the world. In a span of about two hours i.e., between 13:33 to 15:40 hours, a series of 12 bomb explosions took place one after the other at the following twelve places in Bombay, namely, Bombay Stock Exchange, F Katha Bazaar, Sena Bhavan, Century Bazaar, Mahim Causeway, Air India Building, Zaveri Bazaar, Hotel Sea Rock, Plaza Theatre, Juhu Centaur Hotel, Air Port Bay-54 and Air Port Centaur Hotel. In the abovesaid incident of serial bombings, 257 human lives were lost, 713 persons were seriously injured G and properties worth about Rs. 27 crores were destroyed. This was the first ever terrorist attack in the world where ROX (Research Department Explosive) was used on a large scale basis after the World War 11.

(c) The aforesaid calculated act of terror was carried out

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

with utter disregard to human life and dignity. The object of the crime was to incite communal violence and to overawe and weaken the government, disturb social harmony and to break up the social, political and economic order of the country. This overt act of violence not only caused physical and mental damage but also left a psychological impact on society as a wholE;l as the lives of several citizens were completely destroyed. (d) The conspiratorial acts leading to one of the aforesaid object began on or before 06.01.1993 at a meeting in Hotel Persian Darbar, Panvel, wherein the following accused persons, viz., Md. Ahmed Dosa (AA), Md. Salim Mira Moiddin Shaikh @ Salim Kutta (A-134), Md. Kasam Lajpuria (A-136), Ranjitkumar Singh Baleshwar Prasad (A-102) and Md. Sultan Sayyed (A-90) met and organized the landing of fire arms and ammunitions and hand grenades which was to take place on the coast of Dighi Jetty in Raigad District of State of Maharashtra on 09.01.1993. On the said date, Md. Dossa (AA) smuggled and sent a consignment of arms and ammunitions at Dighi Jetty, Raigad in connivance with Md. Sultan Sayeed (A-90), who received illegal gratification for the same. The following persons were also involved in the landing at Dighi Jetty, namely, Uttam Shantaram Poddar (A-30), Abdulla Ibrahim Surti (A-66), Ashok Narayan Muneshwar (A-70), Faki Ali Faki Ahmed Subedar (A-74), Janardhan Pandurang Gambas (A-81), Jaywant Keshav Gurav (A-82), Krishna Sadanand Mokal (A83), Krishna Tukaram Pingle (A-84), Manohar Mahadeo More (A-87), Md. Sultan Sayyed (A-90), Pandharinath Madhukar Mahadik (A-99), Ramesh Dattatray Mali (A-101), Ranjitkumar Singh Baleshwar Prasad (A-102), Sayed @ Mujju Ismail Ibrahim Kadri (A-104), Sayed Ismail Sayed Ali Kadri (A-105), Srikrishna Yeshwant Pashilkar (A-110), Somnath Kakaram Thapa (A-112), Sudhanwa Sadashiv Talwadekar (A-113), Vijay Krishnaji Patil (A-116), Jamir Sayyed Ismail Kadri (A-133), Md. Salim Mira Moiddin Shaikh @ Salim Kutta (A-134) and Md.

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Kasam Lajpuria (A-136). The said meeting dated 06.01.1993

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was not a sudden meeting but was pre-arranged and preplanned. (e) On 19.01.1993, another meeting was held at Dubai wherein Dawood @ Dawood Taklya Mohammed Phanse @ Phanasmiyan (A-14), Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon (both absconding) were present and detailed discussions were held whereafter Tiger Memon agreed to arrange for landing of arms and ammunitions and explosives which were to.be sent to India by sea route for the purpose of committing the aforesaid terrorist act. Pursuant to the above, between 02-08.02.1993, two more such landings of arms and ammunitions, detonators, hand grenades and explosives like ROX took place at Shekhadi Coast under Taluka Shrivardhan in Raigad District through landing agent A-14, Sharif Abdul Gafoor Parkar@ Dadabhai (A-17) (deceased) and Rahim Abbas Karambelkar @ Rahim Laundrywala. In the said landing, the following persons also played an active role, namely, Md. Shoaib Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A-9), Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A10), Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11), Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12), Dawood @ Dawood Taklya Mohammed Phanse @ Phanasmiyan (A-14), lmtiyaz Yunusmiya Ghavte (A-15), Md. Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale (A-16), Sharif Abdul Gafoor Parkar@ Dadabhai (A-17), Suleman Mohammed Kasam Ghavate (A-18), Yeshwant Nago Bhoinkar (A-19), Munna @ Mohammed Ali Khan @ Manojkumar Bhavarlal Gupta (A-24), Muzammil Umar Kadri (A-25), Raju Laxmichand Jain @ Raju Kadi (A-26), Rashid Umar Alware (A-27), Sayyed Abdul Rehman Shaikh (A-28), Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A29), Abdul Aziz Haji Gharatkar (A-34), Ashfaq Kasim Havaldar (A-38), Khalil Ahmed Sayed Ali Nasir (A-42), Mohammed Rafiq @ Rafiq Madi Musa Biyariwala (A-46), Sardar Shahwali Khan (A-54), Sarfaraz Dawood Phanse (A-55), Shahjahan Ibrahim Shaikhdare (A-56), Shaikh Ali Shaikh Umar (A-57), Shaikh Mohammed Ethesham Haji Gulam Rasool Shaikh (A-58), Sharif Khan Abbas Adhikar (A-60), Sajjad Alam @ Iqbal Abdul Hakim Nazir (A-61), Tulsiram Dhondu Surve (A-62), Abu Asim

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR CBI, BOMBAY [P SATHASIVAM, J.]

Azmi (A-63), Nasir Abdul Kader Kewal@ Nasir Dakhla (A-64), Gulam Hafiz Shaikh @ Baba (A-73), Jaywant Keshave Gurav (A-82), Liyakat Ali Habib Khan (A-85), Mohmmed Sultan Sayyed (A-90), Parvez Mohammed Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A100), Ranjitkumar Singh Baleshwar Prasad (A-102), Somnath Kakaram Thapa (A-112), Sudhanwa Sadashiv Talwadekar (A113), Shahnawaz Khan s/o Faiz Mohammed Khan (A-128), Mujib Sharif Parkar (A-131), Mohammed Shahid Nizamuddin Quresh (A-135) and Eijaz Mohammed Sharif@ Eijaz Pathan @Sayyed Zakir (A-137).

(f) Between February to March 1993, the following persons were sent to Pakistan via Dubai by Tiger Memon (AA) and Dawood Ibrahim (AA) for receiving training in handling of fire arms. use of rocket launchers and explosives, in particular, ROX for achieving the common object of the conspiracy, namely, Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale (A-16), Shahnawaz Abdul D Kadar Qureshi (A-29), Zakir Hussain Noor Mohammed Shaikh (A-32), Abdul Khan @ Yakub Khan Akhtar Khan (A-36), Firoz @ Akram Amani Malik (A-39), Nasim Ashraf Shaikh Ali Barmare (A-49), Salim Rahim Shaikh (A-52), Nasir Abdul Kader Kewal @ Nasir Dakhla (A-64), Salim Bismilla Khan @ E Salim Kurla (Dead) (A-65), Faroow lliyas Motorwala (A-75), Fazal Rehman Abdul Khan (A-76), Gui Mohammed @ Gullu Noor Mohammed Shaikh (A-77), Mohammed Hanif Mohammed Usman Shaikh (A-92), Mohammed Rafiq Usman Shaikh (A94), Mohammed Sayeed Mohammed lssaq (A-95), Niyaz F Mohammed @ Islam Iqbal Ahmed Shaikh (A-98), Parvez Mohammed Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100), Shaikh Ibrahim Shaikh Hussain (A-108), Sayed Ismail Sayed Ali Kadri (A-105) and Usman Man Khan Shaikh (A-115). All the above said accused persons were received at Dubai Airport by Ayub G Abdul Razak Memon (AA) and Tahir Mohammed Merchant @ Tahir Taklya (recently deported to India and arrested by the CBI in the case being No. RC 1(s)/1993). (g) Another batch, comprising of the following accused

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persons, namely, Shaikh Mohammed Ethesham Haji Gulam Rasool Shaikh (A-58), Manzoor Ahmed Mohammed Qureshi (A-88), Shaikh Kasam @ Babula I Ismail Shaikh (A-109), Sultan-E-Rome Sardar Ali Gui (A-114), Abdul Aziz Abdul Kader (A-126), Mohammed Iqbal Ibrahim s/o Shaikh Ibrahim (A-127), Shahnawaz Khan s/o Fair Mohammed Khan (A-128), Murad Ibrahim Khan (A-130) and Mohammed Shahid Nizammudin Qureshi (A-135) went to Pakistan for a similar training, however, the said training programme was aborted and they had to return from Dubai. (h) In March 1993, a weapons training programme was also conducted at Sandheri and Borghat at the behest of Tiger Memon (AA). In the said camp, training was imparted by"Tiger Memon (AA), Anwar Theba (AA) and Javed Tailor @ Javed Chikna (AA) to the following persons, namely, Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11), Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12), Bashir Ahmed Usman Gani Khairulla (A-13), Sharif Abdul Gafoor Parkar @ Dadabhai (A-17), Suleman Mohammed Kasam Ghavate (A18), Mohammed Iqbal Mohammed Yusuf Shaikh (A-23), Munna @ Mohammed Ali Khan @ Manojkumar Bhavarlal Gupta (A24), Mohammed Main Faridulla Qureshi (A-43), Sardar Shahwali Khan (A-54), Shaikh Ali Shaikh Umar (A-57), lssaq Mohammed Hajwani (A-79), Shahnawaz@ Shahjahan Dadamiya Hajwani (A-106) and Sikander lssaq Hajwani (A111 ). After completing the said training programme, A-17 and A-79 attempted to destroy the evidence by disposing off the hand grenades in the Sandheri creek on or about 8th March 1993 to aid and abet the above offenders. (i) On 04.03.1993, Tiger Memon called for a preparatory meeting at the Taj Mahal Hotel which was attended by Javed Chikna (AA), Mohammed Mushtaq Moosa Tarani (A-44), Sardar Shahwali Khan (A-54), Shaikh Ali Shaikh Umar (A-57), Niyaz Mohammed @ Islam Iqbal Ahmed Shaikh (A-98) and Mohammed Usman Jan Khan (PW-2) (Appro~). They conducted reconnaissance of some of the targets on 04.03.1993 as well as on 05.03.1993.

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

U) In order to achieve the said object, vehicles were purchased for planting explosives by Tiger Memon, Mohammed Shafi Zariwala and Munaf Halari (all three absconding). Three scooters were purchased through Munaf Halari (AA) who was a close friend of Tiger Memon (AA). Three Commander jeeps were also purchased through Mohammed Shafi Zariwala (AA) and he also bought two Maruti Vans and one Ambassador Car. Mohammed Shafi Zariwala arranged all these vehicles through Suleman Mohammed Lakdawala (PW-365). Two Maruti vans of Blue and Red colour were also purchased through PW-365.

(k) On 07.03.1993, another meeting was held at the house of Shafi where Tiger Memon formed separate groups for reconnaissance of the targets. PW-2, A-64 and A-100 were in one group which was assigned the task to survey Shiv Sena Bhawan and Sahar Airport.

C

(I) On 08.03.1993, another meeting was held at the residence of Babloo where Tiger Memon called Javed Chikna, lrfan Chougule, Salim Mujahid, Bashir Khan, Babloo and PW2 in the flat and selected the following places as targets, namely, Air India Building, Nariman Point, Bharat Petroleum Refinery, Chembur, Share Market near Fountain, Zaveri Bazaar near Mohammed Ali ~oad and Pydhonie, Five Star Hotels, Cinema Theatres, Shiv Sena Bhavan, Shivaji Park, Dadar, Bombay Municipal Corporation Building, V.T., Sahar Airport, Passport Office, Worli, Mantralaya and others places. (m) Again, on 10.03.1993, a meeting was held at the house of Mobina @ Bayamoosa Bhiwandiwala (A-96) where PW-2 met Tiger Memon, Javed Chikna, Salim Rahim Shaikh (A-52), Bashir Khan, Zakir Hussain Noor Mohammed Shaikh (A-32), Nasir Abdul Kader Kewal @ Nasir Dakhla (A-64), Parvez Mohammed Parvez Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100), Mohammed Main Faridulla Qureshi (A-43), Mohammed Iqbal Mohammed Yusuf Shaikh (A-23), Sardar Shahwali Khan (A-54), Bashir Ahmed Usman Gani Khairulla (A-13) and Nasim Ashraf Shaikh Ali Barmare (A-49). In the second meeting, Tiger

•

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Memon distributed Rs, 5,000/- to each one of them and again formed the groups. PW-2 also told Tiger Memon about the survey of Chembur Refinery. The following persons also participated in the said meeting, namely, Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (A-1), Essa @Anjum Abdul Razak Memon (A-3), Yusuf B Abdul Razak Memon (A-4), Abdul Razak Su/email Memon (dead) (A-5), Hanifa Abdul Razak Memon (A-6), Rahin Yakub Memon (A-7), Rubeena Sulernan @ Arif Memon (A-8), Mohammed Shoaib Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A-9), Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10), Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11), Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12), Bashir Ahmed Usman Gani Khairulla (A-13), Md. Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale (A-16), Mohammed Iqbal Mohammed Yusuf Shaikh (A-23), Shahnawaz Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-29), Zakir Hussain Noor Mohammed Shaikh (A-32), Firoz@ Akram Amani Malik (A-39), Mohammed Moin Faridulla Qureshi (A-43), Nasim Ashraf Shaikh Ali Barmare (A-49), Sardar Shahwali Khan (A-54 ), Shaikh Ali Shaikh Umar (A-57), Nasir Abdul Kader Kewal @ Nasir Dakhla (A-64), Mohammed Rafiq Usman Shaikh (A-94), Mobina @ Bayamoosa Bhiwandiwala (A-96), Niyaz Mohammed@ Islam Iqbal Ahmed Shaikh (A-98) and Parvez Mohammed Parvez E Zulfikar Qureshi (A-100).

(n) Another meeting had taken place in the intervening night between 11/12.03.1993 at Al-Hussaini Building, Dargah Street, Mahim, in which a final touch to the proposed plan of serial F bomb blasts was given. The co-conspirators stored explosives like RDX and fire arms in the garages owned by the Memons' and their relatives at Al-Hussaini Building and utilized these garages and open places outside the same for making bombs during the said night. The following persons were also present G there at that time and had actively participated in the-work of filling of RDX in the vehicles and suitcases for the said purpose, namely, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12, A-13, A-16, A-23, A-32, A-36, A-43, A-49, A-52, A-54, A-57, A-64 and A-100.

(o) On 12.03.1993, bombs and other explosive substances

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YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J ]

were planted at various places by the following persons in the following sequence: Firstly, Mohammed Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale (A16), Mohammed Tainur Phansopkar (AA) and lrfan Chougule planted bomb and caused explosion at Bombay Stock Exchange at 13:30 hrs. wherein 84 persons were killed and 218 persons were injured; Secondly, Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12) planted bomb and caused explosion at Katha Bazaar at 14:15 hrs. wherein 4 persons were killed and 21 persons were injured; Thirdly, Mohammed Usman Jan Khan (PW-2) and Mohammed Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale (A-16) planted bomb and caused explm;ion at Lucky Petrol Pump near Shiv Sena Bhavan wherein 4 persons were killed and 50 persons were injured; Fourthly, Abdul Gani Ismail Turk (A-11) planted bomb and caused explosion at Century Bazaar at 14:45 hrs wherein 88 persons were killed and 160 persons were injured; Fifthly, Bashir Ahmed Usman Gani Khairulla (A-13), Zakir Hussain Noor Mohammed Shaikh (A-32), Abdul Khan @ Yakub Khan Akhtar Khan (A-36), Firoz @Akram Amani Malik (A-39), Mohammed Main Faridulla Qureshi (A-43), Salim Rahim Shaikh (A-52) and Ehsan Mohammed Tufel Mohammed Qureshi (A-122) threw hand grenades and caused explosions at Fishermen's colony at Mahim at 14:45 hrs. wherein 3 persons were killed and 6 persons were injured; Sixthly, Mohammed Farooq Mohammed Yusuf Pawale (A-16), Mohammed Tainur (AA) and lrfan Chougule planted bomb and caused explosion at Air India Building at 15:00 hrs wherein 20 persons were killed and 84 persons were injured; Seventhly, Md. Shoaib Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A9) planted bomb and caused explosion at Zaveri Bazaar at

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15:05 hrs. wherein 17 persons were killed and 57 were injured; Eighthly, Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12) planted bomb and caused explosion at Hotel Sea Rock at 15:10 hrs.

Ninthly, Asgar Yusuf Mukadam (A-10) and Shahnawaz B Abdul Kadar Qureshi (A-29) planted explosives and caused explosion at 15:13 hrs at Plaza Cinema wherein 10 persons were killed and 37 were injured;

Tenthly, Mohammed Mustaq Moosa Tarani (A-44) planted bomb and caused explosion at Hotel Centaur, Juhu at 15:20 hrs. which resulted in injury to three persons. Eleventhly, Mohammed Iqbal Mohammed Yusuf Sheikh (A-23) and Nasim Ashraf Shaikh Ali Barmare (A-49) planted bomb and caused explosion at Sahar Airport at 15:30 hrs and; Twelfthly, Anwar Theba (AA) caused explosion at 15:40 hrs at Centaur Hotel, Airpof'i wherein 2 persons were killed and 8 persons were injured.

In addition to the above, at various other places, viz., Naigan Cross Road, Dhanji Street and Sheikh Memon Street etc., bombs were planted by accused persons which were defused in time on the basis of information received by the police. Thus the object behind the said conspiracy was F achieved and commercial hub of the country, Bombay was rocked by a series of blasts.

(p) Thereafter, a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged and pursuant thereto several arrests were made. After the arrest of Altaf Ali Mustaq Ali Sayed (A-67), he made a disclosure G under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and led Mr. Anil Prabhakar Mahabole (PW-506), Police Officer and pancha Suresh Jagaganath Salam (PW-37) to the residence of Mohammed Hanif from where the following articles were recovered and taken into possession vide Panchnama Exh. H 109. A suit case (Article 42) was found containing 65 hand

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J]

grenades and 100 electronic detonators. In addition, one VIP suit case (Article 43) was found containing 40 hand grenades and 50 electronic detonators. During the examination, only 85 grenades were found in the two suit cases which were marked as Article 44 (1-84) and one tiand grenade which was sent to the FSL was marked as Article 45. (q) Further, on 12.03.1993, one maroon coloured Maruti van was found in abandoned condition near Siemens Factory, Worli bearing No. MFC 1972. When the Police party came to know about the abandoned vehicle, a search was conducted and it was seized by the Police Officer, Dinesh P. Kadam (PW371) in the presence of Narayan Datta ram More (PW-46) vide Panchnama Exh. 190. The seizure included 7 AK-56 rifles, a plastic bag and 14 magazines which were forwarded to the FSL. One more plastic bag and four hand grenades were also recovered from the Van and were sent to the FSL. The FSL report Exh. 2439-A establishes that these hana grenades were capable of causing explosion. During investigation, it was found that in the above said van, the following persons were sitting, viz., A-57, Javed Chikna (AA), Bashir Khan and Nasir @ Babloo and were proceeding towards BMC office near V.T. for the purpose of killing BJP and Shiv Sena Corporators but they left the vehicle because of the damage caused to the car during the explosion at Century Bazaar. (r) On 26.03.1993, the following items were recovered from Khalil Ahmed Sayed Ali Nasir (A-42), namely, a single 7.62 mm pistol without magazine (Article 87), a single 7.65 mm pistol without magazine having body No. 352468 made in Czechoslovakia marked as Article 88, four empty magazines, 13 cartridges, 7 cartridges of 7.65 mm pistol, 4 KF 7.65 mm cartridges, 2 SBP 7.65 mm cartridges and 8 cartridges of 7.62 mm pistol. (s) On 26.03.1993, Investigating Officer (PW-506), in the presence of Lakshan Loka Karkare (PW-45) searched the house of accused Mujammil Umar Kadri (A-25) at village

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Mhasala, Tai. Shrivardhan and seized certain aricles vide Exh. 158, namely, 13 AK-56 rifles, 26 empty magazines and 3 gunny bags (Article 86).

(t) During the investigation, on 27.03.1993, at the instance of accused Ashrafur Rehman Azimulla Shaikh @ Lallu, Shivaji B Shankar Sawant (PW-524) and Abdul Kadar A. Khan (PW 323) prepared the disclosure Panchanama Exh. 439 in the presence of Sayyed Badshah Gaus Mohiuddin (PW-85). In pursuance of the said disclosure Panchanama, the police recovered hand grenades, white tubes, detonators tied together C and live cartridges. (u) On 02.04.1993, at the instance of Mohammed Yunus Gulam Rasul@ Bola Miya (A-47), Eknath Dattatraya Jadhav (PW-606), in the presence of PW-34, prepared the disclosure o Panchnama Exh. 93. In pursuance of the same, the police seized vide seizure Panchnama Exh. 94 dated 02.04.1993, a single 7.62 mm assault short rifle without magazine, 30.32 empty rifle, magazines, rounds of 7.62 rifles, Goni, Rexin Bag and 6 swords from Raziya Manzil near Ram Shyam Theatre, E Jogeshwari, West.

(v) On 26.04.1993, at the instance of Mohd. Moin Faridulla Qureshi (A-43), Eknath Dattatraya Jadhav (PW-606), in the presence of Krishnanad Jacob Alwin (PW-41 ), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 133 and in pursuance of the said disclosure Panchnama seized 17 hand grenades vide seizure Panchnama Exh. 134. The said hand grenades were defused with the help of Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad (BODS).

(w) On 14.04.1993, at the instance of Manoj Kumar G Bhawarlal Gupta @ Munna (A-24), Ramrao Mahadev Desai (PW-512), in the presence of Pradeep Atmaram Ire (PW-42), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 138 and in pursuance of the said disclosure Panchnama seized a single .45 pistol with magazine, thirteen rounds of .45 pistol, a single 7.62 mm H pistol with magazine, six cartridges, one .38 revolver, nineteen

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

cartridges, one single barrel country made revolver and four cartridges of .315 bore. (x) On 25.03.1993, at the instance of Parvez Nazir Ahmed Shaikh (A-12), Anil Prabhakar Mahabole (PW-506), in the presence of Padmakar Krishna Bhosle (PW·43)1, prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 146 and in pursuance of the said disclosure Panchnama seized a single revolver No. A-85525, five cartridges and six more cartridges vide seizure Panchnama Exh. 479. Besides the aforesaid items, one rexin pouch, one revolver case and Arms Licence and one permit in the name of Tiger Memon were also recovered. (y) On 02.04.1993, at the instance of Ayub Patel (A-72), Eknath Dattatraya Jadhav (PW-606), in the presence of PW44 prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 154 and in pursuance of the said disclosure Panchnama seized 13 dismantled hand grenades and 3 more hand grenades vide seizure Panchnama Exh. 155 and marked under various article numbers. (z) On 26.03.1993, PW-506, in the presence of Laksham Loka Karkare (PW"45}, searched the house of Sharif Parkar at Sandheri, Dist. Raigad and seized two AK-56 rifles, two empty magazines of AK-56 and one gunny bag. (aa) On 01.04.1993, at the instance of Ibrahim Mussa Chauhan @ Baba (A-41 ), Anil Prabhakar Mahabole (PW506), in the presence of (PW-45), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 171 and -seized a single 7.72 mm Assault short rifle without magazine, 10 empty rifle magazines, 564 cartridges and 25 hand grenades. In addition, a blue coloured rexin bag was also recovered. (ab) On 18.04.1993, at the instance of Ahmed Birya (A35), Uttam Khandoji Navghare (PW-545), in the presence of Manohar Balchandra Tande! (PW-56), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 226 and seized six rifles and 12 black coloured magazines.

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(ac) On 13. 04.1993, at the instance of Salim Rahim Shaikh (A-52), Shivaji Tukaram Kolekar (PW-526), in the presence of Sakharam Kishan (PW-35), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 101 and seized one pistol of black colour and 48 intact 7.62 mm cartridges. (ad) On 04.04.1993, at the instance of Ehsan Mohammed Tufel Mohammed Qureshi (A-122), Prakash Dhanaji Khanvelkar (PW-513), in the presence of Rohitkumar Ramsaran Chaurasia (PW-39), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 119 and seized one 7.62 mm pistol with magazine and 14 intact and two test fired cartridges. (ae) On 10.04.1993, at the instance of Nasim Ashraf Shaikh Ali Barmare (A-49), Srirang Vyas Nadgauda (PW-597), in the presence of Ranjeet Kumar Surender Nath Das (PW-38), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 115 and seized a five chambered country made revolver.

(af) On 08.04.1993, at the instance of Asif Yusuf Shaikh (A-107), Ratan Singh Kalu Rathod (PW-600), in the presence of Chandrakant Atmaram Vaidya (PW-40), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 126 and seized a single 3.62 mm pistol with magazine as well as 32 cartridges.

(ag) On 05.04.1993, at the instance of Shaikh Aziz (A-21 ), Vijay D. Meru (PW-561 ), in the presence of Bhaskar Baburao Jadhav (PW-57), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 245 and seized a single .30 US Carbine, 28 cartridges and 3 magazines.

(ah) On 17.04.1993, at the instance of Ahmed Shah Durani (A-20), Shivaji Shankar Sawant (PW-524), in the presence of Mohd. Ayub Mohd. Umer (PW-72), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 378 and in pursuance of the said panchnama seized one AK-56 rifle and two magazines. (ai) On 09.04.1993, at the instance of Md. Dawood Mohd.

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.)

Yusuf Khan (A-91), PW-522, in the presence of Ashok Kumar Hari Vilas Pande (PW-59), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 265 and seized 9 empty black colour~d magazines and 3 AK-56 guns.

(aj) On 22.03.1993, at the instance of Mohammed Shoeb Mohammed Kasam Ghansar (A-9), PW-615, in the presence of Dinesh Dharma Sarvan (PW-53), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 216 and seized one folded blacken cardboard, one folded cardbox explosive, Packer Package Ltd. Lahore and one Number Plate bearing No. MP-13-D-0380.

(ak) On 12.03.1993, after the blast, one Maruti Van bearing No. MFC-1972 was found abandoned. During the course of search, xerox copies of registration papers of the said vehicle in the name of Rubi(la Suleman @ Arif Memon (A-8) were found which led the police party to the flat Nos. 22, 25 and 26 of Memons' at Al Hussaini Building. As the involvement of Memons' had come to light in the incidents, the said flats were searched by the Police Officer, namely, Dinesh P. Kadam (PW-371), in the presence of Uday Narayari'Vasaikar (PW-67) and vide seizure Panchnama Exh. 337, the police party seized the passport of Shabana Memon, five key bunches, two keys 449, rubber slipper of right foot, brown leather chappal of right foot, pista coloured chappal, carpet pieces, rubber slipper and a pink piece of scrap. (al) On 01.05.1993, at the instance of Yusuf Nullwala (A118), Suresh S. Walishetty (PW-680), in the presence of Gangaram B. Sawant (PW-265), prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 1100 and seized one plastic bag of Metro Co. and 57 intact bullets. (am) During the investigation, the following items were recovered from the compound of Al Hussaini Building in the presence of Leoneison Desouza (PW-52), namely, 31 gunny cloth pieces, 25 black cardboard pieces and 34 blacken polythene papers.

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(an) Sanjay Dutt (A-117) received three AK-56 rifles and ammunitions from accused Abu Salem, who visited his residence along with A-53 and A-41. After sometime, he returned two AK-56 rifles to co-accused and kept one with him. He also purchased one .9mm pistol from one Qyaoom, a close associate of Dawood. When the news of his involvement came to light, he telephoned A-118 to destroy the AK-56 rifle and the pistol. During the course of investigation, A-117 made a disclosure statement Exh. 1068 which was recorded as Exh. 1068-A. He led the police party to A-118. A-118 made a disclosure statement which was recorded as Exh. 1068-B and led the police party to Kersi Adejania (A-124). A-124 made a disclosure statement which is Exh. 1068C and from him one iron rod and one iron spring were recovered. Thereafter, A" 124 led the police party to A-125. A-125 made a disclosure which was recorded in Panchnama Exh. 1068D and led the police party to A-120 who produced one pistol which is Article 384-D which came to be recovered vide Exh. 1068E drawn by Suresh S. Wallishetty (PW-680) in the presence of Shashikaam R.S. (PW-211). (ao) On 18.04.1993, at the instance of Noor Mohammed (A-50), Prakash Dhanaji Khanvelkar (PW-513), in the presence of PW-33, prepared the disclosure Panchnama Exh. 88 and seized one olive green bag, one khaki bag and a blackish lamp. During the course of investigation, Shankar Sadashiv Kamble (PW-503), in the presence of PW-55, recovered one rifle from the residence of Abdul Rashid Khan (AA) at Dreamland Co-op. Society, Marci, Bombay.

(ap) On 07.04.1993, at the instance of Faki Ali Faki Ahmed Subedar (A-74), PW-588, in the presence of PW-88, G recovered 12 AK-56 rifles, 36 magazines and cartridges.

(aq) At the instance of Janu Kamiya Vetkoli, PW-588, in the presence of PW-89, recovered six military coloured bags containing 9000 rounds and 3 wooden boxes containing 44 magazines vide Panchnama Exhibit 503. In the Court, the said

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J]

articles were marked as below:(i)

750 cartridges marked as Article No.296-B;

(ii)

6000 cartridges marked as Article No. 297-(A-i) to (A-viii);

(iii)

549 cartridges marked as Article No. 297 (A-ix(b));

(iv)

750 cartridges marked as Article No. 297 (A-x(b)); and

(v)

850 cartridges marked as Article No. 294-D (Colly).

(ar) On 25.05.1993, PW-670 forwarded 12 AK-56 rifles, 80 magazines and 100 cartridges with forwarding letter vide Exh. 2471 to Chemical Analyser. (as) At the instance of Sayeed @ Mujju Ismail Ibrahim Kadri (A-104), PW-573, in the presence of PW-91, recovered five plastic jars containing explosives and detonators from the lavatory in the courtyard of the accused. (at) The accused persons had undertaken firing practice at Chinchechamal, Dist. Raigad. Nandev P. Mahajan (PW587), in the presence of PW-103, seized certain articles, namely, 3 broken branches, pieces of cardboard, 3 empties, 6 lead pieces and pieces of stones. (au) Out of the aforesaid articles, the following articles were sent to the FSL vide Exh. 2112 i.e., 3 empties, 6 lead shots, 3 tree branches and pieces of target, stones, cardboard and 12 empties recovered on 01.04.1993, 02.04.1993 and 03.04.1993. (av) At the instance of lssaq Mohammed Hajwani (A-79), PW-587, in the presence of PW-104, reco'vered 13 hand grenades and 79 empties from Sandheri Jetty. The articles were marked in the Court as per the details given below:

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(i) 12 empties

Article 307(v) colly

(ii) 67 empties

Article 308-B colly

(iii) One hand grenade

Article 309-A (i)

(iv) White, yellow and green explosive powder and a cap which was removed from the hand grenade.

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(v) PW-598 defused the hand grenades at Goregaon P.S. and issued the Defusal Certificate. The carbon copy of the Defusal Certificate is marked as Exh. 2055. (vi) 12 defused hand grenades Article 310-B colly

(vii) On 21.06.1993, Shashinath Raghunath Chavan (PW676) sent a letter Exh. 2517 to the FSL along with 67 empties for opinion. (viii) CA Report dated 05.08.1993 vide M.L. case No. BL 643/93, 447/93, 385/93 and 568/93 through MA No. 382/2000 dated 17.10.2000.

(aw) During the course of investigation, Shashikant Eknath Shinde (PW-519), in the presence of Dilip Manekrao Dawalekar (PW-65), recovered 57 gunny bags filled with ROX and gelatine from the Nangla Creek on 02.04.1993. Out of 57 bags, 37 were found to be loaded with ROX and the remaining 20 bags to be loaded with gelatine. A-50, A-24, A59, A-69 and A-121 having admitted dumping of the said bags in the Nangla Creek in their confessional statements. (ax) Thereafter, 27 criminal cases were registered in relation to the said incidents at various police stations in Bombay City, District Thane and District Raigarh. Upon completion of the investigation, a single charge sheet was filed against 189 accused persons including 44 absconding accused persons on 04.11.1993. Subsequently, further

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOM9AY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

investigation of the case was transferred to the RespondentCBI who filed 19 supplementary charge sheets under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') and the trial of 123 accused persons was concluded on 23.11.2003. 3. In order to enquire into the matter and render speedy justice, a Special Judge (TADA) was nominated and recording of evidence started in 1995 and the said process was concluded in the year 2002. Total 687 witnesses were examined and the Special Court pronounced the judgment on 12.09.2006/27.07.2007 awarding death sentence to 11 persons and life sentence and other sentences for the offences under TADA, the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC') Arms Act, 1959 and the Explosives Act, 1884. By way of· impugned judgment, the trial Court has convicted 100 persons and acquitted 23 persons of all the charges. The judgment under consideration pertains to the trial of 123 accused persons involved in the said blasts. In cases of death sentence, the Special Judge referred the matter to this Court for confirmation. In fo~I,51 appeals have been filed by the accused against their conv· lion ranging from various sentences upto life impriso ment. Against the order of acquittal, the State of Mahrashlra through CBI has filed 48 appeals.

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Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (A-1) 4. At the first instance, let us consider the charges, materials placed by the prosecution, defence and details regarding conviction and sentence insofar as A-1 is concerned.

Charges: The following charges were framed against A-1, namely: " ..... During the period from December, 1992 to April, 1993 at various places in Bombay, District Raigad and District Thane in India and outside India in Dubai (U.A.E.)

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Pakistan, entered into a criminal conspiracy and/or were members of the said criminal conspiracy whose object was to commit terrorist acts in India and that you all agreed to commit following illegal acts, namely, to commit terrorist acts with an intent to overawe the Government as by law established, to strike terror in the people, to alienate sections of the people and to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people, i.e. Hindus and Muslims by using bombs, dynamites, handgrenades and other explosive substances like ROX or inflammable substances or fire-arms like AK-56 rifles, carbines, pistols and other lethal weapons, in such a manner as to cause or as likely to cause death of or injuries to any person or persons, loss of or damage to and disruption of supplies of services essential to the life of the community, and to achieve the objectives of the conspiracy, you all agreed to smuggle fire-arms, ammunitions, detonators, handgrenades and high explosives like ROX into India and to distribute the same amongst yourselves and your men of confidence for the purpose of committing terrorist acts and for the said purpose to conceal and store all these arms, ammunitions and explosives at such safe places and amongst yourselves and with your men of confidence till its use for committing terrorist acts and achieving the objects of criminal conspiracy and to dispose off the same as need arises. To organize training camps in Pakistan and in India to import and undergo weapons training in handling of arms, ammunitions and explosives to commit terrorist acts. To harbour and conceal terrorists/ co-conspirators, and also to aid, ·abet and knowingly facilitate the terrorist acts and/or any act preparatory to the commission of terrorist acts and to render any assistance financial or otherwise for accomplishing the object of the conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, to do and commit any other illegal acts as were necessary for achieving the aforesaid objectives of the criminal conspiracy and that on 12.03.1993 were successful in causing bomb explosions

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

at Stock Exchange Building, Air India Building, Hotel Sea Rock at Bandra, Hotel Centaur at Juhu, Hotel Centaur at Santacruz, Zaveri Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Century Bazaar at Worli, Petrol Pump adjoining Shiv Sena Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in lobbing handgrenades at Macchimar Hindu Colony, Mahim and at Bay-52, Sahar International Airport which left more than 257 persons dead, 713 injured and property worth about Rs.27 crores destroyed, and attempted to cause bomb explosions at Naigaum Cross Road and Dhanji Street, all in the city of Bombay and its suburbs i.e. within Greater Bombay. And thereby committed offences punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and Section 120-B of IPC read with Section 3(2)(i)(ii), 3(3)(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987 and read with Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 435, 436, 201 and 212 of Indian Penal Code and offences under Sections 3 and 7 read with Sections 25 (1-A), (1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections 9B (1)(a)(b)(c) of the Explosives Act, 1884, Sections 3, 4(a)(b), 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Section 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and within my cognizance."

In addition to the abovesaid principal charge of conspiracy, the appellant was also charged on the following counts: At head secondly, for commission of the offence under Section 3(3) of TADA Act, for in pursuance to the conspiracy in India, Dubai and Pakistan, during the period between December, 1992 and April, 1993, having conspired advocated, abetted, advised and knowingly facilitated the commission of terrorist acts and acts preparatory to terrorist acts i.e. serial bomb blast in Bombay and its suburbs on 12.03.1993 by:

(i)

arranging finance and managing the disbursement by generating the same through Mulchand Shah

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Choksi (A-97) and from the firm Mis Tejarat International owned by Ayub Memon (AA) for achieving the objective of conspiracy to commit the terrorist act;

(ii)

arranging air tickets through Altaf Ali Mushtaq Ali Sayyed (A-67). East West Travels and others to enable the co-conspirators and accused in the case to undergo weapons training in Pakistan and for having made arrangement for their lodging and boarding;

(iii)

purchasing motor vehicles for the purpose of preparing them for'being used as bombs and for planting them at important locations in furtherance of objective of conspiracy to commit terrorist act; and

(iv)

requesting the discharged Amjad Ali Meharbux and A-67 to store suitcases containing arms and ammunitions, handgrenades which were part of consignment smuggled into India by the absconding accused Tiger Memon and other co-conspirators.

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At head thirdly, for commission of the offence under Section 5 of TADA Act, on the count of unauthorisedly, within the notified area of Greater Bombay, from 03.02.1993 onwards, by being in possession of hand grenades, detonators which were the part of the consignment of arms, ammunitions and explosives smuggled into the country by Tiger Memon and his associates for committing the terrorist acts. At head fourthly, for commission of the offence under Section 6 of TADA Act, on the count of unauthorisedly, within the area of Greater Bombay, with an intent to aid terrorists, from 03.02.1993 onwards, being in possession of handgrenades, detonators which were the part of the

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

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consignment of arms, ammunitions and explosives smuggled into the country by Tiger Memon and his associates for committing the terrorist act and thereby having contravened the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959, the Explosives Act, 1884, the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Explosives Rules, 2008 by keeping the same in his possession and by transporting and distributing the same to different persons. At head fifthly, for commission of the offences under Sections 3 & 4 read with Section 6 of the Explosive Substances Act on the count of, from 03.02.1993 onwards, providing premises, having procured, concealed, aided and abe.tted Tiger Memon and his associates for smuggling arms, ammunitions and explosives into the country for commission of terrorist act and also by having in his possession and control explosive substances like handgrenades and detonators with an intent, and by means thereof, to endanger the lives and for causing serious damage to property in India and to enable his coconspirators to do such acts."

5. The appellant (A-1) has been convicted and sentenced for the above said charges as follows:(i) The appellant-A 1 has been convicted and sentenced to death under Section 3(3) of TADA and Section 120-B of IPC read with the offences mentioned in the said charge. In addition, the appellant was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 25, 000/ -. (charge firstly) (ii) The appellant (A-1) was sentenced to RI for life alongwith a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 2 years under Section 3(3) of TADA. (charge secondly)

(iii) The appellant was sentenced to RI for 10 years alongwith a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 2 years under Section 5 of TADA (charge thirdly)

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(iv) The appellant was sentenced to RI for 14 years alongwith a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 2 years under Section 6 of TADA. (charge fourthly) (v) The appellant was sentenced to RI for 10 years with a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 1 year under Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. (charge fifthly).

6. Heard Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior counsel C duly assisted by Mr. Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel and Mr. Satyakam, learned counsel for the respondent-CBI. Contentions raised by A-1:

7. Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel, after taking us through the charges framed against A-1, prosecution witnesses, documents and all other materials raised the following contentions:-

(i) The impugned judgment is not a "judgment" in terms of E Sections 353, 354, 362 and 363 of the Code since reasons for conviction and sentence were not provided to the appellant (A-1) along with the order of conviction and sentence dated 12.09.2006 and 27.07.2007 respectively. Inasmuch as only 'operative portion' was read out and after hearing the accused F the conviction arid sentence was imposed, it is not permissible in law. He further pointed out that as per the "operative portion", A-1 was convicted and sentenced to death, RI along with fine for commission of offences mentioned in charges at head firstly to fifthly. In the absence of the entire judgment in terms of the G above mentioned provisions, the conviction and sentence imposed on A-1 cannot be sustained. (ii) The prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of Mohammed Usman Jan Khan (PW-2), who turned approver. According to learned senior counsel, there is no provision for H pardoning an accused and permitting him to become an

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YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

approver under TADA He further pointed out that neither under TADA nor under the Code it can be said that PW-2 has been validly pardoned. In any event, according to him, his statement needs to be corroborated and conviction based on his sole testimony cannot be sustained. (iii) The Special Judge heavily relied on the confessional statements of A-10, A-11, A-46, A-67 and A-97. Among them, except A-97 others have retracted their statements. Since the prosecution case rests entirely upon the confessional statements of those accused persons, in view of their retraction statements, the conviction and sentence cannot be sustained. (iv) Several recoveries were made by the prosecution on the statement of Md. Hanif (PW-282) and in the absence of strict adherence to the procedure, those recoveries are inadmissible in evidence. He further pointed out that seizure panchnamas were not in accordance with the procedure and, more particularly, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (v) All the confessional statements are exculpatory and not inculpatory. In view of the same, the entire statements made are not acceptable.

(vi) There is no material to prove that there was a conspiracy among the accused persons pursuant to the demolition of Babri Masjid.

(vii) In any event, the prosecution failed to pin point the specific role of A-1. A-1 had no knowledge of the conspiracy and of the ultimate bomb blasts on 12.03.1993. Even, the confessional statements cannot be used against A-1 since the same were recorded before the amendment of Section 3(5) of TADA. Considering the entire evidence against him, the prosecution failed to point out any specific role, accordingly, the death sentence is not warranted and other sentences are also liable to be set aside.

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Reply by CBI: 8. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior counsel for the CBI duly assisted by Mr. Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel and Mr. Satyakam, learned counsel met all the points raised by Mr. Jaspal Singh. He pointed out the following evidence against the appellant (A 1), namely; (i) confessional statements made by co-accused; (ii) testimonies of prosecution witnesses; and

(iii) documentary evidence. According to him, it is incorrect to state that conviction was based solely on the evidence of Approver (PW-2). He pointed out that the prosecution has placed enough materials to substantiate "conspiracy" and the ultimate role played by each one of the accused persons, particularly A-1, in the commission of offence. He further pointed out that all the confessions made by the accused, namely, A-10, A-11, A-46, A-67 and A-97 are admissible, and on the other hand, their alleged retractions cannot be accepted. He further pointed out that apart from the confession of those accused, the prosecution has established several incriminating materials connecting all the accused in the commission of offence. He pointed out various recoveries made against the accused which clearly show the seriousness of the matter. Among all the accused persons, A-1, brother of Tiger Memon, was in-charge of entire financial management, sending persons to Pakistan via Dubai for training in arms and ammunitions, securing air-tickets and travel documents such as passports, visas etc. He further pointed out that there was no flaw in the procedure adopted by the Special Court in delivering the judgment. There is no merit in the appeal filed by A-1 and prayed for confirmation of death sentence. 9. We have carefully considered the entire materials, oral

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] and documentary evidence and the submissions made by A either side. Validity of impugned judgment by the Special Court 10. Among various points raised, since the argument relating to impugned judgment is paramount, we intend to take B up the said issue at the foremost. Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel for A-1, took us through the impugned judgment which contains two parts. According to him, in the absence of . whole judgment for perusal of the accused, the sentence imposed cannot be sustained. In support of the above claim, C he relied on Sections 353, 354, 362 and 363 of the Code. He further pointed out that only 'operative portion' was read out and after hearing the accused, conviction and sentence was imposed. As per the operative portion, A-1 was convicted under Sections 3(3), 5 and 6 of TADA read with Section 120- D B IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1984. He further pointed out that after convicting and sentencing A-1, the Presiding Officer stated that the reasons will be given within two months which shows that, admittedly, the judgment was not ready on the date of the pronouncement. E 11. In view of the above, it is desirable to go through the relevant provisions of TADA. The TADA contains: (a) judgment; and (b) orders, admittedly, it is not defined anywhere that what is meant by judgment/order. It is the claim of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that if it is not a complete judgment, F accused cannot be convicted and sentenced. In the absence of specific provision in TADA with regard to the same, we have to look into the relevant provisions of the Code. Chapter XXVll of the Code speaks about 'Judgment'. The relevant provisions are Sections 353, 354, 362 and 363 which are as under: "353. Judgment.-(1 ). The judgment in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced in open court by the presiding officer immediately after the

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termination of the trial or at some subsequent time of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. (a) By delivering the whole of the judgment; or (b) By reading out the whole of the judgment; or

(c) By reading out the operative part of the judgment and explaining the substance of the judgment in a language, which is understood by the accused or his pleader.

(2) Where the judgment is delivered under clause (a) of sub-section (1 ), the presiding officer shall cause it to be taken down in short hand, sign the transcript and every page thereof as soon as it is made ready, and write on it the date of the delivery of the judgment in open Court.

(3) Where the judgment or the operative part thereof is read out under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1 ), as the case may be, it shall be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open court and if it is not written with his own hand, every page of the judgment shall be signed by him.

(4) Where the judgment is pronounced in the manner specified in clause (c) of sub-section (1), the whole judgment or a copy thereof shall be immediately made available for the perusal of the parties or their pleaders free of cost. (5) If the accused is in custody, he shall be brought up to hear the judgment pronounced.

(6) If the accused is not in custody, he shall be required by the court to attend to hear the judgment pronounced, except where his personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of fine only or he is acquitted:

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY[P. SATHASIVAM, J] Provided that, where there are more accused than one, and one or more of them do not attend the court on the dale on which the judgment is to be pronounced, the presiding officer may, in order to avoid undue delay in the disposal of the case, pronounce the judgment notwithstanding their absence. (7) No judgment delivered by any Criminal Court shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only of the absence of any party or his pleader on the day or from the place notified for the delivery thereof, or of any omission to serve, or defect in serving, on the parties or their pleaders, or any of them, the notice of such day and place.

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(8) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any way the extent of the provisions of section 465.

354. Language and contents of judgment.-(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code, every judgment referred to in section 353, (a) Shall be written in the language of the court;

(b) Shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision; (c) Shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or other law under which, the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced; (d) If it be a judgment of acquittal, shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty.

(2) When the conviction is under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and it is doubtful under which of two sections, or under which of two parts of the same section, of that

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Code the offence falls, the court shall distinctly express the same, and pass judgment in the alternative. (3) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence. (4) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of one year of more, but the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three months, it shall record its reasons for awarding such sentence, unless the sentence is one of imprisonment till the rising of the court or unless the case was tried summarily under the provisions of this Code. (5) When any person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead. (6) Every order under section 117 or sub-section (2) of section 138 and every final order made under section 125, section 145 or section 147 shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. 362. Court not to alter judgment-Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall after or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. 363. Copy of judgment to be given to the accused and other persons.-(1) When the accused is sentenced to imprisonment, a copy of the judgment shall, immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment, be given to him free of cost. (2) On the application of the accused, a certified copy of

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J ]

the judgment, or when he so desires, a translation in his own language if practicable or in the language of the court, shall be given to him without delay, and such copy shall, in every case where the judgment is appeal able by the accused be given free of cost: Provided that where a sentence of death is passed or confirmed by the High Court, a certified copy of the judgment shall be immediately given to the accused free of cost whether or not he applies for the same. (3) The provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply in relation to an order under section 117 as they apply in relation to a judgment, which is appealable by the accused. (4) When the accused is sentenced to death by any court and an appeal lies from such judgment as of right, the court shall inform him of the period within which, if he wishes to appeal, his appeal should be preferred. (5) Save as otherwise provided in sub-Section (2), any person affected by a judgment or order passed by a Criminal Court shall, on an application made in this behalf and on payment of the prescribed charges, be given a copy of such judgment or order of any deposition or other part of the record: Provided that the Court may, if it thinks fit for some special reason, give it to him free of cost. (6) The High Court may, by rules, provide for the grant of copies of any judgment or order of a Criminal Court to any person who is not affected by a judgment or order, on payment, by such person, of such fees, and subject to such conditions, as the High Court may, by such rules provide."

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12. By drawing our attention to, Section 353(1 )(a)(b)(c), it

is contended by learned senior c9unsel for the appellant that it is incumbent on the part of the trial Judge to provide the whole

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judgment. In the absence of reasoning and the discussion in the form of full judgment, it is contended that the conviction and sentence under various provisions are not permissible. He also pointed out that in case of death sentence, special reasons have to be assigned. According to Mr. Jaspal Singh, in terms of Section 353 of the Code, the judgment means the whole judgment signed by the judge. He elaborated that when the Code permits the Court to hear the accused on sentence, he must be provided with the whole judgment including the reasons. According to him, though A-1 was awarded death sentence, no special reasons were assigned by the Designated Court and he was not even furnished the whole judgment. By highlighting various aspects on the issue, in view of the fact that the judgment pronounced is not a "full judgment" in terms of the above said provisions, Mr. Jaspal Singh prayed for remand to the Special Court to go through all the reasoning and hear afresh on the question of sentence. Though Mr. Gopal Subramanium met all the submissions relating to the alleged defect in the impugned judgment, first let us consider the decisions relied on by Mr. Jaspal Singh in support of the above proposition. 13. In Shambhu & Ors. VS. The State AIR 1956 All. 633, learned single Judge of the High Court with regard to the words "judgment" and "order" has held as under:-

"4. The argument sounds plausible; nevertheless I have no hesitation in holding it to be untenable. A study of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure discloses that the expression of the opinion of the criminal Court on any matter at issue arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and of the arguments (if any) falls into two categories : judgments and orders. None-theless neither of these terms has been defined either in the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Indian Penal Code. There is, however, no controversy as to what a "judgment" is. As held by the Federal Court in Hori Ram Singh v.

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J] Emperor AIR 1939 PC 43 (A) and Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, it is used "to indicate the termination of the case by an order of conviction or acquittal of the accused", and to this, by virtue of Section 367(6), Criminal P. C. must be added orders under Sections 118 or 123 (3), orders which bear the character of a conviction. Chapter 26 of the Code deals exclusively with judgments and on the basis of its exhaustive provisions there can be no difficulty in recognising a criminal Court's "judgment"."

14. In Ba/deo. vs. Oeo Narain and Ors. AIR 1954 All. 104, there was discussion about how the judgment to be in terms of the provisions of the Code. The relevant para is as under:

"14 ...... Under Section 367, Criminal P. C. every judgment must contain: (1) the points for determination;

(2) the decision thereon; and (3) the reasons for such decision. Where the reasons given by the trial Court are such as cannot be supported by the evidence on record, they are not reasons for the decision, out reasons against the decision. To constitute a legal appreciation of evidence, the Judgment should be such as to indicate that the Court has applied its mind to it. Every portion of the Judgment of the trial Court seems to indicate non-application of mind by the Court to the evidence on record. The third requirement laid down in Section 367, Criminal P. C. viz., the reasons for the decision, is an important ingredient of a Judgment. Compliance with law in this regard should not be merely formal but substantial and real, for it is this part of the judgment alone which enables the higher Court to appreciate the correctness of the decision, the parties to feel that the Court has fully and impartially considered their

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respective cases and the public to realise that. a genuine and sincere attempt has been made to mete out evenhanded Justice. It is in the way the Court discharges its duty in this regard that it is able to instil confidence in its justice and to inspire that respect and reverence in public mind which is its due. Reasons form the substratum of the decision and their factual accuracy is a guarantee that the Court has applied its mind to the evidence in the case. Where the statement of reasons turn out to be a mere hollow pretension of a baseless claim of application of mind by the Court, the Judgment is robbed of one of its most essential ingredients and forfeits its claim to be termed a Judgment in the eye of law."

15. In Surendra Singh & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 194, this Court has interpreted the word D "judgment". The following conclusion is relevant which reads as under:-

"10. In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these sections is the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal "pronouncement" or "delivery" in open court. It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way. Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there : that can neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it be vague. All the rest - the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and the sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainty about its content and matter - can be cured; but not the hard core, namely the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open court. The exact way in which this is done does not matter. In some courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] for a given number of days for inspection. 11. An important point therefore arises. It is evident that the decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a declaration of the mind of the court as it is at the time of pronouncement. We lay on stress on the mode of manner of delivery, as that is not of the essence, except to say that it must be done in a judicial way in open court. But however it is done it must be an expression of the mind of the court at the time of delivery. We say this because that is the first judicial act touching the judgment which the court performs after the hearing. Everything else up till then is done out of court and is not intended to be the operative act which sets all the consequences which follow on the judgment in motion. Judges may, and often do, discuss the matter among themselves and reach a tentative conclusion. That is not their judgment. They may write and exchange drafts. Those are not the judgments either, however heavily and often they may have been signed. The final operative act is that which is formally declared in open court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the court. That is what constitutes the "judgment". 14. As soon as the judgment is delivered, that becomes the operative pronouncement of the court. The law then provides for the manner in which it is to be authenticated and made certain. The rules regarding this differ but they do not form the essence of the matter and if there is irregularity in carrying them out it is curable. Thus, if a judgment happens not to be signed and is inadvertently acted on and executed, the proceedings consequent on it would be valid because of the judgment, if it can be shown to have been validly delivered, would stand good despite defects in the mode of its subsequent authentication."

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16. In Ratia Mohan. vs. The State of Gujarat AIR 1969 Guj. 320, the following para is pressed into service:-

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"9. In this connection, I was referred to a decision In re. Athipalayan, AIR 1960 Mad 507, where it was held that the irregularity even in pronouncing the judgment in open Court and signing and dating the same would amount to an "illegality vitiating the conviction and sentence passed in the case. While saying so, it has been observed thus:" ....... it is one of the glorious principles of our criminal jurisprudence that we do not try or sentence people in absentia and we do not also convict and sentence people without judgments being pronounced in open court and signed and dated then and there. It may be different in the continental system of criminal jurisprudence." It was a case in which a sentence was announced before judgment, which was the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and the world ;;it large by formal pronouncement of delivery in open court by the trial judge and signing and dating it simultaneo_usly and thereby terminating the criminal proceedings finally. In Nathusing Vridhasing v. Vasantlal B. Shah. 8 Guj LR 496: (AIR 1968 Guj 210), the question arose whether the order of dismissal of a complaint under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code without recording any reasons amounts to an irregularity or illegality curable under Section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code and it was held that the order was one in contravention of that provision and such a breach of the provision renders the order void and ineffective. It was not curable under Section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Some observations made by the Supreme Court in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116, were quoted to say that "the complainant is entitled to know why his complaint has been dismissed with a view to consider an approach to a revisional Court. Being kept in ignorance of the reasons clearly prejudices his right to move the revisional Court and where he takes a matter to the revisional Court

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] renders his task before that Court difficult, particularly in view of the limited scope of the provisions of Sections 438 and 439, Code of Criminal Procedure." Those observations may well apply in the present case particularly when the accused has a right of appeal against the order of conviction and sentence passed in the case and he would obviously be at a disadvantage to assail the reasons which were in the mind of the learned Magistrate and which came out so late as on 6-2-68. The accused-appellant had a right to know the reasons which led the learned Magistrate to come to that conclusion. It may well happen that after coming to know about the accused going in appeal, the learned Magistrate may try to record a proper judgment which otherwise he may later on do in some other manner. In any event, the learned Magistrate has clearly contravened the imperative provisions contained in Section 264 of the Criminal Procedure Code by passing the sentence without recording the judgment in the case and has that way acted illegally. Such an illegality cannot be treated as an irregularity contemplated under Section 537 or an omission as urged by Mr. Nanavati so as to become curable one. Even if it were to be treated as such as coming within the ambit of Section 537, it can easily be said that it had occasioned failure of justice in the circumstances of the case. In any view of the matter, the order is, therefore, liable to be set aside." 17. The other decision relied on is State of Orissa vs. Ram Chander Agarwa/a & Ors. (1979) 2 SCC 305. We have gone through the factual position and the ratio laid down therein. Inasmuch as ii is only a general observation, the same is not helpful to the case on hand.

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18. Another decision relied on is Jhari Lal vs. Emperor AIR 1930 Pat. 148. While considering Sections 367 and 369 of the Code, the Court held that pronouncing sentence before

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completing the judgment, that is to say, before preparing the essential part of it, such as the statement of points for determination and the reasons for decision makes the sentence illegal and vitiates conviction.

19. In State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Jagdev Singh Talwandi (1984) 1 sec 596 while considering how the final order/ judgment is to be pronounced, this Court pointed out as under:-

"30. We would like to take this opportunity to point out that serious difficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which the High Court intends to pass should not be announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that a final order without a reasoned judgment is announced by the High Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the order, or that a person accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute is unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a detenu be released from detention. If the object of passing such orders is to ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is more often defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this Court against the order passed by the High Court. That places this Court in a predicament because, without the benefit of the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this Court to allow the bare order to be implemented. The result inevitably is that the operation of the order passed by the High Court has to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned judgment." 20. The next decision relied on is Krishna Swami vs. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 1407, which is a Constitution Bench decision. We have gone through the factual position and the ratio laid down therein. According to us, the

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI, BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] said decision is neither helpful nor applicable to the case on hand. 21. The other decision relied on by Mr. Jaspal Singh is reported in K. V. Rami Reddi. vs. Prema (2009) 17 SCC 308 which arose out of a civil proceeding. It is not in dispute that Section 2(9) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 defines "judgment". Order XX Rule 1(1 )(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (Madras amendment) refers "judgment when pronounced" and "judgment to be signed". In para 9, this Court has held as under:

"9. Order XX Rule 5 on which great emphasis was laid

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by learned counsel for the appellant says that in suits in which issues have been framed, the court shall state its finding or decision with .the reason therefore, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit."

In the light of the definition clause, namely, "judgment" though the same has not been explained in the Code, the procedure to be followed both in the civil and criminal cases are all acceptable.

22. By pointing out that when the judgment does not contain the material case of the prosecution, defence and discussion on conclusion, according to learned senior counsel, it not only vitiates the principles of natural justice but also infringes the right under Article 21 of the Constitution. He heavily relied on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court reported in Sarojini Ramaswami (Mrs.) vs. Union of India & Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 506. In para 141, the Constitution Bench has held as under:-

"141 ..... It is now settled law that the principles of natural justice are an integral part of constitutional scheme of just and fair procedure envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution." 23. In M. Nagaraj & Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

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(2006) 8 SCC 212 which is also a decision of the Constitution Bench, the following conclusion is pressed into service. "20 ..... Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Supreme Court by a majority held that "procedure established by law" means any procedure established by law made by Parliament or the legislatures of the State. The Supreme Court refused to infuse the procedure with principles of natural justice. It concentrated solely upon the existence of enacted law. After three decades, the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in A.K. Gopalan and held in its landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India that the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness. The Court further held that the procedure should also be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. This example is given to demonstrate an instance of expansive interpretation of a fundamental right. The expression "life" in Article 21 does not connote merely physical or animal existence. The right to life includes right to live with human dignity. This Court has in numerous cases deduced fundamental features which are not specifically mentioned in Part Ill on the principle that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in the enumerated guarantees. For example, freedom of information has been held to be implicit in the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression. In India, till recently, there was no legislation securing freedom of information. However, this Court by a liberal interpretation deduced the right to know and right to access information on the reasoning that the concept of an open Government is the direct result from the right to know which is implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1 )(a)."

24. In Confederation of ex-Servicemen Associations and

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] Others vs. Union of India and Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 399 which is also a Constitution Bench judgment, this Court held as under:"61. It cannot be gainsaid that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution embraces within its sweep not only physical existence but the quality of life. If any statutory provision runs counter to such a right, it must be held unconstitutional and ultra vires Part Ill of the Constitution .... " 25. Now, let us consider the decisions relied on by Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior counsel for the CBI with regard to the contentions raised. In Iqbal Ismail Sodawala vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others (1975) 3 SCC 140, this Court considered almost similar question. It was argued before the Bench that the allegation of the petitioner therein that the judgment in the case under Sections 392 and 397 of IPC against the petitioner was not pronounced by learned Sessions Judge but by his Sheristedar. It was urged that the procedure adopted in this respect by learned Sessions Judge was not in accordance with law. This submission was not acceptable to the Bench. The following observation and conclusion are relevant: "6 ... The report of Shri Gupte shows that he dictated the judgment in the case against the petitioner in open court. The judgment included, as it must, the concluding part relating to the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner. The petitioner who apparently did not know English was thereafter apprised by the Sheristedar of the Court of the concluding part of the judgment relating to his conviction and sentence. Although normally the trial Judges should themselves convey the result of the trial to the accused, the fact that the learned Judge in the present case did not do so and left it to the Sheristedar would not introduce an infirmity in the procedure adopted by him. The Sheristedar in the very nature of things must have translated

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to the petitioner what was contained in the concluding part of the judgment. It was, in our opinion, the dictation of the concluding part of the judgment in open court by the learned Sessions Judge which should in the circumstances be taken to be tantamount to the pronouncement of the judgment. 8. Question then arises as to whether the appellant can be said to be not properly imprisoned if the trial Judge had merely dictated the judgment but not signed it because of its not having been transcribed at the time he pronounced it. So far as this aspect is concerned, we find that Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, inter alia, that subject to the other provisions of the Code, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission, irregularity has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. This section is designed to ensure that no order of a competent court should in the absence of failure of justice be reversed or altered in appeal or revision on account of a procedural irregularity. The Code of Criminal Procedure is essentially a code of procedure and like all procedural law, is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities. At the same time it has to be borne in mind that it is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule of law and rule by whim and caprice. The object of the Code is to ensure for the accused a full and fair trial in accordance with the principles of natural justice. If there be substantial compliance with the requirements of law, a mere procedural irregularity would not vitiate the trial unless the same results in miscarriage of justice. In all procedural

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

laws certain things are vital. Disregard of the provisions in respect of them would prove fatal to the trial and would invalidate the conviction. There are, however, other requirements which are not so vital. Non-compliance with them would amount to an irregularity which would be curable unless it has resulted in a failure of justice." 26. The next decision relied on by learned senior counsel for CBI is reported in Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 513 wherein it was held that judgment becomes complete and appealable only after conviction is recorded and also sentence is awarded.

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27. In view of the above discussion, it is useful to refer the

relevant provision of"the Code with regard to right ofhearing.

Right of hearing under Section 235(2) of the Code

Right of hearing to the accused on the question of sentence is provided under Section 235(2) of the ·Code and this provision was introduced in view of the 48th Report of the Law Commission of India. Section 235(2) of the Code reads as under:

"If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360 hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law."

The purpose of adding the provision is recognition of new trend in penology and awarding of sentence taking into consideration various factors such as the prior criminal record of the offender, his age, employment, educational background, sociological backdrop, family background, financial position, antecedents, social adjustment, emotional and mental condition and the prospects of his returning to normal path in conformity with law. It is in fact humanist principle of individualising punishment to suit the person and his circumstances and, therefore, a hearing is required before imposition of penalty.

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In order to understand the concept more clearly, it is useful to refer some of the decisions of this Court directly on the point in issue.

28. In Santa Singh vs. The State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190, this Court observed:

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"The provisions of Section 235(2) are very salutary and contain one of the cardinal features of natural justice, namely, that the accused must be given an opportunity to make a representation against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him."

"7. Non-compliance with the requirement of Section 235(2) cannot be described as mere irregularity in the course of the trial curable under Section 465. It is much more serious. It amounts to by-passing an important stage of the trial and omitting it altogether, so that the trial cannot be aid to be that contemplated in the Code. It is a different kind of trial conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code. This deviation constitutes disobedience to an express provision of the Code as to the mode of trial, and as pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Subramania Iyer v. King Emperor (1901) 28 I.A. 257 such a deviation cannot be regarded as a me're irregularity. It goes to the root of the matters and the resulting illegality is of such a character that it vitiates the sentence. (Vide Pulukurti Kotayya v. King Emperor (1947) 74 I.A. 65 and Magga and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan 1953 Cri.L.J. 892). Secondly, when no opportunity has been given to the appellant to produce material and make submissions in regard to the sentence to be imposed on him, failure of justice must be regarded as implicit. Section 465 cannot, in the circumstances, have any application in a case like the present". "11 .... This obviously postulates that the accused must be given an opportunity of making his representation only

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P SATHASIVAM, J.] regarding the question of sentence and for this purpose A he may be allowed to place such materials as he may think fit but which may have bearing only on the question of sentence. The statute seeks to achieve a socioeconomic purpose and is aimed at attaining the ideal principle of proper sentencing in a rational and progressive B society. The modern concept of punishment and penology has undergone a vital transformation and the criminal is now not looked upon as a grave menace to the society which should be got rid of but as a diseased person suffering from mental malady or psychological frustration due to subconscious reactions and is, therefore, to be cured and corrected rather than to be killed or destroyed. There may be a number of circumstances of which the Court may not be aware and which may be taken into consideration by the Court while awarding the sentence, D particularly a sentence of death, as in the instant case. It will be difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule, but the statement of objects and reasons of the 1973 Code itself gives a clear illustration. It refers to an instance where the accused is the sole bread-earner of the family. In such a case if the sentence of death is passed and executed it amounts not only to a physical effacement of the criminal but also a complete socio-economic destruction of the family which he leaves behind. Similarly there may be cases, where, after the offence and during the trial, the accused may have developed some virulent disease or F some mental infirmity, which may be an important factor to be taken into consideration while passing the sentence of death. It was for these reasons that Section 235(2) of the 1973 Code was enshrined in the Code for the purpose of making the Court aware of these circumstances so that G even if the highest penalty of death is passed on the accused he does not have a grievance that he was not heard on his personal, social and domestic circumstances before the sentence was given."

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29. In Ram Deo Chauhan@ Raj Nath Chauhan vs. State of Assam, AIR 2001 SC 2231, this Court examined the issue at length and held: "4 ..... The requirement contained in Section 235(2) of the Code (the obligation of the Judge to hear the accused on the question of sentence) is intended to achieve a purpose. The said legislative provision is meant for affording benefit to the convicted person in the matter of sentence. But when the Sessions judge does not propose to award death penalty to a person convicted of the offence under Section 302 IPC what is the benefit to be secured by hearing the accused on the question of sentence. However much it is argued the Sessions Judge cannot award a sentence less than imprisonment for life for the said offence. If a Sessions Judge who convicts the accused under Section 302 IPC (with or without the aid of other sections) does not propose to award death penalty, we feel that the Court need not waste time on hearing the accused on the question of sentence. We therefore choose to use this occasion for reiterating the legal position regarding the necessity to afford opportunity for hearing to the accused on the question of sentence is as follows:(1) When the conviction is under Section 302 IPC (with or without the aid of Section 34 or 149 or 1208 of IPC) if the Sessions Judge does not propose to impose death penalty on the convicted person it is unnecessary to proceed to hear the accused on the question of sentence. Section 235(2) of the Code will not be violated if the sentence of life imprisonment (SIC) awarded for that offence without hearing the accused on the question of sentence. (2) In all other cases the accused must be given sufficient opportunity of hearing on the question of sentence.

(3) The normal rule is that after pronouncing the verdict of

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J] guilty the hearing should be made on the same day and the sentence shall also be pronounced on the same day.

(4) In cases where the Judge feels or if the accused demands more time for hearing on the question of sentence (especially when the Judge propose to impose death penalty) the proviso to Section 309(2) is not a bar for affording such time.

(5) For any reason the court is inclined to adjourn the case after pronouncing the verdict of guilty in grave offences the convicted person shall be committed to jail till the verdict on the sentence is pronounced. Further detention will depend upon the process of law."

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30. In case, such an opportunity of hearing is not provided, the Appellate Court must remand the case to the trial court on a limited issue for re-trial on the question of sentence. (Vide: Narpal Singh & Ors. vs. State of Haryna, AIR 1977 SC 1066). However, in exceptional circumstances, where remand is likely to cause delay, it is open to remedy the prejudice by giving a hearing to the accused on the question of sentence by the Appellate Court. (Vide: Dagdu & Ors. etc. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1579; Tarlok Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1747; and Kama/akar Nandram Bhavsar & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 503). In case, at the time of trial, there was no objection for not providing sufficient time to the accused or in respect of small fraction of the mandatory provision of Section 235(2) of the Code, he cannot be allowed to raise the plea of prejudice of such non-compliance at Appellate stage. (Vide: Motilal vs. State of M.P. (Now Chhatisgarh), (2004) 2 SCC 469).

31. Thus, in view of the above, it is evident that generally judgment must be complete and it must have points for determination, decision thereon and reasons for such a decision. The basic requirement for such ingredients appears

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to be that the superior court (appellate/revisional) may be able to examine as to whether the judgment under challenge has been rendered in accordance with law and particularly, based on evidence on record. So, the purpose of recording reasons is to facilitate the superior court to examine the correctness of the judgment of the courts below. So far as the grievance of the accused/convict that opportunity of hearing was not given by the court below and, thus, he failed to address the court appropriately on the issue of sentence, may not have any substance for the reason that the legislative policy discernible under Section 235(2) read with Section 354(3) is that quantum of punishment is to be determined on considerations and circumstances not merely connected with a particular crime but a court is bound to give due consideration to the other circumstances also of the criminal. It is for this reason that court while hearing a convict on sentence is required to give a party an opportunity of producing evidence or materials relating to the various factors having some bearing on the question of sentence. The court, while determining the quantum of sentence, acts in an altogether different domain in which facts and factors which operate are of an entirely different order than those which come into play on the question of conviction. Therefore, there is bifurcation of trial as an accused has a right of pre-conviction hearing under Section 234 and secondly right of pre-sentence hearing under Section 235 of the Code. For pre-conviction hearing, the accused must be well informed as to what the exact prosecution case is and what evidence have been adduced by the prosecution to prove its case. It is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, as in case the pivot of the prosecution is not accepted, a new prosecution case cannot be made to imperil the defence. The prosecution as well as the convict has a right to adduce evidence to show aggravating grounds to impose severe punishment or mitigating circumstances to impose a lesser sentence. More so, appeal is a continuity of trial. 32. In Akhtari Bi (Smt.) vs. State of M.P, AIR 2001 SC

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] 1528, this Court explained the nature of appeal observing as under:"Appeal being a statutory right, the trial court's verdict does not attain finality during pendency of the appeal and for that purpose his trial is deemed to be continuing despite conviction".

33. Needless to say that Appellate court has a right of rehearing, re-appreciating the evidence and in exceptional circumstances even to permit a party to adduce additional evidence. Therefore, in a case where there has been some irregularity in delivering the judgment, it can be cured at the appellate stage.

34. As against the above mentioned decisions, it is also useful to refer the following decisions which are directly on the point in issue.

35. Judgment indicates the termination of the case by an order of conviction or acquittal of the accused and judgment is to be rendered in strict adherence to the provisions of Chapter XXVll of the Code. (Vide: Hori Ram Singh vs. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 43; and Kuppuswami Rao vs. The King, AIR 1949 PC 1)

36. In view of the provisions of Section 354 of the Code, it is necessary that every judgment must contain:

(1) the points for determination; (2) the decision thereon; and (3) th~ reasons for such decision. Where the reasons given by the trial Court are such· as cannot be supported by the evidence on record, they are not reasons for the decision. To constitute a legal appreciation of evidence, the judgment should be such as to indicate that the

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Court has applied its mind to it. Every portion of the judgment must indicate application of mind by the Court to the evidence on record. The reason for the decision is an important ingredient of a judgment. Compliance with the law in this regard should not be merely formal but substantial and real, for it is this part of the judgment alone which enables the higher Court to appreciate the correctness of the decision, the parties to feel that the Court has fully and impartially considered their respective cases and the public to realise that a genuine and sincere attempt has been made to mete out even-handed justice. Reasons form the substratum of the decision and their factual accuracy is a guarantee that the Court has applied its mind to the evidence in the case. Where the statement of reasons turned out to be a mere hollow pretension of a baseless claim of application of mind by the Court, the judgment is robbed of one of its most essential ingredients and forfeits its claim to be termed as judgment in the eyes of law. 37. In Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898, this Court observed:

"151 ... .. Accordingly, sub-section (3) of Section 354 of the Cr.P. C. provides:

"When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence."

"152. In the context, we may also notice Section 235(2) of the Code of 1973, because it makes not only explicit, what according to the decision in Jagmohan Singh vs. State of UP AIR 1973 SC 947 was implicit in the scheme of the Code .. but also bifurcates the trial by providing for two hearings, one at the pre-conviction stage and another at the pre-sentence stage .... "

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] ..... By enacting Section 235(2) of the new Code, Parliament has accepted that recommendation of the Law Commission. Although sub-section (2) of Section 235 does not contain a specific provision as to evidence and provides only for hearing of the accused as to sentence, yet it is implicit in this provision thatif a request is made in that behalf by either the prosecution or the accused, or by both, the Judge should give the party or parties concerned an opportunity of producing evidence or material relating to the various factors bearing on the question of sentence. In this view, we are in accord with the dictum laid down in Ba/want. Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1976 SC 230, wherein the interpretation of Section 354(3) first came up for consideration. "4 ..... Under this provision the court is required to state the reasons for the sentence awarded and in the case of sentence of death, special reasons are required to be stated. It would thus be noticed that awarding of the sentence other than the sentence of death is the general rule now and only special reasons, that is to say, special facts and circumstances in a given case, will warrant the passing of the death sentence. It is unnecessary nor is it possible to make a catalogue of the special reasons which may justify the passing of the death sentence in a case ..... " The present legislative policy discernible from Section 235(2) read with Section-354(3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or making the choice of sentence for various offences, including one under Section 302 of IPC, the court should not confine its consideration "principally" or merely to the circumstances connected with the particular crime, but also give due consideration to the circumstances of the criminal. 38. In Allauddin Mian & Ors. Sharif Mian & Anr. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1456, this Court observed:

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"10 ..... The said provision therefore satisfies a dual purpose; it satisfies the rule of natural justice by according to the accused an opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence and at the same time helps the court to choose the sentence to be awarded. Since the provision is intended to give the accused an opportunity to place before the court all the relevant material having a bearing on the question of sentence there can be no doubt that the provision is salutary and must be strictly followed. It is clearly mandatory and should not be treated as a mere formality ..... " 39. In Muniappan vs. State of T.N., AIR 1981 SC 1220, this Court held that the obligation to hear the accused on the question of sentence which is imposed by Section 235(2) of the Code is not discharged by putting a formal question to the accused_as to what he has to say on the question of sentence. The Judge must make a genuine effort to elicit from the accused all information which will eventually have a bearing on the question of sentence. All admissible evidence is before the Judge but that evidence itself often furnishes a clue to the genesis of the crime and the motivation of the criminal. It is the bounden duty of a Judge to cast aside the formalities of the court scene and approach the question of sentence from a broad, sociological point of view. The occasion to apply the provisions of Section 235(2) arises only after .the conviction is recorded. What then remains is the question of sentence in which not merely the accused but the whole society .has a stake. The court, while on the question of sentence, is in an altogether different domain in which facts and factors which operate are of an entirely different order than those which come into play on the question of conviction. 40. In Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 5 SCC 740, this Court observed that in a case where the court imposes the death sentence both the aforesaid

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI, BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] provisions, namely, Section 235(2) and Section 354(3) of the Code assume signal significance. The constitutional validity of Section 354(3) was upheld in Bachan Singh (supra) as learned Judges have said that the legislative policy in sentencing is discernable from those two sections. In a judgment, both those two sections supplement each other and in a case where death penalty is imposed, both the sections must be harmoniously and conjointly appreciated and read. 41. Section 235(2), as interpreted by this Court in Bachan Singh (supra), provides for a "bifurcated trial". It gives the accused (i) a right of pre-sentence hearing, on which he can (ii) bring on record material or evidence which may not be (iii) strictly relevant to or connected with the particular crime but (iv) may have a bearing on the choice of sentence. Therefore, it has to be a regular hearing like a trial and not a mere empty formality or an exercise in an idle ritual. Even without referring to Bachan Singh (supra) in Muniappan (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court, emphasised the importance of hearing the accused on the question of sentence under Section 235(2) of the Code and came to the conclusion that the question of hearing the accused on sentence was not to be discharged without putting formal questions to the accused. This Court, in Malkiat Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341, while explaining the provisions under Section 235(2) of the Code, held as under. "18 .... Hearing contemplated is not confined merely to oral hearing but also intended to afford an opportunity to the prosecution as well as the accused to place before the court facts and material relating to various factors on the question of sentence, and if interel'ted by either side, to have evidence adduced to show mitigating circumstances to impose a lesser sentence or aggravating grounds to impose death penalty. Therefore, sufficient time must be given to the accused or the prosecution on the question of sentence, to show the grounds on which the prosecution may plead or the accused may show that the maximum sentence of death may be the appropriate

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sentence or the minimum sentence of life imprisonment may be awarded, as the case may be ..... "

Therefore, fairness, justice and reasonableness which constitute the essence of guarantee of life and liberty B epitomised in Article 21 of the Constitution also pervades the sentencing policy in Sections 235(2) and 354(3) of the Code. Those two provisions virtually assimilate the concept of "procedure established by law" within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, a strict compliance with those C provisions in the way it was interpreted in Bachan Singh (supra) having regard to the development of constitutional law by this Court is a must before imposing death sentence. 42. It is clear that "judgment" is a formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declare in a judicial way in D open court. In other words, it is a declaration of the mind of the Court at the time of pronouncement. It is also clear that passing sentence without recording the judgment would amount to illegality. Pronouncing sentence before completing the judgment, that is, before preparing the essential part makes the E sentence illegal and vitiates the conviction. 43. We have already adverted to the fact that the word "judgment" has not been defined in IPC, and even in TADA. However, the Code, particularly, Sections 353, 354, 362 and F 363 make it clear that how the judgment is to be in a criminal trial, language and contents and the procedure to be followed in furnishing copy of the judgment immediately after pronouncement. It is also clear that the ultimate decision, namely, the judgment, shall be pronounced in the open court after the termination of the trial. Section 353(1) of the Code G makes it clear that it is incumbent on the part of the Presiding Officer to deliver the whole of the judgment or by reading out the operative part of the judgment and explaining the substance of the judgment in a language which is understood by the accused or his pleader. We have already referred to the fact H that the blasts occurred on 12.03.1993. Initially, the charge

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] sheet was filed by the State of Maharasthra on 04.11.1993 relating to 189 persons. Thereafter, CBI was asked to investigate further on 19.11.1993 and filed 19 supplementary charge sheets. Finally, on 10.04.1995, order framing charges was passed. Thereafter, recording of evidence began on 30.06.1995 by examining the first prosecution witness. Recording of the evidence continued till 18.10.2000. Thereafter, the arguments commenced from 09.08.2001 which continued up to 20.09.2003. After having voluminous record of evidence both oral and documentary, the Designated Court reserved for order on 23.11.2003 and the same position continued up till 12.09.2006. It is relevant to point out that in total 123 persons were tried as accused, out of which, 23 persons were acquitted of all the charges and the balance accused were convicted and sentenced under various charges. The records produced show that on 12.09.2006, the Designated Court started reading the conclusion. On that day, the Court passed the following order in respect of A-1.

"For the reasons separately recorded the conclusion being reached of:

A-1 Yakub Abdul Razak Memon being found guilty for offences for which charge at head firstly is framed against him and for offence under Section 3(3) of TADA Act for which charge at head secondly is framed against him and for offence under Section 5 of TADA for which charge at head thirdly is framed against him and for offence under Section 6 of TADA for which charge at head fourthly is framed against him and for offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 6 of the Explosive Act for which charge at head fifthly is framed against him. " Since at this moment, we are concentrating only on A-1, we are not extracting the conclusion- reached in respect of other accused. After recording the above conclusion, the Designated Court has also recorded the following statements:

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"The said accused were apprised regarding offences for which they were found to be guilty. In view of court having reached to such findings A-3, 4, A8 who are on bail are taken into custody of this court and their bail bonds stand cancelled. For recording statement of accused who are found guilty about their say regarding quantum of sentence to be imposed, the matter stands posted tomorrow."

44. On 27.07.2007, the Designated Court again read the following conclusion in respect of A-1. "82 a) Accused no. 1 Yakub Abdul Razak Memon out of remaining 5 accused at trial: is found guilty for the offence of conspiracy for commission of such acts as found proved from charge firstly framed at trial and punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA Act, 1987 and Section 120-B of IPC read with offences mentioned in said charge and on said count said accused is hereby cpnvicted and sentenced to suffer punishment of death and for the said purpose is ordered to be hanged by the neck till he is dead but subject to confirmation of same by Hon'ble Apex Court about said part of sentence and is also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 25, 0001- (Twenty Five Thousand.) (b) is also found guilty for offence punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA Act, 1987 for commission of such acts as found proved from charge at head secondly framed against him and on said count said accused is hereby convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for life and is ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lakh only) and in default of payment of fine is ordered to suffer further RI for a period of 2(two) years. (c) is also found guilty for offence punishable under Section 5 of TADA for commission of such acts as found proved from charge at head thirdly framed against him and on said

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI, BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] counts said accused is hereby convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for 10 (ten) years and is ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lakh only) and in default of payment of fine is ordered to suffer further RI for a period of 2 (two) years. (d) is also found guilty for offence punishable under Section 6 of TADA for commission of such acts as found proved from charge at head fourthly framed against him and on said count said accused is hereby convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for 14 (fourteen) years and is ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lakh only) and in default of payment of fine is ordered to suffer further RI for a period of 2 (two) years. (e) is also found guilty for offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 6 of the Explosives Act for commission of such acts as found proved from charge at head fifthly framed against him and on said count said accused is hereby convicted and sentenced to suffer RI for 10 (ten) years and is ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 50,0001- (Fifty thousand only) and in default of payment of fine is ordered to suffer further RI for a period of 1 (one) year.

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(f) however, aforesaid accused being found not guilty of all ot~er offences for which said accused was charged at trial vide charges framed at Exh. 4 said accused is acquitted for all said offences.

(g) accused entitled for set off in accordance with law for period for which he was in custody. (h) the substantive sentence awarded to A-1 to run concurrently. (i) A-1 is apprised of sentence awarded to him. The said accused is again apprised that sentence of Death awarded to him is subject to confirmation of same by

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Hon'ble Apex Court and for said purpose court would be making necessary reference to Apex Court within 30 days from the day of completion of passing of final order.

U) The said accused is further apprised that it will take some time to complete pronouncement of final order of conviction and sentence of remaining accused in this case and thus complete the judgment by getting same transcribed, corrected and signed. The said accused is apprised that a copy of judgment and order will be supplied to him free of cost after the same is completed and corrected in all respect and for said purpose the said accused will be ordered to be produced before Registrar of this Court on 26th September 2007 for supplying such copy subject to same being by then ready. (k) the court Sheristedar to handover operative part of order passed today to A-1. (I) Registrar to send A-1, A-3,

A-4 and A-8 to Arthur Road Prison along with appropriate warrant. 27.07.2007

-Sd/(P.D. Kade) Presiding Officer of the Designated Court (Under TADA (P) Act, 1987) For Bomb Blast Cases, Greater Bombay" 45. On perusal of the conclusion with regard to A-1, it is very much clear that he was apprised regarding the offences for which he was found to be guilty. While A-1 was awarded death sentence, it is clear from the conclusion that he was apprised that sentence of death awarded to him is subject to

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] the confirmation by the Apex Court and he was also informed that for the said purpose the Court would be making necessary reference to Apex Court within 30 days from the date of completion of passing of final order. In the same order, the Court has also apprised A-1 that it will take some time to complete the pronouncement of the final order of conviction and sentence of remaining accused and completed the judgment by getting the same transcribed, corrected and signed. The court also directed the Sheristedar to handover the 'operative part' of the order passed on both these days, i.e., 12.09.2006 and 27.07.2007. In view of the above, it is useful to refer the following decisions on the point.

46. In Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang & Ors, (1995) 2 sec 513, it was held as under: "12 ....... the trial, therefore, comes to an end only after the sentence is awarded to the convicted person."

(emphasis supplied) "13 ....... Thus a judgment is not complete unless the punishment to which the accused person is sentenced is set out therein."

(emphasis supplied) The Court further held in para 15:

"15 ..... Under the provisions of the Code to which we have already referred there are two stages in a criminal trial before a Sessions Court, the stage upto the recording of a convicton and the stage post-conviction upto the imposition of sentence. A judgment becomes complete after both these stages are covered .... "

(emphasis supplied) 47. In Lakdey Ashok vs. Government of A.P., (2009) 6

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A ALT 677 (in Paras 12, 13 and 15) it was hel<;l by the Andhra Pradesh High Court thatthe 'judgment', as contemplated under Section 353 is complete only after the order on sentence is pronounced. The High Court held that: "It will thus be seen that under the Code after the conviction is recorded, Section 235(2) inter alia provides that a judge shall hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him according to law. The trial, therefore, comes to an end only after the sentence is awarded to the convicted C person. It will thus be seen from above provisions that after the court records a conviction, the accused has to be heard on the question of sentence and it is only after the sentence is awarded that the judgment becomes complete and can be appealed against under Section 373 of the CrPC. Under the provisions of the Code to which we have already referred there D are two stages in a criminal trial before the sessions court, the stage up to recording of a conviction and the stage postconviction up to the imposition of sentence. A judgment becomes complete after both these stages are covered."

(emphasis supplied) It is clear that a conviction order is not a "judgment" as F contemplated under Section 353 and that a judgment is pronounced only after the award of sentence. In the case on hand, the Designated Judge pronounced the operative part of the judgment on 27.07.2007 and explained the substance of the judgment to the appellant in compliance with the G requirements of Section 353(1 )(c) of the Code. A perusal of the final judgment of the Designated Court shows that the Designated Judge has dealt with the issue of pronouncing the judgment under Section 353(1 )(c) in detail. In para 5 of Part 46 of the final judgment, the Designated Judge explained the

YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J] reasons for pronouncing the judgment under Section 353(1 )(c) of the Code as follows:"5. In the premises aforesaid but in light of 1) events which had occurred in past at trial, 2) keeping in mind attitude and conduct of accused as disclosed during course of trial, 3) mammoth subject matter involved at trial i.e. charges framed thereon running into 512 with many of them containing in all 192 sub charges, 4) delicacy and sensitivity of subject matter involved at trial due to numerous incidents involved and communal conflict said to be involved, 5) impact likely to be caused at/even after commencing process of judgment within and even outside court precincts, 6) impact likely to be caused at/after declaration of final order, 7) point of security and safety of concerns attending during course of proceeding within or even outside precincts of court and point of law and order within the City/State/Nation, 8) large number of 123 accused about whom judgment was to be declared, 9) necessity of smoothly completing process of judgement by taking due care to prevenUavoid occurring of any event causing disturbance, interruptions etc. during same vitiating decorum of court, it was proper to deliver judgement only in accordance with provision of Sec. 353(1) (c) of Cr.P.C. rather than adopting any other prescribed mode for delivery of judgement. Needless to add that following the other method was bound to result trend of judgement being known to accused prior to delivery of same and thus giving all the chance to unscrupulous accused on bail to flee away and such accused in custody to create confusion/or indulge in activities, disrupting ongoing work and thereby defeating the process of law. For the same reason it was also felt necessary to keep judgement computerized and contents thereof protected by putting password rather than taking print out of the same."

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48. Since we have completely analyzed the method follwed by the Designated Judge, we are satisfied that the requirements of pronouncing a judgment under Section B 353(1 )(c) of the Code have been fully complied with. The above approach makes it clear that while pronouncing the operative part of the judgment, the Designated Court ensured that the substance of the judgment has been explained to the appellant in compliance with the requirement of Section 353. It is also relevant to point out that the said order dated 27.07.2007 was C pronounced in open court and signed and dated by the Designated Judge in compliance with the requirements of the said section. 49. Regarding the requirement of providing a copy of the D judgment immediately as required by the provisions of Section 363, the Designated Judge in para 61 of Part 46 of the final judgment has dealt with the same as follows:-

"Having regard to the same, the word used "immediately" in sub-sec. 363 (1) of Cr.P.C. will be required to be interpreted in context of subject matter involved in each of the case. In short in a case involving such huge subject matter furnishing of such copy after reasonable time after completion of passing of final order would never be said to be an act offending provisions of law or defeating right of accused."

50. We have already pointed out that this was a joint trial of 123 accused persons. It is also brought to our notice that the copy of the final judgment was provided free of cost to the G appellant after the pronouncement of the orders with respect to each of the accused by the Designated Judge. Further, as is evident from para U) of the order dated 27.07.2007, the appellant was apprised of the fact that a copy of the final judgment would be provided after completion of the order as H regards sentence in respect of the remaining accused.

YAKUBABDUL RAZAK MEMON v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. CBI , BOMBAY [P. SATHASIVAM, J ] 51. As pointed out earlier, the trial at the Designated Court involved 123 accused and findings were recorded for 512 charges and accordingly, the process of pronouncing sentence in respect of each accused and apprising the accused of the same could not have been completed in a day. Thus, the process of pronouncement of judgment had to be carried out for all accused since it was a joint trial and accordingly a copy of the final judgment could be provided to each of the accused only after the sentence was pronounced in respect of all the accused persons. The judgment also shows that detailed hearings on sentencing effectively commenced after all the conviction orders were pronounced and counsel for the appellant/appellants made detailed submissions on it. It is evident from para 351 onwards of Part 46 of the final judgment that detailed submissions were made by the counsel by pointing out mitigating factors that were considered by the Designated Judge while sentencing the appellant and other accused at the trial. It is also cle·ar from the judgment that detailed submissions were made by the appellant (A-1) during the pre-sentence hearing and these submissions were considered and, accordingly, reasons have been recorded by the Designated Judge in Part 46 of the final judgment in compliance with the requirement of Section 235(2) and Section 353 of the Code. It is also relevant to mention that Section 354 makes it clear that 'judgment' shall contain the punishment awarded to the accused. It is therefore, compl

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